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		<title>US-Iran War And Alternative Futures For South Asia</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/us-iran-war-and-alternative-futures-for-south-asia/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Arif Ansar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 25 Jul 2026 17:42:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Afghan Reconciliation]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=10874</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="583" height="428" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/583_Map_of_Middle_East_Jan_13_20103.gif" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" fetchpriority="high" />By Arif Ansar Context The fragile security landscape of South Asia is increasingly tied to the volatile geopolitics of the Middle East. As the tripartite tensions involving the United States, Israel, and Iran simmer, the shockwaves are felt acutely in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and for that matter India as well. To fully comprehend this equation, [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/us-iran-war-and-alternative-futures-for-south-asia/">US-Iran War And Alternative Futures For South Asia</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="583" height="428" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/583_Map_of_Middle_East_Jan_13_20103.gif" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" /><p><img decoding="async" class="alignleft size-full wp-image-2695" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20-04-2011_Pakistan-Iran.jpg" alt="" width="181" height="121" />By Arif Ansar</p>
<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>The fragile security landscape of South Asia is increasingly tied to the volatile geopolitics of the Middle East. As the tripartite tensions involving the United States, Israel, and Iran simmer, the shockwaves are felt acutely in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and for that matter India as well. To fully comprehend this equation, one must analyze the internal regional dynamics of South Asia first and then trace how they intersect with the unfolding Middle Eastern crisis.</p>
<p>The successful negotiation and remote signing of the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/strait-hormuz-reopen-us-lift-iran-sanctions-14-point-deal-seeking-end-rcna350513">Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding</a> (MoU) on June 17, 2026, by U.S. President Donald Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, marked a monumental achievement for Pakistan’s civil-military leadership. If the Islamabad MoU sticks, in its current or reformed form, and transitions into a durable peace agreement, it holds the potential to fundamentally rewrite Pakistan&#8217;s domestic security, energy, and economic paradigms.</p>
<ol>
<li><strong> The Regional Dynamics: South Asia’s Internal Fault Lines</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>The relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan is currently defined by severe friction rather than neighborly cooperation. At the center of this tension is the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an extremist group that has <a href="https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2026/07/15/operation-shaban-toll-rises-to-123-as-security-forces-intensify-offensive-against-terrorists">escalated its terror campaign inside Pakistan</a>. Pakistan accuses the Afghan Taliban of providing safe havens and tacit support to the TTP—a claim the Taliban administration in Kabul denies, though the cross-border nature of TTP attacks remains a persistent flashpoint.</p>
<p>Concurrently, Pakistan’s southwestern province of Balochistan is facing a severe security crisis. The insurgent groups such as Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) are demanding independence for the resource-rich province, has dramatically escalated its attacks against the Pakistani military.</p>
<p>Media reports suggest that the BLA is receiving strategic cooperation and material support from the TTP, creating a combined internal security challenge for Islamabad. Pakistan alleges that the BLA receives external backing from India to destabilize the country. India and Israel are exceptionally close strategic allies, sharing deep defense, intelligence, and counter-terrorism partnerships.</p>
<p>There is great power rivalry part of the equation too. BLA has repeatedly <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/pakistan-what-is-behind-attacks-on-chinese-nationals/a-70425841">targeted Chinese infrastructure projects</a> and personnel associated with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in Balochistan in other parts of the country, aiming to disrupt Pakistan&#8217;s economic lifeline and strain its relationship with Beijing.</p>
<ol start="2">
<li><strong> The Middle East Equation: The Islamabad MoU and Saudi Defense Commitments</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>To understand how these South Asian fault lines link to the Middle East, one must look at Pakistan’s diplomatic balancing act. The nation has historically maintained a delicate equilibrium: keeping close ties with Saudi Arabia, and other GCC nations, while managing a long, porous border with its neighbor, Iran.</p>
<p><strong>The Islamabad MoU</strong></p>
<p>In mid-2026, Pakistan&#8217;s diplomatic corps, alongside Qatar, achieved a historic breakthrough by mediating the Islamabad MoU. This 14-point framework agreement successfully brought the U.S. and Iran to a temporary ceasefire, temporarily halting direct military hostilities, lifting the U.S. naval blockade on Iranian ports, and opening the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz. This diplomatic triumph cemented Pakistan’s role as a vital regional mediator. However, as hostilities have broken again indicating the stability of the Islamabad MoU remains incredibly fragile.</p>
<p><strong>The Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA)</strong></p>
<p>Compounding this fragility is Pakistan&#8217;s security obligation to Riyadh. On September 17, 2025, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/could-pakistani-saudi-defense-pact-be-first-step-toward-nato-style-alliance">Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA)</a>. Echoing NATO’s Article 5 language, the SMDA treats &#8220;any aggression against either country as an aggression against both&#8221;.</p>
<p>If an all-out war breaks out in the Middle East, a dangerous chain reaction is highly likely. Ansar Allah (the Houthis) in Yemen are highly likely to <a href="https://www.dropsitenews.com/p/yemen-sanaa-airport-ansarallah-saudi-houthis-bab-al-mandab-bukhaiti">close the Babul Mandab</a> Strait and launch retaliatory ballistic missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia. Faced with direct attacks, Saudi Arabia will almost certainly invoke the SMDA. Reports indicate that under the <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2644094/saudi-arabia">confidential terms</a> of the pact, Pakistan could be required to deploy up to 80,000 troops to secure Saudi borders. Sooner or later, Pakistan will be forced to choose between entering a foreign conflict to defend Saudi Arabia or reneging on its defense pact, which would devastate its economic and strategic relations with the Gulf.</p>
<ol start="3">
<li><strong> Implications of a Worsening Middle East Conflict on Pakistan and Afghanistan</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>If the Middle East situation continues to deteriorate, the consequences will ripple across South Asia, severely impacting Pakistan and Afghanistan, and India across military, economic, and social domains.</p>
<p>Pakistan is already heavily engaged in counter-insurgency operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) against the TTP, and in Balochistan against the BLA and BLF, the Pakistani military is stretched thin. Faced with a domestic security crisis, coming to the active defense of Saudi Arabia would be an immense logistical and military strain. Knowing this, adversaries like India and Israel are highly likely to speed up their destabilizing activities inside Pakistan. By utilizing existing proxies, they can ensure that Pakistan remains too deeply entangled in internal security crises to project military power or assist its Gulf allies.</p>
<p>This regional sabotage directly undermines <a href="https://politact.com/the-future-of-afghan-taliban-pakistan-conflict-implications-for-regional-stability-and-us-interests/">Washington’s strategic goals</a>. The U.S. relies on Pakistan’s diplomatic weight to mediate with Tehran, as seen with the Islamabad MoU. A destabilized Pakistan is a nation that cannot play a constructive role in preventing a wider regional war in the Middle East or contribute towards the success of <a href="https://politact.com/us-iran-interim-ceasefire-deal-israel-and-the-future-of-abraham-accords/">new vision</a> for the Middle East &#8211; under the Abraham Accords and subsequent establishment of Board of Peace.</p>
<p><strong>The Explosion of Sectarian Strife</strong></p>
<p>A direct conflict involving Iran—the primary Shia power—and the U.S., Israel, or Sunni Arab Gulf states will instantly inflame sectarian fault lines in South Asia. Both Pakistan Afghanistan have <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/shia-population-by-country">sizable Shia minorities</a> that have historically been targeted by hardline Sunni extremist groups. While India also has a sizeable Shia population, and while Muslims there face state repression, Shia’s there have not been targeted in a similar fashion.</p>
<p>A worsening Middle East war will be actively exploited by transnational terror networks, most notably Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISIS-K). ISIS-K, which operates across both Afghanistan and Pakistan, views Shia Muslims as heretics and has frequently targeted their mosques, community centers, and schools.</p>
<p>In Afghanistan: The ruling Taliban, while ideologically hardline Sunni, has sought to maintain basic internal stability. However, a regional sectarian war will severely test their control. ISIS-K will use the anti-Iran, anti-Shia rhetoric of the wider conflict to recruit disgruntled fighters, escalating attacks on the Shia Hazara community and challenging Taliban authority.</p>
<p>In Pakistan: Sectarian violence has historically claimed thousands of lives. An active war involving Iran and Saudi Arabia could trigger a revival of sectarian proxy wars on Pakistani soil, pitting localized militant groups against one another and further fracturing the country’s social cohesion.</p>
<ol start="4">
<li><strong> Economic Devastation and Connectivity Collapses</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>The economic fallout of a prolonged Middle East war on Pakistan and Afghanistan would be catastrophic.</p>
