PoliTact’s Analysis of Perceptions and Perspectives
With inputs from Naade Ali and Arif Ansar
Context
Since the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan in August 2021, there was a perception the installation of Afghan Taliban in Kabul will make Pakistan’s regional influence grow. However, Afghan Taliban-TTP nexus continues to bedevil the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) remains the central source of friction and a key driver of the persistent cross-border violence. There is no indication that the group has endorsed the ceasefire reached in Istanbul; its ongoing attacks suggest that it remains active despite the interstate truce. The next round of talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan are scheduled for November 6 in Istanbul.
Islamabad accuses the Afghan Taliban of providing support and sanctuary to the TTP, designated as a terror group by both UN and the U.S., while Kabul dismisses these allegations. Qatar and Turkey are closely observing the ceasefire, marking their first substantive involvement in mediating between Islamabad and Kabul after previous efforts—including those led by China—failed to achieve meaningful results. While the agreement commits Pakistan to refrain from launching strikes inside Afghanistan, it does not neutralize the TTP threat. Under the deal, Pakistan is expected to avoid cross-border operations but retains the right to target TTP militants attempting to infiltrate its territory.
For the Afghan Taliban, the ceasefire offers a degree of peace and reduces the risk of cross-border strikes. However, relinquishing support for the TTP is not a decision that rests with any single Taliban leader, not even the defense minister. The authority to determine the Taliban’s stance toward the TTP lies solely with their Supreme Leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada. There have been no reports to date indicating that he has issued any directive against the group. Although the ceasefire may temporarily pause the infiltration of TTP militants from Afghanistan into Pakistan, it could simultaneously prompt the group’s factions within Pakistan to become more active, fighting independently in the absence of reinforcement from their Afghan counterparts.
Why do Afghan Taliban Support TTP?
The Afghan Taliban’s support for the TTP stems from their shared combat experience, religious ideology, and tribal ties. The TTP’s leadership has sworn allegiance to the Taliban’s Supreme Leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, granting the group significant autonomy to operate without interference from the Kabul-based Taliban faction.
This arrangement allows the TTP to pursue strategic and geopolitical objectives on behalf of the Taliban, such as challenging Pakistan’s control over territories beyond the Durand Line, which the Taliban considers part of Afghanistan. The Durand Line, a colonial-era border, remains a contentious issue, as the Afghan Taliban rejects its legitimacy, fueling tensions with Pakistan. Despite the recent Afghanistan-Pakistan agreement emphasizing mutual respect for territorial integrity, ambiguity persists regarding both sides’ interpretations of their sovereign boundaries.
Afghanistan’s Defense Minister, Mullah Yaqoob Mujahid, recently described the Durand line as an “imaginary border”, reinforcing the impression that the Afghan Taliban do not consider it a legitimate border. Similarly, the Deputy Interior Minister Nabi Omari expressed hopes of reclaiming “Afghanistan’s old lands” currently under Pakistani control, stating, “By Allah’s will, this land will return to us.”
It is important to note that, unlike the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP), which directly challenges Taliban rule, the TTP does not pose an immediate threat. Instead, it contributes to the Taliban-led Afghan economy by purchasing weapons and sharing profits from smuggling, extortion, and other illicit activities, making the TTP a significant stakeholder in Afghanistan’s economy. In fact, TTP also acts as a Taliban ally against ISKP.
While Al Qaeda (AQ) presence in Afghanistan has significantly diminished, the most significant evidence of continued ties with the Taliban was the U.S. drone strike that killed Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahri in July 2022 in a safe house in Kabul. In the February 2020 Doha Agreement with the U.S., the Taliban pledged to prevent international terrorist groups, including AQ, from using Afghan territory to threaten the U.S. and its allies. However, evidence strongly suggests the Taliban leadership has violated this pledge.
Disarming these battle-hardened TTP militants, who lack alternative livelihoods due to their combat-focused skill set, appears to be a costly and complex endeavor for the Afghan Taliban. Fully integrating them into Afghan security forces could also undermine the Taliban’s public denials of supporting the TTP and risk internal discord.
The present circumstances suggest that the Taliban have chosen to continue supporting the TTP, enabling them to focus on external rather than internal operations. Moreover, by continuing this backing, raises serious questions about the Taliban motivations and world view. Irrespective, this risky strategy jeopardizes the Taliban’s pursuit of international recognition and complicates their relations with Pakistan.
The Key Demands of TTP
While the TTP’s focus has tactically shifted over the years (for instance, limiting attacks on civilians after 2018), their fundamental goal remains the enforcement of their interpretation of Sharia and the withdrawal of the state’s writ from Pakistan’s merged tribal areas. Based on their stated objectives presented during past negotiations, the key demands of the TTP include:
- Implementation of Sharia
The TTP’s long-term goal is the establishment of a state based on its own strict interpretation of Islamic law (Sharia), mirroring the system of the Afghan Taliban.
- Restoring Autonomy and Demilitarization
The TTP demands the reversal of the 2018 constitutional amendment that merged the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) into Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. The TTP seeks to restore the semi-autonomous or independent status of these tribal regions.
A frequent demand is the complete withdrawal of the Pakistani military and security forces from the tribal belt (the former FATA and surrounding regions), allowing the TTP to establish control and implement its own governance system.
- Prisoner and Amnesty Demands
The TTP consistently demands the release of all its imprisoned members and commanders held by Pakistani authorities. This has often been a precondition for engaging in ceasefires or peace talks. The group demands full amnesty for its fighters who have committed acts of terror against the Pakistani state and its citizens.
