By Arif Ansar

Context

The fragile security landscape of South Asia is increasingly tied to the volatile geopolitics of the Middle East. As the tripartite tensions involving the United States, Israel, and Iran simmer, the shockwaves are felt acutely in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and for that matter India as well. To fully comprehend this equation, one must analyze the internal regional dynamics of South Asia first and then trace how they intersect with the unfolding Middle Eastern crisis.

The successful negotiation and remote signing of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on June 17, 2026, by U.S. President Donald Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, marked a monumental achievement for Pakistan’s civil-military leadership. If the Islamabad MoU sticks, in its current or reformed form, and transitions into a durable peace agreement, it holds the potential to fundamentally rewrite Pakistan’s domestic security, energy, and economic paradigms.

1. The Regional Dynamics: South Asia’s Internal Fault Lines

The relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan is currently defined by severe friction rather than neighborly cooperation. At the center of this tension is the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an extremist group that has escalated its terror campaign inside Pakistan. Pakistan accuses the Afghan Taliban of providing safe havens and tacit support to the TTP—a claim the Taliban administration in Kabul denies, though the cross-border nature of TTP attacks remains a persistent flashpoint.

Concurrently, Pakistan’s southwestern province of Balochistan is facing a severe security crisis. The insurgent groups such as Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) are demanding independence for the resource-rich province, has dramatically escalated its attacks against the Pakistani military.

Media reports suggest that the BLA is receiving strategic cooperation and material support from the TTP, creating a combined internal security challenge for Islamabad. Pakistan alleges that the BLA receives external backing from India to destabilize the country. India and Israel are exceptionally close strategic allies, sharing deep defense, intelligence, and counter-terrorism partnerships.

There is great power rivalry part of the equation too. BLA has repeatedly targeted Chinese infrastructure projects and personnel associated with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in Balochistan in other parts of the country, aiming to disrupt Pakistan’s economic lifeline and strain its relationship with Beijing.

2. The Middle East Equation: The Islamabad MoU and Saudi Defense Commitments

To understand how these South Asian fault lines link to the Middle East, one must look at Pakistan’s diplomatic balancing act. The nation has historically maintained a delicate equilibrium: keeping close ties with Saudi Arabia, and other GCC nations, while managing a long, porous border with its neighbor, Iran.

The Islamabad MoU

In mid-2026, Pakistan’s diplomatic corps, alongside Qatar, achieved a historic breakthrough by mediating the Islamabad MoU. This 14-point framework agreement successfully brought the U.S. and Iran to a temporary ceasefire, temporarily halting direct military hostilities, lifting the U.S. naval blockade on Iranian ports, and opening the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz. This diplomatic triumph cemented Pakistan’s role as a vital regional mediator. However, as hostilities have broken again indicating the stability of the Islamabad MoU remains incredibly fragile.

The Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA)

Compounding this fragility is Pakistan’s security obligation to Riyadh. On September 17, 2025, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA). Echoing NATO’s Article 5 language, the SMDA treats “any aggression against either country as an aggression against both”.

If an all-out war breaks out in the Middle East, a dangerous chain reaction is highly likely. Ansar Allah (the Houthis) in Yemen are highly likely to close the Babul Mandab Strait and launch retaliatory ballistic missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia. Faced with direct attacks, Saudi Arabia will almost certainly invoke the SMDA. Reports indicate that under the confidential terms of the pact, Pakistan could be required to deploy up to 80,000 troops to secure Saudi borders. Sooner or later, Pakistan will be forced to choose between entering a foreign conflict to defend Saudi Arabia or reneging on its defense pact, which would devastate its economic and strategic relations with the Gulf.

3. Implications of a Worsening Middle East Conflict on Pakistan and Afghanistan

If the Middle East situation continues to deteriorate, the consequences will ripple across South Asia, severely impacting Pakistan and Afghanistan, and India across military, economic, and social domains.

Pakistan is already heavily engaged in counter-insurgency operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) against the TTP, and in Balochistan against the BLA and BLF, the Pakistani military is stretched thin. Faced with a domestic security crisis, coming to the active defense of Saudi Arabia would be an immense logistical and military strain. Knowing this, adversaries like India and Israel are highly likely to speed up their destabilizing activities inside Pakistan. By utilizing existing proxies, they can ensure that Pakistan remains too deeply entangled in internal security crises to project military power or assist its Gulf allies.

This regional sabotage directly undermines Washington’s strategic goals. The U.S. relies on Pakistan’s diplomatic weight to mediate with Tehran, as seen with the Islamabad MoU. A destabilized Pakistan is a nation that cannot play a constructive role in preventing a wider regional war in the Middle East or contribute towards the success of new vision for the Middle East – under the Abraham Accords and subsequent establishment of Board of Peace.

The Explosion of Sectarian Strife

A direct conflict involving Iran—the primary Shia power—and the U.S., Israel, or Sunni Arab Gulf states will instantly inflame sectarian fault lines in South Asia. Both Pakistan Afghanistan have sizable Shia minorities that have historically been targeted by hardline Sunni extremist groups. While India also has a sizeable Shia population, and while Muslims there face state repression, Shia’s there have not been targeted in a similar fashion.

A worsening Middle East war will be actively exploited by transnational terror networks, most notably Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISIS-K). ISIS-K, which operates across both Afghanistan and Pakistan, views Shia Muslims as heretics and has frequently targeted their mosques, community centers, and schools.

In Afghanistan: The ruling Taliban, while ideologically hardline Sunni, has sought to maintain basic internal stability. However, a regional sectarian war will severely test their control. ISIS-K will use the anti-Iran, anti-Shia rhetoric of the wider conflict to recruit disgruntled fighters, escalating attacks on the Shia Hazara community and challenging Taliban authority.

In Pakistan: Sectarian violence has historically claimed thousands of lives. An active war involving Iran and Saudi Arabia could trigger a revival of sectarian proxy wars on Pakistani soil, pitting localized militant groups against one another and further fracturing the country’s social cohesion.

4. Economic Devastation and Connectivity Collapses

The economic fallout of a prolonged Middle East war on Pakistan and Afghanistan would be catastrophic.

Energy and Remittance Shocks

Pakistan imports the vast majority of its oil and gas from the Gulf. A disruption in the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab el-Mandeb would cause global oil prices to skyrocket, triggering hyperinflation in Pakistan’s fragile, debt-burdened economy. Furthermore, millions of Pakistani expatriates live and work in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. If the Middle East slides into a broader war, many of these workers could be forced to return home, cutting off the vital stream of foreign remittances that keeps Pakistan’s economy afloat.

The Death of Regional Connectivity

Both Afghanistan and Pakistan have pinned their economic futures on becoming trade hubs. Afghanistan under the Taliban has sought to utilize Iran’s Chabahar Port and the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) to bypass landlocked constraints and reduce its dependence on Pakistani transit routes.

While the Islamabad MoU briefly revived hopes for these transit corridors, an escalation of the war would render these infrastructure projects dead on arrival. Iranian ports would once again become military targets, isolating Afghanistan economically and pushing it deeper into poverty, which in turn breeds further radicalization and instability. Moreover, in the recent escalation, reports indicate that US has also targeted Chabahar port to increase pressure on Iran.

5. Conclusion: A Dangerous Convergence

The potential escalation of the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict is not a localized Middle Eastern issue; it is a direct threat to the stability of South Asia. For Pakistan, the war represents an existential geopolitical trap, forcing it to balance a strict mutual defense treaty with Saudi Arabia against the reality of a heavily armed neighbor in Iran and a domestic theater crawling with active insurgencies. For Afghanistan, the conflict threatens to fuel the fires of ISIS-K’s sectarian violence and destroy any hopes of regional economic integration.

As external actors seek to exploit these vulnerabilities, the line between the Middle East’s conflicts and South Asia’s internal wars is rapidly dissolving. If the Islamabad MoU completely unravels, Pakistan and Afghanistan will find themselves directly in the line of fire of a wider, highly destructive regional war.

Conversely:

If the Islamabad MoU “sticks” and transitions from a fragile ceasefire into a durable peace agreement, it holds the potential to fundamentally rewrite Pakistan’s domestic security, energy, and economic paradigms.

a. Security: Strangling Proxies

By capitalizing on its diplomatic leverage from mediating between the U.S. and Iran, Pakistan can demand reciprocal action against cross-border threats. A secure Iran, freed from Western military threats, can work with the Pakistan Army to seal the lawless border, choking the logistics and safe havens of the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) favored by India and Israel. Simultaneously, a stabilized region enables a unified U.S.-Pakistan-Iran diplomatic front to pressure the Afghan Taliban. Highly dependent on Pakistani and Iranian transit trade (like Chabahar Port), Kabul would be forced to dismantle the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). This double clampdown effectively ends the multi-front subversion designed by adversaries to keep Pakistan tactically entrapped.

b. Economy & Energy: Resurrecting the IP Pipeline

A durable reformed MoU triggers the lifting of U.S. sanctions on Iran, allowing Pakistan to complete the Iran-Pakistan (IP) Gas Pipeline without fear of international isolation. This removes the looming $18 billion “take-or-pay” penalty from Tehran, while injecting cheap natural gas to end rolling blackouts and slash industrial costs. Moreover, Gwadar Port is likely to take-off.

c. Autonomy: Balancing GCC Ties

Abundant energy and secured Central Asian trade routes drive organic growth, offering financial self-reliance and breaking Pakistan’s dependency on Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) bailouts. This shields Islamabad from strategic entrapment under its Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) with Riyadh, preserving its neutrality instead of dragging its military into regional proxy wars.

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What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply? – Aug 4, 2022

The post US-Iran War And Alternative Futures For South Asia appeared first on Politact.

By Furqan Khan
Great Power Politics Fellow, PoliTact

Context

President Donald Trump is set to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping this week in Beijing, a summit originally scheduled for April and was stalled due to the ongoing US-Iran war. With the conflict carrying enormous economic consequences due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, it is likely to be a major point of discussion at the summit. What was expected to be a reset moment for US-China relations is now overshadowed by the Middle East conflict, which carries significant implications for the global economy.

Conflict at an Impasse Stage

After the initial Islamabad Talks failed to ease tensions between Iran and the United States, Pakistan’s shuttle diplomacy has reopened the lines of communication between Washington and Tehran. Tensions escalated after Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz in response to the US’ refusal to end the blockade of Iranian ports. While a ‘fragile’ truce remains in place, negotiations are stalled and fears of escalation are growing as the two parties recently exchanged fire in the Persian Gulf. After rejecting Iran’s proposal to open the Strait of Hormuz and end the war, which also suggested delaying negotiations over the nuclear program, Trump reviewed another 14-point proposal from Iran, but has expressed doubts – and later rejected another version. Meanwhile, domestic opposition in the US to the war is growing, which has already cost $25 billion. Moreover, the conflict has caused extensive damage to the US military assets across the Middle East and raised the gasoline price to its highest level in four years.

In the big picture, as the US jumps into another war in the Middle East, diverting its resources from the Pacific, it is pertinent to highlight what this conflict means for China, and its interests in the Middle East, as it also embroils in great power competition.

What is at Stake for China?