<p><strong>Energy and Remittance Shocks</strong></p>
<p>Pakistan imports the <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/pakistan/imports-by-country">vast majority of its oil and gas</a> from the Gulf. A disruption in the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab el-Mandeb would cause global oil prices to skyrocket, triggering hyperinflation in Pakistan&#8217;s fragile, debt-burdened economy. Furthermore, millions of Pakistani expatriates live and work in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. If the Middle East slides into a broader war, many of these workers could be forced to return home, cutting off the vital stream of foreign remittances that keeps Pakistan&#8217;s economy afloat.</p>
<p><strong>The Death of Regional Connectivity</strong></p>
<p>Both Afghanistan and Pakistan have pinned their economic futures on becoming trade hubs. Afghanistan under the Taliban has sought to utilize Iran&#8217;s Chabahar Port and the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) to bypass landlocked constraints and reduce its dependence on Pakistani transit routes.</p>
<p>While the Islamabad MoU briefly revived hopes for these transit corridors, an escalation of the war would render these infrastructure projects dead on arrival. Iranian ports would once again become military targets, isolating Afghanistan economically and pushing it deeper into poverty, which in turn breeds further radicalization and instability. Moreover, in the recent escalation, reports indicate that US has also <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/us-targets-iran-s-chabahar-port-in-fresh-strikes-hegseth-shares-image-of-collapsing-watchtower/ar-AA286DAw">targeted Chabahar port</a> to increase pressure on Iran.</p>
<ol start="5">
<li><strong> Conclusion: A Dangerous Convergence</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>The potential escalation of the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict is not a localized Middle Eastern issue; it is a direct threat to the stability of South Asia. For Pakistan, the war represents an existential geopolitical trap, forcing it to balance a strict mutual defense treaty with Saudi Arabia against the reality of a heavily armed neighbor in Iran and a domestic theater crawling with active insurgencies. For Afghanistan, the conflict threatens to fuel the fires of ISIS-K&#8217;s sectarian violence and destroy any hopes of regional economic integration.</p>
<p>As external actors seek to exploit these vulnerabilities, the line between the Middle East&#8217;s conflicts and South Asia&#8217;s internal wars is rapidly dissolving. If the Islamabad MoU completely unravels, Pakistan and Afghanistan will find themselves directly in the line of fire of a wider, highly destructive regional war.</p>
<p><strong>Conversely:</strong></p>
<p>If the Islamabad MoU &#8220;sticks&#8221; and transitions from a fragile ceasefire into a durable peace agreement, it holds the potential to fundamentally rewrite Pakistan&#8217;s domestic security, energy, and economic paradigms.</p>
<p><strong>a. Security: Strangling Proxies</strong></p>
<p>By capitalizing on its diplomatic leverage from mediating between the U.S. and Iran, Pakistan can demand reciprocal action against cross-border threats. A secure Iran, freed from Western military threats, can work with the Pakistan Army to seal the lawless border, choking the logistics and safe havens of the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) favored by India and Israel. Simultaneously, a stabilized region enables a unified U.S.-Pakistan-Iran diplomatic front to pressure the Afghan Taliban. Highly dependent on Pakistani and Iranian transit trade (like Chabahar Port), Kabul would be forced to dismantle the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). This double clampdown effectively ends the multi-front subversion designed by adversaries to keep Pakistan tactically entrapped.</p>
<p><strong>b. Economy &amp; Energy: Resurrecting the IP Pipeline</strong></p>
<p>A durable reformed MoU triggers the lifting of U.S. sanctions on Iran, allowing Pakistan to complete the Iran-Pakistan (IP) Gas Pipeline without fear of international isolation. This removes the looming $18 billion &#8220;take-or-pay&#8221; penalty from Tehran, while injecting cheap natural gas to end rolling blackouts and slash industrial costs. Moreover, Gwadar Port is likely to take-off.</p>
<p><strong>c. Autonomy: Balancing GCC Ties</strong></p>
<p>Abundant energy and secured Central Asian trade routes drive organic growth, offering financial self-reliance and breaking Pakistan&#8217;s dependency on Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) bailouts. This shields Islamabad from strategic entrapment under its Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) with Riyadh, preserving its neutrality instead of dragging its military into regional proxy wars.</p>
<p><strong>Related Articles</strong></p>
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<a href="https://politact.com/the-us-israel-and-iran-conflict-the-interplay-of-goals-and-strategies/">The US-Israel and Iran Conflict: The Interplay of Goals and Strategies</a> – May 1, 2026<br />
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<a href="https://politact.com/two-state-solution-future-of-gaza-and-iran/">Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran</a> – February 25, 2025<br />
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<a href="https://politact.com/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-and-india-middle-east-europe-corridor-imec/">China’s Belt And Road Initiative And India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC)</a> – Oct 5, 2023<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/irans-potential-retaliation-for-haniyehs-killing-and-wider-consequences/">Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences</a> – Aug 30, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/the-iran-pakistan-gas-pipeline-project-economic-and-geopolitical-realities/">The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities</a> – Sep 27, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/great-power-rivalry-and-chinas-deepening-involvement-in-south-asia-gulf-states/">Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States</a> – Aug 4, 2023<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/what-does-president-bidens-visit-to-israel-and-saudi-arabia-imply/">What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply?</a> – Aug 4, 2022</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/us-iran-war-and-alternative-futures-for-south-asia/">US-Iran War And Alternative Futures For South Asia</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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			</item>
		<item>
		<title>US-Iran Interim Ceasefire Deal, Israel, And The Future of Abraham Accords</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/us-iran-interim-ceasefire-deal-israel-and-the-future-of-abraham-accords/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Arif Ansar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 20:54:56 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[American Experiment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Americas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Analysis of Perception and Perspective]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US and Islamic World]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Gaza International Stabilization Force]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=10804</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="696" height="464" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Abraham Accords Signing Ceremony" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-300x200.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-768x512.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-630x420.jpg 630w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-696x464.jpg 696w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" />By Arif Ansar Context The escalation of open warfare between the United States, Israel, and Iran in early 2026—characterized by some as the &#8220;Third Gulf War&#8221;—has radically upended the strategic architecture of the Middle East. At the center of pre-war Western diplomatic planning were two highly integrated concepts: the Abraham Accords, aiming to build a [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/us-iran-interim-ceasefire-deal-israel-and-the-future-of-abraham-accords/">US-Iran Interim Ceasefire Deal, Israel, And The Future of Abraham Accords</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="696" height="464" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Abraham Accords Signing Ceremony" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-300x200.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-768x512.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-630x420.jpg 630w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-696x464.jpg 696w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" /><figure id="attachment_10638" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-10638" style="width: 1024px" class="wp-caption alignleft"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-10638" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords.jpg" alt="Abraham Accords Signing Ceremony" width="1024" height="683" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-300x200.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-768x512.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-630x420.jpg 630w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-696x464.jpg 696w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-10638" class="wp-caption-text">Abraham Accords Signing Ceremony</figcaption></figure>
<p>By Arif Ansar</p>
<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>The escalation of open warfare between the United States, Israel, and Iran in early 2026—characterized by some as the &#8220;Third Gulf War&#8221;—has radically upended the <a href="https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2026-25-southeast-asia-and-the-third-gulf-war-impact-responses-and-implications-by-ian-storey/">strategic architecture</a> of the Middle East. At the center of pre-war Western diplomatic planning were two highly integrated concepts: the Abraham Accords, aiming to build a normalization bridge between Israel and Arab states, and the Board of Peace (BOP), an <a href="https://www.securityincontext.org/posts/colonial-administration-counterinsurgency-pacification-and-disaster-capitalism-in-trumps-plan-for-gaza">international framework</a> established under UN Security Council Resolution 2803 to oversee a post-conflict administration, international stabilization force, and real estate transformation in Gaza.</p>
