By Furqan Khan
Great Power Politics Fellow, PoliTact

Context

On August 7, Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia signed a joint defense agreement stipulating that an armed attack against one member will be regarded as an attack against all. The agreement, known as the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, is significant because it brings together three powerful Sunni-majority states under a collective-defense framework at a time when the Middle East’s established security order is under considerable strain. Although the pact has attracted attention primarily because of its resemblance to NATO’s Article 5, its broader significance lies in the institutionalization of defense cooperation among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey. The agreement envisages greater political and military coordination and provides a framework for strengthening joint exercises, defense cooperation, and military-industrial collaboration. Turkey has also indicated that the framework could eventually be expanded to include other regional states.

The Mecca agreement should therefore be understood less as a fully developed military alliance than as an emerging regional security mechanism. Its importance derives from the strategic environment in which it was created: declining confidence in the reliability of the existing U.S.-led security architecture, continuing confrontation with Iran, concerns about Israel’s regional conduct, and growing interest among Middle Eastern states in developing greater indigenous capacity for deterrence.

Disordering Regional Security Environment

For nearly five decades, the United States has been the principal external security guarantor for its allies and partners in the Middle East. Its military deployments, defense relationships, and security commitments helped create an environment intended to protect energy infrastructure, maritime routes, and allied governments while preventing any single regional power from dominating the strategic landscape.

The geopolitical changes associated with the Iran war have placed that model under significant pressure. The conflict, which began in February with U.S. and Israeli attacks on Tehran, has exposed limitations in Washington’s ability to simultaneously deter Iran, protect its regional partners, and preserve freedom of action. The resulting uncertainty has encouraged regional states to consider additional security arrangements rather than relying exclusively on American guarantees.

The United States’ difficulties in protecting its Arab partners from Iranian attacks have been particularly consequential for Saudi Arabia. There is growing concern among regional partners about Washington’s reliability. Saudi Arabia has subsequently sought to diversify its security partnerships rather than remain dependent on a single external guarantor. This development is not necessarily inconsistent with the Trump administration’s emphasis on burden-sharing and reducing the costs of U.S. security commitments abroad. A greater willingness by regional partners to assume responsibility for their own defense could, in principle, complement Washington’s objective of reducing its direct military burden.

The problem, however, is one of perception. Burden-sharing produces different strategic effects when it is interpreted as greater allied responsibility and when it is interpreted as evidence that the United States can no longer be relied upon in a crisis. The Mecca agreement is, at least partly, a product of that credibility gap. It reflects Saudi Arabia’s willingness to seek alternative sources of deterrence and Pakistan and Turkey’s willingness to assume larger security roles in the region.

The agreement is also connected to Arab concerns about Israel – and the extent to which regional government’s view Israel’s military policies as another source of instability. Thus, the agreement cannot be explained solely as a response to Iran or solely as a reaction to declining American influence. It reflects a wider reassessment of the regional balance of power.

Mecca Agreement and Board of Peace

The relationship between the Mecca agreement and the Trump administration’s regional strategy is likely to be one of the most consequential questions surrounding the pact. At first glance, the two frameworks could appear competitive. The administration’s earlier regional vision, centered on the Abraham Accords, placed considerable emphasis on Arab-Israeli normalization. A security arrangement centered on Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan could instead encourage a parallel regional bloc whose strategic identity is based more explicitly on collective defense among Muslim-majority states.

Yet the two initiatives need not be mutually exclusive. President Trump reportedly described the Mecca agreement on August 16 as a “big, bold, and important first step”, suggesting that Washington does not necessarily regard the new arrangement as incompatible with its broader regional strategy. The more interesting possibility is that the two frameworks could eventually become complementary. The Board of Peace is accompanied by an International Stabilization Force (ISF) and associated security-architecture components.

The ISF is envisioned as a temporary multinational security and stabilization force, authorized under UN backing, operating under a unified command acceptable to the Board of Peace. Its responsibilities include maintaining public order, protecting reconstruction corridors, supporting humanitarian operations, and coordinating with Egypt and Israel while assisting a newly recruited local Gaza police force. The force is intended to provide an enforcement mechanism for maintaining territorial calm alongside phased Israeli military withdrawals and militant disarmament.

This creates a potential role for countries participating in the Mecca framework. Muslim-majority states could provide political legitimacy, personnel, equipment, or other forms of support for regional stabilization efforts. The difficulty, however, is Israel’s opposition to certain potential contributors. Israel has previously resisted the presence of Turkish armed forces in Gaza, while Israeli officials have also expressed reservations about Turkey’s participation in a future stabilization force.

The underlying dispute is therefore less about whether Muslim-majority countries can participate in stabilization than about who controls the mandate, composition, and rules of engagement of such a force. Israel has not rejected the ISF concept itself; rather, its principal concern is the identity and mandate of participating forces and whether they can independently influence Gaza’s security environment. Israel insists that Hamas must be disarmed and its military infrastructure dismantled before a full Israeli withdrawal. Prime Minister Netanyahu has continued to reject withdrawal until full disarmament is achieved.

This creates an important tension: Washington and the Board of Peace may see regional Muslim participation as essential to the legitimacy and implementation of the Gaza framework, while Israel remains concerned that participating states could acquire an autonomous security or political role.

What Would Trigger Collective Defense?

The central uncertainty surrounding the Mecca agreement concerns the practical meaning of its collective-defense provision. An attack on one member being treated as an attack on all does not necessarily mean that every member would automatically enter a war. The precise military obligations remain insufficiently defined. Critical questions include whether the provision applies only to attacks by states or also to non-state actors; what threshold constitutes an “attack”; and whether assistance would require combat deployments or could instead involve intelligence, air defense, logistics, maritime surveillance, cyber capabilities, or other forms of support.

The three members also have different threat perceptions. Pakistan’s principal security concerns remain concentrated in South Asia, while Turkey’s strategic interests extend across Syria, Iraq, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Caucasus. Saudi Arabia’s immediate concerns are centered more heavily on Iran, Yemen, missile and drone threats, and the protection of critical infrastructure. For that reason, the agreement should not be interpreted as a guarantee that Pakistan and Turkey would automatically fight every adversary confronting Saudi Arabia. Pakistan’s historical position on Yemen illustrates the distinction between political support for Saudi Arabia and participation in Saudi-led military operations. In 2015, Pakistan’s parliament rejected Riyadh’s request to participate directly in the Yemen intervention. At the same time, Pakistan’s current military relationship with Saudi Arabia demonstrates that limited or defensive assistance can be substantial. Pakistan has already deployed thousands of troops and a fighter-jet squadron to Saudi Arabia during the Iran war, along with other air-defense capabilities, under a separate Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA). The agreement was signed between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia last year.

If a state, or a non-state actor, were to launch a major attack on Saudi territory, critical infrastructure, or if the Kingdom’s sovereignty is threatened, the collective-defense provision would presumably become more relevant. Even then, the most likely initial response could involve defensive assistance: intelligence sharing, air-defense systems, counter-drone capabilities, maritime surveillance, logistics, and other forms of military support rather than immediate offensive operations.

The agreement’s effectiveness will therefore depend less on whether it replicates NATO’s Article 5 literally and more on whether the three governments can establish credible mechanisms for consultation, coordination, intelligence sharing, military interoperability, and crisis response.

What Does the Mecca Agreement Bring Home?