Since the beginning of this conflict, China has consistently condemned the US-Israel joint strikes on Iran in February that killed Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and demanded an immediate ceasefire. China has released numerous statements criticizing America’s broader approach to international affairs, and calling the US’ blockade of the Strait of Hormuz “dangerous and irresponsible.” Without mentioning the Iran war or blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, President Xi has criticized American actions in the Gulf, saying that the world may be returning to the “law of the jungle.”

China has substantial stakes in this conflict. It relies heavily on the Strait of Hormuz for more than a third of its energy imports. China remains Iran’s largest trading partner, and over 80 percent of its crude goes to Beijing. At the same time, China has deep economic and investment ties in the Gulf states, and the Strait of Hormuz being critical for its energy supplies, Beijing has leveraged diplomacy to seek an end to this conflict.

The China Hand

The US has accused both China and Russia of providing dual-use equipment and satellite imagery enabling Iran to target US positions in the region. The New York Times and CNN reported, citing US intelligence sources, that China was preparing a shipment of weapons, including anti-aircraft missiles, to Tehran. China has denied these claims, calling them “untrue,” and stating that China opposes such “ill-intentioned conduct.”

As he is set to meet President Xi this week, Trump also played down Chinese assistance to Iran, mentioning Chinese President Xi Jinping’s reassurance that China is not providing any weapons to Iran, while warning of “big problems” for Beijing in case they do so.

The war benefits China in many ways. The spike in oil and gas prices is pushing American allies, from the European Union to the United Kingdom – and from South Korea to the Philippines, into China’s clean energy infrastructure. They see it as a long-term solution to protect their economies. China may also be relieved seeing its rival getting bogged down in yet another war with declining credibility among its allies and the diversion of the American fleet from the Pacific. The US military has already expended an enormous amount of critical munitions that could potentially be used in a future conflict with China. China also appears most resilient in terms of energy security, given its huge oil reserves – the largest in the world. According to a recent report, China has enough oil stored to cover seven months of imports via Hormuz.

However, a conflict with wider economic and security risks reverberating throughout the region is not what China wants. Prolonged instability will threaten global markets and cause supply chain challenges. Moreover, the rising oil prices is already hurting the Chinese economy, making the Iran war and opening of the Strait of Hormuz a central concern for the upcoming Trump-Xi meeting.

China’s Leverage Over Iran

China has a strategic partnership with Iran, which is reflected in the 25-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed in March 2021. This included a massive $400 billion Chinese investment in Iran and defense cooperation in exchange for the discounted purchase of Iranian oil. The partnership allows Tehran to bypass Western sanctions while giving Beijing long-term energy security. China has also expanded its diplomatic footprint in the region by brokering a peace agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2021, helping the two rival Gulf states restore diplomatic relations.

Despite strong economic and security ties with Iran, China’s leverage has been limited. Nonetheless, Beijing’s role has been consistent, limited, and largely predictable. Chinese officials have used their conventional shuttle diplomacy, where Foreign Minister Wang Yi dialed nearly all regional partners and played its role in the UN Security Council, calling for a negotiated settlement. Beijing also joined Islamabad, the principal mediator in this conflict, to issue a joint ‘five-point initiative’ to end the war in the Middle East. At the same time, as both the New York Times and the Washington Post reported, China actively pursued the Iranians to agree to the initial two-week-long ceasefire.

A week before the Trump-Xi summit, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi met FM Wang Yi in Beijing, where Araqchi supported President Xi’s four-point proposal to end the conflict, reaffirming his “trust” in China. As part of his regional diplomacy, FM Araqchi also met Russian President Vladmir Putin in Moscow to discuss the war and continue “consultation” on regional and international issues. Trump held his own phone call with Putin during which the later expressed interest in playing an active role in ending hostilities in the US-Iran war. Trump, however, rebuffed the proposal and instead pressed Putin on ending the Ukraine war.

China’s response reflects a cautious great power strategy, where Beijing is concerned about the risks of conflict escalation but is also reaping its limited geopolitical benefits. It has not been pursuing the role of a mediator but rather a great power concerned about its broader interests in the region. Nonetheless, given its diverse energy sources and limited strategic commitment to Iran, China appears to be confident at managing the risks of this conflict.

Trump-Xi Summit 2026

As the two leaders meet this week, the Iran war and the resulting energy crisis will likely be a potential point of discussion. Trump’s announcement to continue the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, which China uses to import one-third of its energy needs, complicates the process of seeking a reset on major issues, including bilateral trade with China.

Tensions are already mounting as the two powers are taking actions against each other’s firms. The Trump administration recently sanctioned China’s largest refiners and threatened secondary sanctions against Chinese banks for facilitating Iran’s economy. Beijing has blocked Meta’s $2 Billion bid to acquire the AI startup Manus, an attempt to keep cutting-edge AI technology inside China.

The rare Trump-Xi summit is an opportunity for both competitors to bring the US-China relations on track following their trade truce in October last year. Trump realizes this and has been seeking a deal with Iran before the Summit. He wants to meet Xi from a position of strength and not with an unresolved conflict he started, alongside Israel, two months ago, which may now be giving the Chinese side an advantage. With the Iran war hanging over the summit, the meeting will may fall short of the expected outcomes in seeking a reset to the US-China bilateral relations.

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The post Iran War Overhangs Trump-Xi 2026 Summit appeared first on Politact.

The Geography of Stalemate: Risk Thresholds, Narrative Warfare, and the Quest for a New Regional Order

By Naade Ali

Context

Since the war began, it has become clear that the U.S., Israel, and Iran operate with fundamentally different risk thresholds—and those differences shape their strategies. The U.S. is less willing to tolerate prolonged economic strain but more inclined to employ overwhelming force, assuming it will bring the conflict to a swift conclusion. Israel, on the other hand, is betting on a scenario in which Iranian strikes on Gulf states provoke diplomatic backlash, potentially drawing those states into retaliatory action. Such a chain of events could pave the way for the broader regional alignment envisioned by Prime Minister Netanyahu, aimed at countering “radical Shi’a and Sunni forces” and ultimately weakening the Iranian regime. Israel, therefore, is prepared to bear the costs necessary to make this outcome possible.

From Iran’s perspective, the goal is to prevent this scenario from unfolding while influencing on GCC that American military presence on their soil has a cost and no benefit. Iran’s mosaic military doctrine is designed to endure sustained pressure while simultaneously increasing unpredictability and risk, making its actions more dangerous and uncertain. This high-risk tolerance remains one of its few tools to establish and maintain deterrence—something it is unlikely to compromise.

Iran’s geography plays a key role in its Anti-Access/Area-Denial

At present, it appears that the world’s most advanced military systems, equipped with cutting-edge and futuristic capabilities, are fundamentally constrained by geographical realities. Iran’s geography is a central “force multiplier” for its Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategy, effectively turning the country into a natural fortress that complicates any conventional military intervention. The superior airpower fielded by Israel and the United States has not translated into absolute control over critical chokepoints held by Iran, nor has it succeeded in dismantling the undersea and “Undermountain” missile infrastructure that keeps Iran’s defensive network largely operational and difficult to conquer despite relentless bombardment. These deeply embedded installations, carved into the Zagros Mountains, act as fortified nodes that enable Iran to sustain command-and-control functions.

While air strikes can degrade capabilities, complete neutralization requires a high-intensity land campaign—a scenario fraught with risk. Iran’s military doctrine leverages its unique topography, using natural barriers and limited access points to offset an adversary’s technological edge. For any invading force, the combination of logistical hurdles and Iran’s mastery of its difficult terrain makes a quick victory highly improbable. Consequently, U.S. strategy faces a stark trade-off: rely on stand-off strikes that degrade but do not eliminate threats, or escalate toward high-risk options for more decisive results. This geographic and structural advantage effectively cements a strategic stalemate, as Iran’s hardened infrastructure and ‘natural fortress’ prevent any effort from achieving a rapid military outcome.

For Iran, prolonging the conflict appears to be the preferred course at this stage. Tehran has deliberately increased the costs of the war to unprecedented levels so it can have maximum leverage in negotiations with the United States, with its core demands of—financial compensation, the removal of all sanctions, a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region and recognition of its control over strategic maritime chokepoints.

Iran’s use of threat language is particularly significant in this regard. The rhetoric can exert psychological pressure on adversaries, yet it risks backfiring if not supported by actual capability. In Iran’s case, however, its warnings have proven credible rather than symbolic. This is demonstrated by its selective attacks on regional countries and control over the Strait of Hormuz, where only vessels linked to China are permitted passage, effectively transforming global trade into a strategic instrument against the U.S. alliance.

The Narrative Pivot: Trump’s Strategy of Perception Over Conquest

In the conflict with Iran, Trump’s “winning card” is his ability to control the narrative, prioritizing the appearance of victory over the reality of a physical win. He relies on narrative dominance, using the perception of a diplomatic breakthrough to maintain both domestic support and global leverage. While he projects an image of Iran “begging” for a deal, the actual conflict on the ground remains a complex stalemate.

The sudden and highly visible emphasis on diplomacy, initiated under the Islamabad Talks, reflects a calculated effort to manage domestic expectations through narrative control. By steering attention toward backchannel negotiations, President Trump diverts focus from military challenges or internal criticism. It illustrates a broader tactic of strategic distraction: when one narrative weakens, another is introduced to create uncertainty. This deliberate blurring of facts makes it harder for the public to form clear judgments or hold leadership accountable. In this way, confusion becomes a tool—dampening opposition and creating space for an exit framed more by optics than by conventional military success.

On the other side, deeper internal challenges confronting the Trump administration are becoming increasingly evident. Among them is a formal Pentagon request for $200 billion to sustain military operations, a proposal that has provoked strong criticism and concern among both Democrats and fiscal conservatives in Congress. Democrats are actively leveraging the conflict for political advantage, accusing Trump of leading the United States into an unnecessary and prolonged war while positioning themselves ahead of the November midterm elections in hopes of securing a legislative majority. Meanwhile, Republicans with long-term political aspirations—like Vice President JD Vance, widely considered a likely contender for the 2028 presidential race—are encountering increasing challenges in presenting a persuasive “America First” vision as the conflict drags on.

It was during the widespread fatigue and disillusionment from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that Trump originally solidified his “America First” persona. Yet, the prolonged confrontation with Iran threatens to undermine that narrative, as rising casualties, economic strain, and geopolitical entanglements make it harder for emerging Republican leaders to argue for restrained foreign intervention while projecting strength abroad. Vance and others must now navigate a delicate balance: appealing to a voter base that values both national security and fiscal prudence, while demonstrating that they can manage a complex, protracted conflict without repeating the mistakes of previous administrations. This tension illustrates how domestic political ambitions are increasingly intertwined with the outcomes and perception of foreign military engagements.

As a result, the U.S. campaign against Iran has generated numerous challenges and setbacks that outweigh its tactical military achievements to date.

Israeli Game Plan

For Israel, the conflict represents a rare and historic opportunity to significantly weaken Iran. The country appears prepared for a prolonged confrontation; recent surveys indicate that 81% of Israelis support military action, with many willing to endure sustained attacks to see the collapse of the Iranian regime. Years of conflict with Hamas and Hezbollah have conditioned Israel to absorb both psychological and physical strain. In such an environment, hardship becomes normalized, allowing for greater societal resilience. While both Iran and Israel appear capable of enduring prolonged shocks, the United States lacks the same tolerance, creating a possible divergence in strategic trajectories.

