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		<title>US-Iran War And Alternative Futures For South Asia</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/us-iran-war-and-alternative-futures-for-south-asia/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Arif Ansar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 25 Jul 2026 17:42:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Afghan Reconciliation]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Abraham Accords expansion]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Implication of US Iran War on South Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Implications of US]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=10874</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="583" height="428" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/583_Map_of_Middle_East_Jan_13_20103.gif" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" fetchpriority="high" />By Arif Ansar Context The fragile security landscape of South Asia is increasingly tied to the volatile geopolitics of the Middle East. As the tripartite tensions involving the United States, Israel, and Iran simmer, the shockwaves are felt acutely in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and for that matter India as well. To fully comprehend this equation, [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/us-iran-war-and-alternative-futures-for-south-asia/">US-Iran War And Alternative Futures For South Asia</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="583" height="428" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/583_Map_of_Middle_East_Jan_13_20103.gif" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" /><p><img decoding="async" class="alignleft size-full wp-image-2695" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20-04-2011_Pakistan-Iran.jpg" alt="" width="181" height="121" />By Arif Ansar</p>
<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>The fragile security landscape of South Asia is increasingly tied to the volatile geopolitics of the Middle East. As the tripartite tensions involving the United States, Israel, and Iran simmer, the shockwaves are felt acutely in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and for that matter India as well. To fully comprehend this equation, one must analyze the internal regional dynamics of South Asia first and then trace how they intersect with the unfolding Middle Eastern crisis.</p>
<p>The successful negotiation and remote signing of the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/strait-hormuz-reopen-us-lift-iran-sanctions-14-point-deal-seeking-end-rcna350513">Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding</a> (MoU) on June 17, 2026, by U.S. President Donald Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, marked a monumental achievement for Pakistan’s civil-military leadership. If the Islamabad MoU sticks, in its current or reformed form, and transitions into a durable peace agreement, it holds the potential to fundamentally rewrite Pakistan&#8217;s domestic security, energy, and economic paradigms.</p>
<ol>
<li><strong> The Regional Dynamics: South Asia’s Internal Fault Lines</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>The relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan is currently defined by severe friction rather than neighborly cooperation. At the center of this tension is the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an extremist group that has <a href="https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2026/07/15/operation-shaban-toll-rises-to-123-as-security-forces-intensify-offensive-against-terrorists">escalated its terror campaign inside Pakistan</a>. Pakistan accuses the Afghan Taliban of providing safe havens and tacit support to the TTP—a claim the Taliban administration in Kabul denies, though the cross-border nature of TTP attacks remains a persistent flashpoint.</p>
<p>Concurrently, Pakistan’s southwestern province of Balochistan is facing a severe security crisis. The insurgent groups such as Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) are demanding independence for the resource-rich province, has dramatically escalated its attacks against the Pakistani military.</p>
<p>Media reports suggest that the BLA is receiving strategic cooperation and material support from the TTP, creating a combined internal security challenge for Islamabad. Pakistan alleges that the BLA receives external backing from India to destabilize the country. India and Israel are exceptionally close strategic allies, sharing deep defense, intelligence, and counter-terrorism partnerships.</p>
<p>There is great power rivalry part of the equation too. BLA has repeatedly <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/pakistan-what-is-behind-attacks-on-chinese-nationals/a-70425841">targeted Chinese infrastructure projects</a> and personnel associated with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in Balochistan in other parts of the country, aiming to disrupt Pakistan&#8217;s economic lifeline and strain its relationship with Beijing.</p>
