By Arif Ansar

Context

The fragile security landscape of South Asia is increasingly tied to the volatile geopolitics of the Middle East. As the tripartite tensions involving the United States, Israel, and Iran simmer, the shockwaves are felt acutely in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and for that matter India as well. To fully comprehend this equation, one must analyze the internal regional dynamics of South Asia first and then trace how they intersect with the unfolding Middle Eastern crisis.

The successful negotiation and remote signing of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on June 17, 2026, by U.S. President Donald Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, marked a monumental achievement for Pakistan’s civil-military leadership. If the Islamabad MoU sticks, in its current or reformed form, and transitions into a durable peace agreement, it holds the potential to fundamentally rewrite Pakistan’s domestic security, energy, and economic paradigms.

1. The Regional Dynamics: South Asia’s Internal Fault Lines

The relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan is currently defined by severe friction rather than neighborly cooperation. At the center of this tension is the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an extremist group that has escalated its terror campaign inside Pakistan. Pakistan accuses the Afghan Taliban of providing safe havens and tacit support to the TTP—a claim the Taliban administration in Kabul denies, though the cross-border nature of TTP attacks remains a persistent flashpoint.

Concurrently, Pakistan’s southwestern province of Balochistan is facing a severe security crisis. The insurgent groups such as Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) are demanding independence for the resource-rich province, has dramatically escalated its attacks against the Pakistani military.

Media reports suggest that the BLA is receiving strategic cooperation and material support from the TTP, creating a combined internal security challenge for Islamabad. Pakistan alleges that the BLA receives external backing from India to destabilize the country. India and Israel are exceptionally close strategic allies, sharing deep defense, intelligence, and counter-terrorism partnerships.

There is great power rivalry part of the equation too. BLA has repeatedly targeted Chinese infrastructure projects and personnel associated with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in Balochistan in other parts of the country, aiming to disrupt Pakistan’s economic lifeline and strain its relationship with Beijing.

2. The Middle East Equation: The Islamabad MoU and Saudi Defense Commitments

To understand how these South Asian fault lines link to the Middle East, one must look at Pakistan’s diplomatic balancing act. The nation has historically maintained a delicate equilibrium: keeping close ties with Saudi Arabia, and other GCC nations, while managing a long, porous border with its neighbor, Iran.

The Islamabad MoU

In mid-2026, Pakistan’s diplomatic corps, alongside Qatar, achieved a historic breakthrough by mediating the Islamabad MoU. This 14-point framework agreement successfully brought the U.S. and Iran to a temporary ceasefire, temporarily halting direct military hostilities, lifting the U.S. naval blockade on Iranian ports, and opening the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz. This diplomatic triumph cemented Pakistan’s role as a vital regional mediator. However, as hostilities have broken again indicating the stability of the Islamabad MoU remains incredibly fragile.

The Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA)

Compounding this fragility is Pakistan’s security obligation to Riyadh. On September 17, 2025, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA). Echoing NATO’s Article 5 language, the SMDA treats “any aggression against either country as an aggression against both”.

If an all-out war breaks out in the Middle East, a dangerous chain reaction is highly likely. Ansar Allah (the Houthis) in Yemen are highly likely to close the Babul Mandab Strait and launch retaliatory ballistic missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia. Faced with direct attacks, Saudi Arabia will almost certainly invoke the SMDA. Reports indicate that under the confidential terms of the pact, Pakistan could be required to deploy up to 80,000 troops to secure Saudi borders. Sooner or later, Pakistan will be forced to choose between entering a foreign conflict to defend Saudi Arabia or reneging on its defense pact, which would devastate its economic and strategic relations with the Gulf.

3. Implications of a Worsening Middle East Conflict on Pakistan and Afghanistan

If the Middle East situation continues to deteriorate, the consequences will ripple across South Asia, severely impacting Pakistan and Afghanistan, and India across military, economic, and social domains.

Pakistan is already heavily engaged in counter-insurgency operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) against the TTP, and in Balochistan against the BLA and BLF, the Pakistani military is stretched thin. Faced with a domestic security crisis, coming to the active defense of Saudi Arabia would be an immense logistical and military strain. Knowing this, adversaries like India and Israel are highly likely to speed up their destabilizing activities inside Pakistan. By utilizing existing proxies, they can ensure that Pakistan remains too deeply entangled in internal security crises to project military power or assist its Gulf allies.

This regional sabotage directly undermines Washington’s strategic goals. The U.S. relies on Pakistan’s diplomatic weight to mediate with Tehran, as seen with the Islamabad MoU. A destabilized Pakistan is a nation that cannot play a constructive role in preventing a wider regional war in the Middle East or contribute towards the success of new vision for the Middle East – under the Abraham Accords and subsequent establishment of Board of Peace.

The Explosion of Sectarian Strife

A direct conflict involving Iran—the primary Shia power—and the U.S., Israel, or Sunni Arab Gulf states will instantly inflame sectarian fault lines in South Asia. Both Pakistan Afghanistan have sizable Shia minorities that have historically been targeted by hardline Sunni extremist groups. While India also has a sizeable Shia population, and while Muslims there face state repression, Shia’s there have not been targeted in a similar fashion.

A worsening Middle East war will be actively exploited by transnational terror networks, most notably Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISIS-K). ISIS-K, which operates across both Afghanistan and Pakistan, views Shia Muslims as heretics and has frequently targeted their mosques, community centers, and schools.

In Afghanistan: The ruling Taliban, while ideologically hardline Sunni, has sought to maintain basic internal stability. However, a regional sectarian war will severely test their control. ISIS-K will use the anti-Iran, anti-Shia rhetoric of the wider conflict to recruit disgruntled fighters, escalating attacks on the Shia Hazara community and challenging Taliban authority.

In Pakistan: Sectarian violence has historically claimed thousands of lives. An active war involving Iran and Saudi Arabia could trigger a revival of sectarian proxy wars on Pakistani soil, pitting localized militant groups against one another and further fracturing the country’s social cohesion.

4. Economic Devastation and Connectivity Collapses

The economic fallout of a prolonged Middle East war on Pakistan and Afghanistan would be catastrophic.

Energy and Remittance Shocks

Pakistan imports the vast majority of its oil and gas from the Gulf. A disruption in the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab el-Mandeb would cause global oil prices to skyrocket, triggering hyperinflation in Pakistan’s fragile, debt-burdened economy. Furthermore, millions of Pakistani expatriates live and work in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. If the Middle East slides into a broader war, many of these workers could be forced to return home, cutting off the vital stream of foreign remittances that keeps Pakistan’s economy afloat.

The Death of Regional Connectivity

Both Afghanistan and Pakistan have pinned their economic futures on becoming trade hubs. Afghanistan under the Taliban has sought to utilize Iran’s Chabahar Port and the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) to bypass landlocked constraints and reduce its dependence on Pakistani transit routes.

While the Islamabad MoU briefly revived hopes for these transit corridors, an escalation of the war would render these infrastructure projects dead on arrival. Iranian ports would once again become military targets, isolating Afghanistan economically and pushing it deeper into poverty, which in turn breeds further radicalization and instability. Moreover, in the recent escalation, reports indicate that US has also targeted Chabahar port to increase pressure on Iran.

5. Conclusion: A Dangerous Convergence

The potential escalation of the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict is not a localized Middle Eastern issue; it is a direct threat to the stability of South Asia. For Pakistan, the war represents an existential geopolitical trap, forcing it to balance a strict mutual defense treaty with Saudi Arabia against the reality of a heavily armed neighbor in Iran and a domestic theater crawling with active insurgencies. For Afghanistan, the conflict threatens to fuel the fires of ISIS-K’s sectarian violence and destroy any hopes of regional economic integration.

As external actors seek to exploit these vulnerabilities, the line between the Middle East’s conflicts and South Asia’s internal wars is rapidly dissolving. If the Islamabad MoU completely unravels, Pakistan and Afghanistan will find themselves directly in the line of fire of a wider, highly destructive regional war.

Conversely:

If the Islamabad MoU “sticks” and transitions from a fragile ceasefire into a durable peace agreement, it holds the potential to fundamentally rewrite Pakistan’s domestic security, energy, and economic paradigms.

a. Security: Strangling Proxies

By capitalizing on its diplomatic leverage from mediating between the U.S. and Iran, Pakistan can demand reciprocal action against cross-border threats. A secure Iran, freed from Western military threats, can work with the Pakistan Army to seal the lawless border, choking the logistics and safe havens of the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) favored by India and Israel. Simultaneously, a stabilized region enables a unified U.S.-Pakistan-Iran diplomatic front to pressure the Afghan Taliban. Highly dependent on Pakistani and Iranian transit trade (like Chabahar Port), Kabul would be forced to dismantle the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). This double clampdown effectively ends the multi-front subversion designed by adversaries to keep Pakistan tactically entrapped.

b. Economy & Energy: Resurrecting the IP Pipeline

A durable reformed MoU triggers the lifting of U.S. sanctions on Iran, allowing Pakistan to complete the Iran-Pakistan (IP) Gas Pipeline without fear of international isolation. This removes the looming $18 billion “take-or-pay” penalty from Tehran, while injecting cheap natural gas to end rolling blackouts and slash industrial costs. Moreover, Gwadar Port is likely to take-off.

c. Autonomy: Balancing GCC Ties

Abundant energy and secured Central Asian trade routes drive organic growth, offering financial self-reliance and breaking Pakistan’s dependency on Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) bailouts. This shields Islamabad from strategic entrapment under its Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) with Riyadh, preserving its neutrality instead of dragging its military into regional proxy wars.

US-Iran Interim Ceasefire Deal, Israel, And The Future of Abraham Accords – June 18, 2026
The US-Israel and Iran Conflict: The Interplay of Goals and Strategies – May 1, 2026
Geopolitics Of Islamic World And Middle Power Alliances After Iran Attack – Mar 22, 2026
The End Of Strategic Altruism: Putin’s Visit And The New US-India Reality – Jan 13, 2026
From Oslo To Trump’s Abraham Accords And 20-Point Peace Plan For Gaza – Oct 12, 2025
Israel Airstrike Targets Hamas Negotiators In Doha, Threatening Gaza Ceasefire Talks – Sep 15, 2025
Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions – April 26, 2025
Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran – February 25, 2025
Assad’s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East – Dec 26, 2024
The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump – Dec 5, 2024
China’s Belt And Road Initiative And India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) – Oct 5, 2023
Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences – Aug 30, 2024
The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities – Sep 27, 2024
Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States – Aug 4, 2023
What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply? – Aug 4, 2022

The post US-Iran War And Alternative Futures For South Asia appeared first on Politact.

By Arif Ansar

Context

In the aftermath of the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021—formalized through the Doha Accords of 2020—South Asia has entered an entirely new and volatile phase. The Taliban’s return to power, their continued lack of international recognition, and the deepening conflict along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border have collectively reshaped the region’s geopolitical contours. What once was envisaged as an American “peace deal” has since evolved into a crucible of power rivalries, ideological contestations, and security dilemmas extending far beyond Kabul.

Amid this changing landscape, Washington finds itself confronting an old question in a new era: What strategic interests does the United States still have at stake in Afghanistan? This question gained renewed urgency after the tragic shooting near the White House on the eve of Thanksgiving in 2025, when Rahmanullah Lakanwal—a former Afghan supporter of U.S. forces who immigrated under the Protect America Operation—opened fire, killing two National Guard members. The attack, still under investigation, reignited the debate about the consequences of U.S. disengagement from Afghanistan and the enduring ripple effects of America’s two-decade military presence.

To assess these evolving dynamics, The Middle East Institute (MEI) collaborated with PoliTact to host a Webinar in November last year to explore these aspects centered around the evolving situation of Afghanistan and if merits a fresh policy and approach. Earlier in May, soon after the four-day conflict between Pakistan and India, MEI also conducted a discussion with regional experts to assess President Trump’s policy towards Taliban. Both discussions were moderated by Dr. Marvin Weibnbaum, the Director of Afghanistan-Pakistan Center.