In Israel’s view, the objective is to push further toward definitive regime change. However, it recognizes that airstrikes alone are unlikely to achieve this goal, which is why it is increasingly considering the possibility of a ground invasion, potentially with U.S. support. Such a move, however, would likely initiate a prolonged conflict. Israel understands that ending the war prematurely would risk undermining the gains it has already made. While this could help the Israeli government to maintain domestic unity by framing the conflict as an existential necessity, it would not necessarily produce similar political benefits for President Trump or his Republican Party at home.

For the United States, one possible course could involve stepping back and allowing Iran and Israel to confront each other directly. However, Iran appears to have anticipated such a scenario and does not intend for the conflict to remain confined. Its recent shift in military doctrine—confirmed by Major General Ali Abdollahi as a transition from defense to offense—indicates an ambition to expand the effects of the war from a regional to a global scale. By exploiting interconnected vulnerable systems of energy, food, and trade, Iran seeks to create a cascading effect in which damage inflicted upon it reverberates worldwide. Its broader objective appears to be the erosion of U.S. dominance and the restructuring of global power toward a Chinese-centered order.

By encouraging Arab states to align with China’s Global Security Initiative, Iran is promoting an alternative model of security that prioritizes sovereignty over U.S. involvement. In effect, it is attempting to achieve through warfare what China could not accomplish solely through economic means. This strategic gameplay was acknowledged by President Trump himself, who described the situation as a ‘big chess game’ suggesting that Iran is acting as a “smart player, playing high-level chess.”

Iran is striving to ensure that any resolution to the conflict will not restore the pre-war status quo. Instead, it seeks to extract maximum gains whenever negotiations take place. If Iran’s objectives are realized and revenues begin to flow, Iran would not only rebuild its economy but also invest heavily in military modernization, developing capabilities that could prove extremely difficult to counter in any future confrontation.

This prospect is deeply concerning for Israel, which anticipates that a post-war Iran could emerge as a highly militarized and resilient power. From Israel’s perspective, the only viable strategy is to continue the war and ensure that Iran is weakened to such an extent that rebuilding its military strength would take decades. However, such an approach demands sustained endurance, strategic patience, and a high tolerance for risk—traits that Iran has already demonstrated.

Whether Israel can maintain this level of resilience remains uncertain, and this question will become clearer as the conflict continues. This is not a short-term confrontation, but a prolonged struggle likely to reshape regional power dynamics. With diplomatic positions varying and domestic political pressures mounting, the conflict is likely to persist. The result is a negative-sum dynamic in which decisive victory remains unlikely; escalation risks stay high, and any eventual endgame will reflect not shared interests but the relative exhaustion and leverage of the parties involved.

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The post The US-Israel and Iran Conflict: The Interplay of Goals and Strategies appeared first on Politact.

By Arif Ansar

Context

The Middle East’s contemporary realignment did not begin with the war between Iran and Israel, nor with Iranian strikes on U.S. bases across the Gulf. It began earlier, with the slow erosion of faith in a security order built on American primacy, Israeli military overmatch, and the assumption of Arab strategic compliance. The Israeli strike on Doha in September 2025 merely stripped away the last illusions. What followed was not unity, but fragmentation. Instead, the Islamic world entered a phase of deliberate Middle Power alliance‑building, driven by layered threat perceptions and an urgent desire for strategic autonomy.

At the center of this transformation is a paradox. The region is witnessing the rise of new alliances, yet these alliances are not designed to fight a single enemy. They are instead meant to buffer against multiple threats simultaneously: Iranian asymmetry, Israeli unilateralism, and U.S. unpredictability. Complicating this further is the re‑emergence of the “Greater Israel” narrative, which has amplified regional fears that Israeli military power is no longer bounded by defensive logic alone.

From Gulf Unity to Gulf Divergence

For much of the post‑Arab Spring period, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates were viewed as the twin pillars of Arab order. They coordinated in Yemen, aligned against political Islam, and worked closely with Washington. That partnership now seem to have fractured into a structural rivalry rooted in fundamentally different understandings of power and risk.

Saudi Arabia has increasingly embraced a state‑centric, formalized security approach and strategic autonomy. Scarred by years of proxy warfare and conscious of the vulnerability of its economic transformation under Vision 2030, Riyadh has grown wary of open‑ended confrontation—particularly wars triggered by actors outside its control. Iranian attacks on energy infrastructure, U.S. bases, and shipping lanes reinforced Saudi fears not just of Tehran, but of being caught between Washington and Tehran. This explains Riyadh’s pivot toward formal defense guarantees, most notably with Pakistan, and its growing strategic convergence with Turkey.

The UAE, by contrast, has doubled down on a networked, maritime, and technology‑driven security model. Abu Dhabi prefers flexible alignments, proxy leverage, and intelligence dominance over rigid alliance hierarchies. Its deepening ties with Israel and India reflect a desire to hedge not only against Iran, but also against Saudi Arabia’s ambition to re‑centralize Arab leadership. This divergence—well captured in PoliTact’s analysis of Saudi‑UAE power tussles with Turkey and Iran—has become one of the most important drivers of bloc formation in the region. The result is not a split over ideology, but over risk management. Riyadh fears escalation without control; Abu Dhabi fears marginalization within a Saudi‑led order.

As Middle Power alliances harden across the Middle East, the other Gulf states—Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait—illustrate divergent strategies for managing exposure, autonomy, and survival amid the erosion of the U.S.-centric security order. Unlike Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which seek to shape regional outcomes through competing alliance architectures, these states operate primarily as system navigators, each responding differently to rising unilateralism and unmanaged escalation.

Qatar occupies the most exposed position. Its foreign policy has emphasized mediation, diplomatic connectivity, and hosting high‑level interlocutors, allowing Doha to play a central role in ceasefire negotiations and crisis diplomacy. This strategy, however, has carried increasing risk. The Israeli airstrike in Doha in September 2025—widely analyzed as a stress test for Gulf mediation and U.S. security guarantees—demonstrated the limits of protection derived from connectivity alone and raised questions about the durability of mediator immunity in a more permissive strike environment. Mediation provides access and relevance, but as escalation becomes kinetic, it offers diminishing insulation.

Bahrain represents the opposite strategy. Rather than seeking autonomy through flexibility, Manama has embedded itself deeply within Saudi‑led and U.S.‑aligned security structures. Hosting the U.S. Fifth Fleet and relying on external guarantees for regime stability, Bahrain externalizes risk upward to larger patrons, trading strategic maneuverability for protection. This approach offers short‑term stability but reduces Bahrain’s ability to hedge as the regional order fragments.

Oman occupies a quieter middle ground. Like Qatar, Muscat prioritizes mediation, but it does so through deliberate low visibility and strategic restraint. Omani diplomacy is characterized by neutrality, confidentiality, and avoidance of high‑profile military entanglements, allowing it to act as an intermediary without becoming a primary target. This combination has enabled Oman to preserve autonomy with comparatively lower exposure.

Kuwait, meanwhile, adopts a strategy of institutional caution. Its foreign policy emphasizes international law, neutrality, and multilateral legitimacy, shaped in part by domestic constitutional constraints and a historically empowered legislature. Kuwait avoids both alliance leadership and high‑risk mediation, focusing instead on predictability and restraint as a means of survival.

Taken together, these cases highlight the narrowing options available to small states in a region increasingly defined by unilateral force and competitive alignment. Flexibility, dependence, invisibility, and restraint each offer partial protection—but none fully insulate against a security environment in which traditional guarantees no longer reliably constrain escalation.

The Emergence of an “Islamic NATO” and Hexagon Alignment

Out of this environment has emerged what is increasingly described as an Islamic NATO‑style alignment, anchored by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, with Turkey as a central pillar. This bloc is often misunderstood as a purely anti‑Iran coalition. In reality, it is built on three overlapping threat perceptions.

First is Iranian asymmetry: missile forces, drones, and proxies that threaten energy infrastructure and regime stability. Second is U.S. unpredictability—the fear that American military decisions, often aligned closely with Israeli objectives, could entangle Muslim states in wars they neither seek nor control. Third is Israeli strategic autonomy, particularly as Israel demonstrates a willingness to strike across borders without regard for Arab diplomatic calculations.

The Pakistan–Saudi defense agreement reflects this logic. Pakistan offers nuclear credibility and conventional depth; Turkey provides expeditionary experience, NATO interoperability, and drone warfare expertise; Saudi Arabia contributes financial resources and diplomatic weight. Together, they form a deterrence architecture designed less to confront Israel directly than to prevent Muslim states from being involuntary participants in U.S.–Israeli campaigns. This bloc is therefore as much about autonomy as opposition.

Parallel to the perceived Islamic NATO is a looser but influential alignment in infancy, centered on Israel, India, and potentially UAE—often described as a Hexagon Alliance when extended to include additional partners. This bloc is driven by a different hierarchy of threats and economic incentives. For Israel, the priority remains Iran, but also the risk of regional isolation should Sunni states consolidate into a unified security framework. India views the Gulf through the lens of maritime security, energy flows, and competition with China. The UAE sees in this alignment a way to offset Saudi leadership ambitions while retaining access to Israeli technology and U.S. strategic networks. This bloc is not primarily anti‑Islamic. It is anti‑consolidation. Its purpose is to ensure that no single Sunni‑led alliance can dominate the region’s security architecture.

Greater Israel as a Strategic Disruptor
One of the most destabilizing factors shaping alliance behavior today is not a military doctrine, but a narrative: the re‑emergence of the idea of Greater Israel. While not an official policy of the Israeli state, the concept—rooted in religious‑nationalist ideology and echoed by influential political figures—has gained unprecedented visibility during and after the Gaza war. Regional actors interpret this discourse as signaling a rejection of territorial finality and Palestinian sovereignty. Al Jazeera and Middle East Eye have documented how references to biblical borders and permanent Israeli control “from the river to the sea” have triggered alarm across Arab and Muslim capitals.

The destabilizing effect of the Greater Israel narrative is threefold. First, it reframes Israeli military action as potentially expansionist rather than defensive. Second, it undermines the political sustainability of normalization agreements by making it harder for Arab leaders to justify cooperation without a Palestinian resolution. Third, it reinforces the perception that U.S. power in the region is structurally aligned with Israeli territorial objectives rather than regional stability. Even states aligned with Israel, such as the UAE, hedge against this uncertainty. Others respond by accelerating independent deterrence mechanisms.

Great Power Rivalry and the Turn to Hedging

The Islamic world is no longer a passive theater of Great Power rivalry. It is actively shaping a multipolar order in which Middle Powers hedge against everyone—including their allies. The Saudi–UAE split, the rise of Islamic NATO and Hexagon formations, the disruptive force of the Greater Israel narrative, and the quiet advance of China and Russia all point to the same conclusion: the era of uncontested security hierarchies in the Middle East is over. What replaces it is not stability, but agency. And in a region long defined by external control, that may be the most consequential shift of all.

As regional blocs multiply, China and Russia benefit not by conquest but by optionality. China’s deepening involvement in South Asia and the Gulf—through infrastructure, security arrangements, energy, and industrial investment—positions Beijing as an indispensable economic partner to all sides without entanglement in regional wars. Russia, meanwhile, offers selective military alternatives, reinforcing a multipolar security environment in which no single actor dominates. Neither power demands ideological alignment; both profit from fragmentation.

Who Are These Alliances Really Meant to Counter?