<ol start="2">
<li><strong> The Middle East Equation: The Islamabad MoU and Saudi Defense Commitments</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>To understand how these South Asian fault lines link to the Middle East, one must look at Pakistan’s diplomatic balancing act. The nation has historically maintained a delicate equilibrium: keeping close ties with Saudi Arabia, and other GCC nations, while managing a long, porous border with its neighbor, Iran.</p>
<p><strong>The Islamabad MoU</strong></p>
<p>In mid-2026, Pakistan&#8217;s diplomatic corps, alongside Qatar, achieved a historic breakthrough by mediating the Islamabad MoU. This 14-point framework agreement successfully brought the U.S. and Iran to a temporary ceasefire, temporarily halting direct military hostilities, lifting the U.S. naval blockade on Iranian ports, and opening the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz. This diplomatic triumph cemented Pakistan’s role as a vital regional mediator. However, as hostilities have broken again indicating the stability of the Islamabad MoU remains incredibly fragile.</p>
<p><strong>The Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA)</strong></p>
<p>Compounding this fragility is Pakistan&#8217;s security obligation to Riyadh. On September 17, 2025, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/could-pakistani-saudi-defense-pact-be-first-step-toward-nato-style-alliance">Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA)</a>. Echoing NATO’s Article 5 language, the SMDA treats &#8220;any aggression against either country as an aggression against both&#8221;.</p>
<p>If an all-out war breaks out in the Middle East, a dangerous chain reaction is highly likely. Ansar Allah (the Houthis) in Yemen are highly likely to <a href="https://www.dropsitenews.com/p/yemen-sanaa-airport-ansarallah-saudi-houthis-bab-al-mandab-bukhaiti">close the Babul Mandab</a> Strait and launch retaliatory ballistic missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia. Faced with direct attacks, Saudi Arabia will almost certainly invoke the SMDA. Reports indicate that under the <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2644094/saudi-arabia">confidential terms</a> of the pact, Pakistan could be required to deploy up to 80,000 troops to secure Saudi borders. Sooner or later, Pakistan will be forced to choose between entering a foreign conflict to defend Saudi Arabia or reneging on its defense pact, which would devastate its economic and strategic relations with the Gulf.</p>
<ol start="3">
<li><strong> Implications of a Worsening Middle East Conflict on Pakistan and Afghanistan</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>If the Middle East situation continues to deteriorate, the consequences will ripple across South Asia, severely impacting Pakistan and Afghanistan, and India across military, economic, and social domains.</p>
<p>Pakistan is already heavily engaged in counter-insurgency operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) against the TTP, and in Balochistan against the BLA and BLF, the Pakistani military is stretched thin. Faced with a domestic security crisis, coming to the active defense of Saudi Arabia would be an immense logistical and military strain. Knowing this, adversaries like India and Israel are highly likely to speed up their destabilizing activities inside Pakistan. By utilizing existing proxies, they can ensure that Pakistan remains too deeply entangled in internal security crises to project military power or assist its Gulf allies.</p>
<p>This regional sabotage directly undermines <a href="https://politact.com/the-future-of-afghan-taliban-pakistan-conflict-implications-for-regional-stability-and-us-interests/">Washington’s strategic goals</a>. The U.S. relies on Pakistan’s diplomatic weight to mediate with Tehran, as seen with the Islamabad MoU. A destabilized Pakistan is a nation that cannot play a constructive role in preventing a wider regional war in the Middle East or contribute towards the success of <a href="https://politact.com/us-iran-interim-ceasefire-deal-israel-and-the-future-of-abraham-accords/">new vision</a> for the Middle East &#8211; under the Abraham Accords and subsequent establishment of Board of Peace.</p>
<p><strong>The Explosion of Sectarian Strife</strong></p>
<p>A direct conflict involving Iran—the primary Shia power—and the U.S., Israel, or Sunni Arab Gulf states will instantly inflame sectarian fault lines in South Asia. Both Pakistan Afghanistan have <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/shia-population-by-country">sizable Shia minorities</a> that have historically been targeted by hardline Sunni extremist groups. While India also has a sizeable Shia population, and while Muslims there face state repression, Shia’s there have not been targeted in a similar fashion.</p>