Through these deliberations, a sobering consensus emerged: the U.S. has abandoned its nation-building ambition, replacing it with a strictly transactional and selective engagement guided by short-term counterterrorism and strategic interests. This shift marks a watershed in South Asian geopolitics—one in which regional powers like Pakistan, India, China, and Russia are recalibrating alliances, while the Taliban’s regime struggles to define its sovereignty amid growing internal fractures and international isolation.

Counterterrorism and Pragmatism

According to panelists such as Joshua White and David Sedney, Washington’s current strategy toward South Asia is driven not by ideology or doctrine but by political expediency. The United States, still wary of being drawn into another endless conflict, now prefers “quick interventions that can be framed as political wins” without the burden of prolonged commitments. At the heart of this approach lies counterterrorism (CT)—the only enduring U.S. interest in Afghanistan. The Taliban, Washington, and Pakistan paradoxically, share a common adversary: the Islamic State–Khorasan Province (ISKP). While formal cooperation remains limited, intelligence coordination to prevent ISKP attacks has emerged as a rare channel of pragmatic engagement. Adjunct Professor at George Town University, Doug London, underscored this convergence, observing that neither Washington nor the Taliban can afford an al-Qaeda-style attack “with fingerprints all over Afghanistan.” Thus, even hostile actors find themselves bound by mutual survival instincts.

Another dimension of U.S. engagement is transactional diplomacy—a pragmatic mechanism aimed at resolving targeted issues such as hostage recovery and retrieval of left-behind military assets. As former Afghan ambassador Javid Ahmad explained, these dealings often blur ethical lines; American captives have been freed in exchange for concessions, including the removal of Haqqani Network bounties. Similarly, billions of dollars’ worth of infrastructure and equipment left during the withdrawal remain part of simmering behind-the-scenes negotiations—either to buy back through intermediaries like Pakistan or to ensure their destruction to prevent exploitation.

Pakistan’s position in this matrix is particularly complex. While the U.S. remains a visible interlocutor, Islamabad’s deepest strategic alignment continues to be with China. Pakistan leverages Washington’s engagement as a counterbalance against overreliance on Beijing. According to the panelists, efforts to “reset” U.S.-Pakistan relations on the basis of trade, minerals, and counterterrorism cooperation may refresh dialogue but are unlikely to override hard security realities.

Human Rights and the Counterterrorism Dilemma

The Taliban’s domestic policies, particularly toward women and civil society, continue to complicate U.S. engagement. As Lisa Curtis observed, the regime has demonstrated “no change in policies” from its 1990s practices—the repression of women and stifling of dissent remain total. This poses a moral and strategic crisis for Washington: how to cooperate on counterterrorism while refusing to legitimize a regime that flagrantly violates human rights.

Curtis argued that sacrificing principles for intelligence access risks undermining long-term stability, as repression fuels extremism by creating ungoverned spaces ripe for recruitment. Yet London countered that, in practice, the U.S. often cooperates with regimes that commit abuses when it aligns with national interests, effectively separating human rights advocacy from realpolitik.

The delicate balance between moral credibility and strategic necessity defines Washington’s Afghan dilemma—where human rights concerns, while loudly voiced, often take a back seat to the imperatives of terrorism prevention.

The TTP Factor

When U.S. troops exited Afghanistan, many in Pakistan assumed the Taliban’s ascension would enhance Islamabad’s regional leverage. Instead, the opposite has occurred. The enduring ties between the Afghan Taliban and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have emerged as the central source of cross-border friction, destabilizing Pakistan more than any external actor.

Since the short but intense four-day war between Pakistan and India in May 2025, border skirmishes between the Taliban and Pakistani forces have intensified, reflecting a broader regional unraveling. Analysts such as Sedney describe these clashes as a subtext of the larger India-Pakistan rivalry, with each side using Afghan soil as a pressure valve for strategic signaling. Yet a full-scale Taliban-Pakistan war remains improbable. Pakistan’s military, with its overwhelming technological and nuclear superiority, could decimate Taliban forces—but at the risk of provoking a drawn-out insurgency it cannot control. The Taliban, aware of this asymmetry, prefer hybrid tactics, allowing the TTP to wage low-intensity proxy warfare inside Pakistan.

The Taliban dismiss Islamabad’s demands to curb the TTP, calling it a “domestic problem”. This refusal underscores their ideological kinship and the shared ambition to see Pakistan’s border tribal belt revert to Taliban-style Sharia governance. Ahmad warned that this dynamic is perilous: the TTP’s suicide battalions possess the capacity to incite urban terror within Pakistan, amplifying the country’s internal vulnerabilities.

Behind these clashes lies a larger ideological project—the Taliban’s belief, shared by TTP hardliners, that regional power is shifting back to the “Islamic Emirate” model. Sedney noted that radical circles envision a future, within a generation, where Pakistan and even India could see Taliban-like movements ascend. Whether delusional or strategic, this belief animates the persistence of militancy and shapes Islamabad’s deepening anxiety.

US Leverages and Pakistan’s Regime Change Dilemma

The question of whether the U.S. or Pakistan can leverage internal Taliban factionalism looms large. Within the movement, a pragmatic Haqqani network faction favors economic engagement and limited U.S. cooperation, while the isolationist Kandahar faction, led by Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada, rejects dependency and seeks autonomy. Although tensions exist, Akhundzada maintains ultimate control, preventing visible fragmentation that might invite civil war. For Pakistan, frustration with the Taliban’s defiance has sparked talk of supporting Afghan resistance groups. Yet Ahmad warns this path is fraught: funding insurgency would demand resources, while the disunited Afghan opposition lacks both cohesion and stamina.

Consequently, Islamabad’s strategy has shifted from influence to contingency—exploiting Taliban divisions when advantageous, but no longer betting on a “friendly” Kabul. As White put it, the myth of a compliant, pro-Pakistan “Pashtun leadership” in Afghanistan has always been just that—a myth. This reality has spurred a profound shift in mindset within Pakistan’s government. No longer divided between the “good Taliban” and “bad Taliban,” Islamabad increasingly sees a spectrum of “bad and worse Taliban.”

At an event held at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in February, 2022, the Special Representative for Afghanistan at the time, Tom West, had discussed the economic leverages US still holds and commented that Afghan Taliban has shown the least interest in future cooperation with the US in fulling the terms of their side of the Doha Accord. At the same time, West noted that US is not supporting any opposition to Afghan Taliban and is advising other nations to refrain from that, but some will do that sooner or later if Taliban does not show urgency. Answering a question, he commented that many players are realizing that not having US engagement in Afghanistan is not in their interest.

Regional Rivalries and Great Power Calculus

Beyond the Pakistan-Taliban binary, regional power competition has turned Afghanistan into a geopolitical chessboard once again. None of the major powers—China, Russia, India, or the U.S.—wants a total state collapse, yet each pursues a distinct agenda. India, for its part, has pivoted sharply. As Curtis noted, New Delhi is now actively courting elements within the Taliban to undermine Pakistan’s influence. The May 2025 conflict with Pakistan demonstrated India’s willingness to strike deep into Pakistani territory, signaling a readiness to rewrite the traditional escalation playbook.

Meanwhile, China and Russia tread cautiously. For Beijing, the overriding concern is protecting multibillion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) investments from militant spillover. Russia, despite its history of confrontation with Islamist movements, maintains unpublicized CT cooperation with the Taliban to prevent ISKP’s expansion into Central Asia. Trump’s renewed engagement with Central Asian leaders under the “C5+1 initiative”—focused on strategic minerals—has further rattled Moscow and Beijing, who view it as U.S. encroachment upon their regional sphere of influence.

Panelists such as White and Karp noted that China now holds more extensive economic leverage in both Pakistan and Afghanistan than any other actor. Despite attempts to mediate between them, Beijing’s balancing efforts have faltered. Nonetheless, economic interdependence has rendered China an unwilling stakeholder in both states’ stability.

For the Taliban, the Great Power rivalry offers an opportunity. In an assessment, PoliTact noted last year: “As Afghan Taliban celebrate 4^th year in power, the nation now finds itself at a crossroads of competing currents. The net effect is a cautious, multi-prong stance: keep Iranian channels open for trade and energy, nurture Indian economic alternatives through Chabahar, avoid burning bridges with Pakistan as it courts Washington, and remain pragmatically receptive to Chinese infrastructure where it serves Afghan interests.”

Javid Ahmad observed, the regime seeks “economic neutrality,” extracting benefits from all sides while avoiding puppeteering by any. Pragmatic factions engage Russia and China for investment; hardliners in Kandahar, wary of foreign intentions, prefer cautious distance. This balancing act defines Kabul’s foreign policy—a tactical survival strategy that keeps all powers interested, but none dominant.

Containment Over Resolution: The U.S. Strategic Dilemma

Dr. Weinbaum summarized the prevailing expert view succinctly: “There is no military solution to the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict—only conflict management.” After decades of direct engagement, the U.S. now acts as a remote balancer, occasionally intervening diplomatically but avoiding deep entanglement. Washington’s immediate goal is not victory, but containment: preventing Afghanistan’s collapse while denying extremist sanctuaries the freedom to orchestrate global terror. This means sustaining aid and limited engagement but conditioning every form of support on verifiable security behavior.

Panelists urged regional coordination involving China, Turkey, and Qatar, whose economic leverage could pressure the Taliban to restrain the TTP. However, as Karp pointed out, both Turkey and Qatar’s favoritism toward Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated movements complicates their credibility as neutral mediators.

Ahmad cautioned that the U.S. must abandon the pursuit of ideological “unicorns” and embrace pragmatic realpolitik—dealing with actors as they are, not as Washington wishes them to be. The mantra, he argued, should be “leverage first, ideals later.” Delayed engagement only increases risks of ungoverned chaos, but overreaction could trap the U.S. in another open-ended quagmire.

The Perpetual Balancing Act

As of 2025, U.S. policy in South Asia has evolved into a delicate balancing act—a calculated choreography between engagement and restraint. America’s current presence is limited but consequential: intelligence links, sporadic negotiations, and cautious cooperation with regional allies. Yet looming questions remain. If Afghanistan once again becomes a safe haven for transnational terrorist networks, what tools does Washington have to respond? Under Trump’s renewed mandate, analysts predict the U.S. would double down on counterterrorism partnerships—especially with Pakistan and India—to prevent another 9/11-style surprise.

However, as India’s outreach to the Taliban deepens, it risks entrenching the very militant alignments that destabilize Pakistan and jeopardize U.S.-Pakistan rapprochement. Such dynamics may inadvertently revive the ideological monster once defeated by the War on Terror. Moreover, the Taliban’s tacit encouragement of TTP demands—such as reversing Pakistan’s merger of tribal areas and enforcing Sharia law—threatens to seed an insurgent domino effect. This could erode Islamabad’s internal cohesion and ripple across borders, complicating U.S. peace efforts from Gaza to Central Asia. Trump’s Taliban policy would require broader public ownership of Pakistan’s CT strategy and preventing the budding India-Afghan ties from destabilizing Pakistan and the rejuvenated US-Pakistan ties.

Related Articles:

The Unbroken Alliance: Why the Afghan Taliban-TTP Nexus Is Dooming Peace with Pakistan – Nov 4, 2025
The Fragile Truce Between Pakistan And Afghanistan And The War Of Narratives – Nov 2, 2025
Afghanistan’s Strategic Outlook And New Geopolitical Realities – Aug 18, 2025
Afghanistan, Pakistan Relations and Great Power Rivalry – Jul 21, 2025
Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions, Trump, And Wakhan Corridor – Feb 3, 2025
Political Or Military Solution; Pakistan’s New Counter-Terrorism Operation Azm-e-Istehkam – Aug 1, 2024
Convergences in US Pakistan Ties and Afghanistan – Jan 1, 2024
Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP – Feb 22, 2023
Post Withdrawal Campaign Against Extremism In Afghanistan And US-Pakistan Relations – Sep 7, 2022
Emerging US Policy Towards Afghanistan After Withdrawal – March 2, 2022
Recalibrating The US-Pakistan Partnership In Afghanistan – Jun 22, 2021
US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden – Mar 2, 2021

The post The Future Of Afghan Taliban-Pakistan Conflict: Implications For Regional Stability And US Interests appeared first on Politact.