The central question—who are these alliances meant to counter—has no single answer. They are not aimed solely at Iran, Israel, or the United States. They seemed designed to manage uncertainty in a system where all three generate risk. Iran threatens through asymmetry. Israel threatens through unilateral escalation and expansionist rhetoric. The United States threatens—not intentionally, but structurally—through unpredictability and alignment choices that subordinate regional interests to global strategy and balance of power calculations.

For Saudi Arabia, Iran is dangerous not only because of missiles and proxies, but because Iranian escalation reliably draws in U.S. and Israeli responses that Riyadh does not command. For the UAE, Iran is disruptive but manageable through deterrence, diversification, and diplomacy. For Israel, Iran is framed as an existential threat demanding pre‑emptive action. For Turkey and Pakistan, Iran is a competitor to be balanced, not annihilated.

Iran’s retaliatory attacks on U.S. bases in GCC states did not unify the region. Instead, they exposed the costs of hosting American power. Gulf monarchies found themselves targeted not for their own actions, but for decisions made in Washington and Tel Aviv. As the Carnegie Endowment has noted, this dynamic has pushed Gulf states toward independent security thinking rather than deeper reliance on U.S. guarantees. In this sense, Iran functions less as the architect of regional order than as its accelerator—forcing others to adapt. The alliances forming across the Islamic world appear to be alliances of insulation, not crusades. They seek to preserve autonomy, reduce exposure, and prevent any single power from dictating outcomes.

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The post Geopolitics Of Islamic World And Middle Power Alliances After Iran Attack appeared first on Politact.

By Naade Ali

President Trump and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) are redefining the U.S.-Saudi alliance to address China’s rising influence and the Gaza crisis, effectively moving the partnership beyond its traditional foundations. Since their inception, the Saudi-US relations have experienced fluctuations but have been sustained by overlapping strategic interests and mutual dependencies. At the center of their crucible of interaction stood a security–petrodollar arrangement. Even when relations hit their lowest point, the core bargain held: Saudi Arabia continued selling oil in dollars and remained a key supplier to the United States, while Washington preserved its role as the Kingdom’s primary security guarantor and leading defense provider.

However, shifting global dynamics, fueled in part by intensifying great power competition between China and the United States, have pushed middle powers like Saudi Arabia to reduce their dependence on any single major actor and seek greater strategic autonomy. While this shift has broadened their ambitions, it has also uncovered greater opportunities and challenges. The Saudi-US relations are not indifferent to these evolving dynamics, with both countries recalibrating their bilateral ties along new strategic dimensions.

Saudi Arabia as a Swing State in the U.S.–China Rivalry

Today’s Saudi Arabia appears to be hedging away from over reliance on the United States, building a strategy centered on its pragmatic interests and exercising sovereign leverage. This helps in deal-making and to secure the space needed to navigate the great power rivalry. Saudi Arabia’s move to reduce its dependence on the United States gained momentum exactly when ties with Washington soured under the Biden administration. Confronted with the unpredictability of American policy, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) found an attractive alternative in Beijing, which offered strategic engagement without preconditions. Closer ties with China enabled Saudi Arabia to pursue a multidimensional strategy, diversify its partnerships, and maintain the flexibility necessary to manage uncertainties in its relationship with Washington.

For China, Saudi Arabia became a central pillar for expanding regional influence in the Middle East. Riyadh hosted the first-ever China-Arab States Summit and, through Beijing’s mediation, reconciled diplomatic ties with Tehran. Further consolidating their ties with Beijing, both Tehran and Riyadh also integrated into multilateral blocs where China and Russia hold considerable sway, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS. Additionally, China strengthened economic relations with the Kingdom, becoming its largest trading partner and providing robust support for Vision 2030. A major payoff of Saudi Arabia’s strategic pivot toward China was that it transformed Saudi Arabia into a geopolitical swing state. This effectively signaled to Washington it is fully prepared to deepen ties with Beijing unless the U.S. proactively restores its coveted central role.

The Trump–MBS Summit: A Strategic Inflection Point

President Trump’s extraordinary embrace of Mohammed bin Salman during his visit to Washington in November suggests that Riyadh’s calibrated swing-state posture is working. Riyadh now carries significant geostrategic weight and has taken center stage in the U.S.–China competition for influence in the Middle East.

Trump’s approach to strategic competition with China rests on two pillars: credible deterrence and tightening of alignment with key U.S. middle power partners. Within this framework, any complete Saudi drift into Beijing’s orbit is viewed as strategically unacceptable. At the same time, he is acutely aware of the practical limits of attempting to sever Riyadh’s growing relationship with Beijing, recognizing that containment of China cannot succeed solely through coercive pressure on allies to reverse course.

As evidenced by President Trump’s foreign policy conduct, he employs a distinctive blend of generous incentives and far-reaching, exclusive agreements in energy, critical minerals, technology, and defense. These arrangements simultaneously fortify bilateral partnerships and allow middle powers, such as Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to maintain a semblance of strategic autonomy in their relations with China. Beneath this veneer, however, the United States methodically secures alignment on matters of vital national interest, while deliberately imposing significant strategic costs on any partner that leans excessively toward Beijing.

Nevertheless, Trump’s transactional foreign policy has provided Saudi Arabia with an opportunity for adjusting its own strategy, allowing the Kingdom to pursue a more robust, interest-driven relationship with Washington. Riyadh recognizes that being a center of the Islamic holy places provides it immense influence in the Muslim world. United States relies on it not only to balance China in the Middle East but also to help secure a stable regional environment for Israel. This is a goal that, in Trump’s view, could be advanced if Saudi Arabia joins the Abraham Accords, potentially encouraging other Arab and Muslim countries to follow suit.

The Summit Outcome

Through Vision 2030 reforms and skillful diplomatic maneuvering, the Kingdom has transcended its traditional role. This transformation not only redirects the calculus of their bilateral partnership but also carries profound implications for the Middle East’s balance of power and the broader dynamics of great power competition. It has emerged as a pivotal regional powerhouse whose energy resources, vast investment capital, and geopolitical influence make it indispensable to both Washington and Beijing.

During their meeting, President Trump stated he was “the best friend Saudi Arabia has ever had in Washington,” a statement that highlighted his administration’s desire to deepen ties through personal rapport. Nevertheless, the agreements concluded between the two leaders demonstrate that the U.S.-Saudi relationship remains firmly grounded in their respective national interests and strategic imperatives, with both seeking to extract maximum advantage.

President Trump secured a $1 trillion investment pledge from the Crown Prince, alongside the signing of a Strategic Framework for Cooperation. This framework includes Saudi commitments to supply uranium, metals, permanent magnets, and critical minerals essential for U.S. defense and energy sectors. Leveraging Saudi Arabia’s vast deposits of rare earth elements (REEs), Trump advanced his goal of countering China’s dominance in critical minerals.

For his part, Crown Prince achieved major strategic gains: the Kingdom was granted major non-NATO ally status, a defense agreement was finalized, and approval was secured for the purchase of American F-35 fighter jets and other advanced weapons. These acquisitions will strengthen Saudi defense architecture. Additionally, in line with its ambition to become a global hub for artificial intelligence, Saudi Arabia also gained access to advanced AI chips and U.S. technology firms to support the development of its domestic AI infrastructure.

US-Saudi Ties and Gaza Peace Plan

The Washington meeting between President Trump and the Crown Prince highlighted both progress and persistent challenges in U.S.–Saudi relations, with Saudi-Israel normalization remaining a key point of divergence. While Trump pressed Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords, Mohammed bin Salman insisted that any normalization depend on Israel committing to “an irreversible, credible, and time-bound path toward Palestinian statehood.” Following the Israel–Gaza conflict, Riyadh has emerges as a leading advocate for international recognition of Palestine, a position consistently opposed by the U.S. and Israel. Its refusal to yield to Trump’s push for normalization reflects the broader post-war realities in Gaza.

By taking this stance, Crown Prince delivered a twofold message: First, the strengthening of U.S.–Saudi ties must remain entirely independent of any precondition for Saudi–Israeli normalization. Second, while Riyadh is open in principle to normalization, Israel’s refusal to recognize Palestinian statehood remains a major impediment. While Riyadh supports the Trump Gaza peace plan in principle, it rejects full Israeli control over the Gaza territory and insists on concrete conditions: a time-bound Israeli withdrawal, the deployment of an international protection force, and the reinstatement of authority to the Palestinian Authority.

Saudi Arabia’s demands on the Palestinian issue clash directly with Israel’s red lines, leaving Washington struggling to balance relations with both capitals. From Israel’s viewpoint, the rapidly deepening U.S.–Saudi partnership, explicitly decoupled from any obligation of Saudi–Israeli normalization, raises two profound concerns. First, it risks elevating Riyadh’s regional influence while undermining Israel’s primary strategic objective: the expansion of the Abraham Accords. Second, as long as Riyadh continues to regard Israel as a principal source of regional instability, not Iran, the possibility persists that Saudi Arabia could further deepen its relations with Iran.

Historically, the shared enmity toward Iran has been the bedrock of both the U.S.–Israel alliance and U.S.–Saudi security relations. Following their China-brokered détente, Riyadh and Tehran no longer see each other as existential threats. To prevent Washington from viewing improved Saudi–Iranian ties with alarm, Mohammed bin Salman has carefully framed them as potentially beneficial to the United States, offering to help the U.S and Iran reach a deal that could be vital to regional stability. Riyadh can indeed encourage Iran to talk, but persuading Tehran to accept U.S. terms is no less daunting than U.S. convincing Israel to meet Saudi demands on Palestine. The scenario thus exposes the limits of influence on both sides: neither Washington nor Riyadh can fully impose their will on Israel and Iran.

The Washington summit also revealed a deeper convergence: the United States and Saudi Arabia need each other to achieve their core objectives in the Middle East. Under the Trump approach, US appears willing to delegate primary responsibility for preserving and enforcing the U.S.-led order in the Middle East to Saudi Arabia. However, for Riyadh to fully assume the role of America’s pre-eminent regional partner, it will also have to bear the main burden of protecting U.S. interests, containing rivals, and upholding the existing regional architecture.

Such an alignment would signal to Iran that Saudi Arabia had become the de facto guarantor and enforcer of core American interests. A U.S.–Saudi power-sharing arrangement would also carry significant implications for Israel. Confronted with a region increasingly shaped around Saudi primacy, Israel would face a stark choice: either challenge Riyadh and risk damaging its own relationship with Washington, or accommodate Saudi terms and move toward normalization on conditions set by the Kingdom. Under this approach, in which Saudi Arabia and the United States emerge as mutually reinforcing strategic partners, both are able to secure the outcomes they seek from Iran and Israel.

The Saudi-UAE Rivalry and Yemen Conflict

As the new year begins, the region is no longer defined by “Arabs vs. Iran” or “Islamists vs. Monarchies,” but by the fallout of weakening Iran that is creating a power vacuum. Muslim Middle Powers are competing to to fill the space, illustrated by the Saudi-UAE split. In places of old alliances, new ones are taking shape premised on cold, transactional game of national interest. And these tensions are playing out from Yemen to Syria, Sudan, Libya, and Somalia.

