By Arif Ansar

Context

The Middle East’s contemporary realignment did not begin with the war between Iran and Israel, nor with Iranian strikes on U.S. bases across the Gulf. It began earlier, with the slow erosion of faith in a security order built on American primacy, Israeli military overmatch, and the assumption of Arab strategic compliance. The Israeli strike on Doha in September 2025 merely stripped away the last illusions. What followed was not unity, but fragmentation. Instead, the Islamic world entered a phase of deliberate Middle Power alliance‑building, driven by layered threat perceptions and an urgent desire for strategic autonomy.

At the center of this transformation is a paradox. The region is witnessing the rise of new alliances, yet these alliances are not designed to fight a single enemy. They are instead meant to buffer against multiple threats simultaneously: Iranian asymmetry, Israeli unilateralism, and U.S. unpredictability. Complicating this further is the re‑emergence of the “Greater Israel” narrative, which has amplified regional fears that Israeli military power is no longer bounded by defensive logic alone.

From Gulf Unity to Gulf Divergence

For much of the post‑Arab Spring period, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates were viewed as the twin pillars of Arab order. They coordinated in Yemen, aligned against political Islam, and worked closely with Washington. That partnership now seem to have fractured into a structural rivalry rooted in fundamentally different understandings of power and risk.

Saudi Arabia has increasingly embraced a state‑centric, formalized security approach and strategic autonomy. Scarred by years of proxy warfare and conscious of the vulnerability of its economic transformation under Vision 2030, Riyadh has grown wary of open‑ended confrontation—particularly wars triggered by actors outside its control. Iranian attacks on energy infrastructure, U.S. bases, and shipping lanes reinforced Saudi fears not just of Tehran, but of being caught between Washington and Tehran. This explains Riyadh’s pivot toward formal defense guarantees, most notably with Pakistan, and its growing strategic convergence with Turkey.

The UAE, by contrast, has doubled down on a networked, maritime, and technology‑driven security model. Abu Dhabi prefers flexible alignments, proxy leverage, and intelligence dominance over rigid alliance hierarchies. Its deepening ties with Israel and India reflect a desire to hedge not only against Iran, but also against Saudi Arabia’s ambition to re‑centralize Arab leadership. This divergence—well captured in PoliTact’s analysis of Saudi‑UAE power tussles with Turkey and Iran—has become one of the most important drivers of bloc formation in the region. The result is not a split over ideology, but over risk management. Riyadh fears escalation without control; Abu Dhabi fears marginalization within a Saudi‑led order.

As Middle Power alliances harden across the Middle East, the other Gulf states—Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait—illustrate divergent strategies for managing exposure, autonomy, and survival amid the erosion of the U.S.-centric security order. Unlike Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which seek to shape regional outcomes through competing alliance architectures, these states operate primarily as system navigators, each responding differently to rising unilateralism and unmanaged escalation.

Qatar occupies the most exposed position. Its foreign policy has emphasized mediation, diplomatic connectivity, and hosting high‑level interlocutors, allowing Doha to play a central role in ceasefire negotiations and crisis diplomacy. This strategy, however, has carried increasing risk. The Israeli airstrike in Doha in September 2025—widely analyzed as a stress test for Gulf mediation and U.S. security guarantees—demonstrated the limits of protection derived from connectivity alone and raised questions about the durability of mediator immunity in a more permissive strike environment. Mediation provides access and relevance, but as escalation becomes kinetic, it offers diminishing insulation.

Bahrain represents the opposite strategy. Rather than seeking autonomy through flexibility, Manama has embedded itself deeply within Saudi‑led and U.S.‑aligned security structures. Hosting the U.S. Fifth Fleet and relying on external guarantees for regime stability, Bahrain externalizes risk upward to larger patrons, trading strategic maneuverability for protection. This approach offers short‑term stability but reduces Bahrain’s ability to hedge as the regional order fragments.

Oman occupies a quieter middle ground. Like Qatar, Muscat prioritizes mediation, but it does so through deliberate low visibility and strategic restraint. Omani diplomacy is characterized by neutrality, confidentiality, and avoidance of high‑profile military entanglements, allowing it to act as an intermediary without becoming a primary target. This combination has enabled Oman to preserve autonomy with comparatively lower exposure.

