By Arif Ansar

Context

In the aftermath of the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021—formalized through the Doha Accords of 2020—South Asia has entered an entirely new and volatile phase. The Taliban’s return to power, their continued lack of international recognition, and the deepening conflict along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border have collectively reshaped the region’s geopolitical contours. What once was envisaged as an American “peace deal” has since evolved into a crucible of power rivalries, ideological contestations, and security dilemmas extending far beyond Kabul.

Amid this changing landscape, Washington finds itself confronting an old question in a new era: What strategic interests does the United States still have at stake in Afghanistan? This question gained renewed urgency after the tragic shooting near the White House on the eve of Thanksgiving in 2025, when Rahmanullah Lakanwal—a former Afghan supporter of U.S. forces who immigrated under the Protect America Operation—opened fire, killing two National Guard members. The attack, still under investigation, reignited the debate about the consequences of U.S. disengagement from Afghanistan and the enduring ripple effects of America’s two-decade military presence.

To assess these evolving dynamics, The Middle East Institute (MEI) collaborated with PoliTact to host a Webinar in November last year to explore these aspects centered around the evolving situation of Afghanistan and if merits a fresh policy and approach. Earlier in May, soon after the four-day conflict between Pakistan and India, MEI also conducted a discussion with regional experts to assess President Trump’s policy towards Taliban. Both discussions were moderated by Dr. Marvin Weibnbaum, the Director of Afghanistan-Pakistan Center.

Through these deliberations, a sobering consensus emerged: the U.S. has abandoned its nation-building ambition, replacing it with a strictly transactional and selective engagement guided by short-term counterterrorism and strategic interests. This shift marks a watershed in South Asian geopolitics—one in which regional powers like Pakistan, India, China, and Russia are recalibrating alliances, while the Taliban’s regime struggles to define its sovereignty amid growing internal fractures and international isolation.

Counterterrorism and Pragmatism

According to panelists such as Joshua White and David Sedney, Washington’s current strategy toward South Asia is driven not by ideology or doctrine but by political expediency. The United States, still wary of being drawn into another endless conflict, now prefers “quick interventions that can be framed as political wins” without the burden of prolonged commitments. At the heart of this approach lies counterterrorism (CT)—the only enduring U.S. interest in Afghanistan. The Taliban, Washington, and Pakistan paradoxically, share a common adversary: the Islamic State–Khorasan Province (ISKP). While formal cooperation remains limited, intelligence coordination to prevent ISKP attacks has emerged as a rare channel of pragmatic engagement. Adjunct Professor at George Town University, Doug London, underscored this convergence, observing that neither Washington nor the Taliban can afford an al-Qaeda-style attack “with fingerprints all over Afghanistan.” Thus, even hostile actors find themselves bound by mutual survival instincts.

Another dimension of U.S. engagement is transactional diplomacy—a pragmatic mechanism aimed at resolving targeted issues such as hostage recovery and retrieval of left-behind military assets. As former Afghan ambassador Javid Ahmad explained, these dealings often blur ethical lines; American captives have been freed in exchange for concessions, including the removal of Haqqani Network bounties. Similarly, billions of dollars’ worth of infrastructure and equipment left during the withdrawal remain part of simmering behind-the-scenes negotiations—either to buy back through intermediaries like Pakistan or to ensure their destruction to prevent exploitation.

Pakistan’s position in this matrix is particularly complex. While the U.S. remains a visible interlocutor, Islamabad’s deepest strategic alignment continues to be with China. Pakistan leverages Washington’s engagement as a counterbalance against overreliance on Beijing. According to the panelists, efforts to “reset” U.S.-Pakistan relations on the basis of trade, minerals, and counterterrorism cooperation may refresh dialogue but are unlikely to override hard security realities.

Human Rights and the Counterterrorism Dilemma

The Taliban’s domestic policies, particularly toward women and civil society, continue to complicate U.S. engagement. As Lisa Curtis observed, the regime has demonstrated “no change in policies” from its 1990s practices—the repression of women and stifling of dissent remain total. This poses a moral and strategic crisis for Washington: how to cooperate on counterterrorism while refusing to legitimize a regime that flagrantly violates human rights.

Curtis argued that sacrificing principles for intelligence access risks undermining long-term stability, as repression fuels extremism by creating ungoverned spaces ripe for recruitment. Yet London countered that, in practice, the U.S. often cooperates with regimes that commit abuses when it aligns with national interests, effectively separating human rights advocacy from realpolitik.

The delicate balance between moral credibility and strategic necessity defines Washington’s Afghan dilemma—where human rights concerns, while loudly voiced, often take a back seat to the imperatives of terrorism prevention.

The TTP Factor

When U.S. troops exited Afghanistan, many in Pakistan assumed the Taliban’s ascension would enhance Islamabad’s regional leverage. Instead, the opposite has occurred. The enduring ties between the Afghan Taliban and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have emerged as the central source of cross-border friction, destabilizing Pakistan more than any external actor.

Since the short but intense four-day war between Pakistan and India in May 2025, border skirmishes between the Taliban and Pakistani forces have intensified, reflecting a broader regional unraveling. Analysts such as Sedney describe these clashes as a subtext of the larger India-Pakistan rivalry, with each side using Afghan soil as a pressure valve for strategic signaling. Yet a full-scale Taliban-Pakistan war remains improbable. Pakistan’s military, with its overwhelming technological and nuclear superiority, could decimate Taliban forces—but at the risk of provoking a drawn-out insurgency it cannot control. The Taliban, aware of this asymmetry, prefer hybrid tactics, allowing the TTP to wage low-intensity proxy warfare inside Pakistan.

The Taliban dismiss Islamabad’s demands to curb the TTP, calling it a “domestic problem”. This refusal underscores their ideological kinship and the shared ambition to see Pakistan’s border tribal belt revert to Taliban-style Sharia governance. Ahmad warned that this dynamic is perilous: the TTP’s suicide battalions possess the capacity to incite urban terror within Pakistan, amplifying the country’s internal vulnerabilities.

Behind these clashes lies a larger ideological project—the Taliban’s belief, shared by TTP hardliners, that regional power is shifting back to the “Islamic Emirate” model. Sedney noted that radical circles envision a future, within a generation, where Pakistan and even India could see Taliban-like movements ascend. Whether delusional or strategic, this belief animates the persistence of militancy and shapes Islamabad’s deepening anxiety.