While the Trump-MBS summit secured vital U.S. interests in energy and defense, it exposed the fragility of the broader regional architecture. Saudi Arabia is acting like a state, prioritizing borders, stability, and institutions to protect Vision 2030. The UAE resembles a corporation, prioritizing ports, trade routes, and resource extraction. Turkey and Qatar are navigating the space between them, leveraging their military and ideological assets to carve out their own spheres of influence.

Similarly, President Trump’s “20-Point Peace Plan,” unveiled in September 2025, was predicated on a unified regional architecture: Gulf capital would fund reconstruction, Egyptian-Turkish logistics would secure the ground, Pakistan-Indonesia-Turkey may be part of the International Stabilization Force (ISF), and Israeli-Saudi normalization would provide the political horizon.

As of late December 2025, the dramatic rupture between Saudi Arabia and the UAE—culminating in the Saudi airstrike on UAE-backed assets in Mukalla, Yemen—has shattered the “Sunni Coalition” prerequisite for the plan’s success. The 20-point framework is now being pulled apart by the competing power centers and Israel may find itself the short-term beneficiary of Arab fragmentation. Unless Washington can repair the rupture within the Gulf Cooperation Council, its grand strategy for the Middle East risks becoming a two-legged stool: supported by a strong U.S.-Saudi bilateral deal, but lacking the regional stability required to stand.

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The post Saudi Arabia as a Rising Middle Power: The Trump-MBS Summit, China, and the Future of Gaza appeared first on Politact.

By Naade Ali

Context

Afghanistan is once again at the dead center of great power rivalries. The then Soviet Union departed Afghanistan in 1989 abandoning the quest for access to warm waters and subsequently losing the Cold War, and then US left in 2021 after claiming to have achieved the primary goals of War Against Extremism.

The departure of U.S. from Afghanistan did not mean that it did no longer had any interests left in the country. It made sure to maintain over the horizon counter-terror capabilities. While the government of Pakistan at the time facilitated the peace talks between the US and Afghanistan and the withdrawal that followed – it was reluctant to offer further assistance as it related to fighting terrorists in Afghanistan. Many believe, this led to the fall of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government in Pakistan.

As the balance of power tussles escalate, with the US on the one side, and Russia and China on the other, the significance of Afghanistan is fast changing. The UN General Assembly recently adopted a resolution despite US objections, and abstentions of China, Russia, India and Iran, and with 116 nations including Pakistan voting in favor. The resolution calls on Taliban to reverse their growing oppression of women and girls and eliminate all terrorist organizations operating from its soil.

On the other hand, Russia that emerged from the ashes of Soviet Union, became the first country in the world to officially recognize Afghanistan on July 3rd, as US removed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which now is in power in Syria, from its list of terrorist organizations. This was after quick Western legitimation of Islamic authorities in Syria led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, a former al Qaeda member. Meanwhile, China congratulated Russia for recognizing Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan with it foreign ministry commenting, Afghanistan “should not be excluded from the international community”. Earlier in January 2024, China had recognized Bilal Karimi, as an official envoy to Beijing out of security concerns and economic interests.

The international configuration formulated in the aftermath of 9/11 to fight the Global War on Terror (GWOT) appears to be dismantling with the potential reemergence of traditional game play of ‘proxy wars.’ While US stance towards Afghan Islamic Emirate appears to be easing since the withdrawal, it does not look any closer to bestow recognition.

Where Does US Stand on Afghanistan?

Although the U.S. removed a $10 million bounty on Sirajuddin Haqqani, State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce clarified recently that many Taliban leaders remain designated terrorists and that this position remains unchanged. This statement came in the wake of a U.S. delegation’s visit to Kabul in March, where they secured the release of American hostages and held important meetings with Taliban leadership. During the meetings, the Taliban expressed their interest in re-engaging with the U.S. and resetting bilateral ties. They offered to reopen the U.S. embassy in Kabul in exchange for the transfer of control of the Afghan Embassy in Washington to the Taliban government.

Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi has repeatedly called on Washington to engage with the Taliban administration—a message he reiterated during trips to Saudi Arabia and Qatar in April. Muttaqi, explaining his interaction with American counterparts, said that during their discussions, he dismissed concerns about instability and the Taliban’s perceived lack of public support. He asserted, “No power can control Afghanistan without the support of its people. This truth must be acknowledged, and engagement with this government must take place.” He further argued that Taliban rule has brought enhanced internal stability and cautioned that any effort to weaken their government could lead to renewed instability in Afghanistan, threatening broader regional peace and security.

Despite the Taliban’s diplomatic overtures, the Trump administration has so far ruled out the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul or the formal recognition of the interim Taliban government. State Department spokesperson Bruce stated , “The United States does not recognize any entity as the government of Afghanistan and therefore has no plans to allow for the reopening of its embassy.” National Security Council spokesperson James Hewitt reinforced this stance, saying, “We have made no commitments regarding the Afghan Embassy in Washington, and there are no discussions underway concerning the status of the U.S. Embassy compound in Kabul.”

Pakistan-U.S. Pressure on Taliban

Washington’s continued refusal to recognize the Taliban regime is also widely seen as part of a coordinated counterterrorism understanding with Pakistan, aimed at pressuring the Taliban to break its ties with the internationally designated terrorist groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Pakistan has raised concerns about the U.S.-weapons left behind during the American withdrawal falling into the hands of terrorist organizations. A Washington Post report revealed that the perpetrators of the March Jaffar Express train attack in Balochistan used these abandoned U.S. weapons. Although President Trump had previously threatened to permanently suspend U.S. aid to Afghanistan unless the Taliban returned the military equipment, the Taliban flatly rejected the demand, declaring that the remaining American weapons “now belong to the Taliban and will not be returned.”

However, recent developments suggest a significant shift in the Taliban’s stance as U.S. and Pakistani pressure intensifies. In a phone call between U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar reported in April, both leaders underscored the urgency of neutralizing the threat posed by these weapons. Shortly after, Pakistan’s special envoy for Afghanistan, Muhammad Sadiq Khan, issued a stern warning that “all deals with Afghanistan are off” if the Taliban failed to address Islamabad’s terrorism concerns. He then traveled to Kabul to participate in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Joint Coordination Committee (JCC), aimed at restarting dialogue and addressing key security issues, particularly the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) threat.

According to media reports, the Taliban leadership has, for the first time, shown signs of flexibility suggesting a potential policy shift in response to Pakistan’s demands. Analysts point to mounting pressure from both Washington and Islamabad, including U.S. aid suspension and Pakistan’s mass expulsion of Afghan refugees, as key factors forcing the Taliban to reconsider their approach. With limited capacity to manage a large influx of returning refugees, the Taliban government now face the risk of a deepening humanitarian crisis. On the other hand, with the on-going tensions between Iran and Israel in the Middle East, Iran has also started deporting undocumented Afghan immigrants.

Afghanistan-India and U.S.

At the same time, growing Indian engagement in Afghanistan warrants equal attention. As a key U.S. strategic partner, India—owing to its improving ties with the Taliban regime—is well positioned to tap into Afghanistan’s vast mineral reserves, including rare earth elements vital for semiconductor manufacturing. With India striving to become a global semiconductor hub in collaboration with the U.S., Afghanistan could serve as a crucial resource partner. India’s trade with Afghanistan has already hit a record $642.29 million in 2023–24, according to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

If India succeeds in establishing a firm strategic and economic presence in Afghanistan, the U.S. could advance its goal of curbing China’s growing influence in Central Asia—without reintroducing a military footprint. Washington is well placed to leverage its bilateral relationships with both India and Pakistan in this context. While continuing to support Pakistan in counter-terrorism operations, the U.S. may once again delegate regional security responsibilities to Islamabad.

At the same time, it could enable India to expand its geo-economic role in Afghanistan, effectively advancing U.S. interests. This dual-track strategy—outsourcing security to Pakistan and economic engagement to India—offers a cost-effective, high-return approach for the U.S., especially when Trump prefers limited, transactional relations with South Asia. With larger foreign policy priorities elsewhere, this model allows Washington to remain influential in the region without committing significant resources.

U.S.-China and Afghanistan

The House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Authorization and Oversight Plan for the 119th Congress explicitly identified China as its top oversight priority and aligns with the central foreign policy objective of the Trump administration, underscoring countering Chinese influence while offering alternative development paths.

Part of the challenge from the American perspective is that Pakistan is strategically aligned with China, which is actively engaged to reconfigure the region around its interests, and the recent inclusion to this vision is Bangladesh. Pakistan’s Foreign Office Spokesperson Shafqat Ali Khan commented earlier this month on the topic that the cooperation between China, Bangladesh, and Pakistan is part of Beijing’s development agenda.

China holds significant geo-strategic stakes in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. As a key ally to Pakistan, China would face substantial setbacks if relations between the two neighbors further deteriorate. Beijing has sought to leverage its Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Global Development Initiative (GDI) as frameworks to promote peace, counter-terrorism cooperation, and economic development in the region. Chinese Ambassador to Afghanistan Zhao Xing, in a recent interaction with Taliban leaders, proposed key strategies to enhance collaboration with Afghanistan, which could potentially restore its strained relations with Pakistan.

It’s due to these interests that a trilateral summit between China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan was held on May 21 in Beijing soon after the four-day conflict between India and Pakistan. Some of the major outcomes of the meeting was the restoration of diplomatic ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan leading to the exchange of ambassadors. Moreover, the Chinese foreign ministry announced that China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) would now also be extended to Afghanistan.

The trilateral meeting occurred after Afghan side has progressively adjusted its position regarding the criticism emanating from Pakistan on providing support to TTP. The Afghan Taliban government has publicly denied accusations of supporting the TTP and allowing them to operate from Afghan soil. They have reiterated their commitment to preventing any group from using Afghanistan to threaten other countries. In a recent move, Afghan officials announced, “Sheikh Hibatullah’s diktats bind all groups pledging allegiance to him, and his diktat is that attacking Pakistan is haram.”

The Afghan Game Plan

In the evolving great power rivalry Afghanistan appears to be courting both US and China to get involved in Afghanistan, especially to address the security concerns emanating from the country – and using that as a leverage to gain international recognition. This approach seems to have worked in the case of Russia. Moreover, it’s also exploiting the vulnerabilities of Pakistan and China from India – possibly suggesting its potential utility to the U.S.

On the other hand, the Chinese strategy involves getting more involved in trade and connectivity of Afghanistan, through its partnership with Pakistan, pushing Afghans to change their behavior. However, U.S. appears to be employing the same approach towards Afghanistan, utilizing its partnership with India, to change Pakistan’s calculations.

Related Articles:

Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions, Trump, And Wakhan Corridor – Feb 3, 2025
Political Or Military Solution; Pakistan’s New Counter-Terrorism Operation Azm-e-Istehkam – Aug 1, 2024
Convergences in US Pakistan Ties and Afghanistan – Jan 1, 2024
Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP – Feb 22, 2023
Post Withdrawal Campaign Against Extremism In Afghanistan And US-Pakistan Relations – Sep 7, 2022
Emerging US Policy Towards Afghanistan After Withdrawal – March 2, 2022
Recalibrating The US-Pakistan Partnership In Afghanistan – Jun 22, 2021
US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden – Mar 2, 2021

The post Afghanistan, Pakistan Relations and Great Power Rivalry appeared first on Politact.

Policy Brief – Vantage Point Analysis

Context

The recent meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Field Marshal Asim Munir, has stirred considerable global attention in particularly regarding what led to the meeting and what could have been discussed. It marks the first-ever instance of a sitting U.S. president holding a one-on-one meeting with Pakistan’s top military leader—an unprecedented move that reveals deeper shifts in regional strategy and global alignments.