For Saudi Arabia, the agreement offers two strategic benefits: additional deterrence and greater regional leadership. Faced with Iranian and Houti attacks and uncertainty over the reliability of U.S. protection, Riyadh gains an institutional mechanism through which it can diversify its security relationships. For Pakistan and Turkey, the agreement expands their regional strategic profiles. Both countries already possess significant defense relationships with Saudi Arabia, while Pakistan and Turkey have developed extensive bilateral military cooperation. The Mecca agreement gives these relationships a broader institutional framework. According to the Turkish Defense Ministry, the fundamental goal of the agreement is to place existing military ties on a more “institutional and sustainable” basis.

The possibility of additional states joining also gives the agreement longer-term significance. Turkey has indicated that the framework could be expanded, with Egypt among the countries potentially relevant to its future development. The agreement has also been described by Pakistani officials as open to other countries in the region. A larger membership could eventually produce something resembling a “Muslim NATO,” although that comparison should be treated cautiously. NATO’s institutional depth, integrated command structure, standardized forces, and decades of operational experience are not currently replicated by the Mecca framework.

The strategic implications nevertheless extend beyond the three signatories. The emerging security arrangements in West Asia have consequences for American interests and influence. Washington’s declining agency in the regional security architecture could create greater opportunities for China and Russia to expand their diplomatic and strategic influence. More importantly, it signals that regional states increasingly regard security diversification as necessary even while maintaining relationships with the United States.

Conclusion

The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement is best understood as a product of a changing Middle Eastern security environment rather than simply as the creation of a new military alliance. The Iran war, uncertainty surrounding American deterrence, persistent Israeli-Arab tensions, and the wider fragmentation of the regional order have encouraged Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey to institutionalize defense cooperation. The agreement’s collective-defense provision is politically significant, but its military implications remain uncertain. The absence of clearly defined automatic obligations means that it should not yet be equated with NATO. Its immediate value lies in creating mechanisms for consultation, joint exercises, defense cooperation, technology development, and potentially coordinated responses to regional threats. Its durability will depend on whether the three members can reconcile their divergent threat perceptions and translate political solidarity into credible military interoperability.

The larger significance of the Mecca agreement, therefore, is not simply how many troops Pakistan or Turkey might commit in a future conflict. It is that three important regional powers are attempting to create a security mechanism that reduces dependence on any single external guarantor. If the framework expands and develops effective institutional and operational capabilities, it could become an important component of a more pluralistic security order in West Asia.

The emerging arrangement does not necessarily signal the end of American influence. Rather, it indicates that U.S. influence may increasingly operate alongside regional security structures that Washington does not fully control. The Mecca agreement may consequently prove significant not because it immediately creates a “Muslim NATO,” but because it represents another step toward a Middle Eastern security architecture in which regional powers assume a greater share of responsibility for their own deterrence and strategic stability.

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The post The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement: Implications For West Asian Security Architecture appeared first on Politact.

By Naade Ali

President Trump and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) are redefining the U.S.-Saudi alliance to address China’s rising influence and the Gaza crisis, effectively moving the partnership beyond its traditional foundations. Since their inception, the Saudi-US relations have experienced fluctuations but have been sustained by overlapping strategic interests and mutual dependencies. At the center of their crucible of interaction stood a security–petrodollar arrangement. Even when relations hit their lowest point, the core bargain held: Saudi Arabia continued selling oil in dollars and remained a key supplier to the United States, while Washington preserved its role as the Kingdom’s primary security guarantor and leading defense provider.

However, shifting global dynamics, fueled in part by intensifying great power competition between China and the United States, have pushed middle powers like Saudi Arabia to reduce their dependence on any single major actor and seek greater strategic autonomy. While this shift has broadened their ambitions, it has also uncovered greater opportunities and challenges. The Saudi-US relations are not indifferent to these evolving dynamics, with both countries recalibrating their bilateral ties along new strategic dimensions.

Saudi Arabia as a Swing State in the U.S.–China Rivalry

Today’s Saudi Arabia appears to be hedging away from over reliance on the United States, building a strategy centered on its pragmatic interests and exercising sovereign leverage. This helps in deal-making and to secure the space needed to navigate the great power rivalry. Saudi Arabia’s move to reduce its dependence on the United States gained momentum exactly when ties with Washington soured under the Biden administration. Confronted with the unpredictability of American policy, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) found an attractive alternative in Beijing, which offered strategic engagement without preconditions. Closer ties with China enabled Saudi Arabia to pursue a multidimensional strategy, diversify its partnerships, and maintain the flexibility necessary to manage uncertainties in its relationship with Washington.

For China, Saudi Arabia became a central pillar for expanding regional influence in the Middle East. Riyadh hosted the first-ever China-Arab States Summit and, through Beijing’s mediation, reconciled diplomatic ties with Tehran. Further consolidating their ties with Beijing, both Tehran and Riyadh also integrated into multilateral blocs where China and Russia hold considerable sway, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS. Additionally, China strengthened economic relations with the Kingdom, becoming its largest trading partner and providing robust support for Vision 2030. A major payoff of Saudi Arabia’s strategic pivot toward China was that it transformed Saudi Arabia into a geopolitical swing state. This effectively signaled to Washington it is fully prepared to deepen ties with Beijing unless the U.S. proactively restores its coveted central role.

The Trump–MBS Summit: A Strategic Inflection Point

President Trump’s extraordinary embrace of Mohammed bin Salman during his visit to Washington in November suggests that Riyadh’s calibrated swing-state posture is working. Riyadh now carries significant geostrategic weight and has taken center stage in the U.S.–China competition for influence in the Middle East.

Trump’s approach to strategic competition with China rests on two pillars: credible deterrence and tightening of alignment with key U.S. middle power partners. Within this framework, any complete Saudi drift into Beijing’s orbit is viewed as strategically unacceptable. At the same time, he is acutely aware of the practical limits of attempting to sever Riyadh’s growing relationship with Beijing, recognizing that containment of China cannot succeed solely through coercive pressure on allies to reverse course.

As evidenced by President Trump’s foreign policy conduct, he employs a distinctive blend of generous incentives and far-reaching, exclusive agreements in energy, critical minerals, technology, and defense. These arrangements simultaneously fortify bilateral partnerships and allow middle powers, such as Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to maintain a semblance of strategic autonomy in their relations with China. Beneath this veneer, however, the United States methodically secures alignment on matters of vital national interest, while deliberately imposing significant strategic costs on any partner that leans excessively toward Beijing.

Nevertheless, Trump’s transactional foreign policy has provided Saudi Arabia with an opportunity for adjusting its own strategy, allowing the Kingdom to pursue a more robust, interest-driven relationship with Washington. Riyadh recognizes that being a center of the Islamic holy places provides it immense influence in the Muslim world. United States relies on it not only to balance China in the Middle East but also to help secure a stable regional environment for Israel. This is a goal that, in Trump’s view, could be advanced if Saudi Arabia joins the Abraham Accords, potentially encouraging other Arab and Muslim countries to follow suit.

The Summit Outcome

Through Vision 2030 reforms and skillful diplomatic maneuvering, the Kingdom has transcended its traditional role. This transformation not only redirects the calculus of their bilateral partnership but also carries profound implications for the Middle East’s balance of power and the broader dynamics of great power competition. It has emerged as a pivotal regional powerhouse whose energy resources, vast investment capital, and geopolitical influence make it indispensable to both Washington and Beijing.