Kuwait, meanwhile, adopts a strategy of institutional caution. Its foreign policy emphasizes international law, neutrality, and multilateral legitimacy, shaped in part by domestic constitutional constraints and a historically empowered legislature. Kuwait avoids both alliance leadership and high‑risk mediation, focusing instead on predictability and restraint as a means of survival.

Taken together, these cases highlight the narrowing options available to small states in a region increasingly defined by unilateral force and competitive alignment. Flexibility, dependence, invisibility, and restraint each offer partial protection—but none fully insulate against a security environment in which traditional guarantees no longer reliably constrain escalation.

The Emergence of an “Islamic NATO” and Hexagon Alignment

Out of this environment has emerged what is increasingly described as an Islamic NATO‑style alignment, anchored by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, with Turkey as a central pillar. This bloc is often misunderstood as a purely anti‑Iran coalition. In reality, it is built on three overlapping threat perceptions.

First is Iranian asymmetry: missile forces, drones, and proxies that threaten energy infrastructure and regime stability. Second is U.S. unpredictability—the fear that American military decisions, often aligned closely with Israeli objectives, could entangle Muslim states in wars they neither seek nor control. Third is Israeli strategic autonomy, particularly as Israel demonstrates a willingness to strike across borders without regard for Arab diplomatic calculations.

The Pakistan–Saudi defense agreement reflects this logic. Pakistan offers nuclear credibility and conventional depth; Turkey provides expeditionary experience, NATO interoperability, and drone warfare expertise; Saudi Arabia contributes financial resources and diplomatic weight. Together, they form a deterrence architecture designed less to confront Israel directly than to prevent Muslim states from being involuntary participants in U.S.–Israeli campaigns. This bloc is therefore as much about autonomy as opposition.

Parallel to the perceived Islamic NATO is a looser but influential alignment in infancy, centered on Israel, India, and potentially UAE—often described as a Hexagon Alliance when extended to include additional partners. This bloc is driven by a different hierarchy of threats and economic incentives. For Israel, the priority remains Iran, but also the risk of regional isolation should Sunni states consolidate into a unified security framework. India views the Gulf through the lens of maritime security, energy flows, and competition with China. The UAE sees in this alignment a way to offset Saudi leadership ambitions while retaining access to Israeli technology and U.S. strategic networks. This bloc is not primarily anti‑Islamic. It is anti‑consolidation. Its purpose is to ensure that no single Sunni‑led alliance can dominate the region’s security architecture.

Greater Israel as a Strategic Disruptor
One of the most destabilizing factors shaping alliance behavior today is not a military doctrine, but a narrative: the re‑emergence of the idea of Greater Israel. While not an official policy of the Israeli state, the concept—rooted in religious‑nationalist ideology and echoed by influential political figures—has gained unprecedented visibility during and after the Gaza war. Regional actors interpret this discourse as signaling a rejection of territorial finality and Palestinian sovereignty. Al Jazeera and Middle East Eye have documented how references to biblical borders and permanent Israeli control “from the river to the sea” have triggered alarm across Arab and Muslim capitals.

The destabilizing effect of the Greater Israel narrative is threefold. First, it reframes Israeli military action as potentially expansionist rather than defensive. Second, it undermines the political sustainability of normalization agreements by making it harder for Arab leaders to justify cooperation without a Palestinian resolution. Third, it reinforces the perception that U.S. power in the region is structurally aligned with Israeli territorial objectives rather than regional stability. Even states aligned with Israel, such as the UAE, hedge against this uncertainty. Others respond by accelerating independent deterrence mechanisms.

Great Power Rivalry and the Turn to Hedging

The Islamic world is no longer a passive theater of Great Power rivalry. It is actively shaping a multipolar order in which Middle Powers hedge against everyone—including their allies. The Saudi–UAE split, the rise of Islamic NATO and Hexagon formations, the disruptive force of the Greater Israel narrative, and the quiet advance of China and Russia all point to the same conclusion: the era of uncontested security hierarchies in the Middle East is over. What replaces it is not stability, but agency. And in a region long defined by external control, that may be the most consequential shift of all.