US Leverages and Pakistan’s Regime Change Dilemma

The question of whether the U.S. or Pakistan can leverage internal Taliban factionalism looms large. Within the movement, a pragmatic Haqqani network faction favors economic engagement and limited U.S. cooperation, while the isolationist Kandahar faction, led by Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada, rejects dependency and seeks autonomy. Although tensions exist, Akhundzada maintains ultimate control, preventing visible fragmentation that might invite civil war. For Pakistan, frustration with the Taliban’s defiance has sparked talk of supporting Afghan resistance groups. Yet Ahmad warns this path is fraught: funding insurgency would demand resources, while the disunited Afghan opposition lacks both cohesion and stamina.

Consequently, Islamabad’s strategy has shifted from influence to contingency—exploiting Taliban divisions when advantageous, but no longer betting on a “friendly” Kabul. As White put it, the myth of a compliant, pro-Pakistan “Pashtun leadership” in Afghanistan has always been just that—a myth. This reality has spurred a profound shift in mindset within Pakistan’s government. No longer divided between the “good Taliban” and “bad Taliban,” Islamabad increasingly sees a spectrum of “bad and worse Taliban.”

At an event held at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in February, 2022, the Special Representative for Afghanistan at the time, Tom West, had discussed the economic leverages US still holds and commented that Afghan Taliban has shown the least interest in future cooperation with the US in fulling the terms of their side of the Doha Accord. At the same time, West noted that US is not supporting any opposition to Afghan Taliban and is advising other nations to refrain from that, but some will do that sooner or later if Taliban does not show urgency. Answering a question, he commented that many players are realizing that not having US engagement in Afghanistan is not in their interest.

Regional Rivalries and Great Power Calculus

Beyond the Pakistan-Taliban binary, regional power competition has turned Afghanistan into a geopolitical chessboard once again. None of the major powers—China, Russia, India, or the U.S.—wants a total state collapse, yet each pursues a distinct agenda. India, for its part, has pivoted sharply. As Curtis noted, New Delhi is now actively courting elements within the Taliban to undermine Pakistan’s influence. The May 2025 conflict with Pakistan demonstrated India’s willingness to strike deep into Pakistani territory, signaling a readiness to rewrite the traditional escalation playbook.

Meanwhile, China and Russia tread cautiously. For Beijing, the overriding concern is protecting multibillion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) investments from militant spillover. Russia, despite its history of confrontation with Islamist movements, maintains unpublicized CT cooperation with the Taliban to prevent ISKP’s expansion into Central Asia. Trump’s renewed engagement with Central Asian leaders under the “C5+1 initiative”—focused on strategic minerals—has further rattled Moscow and Beijing, who view it as U.S. encroachment upon their regional sphere of influence.

Panelists such as White and Karp noted that China now holds more extensive economic leverage in both Pakistan and Afghanistan than any other actor. Despite attempts to mediate between them, Beijing’s balancing efforts have faltered. Nonetheless, economic interdependence has rendered China an unwilling stakeholder in both states’ stability.

For the Taliban, the Great Power rivalry offers an opportunity. In an assessment, PoliTact noted last year: “As Afghan Taliban celebrate 4^th year in power, the nation now finds itself at a crossroads of competing currents. The net effect is a cautious, multi-prong stance: keep Iranian channels open for trade and energy, nurture Indian economic alternatives through Chabahar, avoid burning bridges with Pakistan as it courts Washington, and remain pragmatically receptive to Chinese infrastructure where it serves Afghan interests.”

Javid Ahmad observed, the regime seeks “economic neutrality,” extracting benefits from all sides while avoiding puppeteering by any. Pragmatic factions engage Russia and China for investment; hardliners in Kandahar, wary of foreign intentions, prefer cautious distance. This balancing act defines Kabul’s foreign policy—a tactical survival strategy that keeps all powers interested, but none dominant.

Containment Over Resolution: The U.S. Strategic Dilemma

Dr. Weinbaum summarized the prevailing expert view succinctly: “There is no military solution to the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict—only conflict management.” After decades of direct engagement, the U.S. now acts as a remote balancer, occasionally intervening diplomatically but avoiding deep entanglement. Washington’s immediate goal is not victory, but containment: preventing Afghanistan’s collapse while denying extremist sanctuaries the freedom to orchestrate global terror. This means sustaining aid and limited engagement but conditioning every form of support on verifiable security behavior.

Panelists urged regional coordination involving China, Turkey, and Qatar, whose economic leverage could pressure the Taliban to restrain the TTP. However, as Karp pointed out, both Turkey and Qatar’s favoritism toward Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated movements complicates their credibility as neutral mediators.

Ahmad cautioned that the U.S. must abandon the pursuit of ideological “unicorns” and embrace pragmatic realpolitik—dealing with actors as they are, not as Washington wishes them to be. The mantra, he argued, should be “leverage first, ideals later.” Delayed engagement only increases risks of ungoverned chaos, but overreaction could trap the U.S. in another open-ended quagmire.

The Perpetual Balancing Act

As of 2025, U.S. policy in South Asia has evolved into a delicate balancing act—a calculated choreography between engagement and restraint. America’s current presence is limited but consequential: intelligence links, sporadic negotiations, and cautious cooperation with regional allies. Yet looming questions remain. If Afghanistan once again becomes a safe haven for transnational terrorist networks, what tools does Washington have to respond? Under Trump’s renewed mandate, analysts predict the U.S. would double down on counterterrorism partnerships—especially with Pakistan and India—to prevent another 9/11-style surprise.

However, as India’s outreach to the Taliban deepens, it risks entrenching the very militant alignments that destabilize Pakistan and jeopardize U.S.-Pakistan rapprochement. Such dynamics may inadvertently revive the ideological monster once defeated by the War on Terror. Moreover, the Taliban’s tacit encouragement of TTP demands—such as reversing Pakistan’s merger of tribal areas and enforcing Sharia law—threatens to seed an insurgent domino effect. This could erode Islamabad’s internal cohesion and ripple across borders, complicating U.S. peace efforts from Gaza to Central Asia. Trump’s Taliban policy would require broader public ownership of Pakistan’s CT strategy and preventing the budding India-Afghan ties from destabilizing Pakistan and the rejuvenated US-Pakistan ties.