Great Power Rivalry

U.S.-Pakistan relations have always been shaped by broader global dynamics, and the context now is the intensifying great power rivalry, primarily between the U.S., China, and Russia. The escalating Iran-Israel conflagration has added to this.

One of the persistent suggestions coming out of some DC based think-tanks is to avert pushing Pakistan into the full embrace of China. On the other hand, Pakistan has been messaging insistently that it wants to maintain close ties to the US despite its strategic ties to China. The meeting between President Trump and Field Marshal Asim Munir – and what follows – will likely test this. In the unfolding international relations maintaining a balance between great powers is becoming increasingly untenable.

Another critical dimension is the ongoing Iran-Israel conflict. In the post October 7, 2023, Hamas led attack on Israel, the geopolitics of Middle East is fast evolving. This has been accompanied by the loss of Hamas and Hezbollah leadership and the fall of Assad regime in Syria in December 2024, as part of what many consider the Outside-in Approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The likelihood of a broader conflict between Iran and Israel hangs in balance as President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have forged a strong strategic alignment. Netanyahu has tried to ensure that U.S. policy remained closely aligned with Israel’s objective of weakening Iran’s defense capabilities, particularly preventing it from ever acquiring nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Iran had hoped that Trump would adopt a pragmatic approach and revive nuclear talks leading to easing of economic pressure. To Iran’s disappointment, Trump pursued the reinstatement of “maximum pressure” policy on Tehran – culminating into an attack on its nuclear sites on June 22.

Pakistan has maintained the policy of siding with Iran. In his speech to the diaspora in Washington DC, Field Marshal Asim Munir reportedly cited Pakistan’s ‘clear and strong support’ for Iran in war against Israel. President Trump would have likely discussed Pakistan’s intent and the scope of its support in the background of expanding Israeli-Iran conflict, especially if US gets engaged, as it did on June 22, in eliminating Iran’s nuclear program – or any endeavors to change the regime.

From what has been reported since the meeting, Pakistan has offered to mediate with Iran and to assist President Trump pursue a negotiated solution, as he did with its recent short war with India. After meeting with Field Marshal Asim Munir, Trump had given two weeks window to arrive at a decision on if the US will get directly involved in the war against Iran. However, the attack on Iran’s nuclear sites occurred much before the window for negotiated solution was to expire.

According to some estimates, about 15%-20% of Pakistan’s population belong to Shia sect. Any attack on Iran, regime change, or any subsequent insurgency can have serious consequences for the ethnic and religious harmony in Pakistan and the Islamic regions. A foreign policy alignment too closely with Western military actions against Iran could inflame sectarian tensions at home. It would also put Pakistan and Chinese strategic alignment to the test – as Iran is also an ally of China and Russia. Additionally, the aforementioned nations shared membership in the China dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

US Pakistan Relations

Under President Biden, Pakistan was often viewed critically and often through an India-centric lens, particularly in the context of counter-terrorism. In contrast, the Trump administration was initially expected to adopt a hardline stance toward Pakistan, recent events suggest a pragmatic recalibration driven by strategic needs. Moreover, Pakistan’s government has carried out an active trade and security outreach with the U.S. administration to demonstrate its economic and security potential. In remarks by CENTCOM Commander Gen. Michael Kurilla, or Trump’s own statements, there’s been notable recognition of Pakistan’s role beyond the narrow counterterrorism framework.

The performance of the Pakistani military during the brief conflict with India in May has raised its global stature. While both sides de-escalated after Trump administration negotiated a cease fire, Pakistan’s ability to outmaneuver a much larger adversary, despite its plaguing political and economic challenges, captured international attention and enhanced the credibility of its defense establishment. This strengthened perception has also prompted the US to reconfigure its engagement with Pakistan’s power centers—primarily its military—based on shared regional interests, particularly as tensions in the Middle East escalate.

Allied with the U.S., Pakistan has played a decisive security role in the Cold War and the Campaign Against Extremism. Due to this partnership, it received western economic and military assistance. Pakistan once again stands at the juncture of another critical role involving the change in global balance of power. U.S. would once again desire security relation with Pakistan and furthering of the future envisioned under the Abraham Accords. As the security situation related to Iran worsens, it’s possible that different brands of non-state actors operating from the region and beyond attempt to exploit the situation. Pakistan’s experience in managing extremists could become very useful. For this cooperation, U.S. could potentially assist in dealing with India, undo the suspension of Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), while moving forward with the trade deals.

Civil-Military Imbalance: A Familiar Pattern

While the Trump-Munir meeting may elevate Pakistan’s global profile, it also underscores a persistent internal challenge: the civil-military imbalance. The fact that such a high-level bilateral meeting involved the military chief—and not the elected civilian leadership—highlights the dominance of Pakistan’s military in both foreign policy and national security.

This imbalance perpetuates a troubling precedent in which strategic decisions of national consequence have to be made in private without discussion, consensus, or public ownership. Such secrecy has historically resulted in policies with long-term political, economic, and social consequences—often to the detriment of public trust and national cohesion.

The Trump-Munir meeting is emblematic of a shifting global landscape in which Pakistan finds itself once again at a strategic crossroads. The potential for a renewed, multifaceted partnership with the U.S. is real, but it hinges on careful diplomacy, a balance between competing alliances, and a rethinking of how power is exercised at home. As great power competition intensifies and both the Subcontinent and the Middle East become more volatile, Pakistan may well reemerge as a pivotal actor—if it can navigate both its external relations and internal governance with foresight and integrity.

The post What Does Trump-Munir Meeting Means for US-Pakistan Relations – As Iran-Israel Conflict Escalates? appeared first on Politact.

By Naade Ali
South Asia and Middle East Analyst

Context

Since the withdrawal of US and NATO troops from Afghanistan in the aftermath of 2020 Doha Agreement, tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan have frequently escalated. The differences reached their peak last year when the Pakistani military conducted targeted airstrikes in Afghanistan’s Barmal district, located in eastern Paktika province. The aim of the strike was to neutralize key Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) commanders and dismantle a media facility. In retaliation, the Afghan Taliban launched attacks on multiple targets, including military posts, beyond the Durand Line. In its messaging, the Afghan Defense Ministry further dismissed Pakistan’s claim over the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), now integrated into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP).

Adding to the strain, the Afghan Taliban collaborated with TTP forces in joint border offensives, resulting in prolonged skirmishes that significantly deteriorated bilateral relations. This year, clashes between the two militaries resumed in Khost province. On January 11, Taliban spokesperson Zabiullah Mujahid accused Pakistani forces of targeting civilian infrastructure in eastern Kunar province which resulted in casualties, and urged them to cease such actions. While border clashes became the new normal, Pakistan maintains that despite the tensions, it seeks friendly relations with Afghanistan.

What is clear is that the security situation in Pakistan has worsened by an acute increase in terrorist violence, with an estimated 4,000 TTP militants reportedly taking refuge in KP. These militants operate secretly, launching attacks on security forces at night and blending into civilian areas during the day. Recent reports from the KP police indicate that these militants often use civilians as shields, making counter terror operations particularly complex.

The opposition from certain local groups to military operations has further exacerbated these challenges. Political groups like the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI)-led government in KP have publicly criticized the military’s actions, even demanding its withdrawal from the region.

Pakistan’s policy on how to deal with TTP has swung between achieving a political solution to using force. The core of the issue is how to engage with the Afghan Taliban who have provided refuge to TTP, reciprocating the support TTP previously provided to Afghan Taliban that resulted in US and NATO withdrawal.

Political versus Military Solution

Recent reports indicate that Afghan Taliban government privately acknowledged the TTP as a problem but objected to Pakistan’s hardline approach in addressing the threat. Instead, the Afghan Taliban proposed dialogue as a solution, but Pakistan dismissed the TTP’s demands as unacceptable, ruling out negotiations. This development starkly contrasts with the Afghan Taliban’s official stance, which denies the presence of the TTP in Afghanistan and frames the issue as an internal matter for Pakistan. Taliban spokesperson Zabiullah Mujahid was observed saying, “The issue of the TTP or the war within Pakistan is a matter that pertains to that country. We are working to find a solution to this issue; however, it is not our matter. We will not allow Afghanistan’s soil to be used against any country, including Pakistan.”

The Afghan Taliban have consistently portrayed terrorism in Pakistan as an internal matter, and continued refusal to recognize the Durand Line as an international border. By fostering Pashtun nationalist sentiments in KP, the Taliban have undermined Pakistan’s territorial integrity and bolstered support for the TTP’s broader agenda.

The TTP’s ultimate aim of transforming KP into a province of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan aligns with the Taliban’s ideological goals, posing a long-term threat to Pakistan’s sovereignty. In response, Pakistan’s military leadership has labelled the TTP as Fitna Al Khawarij (anarchist infidels), using religious nationalism to delegitimize the group. However, this narrative has struggled to gain widespread public support and political ownership.

Adding to the diplomatic rhetoric, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, the deputy political minister of foreign affairs, stated that the Islamic Emirate would not permit external interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. He also urged neighboring countries, especially Pakistan, to reciprocate by avoiding interference in Afghanistan’s internal matters. His remarks highlighted Afghan Taliban’s resistance to Pakistan’s pressure for dismantling the TTP and relocating fighters from border regions. Despite terse diplomatic exchanges and rising hostilities, Pakistan acknowledged its “multilayered engagement” with the Afghan Taliban reflects the involvement of multiple actors working to de-escalate tensions.

Pakistan’s Shifting Afghan Policy

For Pakistan’s military, however, ceasing counter-terrorism operations would effectively allow the TTP to regroup and further destabilize the region. This sentiment was reiterated by the army chief during meetings with political factions in KP, where he urged unity against terrorism, stating, “The existence of the state ensures the existence of politics; God forbid, if there is no state, there is nothing. We must all stand united against terrorism, without any discrimination or prejudice.” He further emphasized, “Creating disorder is a grave sin, and without the state, nothing else matters.”

During a recent provincial-level security meeting in Peshawar, Pakistan’s army chief, General Asim Munir, described Afghanistan as a “brotherly neighbor” and an “Islamic country” with which Pakistan has always sought better relations. However, he emphasized, “The only difference with Afghanistan is the presence of Fitna al-Khawarij in Afghanistan and the spread of terrorism in Pakistan from across the border.”

General Munir expressed regret over the Afghan Taliban’s refusal to dismantle the TTP, stating that Pakistan had “exhausted all options” to persuade Afghanistan to curb cross-border militant attacks. He further remarked, “Our only policy is Pakistan,” signaling that national security remains paramount and that military operations against TTP-led terrorism would continue, even at the expense of heightened tensions with the Afghan Interim Government (AIG). His statements highlighted the culmination of months of unsuccessful diplomatic efforts and signaled a shift toward a more assertive stance against the TTP and its Afghan supporters.

Meanwhile, commenting on the current state of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, Foreign Office spokesperson Shafqat Ali Khan reiterated Islamabad’s call for the Kabul government to act against terrorist groups operating from sanctuaries across the border. FO spokesperson also dismissed reports of any Pakistani annexation of the Wakhan Corridor, affirming it as an inseparable part of Afghanistan and emphasizing Pakistan’s commitment to respecting Afghanistan’s territorial integrity. Some articles have recently indicated that Pakistan wants to disrupt Afghan Taliban plans to connect directly with China through the Wakhan Corridor, bypassing Pakistan.