During their meeting, President Trump stated he was “the best friend Saudi Arabia has ever had in Washington,” a statement that highlighted his administration’s desire to deepen ties through personal rapport. Nevertheless, the agreements concluded between the two leaders demonstrate that the U.S.-Saudi relationship remains firmly grounded in their respective national interests and strategic imperatives, with both seeking to extract maximum advantage.

President Trump secured a $1 trillion investment pledge from the Crown Prince, alongside the signing of a Strategic Framework for Cooperation. This framework includes Saudi commitments to supply uranium, metals, permanent magnets, and critical minerals essential for U.S. defense and energy sectors. Leveraging Saudi Arabia’s vast deposits of rare earth elements (REEs), Trump advanced his goal of countering China’s dominance in critical minerals.

For his part, Crown Prince achieved major strategic gains: the Kingdom was granted major non-NATO ally status, a defense agreement was finalized, and approval was secured for the purchase of American F-35 fighter jets and other advanced weapons. These acquisitions will strengthen Saudi defense architecture. Additionally, in line with its ambition to become a global hub for artificial intelligence, Saudi Arabia also gained access to advanced AI chips and U.S. technology firms to support the development of its domestic AI infrastructure.

US-Saudi Ties and Gaza Peace Plan

The Washington meeting between President Trump and the Crown Prince highlighted both progress and persistent challenges in U.S.–Saudi relations, with Saudi-Israel normalization remaining a key point of divergence. While Trump pressed Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords, Mohammed bin Salman insisted that any normalization depend on Israel committing to “an irreversible, credible, and time-bound path toward Palestinian statehood.” Following the Israel–Gaza conflict, Riyadh has emerges as a leading advocate for international recognition of Palestine, a position consistently opposed by the U.S. and Israel. Its refusal to yield to Trump’s push for normalization reflects the broader post-war realities in Gaza.

By taking this stance, Crown Prince delivered a twofold message: First, the strengthening of U.S.–Saudi ties must remain entirely independent of any precondition for Saudi–Israeli normalization. Second, while Riyadh is open in principle to normalization, Israel’s refusal to recognize Palestinian statehood remains a major impediment. While Riyadh supports the Trump Gaza peace plan in principle, it rejects full Israeli control over the Gaza territory and insists on concrete conditions: a time-bound Israeli withdrawal, the deployment of an international protection force, and the reinstatement of authority to the Palestinian Authority.

Saudi Arabia’s demands on the Palestinian issue clash directly with Israel’s red lines, leaving Washington struggling to balance relations with both capitals. From Israel’s viewpoint, the rapidly deepening U.S.–Saudi partnership, explicitly decoupled from any obligation of Saudi–Israeli normalization, raises two profound concerns. First, it risks elevating Riyadh’s regional influence while undermining Israel’s primary strategic objective: the expansion of the Abraham Accords. Second, as long as Riyadh continues to regard Israel as a principal source of regional instability, not Iran, the possibility persists that Saudi Arabia could further deepen its relations with Iran.

Historically, the shared enmity toward Iran has been the bedrock of both the U.S.–Israel alliance and U.S.–Saudi security relations. Following their China-brokered détente, Riyadh and Tehran no longer see each other as existential threats. To prevent Washington from viewing improved Saudi–Iranian ties with alarm, Mohammed bin Salman has carefully framed them as potentially beneficial to the United States, offering to help the U.S and Iran reach a deal that could be vital to regional stability. Riyadh can indeed encourage Iran to talk, but persuading Tehran to accept U.S. terms is no less daunting than U.S. convincing Israel to meet Saudi demands on Palestine. The scenario thus exposes the limits of influence on both sides: neither Washington nor Riyadh can fully impose their will on Israel and Iran.

The Washington summit also revealed a deeper convergence: the United States and Saudi Arabia need each other to achieve their core objectives in the Middle East. Under the Trump approach, US appears willing to delegate primary responsibility for preserving and enforcing the U.S.-led order in the Middle East to Saudi Arabia. However, for Riyadh to fully assume the role of America’s pre-eminent regional partner, it will also have to bear the main burden of protecting U.S. interests, containing rivals, and upholding the existing regional architecture.

Such an alignment would signal to Iran that Saudi Arabia had become the de facto guarantor and enforcer of core American interests. A U.S.–Saudi power-sharing arrangement would also carry significant implications for Israel. Confronted with a region increasingly shaped around Saudi primacy, Israel would face a stark choice: either challenge Riyadh and risk damaging its own relationship with Washington, or accommodate Saudi terms and move toward normalization on conditions set by the Kingdom. Under this approach, in which Saudi Arabia and the United States emerge as mutually reinforcing strategic partners, both are able to secure the outcomes they seek from Iran and Israel.

The Saudi-UAE Rivalry and Yemen Conflict

As the new year begins, the region is no longer defined by “Arabs vs. Iran” or “Islamists vs. Monarchies,” but by the fallout of weakening Iran that is creating a power vacuum. Muslim Middle Powers are competing to to fill the space, illustrated by the Saudi-UAE split. In places of old alliances, new ones are taking shape premised on cold, transactional game of national interest. And these tensions are playing out from Yemen to Syria, Sudan, Libya, and Somalia.

While the Trump-MBS summit secured vital U.S. interests in energy and defense, it exposed the fragility of the broader regional architecture. Saudi Arabia is acting like a state, prioritizing borders, stability, and institutions to protect Vision 2030. The UAE resembles a corporation, prioritizing ports, trade routes, and resource extraction. Turkey and Qatar are navigating the space between them, leveraging their military and ideological assets to carve out their own spheres of influence.

Similarly, President Trump’s “20-Point Peace Plan,” unveiled in September 2025, was predicated on a unified regional architecture: Gulf capital would fund reconstruction, Egyptian-Turkish logistics would secure the ground, Pakistan-Indonesia-Turkey may be part of the International Stabilization Force (ISF), and Israeli-Saudi normalization would provide the political horizon.

As of late December 2025, the dramatic rupture between Saudi Arabia and the UAE—culminating in the Saudi airstrike on UAE-backed assets in Mukalla, Yemen—has shattered the “Sunni Coalition” prerequisite for the plan’s success. The 20-point framework is now being pulled apart by the competing power centers and Israel may find itself the short-term beneficiary of Arab fragmentation. Unless Washington can repair the rupture within the Gulf Cooperation Council, its grand strategy for the Middle East risks becoming a two-legged stool: supported by a strong U.S.-Saudi bilateral deal, but lacking the regional stability required to stand.

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The post Saudi Arabia as a Rising Middle Power: The Trump-MBS Summit, China, and the Future of Gaza appeared first on Politact.

Context

Syria has emerged as one of the most critical fault line for the global balance of power struggles. It is perhaps the only place in the world where both the global and regional powers have boots on the ground – such as US, Russia, and Turkey. US has about 900 soldiers based there, while Russian presence constitutes about 5,000 troops, and Turkey according to some estimates has more than 10,000 soldiers in northern Syria carrying out military operations.

Syria is also home to Iranian backed proxies which includes Shiite Hezbollah, and Sunni extremist groups such as ISIL and Al Qaeda. Moreover, there are other local non-state actors that are fighting against the Assad regime, such as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Free Syria Army (FSA), with western support and backing of Turkey and other Arab nations, such as UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. And then there is legacy business of Kurds, Syrian Kurds (YPG) operate from northern Syria against Turkey while also receiving US support for the fight against ISIL.