Related Articles:

The Unbroken Alliance: Why the Afghan Taliban-TTP Nexus Is Dooming Peace with Pakistan – Nov 4, 2025
The Fragile Truce Between Pakistan And Afghanistan And The War Of Narratives – Nov 2, 2025
Afghanistan’s Strategic Outlook And New Geopolitical Realities – Aug 18, 2025
Afghanistan, Pakistan Relations and Great Power Rivalry – Jul 21, 2025
Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions, Trump, And Wakhan Corridor – Feb 3, 2025
Political Or Military Solution; Pakistan’s New Counter-Terrorism Operation Azm-e-Istehkam – Aug 1, 2024
Convergences in US Pakistan Ties and Afghanistan – Jan 1, 2024
Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP – Feb 22, 2023
Post Withdrawal Campaign Against Extremism In Afghanistan And US-Pakistan Relations – Sep 7, 2022
Emerging US Policy Towards Afghanistan After Withdrawal – March 2, 2022
Recalibrating The US-Pakistan Partnership In Afghanistan – Jun 22, 2021
US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden – Mar 2, 2021

The post The Future Of Afghan Taliban-Pakistan Conflict: Implications For Regional Stability And US Interests appeared first on Politact.

Context

The abrupt withdrawal of US and coalition forces from Afghanistan last August, and the arrival of Afghan Taliban at the helm, represented a key turning point in the region and beyond. The attention in the past had remained on the risks of what the return of Afghan Taliban would mean. Now that it is the reality, the inquiry becomes what do their initial policies reflect about the future – particularly as it relates to the primary concerns of two principal stakeholders, US and Pakistan.

Since the arrival of US and coalition forces soon after 9/11, the focus was on dismantling Al Qaeda (AQ) and the support structure that created the safe havens for the planning of attack. In the so-called War Against Terror, the assistance of Pakistan was instrumental. However, while the nation has supported efforts to go after AQ, it was always apprehensive about taking the same line against Afghan Taliban.

Over the years, Pakistan had tried to convince US that the best approach would be to reconcile with the Afghan Taliban – while US strived to influence Pakistan to go after all brands of extremists, including those oriented towards India. The differentiation would come to be known as the Good versus Bad Extremists – those that were targeting Pakistan and those that were not.

Based on the state-of-affairs when the Soviets left Afghanistan in the late 80’s – and subsequent loss of US interest, Pakistan calculated that one day US and coalition forces would also depart – and then the country would be left to fend for itself.

Analysis

Doha Accord, Fall of Ashraf Ghani Government and US Withdrawal

The talks in Doha represented the negotiated path to settlement with the Afghan Taliban and these went through various phases. US sought assurances that Afghan Taliban would break ties with AQ and prevent Afghan territory to be used against any other nation again, respect human rights and minorities, and not hinder access of girls to education and professional careers. US and Afghanistan signed the peace accord in February 2020.

On the other hand, while not overtly stated Pakistan expected favorable policies from Afghan Taliban as it relates to India and Baluch insurgents – and firmer stand against the activities of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). TTP is responsible for several deadly terror attacks in Pakistan and against its security forces, while at the same time assisting Afghan Taliban. These ties represent a complex web of ties between extremist groups.

Doha agreement envisioned reduction in violence, withdrawal of foreign troops, intra-Afghan negotiations, and rewriting of the constitution. The manner in which the Ashraf Ghani government collapsed in the end, accompanied by US withdrawal, left many of the terms of agreement in ambiguity. However, Afghan Taliban did allow US forces to evacuate in safety, indicating that it meant to abide with some terms of the agreement. It is not clear if Afghan Taliban had given assurances that it would not militarily take over the government.

Afghan Economy and US Emerging Policy

Mired in conflict for years, the economy of Afghanistan was never doing well, and it was widely known that minus foreign support it would collapse. According to World Bank estimates, 45% of the GDP and 75% of government spending was foreign aid.

Therefore, taking over the government was one thing but running and governing the nation was a totally different matter. Experts agree that Afghan Taliban were not well equipped in the lateral and lacked professional expertise required to run the economy in shambles. And these circumstances offer an ideal environment for humanitarian crisis, which could then provide the ecosystem for the return of extremists.

Soon after withdrawal, US suspended more $7 billion worth of Afghan foreign reserves. The sanctions that were applicable previously on Afghan Taliban as a terrorist group got reinstated as well. All of this makes it very difficult to do business with the country. According to some estimates half of the nations 40 million population is facing hunger this year, made worse by severe drought. Under mounting pressure from aid groups, in a controversial decision US agreed to unfreeze $3.5 billion worth of frozen Afghan assets – the other $3.5 would be given to the families of 9/11 victim.

Speaking the USIP on February 15, the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Bureau of South and Central Asia Affairs, Thomas West, explained the emerging US policy and the quandary.

He stated that US wants to help the Afghan people but not Afghan Taliban. Replying to a question on what leverage does the US have now if Afghan Taliban does not abide by the agreement and demands of international community, Mr. West did not mention the immense economic leverage US has and is using.

However, when it comes to security cooperation, the Afghan Taliban has shown the least interest in future cooperation with the US in fulling the terms of their side of the Doha Accord, he added. At the same time, West noted that US is not supporting any opposition to Afghan Taliban and is advising other nations to refrain from that, but some will do that sooner or later if Taliban does not show urgency. Answering a question, he commented that many players are realizing that not having US engagement in Afghanistan is not in their interest.

He went on clarify, while US is trying to avert the humanitarian crisis, stabilize the Central bank and increase liquidity, it is not planning any major bilateral program and development assistance for the country. And even for the humanitarian aid, US will work through professionals and Taliban will have no say in that.

Afghan Taliban and Pakistan

Often blamed for supporting the Afghan Taliban and providing them refuge, Pakistan has shared the international demands of them – before any sort of recognition can take place. At the same time, the nation is worried by the brewing humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan which can send thousands of refugees its way once again – and create the kind of instability posing serious security and economic challenges for the country.

Since the Afghan Taliban came into power, and except a few ISIS-K claimed attacks, Afghanistan has witnessed the safest six months for quite some time. This however cannot be claimed for Pakistan where the TTP linked attacks are on the rise. The country has made great strides in its own war against extremists – as compared to the heydays.

Recent policy postures from Afghan Taliban reflect its falling short of many expectations important to Pakistan. These issues include the status of Durand Line, exerting pressure on TTP, and taking a tougher line on India.

Speaking at a webinar organized by Karachi Council on Foreign Relations on January 11, Taliban’s Representative in Pakistan Sardar Ahmed Khan Sakeeb took a stance on Durand Line that is not much different from the Ashraf Ghani and Karzai governments. He stated that his administration wants to take the matter to the Afghan people and then discuss the matter further.

On relations with India and Pakistan’s apprehensions, the Taliban representative explained that they wanted to pursue economic and political relations with India, and will not make it an enemy because of Pakistan, or make anyone else an adversary because of India – and this is beneficial for all. Replying to criticism for not speaking up for Indian atrocities in Kashmir, he added that they will speak out whether the atrocities are being committed by India or anyone else. He advised on solving all matters though negotiations.