<p>However, the military campaign launched on February 28, 2026, under the U.S.-Israeli codename &#8220;Operation Epic Fury&#8221;, fundamentally collided with the core assumptions of these frameworks. Instead of solidifying a prosperous, integrated, and Western-aligned trade bloc, the <a href="https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/ResearchAndStudies/Pages/risk-politics-and-the-us-israeli-war-on-iran.aspx">kinetic conflict</a> exposed deep structural flaws in regional deterrence, shattered the prospects of two-state solution, and triggered an unprecedented shift in the balance of power.</p>
<ol>
<li><strong> The Disintegration of the Pre-War Vision: BOP and Abraham Accords Under Fire</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>Before the military escalation of 2026, the Abraham Accords and the Board of Peace functioned as a synchronized carrot-and-stick diplomatic strategy. The political objective was clear: circumvent the core issue of Palestinian statehood by offering massive economic, infrastructure, and technological incentives to the Arab world, effectively managing the region from the <a href="https://politact.com/the-emerging-outside-in-approach-to-israeli-palestinian-conflict-afghan-reconciliation-and-kashmir-issue/">outside-in</a>. The BOP was envisioned as a multi-layered <a href="https://www.securityincontext.org/posts/colonial-administration-counterinsurgency-pacification-and-disaster-capitalism-in-trumps-plan-for-gaza">colonial and financial administration</a>—overseeing a Gaza Executive Board and a Palestinian National Committee—meant to signal a new era of regional co-prosperity.</p>
<p>When <em>Operation Epic Fury</em> commenced with devastating strikes on Iranian command structures, nuclear sites, and energy facilities, this vision suffered an immediate kinetic shock. Rather than acting as bridges for trade, the Abraham Accords were abruptly tested as raw military alignments. Iran’s retaliatory doctrine did not spare the region; Tehran launched waves of drones and ballistic missiles targeting not only Israeli territory but also Western assets and allies across the Gulf.</p>
<p>The BOP’s ambitious plans for Gaza—such as beachfront hotels and special economic zones—were instantly frozen as global energy markets panicked and global fertilizer and agricultural supply chains broke down. The war exposed an untenable contradiction: attempting to build an institutional framework for peace while simultaneously fighting a total regional war.</p>
<ol start="2">
<li><strong> The Great Divergence: Independent Israeli Maneuvers vs. Joint Strategy</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>A central complication in the future of the BOP and the Abraham Accords is the apparent <a href="https://politact.com/the-us-israel-and-iran-conflict-the-interplay-of-goals-and-strategies/">divergence</a> between American diplomatic objectives and Israeli kinetic execution. While the United States has continuously attempted to orchestrate a diplomatic off-ramp, Israel has aggressively expanded its military footprint. Israel’s actions in Gaza, its incursions into Lebanon, and its unilateral willingness to strike deep into Iranian territory—even during active diplomatic windows—have created two starkly different strategic interpretations &#8211; that pose the most acute risk to the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/strait-hormuz-reopen-us-lift-iran-sanctions-14-point-deal-seeking-end-rcna350513">Interim Ceasefire Deal</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Interpretation A: The Maverick State Acting Unilaterally</strong></p>
<p>This perspective argues that Israel is acting in open contradiction to Washington&#8217;s goals. Israeli leadership has made it clear that they <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/un-chief-blasts-israels-unacceptable-rejection-of-two-state-solution/">no longer view</a> the Oslo Accords or a two-state solution as viable frameworks. By pursuing a permanent military solution rather than a political compromise, Israel is explicitly prioritizing the absolute destruction of the &#8220;Axis of Resistance&#8221; over the long-term diplomatic health of the Abraham Accords. They are gambling that Arab states will eventually be forced to accept a dominant, nuclear-armed Israel as a fait accompli, regardless of the Palestinian issue.</p>
<p><strong>Interpretation B: A Tightly Orchestrated Joint Strategy</strong></p>
<p>Conversely, realism suggests that Israeli actions represent a coordinated, dual-track &#8220;Good Cop / Bad Cop&#8221; strategy with the United States. While Washington acts as the diplomatic negotiator—offering terms, carrots, and structural limitations—Israel functions as the unhinged kinetic hammer. By maintaining maximum military pressure on Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, Israel forces adversaries to negotiate from a position of acute vulnerability, allowing American diplomats to demand structural concessions that would be nearly impossible to attain through standard statecraft.</p>
<p>Regardless of which interpretation is accurate, the structural fallout is identical: Israel&#8217;s complete abandonment of the Palestinian political track has severed the primary artery through which the Abraham Accords were expected to expand to critical Muslim-majority nations like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, who have historically conditioned formal normalization on a viable two-state solution.</p>
<ol start="3">
<li><strong> The 60-Day Ceasefire: Why Iran Emerges in an Enhanced Position</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>The multi-week diplomatic push that culminated in the temporary cessation of hostilities has set the stage for a potential <a href="https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-war-ceasefire-deal-e0a9e4e1152ea8da10ea066ad174a23a">60-day extended ceasefire</a>. However, an assessment of the strategic balance indicates that if a prolonged ceasefire is institutionalized under current conditions, Iran will have effectively won the geopolitical argument, shifting the regional balance of power in its favor with far reaching implications.</p>
<p>Despite enduring massive leadership losses and targeted degradation of its conventional military facilities during the initial strikes of Operation Epic Fury, Tehran demonstrated profound <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/operation-epic-fury-a-closer-look-at-iran-s-military-resilience/ar-AA238Rpm">asymmetric resilience</a>:</p>
<ul>
<li>Weaponization of the Chokepoints: By effectively throttling the Strait of Hormuz and imposing a massive $2 million transit toll on commercial tankers while outright banning American and Israeli vessels, Iran proved it could hold global energy markets hostage. It’s not clear whether the toll or fees will remain in any future deal.</li>
<li>Surviving Regime Change Ambitions: Iran successfully weathered a decapitation campaign that killed its highest officials, proving that its institutional and proxy network could function and retaliate even under extreme duress.</li>
<li>Demonstrated Retaliatory Reach: By launching direct, sustained missile strikes against Israel and retaliating against U.S. bases in the region, Iran dismantled the myth of Western invulnerability.</li>
</ul>
<p>As far as its nuclear program is concerned, while Iran had previously committed to not attain weaponized capability. The major criticism of the earlier agreement with Iran reached in 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) under Obama administration was that it neither addressed Iran’s wider behavior in the region nor its ballistic missile program. On the positive side, JCPOA was backed by P5+1 countries i.e. US, China, Russia, France, UK, and Germany – along with European Union.</p>
<p>In the present context, P5+1 were not in the negotiating loop – but this does not indicate that they may not partake in any future roles. While frictions between NATO and US have increased over Ukraine and military approach towards Iran, President Trump is likely to seek support from the leaders at the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/trump-g7-iran-france-india-2b13227bfc63d5c7c92c64488e3e2753">G7 Summit</a> meeting held in France, where he electronically signed the Islamabad MOU. However, in the escalating great power rivalries environment, the involvement of G7 nations will be quite nuanced.</p>
<p>Deciphering from the information available so far, nothing within the preliminary terms of the present ceasefire suggests that a 60-day truce will compel Iran to permanently abandon its regional proxy network. For Iran, groups like Hezbollah and Hamas are vital defensive organs. Because forcing their complete dissolution is beyond the scope of a standard ceasefire, Israel will view any finalized U.S.-Iran document with deep suspicion and may ultimately refuse to honor its terms, preferring to continue its military campaign.</p>
<ol start="4">
<li><strong> The South Asian Pivot: Pakistan and India’s Subcontinental Tussle in the Gulf</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>The 2026 conflict has also manifested the subcontinental rivalry of India and Pakistan directly into the Middle Eastern theater, altering the geopolitical balance of power between the two nuclear-armed neighbors.</p>
<p>With the collapse of direct Western-led communication channels during the peak of the fighting, Pakistan leveraged its historic 900-kilometer border with Iran and its deep institutional ties with the Arab Gulf to emerge as the prime mediator between Washington and Tehran. The resulting &#8220;Islamabad Peace Process&#8221;—headlined by face-to-face talks in April 2026 between U.S. Vice President JD Vance and Iranian Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—elevated Pakistan into an indispensable global peace broker. By opening up back-channel communication lines via its Interests Section in Washington, Pakistan successfully negotiated the temporary cessation of hostilities, protecting its own vital economic interests, specifically the massive flow of worker remittances from the Gulf.</p>
<p>This diplomatic triumph directly challenges <a href="https://politact.com/examining-saudi-iran-tensions-and-its-impact-on-south-asia-china/">India’s long-term strategic investments in the Middle East</a>. Over the previous decade, New Delhi had built a formidable geopolitical axis anchored on deep technological, defense, and economic ties with Israel and the UAE. India viewed this alignment as a way to project power westward and isolate Pakistan.</p>
<p>However, as Pakistan successfully positions itself as the necessary arbiter of regional stability between the U.S. and Iran, India’s rigid alignment with the Israel-UAE axis risks locking it out of the broader post-war regional consensus. If the Middle East transitions into a managed &#8220;cold peace&#8221; where Iran’s equities are formally recognized, Pakistan&#8217;s diplomatic capital will grow, neutralizing some of the strategic leverage India had accumulated through its partnerships.</p>