Arab Spring and Syria

The Arab Spring protests in Syria began in March 2011 as part of a series of pro-democracy demonstrations that swept across the Middle East. The protests initially called for increased civil liberties, greater freedom of speech, and the end of the Ba’ath Party’s rule. The Syrian government responded with a brutal crackdown on protesters, resulting in hundreds of deaths and thousands of arrests. As the protests continued, the government’s reaction grew increasingly violent, and the conflict escalated into a full-scale civil war and millions of refugees. Close to 3.5 million Syrian refugees migrated to Turkey while others went to different places in MENA region, Europe, and the US.

The threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) emerged in Syria around 2011. The group joined forces with other extremist groups in the region to fight against the Assad government – and quickly gained control over large swathes of territory in the country. ISIL was eventually defeated in Syria in March 2019.

The Assad regime in Syria was able to survive largely due to support from Russia, Iran, Hezbollah. They provided the Assad regime with military and financial support, enabling it to remain in power despite the civil war and international sanctions. Iran sent thousands of militiamen to fight alongside Syrian government forces in their fight against ISIL, SDF, and FSA that were operating to topple the Syrian government. Additionally, the Assad regime was able to rely on its strong security apparatus to repress domestic opposition and maintain control over the country. At the same time, while US, Turkey, and UAE were backing groups such as SDF and FSA to remove Assad, they were also fighting against ISIL.

As the extremist threat diminished, which was a common threat for state actors operating in Syria, the fissures became apparent along the respective geopolitical interests that are tied to the great power competition.

The Fight to Remove Assad’s Regime and Iran

Since the beginning of Arab Spring, one of the overarching aspirations has been to do deal with the wider Iranian behavior and influence in the Middle East, and constraining its nuclear and missile program. From the perspective of Israel and the US, any potential regime change in Syria would have undermined Iran and its control over Hezbollah – that extends its influence into Lebanon and Palestinian territories. Moreover, Iranian proxies also complicate the Middle East Peace Process between Israel and Palestine.

To counter this, Israel has simultaneously been working on what has come to be known as the Outside-In Approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and associated with it the ‘War between Wars’ strategy. The premise of the Outside-In approach has been to alter the regional dynamics to such an extent that it leads to diminished Arab support for the Palestinian cause – this would make the Palestinian more amenable to accept peace on Israeli terms. The approach also envisions undermining Iran’s nuclear and missile program while maintaining the threat of military action against Iran. This overtime led to the agreements which came to be known as Abraham Accords in 2020 and normalization of ties between UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco and Israel.

One the other hand, the main focus of the ‘War between Wars’ strategy is to prevent Iran from getting entrenched in Syria and thus threatened Israel directly via Lebanon. According to some estimates close to 2500 Iranian Revolutionary Guard members are operating in Syria.

Russian Role in Syria

The Russian support of Assad’s government and military intervention in 2015, directly undercuts the objective of regime change. Moreover, Israeli strikes against Iranian targets and Hezbollah in Syria risks hurting ties with Russia. Yet Israel has maintained close ties with Russia despite their differences over the Syrian conflict. Israel and Russia cooperate on a variety of matters, including security and trade. Additionally, the two countries have developed a mechanism to de-conflict their operations in Syria and ensure that their forces do not come into conflict with one another. Despite their differences, Israel and Russia have managed to maintain a good working relationship.

On the other hand, Russia has provided the Assad regime with military, financial, and political support, helping to keep it in power despite international sanctions and widespread opposition. Additionally, Russia has deployed thousands of troops and airpower to support the government in its fight against the FSA, SDF, and ISIL. To keep amicable ties with Turkey, Russia has generally maintained a neutral stance towards the Kurdish-led YPG in Syria.

In addition to air bases, Russia also maintains a naval base in Tartous. The larger Russian strategy is not only to protect the Assad regime but also maintain a foothold in the larger Middle East and North Africa. Russia is also military involved directly or through mercenaries in Libya and Sudan. But the conflict in Ukraine has had a significant impact on Russia’s military presence in Syria. Following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2014, the United States and its allies imposed economic sanctions on Russia hitting its economy. As a result, Russia has had to reduce its military presence in Syria and focus its resources on the conflict in Ukraine.

Turkey, YPG, PKK and Syria

Turkey is another stakeholder to the conflict in Syria, it has carried out military operations against the Kurdish-led YPG. Additionally, Turkey has sought to maintain a buffer zone along its border with Syria, which has been opposed by the YPG. Turkey’s actions against the YPG have caused tensions with the United States since it supports the group in its fight against ISIL – and YPG has collaboration with SDF and FSA to topple Assad’s regime. Being a NATO member, Turkey has also provided the SDF and FSA with arms, training, and financial support in their fight against the Assad regime.

On the other hand, both Russia and Iran have not directly engaged in the conflict between YPG and the Assad government and accused the group of cooperating with the United States and other foreign powers.

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Kurdish-led YPG in Syria have a close ideological and organizational relationship. The PKK has provided the YPG with military and financial support in its fight against ISIL, as well as political and diplomatic support in international forums. Additionally, many members of the PKK have joined the YPG in its fight against ISIL.

Like Turkey, US and EU consider PKK a terrorist organization. This approach which supports YPG in Syria but considers PKK a terrorist group, complicates US and European ties with Turkey and NATO – and raises Turkish concerns about the real intent behind supporting separatist YPG.

Saudi-Iran Detente

The question becomes how the situation of Syria will impact the Chinese facilitated Saudi-Iran truce reached in March. Or, in other words, what are the key terms of the détente reached by Saudi Arabia and Iran, that will facilitate establishing a regional balance of power and resolve proxy wars in places like Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, and Palestine. Moreover, what does it imply for the budding great power rivalry in South Asia.

One of the immediate benefits of the truce has been the ceasefire in Yemen, followed up by exchange of prisoners. The foreign minister of Syria has also visited Saudi Arabia, reciprocated by the Saudi Foreign Minister’s trip to Syria – raising hopes for potential reentry of Syria into the Arab League. Earlier in March, Assad had also visited UAE to rebuild ties that had been cut-off due to the support provided by Gulf States to anti-Assad Forces.

Iran’s nuclear program and the threat posed by its wider behavior in the region, represented the threat perception that had moved the Arab world closer to Israel – and by extension to the US. Additionally, the criticism of the Abraham Accord, reached in 2020, has been that it has not resulted in any quid-pro-quo when it comes to Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In fact, with the return of Netanyahu’s right-wing government and the aggressive actions it has taken, has reversed the gains made under the Abraham agreement. This has adversely impacted Israeli ties with the US.

However, it is also a fact that US interests in the Middle East have transformed in the aftermath of the campaign against extremism, and military withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan. It is no longer dependent on the energy resources of the region, as China is, but it is engaged head on in the great power rivalry with China and Russia. The Middle Powers are caught in the middle of these power tussles. According to the White House Coordinator for MENA, Brett McGurk, the main objectives of US in Syria are to reduce the violence, maintain a check on the activities of ISIL, help the Syrian humanitarian crisis, and back Israel.