As regional blocs multiply, China and Russia benefit not by conquest but by optionality. China’s deepening involvement in South Asia and the Gulf—through infrastructure, security arrangements, energy, and industrial investment—positions Beijing as an indispensable economic partner to all sides without entanglement in regional wars. Russia, meanwhile, offers selective military alternatives, reinforcing a multipolar security environment in which no single actor dominates. Neither power demands ideological alignment; both profit from fragmentation.

Who Are These Alliances Really Meant to Counter?

The central question—who are these alliances meant to counter—has no single answer. They are not aimed solely at Iran, Israel, or the United States. They seemed designed to manage uncertainty in a system where all three generate risk. Iran threatens through asymmetry. Israel threatens through unilateral escalation and expansionist rhetoric. The United States threatens—not intentionally, but structurally—through unpredictability and alignment choices that subordinate regional interests to global strategy and balance of power calculations.

For Saudi Arabia, Iran is dangerous not only because of missiles and proxies, but because Iranian escalation reliably draws in U.S. and Israeli responses that Riyadh does not command. For the UAE, Iran is disruptive but manageable through deterrence, diversification, and diplomacy. For Israel, Iran is framed as an existential threat demanding pre‑emptive action. For Turkey and Pakistan, Iran is a competitor to be balanced, not annihilated.

Iran’s retaliatory attacks on U.S. bases in GCC states did not unify the region. Instead, they exposed the costs of hosting American power. Gulf monarchies found themselves targeted not for their own actions, but for decisions made in Washington and Tel Aviv. As the Carnegie Endowment has noted, this dynamic has pushed Gulf states toward independent security thinking rather than deeper reliance on U.S. guarantees. In this sense, Iran functions less as the architect of regional order than as its accelerator—forcing others to adapt. The alliances forming across the Islamic world appear to be alliances of insulation, not crusades. They seek to preserve autonomy, reduce exposure, and prevent any single power from dictating outcomes.

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The post Geopolitics Of Islamic World And Middle Power Alliances After Iran Attack appeared first on Politact.

Context

Increasingly the media sources whose job is to keep the audiences updated on current affairs, are producing material with little perspective. Moreover, the centers of global intellect are writing about the complexities of present realpolitik in such a jumbled manner that it would be quite challenging for a common reader to follow what actually is transpiring – and where matters are heading. Many of these outlets have simply become propaganda tools to shape certain perceptions. Due to this, they have lost credibility and relevance, while at the same time giving rise to the phenomenon of Fake News.

Around 2010, PoliTact laid down a framework for comprehending the evolving political, economic and security dynamics of the Islamic world. This characterization was based, first of all, on understanding the dynamics of the Core versus Peripheral Islamic regions. Secondly it was premised on gauging the direction of the War Against Extremism, and on grasping the societal, economic, and cultural transformation resulting from this unending campaign. The third most significant aspect had to do with the deteriorating Western and American perceptions in the Core and the Peripheral Islamic regions, which presented an opportunity for the Russian and Chinese to exploit, and that they did. President Trump’s recent trip to the Middle East, and bonhomie with Saudi Arabia, appears to be an attempt to reverse that trend now by focusing on the Core.

Analysis

Core versus Peripheral Islamic World

Our previous assessments and forecasts have outlined the theory of Core versus Peripheral Islamic regions. These analyses projected that the Core comprised of nations, such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, are likely to be destabilized to such as extent; they would reach out for support from the Peripheral nations such as Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and the Pacific nations of Indonesia and Malaysia. Or, in other words, the Peripheral nations will become more consequential in determining the fate of the ever-destabilized Core, and their utility for the emerging and established powers will thus increase significantly. However, it’s the Core which carries immense sway over the Periphery due to its religious significance.

Applying the theory to the present reveals that Saudi Arabia is forming an alliance (IMATF), which includes Pakistan, to confront the threat faced by Daesh – and perhaps more importantly its regional nemesis Iran. Facing competition From Qatar and emboldened by the recent visit of the American president, other GCC nations such as UAE and Bahrain, including Egypt, have begun to politically and economically blockade and isolate Doha. Not only that, the Core nations are demanding from the other Muslim states to do the same, and decide if they are on the side of Qatar or Saudi Arabia.