<ol start="5">
<li><strong> Conclusion: The Structural Impasse of the Grand Vision</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>The grand vision originally championed by the Abraham Accords and the Board of Peace has arrived at a structural impasse. The only plausible pathway for these frameworks to move forward as instruments of a durable, comprehensive regional peace requires two simultaneous, seemingly impossible geopolitical concessions:</p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Iran must join the bandwagon</strong>, abandoning its regional agenda and accepting a formalized integration into a security architecture alongside Israel. This would be accompanied by the cassation of support for Hezbollah and Hamas.</li>
<li><strong>Israel must accept a viable, sovereign two-state solution</strong>, ceasing expansion of territory either via settlements or military use.  This will providing the necessary political cover for Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the wider Muslim world to formally normalize ties.</li>
</ol>
<p>Given current political realities, neither condition is achievable. Israel’s domestic political landscape remains firmly set against territorial compromise, viewing military containment and absolute security dominance as its only viable future. Concurrently, Iran’s clerical and military elite view their asymmetric deterrent power and proxy networks as the sole shield preserving the Islamic Republic from Western-orchestrated regime change.</p>
<p>Consequently, whether the conflict transitions through continued military attrition or a formalized ceasefire, the Board of Peace and the Abraham Accords will be forced to mutate. Rather than tools for authentic peace and regional integration, they will function as a defensive alignment designed not to resolve the region’s core disputes, but to manage an unstable and fractured &#8220;cold peace.&#8221;</p>
<p><strong>Related Articles:<br />
</strong></p>
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<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/us-iran-interim-ceasefire-deal-israel-and-the-future-of-abraham-accords/">US-Iran Interim Ceasefire Deal, Israel, And The Future of Abraham Accords</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>The US-Israel and Iran Conflict: The Interplay of Goals and Strategies</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/the-us-israel-and-iran-conflict-the-interplay-of-goals-and-strategies/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Naade Ali]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 13:29:47 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Core vs Peripheral Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Libya, Palestine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US and Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vantage Point Analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Anti-Access/Area-Denial]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Asymmetric Naval Warfare Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China Iran relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaza]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics of Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Islamabad Talks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Narratives around Iran conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[New regional order for Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Operation Epic Fury]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strait of Hormuz]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Iran relations]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=10780</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="696" height="603" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024.webp" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Strait of Hormuz" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024.webp 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-300x260.webp 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-768x665.webp 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-485x420.webp 485w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-696x603.webp 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-534x462.webp 534w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" />The Geography of Stalemate: Risk Thresholds, Narrative Warfare, and the Quest for a New Regional Order By Naade Ali Context Since the war began, it has become clear that the U.S., Israel, and Iran operate with fundamentally different risk thresholds—and those differences shape their strategies. The U.S. is less willing to tolerate prolonged economic strain [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-us-israel-and-iran-conflict-the-interplay-of-goals-and-strategies/">The US-Israel and Iran Conflict: The Interplay of Goals and Strategies</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="696" height="603" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024.webp" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Strait of Hormuz" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024.webp 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-300x260.webp 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-768x665.webp 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-485x420.webp 485w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-696x603.webp 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-534x462.webp 534w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" /><p><em><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignleft size-medium wp-image-10765" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-300x260.webp" alt="Strait of Hormuz" width="300" height="260" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-300x260.webp 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-768x665.webp 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-485x420.webp 485w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-696x603.webp 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-534x462.webp 534w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024.webp 1024w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" />The Geography of Stalemate: Risk Thresholds, Narrative Warfare, and the Quest for a New Regional Order</em></p>
<p>By Naade Ali</p>
<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>Since the war began, it has become clear that the U.S., Israel, and Iran operate with fundamentally different risk thresholds—and those differences shape their strategies. The U.S. is less willing to tolerate prolonged economic strain but more inclined to employ overwhelming force, assuming it will bring the conflict to a swift conclusion. Israel, on the other hand, is betting on a scenario in which Iranian strikes on Gulf states provoke diplomatic backlash, potentially drawing those states into retaliatory action. Such a chain of events could pave the way for the broader regional alignment <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260223-netanyahu-speaks-of-forming-alliance-against-sunni-and-shia-axes-including-arab-states/">envisioned by Prime Minister Netanyahu</a>, aimed at countering “radical Shi’a and Sunni forces” and ultimately weakening the Iranian regime. Israel, therefore, is prepared to bear the costs necessary to make this outcome possible.</p>
<p>From Iran’s perspective, the goal is to prevent this scenario from unfolding while influencing on GCC that American military presence on their soil has a cost and no benefit. Iran’s <a href="https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2026-march-9a/">mosaic military doctrine</a> is designed to endure sustained pressure while simultaneously increasing unpredictability and risk, making its actions more dangerous and uncertain. This high-risk tolerance remains one of its few tools to establish and maintain deterrence—something it is unlikely to compromise.</p>
<p><strong>Iran&#8217;s geography plays a key role in its Anti-Access/Area-Denial </strong></p>
<p>At present, it appears that the world’s most advanced military systems, equipped with cutting-edge and futuristic capabilities, are fundamentally constrained by geographical realities. Iran&#8217;s geography is a central &#8220;force multiplier&#8221; for its Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategy, effectively turning the country into a natural fortress that complicates any conventional military intervention. The superior airpower fielded by Israel and the United States has not translated into absolute control over critical chokepoints held by Iran, nor has it succeeded in dismantling the undersea and &#8220;Undermountain&#8221; missile infrastructure that keeps Iran’s defensive network largely operational and difficult to conquer despite relentless bombardment. These deeply embedded installations, carved into the Zagros Mountains, act as <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2026/03/natural-fortress-how-geography-protects-irans-regime/">fortified nodes</a> that enable Iran to sustain command-and-control functions.</p>
<p>While air strikes can degrade capabilities, complete neutralization requires a high-intensity land campaign—a scenario fraught with risk. Iran’s military doctrine leverages its unique topography, using natural barriers and limited access points to offset an adversary&#8217;s technological edge. For any invading force, the combination of logistical hurdles and Iran’s mastery of its difficult terrain makes a quick victory highly improbable. Consequently, U.S. strategy faces a stark trade-off: rely on stand-off strikes that degrade but do not eliminate threats, or escalate toward high-risk options for more decisive results. This geographic and structural advantage effectively cements a strategic stalemate, as Iran’s hardened infrastructure and &#8216;natural fortress&#8217; prevent any effort from achieving a rapid military outcome.</p>
<p>For Iran, prolonging the conflict appears to be the preferred course at this stage. Tehran has deliberately increased the costs of the war to unprecedented levels so it can have maximum leverage in negotiations with the United States, with its core demands of—financial compensation, the removal of all sanctions, a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region and recognition of its control over strategic maritime chokepoints.</p>