The post What Does Afghanistan, Pakistan Conflict Mean For Regional Stability And US Strategic Interests? appeared first on Politact.

PoliTact’s Analysis of Perceptions and Perspectives

With inputs from Naade Ali and Arif Ansar

Context

Since the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan in August 2021, there was a perception the installation of Afghan Taliban in Kabul will make Pakistan’s regional influence grow. However, Afghan Taliban-TTP nexus continues to bedevil the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) remains the central source of friction and a key driver of the persistent cross-border violence. There is no indication that the group has endorsed the ceasefire reached in Istanbul; its ongoing attacks suggest that it remains active despite the interstate truce. The next round of talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan are scheduled for November 6 in Istanbul.

Islamabad accuses the Afghan Taliban of providing support and sanctuary to the TTP, designated as a terror group by both UN and the U.S., while Kabul dismisses these allegations. Qatar and Turkey are closely observing the ceasefire, marking their first substantive involvement in mediating between Islamabad and Kabul after previous efforts—including those led by China—failed to achieve meaningful results. While the agreement commits Pakistan to refrain from launching strikes inside Afghanistan, it does not neutralize the TTP threat. Under the deal, Pakistan is expected to avoid cross-border operations but retains the right to target TTP militants attempting to infiltrate its territory.

For the Afghan Taliban, the ceasefire offers a degree of peace and reduces the risk of cross-border strikes. However, relinquishing support for the TTP is not a decision that rests with any single Taliban leader, not even the defense minister. The authority to determine the Taliban’s stance toward the TTP lies solely with their Supreme Leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada. There have been no reports to date indicating that he has issued any directive against the group. Although the ceasefire may temporarily pause the infiltration of TTP militants from Afghanistan into Pakistan, it could simultaneously prompt the group’s factions within Pakistan to become more active, fighting independently in the absence of reinforcement from their Afghan counterparts.

Why do Afghan Taliban Support TTP?

The Afghan Taliban’s support for the TTP stems from their shared combat experience, religious ideology, and tribal ties. The TTP’s leadership has sworn allegiance to the Taliban’s Supreme Leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, granting the group significant autonomy to operate without interference from the Kabul-based Taliban faction.

This arrangement allows the TTP to pursue strategic and geopolitical objectives on behalf of the Taliban, such as challenging Pakistan’s control over territories beyond the Durand Line, which the Taliban considers part of Afghanistan. The Durand Line, a colonial-era border, remains a contentious issue, as the Afghan Taliban rejects its legitimacy, fueling tensions with Pakistan. Despite the recent Afghanistan-Pakistan agreement emphasizing mutual respect for territorial integrity, ambiguity persists regarding both sides’ interpretations of their sovereign boundaries.

Afghanistan’s Defense Minister, Mullah Yaqoob Mujahid, recently described the Durand line as an “imaginary border”, reinforcing the impression that the Afghan Taliban do not consider it a legitimate border. Similarly, the Deputy Interior Minister Nabi Omari expressed hopes of reclaiming “Afghanistan’s old lands” currently under Pakistani control, stating, “By Allah’s will, this land will return to us.”

It is important to note that, unlike the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP), which directly challenges Taliban rule, the TTP does not pose an immediate threat. Instead, it contributes to the Taliban-led Afghan economy by purchasing weapons and sharing profits from smuggling, extortion, and other illicit activities, making the TTP a significant stakeholder in Afghanistan’s economy. In fact, TTP also acts as a Taliban ally against ISKP.

While Al Qaeda (AQ) presence in Afghanistan has significantly diminished, the most significant evidence of continued ties with the Taliban was the U.S. drone strike that killed Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahri in July 2022 in a safe house in Kabul. In the February 2020 Doha Agreement with the U.S., the Taliban pledged to prevent international terrorist groups, including AQ, from using Afghan territory to threaten the U.S. and its allies. However, evidence strongly suggests the Taliban leadership has violated this pledge.

Disarming these battle-hardened TTP militants, who lack alternative livelihoods due to their combat-focused skill set, appears to be a costly and complex endeavor for the Afghan Taliban. Fully integrating them into Afghan security forces could also undermine the Taliban’s public denials of supporting the TTP and risk internal discord.

The present circumstances suggest that the Taliban have chosen to continue supporting the TTP, enabling them to focus on external rather than internal operations. Moreover, by continuing this backing, raises serious questions about the Taliban motivations and world view. Irrespective, this risky strategy jeopardizes the Taliban’s pursuit of international recognition and complicates their relations with Pakistan.

The Key Demands of TTP

While the TTP’s focus has tactically shifted over the years (for instance, limiting attacks on civilians after 2018), their fundamental goal remains the enforcement of their interpretation of Sharia and the withdrawal of the state’s writ from Pakistan’s merged tribal areas. Based on their stated objectives presented during past negotiations, the key demands of the TTP include:

1. Implementation of Sharia

The TTP’s long-term goal is the establishment of a state based on its own strict interpretation of Islamic law (Sharia), mirroring the system of the Afghan Taliban.

2. Restoring Autonomy and Demilitarization

The TTP demands the reversal of the 2018 constitutional amendment that merged the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) into Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. The TTP seeks to restore the semi-autonomous or independent status of these tribal regions.

A frequent demand is the complete withdrawal of the Pakistani military and security forces from the tribal belt (the former FATA and surrounding regions), allowing the TTP to establish control and implement its own governance system.

3. Prisoner and Amnesty Demands

The TTP consistently demands the release of all its imprisoned members and commanders held by Pakistani authorities. This has often been a precondition for engaging in ceasefires or peace talks. The group demands full amnesty for its fighters who have committed acts of terror against the Pakistani state and its citizens.

Pakistan’s Evolving Policy Towards Afghan Taliban and TTP

Pakistan has long tried to convince Afghan Taliban to act against the TTP. While Afghan Taliban offered to facilitate talks between TTP and Pakistan and relocate it from the border regions – it has restrained from taking any serious actions against it. Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) led government had sought Afghan Taliban assistance in pacifying TTP, resulting in a ceasefire that fell apart in November 2022 – and resumption of TTP attacks against Pakistan. The TTP demands related to release of prisoners were also met to some extent. On the other hand, their requirements of decreasing the number of security forces in FATA – and rescinding of FATA merger are more complicated.

The situation now seems different. By conducting military strikes in Afghanistan and killing dozens of Taliban fighters, Islamabad has set a new precedent, signaling that the Afghans must face consequences for supporting its enemies. Though, Pakistan’s carrot-and-stick strategy was designed to change the Taliban cost-benefit calculus, forcing them to choose between Pakistan or TTP. To date, the Afghan Taliban have chosen the latter, a course they may continue to follow, as tensions with Islamabad neither threaten their domestic control nor hinder their growing engagement with other regional actors, including India.

The Taliban has yet to craft an effective framework to regulate the TTP, restrict its autonomy, or halt its cross-border operations. Instead, growing friction with Pakistan has only deepened the alignment between the two. Afghan Deputy Minister of Interior Affairs, Mawlawi Muhammad Nabi Omari, was reported to have issued a stark warning to Pakistan, stating that if Afghan tribes and the nation declare Pakistan an invader by religious decree, “by God, you will not find safety even up to the Indian border.”

These anti-Pakistan sentiments cast doubts about the Afghan Taliban intentions. The combined pride of the Afghan Taliban and TTP in their perceived triumphs over major powers like the U.S. and NATO, and in reclaiming Afghanistan after decades of war, reinforces their determination and stubbornness.

Afghan Taliban support alone does not fully explain the TTP’s survival and expansion. A significant portion of its fighters are disenfranchised and radicalized youth from Pakistan’s impoverished regions, particularly Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. In a security briefing to KP lawmakers, the provincial police chief once revealed that around 4,000 militants, including 35% Afghan nationals, were operating in the province, often blending in with civilians by day and carrying out attacks at night.

A belief reportedly exists within the TTP that, with support from local tribes, it can seize Pakistani territory by force and eventually transform from a non-state actor into a legitimate state actor, like their Afghan counterpart. This perception boosts the morale of its fighters and encourages the group’s continued expansion. These characteristics truly indicate that TTP aspires for a space from where Afghan Taliban can extend their reach.

Pakistan’s security establishment accuses India of using Afghanistan as a base for launching terror operations against Pakistan – and the availability of modern weapons in Afghanistan has enhanced militants’ capabilities. At the same time, the military recognizes that Pakistan’s terrorism problem is not purely external but also internally facilitated. In his recent remarks, Pakistan Army Chief urged Kabul to prioritize mutual security over ongoing violence, calling on the Afghan Taliban regime to “rein in the proxies who have sanctuaries in Afghanistan.”

An Alliance of Ideology vs. State Necessity

The current crisis surrounding the ceasefire reveals a fundamental and seemingly unresolvable conflict: while Pakistan demands the Afghan Taliban choose state necessity (diplomatic recognition and regional trade) over ideological loyalty, the leadership in Kabul has consistently chosen the latter.

The TTP is more than just an operational proxy; it is a vital ideological ally and an economic stakeholder that reinforces the Afghan Taliban’s own anti-state identity and vision for a borderless Islamic Emirate. Pakistan’s previous posture of limited intervention in Afghanistan, coupled with the TTP’s growing recruitment base among disenfranchised Pakistani youth, means that Islamabad’s carrot-and-stick strategy has failed to alter the Taliban’s calculus.

While the Pakistani government has previously pursued political solutions, the TTP’s extremist demands and uncompromising approach have rendered sustained negotiations nearly impossible. The current strategic pivot toward a military approach—which carries the inherent risk of seeking regime change in Afghanistan—is equally unlikely to yield a long-term roadmap. For any military pressure to be effective, it must be integrated with political steps that foster public ownership and address long-held local grievances. This sophisticated, multi-pronged strategy offers the best chance to definitively dismantle the Taliban-TTP nexus.

Any attempt at regime change is heavily contingent upon securing the explicit support of key regional players, most notably China. A full-scale war directly jeopardizes substantial Chinese investments, particularly those under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and risks creating a dangerous new front amid Pakistan’s ongoing tensions with India. Furthermore, escalating border conflicts are likely to severely complicate the recent reset in U.S.-Pakistan relations, which is premised on cooperation in trade, strategic minerals, and technology.

Internationally, being mired in internal and border conflicts would significantly erode Pakistan’s capacity to play a credible regional role, hindering its ability to support allies like Saudi Arabia or contribute to broader stability efforts, such as a Gaza peace plan. Even with powerful backing from both China and the U.S., attempting to alter the ethnic balance of power within Afghanistan remains an extremely high-risk gamble that could easily spiral into a prolonged, devastating civil war.

In the absence of a truly sophisticated methodology—one that moves beyond binary military or political options—Pakistan risks becoming entangled in a protracted proxy guerrilla warfare within an era of escalating great power rivalry. The recent Istanbul ceasefire, therefore, provides only a temporary and fragile pause. This strategic impasse casts a long, enduring shadow over the future of South Asian security.

Related Articles:

The Fragile Truce Between Pakistan And Afghanistan And The War Of Narratives – Nov 2, 2025
Afghanistan’s Strategic Outlook And New Geopolitical Realities – Aug 18, 2025
Afghanistan, Pakistan Relations and Great Power Rivalry – Jul 21, 2025
Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions, Trump, And Wakhan Corridor – Feb 3, 2025
Political Or Military Solution; Pakistan’s New Counter-Terrorism Operation Azm-e-Istehkam – Aug 1, 2024
Convergences in US Pakistan Ties and Afghanistan – Jan 1, 2024
Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP – Feb 22, 2023
Post Withdrawal Campaign Against Extremism In Afghanistan And US-Pakistan Relations – Sep 7, 2022
Emerging US Policy Towards Afghanistan After Withdrawal – March 2, 2022
Recalibrating The US-Pakistan Partnership In Afghanistan – Jun 22, 2021
US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden – Mar 2, 2021

The post The Unbroken Alliance: Why the Afghan Taliban-TTP Nexus Is Dooming Peace with Pakistan appeared first on Politact.