On the other hand, Qatar has successfully garnered the support of Iran and Turkey. In the aftermath of Arab Spring, the Core states have gradually been loosing political credibility, and now have no alternative left but to exploit their religious significance for survival. Since the Gaza Crisis and blockade that led to the Peace Flotilla incident in 2010, the Core states also compromised on their traditional support for the Palestinian cause, which has been taken over pretty much by Turkey, Iran, and Qatar. In Syria and Libya as well, the Qatari policy is aligned more with Turkey than the nations that have decided to isolate it.

Thus Core states are facing loss of political and religious credibility, which will be exploited by extremist forces, potentially leading to an implosion. To overcome this fragility, the Core states are latching on zealously to the unending campaign against extremism, and in this their utility for the West.

The performance of these Core states in the campaign against extremism though has been checkered. Facing Western criticism of not doing enough in leading the fight, Saudi Arabia decided to intervene in Yemen. Moreover, the Kingdom went to great lengths to form a Muslim alliance to tackle extremists, which is led by former chief of Pakistan’s military, General Raheel Sharif. The purpose of the alliance remains unclear, and it’s quite likely it would be used to counter Iran – rather then confronting groups such as Daesh and Al Qaeda. And in this, the nations that have decided to punish Qatar, have found a common purpose with the new American administration.

The emerging posture of Core nations is more a representation of desperation. The Core states, such as the Kingdom, are heavily dependent on Western support for support and survival. Meanwhile the key Peripheral states are spinning out of Western sphere and in to the Chinese and Russian influence.

Tussle of the Emerging and Established Powers

As has been noted before, the campaign against extremism has been quite damaging to the American perceptions in the Core and the Peripheral regions of the Islamic world. However, in the tussles of the emerging and established powers, this has been a blessing in disguise for Russia and China.

Both have fully exploited this, as can be seen in the case of Pakistan. The country has strategically moved out of the American sphere of influence, and in to the arms of China, represented by projects such as CPEC. On the other hand, India has shifted to the American sphere of Influence, complicating its traditional closeness with Russia. Meanwhile, India and Pakistan have both joined Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

In the case of Iran, it is already a strong ally of Russia, and both have been cooperating closely in Syria. While also a member of NATO, Turkey has been gradually moving away from its Western orientation. This process has been speeded up by the recent coupe attempt, which Erdogan blamed on the American exiled Fatehullah Gulen.

Since 9/11 the debate has continued on how to counter the Ideology that led to the tragic event.

That emphasis seems to have to taken a back seat for right now as the focus shifts to dealing with the extremist activities being carried out by Iran, and the groups supported by Qatar, Iran and Turkey.

The policies being adopted by the Core states, with Western support, can divide the Peripheral nations, and meanwhile create problems for China and Russia, whose influence is resurgent in the Peripheral regions. This will obviously also create serious fissures amongst the Islamic nations of the Core and the Periphery, and between the Shiite and Sunni Muslims.

Conclusion

The military solutions are not working out, be it in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, or Yemen. This has not stopped the global powers to compete in the race for launching various peace initiatives. In addition to the Geneva process, Russia has its own peace process brewing in Syria, which includes Iran and Turkey. On the other hand, China and Russia both have jumped on the peace bandwagon in Afghanistan. In the midst of this, President Trump aspires to jumpstart the Middle East Peace Process, as witnessed by his first visit to the region.

The battle for control of the Muslim Core and Periphery will not solely be achieved through the barrel of the gun, negotiating peace is equally plausible method to exert influence. As the Core states become weak due to lack of politically and religious legitimacy, the Peripheral states are being pulled in to fill in the void. As this scenario evolves, the Peripheral sates will need to concentrate on maintaining their domestic political relevance. This will be the most critical factor in dealing with the strong forces emanating from the tussles of the emerging and established global powers, and in tackling proxies and extremists of various colors.

The post Global Power Tussles, War Against Extremism, And What It Means For Core, Peripheral Islamic Regions appeared first on Politact.

The Second China-Arab forum opened on Wednesday in Yinchuan, capital city of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. The forum’s opening was overseen by political advisor Jia, Qinglin who chairs the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. The five day convention will focus on various sectors including agriculture, science, energy, finance, tourism and publishing. The symposium hosted more than 7000 delegates including 1200 from nearly 76 different countries and regions. The forum aims to strengthen economic and trade cooperation between China and the Arab countries.

The post Second China-Arab Trade Forum Opens In NW China appeared first on Politact.