<p>Iran’s use of threat language is particularly significant in this regard. The rhetoric can exert psychological pressure on adversaries, yet it risks backfiring if not supported by actual capability. In Iran’s case, however, its warnings have proven credible rather than symbolic. This is demonstrated by its selective attacks on regional countries and <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-says-it-maintains-firm-control-over-hormuz-foreign-powers-have-no-right-to-interfere-in-gulf-security/3876469">control over</a> the Strait of Hormuz, where only vessels linked to China are permitted passage, effectively transforming global trade into a strategic instrument against the U.S. alliance.</p>
<p><strong>The Narrative Pivot: Trump’s Strategy of Perception Over Conquest</strong></p>
<p>In the conflict with Iran, Trump’s “winning card” is his ability to control the narrative, prioritizing the appearance of victory over the reality of a physical win. He relies on narrative dominance, using the perception of a <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/23/trump-iran-war-power-plants-energy-infrastructure-middle-east.html">diplomatic breakthrough</a> to maintain both domestic support and global leverage. While he projects an image of Iran “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/26/as-trump-claims-us-winning-tehran-asserts-legal-right-over-hormuz-strait">begging</a>” for a deal, the actual conflict on the ground remains a complex stalemate.</p>
<p>The sudden and highly visible emphasis on diplomacy, initiated under the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/9/us-iran-talks-in-pakistan-whos-attending-whats-on-the-agenda">Islamabad Talks</a>, reflects a calculated effort to manage domestic expectations through narrative control. By steering attention toward <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/26/trump-postpones-us-strikes-on-iranian-power-grid-to-april-6-amid-talks">backchannel negotiations</a>, President Trump diverts focus from military challenges or internal criticism. It illustrates a broader tactic of strategic distraction: when one narrative weakens, another is introduced to create uncertainty. This deliberate blurring of facts makes it harder for the public to form clear judgments or hold leadership accountable. In this way, confusion becomes a tool—dampening opposition and creating space for an exit framed more by optics than by conventional military success.</p>
<p>On the other side, deeper internal challenges confronting the Trump administration are becoming increasingly evident. Among them is a <a href="https://time.com/article/2026/03/20/republican-democrat-lawmakers-condemn-pentagon-iran-war-funding-request/">formal Pentagon request for $200 billion</a> to sustain military operations, a proposal that has provoked strong criticism and concern among both Democrats and fiscal conservatives in Congress. Democrats are actively leveraging the conflict for political advantage, <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/us-israel-war-on-iran-enters-4th-week-democrats-accuse-trump-of-lying-about-talks-with-tehran/3876928">accusing</a> Trump of leading the United States into an unnecessary and prolonged war while positioning themselves ahead of the November midterm elections in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/mar/17/midwest-swing-states-iran-war">hopes</a> of securing a legislative majority. Meanwhile, Republicans with long-term political aspirations—like Vice President JD Vance, widely considered a likely contender for the 2028 presidential race—are encountering increasing challenges in presenting a persuasive “America First” vision as the conflict drags on.</p>
<p>It was during the widespread fatigue and disillusionment from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that Trump originally solidified his “America First” persona. Yet, the prolonged confrontation with Iran threatens to undermine that narrative, as rising casualties, economic strain, and geopolitical entanglements make it harder for emerging Republican leaders to argue for restrained foreign intervention while projecting strength abroad. Vance and others must now navigate a delicate balance: appealing to a voter base that values both national security and fiscal prudence, while demonstrating that they can manage a complex, protracted conflict without repeating the mistakes of previous administrations. This tension illustrates how domestic political ambitions are increasingly intertwined with the outcomes and perception of foreign military engagements.</p>
<p>As a result, the U.S. campaign against Iran has generated numerous challenges and setbacks that outweigh its tactical military achievements to date.</p>
<p><strong>Israeli Game Plan</strong></p>
<p>For Israel, the conflict represents a rare and historic opportunity to significantly weaken Iran. The country appears prepared for a prolonged confrontation; <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/poll-most-jewish-israelis-support-iran-war-toppling-regime-arab-backing-far-lower/">recent surveys</a> indicate that 81% of Israelis support military action, with many willing to endure sustained attacks to see the collapse of the Iranian regime. Years of conflict with Hamas and Hezbollah have conditioned Israel to absorb both psychological and physical strain. In such an environment, hardship becomes normalized, allowing for greater societal resilience. While both Iran and Israel appear capable of enduring prolonged shocks, the United States lacks the same tolerance, creating a possible divergence in strategic trajectories.</p>
<p>In Israel’s <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-891001">view,</a> the objective is to push further toward definitive regime change. However, it recognizes that airstrikes alone are unlikely to achieve this goal, which is why it is increasingly <a href="https://www.gbnews.com/news/world/benjamin-netanyahu-ground-invasion-israel-iran-us">considering</a> the possibility of a ground invasion, potentially with U.S. support. Such a move, however, would likely initiate a prolonged conflict. Israel understands that ending the war prematurely would risk undermining the gains it has already made. While this could help the Israeli government to maintain domestic unity by framing the conflict as an existential necessity, it would not necessarily produce similar political benefits for President Trump or his Republican Party at home.</p>
<p>For the United States, one possible course could involve stepping back and allowing Iran and Israel to confront each other directly. However, Iran appears to have anticipated such a scenario and does not intend for the conflict to remain confined. Its recent shift in military doctrine—<a href="https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2026/03/22/765699/Iran-s-military-doctrine-shifts-from-defensive-to-offensive-Senior-commander">confirmed by Major General Ali Abdollahi</a> as a transition from defense to offense—indicates an ambition to expand the effects of the war from a regional to a global scale. By exploiting interconnected vulnerable systems of energy, food, and trade, Iran seeks to create a cascading effect in which damage inflicted upon it reverberates worldwide. Its broader objective appears to be the erosion of U.S. dominance and the restructuring of global power toward a Chinese-centered order.</p>
<p>By encouraging Arab states to align with China’s <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202603/1356948.shtml">Global Security Initiative</a>, Iran is promoting an alternative model of security that prioritizes sovereignty over U.S. involvement. In effect, it is attempting to achieve through warfare what China could not accomplish solely through economic means. This strategic gameplay was acknowledged by President Trump himself, who <a href="https://upstox.com/news/business-news/latest-updates/big-chess-game-dealing-with-very-smart-players-trump-s-iran-war-comments-raise-questions-on-endgame/article-190789/">described</a> the situation as a ‘big chess game’ suggesting that Iran is acting as a &#8220;smart player, playing high-level chess.&#8221;</p>
<p>Iran is striving to ensure that any resolution to the conflict will not restore the pre-war status quo. Instead, it seeks to extract maximum gains whenever negotiations take place. If Iran’s objectives are realized and revenues begin to flow, Iran would not only rebuild its economy but also invest heavily in military modernization, developing capabilities that could prove extremely difficult to counter in any future confrontation.</p>
<p>This prospect is deeply concerning for Israel, which anticipates that a post-war Iran could emerge as a highly militarized and resilient power. From Israel’s perspective, the only viable strategy is to continue the war and ensure that Iran is weakened to such an extent that rebuilding its military strength would take decades. However, such an approach demands sustained endurance, strategic patience, and a high tolerance for risk—traits that Iran has already demonstrated.</p>
<p>Whether Israel can maintain this level of resilience remains uncertain, and this question will become clearer as the conflict continues. This is not a short-term confrontation, but a prolonged struggle likely to reshape regional power dynamics. With diplomatic positions varying and domestic political pressures mounting, the conflict is likely to persist. The result is a negative-sum dynamic in which decisive victory remains unlikely; escalation risks stay high, and any eventual endgame will reflect not shared interests but the relative exhaustion and leverage of the parties involved.</p>
<p><strong>Related Articles:<br />
</strong></p>
<p class="entry-title"><a href="https://politact.com/geopolitics-of-islamic-world-and-middle-power-alliance-building-after-iran-attack/">Geopolitics Of Islamic World And Middle Power Alliances After Iran Attack</a> &#8211; Mar 22, 2026<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/the-end-of-strategic-altruism-putins-visit-and-the-new-us-india-reality/">The End Of Strategic Altruism: Putin’s Visit And The New US-India Reality</a> – Jan 13, 2026<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/from-oslo-to-trumps-abraham-accords-and-20-point-peace-plan-for-gaza/">From Oslo To Trump’s Abraham Accords And 20-Point Peace Plan For Gaza</a> – Oct 12, 2025<br />