<p>A worsening Middle East war will be actively exploited by transnational terror networks, most notably Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISIS-K). ISIS-K, which operates across both Afghanistan and Pakistan, views Shia Muslims as heretics and has frequently targeted their mosques, community centers, and schools.</p>
<p>In Afghanistan: The ruling Taliban, while ideologically hardline Sunni, has sought to maintain basic internal stability. However, a regional sectarian war will severely test their control. ISIS-K will use the anti-Iran, anti-Shia rhetoric of the wider conflict to recruit disgruntled fighters, escalating attacks on the Shia Hazara community and challenging Taliban authority.</p>
<p>In Pakistan: Sectarian violence has historically claimed thousands of lives. An active war involving Iran and Saudi Arabia could trigger a revival of sectarian proxy wars on Pakistani soil, pitting localized militant groups against one another and further fracturing the country’s social cohesion.</p>
<ol start="4">
<li><strong> Economic Devastation and Connectivity Collapses</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>The economic fallout of a prolonged Middle East war on Pakistan and Afghanistan would be catastrophic.</p>
<p><strong>Energy and Remittance Shocks</strong></p>
<p>Pakistan imports the <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/pakistan/imports-by-country">vast majority of its oil and gas</a> from the Gulf. A disruption in the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab el-Mandeb would cause global oil prices to skyrocket, triggering hyperinflation in Pakistan&#8217;s fragile, debt-burdened economy. Furthermore, millions of Pakistani expatriates live and work in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. If the Middle East slides into a broader war, many of these workers could be forced to return home, cutting off the vital stream of foreign remittances that keeps Pakistan&#8217;s economy afloat.</p>
<p><strong>The Death of Regional Connectivity</strong></p>
<p>Both Afghanistan and Pakistan have pinned their economic futures on becoming trade hubs. Afghanistan under the Taliban has sought to utilize Iran&#8217;s Chabahar Port and the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) to bypass landlocked constraints and reduce its dependence on Pakistani transit routes.</p>
<p>While the Islamabad MoU briefly revived hopes for these transit corridors, an escalation of the war would render these infrastructure projects dead on arrival. Iranian ports would once again become military targets, isolating Afghanistan economically and pushing it deeper into poverty, which in turn breeds further radicalization and instability. Moreover, in the recent escalation, reports indicate that US has also <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/us-targets-iran-s-chabahar-port-in-fresh-strikes-hegseth-shares-image-of-collapsing-watchtower/ar-AA286DAw">targeted Chabahar port</a> to increase pressure on Iran.</p>
<ol start="5">
<li><strong> Conclusion: A Dangerous Convergence</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>The potential escalation of the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict is not a localized Middle Eastern issue; it is a direct threat to the stability of South Asia. For Pakistan, the war represents an existential geopolitical trap, forcing it to balance a strict mutual defense treaty with Saudi Arabia against the reality of a heavily armed neighbor in Iran and a domestic theater crawling with active insurgencies. For Afghanistan, the conflict threatens to fuel the fires of ISIS-K&#8217;s sectarian violence and destroy any hopes of regional economic integration.</p>
<p>As external actors seek to exploit these vulnerabilities, the line between the Middle East&#8217;s conflicts and South Asia&#8217;s internal wars is rapidly dissolving. If the Islamabad MoU completely unravels, Pakistan and Afghanistan will find themselves directly in the line of fire of a wider, highly destructive regional war.</p>
<p><strong>Conversely:</strong></p>
<p>If the Islamabad MoU &#8220;sticks&#8221; and transitions from a fragile ceasefire into a durable peace agreement, it holds the potential to fundamentally rewrite Pakistan&#8217;s domestic security, energy, and economic paradigms.</p>
<p><strong>a. Security: Strangling Proxies</strong></p>
<p>By capitalizing on its diplomatic leverage from mediating between the U.S. and Iran, Pakistan can demand reciprocal action against cross-border threats. A secure Iran, freed from Western military threats, can work with the Pakistan Army to seal the lawless border, choking the logistics and safe havens of the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) favored by India and Israel. Simultaneously, a stabilized region enables a unified U.S.-Pakistan-Iran diplomatic front to pressure the Afghan Taliban. Highly dependent on Pakistani and Iranian transit trade (like Chabahar Port), Kabul would be forced to dismantle the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). This double clampdown effectively ends the multi-front subversion designed by adversaries to keep Pakistan tactically entrapped.</p>