Pakistan’s Evolving Policy Towards Afghan Taliban and TTP
Pakistan has long tried to convince Afghan Taliban to act against the TTP. While Afghan Taliban offered to facilitate talks between TTP and Pakistan and relocate it from the border regions – it has restrained from taking any serious actions against it. Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) led government had sought Afghan Taliban assistance in pacifying TTP, resulting in a ceasefire that fell apart in November 2022 – and resumption of TTP attacks against Pakistan. The TTP demands related to release of prisoners were also met to some extent. On the other hand, their requirements of decreasing the number of security forces in FATA – and rescinding of FATA merger are more complicated.
The situation now seems different. By conducting military strikes in Afghanistan and killing dozens of Taliban fighters, Islamabad has set a new precedent, signaling that the Afghans must face consequences for supporting its enemies. Though, Pakistan’s carrot-and-stick strategy was designed to change the Taliban cost-benefit calculus, forcing them to choose between Pakistan or TTP. To date, the Afghan Taliban have chosen the latter, a course they may continue to follow, as tensions with Islamabad neither threaten their domestic control nor hinder their growing engagement with other regional actors, including India.
The Taliban has yet to craft an effective framework to regulate the TTP, restrict its autonomy, or halt its cross-border operations. Instead, growing friction with Pakistan has only deepened the alignment between the two. Afghan Deputy Minister of Interior Affairs, Mawlawi Muhammad Nabi Omari, was reported to have issued a stark warning to Pakistan, stating that if Afghan tribes and the nation declare Pakistan an invader by religious decree, “by God, you will not find safety even up to the Indian border.”
These anti-Pakistan sentiments cast doubts about the Afghan Taliban intentions. The combined pride of the Afghan Taliban and TTP in their perceived triumphs over major powers like the U.S. and NATO, and in reclaiming Afghanistan after decades of war, reinforces their determination and stubbornness.
Afghan Taliban support alone does not fully explain the TTP’s survival and expansion. A significant portion of its fighters are disenfranchised and radicalized youth from Pakistan’s impoverished regions, particularly Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. In a security briefing to KP lawmakers, the provincial police chief once revealed that around 4,000 militants, including 35% Afghan nationals, were operating in the province, often blending in with civilians by day and carrying out attacks at night.
A belief reportedly exists within the TTP that, with support from local tribes, it can seize Pakistani territory by force and eventually transform from a non-state actor into a legitimate state actor, like their Afghan counterpart. This perception boosts the morale of its fighters and encourages the group’s continued expansion. These characteristics truly indicate that TTP aspires for a space from where Afghan Taliban can extend their reach.
Pakistan’s security establishment accuses India of using Afghanistan as a base for launching terror operations against Pakistan – and the availability of modern weapons in Afghanistan has enhanced militants’ capabilities. At the same time, the military recognizes that Pakistan’s terrorism problem is not purely external but also internally facilitated. In his recent remarks, Pakistan Army Chief urged Kabul to prioritize mutual security over ongoing violence, calling on the Afghan Taliban regime to “rein in the proxies who have sanctuaries in Afghanistan.”
An Alliance of Ideology vs. State Necessity
The current crisis surrounding the ceasefire reveals a fundamental and seemingly unresolvable conflict: while Pakistan demands the Afghan Taliban choose state necessity (diplomatic recognition and regional trade) over ideological loyalty, the leadership in Kabul has consistently chosen the latter.
The TTP is more than just an operational proxy; it is a vital ideological ally and an economic stakeholder that reinforces the Afghan Taliban’s own anti-state identity and vision for a borderless Islamic Emirate. Pakistan’s previous posture of limited intervention in Afghanistan, coupled with the TTP’s growing recruitment base among disenfranchised Pakistani youth, means that Islamabad’s carrot-and-stick strategy has failed to alter the Taliban’s calculus.
While the Pakistani government has previously pursued political solutions, the TTP’s extremist demands and uncompromising approach have rendered sustained negotiations nearly impossible. The current strategic pivot toward a military approach—which carries the inherent risk of seeking regime change in Afghanistan—is equally unlikely to yield a long-term roadmap. For any military pressure to be effective, it must be integrated with political steps that foster public ownership and address long-held local grievances. This sophisticated, multi-pronged strategy offers the best chance to definitively dismantle the Taliban-TTP nexus.
Any attempt at regime change is heavily contingent upon securing the explicit support of key regional players, most notably China. A full-scale war directly jeopardizes substantial Chinese investments, particularly those under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and risks creating a dangerous new front amid Pakistan’s ongoing tensions with India. Furthermore, escalating border conflicts are likely to severely complicate the recent reset in U.S.-Pakistan relations, which is premised on cooperation in trade, strategic minerals, and technology.
Internationally, being mired in internal and border conflicts would significantly erode Pakistan’s capacity to play a credible regional role, hindering its ability to support allies like Saudi Arabia or contribute to broader stability efforts, such as a Gaza peace plan. Even with powerful backing from both China and the U.S., attempting to alter the ethnic balance of power within Afghanistan remains an extremely high-risk gamble that could easily spiral into a prolonged, devastating civil war.
In the absence of a truly sophisticated methodology—one that moves beyond binary military or political options—Pakistan risks becoming entangled in a protracted proxy guerrilla warfare within an era of escalating great power rivalry. The recent Istanbul ceasefire, therefore, provides only a temporary and fragile pause. This strategic impasse casts a long, enduring shadow over the future of South Asian security.
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