PoliTact’s Issue Brief

By Naade Ali

Context

After several rounds of intensive negotiations mediated by Qatar and Türkiye, Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to extend their ceasefire despite failing to achieve a major breakthrough. The decision followed a series of fierce cross-border clashes that caused heavy casualties on both sides. According to Türkiye’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, both countries also consented to establish a monitoring and verification mechanism to ensure the ceasefire’s implementation and to penalize any violations.

The latest round of talks in Istanbul followed the initial negotiations held in Doha, where Islamabad and Kabul first agreed to an immediate ceasefire and the creation of frameworks to consolidate peace and stability. During the Doha meeting, Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif and Afghanistan’s Acting Defense Minister Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob Mujahid signed a bilateral agreement prohibiting either country’s forces from targeting the other’s military, civilians, or critical infrastructure, while pledging mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Analysis

Throughout the negotiation process, several details have surfaced that expose the deep-seated fault lines underpinning the conflict between the two neighbors. Although cross-border hostilities have paused, a “war of narratives” has emerged in the aftermath of the Istanbul talks, with both Kabul and Islamabad accusing each other of distorting facts. Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid accused Pakistan’s military of fueling instability to pave the way for a U.S. return to Bagram Air Base, claiming Islamabad’s actions aim to create chaos. He said the Taliban do not trust Pakistan’s assurances of peaceful relations, adding that Pakistan’s demand for the Taliban to prevent militant attacks inside its territory was unrealistic. Mujahid also criticized Pakistan’s defense minister for making “threatening remarks” during the Istanbul talks, warning that “Afghans should never be spoken to in the language of threats.”

The principal point of contention remains the two sides’ differing perceptions of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which Islamabad designates as a terrorist organization and refers to as Fitna al-Khawarij—“deviant rebels sowing chaos.” Mujahid denied the presence of TTP leaders in Afghanistan, asserting that those identified by Pakistan were merely “Pakistani refugees” returning home. The Afghan side even offered to facilitate their repatriation, a claim Pakistan dismissed as deliberately distorted. Pakistan’s Information Ministry clarified that Islamabad had demanded action against militants operating from Afghan soil and, when Kabul insisted those individuals were Pakistani nationals, proposed that they be handed over via designated border posts.

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s Foreign Office stated that the Taliban regime had effectively admitted the presence of TTP and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan, offering various justifications for not taking action against them. In a separate statement, Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif accused the Taliban regime of “treacherous and barbaric patronization of India-sponsored terrorism,” asserting that Pakistan harbored “no illusions” about Kabul’s intentions. Asif described the Taliban government as non-representative, deeply divided, and repressive toward Afghanistan’s ethnic minorities, women, and civil society. Amid these tensions, Pakistan is seeking a binding written agreement conditioning its cooperation on the Taliban’s commitment to prevent TTP from using Afghan territory for attacks. Asif stated that lasting peace would require the Taliban to end its support for the TTP, enforce a long-term ceasefire, and facilitate the repatriation of Afghan refugees.

The Taliban, however, rejected Asif’s characterization, insisting that the TTP issue is an internal matter for Pakistan. Doubts persist over the durability of the ceasefire and its ability to address the entrenched mistrust between the two countries. Anti-Pakistan and anti-Afghanistan sentiment has increasingly become part of national discourse on both sides, rapidly translating into broader social polarization. The growing hostility suggests that the prospects for durable peace or a return to normalcy between Islamabad and Kabul remain distant.

The Future of Ceasefire

Highlighting the fragility of the deal, Khawaja Asif cautioned that its success depends on the Taliban’s capacity to restrain militants targeting Pakistan. “Anything coming from Afghanistan will be a violation of this agreement,” he said, defending Pakistan’s right to carry out cross-border strikes. “They are in Kabul. They are everywhere. Wherever they are, we will attack them. Kabul is not a no-go area.” Asif emphasized that the ceasefire applies only to the Afghan Taliban and does not extend to the TTP, reaffirming that Islamabad will not negotiate with the group.

In response to Pakistan’s repeated threats of cross-border action, the Taliban have issued a strong warning through Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, asserting that Afghanistan would not tolerate any violation of its sovereignty. Haqqani cautioned that any aggression or incursion by Pakistan would be met with firm resistance, declaring, “If anyone attacks or invades our country, we will defend it. Our history speaks volumes about how Afghanistan has dealt with aggressors.” His remarks reflected the Taliban’s growing frustration over Islamabad’s rhetoric and underscored Kabul’s resolve to respond militarily if Pakistan carries out further strikes inside Afghan territory

Against this backdrop, it is unlikely that the agreement will substantially resolve Pakistan’s growing terrorism challenge. While ongoing tensions between the two countries offer no clear advantage to either side, they continue to hinder development and progress. Before the escalation, there were hopes that Afghanistan might participate in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Such economic interdependence, following the Chinese model, could have created a win-win scenario, reducing the likelihood of conflict and fostering regional collaboration. However, that prospect now appears increasingly remote.

As Pakistan enters Phase Two of CPEC and the U.S. begins investing in its critical minerals sector, Islamabad cannot afford to let terrorism persist. The Pakistani military faces mounting pressure from China, whose personnel and infrastructure have already come under attack. If any such incident were to occur with American ventures, it would have severe repercussions for Pakistan’s security apparatus and its relations with Washington. Hence, countering terrorism has become a top priority for the Pakistani military, which aims to ensure a secure environment for foreign investors in the country’s vast mineral resources.

The current ceasefire with Afghanistan is viewed as Pakistan’s last opportunity to compel the Afghan Taliban to reconsider their stance toward the TTP. However, if the Taliban fail to act, the situation could deteriorate further. The prospect of a wider Pakistan-Afghanistan confrontation cannot be ruled out, particularly as Kabul and New Delhi draw closer. India has recently upgraded its technical mission in Kabul to a full embassy, and last year, Indian Minister of External Affairs J.P. Singh held a landmark meeting with Taliban Defense Minister Mullah Yaqoob, who expressed hopes for enhanced defense ties with India.

Islamabad is concerned that the warming diplomatic relations between India and Afghanistan could evolve into security cooperation, extending Pakistan’s threat landscape. Pakistan has accused India of waging a low-intensity proxy war through Afghanistan, alleging that New Delhi aims to keep Islamabad preoccupied on both its eastern and western fronts.

Nonetheless, these developments reflect Islamabad’s deepening insecurity and impatience toward Kabul and raise the possibility that any India-Afghanistan defense cooperation could be perceived by Islamabad as a direct threat to its own security, potentially drawing the two countries into a broader conflict. Without addressing these core issues, any ceasefire will remain fragile, and true peace between the two neighbors, crucial to regional stability, will remain out of reach.

Related Articles:

Afghanistan’s Strategic Outlook And New Geopolitical Realities – Aug 18, 2025
Afghanistan, Pakistan Relations and Great Power Rivalry – Jul 21, 2025
Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions, Trump, And Wakhan Corridor – Feb 3, 2025
Political Or Military Solution; Pakistan’s New Counter-Terrorism Operation Azm-e-Istehkam – Aug 1, 2024
Convergences in US Pakistan Ties and Afghanistan – Jan 1, 2024
Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP – Feb 22, 2023
Post Withdrawal Campaign Against Extremism In Afghanistan And US-Pakistan Relations – Sep 7, 2022
Emerging US Policy Towards Afghanistan After Withdrawal – March 2, 2022
Recalibrating The US-Pakistan Partnership In Afghanistan – Jun 22, 2021
US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden – Mar 2, 2021

The post The Fragile Truce Between Pakistan And Afghanistan And The War Of Narratives appeared first on Politact.

Policy Brief – Analysis of Perceptions and Perspectives

Navigating India, Pakistan, Iran, and U.S. Pressures

Context

Afghanistan’s strategic outlook is undergoing a dramatic overhaul amid escalating connectivity disputes, geopolitical realignments, and regional conflicts. The combined pressures of India–Pakistan instability, U.S. trade friction with India, Iran-Israel hostilities, and Pakistan’s rising diplomatic leverage are forcing Kabul into a balanced posture—nurturing Indian, Iranian, Chinese, and Pakistani ties while maintaining neutrality in broader conflicts.

Fallout from the India–Pakistan Escalation

The recent missile and drone escalation between India and Pakistan, while brief, sent strong ripples across Afghanistan’s strategic thinking. For Kabul, the clashes underscored both the volatility of its neighborhood and the fragility of its trade lifelines. Afghanistan’s heavy dependence on Pakistani corridors for access to Indian markets became immediately apparent when border closures stranded hundreds of trucks and brought transit under the Afghanistan–Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement to a halt. This economic disruption has reinforced the Taliban government’s determination to diversify its trade routes and reduce over reliance on Pakistan, with particular focus on accelerating use of Iran’s Chabahar port—an initiative backed by India and bolstered by Kabul’s recent investment in the facility.

Diplomatically, Afghanistan responded with a careful balancing act, calling for restraint on both sides while deepening engagement with India. Meetings earlier in 2025 between Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi and Indian officials signaled a renewed willingness to explore closer economic ties, particularly through the Chabahar route, which would allow Afghanistan to bypass Pakistani territory entirely. This outreach also served to assert Kabul’s independence in regional diplomacy, reducing the perception of Pakistan as the sole gateway for Afghan connectivity.

At the same time, China seized the moment to mediate and position itself as an economic partner. Through Chinese facilitation in June 2025, Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed to restore ambassador-level diplomatic ties, with Kabul invited to formally participate in the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This not only offered Afghanistan access to infrastructure funding and regional integration but also came with commitments from the Taliban to address Pakistan’s concerns over cross-border militancy—particularly activity by the Pakistani Taliban (TTP). While Afghan officials have long denied harboring such groups, the inclusion of security assurances in the deal signaled a cautious willingness to engage on this sensitive issue.

However, the credibility of these pledges remains under scrutiny. Pakistan continues to voice concerns about militant sanctuaries on Afghan soil, and incidents of TTP-linked violence persist. For Afghanistan, managing this security profile will be central to sustaining the diplomatic thaw with Islamabad and maximizing the economic benefits of regional projects like CPEC.

In the end, the India–Pakistan conflict served as both a warning and an opportunity for Afghanistan. It highlighted the risks of over-dependence on a single trade corridor, incentivized diversification through Iranian and Indian partnerships, and opened doors for Chinese-backed connectivity initiatives. Yet, it also reinforced that regional credibility is not solely a function of military capability but also of sustained economic reliability and security cooperation.

US-India Economic Tensions

Against this backdrop, rising trade tensions between the United States and India are adding another layer of complexity to South Asia’s connectivity politics. Washington’s imposition of tariffs of up to 50% on Indian exports—including textiles, jewelry, and footwear—is expected to slow India’s growth, intensify pressure on its export industries, and strain the once-warm personal rapport between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and former President Donald Trump. The tariff amount includes 25% penalty for importing Russian oil and military equipment – and thus energizing its war machine in Ukraine. In response, India has delayed certain U.S. defense procurements, expanded outreach to BRICS partners, and signaled a more assertive, independent foreign policy stance.

For Afghanistan, this shift may mean a more determined Indian push to limit Kabul’s integration into China-led connectivity projects like CPEC. In the aftermath of the May 2025 India–Pakistan clashes, Indian strategists are reportedly concerned that closer Afghan–China ties could deepen Pakistan’s leverage in the region. New Delhi’s outreach to Kabul—centered on expanding trade via Chabahar—fits within this broader effort to offer alternatives to Chinese-backed corridors.

Yet, India’s evolving stance is not entirely about containment. Modi is expected to travel to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin from August 31 to September 1—his first visit since the deadly 2020 Galwan Valley clashes. The visit comes amid signs of a tentative thaw in relations, including the resumption of direct flights, new pilgrimage agreements, and eased Chinese export restrictions to India. While Modi’s presence at the SCO will be closely watched, Indian analysts stress this is not a wholesale pivot toward Beijing but rather an exercise in strategic autonomy—leveraging engagement with China to balance U.S. pressure without committing to China’s broader geopolitical vision.