China and Pak-Afghan Tensions

China holds significant geo-strategic stakes in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. As a key ally to Pakistan, China would face substantial setbacks if relations between the two neighbors further deteriorate. Beijing has sought to leverage its Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Global Development Initiative (GDI) as frameworks to promote peace, counter-terrorism cooperation, and economic development in the region. Chinese Ambassador to Afghanistan Zhao Xing, in a recent interaction with Taliban leaders, proposed key strategies to enhance collaboration with Afghanistan, which could potentially restore its strained relations with Pakistan.

Speaking at an event commemorating 70 years of diplomatic ties between China and Afghanistan, Zhao emphasized the need for mutual respect, trust-building, and expanded cooperation. He commented, “In today’s complex international environment, China and Afghanistan must respect each other’s core interests, build mutual trust, and expand cooperation in all areas. We must work toward a shared future.” Beijing’s proposals align with the broader goals of the GSI, which emphasizes collective security and regional stability, and the GDI, which focuses on infrastructure development and economic connectivity.

Whether these overtures offered by China will influence AIG to reassess their approach towards Pakistan remains to be seen. So far, their guarantees of not allowing their territory to be used against Pakistan have proven ineffective, raising questions about the extent of their willingness to cooperate. At the same time, China’s growing engagement with Afghanistan underscores its desire to mediate tensions between Islamabad and Kabul while protecting its own strategic interests in the region.

Strategic and Regional Implications

Pakistan’s shifting stance toward AIG reflects its growing mistrust and a potential re-calibration of its approach. This is occurring in the backdrop of emerging reports indicating internal power struggles between the Kandhari and Kabuli factions within the Afghan Taliban. A notable meeting between Pakistan’s DG ISI and Tajikistan’s President recently hinted at Islamabad’s interest in engaging with regional actors to achieve its security objectives. Tajikistan holds a pivotal position in Afghanistan’s internal dynamics, serving as a base for the leadership of the National Resistance Front (NRF). Actively resisting the Taliban since 2021, the NRF has welcomed Pakistan’s expanding security ties with Tajikistan and its call for an inclusive and legitimate Afghan government.

The return of the Trump administration is expected to strain Taliban-U.S. relations further while potentially boosting support for the NRF. The Afghan Taliban, despite attempts to restore ties with the Trump administration, face strong criticism. Trump has signaled continued pressure through sanctions, withholding recognition, and linking financial aid to the return of U.S. military equipment. Trump’s remarks, including his emphasis on recovering military assets left behind in Afghanistan, underscore his administration’s tough stance towards the Taliban regime, particularly as they relate to human rights abuses.

On the other hand, the NRF sees an opportunity to align with the U.S., positioning itself as a viable alternative force to counter terrorism in Afghanistan. NRF representatives, including foreign relations head Maisum Nazari, have expressed optimism about American support, highlighting their willingness to combat Al-Qaeda and IS with adequate backing. If the Trump administration extends support to the NRF, it would mark a significant blow to AIG and could enable Pakistan to reassess its regional strategy too. Aligning with the NRF, however, would be a controversial move for Pakistan, potentially antagonizing domestic Pashtun and religio-political factions like Jamiat-e-Islam Fazal and Jamat-e-Islami.

Meanwhile, the AIG, recognizing the shifting regional dynamics, have sought to diversify their alliances by strengthening ties with Pakistan’s adversary, India, and the U.S.’s rival, Russia. Though these partnerships are primarily focused on economic cooperation, the AIG’s interest in expanding them into defense agreements poses a serious challenge to Pakistan. A closer alignment between Afghanistan and India could weaken Islamabad’s efforts to counter India’s influence in the region. Additionally, if Russia transitions from economic cooperation to defense collaboration, it would further complicate Pakistan’s security landscape.

Domestic Challenges

Domestically, Pakistan faces significant hurdles in developing a unified counter-terrorism strategy. Political instability and ethnic divisions have hindered efforts to effectively address the TTP threat. Long-standing grievances among marginalized Pashtun and Baloch communities have been exploited by anti-Pakistan elements, including the Afghan Taliban, to fuel sub-nationalist movements.

To counter this, Pakistan’s military leadership has sought to promote national unity, emphasizing Islam’s role in uniting the country’s diverse ethnic and cultural groups. The army chief has strongly condemned groups threatening Pakistan’s national integrity, branding them as enemies of both Islam and the state. However, this approach has faced criticism for its inconsistency, targeting the TTP while sparing the Afghan Taliban. This selective narrative undermines Pakistan’s counter-terrorism efforts and weakens its credibility.

Conclusion

The on-going tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan has been exacerbated by the mishandling of the TTP issue. The Afghan Taliban’s refusal to sever ties with the TTP, rejection of the Durand Line, and manipulation of ethnic sentiments continue to undermine Pakistan’s national security and territorial integrity. While Pakistan has received international recognition for its stance against the TTP, its inconsistent counter-terrorism narrative and fractured domestic strategy weaken its position. The AIG’s growing ties with India and Russia further complicate Pakistan’s geopolitical calculus, particularly as Islamabad has recently succeeded in re-calibrating its relationships with Bangladesh.

To navigate these challenges, Pakistan must adopt a cohesive strategy that balances military action with diplomatic efforts. However, without political unity and public ownership this approach is unlikely to work. While continued engagement with the Afghan Taliban is a necessity, Pakistan should also explore alternatives. Encouraging China, Russia, Turkey, and Gulf nations to diplomatically pressure the Taliban into forming an inclusive government. At the same time, Pakistan must engage with all political factions in Afghanistan to oppose the TTP.

Related Articles:
Political Or Military Solution; Pakistan’s New Counter-Terrorism Operation Azm-e-Istehkam – Aug 1, 2024
Convergences in US Pakistan Ties and Afghanistan – Jan 1, 2024
Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP – Feb 22, 2023
Post Withdrawal Campaign Against Extremism In Afghanistan And US-Pakistan Relations – Sep 7, 2022
Emerging US Policy Towards Afghanistan After Withdrawal – March 2, 2022
Recalibrating The US-Pakistan Partnership In Afghanistan – Jun 22, 2021
US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden – Mar 2, 2021

A version of this article was also published in Defence Journal Pakistan.

The post Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions, Trump, And Wakhan Corridor appeared first on Politact.

By Naade Ali

Context

The chain reaction that got underway in the aftermath of Hamas October 7, 2023 attack on Isreal, continues to unfold at a tremendous speed. The fall of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime, a key ally in Iran’s axis of resistance against Israel, has triggered profound geopolitical changes in the Middle East, reshaping regional power dynamics. These shifts are not merely reactions to Assad’s fall but are also a reflection of broader ambitions and vulnerabilities of the regional and global powers. The Syrian Civil War’s devastating impact has left a fractured nation with competing factions vying for influence, complicating any resolution of the crisis.

The coalition of Turkey-backed Islamist and nationalist militant factions that toppled Assad has emerged as a pivotal force. Assad’s downfall represents a significant blow to Iran’s fragile axis of resistance, undermining its influence across the Levant. With Iran effectively expelled from Syria and Hezbollah’s reach significantly diminished in Lebanon, Israel has seized the opportunity to expand its strategic foothold.

Meanwhile, a transitional interim government led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Islamist group ideologically linked to Al-Qaeda, has assumed control in Syria. The country, however, remains in a state of chaos as multiple actors, including rebel factions, Turkey, and Israel, seek to consolidate their gains.

Although the civil war has officially ended, the shadow of potential conflict continues to loom over Syria. The involvement of external powers—ranging from Russia and China to the United States and Gulf States—adds another layer of complexity to Syria’s future. Each stakeholder has its own interests, and their competing agendas have made Syria a geopolitical chessboard. These developments underscore a pivotal moment for the Middle East, as the region grapples with shifting alliances and evolving power structures.

What to Expect from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham?

The newly formed interim government in Syria, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and composed of various rebel factions, faces the daunting task of navigating a fractured and war-torn nation. HTS has announced its intention to govern until March 1 next year, at which point new elections are expected to formalize its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, as Syria’s next president. Al-Sharaa has outlined a three-stage roadmap for the country’s transition to stability. The first stage involves legitimizing the interim government, followed by convening a national conference to address constitutional reforms and governance. The final stage aims to organize elections and restore full citizenship to displaced Syrians.

Despite these ambitious plans, the likelihood of elections occurring by March remains slim. HTS’s dominance suggests that it may continue to govern Syria for the foreseeable future. In an effort to gain legitimacy both domestically and internationally, HTS has launched a rebranding campaign to distance itself from its radical jihadist roots. This campaign emphasizes governance, state-building, and inclusivity.

Al-Sharaa and interim Prime Minister Mohammad Al-Bashir have outlined a five-point agenda focused on national unification, strengthening state institutions, rebuilding infrastructure, gaining international recognition, and fostering diplomatic ties with neighboring countries and the West.

One of the most significant challenges facing HTS is unifying Syria’s diverse political and ideological factions. The country’s political landscape includes Islamist and secular nationalist groups representing a broad spectrum of ethnic and religious communities. HTS, which historically drew support from radical Salafist elements, may encounter resistance from groups advocating for a secular democratic state. Its governance model in Idlib, where it established centralized control after defeating rival factions, raises concerns about its willingness to share power. Secular factions fear that HTS may impose an Islamist authoritarian regime, alienating Syria’s diverse population.

Some analysts caution that Syria risks becoming an Islamic Emirate akin to Afghanistan, with HTS governing in a manner reminiscent of the Taliban. Although HTS has demonstrated administrative competence in Idlib and appointed self-styled technocrats like Mohammad Al-Bashir, applying this model to Syria’s complex socio-political landscape will be far more challenging. Protests demanding secular governance have already erupted in Damascus, reflecting widespread skepticism about HTS’s intentions. Within HTS itself, hardliners may oppose Al-Sharaa’s attempts to adopt a more moderate stance, further complicating efforts to stabilize the nation.

To address these challenges, Al-Sharaa has promised to shift away from a revolutionary mindset, emphasizing unity, stability, and institutional reform. He has pledged to disband rebel factions, integrate trained fighters into the Syrian army, and grant citizenship to foreign fighters willing to pledge loyalty to the new government. Internationally, HTS has sought to portray itself as pragmatic and inclusive, emphasizing human rights and good governance. However, reports of extrajudicial killings of former regime members by the HTS local commanders paint a different picture of the group. Notably, HTS has announced the establishment of tribunals to prosecute ex-officials of the Assad regime, despite initially granting them amnesty. This move has raised concerns about the group’s double standards and the potential for acts of vengeance will present a critical test for its leadership.

Another major challenge is economic reconstruction. Years of war have left Syria’s infrastructure in ruins, and millions of refugees are anticipated to return in search of better opportunities. To gain public trust, HTS would need to focus on rebuilding the economy and meeting the needs of Syrians. However, the current leadership of HTS is primarily focused on securing international support, including lifting sanctions and removing itself from terrorism designations. Al-Sharaa has assured the international community that Syria will not serve as a base for attacks against neighboring countries, to include Israel and Turkey. These assurances are part of HTS’s broader strategy to seek international recognition and restore trust.