When it came to the activities of TTP, Afghan Taliban have facilitated talks between Pakistan and TTP that had led to a temporary ceasefire which expired in December – but does not seem to have gone beyond that i.e., preventing the use of its territory for launching attack on others. According to the US Afghan Special Representative, this could be because of capacity and not the absence of will to act against groups such as ISIS-K. West fears the ISIS-K attacks could increase in Afghanistan once the weather becomes warmer.

Way Forward

Clearly, the nascent Afghan Taliban government is trying to develop independent positions and does not want to appear a lackey for anyone. It is too early to tell if the Afghan Taliban government intends to abide by the terms of Doha Accord related to security assurances, women and minority rights, and forming an inclusive government. It has shown the least progress when it comes to developing a government that represents the Afghan society.

The recognition of Afghan government and major humanitarian assistance is likely to be ultimately linked to what counter-terrorism cooperation Afghan Taliban can offer, in addition to progress in other areas mentioned above. This is especially true if the security situation deteriorates in Afghanistan as the weather warms up, and then spreads to Pakistan as the security officials of the country fear. And this predicament will also increase pressure on Pakistan to offer more assistance when it come to over the horizon operations.

The post Emerging US Policy Towards Afghanistan After Withdrawal appeared first on Politact.

Context

Now that US is withdrawing from Afghanistan and that ambiguity is out of the equation, the attention is naturally shifting how will the balance the power be achieved. There are obviously several competitors battling it out. In this the critical aspect is the influence of players that have been historically and culturally more engaged in the political and security dynamics of Afghanistan. Such as Iran, Turkey, and other Gulf nations. While Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan have ethnic connections, the Gulf nations got involved more in the context of jihad against the Soviets in the 80s, and later with supporting the Taliban, leading up to 9/11. The Arab connection got dense because of the ideological linkages that gave birth to extremist groups such as Al Qaeda and more recently ISIS.

As the war against extremism is subsiding with great power rivalry taking a center stage, the traditional regional civilizational based tussles are becoming apparent in Afghanistan. And as they do, the following questions related to the politics of regional players are also becoming prominent. The sequencing and interplay of these will influence the future outcomes. Some of these inquiries are:

1. How will the Afghan withdrawal impact the widely criticized Iranian behavior in the wider Middle East? The newly elected hardline Iranian leader Ebrahem Raisi is to be accompanied by another hardliner Neftali Bennett in Israel – and that also brings an interesting twist to the political dynamics of the Middle East. While the Biden administration has a different approach than its predecessor towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israel has indicated any leniency towards Iran in the on-going Vienna negotiations related to its nuclear program will not be taken lightly. On the other hand, Iranian leader has stated that its missile program is not up for discussion.

The change of US administration has also caused a rethink in Saudi Arabia where matters related to Yemen appear to be calming down, and Saudi Arabia is also in the process of mending its ties with Qatar and Turkey. But will the US Afghan withdrawal embolden the Iranians to take a more aggressive approach towards US presence in Iraq, and other places in the region like Syria, is yet to be seen. Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi is traveling to the US presently to discuss the future of US military presence in Iraq, where it has been under increasing attacks, reportedly from proxies supported by Iran.

Under Trump, Iran had been under the gun, demonstrated by the dramatic step of the elimination of its intelligence chief, Qasem Soleimani. Similarly, Israel has also repeatedly carried out strikes against Iranian proxies in Syria particularly.

US withdrawal from Afghanistan, and potentially from Iraq where it presently has around 2,500 soldiers, accompanied by taking out its air defense systems and troops from Saudi Arabia, signals that US is less interested in Middle East and is ready to settle matters with Iran. Afterall, since US achieved self sufficiency in its energy needs, it is the Chinese and the Russians who have more at risk if Middle East is in turmoil.

If the Iran nuclear talks with Biden administration prove to be successful, it would likely play out of its of its own historical aspirations, in Afghanistan and the wider Middle East. But that also means relegation of the Sunni Arabs and Turks – and more importantly, this will require Israeli acquiescence. Nonetheless, these moves can make the customary Turkish, Persian, and Arab civilizational based tussles even more combustible than they already are.

2. Then there is the role of Turkey in Afghanistan and how that is transforming the geopolitical environment – especially after the meeting of President Biden and Erdogan around the NATO summit in June.

Turkey has shown interest in taking over the security of Kabul airport – followed by swift warning from the Taliban. Pakistan’s senior military leadership also visited Turkey and Azerbaijan in June to meet with the counterparts there. It is in unclear if the expression of Turkish interests in Afghanistan was conducted in consultation.

Turkish ethnic (Uzbek and Turkman) influence in Afghanistan can have a positive impact on the negotiated settlement and forming of an inclusive government. At the same time, Turkish push for Afghan reconciliation would support its NATO credentials which have recently been questioned, including those of a once major non-NATO ally Pakistan that has now refused to allow US military bases on its soil.

Any long-term Turkish military involvement will not be seen as a positive development, especially by India, and would cause Iran to enhance its support as well. Turkish role in NATO led ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) has mostly been in non-combative capacity, as was the case for UAE.

The political and economic overtures by Pakistan in the July 14 SCO Foreign Ministers’ Conference held in Tajikistan can also be seen as offshoots of the growing Pakistan-Turkey cooperation – and the Pakistan’s budding Look North posture. While Afghanistan is landlocked, in a way Pakistan has also been stuck between unfriendly India and Afghanistan on the West and the East. Managing the Afghan turmoil is critical for the nations outreach to Central Asia.

This growing affinity between the Turkey and Pakistan is seen with alarm by UAE and Saudi Arabia, in the same manner as Pakistan sees these traditional supporters drifting towards India.

3. On the other hand, UAE and Saudi Arabia appear to be distancing themselves from the Afghan quagmire. This may be due to their growing security and economic ties with India and Israel, which has also complicated their relations with Pakistan on matters related to Kashmir. In the post War Against Extremism world, the Gulf Arabs want to be seen as associated with modernism and to alter the stigma related to their involvement in 9/11.

UAE and Saudi Arabia are also wary of Iranian influence in Afghanistan as they are already entangled in a struggle with them in places like Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon. However, there is no desire to extend that theater to Afghanistan because that will bring them right in the middle of US, India and China, Pakistan tensions – which they would like to avoid at this juncture.