For Pakistan, India’s maneuvering presents a mixed picture. On one hand, a more China-friendly India could soften some of the sharpest India–Pakistan tensions in multilateral forums. On the other, if India doubles down on keeping Afghanistan out of CPEC’s orbit, Islamabad could see increased competition for influence in Kabul. For Afghanistan, the outcome will likely hinge on whether New Delhi’s engagement translates into viable alternatives to Chinese-backed connectivity—or whether it remains largely symbolic in the face of China’s economic weight.

In short, the twin developments of India–Pakistan border tensions and U.S.–India trade frictions are accelerating New Delhi’s pursuit of a multi-vector foreign policy: resisting over-dependence on Washington, engaging with Beijing when tactically useful, and asserting itself more forcefully in regional connectivity debates involving Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Iran and Tensions in the Middle East

The June Iran–Israel war and the continuing Gaza crisis have spilled into Afghanistan’s neighborhood in very tangible ways. Iran’s internal security clampdown after the twelve-day war coincided with a surge in forced returns of Afghans from Iran—UNHCR estimated average daily deportations jumped to roughly 30,000 per day during the fighting—creating new humanitarian strain on western Afghanistan and exposing Kabul’s dependence on cross-border labor flows.

Politically, the Taliban sought a posture of guarded alignment with Tehran without direct entanglement: Kabul condemned Israeli strikes (and later U.S.) on Iran while calling for regional restraint—signals aimed at maintaining Iranian goodwill for trade and transit via the Chabahar route, but also at avoiding open confrontation with larger powers.

Against this volatile backdrop, a rare and highly symbolic development occurred: Pakistan Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir was invited for a private lunch at the White House—a groundbreaking move that was quickly interpreted as a U.S. outreach toward Islamabad during rising Middle East tensions. As Trump reportedly praised Munir for helping avert an outright war with India, he also acknowledged Pakistan’s crucial insight into the Iran–Israel conflict—signaling potential U.S. interest in leveraging Pakistani mediation efforts in a region on the brink of broader conflict.

Munir’s meeting—and Pakistan’s positioning—reflect Islamabad’s growing role as an interlocutor in the Iran–Israel standoff, balancing ties with both Tehran and Washington while contending with regional instability. Islamabad has publicly condemned Israeli strikes on Iran and underscored the need for diplomatic solutions, deepening its appeal as mediator.

At the same time, the Iran-Israeli tensions and Pakistan’s growing diplomatic role complicates Afghanistan’s reliance on the Chabahar Port as an alternative trade route to Pakistan, which US had previously exempted from sanctions on Iran. The Port is being developed by Iran in partnership with India. President Trump has already conveyed his dismay to India for buying oil from Russia, benefiting the country in sustaining its policies towards Ukraine. Some experts claim that if the high-stake meeting between President Trump and Putin goes well on August 15, the pressure on India will likely ease as well.

Conclusion

As Afghan Taliban celebrate 4^th year in power, the nation now finds itself at a crossroads of competing currents. The net effect is a cautious, multi-prong stance: keep Iranian channels open for trade and energy, nurture Indian economic alternatives through Chabahar, avoid burning bridges with Pakistan as it courts Washington, and remain pragmatically receptive to Chinese infrastructure where it serves Afghan interests. In practice, that means neutral rhetoric on Middle East tensions, practical cooperation with Iran on border management amid deportations, and transactional engagement with India, Pakistan, and China to keep multiple corridors viable despite shifting great-power winds. However, as it stands now, U.S. pressure on Iran and India have restricted options for Afghanistan.

Related Articles:

The post Afghanistan’s Strategic Outlook And New Geopolitical Realities appeared first on Politact.

Policy Brief – Vantage Point Analysis

Context

The recent meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Field Marshal Asim Munir, has stirred considerable global attention in particularly regarding what led to the meeting and what could have been discussed. It marks the first-ever instance of a sitting U.S. president holding a one-on-one meeting with Pakistan’s top military leader—an unprecedented move that reveals deeper shifts in regional strategy and global alignments.

Great Power Rivalry

U.S.-Pakistan relations have always been shaped by broader global dynamics, and the context now is the intensifying great power rivalry, primarily between the U.S., China, and Russia. The escalating Iran-Israel conflagration has added to this.

One of the persistent suggestions coming out of some DC based think-tanks is to avert pushing Pakistan into the full embrace of China. On the other hand, Pakistan has been messaging insistently that it wants to maintain close ties to the US despite its strategic ties to China. The meeting between President Trump and Field Marshal Asim Munir – and what follows – will likely test this. In the unfolding international relations maintaining a balance between great powers is becoming increasingly untenable.

Another critical dimension is the ongoing Iran-Israel conflict. In the post October 7, 2023, Hamas led attack on Israel, the geopolitics of Middle East is fast evolving. This has been accompanied by the loss of Hamas and Hezbollah leadership and the fall of Assad regime in Syria in December 2024, as part of what many consider the Outside-in Approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The likelihood of a broader conflict between Iran and Israel hangs in balance as President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have forged a strong strategic alignment. Netanyahu has tried to ensure that U.S. policy remained closely aligned with Israel’s objective of weakening Iran’s defense capabilities, particularly preventing it from ever acquiring nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Iran had hoped that Trump would adopt a pragmatic approach and revive nuclear talks leading to easing of economic pressure. To Iran’s disappointment, Trump pursued the reinstatement of “maximum pressure” policy on Tehran – culminating into an attack on its nuclear sites on June 22.

Pakistan has maintained the policy of siding with Iran. In his speech to the diaspora in Washington DC, Field Marshal Asim Munir reportedly cited Pakistan’s ‘clear and strong support’ for Iran in war against Israel. President Trump would have likely discussed Pakistan’s intent and the scope of its support in the background of expanding Israeli-Iran conflict, especially if US gets engaged, as it did on June 22, in eliminating Iran’s nuclear program – or any endeavors to change the regime.

From what has been reported since the meeting, Pakistan has offered to mediate with Iran and to assist President Trump pursue a negotiated solution, as he did with its recent short war with India. After meeting with Field Marshal Asim Munir, Trump had given two weeks window to arrive at a decision on if the US will get directly involved in the war against Iran. However, the attack on Iran’s nuclear sites occurred much before the window for negotiated solution was to expire.

According to some estimates, about 15%-20% of Pakistan’s population belong to Shia sect. Any attack on Iran, regime change, or any subsequent insurgency can have serious consequences for the ethnic and religious harmony in Pakistan and the Islamic regions. A foreign policy alignment too closely with Western military actions against Iran could inflame sectarian tensions at home. It would also put Pakistan and Chinese strategic alignment to the test – as Iran is also an ally of China and Russia. Additionally, the aforementioned nations shared membership in the China dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

US Pakistan Relations

Under President Biden, Pakistan was often viewed critically and often through an India-centric lens, particularly in the context of counter-terrorism. In contrast, the Trump administration was initially expected to adopt a hardline stance toward Pakistan, recent events suggest a pragmatic recalibration driven by strategic needs. Moreover, Pakistan’s government has carried out an active trade and security outreach with the U.S. administration to demonstrate its economic and security potential. In remarks by CENTCOM Commander Gen. Michael Kurilla, or Trump’s own statements, there’s been notable recognition of Pakistan’s role beyond the narrow counterterrorism framework.

The performance of the Pakistani military during the brief conflict with India in May has raised its global stature. While both sides de-escalated after Trump administration negotiated a cease fire, Pakistan’s ability to outmaneuver a much larger adversary, despite its plaguing political and economic challenges, captured international attention and enhanced the credibility of its defense establishment. This strengthened perception has also prompted the US to reconfigure its engagement with Pakistan’s power centers—primarily its military—based on shared regional interests, particularly as tensions in the Middle East escalate.

Allied with the U.S., Pakistan has played a decisive security role in the Cold War and the Campaign Against Extremism. Due to this partnership, it received western economic and military assistance. Pakistan once again stands at the juncture of another critical role involving the change in global balance of power. U.S. would once again desire security relation with Pakistan and furthering of the future envisioned under the Abraham Accords. As the security situation related to Iran worsens, it’s possible that different brands of non-state actors operating from the region and beyond attempt to exploit the situation. Pakistan’s experience in managing extremists could become very useful. For this cooperation, U.S. could potentially assist in dealing with India, undo the suspension of Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), while moving forward with the trade deals.

Civil-Military Imbalance: A Familiar Pattern

While the Trump-Munir meeting may elevate Pakistan’s global profile, it also underscores a persistent internal challenge: the civil-military imbalance. The fact that such a high-level bilateral meeting involved the military chief—and not the elected civilian leadership—highlights the dominance of Pakistan’s military in both foreign policy and national security.

This imbalance perpetuates a troubling precedent in which strategic decisions of national consequence have to be made in private without discussion, consensus, or public ownership. Such secrecy has historically resulted in policies with long-term political, economic, and social consequences—often to the detriment of public trust and national cohesion.

The Trump-Munir meeting is emblematic of a shifting global landscape in which Pakistan finds itself once again at a strategic crossroads. The potential for a renewed, multifaceted partnership with the U.S. is real, but it hinges on careful diplomacy, a balance between competing alliances, and a rethinking of how power is exercised at home. As great power competition intensifies and both the Subcontinent and the Middle East become more volatile, Pakistan may well reemerge as a pivotal actor—if it can navigate both its external relations and internal governance with foresight and integrity.

The post What Does Trump-Munir Meeting Means for US-Pakistan Relations – As Iran-Israel Conflict Escalates? appeared first on Politact.

By Naade Ali
South Asia and Middle East Fellow, PoliTact

Context

The recent brief yet intense escalation between India and Pakistan has further exposed the fragile nature of South Asia’s security landscape. The four-day-long tit-for-tat cross-border military confrontation between the two nuclear-armed rivals has significantly undermined prospects for normalization, redefining the rules of engagement and signaling a shift in how both countries may manage their relationship moving forward. What began as a terrorist attack on Indian tourists in the Pahalgam region of the disputed India-administered Kashmir last month, resulting in the deaths of 26 people, quickly escalated into a significant diplomatic and military crisis.

India’s Strategic Shift: Operation Sindoor and the ‘New Normal

India hastily accused Pakistan of orchestrating the terror attacks and used the incident as justification to revise its military doctrine through the launch of Operation Sindoor.

In a public speech highlighting the goals of Operation Sindoor, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced what he described as reaching a ‘new normal,’ signaling a decisive departure from India’s earlier posture of restraint, long shaped by the perceived threat of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent. He emphasized that the new approach centered on firm and unyielding retaliation against terrorist attacks, including cross-border military operations and a deliberate refusal to distinguish between militant groups and their state sponsors—effectively placing direct responsibility on Pakistan for any acts of terrorism on Indian soil. Modi also stated that India would no longer be deterred by the threat of nuclear escalation, signaling a willingness to pursue bold and proactive actions despite potential risks. Having absorbed the initial Indian strikes, Pakistan, in response to the damage inflicted from Operation Sindoor, initiated its own military campaign named Banyan-Marsoos, targeting key Indian military targets to restore deterrence.

A Pause in Hostilities: U.S. Intervention and the Ceasefire

As the two countries climbed the escalation ladder, a surprise ceasefire announcement by U.S. President Trump on social media temporarily halted the hostilities. While the truce continues to hold, prospects for lasting peace remain uncertain. Inflammatory national rhetoric and the unresolved diplomatic deadlock continue to fuel tensions. At the core of the post-ceasefire period is a significant divide between India and Pakistan, each celebrating their military campaigns as a victory and viewing the outcome of their confrontation through a zero-sum lens. This has made the aftermath more complex and contentious than the conflict itself, while also revealing how both sides intend to manage their ongoing disputes moving forward. In this context, key questions have emerged: what does the temporary truce mean for the India-Pakistan rivalry, and what are its implications for the long-term stability of South Asia?