The shift in UAE and Saudi position reflects a realization the Assad’s regime has survived the worse with Russian and Iranian support. The China, Iran Economic and Security Deal reached in 2020 demonstrated that China was also throwing its weight behind Iran, which has traditionally been also backed by Russia. PoliTact had pointed out at that time that the pact represented China’s pivot to the Middle East. With the China facilitating the Saudi-Iran truce, the balance of power appear to be shifting away from the US, which is increasingly been seen as an unreliable partner. Commenting on the deal, former Israeli prime minister commented that “This is a fatal blow to the effort to build a regional coalition against Iran.”

Will Israel counter or accept any potential guarantees from China that it can manage Iranian nuclear program and wider behavior in the region, remains to be seen. The new Chinese foreign minister Qin Gang recently stated that it is ready to mediate peace talks between Israel and Palestine.

Meanwhile, the Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had warned Israel in 2019 to reduce its economic and security ties with China or risk reduced security cooperation from US. During his visit to Saudi Arabia in 2022, President Biden had stated, “We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia or Iran … We will seek to build on this moment with active, principled, American leadership.”

Related:

• What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply? Aug 4, 2022
• Biden’s Middle East Policy, China-Iran Ties, and CPEC
  On July 28, 2020, PoliTact held a webinar to discuss the potential China-Iran economic deal and its impact on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

• PoliTact’s Chief Analyst Arif Ansar’s interview on the situation of Syria on Pakistan Television, March 2023

• The Emerging ‘Outside In’ Approach To Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Afghan Reconciliation, And Kashmir Issue. July 15, 2015

The post Saudi-Iran Détente, Syria, And Changing MENA appeared first on Politact.

NATO participated in military airstrikes in Libya to help the National Transitional Council oust Colonel Gaddafi from power.

The post Moscow Question’s NATO Military Involvement In Libya appeared first on Politact.

Context

By Arif Ansar

In earlier articles different facets and phases of the ‘war against terror’ since it got underway, have been discussed. The terminology has almost become defunct as the balance of power in Middle East stands at a tipping point. Why that has happened is instrumental towards understanding the present status of the campaign against extremists.

For all intents and purposes, the first phase can be classified as the time frame between 9/11 and the demise of Osama bin Laden. The period between Operation Geronimo to the ignition of Yemen conflict can be termed as the second phase. While Yemen has been in the limelight for a while as a strong seat for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the departure of US Special Forces in March this year represented a turning point. The eruption of Yemen conflict in its current form, and the growing Saudi and Gulf involvement there, marks the beginning of the third phase.

Each period of the campaign was accompanied by its own sets of assumptions and characteristics that have been previously discussed. They are being summarized to recollect and help us understand the Stage III. Obviously, each one these patterns pose unique implications.

Phase III of the campaign against terror may see more direct interstate conflict which risks involving one or the other global power. And this will fundamentally change the nature of the conflict that was initially deemed as the war against Islamic extremists.

Mitigating far-flung security threats is one thing, risks that can imperil influence in the home sphere and economic lifeline of an aspiring or an established global power, is a different matter altogether.

Analysis

Character I – The growth of Non-State Actors of different colors accompanied by Asymmetric Warfare, which the conventional militaries were not trained to engage in.

These include Sunni Islamic State (IS, ISIL, ISIS, Daesh) and AQ that apparently do not listen to anyone. Since 9/11 many affiliates of AQ have also sprung up in the extremism inflicted regions. Some are loosely attached while others are more directly linked with AQ. In some instances, these associates are also perceived to be under the influence of a state entity.

On the other hand, there is the Shia Hezbollah acting as a proxy of Iran.
The third kind of non-state actors are nationalist in character such as the Kurds and Houthis, and moderate forces like Free Syrian Army (FSA) supported by the West, and others, against the extremists.

Character II – Future of extremism as represented by Fission and Fusion of Sunni extremists and the emergence of IS. The harmonization or divisions have resulted in new alignments amongst extremist posing ominous risks for the nation-states of the region and beyond. For examples the tussles between AQ and Associates against IS and Associates.

Character III – Societal transformation of extremist inflicted regions with increased polarization, growing religious conservatism, decreasing secular space and respect for minorities, with difficulty in achieving political consensus. The election results are narrow; power sharing formulas and unity governments are the outcome as witnessed in places like Iraq, Afghanistan and Tunisia.

In addition, this transformation has created a fear that religious parties may make it to the helm of power using the system, as occurred in Egypt. Preventing this is requiring constitutional amendments.

Character IV – The application of military force against extremists appears to have not worked and the political reconciliation is proving to be equally difficult; there are no clear winners or losers. The agenda of the extremists is often too harsh to reach any settlement. On the other hand, there is lack of ingenuity in crafting an alternative approach.

Character V – The tactics and strategies employed against extremists are mostly event/incident driven. Strategically, the emerging focus is on regional approaches and the onus is shifting towards western allies to take the lead in the fight against extremists and applying kinetic tactics. In many theaters of the war against terror, civil war like scenarios are now ripe, and Urban Warfare the likely outcome

Character VI – The weakening Nation-State structure is under dual economic and security pressures. The governments of the regions concerned are finding it harder and harder to govern as the multidimensional internal and external security risks intermingle and manifest. Internal divisions make it harder to deal with the external enemies, while those that pose external threats exploit internal risks. This dynamics produces a circular threat perception for the subject.

Character VII – Globalization and interconnectivity is being hindered by security apprehensions whether it be Trans Pacific Partnership, Kashgar-Gwadar Economic Corridor, Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project, or New Silk Road.

Economic aspirations now stand face to face with security concerns in many parts of the world, and the individual identity hangs in balance between the national, global, religious, tribal, and ethnic loyalties. The forces of religion and globalization are both acting against the nation-state structure and are often perceived as exploitive.

Character VIII – The cross-pollination of global power tussles, Arab Spring, and extremism has made the war against terror even more complex and motives confusing. This is amply visible in Syrian conflict. Moreover, weakening Europe and emerging BRICS have created a flux in the international systems, making the balancing act very stressful for international players.

Character IX – The future role of religion and the crisis of identity is brewing as nation states become weaker. Two key questions are emerging in this context:
one of them is equally applicable to the West and has to do with the settled debate of the separation of church and state. The other question is related to the extremist inflicted regions, in terms of who represents Islam.

Character X – The emergence of virtual soft weapons of mass destruction: Information and Cyber Warfare. The use of Social Media for radicalization, recruitment, and countering extremist messages and ideologies is an example. While the access to physical WMD’s is limited, these virtual soft weapons are freely available.

Arab and Western Perspectives

In essence, the campaign that was initially directed primarily against the perpetrators of 9/11 and their collaborators, have now spread to the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia. Afghanistan and Iraq, which were the focus of the Phase I and II, have remerged as a threat and have complicated western withdrawal strategies.

In Phase II, we saw other nations such as Syria, Libya and Yemen join the widening ring of instability. The beginning of Phase III is marked by gradual destabilization of the more secure states of the region, to include Egypt, Saudi Arabia and GCC, Jordan, Pakistan, and potentially India.

While the primary threat posed to these states initially came from the Sunni AQ and Associates, over time, the sectarian dimension and nationalist non-state actors (such as Kurds) have joined the fray. While the Western nations have remained supportive in the fight against Sunni extremists, when it comes to the sectarian angle and nationalist forces, their postures are more ambiguous. This has magnified the headaches for the respective states in question.