Israel’s Strategic Response to Assad’s Fall

Israel has significantly benefited from Assad’s downfall, exploiting the power vacuum to further its strategic goals. Within just one week, Israel carried out over 350 airstrikes on Syrian military installations, neutralizing 80% of Assad’s critical military assets. Additionally, Israel has seized strategic positions in southern Syria, establishing a 400-square-kilometer demilitarized buffer zone that includes Mount Hermon—a vital vantage point for monitoring regional threats. These newly occupied positions provide Israel with a tactical advantage, enabling it to target Iran’s assets without the threat of Syrian anti-missile radar systems. By controlling key areas in Syria, Israel has bolstered its deterrence against Iran and other adversaries.

The fall of Assad and the subsequent weakening of Iran’s influence have allowed Israel to consolidate its position as a dominant regional player. Israeli leaders have framed Assad’s removal as a historic achievement, celebrating the collapse of an adversarial regime. Moving forward, Israel has extended a cautious diplomatic overture to the HTS-led government, signaling a willingness to explore avenues for peace and cooperation. However, any potential rapprochement with Israel will depend on HTS’s ability to demonstrate its commitment to Israeli-led security order in the region.

Turkey’s Expanding Role in Syria

Turkey has emerged as another significant player in the post-Assad era. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a long-time opponent of Assad, has used the opportunity to expand Turkey’s influence in Syria. By supporting opposition factions, Turkey aims to secure its southern border, exploit Syria’s resources, and establish the country as a client state. This strategic expansion aligns with Erdoğan’s broader ambition to position Turkey as a leading power in the Muslim world, challenging the traditional dominance of Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Turkey’s involvement in Syria also serves domestic political purposes, allowing Erdoğan to strengthen his nationalist base by portraying himself as a defender of Sunni Muslims. However, Turkey’s actions have not been without controversy. Its military interventions and support for Islamist factions have drawn criticism from both Russia and China. On the other hand, its opposition to US supported Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has put it at odds with the NATO alliance. Despite these challenges, Turkey’s influence in Syria continues to grow, making it a key stakeholder in the country’s future.

Iran and Hezbollah: Reeling from Setbacks

The fall of Assad’s regime has dealt a severe blow to Iran and its proxy, Hezbollah. For years, Syria served as a critical link in Iran’s axis of resistance, providing a conduit for arms shipments to Hezbollah in Lebanon. With Assad’s removal, Iran has lost a key ally, and its influence in the region has diminished significantly. Hezbollah, which has suffered heavy losses in the Syrian conflict, now faces an uncertain future. The group’s ability to project power in Lebanon and beyond has been severely weakened, raising questions about its long-term viability.

Iran, meanwhile, faces a critical situation. The loss of its strategic foothold in Syria has forced Tehran to reconsider its regional strategy. Some analysts speculate that Iran may pursue pragmatic diplomacy with the West to offset its losses, while others argue that it could escalate its nuclear program to establish deterrence against Israel. Regardless of the path Iran chooses its diminished role in Syria marks a turning point for the axis of resistance.

The Rise of Transnational Jihadist Movements

The victory of HTS in Syria has emboldened global jihadist movements, inspiring groups such as the Taliban and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Islamist groups from across the globe, like Afghan Taliban and various factions of Muslim Brotherhood, have sent congratulatory notes to HTS.

This development marks a significant shift in the nature of jihadist organizations, with non-state actors evolving into state entities. HTS’s success in Syria—achieving what ISIS could not—raises concerns about the rise of transnational jihadist states. While HTS has promised governance and reform, its ability to deliver stability remains uncertain.

Conclusion

Syria stands at a crossroads. The fall of Russian supported Assad’s regime has created a vacuum in the Middle East and upset the tender balance of power, which was already in tatters with the weakening of Iranian backed Hezbollah and Hamas.
The nation is torn between the promise of renewal and the threat of further devastation. The actions of HTS and other key stakeholders will determine whether Syria can overcome its challenges or succumb to further conflict. For now, the future remains blurred, but one thing is clear: the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East will never be the same.

The post Assad’s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East appeared first on Politact.

By Naade Ali

Context

What began as a focused conflict between Israel and Hamas has morphed into a complex regional crisis that threatens to engulf the entire Middle East. Despite intensive diplomatic efforts from both Western powers and Arabian Gulf states, the situation continues to get worse, with military action becoming less a means to peace and more an end in itself.

The results of the American elections have added to the complex situation, in terms of what policy direction will president elect Trump will take after his inauguration on January 20th. His administration was the architect of Abraham Accords reached in 2020, which envisioned normalization of Arab Israeli ties – accompanied by two-state solution. Reportedly, his Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, has already traveled to Qatar to help achieve Gaza ceasefire accompanied by release of hostages.

Netanyahu’s War Strategy and Domestic Pressures

In the aftermath of October 7, Israel’s military response has evolved into a pattern of expanding operations that extends far beyond its initial defensive posture. Under Netanyahu’s leadership, the emphasis is on military action irrespective of the cost, rather than diplomatic engagement.

The strategy is most visible in two key theaters. In Gaza, where the conflict began, Israel has made its intentions clear through leaflets declaring “Hamas will no longer rule Gaza,” suggesting plans for a fundamental restructuring of the territory’s governance.
Netanyahu’s approach is defined by several consistent elements: an unwavering rejection of the two-state solution, a commitment to military rather than diplomatic solutions, and a stated goal of eliminating both Hamas and Hezbollah. His vision extends beyond immediate security concerns to what he describes as “reshaping the region’s security landscape for future generations.” Some call this a version of the Greater Israel approach.

This expansive military strategy has manifested in multiple forms: the deployment of forces to Lebanon, sustained operations in Gaza, reinforced positions along the Golan Heights, and over 220 strikes in Syria. Each action suggests a regional approach to security that prioritizes military control over diplomatic compromise.

Israel’s security challenges extend far beyond Lebanon. The Houthi forces in Yemen have opened a maritime front, targeting Israeli-linked ships in the Gulf of Aden and forcing Israel to consider establishing a military base in Somaliland. Iraq’s Islamic Resistance has joined the fray with drone strikes, while Syria serves as a strategic haven for Hezbollah while maintaining support from both Iran and Russia.

Russia’s role adds another layer of difficulty, warning Israel against attacking either Syrian President Assad’s regime or Iranian nuclear facilities. Recent Russian bombing of rebel-held areas in Syria serves as a reminder of Moscow’s military presence and its potential to intervene.

The broader implications of this strategy are still unfolding, as Israel balances its military objectives against growing international pressure and regional resistance. However, Netanyahu remains steadfast in his position that Israel will “stand alone if needed,” suggesting a long-term expansive security approach regardless of international opinion or diplomatic alternatives.

This hard-line stance also serves a domestic political purpose. With Israel experiencing widening divisions between secular elites and the far-right, Netanyahu has positioned the war as crucial not only for national security but for his own political survival. Even attacks on his private residence have been leveraged to reinforce this narrative of unwavering determination.

The Multi-Front Challenge

Israel’s military ambitions are most visible in Lebanon, where Operation Northern Arrows has expanded far beyond its initial scope of “limited, localized raids.” The deployment of over 15,000 troops across four army divisions suggests potential territorial ambitions reminiscent of Israel’s 1981 annexation of the Golan Heights.

However, Hezbollah has proven a formidable opponent. Despite losing key leaders, including Hassan Nasrallah, the group maintains significant combat capabilities with an arsenal of 150,000 rockets, missiles, and drones. Under the new Secretary General Naim Qassem, Hezbollah has adapted its strategy, combining traditional guerrilla warfare with sophisticated drone strikes that have exposed vulnerabilities in Israel’s defenses. Reports estimate Hezbollah has a stockpile of about 2,000 long-range drones capable of striking targets up to 2,000 km away.

The human cost has been substantial, with Israel suffering over 700 military fatalities and thousands of wounded soldiers. This has forced heavy reliance on reservists, raising questions about their effectiveness against Hezbollah’s experienced fighters. Despite Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s attempts to boost morale by claiming Hezbollah is “collapsing,” continued rocket salvos into Israel suggest otherwise.

Iran’s Diplomatic and Military Maneuvers

Iran has emerged as a sophisticated player in this expanding conflict, balancing military deterrence with diplomatic outreach. While maintaining the threat of harsh retaliation for any Israeli attacks, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has conducted an aggressive diplomatic campaign, strengthening ties not only with traditional allies but also with countries having peace agreements with Israel.

This diplomatic offensive has included warnings to Gulf Arab states against allowing their airspace or military bases to be used by Israel, while simultaneously calling for regional cooperation to prevent Lebanon from becoming “another Gaza.” Turkey has emerged as Iran’s most vocal supporter, promising backing if Israel draws Iran into direct conflict.
Strains in the Western Alliance

With its emphasis on military solution that has coming at a tremendous human toll, Israel’s relationships with Western allies show increasing strain. European nations are divided, with some calling for weapons sales restrictions and potential sanctions against far-right Israeli ministers. France’s President Macron has repeatedly urged countries to stop arms deliveries to Israel, while Spain and Ireland push for reevaluating EU-Israel relationships. Germany, however, remains steadfast as Israel’s second-largest arms supplier after the U.S.
The U.S.-Israel relationship faces its own complications. While the U.S. has deployed anti-missile systems and forces to support Israel’s defenses, it has also warned of potentially cutting off arms shipments unless more humanitarian aid reaches Gaza. Netanyahu appears to be looking beyond current tensions, possibly anticipating renewed support under Trump presidency.

Conclusion

The conflict has evolved into a war of attrition, with both Israel and Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” seeking to exhaust each other militarily. However, this strategy risks indefinite conflict escalation. Even if a ceasefire is achieved, deep-rooted ideological animosities suggest continued regional instability.

For Iran and its allies, the struggle against Israeli Zionism represents a religious obligation. Israel, conversely, appears committed to pursuing regime change in Iran and neutralizing its proxy forces. This fundamental clash of worldviews, combined with historical grievances and religious differences, has created a self-perpetuating cycle of violence that continues to reshape the Middle East’s political landscape.

As the conflict enters new phases, neither side shows signs of backing down. Netanyahu maintains his position that Israel will stand alone if necessary, while Iran continues to strengthen its regional alliances with the backing of Russia and China. The intersection of religious conviction, political ambition, and great power competition has created a complex web of conflicts that threatens to permanently alter the region’s security architecture. Without significant diplomatic breakthroughs or shifts in strategic thinking from key players, the Middle East appears set for continued instability and potential further escalation.

Possibly the best result at this point can be the renewal of the Abraham Accord as President Trump returns to office. However, it was the very apprehensions regarding the ‘Outside In’ approach, associated with the Abraham Accords, which also caused the October 7 Hamas attack last year.

The “Outside-In” approach refers to Israel’s strategy of normalizing relations with Arab and Muslim-majority countries to foster regional stability and security. This strategy was notably advanced through the Abraham Accords in 2020, which established diplomatic ties between Israel and nations such as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco – but left out the Palestinians.

Rekindling the Abraham Accords would mean accepting the two-state premise as agreed in the 1995 Oslo Accords. It would also require a cessation of military hostilities and inflow of massive humanitarian assistance for Gaza – followed by the reconstruction phase in earnest. The stickiest points would be to determine if the two-state solution is still on the table  – and who now represents the Palestinians.

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