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<a href="https://politact.com/gaza-ceasefire-plan-and-us-iran-tensions/">Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions</a> – April 26, 2025<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/two-state-solution-future-of-gaza-and-iran/">Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran</a> – February 25, 2025<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/assads-demise-and-the-shifting-balance-of-power-in-middle-east/">Assad’s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East</a> – Dec 26, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/the-escalating-middle-east-crisis-and-president-elect-trump/">The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump</a> – Dec 5, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-and-india-middle-east-europe-corridor-imec/">China’s Belt And Road Initiative And India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC)</a> – Oct 5, 2023<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/irans-potential-retaliation-for-haniyehs-killing-and-wider-consequences/">Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences</a> – Aug 30, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/the-iran-pakistan-gas-pipeline-project-economic-and-geopolitical-realities/">The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities</a> – Sep 27, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/great-power-rivalry-and-chinas-deepening-involvement-in-south-asia-gulf-states/">Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States</a> – Aug 4, 2023<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/what-does-president-bidens-visit-to-israel-and-saudi-arabia-imply/">What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply?</a> – Aug 4, 2022</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-us-israel-and-iran-conflict-the-interplay-of-goals-and-strategies/">The US-Israel and Iran Conflict: The Interplay of Goals and Strategies</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Arab Fissions And Gaza Crisis</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/the-arab-fissions-and-gaza-crisis/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 23 Jul 2014 12:32:58 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Core vs Peripheral Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vantage Point Analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Egypt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of Egypt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of Iraq]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of the Arab world]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaza]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaza Crisis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hamas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hezbollah]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran nuclear talks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ISIS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israeli Palestinian conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Muslim Brotherhood]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Operation Protective Edge]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The geopolitics of Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War on terror]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://beta.politact.com/?p=6172</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="650" height="365" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/23-07-2014_Persian-Gulf-Arab-states.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/23-07-2014_Persian-Gulf-Arab-states.jpg 650w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/23-07-2014_Persian-Gulf-Arab-states-600x337.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/23-07-2014_Persian-Gulf-Arab-states-300x168.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 650px) 100vw, 650px" />Context As the Gaza crisis unfolds, the Arab world is also engulfed in the Arab Awakening and the ever widening War and Terror. Meanwhile, the global power tussles are also escalating in the region. While the American perception has deteriorated due to the campaign against extremists, the Russians have gained in places like Syria. Iraq [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-arab-fissions-and-gaza-crisis/">The Arab Fissions And Gaza Crisis</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="650" height="365" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/23-07-2014_Persian-Gulf-Arab-states.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/23-07-2014_Persian-Gulf-Arab-states.jpg 650w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/23-07-2014_Persian-Gulf-Arab-states-600x337.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/23-07-2014_Persian-Gulf-Arab-states-300x168.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 650px) 100vw, 650px" /><p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-6173 alignright" src="https://beta.politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/23-07-2014_Persian-Gulf-Arab-states-300x168.jpg" alt="23-07-2014_Persian Gulf Arab states" width="300" height="168" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/23-07-2014_Persian-Gulf-Arab-states-300x168.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/23-07-2014_Persian-Gulf-Arab-states-600x337.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/23-07-2014_Persian-Gulf-Arab-states.jpg 650w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" />As the Gaza crisis unfolds, the Arab world is also engulfed in the Arab Awakening and the ever widening War and Terror. Meanwhile, the global power tussles are also escalating in the region. While the American perception has deteriorated due to the campaign against extremists, the Russians have gained in places like Syria. Iraq and Egypt both have shown indications on moving closer to Russia, especially when they don’t get what they want from the West.</p>
<p>The Gulf nations, especially Qatar and the Saudis, are caught in their own battle for supremacy in the region, and to establish their influence over one or the other Palestinian faction. While Qatar, along with Turkey and Iran, has economically supported Gaza and by default Hamas, Saudis and Israelis see this as detrimental to the two-state solution.</p>
<p>Ironically, there is synergy of interest between the regional Sunni Arab States and Israel. They both support Fatah over Hamas, the secular set up in Egypt, reversal of Iran’s regional resurgence and its endeavor towards acquiring nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>Differences also exist over the affairs of Syria and which opposition fighters to support there, the moderates or the AQ and IS linked extremists. Then there is the divergence over the future of Egypt, where Saudi Arabia went out of its way to back al-Sisi, who had earlier removed Muslim Brotherhood supported Mursi government. On the other hand, Qatar, Turkey and Iran, criticized the removal of Mursi from power. Among other matters, Mursi was attempting to develop better relations with Iran and that had greatly worried the Gulf States.</p>
<p><span id="more-6172"></span></p>
<p><strong>Analysis</strong></p>
<p>As the Gaza crisis worsens, it is quickly becoming apparent that one of the major causalities of the changes in Egypt was its traditional role of playing a peacemaker between Hamas and Israel. With the crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood, al-Sisi seems to have lost this influence.</p>
<p>While Saudis and Turkey do not see eye-to-eye over the future of Gaza and Egypt, they coincide over how to handle the Syrian quagmire, where Iran is supporting the Assad government.</p>
<p>The evolving situation of Iraq has complicated and added pressures on the Saudis and on the positions of other Gulf States as well. On the one hand, they loathed the Iranian supported Nouri al-Maliki regime, but on the other hand they fear the IS onslaught, whose direction could easily change towards Arab states that are already reeling under the stress of Arab Awakening.</p>
<p>Respected Saudi journalist and editor-at-large of Saudi Gazette, Khaled Almaeena, wrote in Al Arabia News recently:</p>
<p>“The Arab masses see images of dead bodies of men, women and children. They observe the total disregard for the sanctity of places of worship and hospitals. They see orphanages being blown to bits. Above all they see the complete paralysis and helplessness of Arab governments which cannot even pressure their so-called friends in the West to ask Israel to stop this aggression.”</p>
<p>As reflected by the loss of Egyptian influence, if other state actors continue to fail towards playing a balanced approach, they too will start to loose relevance. Every time Israel launches aerial bombardments and ground operations and acts with impunity, the Arab and Gulf States appear more and more mute, leading to more loss of credibility while making peaceful settlement more elusive.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-arab-fissions-and-gaza-crisis/">The Arab Fissions And Gaza Crisis</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>Fatah, Hamas Sign A Reconciliation Deal In Doha</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/fatah-hamas-sign-a-reconciliation-deal-in-doha/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 08 Feb 2012 11:44:43 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Issue Brief]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Arab Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arab Israeli conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Doha Declaration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaza]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics of Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israeli Palestinian conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East Peace Process]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Palestinian authority]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Salam Fayyad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Situation of Egypt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Situation of Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[West Bank]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://beta.politact.com/?p=6505</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Western backed Abbas and Hamas chief Khaled Meshaal have finally signed the ‘Doha Declaration’. The agreement states that Palestinian government will be made up of ‘independent technocrats’ who will also oversee the reconstruction efforts in Gaza. The deal accepts Abbas as the over all Prime Minister of the interim government that will hold elections. Abbas [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/fatah-hamas-sign-a-reconciliation-deal-in-doha/">Fatah, Hamas Sign A Reconciliation Deal In Doha</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Western backed Abbas and Hamas chief Khaled Meshaal have finally signed the ‘Doha Declaration’. The agreement states that Palestinian government will be made up of ‘independent technocrats’ who will also oversee the reconstruction efforts in Gaza. The deal accepts Abbas as the over all Prime Minister of the interim government that will hold elections. Abbas replaces Salam Fayyad as the head of Palestinian Authority in West Bank.</p>