The present paranoia exhibited by Saudi Arabia and GCC nations is stemming from these contradictions. While the Sunni Arab nations have been fighting the war against Sunni non-state actors, the influence of Iran and Hezbollah has increased in places like Iraq and Syria. In contrast to opposing Hezbollah and Iran, the West entered in to negotiations with the country related to its nuclear program. According to the GCC nations, Iran’s behavior has been rewarded and this will embolden it. Imagine if Saudi Arabia was to do the same; back AQ and IS and then build a nuclear program, while at the same time threaten Israel and the West.

From the Western perspective, Sunni Arab nations have not led a spirited fight against Sunni extremists like Iran, Hezbollah, and Kurds have. Moreover, Western policy is premised first of all on preventing weapons of mass destruction falling in to the hands of extremists, or rogue and autocratic leaders that can threaten Israel or the West. Secondly, to prevent the extremists attacking Western targets again or becoming a proxy for an adversarial power in the future, along the lines of Afghan Jihad of the 80s.

As it stands now, Arab states are left with no leverage other than using the religious card. Even on the sensitive issue of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is Iran, Turkey, and to some extent Qatar, that took the lead. For its role, Qatar faced serious opposition with in the GCC.

In essence, the Iran deal, if finalized, contains its nuclear program, reduces the risk to Israel and the West, and thus strengthens it to become a strong ally in the fight against Sunni extremists. Additionally, it can help in pushing the Middle East Peace Process forward.

The Emerging Approach to the Middle East Peace

At an event hosted by Atlantic Council on May 7, the author asked the former US Special Envoy for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the present Executive Vice President of Brookings Institution, Martin Indyk, about how the Iranian nuclear deal and the US-Gulf partnership can help or hinder the Middle East Peace Process. Martine Indyk commented that the prospects of a solution emerging from an ‘inside out approach’ i.e., from with in Israel and Palestine, and independent of whatever else is going on in the Middle East, are not good. However, the potential for an ‘outside in’ solution which has emerged because of the possible Iran nuclear deal and Israeli and Arab countries being on the same side, might emerge with positive response because of the new strategic alignment in the region.

Speaking at the Heritage Foundation, Israeli envoy to the US, Ron Dermer, recently commented along the same line:

“They used to believe the key to that [a rapprochement with the Arab word] was solving the Palestinian question, and there is no doubt that issue cannot be ignored,” Dermer said.

He continued: “But as the prime minister said a few months ago, I’m not so sure the reverse won’t be true, meaning that I don’t know if Israel and Palestinian peace will unlock wider rapprochement with the Arab world. It might be broader rapprochement with the Arab world will unlock Israeli-Palestinian peace. We should be focusing the next few years on how we can take advantage of this historic aligning of interests between Israel and our Arab neighbors.”

(Note: It’s too early to tell if a similar ‘Outside In’ approach is applicable towards other festering hot spots, such as Afghanistan and Kashmir. However, despite differences, parallels do exist, and PoliTact will be researching this comparison further.)

The US Elections and Middle East

From the Arab and GCC perspective, the shift in the regional balance of power towards Iran is an additional danger to their security, perhaps even bigger than that posed by Sunni extremists. This view is shared by Israel and the Republican Party in the US, which is in control of both the House and the Senate. This is why the next US election is becoming so crucial. On it depends the direction of the Middle East; will the new American president share the threat perception of Israel and Arab allies, is in contention. In addition, the foreign policy hawks in the Republican Party also want US to once again take an aggressive role in the fight against extremists and against Russia and China.

Extremism and Global Players

US, Russia, and China, and other global powers, share the threat from Islamic extremists and have supported the fight against them in one form or the other. While US has been doing the heavy lifting, other powers have facilitated by building capacity of the allies; by giving training and providing military equipment. Moreover, they have also helped by allowing the use of their territories as part of the crucial supply lines for the campaign against extremists.

However, as the regional states become more entangled in this fight, and with their future at stake, the question for these global players is: what does the change in the regional equilibrium of power means for the global balance. Or in other words, what does the extending arc of instability in these regions implies for their security and economic interests.

In essence, three main considerations arise from this for the global players:

Firstly, if the states involved in the campaign against extremists, which may be allied with China and Russia, start faltering, what would that mean for their global positioning?

Secondly, how will these powers react to the activities of the competitor in their perceived home spheres of influence?

For example, Russia has cooperated with the West when it comes to Syrian chemical weapons and the Iran nuclear deal, as being part of P5+1, but it is playing a different role when it comes to the affairs of Ukraine. Similarly, China would evaluate its posture in South and Central Asia in comparison to what occurs as part of the ‘Pivot to Asia’ US policy.

Thirdly, what would be their contingency plans if the regions engulfed by extremism sink to full fledge chaos that may impact global energy and trade flows?

The Chinese and Russian energy deals may be the direct result of these assessments. On the other hand, US has also made big gains towards energy independence while Europe is still caught in the bind. Phase III of the campaign against terror may see more direct interstate conflict which risks involving one or the other global power. And this will fundamentally change what was initially deemed as the war against Islamic extremists.

While mitigating far-flung security threats is one thing, risks that can imperil influence in the home sphere and economic lifeline of an aspiring or an established global power, is a different matter all together.

The post The Future Of The War Against Extremists; The Arrival Of Stage III appeared first on Politact.

Context

The primary purpose of developing a forecast is to better plan. And at a more sophisticated level, to help shape a future that is conducive for ones interests. It’s an exercise to make a reasonable assessment of where matters might be heading. Smaller the variation between the trajectory of actual events, and the anticipated plan, greater the chances of success. Then there are risks, which if they were to come true, can seriously dent the expectations. Now a day, a term ‘black swan’ is more and more being used to conceptualize an unexpected and unprecedented event that can dramatically alter the present reality.

For instance, in the growing power tussles of the established and emerging powers, many nations are caught in a balancing act. While the present phase may be a transitory one, a single event could potentially end this stage and push different nations to chose between one or the other alignment. This is similar to how 9/11 dramatically altered international affairs. Anticipating what that incident could be, and how to pro-actively prevent such an eventuality, is critical.

While producing a forecast and a risk assessment, another important consideration to keep in perspective is the aspect of vantage point. Meaning, the future and the risks for one country are not the same as they may be for the other, just as is the case for individuals. Yes, there may be generalizations, but then there are always peculiarities as well. As a case in point, let’s take the example of campaign against extremism. The ramifications for the campaign that has been raging for about 13 years are different for the western nations than those regions that are inflicted by extremism.

Nonetheless, developing and understanding patterns and trends are an important ingredient and prerequisite for any forecast and plan.

Another essential distinction is the difference between local change brought upon by regional and global flux. Most often than not, global patterns are forcing a local response. Before formulating an appropriate tactical, strategic or policy level response, and for the sake of the success of the reply, it is vital to identify and understand the dynamics of global change first.

With this context, PoliTact has been working on identifying the most significant political, economic, and security patterns, from the vantage point of South Asia and Middle East. As oppose to listing them as the top ten risks or trends, as is fashionable these days, we have chosen a format that depicts how the political, economic, security and technology patterns are inter-linked. We have done so with an attempt to minimize rampant confusion and to enhance a conceptualization that helps to understand the confusion the world is presently experiencing.

The most important trend the nations of the region would have to grapple with is the changing nature of the world order.

Analysis
Nation-State Structure

While the world is organized politically in to an often arbitrary nation-state structure, there are a number of forces that are acting for and against this architecture. The campaign against terror with the associate phenomenon of non-state actors, climate change, disease, and technological advancements – particularly in the realm of communication technologies and social media, are all maneuvering against preserving the sanctity of the state, as we know it.