The Saudi Deputy Defense Minister Khalid Bin Salman visited the US in early July to discuss a whole gamut of affairs that included peace in Yemen, Lebanon, and countering Iran. The media reports conspicuously missed the draw down of US forces and equipment from the region, including Saudi Arabia. While the prospects of Saudi-Iran détente in Yemen appear promising – it is in no way a settled matter. In the present circumstances, Saudis likely would want to avert opening another front with Iran in Afghanistan.

While Saudi Arabia and UAE may be distancing themselves from Afghanistan crisis, the Gulf nation of Qatar is an active participant and has hosted numerous rounds of peace talks in Doha, as have Turkey and Iran. After the US extended the timeline for the Afghan withdrawal, Taliban cancelled the April Istanbul peace talks to be held under the UN auspices and which included India, but they did subsequently meet in Doha and Tehran.

Conclusion

The greater alignment between Pakistan, Turkey, China, and Russia potentially opens Central Asia for Pakistan, a region previously neglected and rich in energy resources.

The jihad against the Soviets and subsequent War Against Terror, plus energy dependence, and remittances from the region are the factors that brought Gulf Arabs more directly into the politics of Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, in the future, the country would be seen aligning with Turkey – and with the regions and nations under its influence. It also means that its is likely to face more headwind from UAE and Saudi Arabia who are increasingly closer to India and Israel.

In this new configuration, while Persian and Turkish influences in Afghanistan are organic, the presence of India can be seen as an anomaly. Yes, before the division of India and Pakistan the Indian sub-continent had historical interlinkages – but the direction of that influence was one-way – and that is what continues to bedevil India. While the Indian soft culture has penetrated Afghanistan, and for that matter Pakistan as well, but that is deeply despised by its conservative segments. And that was one more reason, Turkish drama’s have made inroads as a counter.

Ultimately, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran should strive towards a treaty of the sorts of Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 between UK and France – with consent from Russian Empire and Kingdom of Italy – on their spheres of influence as Ottoman Empire was breaking up. Not to suggest that Afghanistan is being partitioned – but to ensure its sovereignty and avert any conflict. But the prerequisite for that would be some sort of détente between US, China, and Russia.

The post US Afghan Withdrawal And The Interplay Of Turkish, Iranian, and Arab Influences appeared first on Politact.

By Dr. Syed Mohammad Ali

Context

While longstanding, relations between the US and Pakistan have experienced much turbulence especially since 9/11. It looks like the unceremonious American exit after two decades of intervention in Afghanistan is going to become another source of contention for this troubled bilateral relationship. Yet, some opportunities still exist for the US and Pakistan to cooperate, especially with regards to ensuring long-term stabilization in Afghanistan.

The story of Pakistan working with Saudi Arabia and the US to help wage a holy war against the Soviets in the 80s is well known. But Pakistan’s security cooperation with US goes back much earlier. Pakistan joined Cold War alliances like the Baghdad Pact in 1955 and the Central Treaty Alliance in 1959. In 1958, Dwight D. Eisenhower even requested Pakistan’s Prime Minister Feroze Khan Noon for a secret facility, to fly reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union. This arrangement was only uncovered when an American U2 spy plane which flew from Peshawar was shot down in May 1960 by Soviet forces.

In the Global War Against Terror (GWOT), Pakistan was pressured to become a ‘frontline’ state, and to help the US fight the same hardliners it helped create in Afghanistan during the 1980s. Pakistan has repeatedly complained of being embroiled in GWOT and not being adequately appreciated for its cooperation and sacrifices. On the other hand, the US has long suspected Pakistan of being duplicitous and not doing enough to ensure stabilization in Afghanistan.

It took the US almost twenty years to realize that there is no military solution to the Afghan crisis. While American talks with the Taliban have produced lackluster results, these ‘peace’ talks did allow President Trump an opportunity to announce a US military withdrawal. Once the withdrawal decision was made, it has proven very difficult for the incoming Biden administration to reverse course, despite his claims of wanting a ‘responsible exit’.

The US and other NATO allies will probably continue proving financial assistance to Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, including funds to the national army that they created. While the US is withdrawing militarily, the budget request for the next fiscal year is still asking Congress for $3.3bn to support and sustain the Afghan Security Forces, a jump of 9.2 percent from 2021. In addition, the US intends to keep ‘over the horizon’ counter terrorism capabilities in neighboring countries to ensure that ISIS and Al Qaeda are not able to gain enough ground in Afghanistan that they become an international threat again.

Pakistan would logistically have been an ideal base for US counter-terrorism operations, but the Pakistani government has categorically rejected the possibility of such cooperation. Pakistan’s refusal to give the US military bases to undertake operations in Afghanistan is understandable. Such a move would be deeply unpopular given the controversy surrounding tacit Pakistani endorsement of US drone strikes despite the collateral damage caused by them. It may risk fueling extremist attacks within Pakistan, and it may irk the Taliban who have warned neighboring countries of hosting an American military presence.

Media reports reflect that under the Biden administration budget request for fiscal year 2022, some military training and economic assistance for Pakistan is forthcoming, but the overall suspension of military aid that came about in May 2018 remains intact. What will be the actual size of US aid to Pakistan next year, especially if it does not succumb to American pressure to provide it military bases to operate in Afghanistan remains to be seen. Pakistan could be pressured by the US via lending agencies like the IMF. Threatening to blacklist Pakistan using the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) if it refuses to allow the US to operate military bases on its soil would not be fair. But in the realpolitik world, states can often resort to such tactics to try and get what they need.

Emerging Complications and Compulsions

While Pakistan keeps insisting that it is open to any permutation of power sharing which are acceptable to the Afghans, the nation is widely suspected of preferring a hardline Afghan state which would rebuff Indian attempts to encircle Pakistan. The latest Congressional Research Service Report’s assessment of Islamabad’s motives are not too rosy. It concludes that Pakistan will prefer a weak and destabilized Afghanistan, instead of a strong Pashtun-dominated government (which would continue to resist the status of the Durand Line and appeal to Pakistan’s own restive Pashtun minority). Such suspicions are questionable, however, given that destabilization in Afghanistan would incur the hefty cost of another large wave of Afghan refugees pouring into Pakistan. Unfortunately, there are no easy solutions when it comes to ensuring a semblance of order and stability in Afghanistan. The Tajiks will probably continue to resist the Taliban’s attempt to gain complete power over the country, and they will again look towards different regional backers to challenge the Taliban. Turkey’s recent offer to take a lead role in ensuring the security of Kabul airport after the American departure is an interesting twist in this regard, hinting at an expanded Turkish role in Afghanistan in the foreseeable future.