<p>The deal is being seen as a major breakthrough after four years of separate governments in West Bank and Gaza. The division has also been a source of complication in progress towards the stagnant Middle East Peace Process. Meshaal has stated that both parties are committed to ending the hostilities of the past, to resist the enemy, and achieve national goals.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/fatah-hamas-sign-a-reconciliation-deal-in-doha/">Fatah, Hamas Sign A Reconciliation Deal In Doha</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Season Of Revolts And The Future Of Nation-State</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/the-season-of-revolts-and-the-future-of-nation-state/</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 17 Oct 2011 03:56:38 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Analysis of Perception and Perspective]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arab Spring]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European Spring]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of Nation State]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaza]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global revolts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indian Spring]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Occupy Wall Street]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Robert I. Rotberg]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sir Syed Ahmed Khan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Social Media]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turki Bin Faisal]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[WikiLeaks]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="400" height="282" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/17-10-2011_Arab_Spring.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/17-10-2011_Arab_Spring.jpg 400w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/17-10-2011_Arab_Spring-300x212.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/17-10-2011_Arab_Spring-100x70.jpg 100w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 400px) 100vw, 400px" />Context The Arab Spring is now well underway and appears to have spread to other continents as well. Early signs of a European Spring are visible in UK and Greece, and an American version in the form of the Occupy Wall Street movement. Meanwhile, Anna Hazare provided a glimpse of how an Indian Spring may [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-season-of-revolts-and-the-future-of-nation-state/">The Season Of Revolts And The Future Of Nation-State</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="400" height="282" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/17-10-2011_Arab_Spring.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/17-10-2011_Arab_Spring.jpg 400w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/17-10-2011_Arab_Spring-300x212.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/17-10-2011_Arab_Spring-100x70.jpg 100w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 400px) 100vw, 400px" /><p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignleft" src="https://www.politact.com/images/stories/17-10-2011_Arab_Spring.jpg" alt="" width="213" height="150" align="left" />The Arab Spring is now well underway and appears to have spread to other continents as well. Early signs of a European Spring are visible in UK and Greece, and an American version in the form of the Occupy Wall Street movement. Meanwhile, Anna Hazare provided a glimpse of how an Indian Spring may look like. The underpinnings of these protests may be different but at a broader level they signify the widening gulf between governments and their citizenry. In other words, hidden in these protests is a modern crisis of the nation-state system.</p>
<p>This article reviews the forces that are acting upon a state from with in and externally, including the role of Wikileaks and social media, in order to understand what may have triggered these revolts and what may lie ahead.</p>
<p><span id="more-1702"></span></p>
<p><strong>Analysis</strong></p>
<p>What triggered these public uprising is a hotly debated topic. However, in the context of the Arab world and Pakistan, the WikiLeaks disclosures may have played a major role. These secrets revealed how governments are playing a duplicitous role with their public, especially about their dealings with the US.</p>
<p>The nations at the forefront of the war on terror in these regions are wedged between representing the sentiments and welfare of their public, and on the other hand serving the US interests. Many of these weak regimes have traditionally relied on US support to extend their otherwise untenable reign. The variance between the two tangents has progressed overtime, as public anti-Americanism grew. This resulted in an especially awkward position for the Sunni autocratic regimes of the Arab world, particularly when it comes to, for example, the Palestinian issue. The following comment that Prince Turki bin Faisal made during the Gaza crisis, reflects on the level of angst created by this disequilibrium. He wrote in The Financial Times on January 22, 2009:</p>
<p>&#8220;So far, the Kingdom has resisted these calls, but every day this restraint becomes more difficult to maintain. When Israelis deliberately kill Palestinians, appropriate their lands, destroys their homes, uproot their farms and impose an inhumane blockade of them; and as the world laments once again the sufferings of the Palestinians, people of conscience from every corner of the world are clamoring for action. Eventually, the Kingdom will not be able to prevent its citizens from joining the worldwide revolt against Israel. Today, every Saudi is a Gazan, and we remember well the words of our late King Faisal: &#8220;&#8216;I hope you will forgive my outpouring of emotions, but when I think that our Holy Mosque in Jerusalem is being invaded and desecrated, I ask God that if I am unable to undertake the Holy Jihad, then I should not live a moment more.&#8217; &#8221;</p>
<p>In short, Wikleaks has put these governments on a collision course with their public, while increasing pressure to justify the variance between their public and private faces. To avert this public pressure, Pakistan has also asked US to not criticize its role in the war against terror publicly. For example, when it comes to the drone attacks, the government publicly criticizes it but privately condones them.</p>
<p>On the other hand, the difference between the public and private stances of these actors makes the US unsure of its allies and results in mistrust. Furthermore, it indicates that these countries have been unable to garner public support for their participation in the campaign against terror, and this has pushed the US to now fight most of this war covertly.</p>
<p>In discussing the implications of the documents leaked by Wikileaks, PoliTact noted in December 2010 that at a macro level, the leaks represent a reset button in international relations, especially, ties of different countries to the United States. From the American perspective, in the emerging multi-polar world, the status of the US as the sole super-power is being challenged, and it is not clear if traditional alliances can be relied upon in the future. It is crucial for America to narrow down the variance in public and private stances of various governments and leaders, and to create a realistic assessment of where these countries actually stand on policies and matters of international significance.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, the relentless American pursuit and the inability of its allies in the region to generate pubic support for the war against extremists, will likely result in the unraveling of many a nation-state.</p>
<p>There are of course additional factors that can cause a state to crumble. One of the essential responsibilities of a state is to protect the life and property of its citizen and provide opportunities for their economic wellbeing. The former director of the Kennedy School’s Program on Interstate Conflict, Robert I. Rotberg, presented the following characteristics of a failed state in his article “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure”, published in Washington Quarterly of Summer 2002:</p>
<p>“The absolute intensity of violence does not define a failed state. Rather, it is the enduring character of that violence (as in Angola, Burundi, and Sudan), the direction of such violence against the existing government or regime, and the vigorous character of the political or geographical demands for shared power or autonomy that rationalize or justify that violence that identifies the failed state. Failure for a nation-state looms when violence cascades into all-out internal war, when standards of living massively deteriorate, when the infrastructure of ordinary life decays, and when the greed of rulers overwhelms their responsibilities to better their people and their surroundings.”</p>
<p>This characterization matches the conditions in many third world countries, and the last part dealing with ‘greed’ also helps explain the present economic crisis in Europe and the US. Although, the description still misses an even more fundamental role a state should be performing, to epitomize the sentiments and aspirations of its citizens. Revolts and Revolutions result from this deeper level of disconnect and disillusionment between the people and the rulers.</p>
<p>Sir Syed Ahmed Khan summed up this point in the following fashion when he wrote about the causes of the Indian Revolt of 1857 against the British, for which Muslims were implicated:</p>
<p>&#8220;The primary causes of rebellion are, I fancy, everywhere the same. It invariably results from the existence of a policy obnoxious to the dispositions, aims, habits, and views, of those by whom the rebellion is brought about. From this it follows that widely-spread disaffection cannot spring from any solitary, or local cause. Universal rebellion must arise from universal grounds for discontent or from streams deriving from many different sources, but finally merging into one wide-spreading, turbulent water.&#8221;</p>