These man-made and other forces of nature are also hastening what has come to be known as the phenomenon of globalization, and making governance difficult. Equally, the communication revolution and social media has increased awareness and global consciousness for issues that transcend national borders and national identity. Then there are vested interests that have been over employed at the expense of the common people while putting the very social contract at jeopardy. The reaction can be seen in the form of movements such as the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street.

At another level, and more seriously, a crisis of identity is brewing. National identity is increasingly in friction with the economic necessities represented by the forces of globalization, which in turn are being challenged by the national security pressures of a state. Economic aspirations now stand face to face with security concerns in many parts of the world, and the individual identity hangs in balance between the national, global, religious, and ethnic loyalties. The forces of religion and globalization are both acting against the nation-state structure and are often perceived as exploitive. Recent events in India, Russia, and even Europe, suggests that the separation of religion/church and state may not be a done deal after all.

The European Union Model

The European Union was taken by many as the natural evolution of the nation-state structure, where states willing give up some of the sovereignty for the larger benefits derived from growing trade. However, the recent economic crises especially related to the banking and housing sectors, and tensions over Ukraine, are testing this model. The election results in Greece have once again revived thorny issues with in the EU.

This also remains a dilemma when it comes to Pakistan-India ties. The theory stipulates that increasing trade between nations leads to lessening of mistrust, while at the same time tying their fates to a shared future. This is not how the European Union appears to be evolving. The revisionist and nationalistic tendencies are reemerging.

In the long run, if economic circumstances worsen and security concerns rise, growing interconnectedness can create dependencies that could be extremely risky, as far as the sovereignty of a nation, are concerned. This is especially true if interconnectedness is exploited for political and security ends, as is when sanctions are imposed, witnessed recently in the case of Iran and Russia.

These concerns have posed a major roadblock in promoting trade between Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, as part of the New Silk Road vision.

TTP and TTIP

In additional to the European Union Model, the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Trans Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which the US is trying to finalize, will also provide important lessons.

The TPP will include 792 million people, makes up 40 percent of the world economy, and is perceived by China as a way to economically contain it. While the TTP excludes China, the nations regional approach to developing trade agreements, is seen as a way to keep US out from the region. At stake are the principles of bilateralism and regionalism versus multilateralism propagated by WTO.

Conclusion

The interplay of political, economic, security, and technology trends, and the forces of nature and globalization, are creating unique sets of pressures and vulnerabilities for the nation-state structure.

While the future model is still in evolution, the identity crisis that has ensued is creating multifaceted outcomes that need to be understood before policies and plans are put in place to address the challenges.

The larger trends are working across states and the response would also have to be coordinated and multilateral, which is difficult under the nation-state structure and the UN system (UN Security Council). Forming alliances is not easy in the absence of shared interests and values. What is occurring more and more is the configuration of coalitions around major crises and conflicts.

Then there is the issue of how the benefits and loses will be spread out in a globalized world, which depends on what one produces, and is also tied to how the value of those assets is determined. Consider the recent drop in oil prices, which has suddenly thrown the economies of Russia, Iran, and others, in to turmoil.

The global transition is by no means over, what’s critical is to spot what is emerging early and to be able to adapt quickly. The nation-state structure was suitable for an environment that is changing fast. The challenge now is to organize in a way that helps to deal with the future trends. And for this alliances and multilateralism are better suited than simple bilateralism. The complication being: aligning bilateral with multilateral approaches is a complicated task.

The post Organizing For The Future World; The Crisis Of Identity And Nation State appeared first on Politact.

Context

The fast pace of scientific and technological breakthroughs has enabled mankind to surmount many serious obstacles of the day, be it in the domain of medicine, space, information technology, or engineering. At the same time, these leaps have also brought to the fore unique implications. For example, cloning has presented special opportunities but has also raised many ethical dilemmas. Moreover, researchers predict the increased use of Internet to find information is overtime changing the way our brain operates, with memory function on the decline.

The full magnitude of the societal impact being caused by the information and communication revolution is not clearly known but it has opened up a Pandora box of issues. The information technology revolution is also posing unique security threats in the form of cyber crimes and cyber warfare. Self-help guides on how to construct Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) are easily accessible on YouTube for non-state actors and individuals to utilize.

Many claim the Arab Spring may not have bloomed the way it did if it was not due to the facilitation offered by the Social Media tools. It pointed out to the divide between virtual and physical reality, and it was the virtual reality that appeared to have influenced the ground reality. In essence, the cross-pollination of free flowing information has created serious consequences for existing structures of governance, while threatening the status quo in many places of the world.

On one level, questions are being raised about what laws and conventions apply to different risks and challenges introduced by new technologies, such as the drones and robotics. On the other hand, there are hurdles of how to make policy in an unpredictable environment and fast moving change. Most seriously, when so much is uncertain, how to make decisions. Inadvertently, the focus has shifted to deal with the immediate constant crisis, at the cost of long-term planning and strategy.

But how does this global transformation apply to the region of South Asia and Middle East. It appears that the leaders of these regions dedicate most of the their attention on distracting the masses from the real challenges and not on educating them. This in turn becomes their strongest weakness. As oppose to working on trends and understanding the underlying causes, the focus is on the outcome of these patterns.

The lofty goals of spreading health, education, and economic opportunities, only work under stable law and order situation. If the security threats from state and non-state actors continue to dominate the national landscape, all other domains will suffer and disorder will spread. In fact, it can be argued that preoccupation with political and security risks may have resulted in the very situation that is confronted today in these regions. Meanwhile, a new kind of non-state threat has been added to the list: the climate change, or the risk posed by nature.

These pressures have made governance even harder, when the citizens are increasingly empowered to question their governments. Moreover, when governments fail to administer and as extremism spreads, the chances of a state failing grows even further. In this environment, the western capitals are increasingly worried about a whole array of political, economic, security and technological threats posed by these regions. From the western perspective, many parts of the world are likely to be unable to cope with the fast moving technologically driven change. To protect their interests, they have to be ahead of the curve to mitigate the risks.

In the era of financial recession, agility to respond is more and more the buzzword in the western strategic policy making circles. The threats are quadrupling and this requires dealing simultaneously with state and non-state actors, while the resources to prepare for these risks are drying up. At the same time, many western strategic thinkers are pondering if the goal of aspiring stability as even attainable in such uncertain times. Perhaps, it is wiser to get used to the constant flux and uncertainty, while managing change and the accompanied anxiety, as best as possible.

Former US sectary of state Madeleine Albright recently conceptualized this debate as a distinction between being objective or subjective. There is growing realization and alarm that the present governance structures, institutions, and policies, which most nations have in place, are not fit, or are moving too slow, to deal with the impediments.

Renowned American strategist and former secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, commented at the inception of Asia Society’s Policy Institute (ASPI) in April that the world needs fresh conceptual frameworks to identify underlying problems, analyze them, and develop solutions. Associated with this concern was a discussion about the availability of conceptual contexts to understand world affairs and where it may be heading. For example, he stated, there is a difference of opinion on what triggered Arab Spring and its future direction. And if there are no mechanisms in place to identify problems and risks, understanding and solving them will become even more difficult.