US attempts to support the Afghan national army from being overrun by the Taliban may compel the Taliban to increasingly rely on Al Qaeda’s support. The CIA has also built-up counter-terrorism militias over these past several years, which have problematic human rights records, and these militias may now back varied factions motivated by personal gains. The presence of major illicit arms and drug trade cartels operating in the region could add to the threat of worsening violence.

While Pakistan can play an important role in helping create stability and economic prosperity in Afghanistan, the US continues to view Pakistan from the narrow lens of achieving its own counter-terrorism goals. Pakistan has not done much either to provide alternative pathways to working with the US which could help improve the lives of ordinary people in Afghanistan.

The Way Forward

Recent Pakistani attempts to reboot relations with the US are perhaps too ambitious given US suspicion of China, and the Biden administration’s decision to continue working with India to contain Chinese influence. Instead, Pakistan now needs to focus on more pragmatic and mutually beneficial opportunities for collaboration, such as the need to enable much needed stabilization in Afghanistan.

One possibility in this regard is the activation of the much discussed but still not operationalized reconstruction opportunity zone (ROZ) on both sides of the Durand Line, via which jointly produced Afghan and Pakistani products could be given preferential access to US markets. A well-functioning ROZ could create a strong incentive for Pakistan and Afghanistan to cooperate and it could provide the means for boosting economic sustainability within Afghanistan.

There is ample room for the US and Pakistan to work together to avert escalating chaos in Afghanistan. In his June 21 article in the Washington Post, Prime Minister Khan reiterated his desire to be a willing partner for ensuring peace in conflict-ridden Afghanistan, even though his government is unwilling to host US military bases. He also significantly asserted that Pakistan would reject attempts to impose a government in Kabul though the use of force.

The need for promoting economic connectivity and regional trade to promote lasting peace and security in Afghanistan is well recognized. Within this context, an ROZ between Pakistan and Afghanistan is an idea whose time has come. There is need to show pro-activeness in articulating parameters of such an ROZ, so that needed incentives are in place for boosting economic cooperation between the neighboring states as soon as a power-sharing formula emerges in post-withdrawal Afghanistan.

The post Recalibrating The US-Pakistan Partnership In Afghanistan appeared first on Politact.

A media discussion on a VOA Urdu Program Jahan Rang hosted by Behjat Gilani on October 14, 2017. Topics included:

Trump’s US Iran policy and world reaction.
Situation of Myanmar Rohingyas.
Pakistan, US, and Afghanistan Relations.
Pakistan’s Civil Military Confrontation.

The analysts participating in the discussion were:

Lord. Nazir Ahmad – Permanent British Parliament Member, London
Arif Ansar – CEO, “POLITACT” Washington, DC
Brigadier (R) Imran Malik – Defense Analyst & Columnist
Mir Waise Afghan – London based Analyst, ‘Khabrial’
Prof. A. Z. Hilali – Political Analyst, Peshawar University

Sound Bites From
Syed Khursheed Shah, Leader of Opposition, National Assembly Pakistan
Major General Asif Ghafoor, Director General ISPR Pakistan

Strategic Insight

While it is customary to point to issues related to Afghanistan, and more recently India, for the cause of mistrust between US and Pakistan, it is actually the differing strategic visions. Approaching the future of the region in a zero-sum manner is the basis for recurring tensions between US and Pakistan. There is a need to craft win-win scenarios amongst the various stakeholders and dealing with extremism of different colors.

On the other hand, scrutiny of the Iran nuclear deal is part of the wider US foreign policy review being carried out under President Trump’s America First Doctrine. A number of international economic and security treaties have already been revoked, and others are being appraised on how they benefit the US. What would be critical is how the foreign policy evolves after the initial bluster that has marked President Trump’s style.

The post Review of Iran Nuclear Deal And Pakistan, US, Afghanistan Relations appeared first on Politact.

After the NATO strike, Pakistan and US are redefining their troubled ties. Pakistan is thinking of giving up US aid that made it too dependent on the country. On the other hand, US conceded that delay in apology has further aggravated the situation.

Maj. Gen Athar has said that Pakistan now wants a formal relationship with the US, which would disallow US a free run of the past. Pakistan is also expected to reduce the number of US military personal in the country and has asked US to not to send any high-level visitors to Pakistan for the time being.

The US State Department Spokesperson, Victoria Nuland stated that after the passage of defense authorization act, Department of Defense has to provide a strategy on using certain military assistance. She also said that US is maintaining talks with Pakistan at all levels and want to get back to the full counter terrorism relationship. She reiterated that the relationship is imperative for the stability and peace for US, Pakistan and the entire region.

Responding to Pak-Iran signing the pipeline deal, she said America has already conveyed its concerns and will further talk over it. Meanwhile, NATO has expressed its keen desire to normalize relations with Pakistan and restoring the supply lines.

The post NATO Wants Improved Relations While Pakistan Desires More Formal US Ties appeared first on Politact.

Commenting on the recent visit of Marc Grossman, Crocker informed that he engaged in a comprehensive discussion with Karzai and the leaders of High Peace Council to map the way forward.

Updating on the Qatar talks, ambassador Crocker stated that Karzai has given support for opening Taliban’s office in Qatar and that it is imperative that Afghans talk to Afghans for the success of the peace process. He said meetings in Qatar are underway and there is support for a central government and its efforts to build a strong, stable and secure state.

US special envoy for Pakistan and Afghanistan, Marc Grossman, is trying to mitigate tensions between Afghanistan and Qatar to facilitate peace talks with the Taliban. Grossman has stated that Afghanistan and Qatar need to be in direct contact with each other. Tensions between the two mounted when Qatar agreed to open Taliban liaison office, while Afghanistan felt sidelined for not being consulted.

On the other hand, Taliban recently announced that they are opening office in Qatar, however added that holding talks does not mean that they accept Afghan constitution.

The post Ambassador Crocker Updates On Afghan Reconciliation And Grossman’s Visit appeared first on Politact.

Context

The delay in signing of the US-Afghan bilateral security agreement now appears to be accompanied by another imbroglio. Not only is there no security agreement in place, the political transition is also mired in complication. Abdullah Abdullah, the winner of the first round, refused to accept the preliminary election results announced on July 7 due to allegations of fraud. The initial results indicated his opponent Ashraf Ghani to be the potential winner of the runoff with 56 percent of the vote.

The failure to successfully complete security and political transition in Afghanistan poses grave consequences for the nation and the region.
While parallels to the present predicament of Iraq are being vehemently denied, if the threats are not managed, Afghanistan is fast-forwarding to circumstances similar to Iraq.