<p>Like many other outcomes of the linked and globalized world, these public revolts are also transnational in nature. There appears to be two contradictory forces at work, on the one hand the technological advancements and social media are making the borders increasingly irrelevant, and on the other, worsening economics is causing nationalism to resurge. The future of nation-sate structure is dependent on how it reconciles the pulls and tugs that emanate from with in, with those that act upon it from outside.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-season-of-revolts-and-the-future-of-nation-state/">The Season Of Revolts And The Future Of Nation-State</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>Erdogan In Egypt To Boost Regional Influence</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/erdogan-in-egypt-to-boost-regional-influence/</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 12 Sep 2011 15:22:57 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Issue Brief]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Balance of power in Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaza]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics of Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel Turkey realations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Palestinian Statehood]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Peace Flotilla]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey Egypt relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Israel relations]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Context Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan met with Egypt’s new military rulers in a visit to Cairo on Monday. The meeting was an attempt to strengthen cooperation between the two countries in the post Mubarak era. The Turkish prime minister is expected to also meet his Egyptian counterpart to sign economic, trade and investment accords. [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/erdogan-in-egypt-to-boost-regional-influence/">Erdogan In Egypt To Boost Regional Influence</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan met with Egypt’s new military rulers in a visit to Cairo on Monday. The meeting was an attempt to strengthen cooperation between the two countries in the post Mubarak era. The Turkish prime minister is expected to also meet his Egyptian counterpart to sign economic, trade and investment accords. A political declaration is set to be signed between the two leaders to create a strategic council for cooperation. Israel will be watching any new regional developments between Egypt and Turkey very closely. It’s once congenial relationship has deteriorated sharply with both countries.</p>
<p>Erdogan is due to visit Tunisia and Libya later in the week in what is seen as a move to expand Turkey’s regional influence.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/erdogan-in-egypt-to-boost-regional-influence/">Erdogan In Egypt To Boost Regional Influence</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>Erdogan: Turkish Forces To Escort Aid To Gaza</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/erdogan-turkish-forces-to-escort-aid-to-gaza/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 09 Sep 2011 22:19:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Issue Brief]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Egypt Israel relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[flotilla incident]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaza]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics of Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Palestinian Statehood]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tel Aviv]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey Israel relations]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Context Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Edrogan announced on Thursday that Turkey naval forces would escort the country’s humanitarian aid ships bound for Gaza. Erdogan told reporters “Turkish warships will be tasked with protecting the Turkish boats bringing humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip.” The announcement came in light of the row between Ankara and [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/erdogan-turkish-forces-to-escort-aid-to-gaza/">Erdogan: Turkish Forces To Escort Aid To Gaza</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Edrogan announced on Thursday that Turkey naval forces would escort the country’s humanitarian aid ships bound for Gaza. Erdogan told reporters “Turkish warships will be tasked with protecting the Turkish boats bringing humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip.” The announcement came in light of the row between Ankara and Tel Aviv over Israel’s refusal to apologize for a raid on a flotilla. In May 2010, Israeli commandos boarded the ship Mayi Marmara killing nine Turks, and sparking an international row between the two countries.</p>
<p>Israeli officials have terms the remarks serious, but do not plan to retaliate to the verbal attacks.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/erdogan-turkish-forces-to-escort-aid-to-gaza/">Erdogan: Turkish Forces To Escort Aid To Gaza</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>Some 140 Countries Expected To Vote For Palestinian Statehood Bid At UN</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/some-140-countries-expected-to-vote-for-palestinian-statehood-bid-at-un/</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 05 Sep 2011 15:37:04 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Issue Brief]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arab Israeli conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arab Spring and Palestine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Balance of power in Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaza]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics of Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nabil Shaath]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Palestinian Statehood]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ramallah]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sinai]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Context Palestine officials are confident of support for their bid for full membership in the United Nations. According to Nabil Shaath, a senior negotiator, the Palestinian authorities expect around 140 countries to vote in favor of an independent state of Palestine in the General Assembly meetings starting September 23. He said this was a result [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/some-140-countries-expected-to-vote-for-palestinian-statehood-bid-at-un/">Some 140 Countries Expected To Vote For Palestinian Statehood Bid At UN</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>Palestine officials are confident of support for their bid for full membership in the United Nations. According to Nabil Shaath, a senior negotiator, the Palestinian authorities expect around 140 countries to vote in favor of an independent state of Palestine in the General Assembly meetings starting September 23. He said this was a result of extensive efforts by Ramallah to convince world leaders to accept the Palestine state.</p>
<p>Palestine’s demands for full membership in the UN comes after peace talks with Israel remain moot.<span style="font-size: 10px;"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br />
</span></span></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/some-140-countries-expected-to-vote-for-palestinian-statehood-bid-at-un/">Some 140 Countries Expected To Vote For Palestinian Statehood Bid At UN</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>Violence At Egypt-Israeli Border Claims Seven Lives</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/violence-at-egypt-israeli-border-claims-seven-lives/</link>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 19 Aug 2011 12:01:59 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Issue Brief]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Al Qaeda in Sinai Peninsula]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arab Israeli conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Balance of power in Middle East and North Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Egypt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaza]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics of Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hamas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Palestinian Statehood]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sinai Peninsula]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Situation of Egypt after Mubarak]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Situation on Egyptian Israeli border]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Threat perception on Israel]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="576" height="550" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/20-08-2011_Map-of-Israel.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/20-08-2011_Map-of-Israel.jpg 576w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/20-08-2011_Map-of-Israel-450x430.jpg 450w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/20-08-2011_Map-of-Israel-300x286.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/20-08-2011_Map-of-Israel-440x420.jpg 440w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 576px) 100vw, 576px" />Context Israel on Thursday suffered one of the worst direct assaults in years. Fighters carried out a series of coordinated attacks from across the border in Egypt, targeting commuter buses. The attack left seven persons dead and several others wounded. Israel’s military responded last night with bombing raids against the Hamas-controlled territory of Gaza, from [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/violence-at-egypt-israeli-border-claims-seven-lives/">Violence At Egypt-Israeli Border Claims Seven Lives</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="576" height="550" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/20-08-2011_Map-of-Israel.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/20-08-2011_Map-of-Israel.jpg 576w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/20-08-2011_Map-of-Israel-450x430.jpg 450w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/20-08-2011_Map-of-Israel-300x286.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/20-08-2011_Map-of-Israel-440x420.jpg 440w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 576px) 100vw, 576px" /><p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>Israel on Thursday suffered one of the worst direct assaults in years. Fighters carried out a series of coordinated attacks from across the border in Egypt, targeting commuter buses. The attack left seven persons dead and several others wounded.</p>
<p>Israel’s military responded last night with bombing raids against the Hamas-controlled territory of Gaza, from where the attacks were said to have been originated. Six persons were killed, whereas the UN pulled out its entire foreign staff from the territory.</p>
<p>The attacks are connected to the security situation of Sinai Peninsula where Al Qaeda presence is suspected. Egyptian military had launched an operation in Sinai Peninsula on Sunday with the objective of restoring peace in the area.</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.politact.com/images/stories/20-08-2011_Map%20of%20Israel.jpg" alt="" width="576" height="550" align="bottom" /></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/violence-at-egypt-israeli-border-claims-seven-lives/">Violence At Egypt-Israeli Border Claims Seven Lives</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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