Experts Respond

On May 12, PoliTact hosted a panel discussion under the auspices of recently formed US-Pakistan Policy Forum titled: “India-Pakistan Tensions and the Way Forward,” moderated by its Chief Analyst, Arif Ansar. The session featured a distinguished panel, including Dr. Hassan Abbas, Chair of the Department of Regional and Analytical Studies at the U.S. National Defense University; Dr. Qamar ul Huda, Michael E. Paul Chair in International Affairs and Distinguished Visiting Professor at the U.S. Naval Academy; and Mr. Khaled Al Maeena, former Editor-in-Chief of Arab News and Saudi Gazette. The discussion centered on the implications of the recent ceasefire between India and Pakistan, the roles of international actors, and the significant obstacles to achieving long-term peace.

Will the Ceasefire Hold?

One of the key questions examined was whether the current ceasefire between India and Pakistan is likely to hold.

A cautious optimism emerged from Dr. Hassan Abbas, who expressed confidence that the ceasefire between India and Pakistan would likely hold — at least in the short term. He argued that both nations had achieved what they needed politically and militarily to step back from the brink. India could claim it had struck militant targets, while Pakistan could point to a successful air defense response. He emphasized that U.S. mediation had played a key role in facilitating the agreement and that both governments were likely committed to preventing further military action. However, he warned that unless deeper structural issues — particularly the Kashmir dispute and proxy militancy — were addressed diplomatically, this ceasefire would remain fragile.

Dr. Qamar ul Huda shared a more skeptical view. While not dismissing the ceasefire outright, he questioned its substance, noting the absence of a transparent or structured diplomatic process. The ceasefire, in his view, seemed to have emerged from informal channels — tweets and backchannel phone calls — rather than serious, trackable negotiations. He was concerned that such an approach lacked durability and legitimacy. Dr. Huda stressed that a real ceasefire requires more than silence on the battlefield; it demands diplomatic engagement on the root causes of conflict: Kashmir, water disputes, and terrorism. He also noted the potential influence of third-party actors, from China to Gulf states, and expressed concern over the lack of clarity in the U.S. position. In his view, the region wasn’t yet “ripe” for lasting peace, and without a comprehensive approach, this ceasefire might only be a pause rather than a turning point.

From a media and public sentiment angle, Mr. Khaled Al Maeena brought a grounded and people-centered perspective. He voiced deep concern over the role of Indian media, which he accused of fomenting hate and spreading misinformation that inflamed public opinion and made diplomacy politically costly. Drawing on conversations with people across religious and national lines, he asserted that the majority of Indians and Pakistanis want peace, not war. Mr. Al Maeena emphasized that the region’s pressing need was not military confrontation but economic development and political stability. He also highlighted the proactive role of Gulf states — especially Saudi Arabia — in de-escalating tensions. With ties to both India and Pakistan, and a vested interest in regional peace due to economic interdependence, Mr. Al Maeena saw the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia, as a credible mediator. While hopeful about the ceasefire’s potential, he underscored the importance of media responsibility, regional diplomacy, and leadership that prioritizes stability over nationalist bravado.

The panel discussed the evolving role of the Gulf states—particularly Saudi Arabia—as key international mediator. The panelists agreed that Saudi Arabia, with significant interests in both India and Pakistan, could play a constructive role in easing tensions. Mr. Khaled Al Maeena stressed that Saudi Arabia seeks regional stability, including in South Asia, and could facilitate dialogue, if requested, between the two rivals by encouraging both sides to come to the table and accept international mediation.

The panelists agreed that India and Pakistan must move beyond tactical ceasefires and pursue a comprehensive, long-term peace process—ideally supported by third-party mediation. The speakers emphasized that unless the two countries address their domestic challenges and regional rivalries, their aspirations will remain unmet.

What Role should US Play?

Throughout the discussion, the panelists recognized the United States as a pivotal external actor with the capacity to influence the trajectory of the India-Pakistan ceasefire. However, their assessments revealed a shared caution about the limitations and inconsistencies in the U.S. approach.

Dr. Abbas emphasized that U.S. involvement was instrumental in brokering the initial ceasefire, with both India and Pakistan reaching out to Washington behind the scenes. He argued that this reflected the high-level trust and strategic alignment both countries maintain with the U.S., albeit for different reasons. India is a key partner in the Indo-Pacific strategy and a counterbalance to China, while Pakistan has long-standing security and geopolitical ties to the U.S., particularly in the context of Afghanistan. However, Abbas cautioned that the U.S. influence alone cannot guarantee lasting peace. He urged Washington to move beyond tactical mediation and instead support long-term conflict resolution mechanisms, including structured dialogue on Kashmir and militancy. He also noted that U.S. credibility depends on maintaining a balanced posture, especially when public narratives in India resist outside interference.

Dr. Huda took a more critical and analytical stance on the U.S. role. He noted that while President Trump’s tweet announcing the ceasefire was widely reported, it lacked substantive follow-through or diplomatic backing. From his view in Washington, the ceasefire appeared to be the result of sporadic political gestures rather than coordinated U.S. policy. Huda questioned whether the U.S. is truly committed to sustained mediation or simply reacting to crises. He highlighted the ambiguity in U.S. policy—initially appearing indifferent, then suddenly claiming credit—and argued that this inconsistency undermines its ability to lead serious peace efforts. To sustain negotiations, the U.S. would need to invest diplomatically and involve multilateral partners, such as the EU, China, and Gulf states, in creating a legitimate and lasting peace framework.

Mr. Khaled Almaeena provided a regional and Gulf-centered perspective, acknowledging the U.S. role but emphasizing that regional actors—particularly Saudi Arabia—are just as important. He noted that while the U.S. has diplomatic leverage, it should not attempt to dominate the process unilaterally. Instead, he advocated for a collaborative approach, where the U.S. works in concert with Gulf countries and other stakeholders who maintain strong ties with both India and Pakistan. Mr. Al Maeena viewed President Trump’s announcement of the ceasefire with skepticism, suggesting it may have been more performative than strategic. He argued that the U.S. can help facilitate talks, but its influence must be exercised carefully and in support of locally driven, regionally endorsed initiatives.

In summary, the panelists suggested that while the U.S. remains a necessary actor for de-escalation, its role must evolve from crisis management to sustained diplomacy, ideally in partnership with regional powers who have both legitimacy and proximity to the conflict.

Great Power Rivalry and Peace Talks

In the discussion of whether the ceasefire between India and Pakistan could evolve into lasting peace, all three panelists acknowledged that great power dynamics—particularly involving China—play a critical role in shaping the strategic landscape of South Asia.

Dr. Qamar-ul Huda emphasized the geopolitical complexity introduced by China’s growing influence and the competing interests of major powers. He noted that China, along with the Gulf states, the EU, and the U.S., has shown interest in being involved in conflict resolution efforts between India and Pakistan. However, this multiplicity of actors creates a crowded diplomatic space, making coherent mediation more difficult. Dr. Huda pointed out that China’s strategic alignment with Pakistan and its rivalry with India complicate peace efforts. He also raised a broader concern: if India aspires to be a global leader, as envisioned through its role in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategy and the Quad alliance, it must demonstrate stability and responsible leadership in its own region. Repeated border skirmishes and crises with Pakistan, he argued, undermine India’s credibility as a reliable partner in the great power competition with China.

Dr. Hassan Abbas echoed these concerns, observing that China’s influence is an integral part of South Asia’s strategic fabric, particularly through its economic and military ties with Pakistan. He highlighted how Chinese military technology—especially fighter jets used by Pakistan—played a significant role in the recent skirmishes, which helped Pakistan demonstrate parity in air power despite India’s numerical advantage. Dr. Abbas saw China’s indirect support as a factor that emboldens Pakistan to resist Indian pressure and sustain its strategic posture. However, he also noted that the escalation ladder is becoming dangerously steep due to technological advancements and information warfare, increasing the risk of miscalculation in a region already shaped by great power rivalries.

Mr. Khaled Al Maeena took a broader, more diplomatic view, situating China within a network of powerful states — including the U.S. and Gulf nations — that have vested interests in regional stability. While not delving deeply into China’s military role, Mr. Al Maeena acknowledged that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are increasingly aware of China’s regional footprint, particularly through its economic initiatives like the Belt and Road. He suggested that China, like the U.S., could play a constructive role in diffusing tensions if it acts as a responsible stakeholder. However, he warned that foreign involvement, including by great powers, must be invited and balanced, as unilateral or self-interested interventions could backfire.

Collectively, the panelists agreed that China’s strategic position and the broader great power rivalry intensify the stakes in South Asia. While this rivalry may deter full-scale war, it also raises the risk of prolonged instability unless managed through inclusive and multilateral diplomacy.

Nuclear Environment and the Escalation Ladder

In examining how the India-Pakistan conflict unfolds within a nuclear framework, the panelists offered nuanced perspectives on the risks and realities of escalation.

Dr. Hassan Abbas presented a cautiously optimistic view, asserting that while both nations had indeed tested the boundaries of military engagement—through strikes, counterstrikes, and air skirmishes—they ultimately pulled back due to the overarching presence of nuclear deterrence. He emphasized that both sides were able to claim symbolic victories: India asserted it had targeted militant-linked sites, while Pakistan showcased its military preparedness and air defense capabilities, including the successful use of advanced Chinese aircraft. For Dr. Abbas, this demonstration of strength on both sides created the space for de-escalation, as neither nation was willing to push the conflict into full-scale war, knowing the devastating consequences of nuclear engagement. He remained confident that, despite heightened tensions, both countries were rational actors who understood the mutual destruction that a nuclear exchange would bring.

Dr. Qamar-ul Huda, meanwhile, offered a more cautious and critical interpretation. He characterized the pattern of India-Pakistan escalation as a dangerous cycle—an unending loop of skirmishes, retaliations, and brief periods of calm that lacked any strategic architecture. According to him, this repetitive behavior pointed to a fundamental weakness in regional diplomacy and governance. Despite the presence of nuclear weapons acting as a deterrent, he argued that the failure to address root causes—such as the Kashmir dispute, water-sharing tensions, and cross-border terrorism—meant that both countries continued to climb the escalation ladder in an ad hoc and reactive manner. Without institutional reforms or sustained international engagement, he warned, the region remained vulnerable to miscalculations that could spiral beyond control, even in a nuclear context.

Mr. Khaled Almaeena approached the issue from a societal and media perspective, underscoring how misinformation, media sensationalism, and hyper-nationalist rhetoric often play a more dangerous role in escalation than military strategy itself. Drawing comparisons to the “phony war” period of World War II, Mr. Al Maeena argued that the most recent flare-up between India and Pakistan resembled more of a media-fueled standoff than a genuine military confrontation. He criticized the Indian mainstream media in particular for manufacturing a climate of hostility, which in turn pressured political leaders to take aggressive stances to appease domestic audiences. In this environment, the escalation ladder becomes more volatile—not because of formal military decisions, but because public sentiment, stoked by inflammatory media narratives, compels leaders to act out of fear of appearing weak.

In essence, the three panelists painted a complex picture of escalation in South Asia. While they all agreed that nuclear deterrence plays a restraining role in preventing all-out war, they also highlighted different drivers of danger—be it military miscalculation, diplomatic failure, or media manipulation. The consensus was clear: the region may be protected by the logic of mutual destruction, but without responsible leadership, institutional dialogue, and media accountability, the rungs of the escalation ladder remain all too easy to climb.

Domestic Politics and Sustained Political Dialogue

As the conversation shifted from immediate military de-escalation to the prospect of sustained political dialogue, all three panelists highlighted domestic political dynamics in both India and Pakistan as central to whether the ceasefire could evolve into meaningful negotiations.

Dr. Abbas offered a deep dive into the Pakistani domestic landscape, emphasizing that the ceasefire had inadvertently strengthened the military establishment’s standing at a time when it was under intense public and political criticism—especially over its handling of the Imran Khan-led Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) movement. He noted that the military’s effective management of the immediate crisis had boosted its credibility and given the current coalition government some breathing room. However, he warned that without broader political consensus and constitutional legitimacy, Pakistan could not sustain a serious peace process. He stressed that internal unity, political stability, and inclusiveness—particularly reconciling with PTI’s large support base—would be necessary if Pakistan hoped to engage in long-term diplomacy with India.