As oppose to mitigating the real risks, the international stakeholders seem to be in either a state of denial or indifferent. According to media reports, Secretary of State John Kerry is planning to make a stopover in Kabul on his way back from the sixth round of US-China Strategic and Economic dialogue held in Beijing.

If there is such a colossal failure in Afghanistan, Pakistan will bear the brunt and India, Pakistan ties are likely to be impacted as well. The energy and trade initiatives for regional integration will also be hit. Most importantly, Pakistan writ in FATA will become the most important component in the future.

Failure of Political and Security Transition

First of all, there has to be a realization that we are not talking about a hypothetical possibility of acute risks coming true in Afghanistan; the country is actually on the verge of them materializing.

Lack of smooth political transition most likely means the security agreement will also remain in limbo, while causing the suspension of foreign support Afghanistan desperately needs. President Obama and Secretary Kerry warned the Afghan leaders again this week of this potential outcome i.e., if any of the candidates resort to extra constitutional steps. Although, in the back of their mind they must be aware of what the ceasing of economic and military support will mean, with lessons of Iraq abundantly clear.

The polarization stemming from the potential collapse of the political and security transition will impact the nascent Afghan military and security forces also, creating morale problems and splintering it along ethnic and tribal lines. In these circumstances, Taliban will capitalize and gain more ground. If the situation persists, the present dysfunction in Afghanistan will not bode well for the Afghan led reconciliation, which is likely to be doomed particularly if the Taliban gain the decisive upper hand.

What it Means for India, Pakistan

These eventualities are sure to be worrying both India and Pakistan. Failure to attain a smooth transfer of power in Afghanistan will cause India to increase its security involvement, which in turn can aggravate ties with Pakistan. Moreover, the continuing political and security quagmire in Afghanistan will scuttle the regional energy and trade integration initiatives, with existing investment from China and India at stake.

Pakistan’s ongoing and long awaited North Waziristan operation also needs to be reviewed in the context of the unfolding events in Afghanistan.

PoliTact had accurately projected in February why Pakistan may finally have to conduct the North Waziristan operation. One of the reason was dealing with TTP; a group most out of place if Afghan reconciliation were to progress. The Afghan Taliban are unlikely to be pressed to politically reconcile in the absence of this pressure. The Good and Bad Taliban are connected at the hip and thus requiring equal pressure, especially at this juncture.

Objectives of Pakistan’s Zarb-e-Azb Operation

In view of the developments in the Middle East, two additional factors may have been added into Pakistan’s calculation.

One of them has to do with the magnitude of the threat non-state actors now pose to the nation-states in the Middle East. A number of Pakistan experts, such as Ahmed Rashid and Zahid Hussain, have recently attempted to compare and contrast IS and Taliban, based on if they have local or regional and global aspirations. Regardless, the Taliban are likely to be emboldened by the successes of IS. It does appear to be occurring in the case of al Shabaab in the Horn of Africa and Boko Haram in Nigeria. More important is what the AQ and Associated are becoming not what they were. Thus Pakistan has every reason to worry from any consolidation of Afghan, Pakistan, India, Iran, Arab, China and Central Asian focused extremists, in its backyard.

The second worry is connected with the emerging paralysis in Afghanistan. If the country does fail to complete a political and security transition, FATA and Balochistan can become even more significant. In Iraq and Syria, areas with weak state presence have quickly converted in to strongholds for the non-state actors that are spread across borders, and have morphed with ethnic and nationalistic drives.

Thus, Pakistan has two urgent motives for why it needs to exert its writ in FATA now: to facilitate Afghan reconciliation, if that happens, and secondly to prevent any consolidation of non-state actors in its minimally governed areas. There is little tolerance for fresh attacks originating from this region and targeting China, India, Iran, Europe or US.

Pushing the non-state actors out of its territory into Afghanistan, and then pressing Afghan’s to deal with them, is perhaps the primary goal of the new Pakistan’s counter terror strategy. This would have to be accompanied by vigilance in cities like Karachi and Lahore, to prevent backlash and to flush the extremists out from there.

However, this approach only works with a successful political and security transition in Afghanistan. In case that does not happen, Pakistan will have to instead protect itself from the spill over from Afghanistan side, where the Good and Bad Taliban may have taken refuge. This will require full Pakistani control of FATA.

How Will NATO and US Respond

Then there is the question of how would NATO and the US react to the incomplete political and security transition in Afghanistan. Iraq perhaps provides the best example.

If Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah are unable to resolve the impasse, Karzai will benefit by default. NATO and US will in this case impress upon him to help reconcile the political differences, just as they have on Nouri al-Maliki, and the military help (air support) against Taliban will be linked to that. If this occurs, Karzai could very well approach India and Russia for its immediate defense needs. And it will again become the game of if Karzai needs the West, or the opposite.

Even if US and NATO do provide military assistance in the future, it will be in the form of training and capability building, except Special Forces no directly troops on the ground type involvement will take place. During his visit to the US this week, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen made this clear; the organization will not get directly involved in Iraq. He added that at the upcoming Wales NATO Summit a Defense Capability Support Initiative is being created to support allies. This appears to be mirroring to the $5 billion Counter Terrorism Partnerships Fund announced by President Obama in his West Point speech in May.

The question is: what happens if the allies fail to turn the tide against non-state actors, will NATO let these states fail? In Iraq, while the US was debating providing air support, the Russian Sukhoi fighter jets had already arrived to be operated by the Iraqi pilots.

A resident fellow at the Atlantic Council, Faysal Itani, puts the Middle East quagmire and the ground reality pretty succinctly in a recent report:

“When assessing the field of candidates, the United States must also place rebel actions, statements, and beliefs in Syria’s wider social and political contexts. Not all moderate Syrians are secular; not all devout Syrians are Islamists; and not all Islamists pose a threat to the United States.”

The fact is that liberal space is shrinking while religious conservatism and ethnic nationalism is rising across the region. It is essential to objectively figure out what is causing this, and where are the matters heading, before any meaningful reversal of the pattern can occur. Further complicating the matter is the mixing up of the campaign against extremists with the regional and global power struggles.

The post The Risks Of Political Impasse In Afghanistan And Pakistan’s Operation In N Waziristan appeared first on Politact.

Context
More and more the ground reality is at odd with the narrative that is presented publicly to explain it. There are several reasons for why this may be happening. Events are occurring rapidly, and moving too quickly, to be understood fully in the time available. There are vested interests that desire to present their side of the story and manage perceptions. The forces of status quo are stronger, and while they are successful in projecting their interpretation, in the long run, they often miss the mark. The reality by itself holds no biases.