Widely available communication tools have enabled and empowered individuals while creating new sources of influence. Although the application of hard power has persisted, the soft power is increasingly at play as well. With the rise of non-state actors and technological advances, a debate has emerged about when and against whom should a state apply different tools of its economic, political and military power, and what does that imply for international law and state sovereignty.

Conclusion

The very scientific and technological advances that leapfrogged the human civilization are also on the other hand becoming the sources of chaos, by making affairs unmanageable and changing the very norms under which the present world operates. While the risks created by humans may be manageable, more worrisome are the threats emerging from nature, which may ultimately provide the true black swan event. And even behind climate change, human tinkering is involved.

At the same time, the spirit of human adventurism cannot be tempered down. The nations that have the best ideas, accompanied by smart utilization of resources to explore them and solve real problems, will have the advantage; to not only shape the emerging world but also to formulate the rules that govern it. This realization is further fueling the race amongst competing powers to acquire cutting edge technological knowhow, whether by hook or crook. The ones left behind will once again be relegated to complain, adapt or perish. The battle is between status quo and change that is inevitable, and the ones that are able to master the art of transformation will no doubt lead and win.

The post Framing And Dealing With Future Challenges appeared first on Politact.

Context

Media discussion on VOA Urdu Radio Program ‘Today’s Topics.’ This was a special edition of the program covering 68th session of the United Nation. The debate revolves around President Obama’s speech at the UN, the growing threat of non-state actors, and US withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Panel included:

– Yasmin Ali – Lawyer and Political Analyst, Pakistan
– Arif Ansar – Chief Analyst, PoliTact, Washington DC
– Ahmed Mubarak – Analyst, UK
– Manzur Waseem – Independent Analyst
– Sami Yusufzai – Senior Afghan Journalist
– Dr. Muktedar Khan – Department of IR and Political Science, University of Delaware

Analysis

The post Emerging US Policy Towards Middle East, North Africa appeared first on Politact.

Context
Media discussion on VOA Urdu Program ‘Round Table.’

The discussion revolves around the future of Middle East and Egypt, emerging dynamics of Islamist movements, and the role of Gulf States and the West.

Panel included:

– Khaled Maeena – Editor in Chief Saudi Gazette, Saudi Arabia

– Dr. Hassan Askari Rizvi – Independent Political and Defense Analyst, Pakistan

– Arif Ansar – Chief Analyst, PoliTact, Washington DC

– Khalid Awan – Chairman Foreign Relations Institute, New York

The post Where Is Change Heading In Egypt And Middle East? appeared first on Politact.

Context
Egypt has been garnering a lot of attention of late and even Syria has taken a back seat. Most of the focus is on its internal situation and scantly on how change in Egypt impacts the region. It is in fact the geopolitical significance of this strategically important nation, located at the intersection of Middle East and Islamic Maghreb (northern Africa), which will determine the direction it is allowed to go in, and not necessarily if majority of the people liked Morsi or not.

The Gulf States for the most part have put their weight behind the Egyptian military and US also appears reluctant to suspend military aid to the country, even after the violent rampage that has left more than 900 people dead in the last couple of days. The EU has taken a harsher line initially but is likely to fall in line later.

Analysis

One of the key reasons for supporting the Egyptian military has to do with the just initiated Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the continuation of the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. This point is not in any way intended to convey that the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) affiliated Mohamed Morsi had endangered the peace treaty; in fact Israeli officials have themselves admitted their surprise and contentment to the level of cooperation he offered. On the other hand, in his recent message, Ayman al-Zawahiri blamed Morsi for the policy of appeasement towards Israel and the West for the predicament his regime now faces.

The question is what really changed that brought the quick demise of Morsi. Was it really his non-inclusiveness or were there external causes at play? It was more Morsi going all out in offering support to Sunni opposition fighters in Syria, after his initial foreplay with Iran. This triggered wider anxiety about his intentions. But, how would this be any different from the backing being given by other Gulf regimes, and the West, to the Syrian opposition fighters.

Egypt, Gulf States and Syria

As oppose to Morsi, the other Gulf States present themselves as secular. Morsi’s support base is derived from Islamists (MB) whose ideology is premised on reviving the Khilafat. While the offer of support to Syrian opposition may have meant simply sending the Egyptian jihadists, two dangerous trends could have emerged. One of them is: the coming together of Islamists from Egypt with those of its long lost brethren, which are assembling in Syria from other hot spots, such as AfPak. Secondly, this policy could have inadvertently influenced the fabric and balance of the Egyptian military. These prospects are hardly what Israel can afford at this juncture, especially when Al Qaeda affiliated groups have been gaining traction in Syria and northern Africa.

Furthermore, the outpouring of support from Saudi Arabia for the Egyptian military reflects on the threat perception of many Gulf monarchs. By going out of the way in repressing even the moderate Islamist elements, Saudi Arabia is setting it self for a dangerous backlash for interference in both Syria and Egypt. If the brutalities against civilians continue in Egypt, sooner or later, cracks might start to appear with in the Egyptian military with serious repercussions for the region.

The Salafist experience with democracy is certainly not going well at all. After the failure of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front during the 90s, and Hamas in 2006, the ouster of Morsi represents the third time and Islamist party has been prevented to rule after having won the elections. This will now convince some factions of MB to pick up arms, vindicating and rehabilitating Syed Qutb’s school of thought that the replacement of the near enemy was more important than the more distant enemy. In the present circumstances, the improvisation could be to wage a fight against both the near and the distant adversary simultaneously.

Western Interests, Egyptian Army, And Extremist Groups

Keeping intact the moderate outlook of Egyptian military is of utmost importance when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel and US rely on Egyptian intelligence to manage the complex MB, Hamas and Fatah dynamics. It should be emphasized how Hosni Mubarak had kept the Rafah border closed, to pressure Hamas in Gaza. On the other hand, Iran, Turkey and Qatar, have continued to make inroads there. After criticizing the Egyptian military for routing Morsi, Erdogan’s visit to Gaza was promptly cancelled, and reportedly, Egypt has also now suspended its ties with Qatar.

The nations that have criticized the recent Egyptian military actions as a ‘massacre’ i.e., Iran, Qatar and Turkey, are pretty much the same polities that have stood up against the Israeli blockade of Gaza. They have offered economic support, and arms to Hamas in case of Iran, to rebuild Gaza. Others have been critical of this assistance to Hamas as it may jeopardize the ‘two-state’ solution. In the aftermath of military action in Egypt, Gaza based Salafi groups have reportedly declared jihad against the Egyptian military which is increasingly facing attacks in Sinai Peninsula. This volatile situation could easily lead to the closure of Suez Canal.

Under these circumstances, US, Israeli and Saudi dependence on Egyptian military would only grow and it is unlikely the American military aid to the country will be cut-off. The call for return to democracy will prove to be merely rhetoric. However, this will further hurt American credibility in the region and strengthen the message of extremists.

In essence, the actions of Egyptian military are now pushing moderate Islamists to join hands with the extremists. If they do, the Egyptian military will be able to justify the extension of its state of emergency. Nonetheless, this could on the one hand lead to a regional backlash against secular outfits, and on the other, it could morph into a front against Shiites. This pattern is already playing out in Syria where Shiite Hezbollah and Sunni jihadist, including Al Qaeda, are now clearly going at each other. The trends unfolding on the ground can no longer be contained with in the confines of arbitrarily drawn borders.

The post Western Interests, Egyptian Army, Islamists And The Region appeared first on Politact.