Dr. Huda placed domestic politics within a broader governance and institutional context, particularly in Pakistan. He saw the moment as an opportunity for political re-examination, noting that recurring conflict cycles had revealed the deep fractures in the country’s political system. He emphasized the need for Pakistan’s political institutions to commit to constitutionalism and inclusivity, warning that sidelining popular political parties (such as PTI) or suppressing dissent only deepens instability. For Dr. Huda, sustainable negotiations—whether about the ceasefire or Kashmir—would require a bipartisan or multiparty consensus. In his view, the absence of such internal coherence would make Pakistan an unreliable negotiating partner, especially in the eyes of international actors.

Mr. Khaled Al Maeena focused more broadly on the popular mood and societal divide within both India and Pakistan. He warned that rising hate rhetoric, media manipulation, and political polarization—particularly in India—create an environment where leaders are constrained by nationalist pressures. In both countries, he argued, the public appetite for peace exists, but political elites often exploit nationalist sentiment for short-term gain. He called for leadership that could rise above partisanship and media-driven hysteria, emphasizing that economic development and social stability should be the common goals uniting political factions. Mr. Al Maeena also stressed that peace efforts cannot be externally imposed; they must be grounded in domestic political will and legitimacy.

The panelists agreed that no ceasefire or peace process can succeed without strong, credible, and inclusive domestic political foundations. While foreign mediation may help broker talks, lasting peace must come from within, supported by political leadership that reflects the will and aspirations of their people.

Related Research

Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States August 4, 2023
Examining Saudi-Iran Tensions And Its Impact On South Asia, China Jan 4, 2019

The post India-Pakistan Ceasefire And The Way Forward appeared first on Politact.

By Naade Ali
South Asia and Middle East Analyst

Context

Since the withdrawal of US and NATO troops from Afghanistan in the aftermath of 2020 Doha Agreement, tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan have frequently escalated. The differences reached their peak last year when the Pakistani military conducted targeted airstrikes in Afghanistan’s Barmal district, located in eastern Paktika province. The aim of the strike was to neutralize key Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) commanders and dismantle a media facility. In retaliation, the Afghan Taliban launched attacks on multiple targets, including military posts, beyond the Durand Line. In its messaging, the Afghan Defense Ministry further dismissed Pakistan’s claim over the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), now integrated into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP).

Adding to the strain, the Afghan Taliban collaborated with TTP forces in joint border offensives, resulting in prolonged skirmishes that significantly deteriorated bilateral relations. This year, clashes between the two militaries resumed in Khost province. On January 11, Taliban spokesperson Zabiullah Mujahid accused Pakistani forces of targeting civilian infrastructure in eastern Kunar province which resulted in casualties, and urged them to cease such actions. While border clashes became the new normal, Pakistan maintains that despite the tensions, it seeks friendly relations with Afghanistan.

What is clear is that the security situation in Pakistan has worsened by an acute increase in terrorist violence, with an estimated 4,000 TTP militants reportedly taking refuge in KP. These militants operate secretly, launching attacks on security forces at night and blending into civilian areas during the day. Recent reports from the KP police indicate that these militants often use civilians as shields, making counter terror operations particularly complex.

The opposition from certain local groups to military operations has further exacerbated these challenges. Political groups like the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI)-led government in KP have publicly criticized the military’s actions, even demanding its withdrawal from the region.

Pakistan’s policy on how to deal with TTP has swung between achieving a political solution to using force. The core of the issue is how to engage with the Afghan Taliban who have provided refuge to TTP, reciprocating the support TTP previously provided to Afghan Taliban that resulted in US and NATO withdrawal.

Political versus Military Solution

Recent reports indicate that Afghan Taliban government privately acknowledged the TTP as a problem but objected to Pakistan’s hardline approach in addressing the threat. Instead, the Afghan Taliban proposed dialogue as a solution, but Pakistan dismissed the TTP’s demands as unacceptable, ruling out negotiations. This development starkly contrasts with the Afghan Taliban’s official stance, which denies the presence of the TTP in Afghanistan and frames the issue as an internal matter for Pakistan. Taliban spokesperson Zabiullah Mujahid was observed saying, “The issue of the TTP or the war within Pakistan is a matter that pertains to that country. We are working to find a solution to this issue; however, it is not our matter. We will not allow Afghanistan’s soil to be used against any country, including Pakistan.”

The Afghan Taliban have consistently portrayed terrorism in Pakistan as an internal matter, and continued refusal to recognize the Durand Line as an international border. By fostering Pashtun nationalist sentiments in KP, the Taliban have undermined Pakistan’s territorial integrity and bolstered support for the TTP’s broader agenda.

The TTP’s ultimate aim of transforming KP into a province of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan aligns with the Taliban’s ideological goals, posing a long-term threat to Pakistan’s sovereignty. In response, Pakistan’s military leadership has labelled the TTP as Fitna Al Khawarij (anarchist infidels), using religious nationalism to delegitimize the group. However, this narrative has struggled to gain widespread public support and political ownership.

Adding to the diplomatic rhetoric, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, the deputy political minister of foreign affairs, stated that the Islamic Emirate would not permit external interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. He also urged neighboring countries, especially Pakistan, to reciprocate by avoiding interference in Afghanistan’s internal matters. His remarks highlighted Afghan Taliban’s resistance to Pakistan’s pressure for dismantling the TTP and relocating fighters from border regions. Despite terse diplomatic exchanges and rising hostilities, Pakistan acknowledged its “multilayered engagement” with the Afghan Taliban reflects the involvement of multiple actors working to de-escalate tensions.

Pakistan’s Shifting Afghan Policy

For Pakistan’s military, however, ceasing counter-terrorism operations would effectively allow the TTP to regroup and further destabilize the region. This sentiment was reiterated by the army chief during meetings with political factions in KP, where he urged unity against terrorism, stating, “The existence of the state ensures the existence of politics; God forbid, if there is no state, there is nothing. We must all stand united against terrorism, without any discrimination or prejudice.” He further emphasized, “Creating disorder is a grave sin, and without the state, nothing else matters.”

During a recent provincial-level security meeting in Peshawar, Pakistan’s army chief, General Asim Munir, described Afghanistan as a “brotherly neighbor” and an “Islamic country” with which Pakistan has always sought better relations. However, he emphasized, “The only difference with Afghanistan is the presence of Fitna al-Khawarij in Afghanistan and the spread of terrorism in Pakistan from across the border.”

General Munir expressed regret over the Afghan Taliban’s refusal to dismantle the TTP, stating that Pakistan had “exhausted all options” to persuade Afghanistan to curb cross-border militant attacks. He further remarked, “Our only policy is Pakistan,” signaling that national security remains paramount and that military operations against TTP-led terrorism would continue, even at the expense of heightened tensions with the Afghan Interim Government (AIG). His statements highlighted the culmination of months of unsuccessful diplomatic efforts and signaled a shift toward a more assertive stance against the TTP and its Afghan supporters.

Meanwhile, commenting on the current state of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, Foreign Office spokesperson Shafqat Ali Khan reiterated Islamabad’s call for the Kabul government to act against terrorist groups operating from sanctuaries across the border. FO spokesperson also dismissed reports of any Pakistani annexation of the Wakhan Corridor, affirming it as an inseparable part of Afghanistan and emphasizing Pakistan’s commitment to respecting Afghanistan’s territorial integrity. Some articles have recently indicated that Pakistan wants to disrupt Afghan Taliban plans to connect directly with China through the Wakhan Corridor, bypassing Pakistan.

China and Pak-Afghan Tensions

China holds significant geo-strategic stakes in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. As a key ally to Pakistan, China would face substantial setbacks if relations between the two neighbors further deteriorate. Beijing has sought to leverage its Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Global Development Initiative (GDI) as frameworks to promote peace, counter-terrorism cooperation, and economic development in the region. Chinese Ambassador to Afghanistan Zhao Xing, in a recent interaction with Taliban leaders, proposed key strategies to enhance collaboration with Afghanistan, which could potentially restore its strained relations with Pakistan.

Speaking at an event commemorating 70 years of diplomatic ties between China and Afghanistan, Zhao emphasized the need for mutual respect, trust-building, and expanded cooperation. He commented, “In today’s complex international environment, China and Afghanistan must respect each other’s core interests, build mutual trust, and expand cooperation in all areas. We must work toward a shared future.” Beijing’s proposals align with the broader goals of the GSI, which emphasizes collective security and regional stability, and the GDI, which focuses on infrastructure development and economic connectivity.

Whether these overtures offered by China will influence AIG to reassess their approach towards Pakistan remains to be seen. So far, their guarantees of not allowing their territory to be used against Pakistan have proven ineffective, raising questions about the extent of their willingness to cooperate. At the same time, China’s growing engagement with Afghanistan underscores its desire to mediate tensions between Islamabad and Kabul while protecting its own strategic interests in the region.

Strategic and Regional Implications

Pakistan’s shifting stance toward AIG reflects its growing mistrust and a potential re-calibration of its approach. This is occurring in the backdrop of emerging reports indicating internal power struggles between the Kandhari and Kabuli factions within the Afghan Taliban. A notable meeting between Pakistan’s DG ISI and Tajikistan’s President recently hinted at Islamabad’s interest in engaging with regional actors to achieve its security objectives. Tajikistan holds a pivotal position in Afghanistan’s internal dynamics, serving as a base for the leadership of the National Resistance Front (NRF). Actively resisting the Taliban since 2021, the NRF has welcomed Pakistan’s expanding security ties with Tajikistan and its call for an inclusive and legitimate Afghan government.

The return of the Trump administration is expected to strain Taliban-U.S. relations further while potentially boosting support for the NRF. The Afghan Taliban, despite attempts to restore ties with the Trump administration, face strong criticism. Trump has signaled continued pressure through sanctions, withholding recognition, and linking financial aid to the return of U.S. military equipment. Trump’s remarks, including his emphasis on recovering military assets left behind in Afghanistan, underscore his administration’s tough stance towards the Taliban regime, particularly as they relate to human rights abuses.

On the other hand, the NRF sees an opportunity to align with the U.S., positioning itself as a viable alternative force to counter terrorism in Afghanistan. NRF representatives, including foreign relations head Maisum Nazari, have expressed optimism about American support, highlighting their willingness to combat Al-Qaeda and IS with adequate backing. If the Trump administration extends support to the NRF, it would mark a significant blow to AIG and could enable Pakistan to reassess its regional strategy too. Aligning with the NRF, however, would be a controversial move for Pakistan, potentially antagonizing domestic Pashtun and religio-political factions like Jamiat-e-Islam Fazal and Jamat-e-Islami.

Meanwhile, the AIG, recognizing the shifting regional dynamics, have sought to diversify their alliances by strengthening ties with Pakistan’s adversary, India, and the U.S.’s rival, Russia. Though these partnerships are primarily focused on economic cooperation, the AIG’s interest in expanding them into defense agreements poses a serious challenge to Pakistan. A closer alignment between Afghanistan and India could weaken Islamabad’s efforts to counter India’s influence in the region. Additionally, if Russia transitions from economic cooperation to defense collaboration, it would further complicate Pakistan’s security landscape.

Domestic Challenges

Domestically, Pakistan faces significant hurdles in developing a unified counter-terrorism strategy. Political instability and ethnic divisions have hindered efforts to effectively address the TTP threat. Long-standing grievances among marginalized Pashtun and Baloch communities have been exploited by anti-Pakistan elements, including the Afghan Taliban, to fuel sub-nationalist movements.

To counter this, Pakistan’s military leadership has sought to promote national unity, emphasizing Islam’s role in uniting the country’s diverse ethnic and cultural groups. The army chief has strongly condemned groups threatening Pakistan’s national integrity, branding them as enemies of both Islam and the state. However, this approach has faced criticism for its inconsistency, targeting the TTP while sparing the Afghan Taliban. This selective narrative undermines Pakistan’s counter-terrorism efforts and weakens its credibility.