A number of confusions presently engulf the world of politics and international relations. Some of them stem from the fact that in the information age we have come to expect everyone to freely and publicly declare their intent, which has hardly ever been the case. So when we hear policy statements and political leaders speak, we believe this is what they intend to do. In fact, there is now a stark demarcation between words and actions.

As oppose to commenting about how Iraq arrived at the present predicament, which is amply being done in the media, a more productive endeavor at this junction is to examine where the region is heading next. The public appetite in the West for more military interventions, or going back to places from where the withdrawal was expected, is no longer there, especially in times of economic recession. More seriously, how can authorities make a public case for more military involvements when the past policies and missions were presented as successful?

Analysis

The Present Predicament

At a NATO related speech, John Kerry on June 25 pointed out how Russia has used a massive media/information campaign to present a reality that differs from what is taking place on the ground in Ukraine. Then there is the question of if the US is truly pivoting to the Pacific, or is the highest priority to keep Europe aligned. At a recent speech by President Obama at West Point, he stated countering extremism was at the top of the list. Realistically, probably all three areas remain the priority for the US; it’s a matter of converging these three objectives under a single a goal.

Moreover, even the best held narrative on Iraq, and increasingly Afghanistan, is falling to stand against reality. Then there is the question of what is happening to the wider campaign against extremists, and where is it heading. PoliTact has been examining these questions in detail (see Related Articles section below). While the key leadership of AQ has been eliminated, the associates, and AQ inspired groups, have now spread the threat far and beyond. The original risk has multiplied many times over. While the West succeeded in taking the fight to the enemy and protect the homeland against major attacks, many of its state allies in the region are at a precipice of major debacle.

The irony is that the non-state actors, and the threat they pose; also provide the reason d’être for the badly needed western unity against the emerging strategic adversaries. On the other hand, the fragile state actors of the region inflicted by extremism have become more of a liability, with their alignment with the West increasingly uncertain, and their governance failing. The present situation needs to be understood in this context as well.

Dealing with the quagmire, now requires a kind of response for which the West neither has the appetite nor the resources. As pointed out in the previous assessments, the US and NATO are relying on Special Forces, smart technologies, and its regional allies to take on the fight against extremists. These allies, meanwhile, are increasingly reluctant, economically dependent, and proving incapable of leading the fight against extremists. Polarization is growing in these societies, and like Egypt, military may be relied upon again as an institution to control and govern. However, it’s not clear that even they can simultaneously control the forces of anarchy and also govern.

Then there is the question of a military or a political solution. The primarily military approach that lasted until Barack Obama came in to power, may have generated some room to attempt political settlement in places like Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. That breathing space has fast evaporated. The Talk-Fight approach has not shown any remarkable results either. Now, it appears the pendulum is reverting back to the military focus as being witnessed in North Waziristan and Iraq. In Syria, ‘Good’ and moderate non-state actors are going to be trained by US/NATO to stand up to Assad. Without clear-cut winners, or one or the other party having an upper hand, it’s hard to see why any party will reconcile.

The Future Challenge

As oppose to commenting about how Iraq arrived at the present predicament, which is amply being done in the media, a more productive endeavor at this junction is to examine where the bandwagon is heading next. PoliTact covered this theme in detail in its 2014 forecast. A number of broader questions are raised connected to the possible undoing of Iraq.

Will other week nations hold off the non-state actors, and how will the West and other stakeholders now respond. How will the slow moving US-Iran détente, and the shift in the balance of power in favor of Shia Muslims, impact the response from the Sunni State and ‘Bad’ non-state actors of the Gulf region, AfPak, and Turkey? Most critically, how does Israel view that shift of circumstance in favor of its archenemy Iran, especially in the aftermath of the collapse of the Middle East Peace Process?

In PoliTact’s estimation, the foremost priority for the western approach is geared towards preventing the non-state actors from getting hold of weapons of mass destruction, as witnessed in the case of Iraq and recently Syria. This is a goal shared with other powers such as Russia and China. The chemical weapons deal with Syria would not have been possible without the Russian assistance.

The second priority is to counter extremism using regional allies and moderate Sunni ‘Good’ non-state actors on the ground, especially in the Middle East, while at the same time continue to move ahead with the Iranian détente. The Iran factor also acts as leverage in acquiring better cooperation from Sunni state allies, while offering opportunities to use Shia non-state actors (Hezbollah) against ‘Bad’ Sunni non-state actors (AQ and Affiliates).

An increasingly important realization is to prevent China and Russia to take advantage of the situation in these regions. For example, both Egypt and Iraq, including Pakistan, are moving towards acquiring weapons from Russia. Moreover, from time to time, Russia has threatened to deliver advance air defense systems to Iran, which can have a dramatic influence over western and Israeli military options. Not to mention whoever maintains influence in these strategic regions will also maintain control over the critical trade and energy sea-lanes. Any closure of the Suez Canal, choking of the Strait of Hormuz, and instability around Horn of Africa, will have tremendous impact on global trade.

The exercise of promoting democratic norms and pressure for reforms will only be in places where it is convenient to do so.

The responses from other stakeholders will also be examined in the future articles. However, how China and Russia react to the western strategy in these regions are the major determinants of the future direction.

A prerequisite for solving a complex challenge, first of all, requires identifying and explaining it correctly. That is hardly achievable when the narrative for public and private consumption has discrepancies. It leads to many more issues, some of which we are witnessing presently in the West and the regions impacted by extremism. The public appetite for more military interventions in the West, or going back to places from where the withdrawal was expected, is no longer there, especially in times of economic recession. More seriously, how can authorities make a public case for more military involvements when the past policies and missions were presented as successful?

The post What Does Iraq Represent; Ground Reality And Public Narrative appeared first on Politact.

context

Media discussion on Urdu VOA Radio program ‘In the News’ hosted by Asad Hassan.

The debate assesses the significance of elections in Afghanistan, voter turnout, and what it means for the future of the country. The prospects of the three election front runners; Ashraf Ghani, Zalmai Rassoul, and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, are also examined. Lastly, Pakistan’s reaction to Afghan election is evaluated as the reconciliation process there with TTP (Pakistani Taliban) has entered a peculiar phase.

The panel includes:

– Kamran Bokhari – Vice President for Middle Eastern, North African Affairs for Stratfor
– Amanullah Ghilzai – US based Senior Afghan Analyst
– Arif Ansar – Chief Analyst, PoliTact
– Ikram Ullah Shinwari – Kabul based journalist

The post The Significance Of Afghan Elections, Voter Turnout, And Future Challenges appeared first on Politact.