Conclusion

The on-going tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan has been exacerbated by the mishandling of the TTP issue. The Afghan Taliban’s refusal to sever ties with the TTP, rejection of the Durand Line, and manipulation of ethnic sentiments continue to undermine Pakistan’s national security and territorial integrity. While Pakistan has received international recognition for its stance against the TTP, its inconsistent counter-terrorism narrative and fractured domestic strategy weaken its position. The AIG’s growing ties with India and Russia further complicate Pakistan’s geopolitical calculus, particularly as Islamabad has recently succeeded in re-calibrating its relationships with Bangladesh.

To navigate these challenges, Pakistan must adopt a cohesive strategy that balances military action with diplomatic efforts. However, without political unity and public ownership this approach is unlikely to work. While continued engagement with the Afghan Taliban is a necessity, Pakistan should also explore alternatives. Encouraging China, Russia, Turkey, and Gulf nations to diplomatically pressure the Taliban into forming an inclusive government. At the same time, Pakistan must engage with all political factions in Afghanistan to oppose the TTP.

Related Articles:
Political Or Military Solution; Pakistan’s New Counter-Terrorism Operation Azm-e-Istehkam – Aug 1, 2024
Convergences in US Pakistan Ties and Afghanistan – Jan 1, 2024
Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP – Feb 22, 2023
Post Withdrawal Campaign Against Extremism In Afghanistan And US-Pakistan Relations – Sep 7, 2022
Emerging US Policy Towards Afghanistan After Withdrawal – March 2, 2022
Recalibrating The US-Pakistan Partnership In Afghanistan – Jun 22, 2021
US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden – Mar 2, 2021

A version of this article was also published in Defence Journal Pakistan.

The post Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions, Trump, And Wakhan Corridor appeared first on Politact.

Context

The saga of the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline project is a stark illustration of how geopolitical complexities can impede critical infrastructure development, even when the need is dire. For Pakistan, a country grappling with chronic energy shortages, this pipeline has long represented a beacon of hope for economic stability and growth. Yet, for decades, it has remained tantalizing out of reach, a victim of international pressures, regional rivalries, and economic challenges.

The story begins in 2010 when Pakistan, facing an escalating energy crisis, signed a landmark deal with Iran to construct a 2,750-kilometer pipeline. Initially valued at $7.5 billion, the project promised to be a game-changer for Pakistan’s energy sector. The potential impact was significant: according to a USIP report, Pakistan’s persistent power crisis was trimming off about 2 percent of the country’s annual domestic product[1]. Furthermore, a World Bank study estimated that power shortages in developing countries like Pakistan could reduce business profitability by up to 40 percent[2]. These figures underscored the critical nature of the project for Pakistan’s economic well-being and future growth prospects.

Economic and Geopolitical Realities

From its inception, the project has been shadowed by the looming threat of U.S. sanctions. Unlike India, which received exemptions for its involvement in Iran’s Chabahar port, or Afghanistan, which was granted allowances for trade through Iran, Pakistan has consistently faced stern warnings from Washington about the consequences of proceeding with the pipeline. This disparity in treatment reflects the complex web of U.S. strategic interests in the region. India is viewed as a potential counterweight to China’s growing influence, while for Afghanistan Chabahar represents and alternative for its dependence on Pakistan. Pakistan, with its complex relationship with the U.S. and close ties to China, finds itself in a less favorable position.

The US policy towards Pakistan, Iran, and India have different ambitions. The situation demonstrates the complexity of international relations, where strict policy adherence often gives way to strategic exceptions based on broader geopolitical goals. The American approach has been criticized for its inconsistency, but from the U.S. perspective, it reflects a nuanced balancing of various strategic interests in the region. Using exceptions and restrictions as tools allows U.S, to influence foreign policy choices of regional players.

The geopolitical landscape has further complicated Pakistan’s position. Historically, tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran meant that Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations were hesitant to support a project that could increase Iran’s influence and decrease Pakistan’s financial dependence on them. Especially because Iran’s influence in the Middle East has consistently been increasing. China and Iran also signed $400 billion-dollar strategic economic agreement in 2021.

While the Chinese facilitated Saudi-Iran détente reached in 2023 offered a glimmer of hope, it has not significantly altered the dynamics surrounding the pipeline project. This hesitation from traditional allies has left Pakistan in a precarious position, caught between its energy needs and its diplomatic relationships. Moreover, the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel has further hardened positions against Iran.

Pakistan’s economic instability has added another layer of difficulty. The country’s frequent need for IMF bailouts and its struggle to finance large-scale infrastructure projects have made the pipeline’s completion seem increasingly elusive. As years passed, the project’s costs escalated, and the global political and security environment became even more convoluted, making it more challenging for Pakistan to move forward. In August 2023, Pakistan announced the suspension of the project due to the threat of U.S. sanctions, highlighting the ongoing pressures and uncertainties surrounding the initiative.

The failure of alternative energy projects has exacerbated Pakistan’s predicament. Initiatives like TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline) and CASA 1000 (Central Asia-South Asia power project) have stalled, often citing security concerns in Afghanistan and Baluchistan. Consequently, Pakistan remains heavily reliant on expensive Independent Power Producers (IPPs), a situation that undermines the competitiveness of its exports in the global market. This dependence on costly energy sources creates a vicious cycle, hampering economic growth and making it even more difficult for Pakistan to invest in long-term energy solutions.

Meanwhile, regional dynamics have shifted dramatically. India has made significant strides in enhancing its connectivity to Central Asia through the Chabahar port, effectively bypassing Pakistan. In May 2024, India signed a 10-year agreement to develop and operate Iran’s strategic Chabahar Port, committing $120 million, along with an additional $250 million loan credit facility for related projects. This development not only provides India with strategic advantages but also highlights the opportunities Pakistan is missing due to its inability to complete the pipeline project. The Chabahar port offers India an opportunity to reestablish its presence in Afghanistan and enhance its access to Central Asian markets, areas where Pakistan could have played a pivotal role had the pipeline project moved forward.

The Opportunity Cost

The opportunity cost for Pakistan is substantial and multifaceted. Economically, the completion of the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline could have significantly reduced Pakistan’s energy import bill. Conservative estimates suggest that access to Iranian natural gas could have saved Pakistan billions of dollars annually in energy costs[3]. This reduction in energy expenses would have had a cascading positive effect on the economy, potentially boosting GDP growth by 1-2% per annum[4].

Moreover, the availability of reliable and affordable energy would have been a boon for Pakistan’s industrial sector. Many industries, particularly textiles – a key export sector for Pakistan – have suffered due to inconsistent power supply. With a steady supply of natural gas, these industries could have operated at full capacity, potentially increasing export revenues by 15-20% annually[5].

The pipeline could have also played a crucial role in reducing Pakistan’s dependence on the IMF. By stabilizing energy costs and boosting industrial output, Pakistan could have improved its foreign exchange reserves and reduced its current account deficit. Economic projections suggest that over a 10-year period, the pipeline could have contributed to reducing Pakistan’s external debt by 20-25%, significantly altering its financial landscape and reducing the need for frequent IMF interventions[6].

Furthermore, the project had the potential to transform Pakistan into an energy corridor, linking Iran to the vast markets of South Asia. This role could have brought in significant transit fees and positioned Pakistan as a key player in regional energy dynamics. Conservative estimates put potential transit fee earnings at $500 million to $1 billion annually, a substantial boost to Pakistan’s foreign exchange earnings[7].

The environmental impact is another overlooked aspect. Natural gas, being a cleaner fuel compared to oil and coal, could have helped Pakistan meet its climate change commitments more effectively. The shift to gas could have reduced carbon emissions by 15-20% in the power sector alone, contributing to global climate goals while also improving local air quality[8].

Navigating the Future

As Pakistan grapples with these lost opportunities and ongoing challenges, it finds itself at a critical juncture. The country must navigate the escalating great power rivalry between the United States and China while addressing its pressing energy needs. In this context, Pakistan could consider a multi-faceted approach to move forward.

Firstly, Pakistan should intensify its diplomatic efforts with the United States, emphasizing the project’s importance for regional stability and economic development. Framing the pipeline as a crucial element for broader international goals in the region might help in securing exemptions or finding a middle ground. This approach could involve highlighting how energy security in Pakistan contributes to overall regional stability, a key U.S. foreign policy objective. A more economically stable Pakistan could be a more effective partner in fighting extremism and promoting regional security.

Engaging with Iran through economic projects could provide more diplomatic leverage for the international community in negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program. While the pipeline would benefit Iran, it would also make Iran more dependent on its neighbors for economic stability, potentially increasing leverage in nuclear negotiations.

Secondly, Pakistan could leverage the improved Saudi-Iran relations to garner support from GCC countries. This diplomatic outreach should be coupled with a renewed focus on diversifying energy sources, including accelerating the development of domestic resources and exploring alternative gas import options. The recent geopolitical shifts in the Middle East offer a unique opportunity for Pakistan to reposition itself in regional energy dynamics.

Thirdly, Pakistan should consider a phased implementation of the pipeline project, starting with sections less likely to trigger immediate sanctions. This approach could be complemented by exploring technical solutions that might mitigate sanctions risks, such as processing Iranian gas at the border. By breaking the project into smaller, more manageable phases, Pakistan might be able to demonstrate progress and build momentum while navigating complex international regulations.

Furthermore, Pakistan needs to reduce political polarization and strengthen its economic foundations through structural reforms. Improving the investment climate to attract foreign investment in the energy sector and reducing dependence on external financial support would put Pakistan in a stronger position to pursue its energy security goals. These reforms could include streamlining bureaucratic processes, enhancing transparency in the energy sector, and developing a clear, long-term energy policy that prioritizes sustainable and affordable energy sources.

In the broader context of great power rivalry, Pakistan should maintain a balanced approach between the U.S. and China. Leveraging relationships with both nations, while also exploring multilateral forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and potentially BRICS, could open new avenues for support and cooperation on energy projects. This balanced approach could involve positioning the pipeline project as part of a broader regional connectivity initiative that benefits multiple stakeholders, potentially making it more palatable to international partners.

The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline project remains a symbol of unfulfilled potential in regional cooperation and energy security. Its completion could catalyze a transformation in Pakistan’s economic landscape, potentially adding 2-3% to annual GDP growth, creating hundreds of thousands of jobs, and significantly reducing the country’s carbon footprint. The ripple effects would extend beyond Pakistan’s borders, fostering regional integration and potentially contributing to stability in a volatile region.

As Pakistan continues to navigate the complex interplay of domestic needs and international pressures, the path forward requires astute diplomacy, economic resilience, and strategic foresight. By addressing these challenges head-on and adapting to the evolving geopolitical landscape, Pakistan may yet find a way to turn this long-delayed project into a reality. The stakes are high – not just for Pakistan’s energy security, but for its economic future and its role in an increasingly interconnected region.

The coming years will be crucial in determining whether Pakistan can overcome the hurdles that have long delayed this project. Success would not only secure a more stable energy future for its people but could also redefine Pakistan’s position in the regional and global economic order. The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline, therefore, represents more than just an energy project; it is a test of Pakistan’s ability to navigate complex geopolitical waters and emerge as a key player in the changing dynamics of South and Central Asia.

References:

[1] United States Institute of Peace (USIP) report on Pakistan’s energy crisis (2023)

[2] World Bank study on power shortages in developing countries (2022)

[3] Asian Development Bank (ADB) report on South Asian energy trade (2021)

[4] International Monetary Fund (IMF) country report on Pakistan (2023)

[5] Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Annual Export Data (2023)

[6] Economic projections by Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) (2022)

[7] Estimates from Pakistan’s Ministry of Energy (Petroleum Division) (2021)

[8] Pakistan’s Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to the Paris Agreement (2021)

Related Links:

Iran-Pakistan Cross-Border Clashes And Deep-Rooted Challenges

Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States

The Future and Politics of Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project

The post The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities appeared first on Politact.