<p><strong>b. Economy &amp; Energy: Resurrecting the IP Pipeline</strong></p>
<p>A durable reformed MoU triggers the lifting of U.S. sanctions on Iran, allowing Pakistan to complete the Iran-Pakistan (IP) Gas Pipeline without fear of international isolation. This removes the looming $18 billion &#8220;take-or-pay&#8221; penalty from Tehran, while injecting cheap natural gas to end rolling blackouts and slash industrial costs. Moreover, Gwadar Port is likely to take-off.</p>
<p><strong>c. Autonomy: Balancing GCC Ties</strong></p>
<p>Abundant energy and secured Central Asian trade routes drive organic growth, offering financial self-reliance and breaking Pakistan&#8217;s dependency on Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) bailouts. This shields Islamabad from strategic entrapment under its Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) with Riyadh, preserving its neutrality instead of dragging its military into regional proxy wars.</p>
<p class="entry-title"><a href="https://politact.com/us-iran-interim-ceasefire-deal-israel-and-the-future-of-abraham-accords/">US-Iran Interim Ceasefire Deal, Israel, And The Future of Abraham Accords</a> &#8211; June 18, 2026<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/the-us-israel-and-iran-conflict-the-interplay-of-goals-and-strategies/">The US-Israel and Iran Conflict: The Interplay of Goals and Strategies</a> – May 1, 2026<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/geopolitics-of-islamic-world-and-middle-power-alliance-building-after-iran-attack/">Geopolitics Of Islamic World And Middle Power Alliances After Iran Attack</a> – Mar 22, 2026<br />
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<a href="https://politact.com/from-oslo-to-trumps-abraham-accords-and-20-point-peace-plan-for-gaza/">From Oslo To Trump’s Abraham Accords And 20-Point Peace Plan For Gaza</a> – Oct 12, 2025<br />
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<a href="https://politact.com/gaza-ceasefire-plan-and-us-iran-tensions/">Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions</a> – April 26, 2025<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/two-state-solution-future-of-gaza-and-iran/">Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran</a> – February 25, 2025<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/assads-demise-and-the-shifting-balance-of-power-in-middle-east/">Assad’s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East</a> – Dec 26, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/the-escalating-middle-east-crisis-and-president-elect-trump/">The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump</a> – Dec 5, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-and-india-middle-east-europe-corridor-imec/">China’s Belt And Road Initiative And India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC)</a> – Oct 5, 2023<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/irans-potential-retaliation-for-haniyehs-killing-and-wider-consequences/">Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences</a> – Aug 30, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/the-iran-pakistan-gas-pipeline-project-economic-and-geopolitical-realities/">The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities</a> – Sep 27, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/great-power-rivalry-and-chinas-deepening-involvement-in-south-asia-gulf-states/">Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States</a> – Aug 4, 2023<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/what-does-president-bidens-visit-to-israel-and-saudi-arabia-imply/">What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply?</a> – Aug 4, 2022</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/us-iran-war-and-alternative-futures-for-south-asia/">US-Iran War And Alternative Futures For South Asia</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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			</item>
		<item>
		<title>US-Iran Interim Ceasefire Deal, Israel, And The Future of Abraham Accords</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/us-iran-interim-ceasefire-deal-israel-and-the-future-of-abraham-accords/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Arif Ansar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 20:54:56 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[American Experiment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Americas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Analysis of Perception and Perspective]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US and Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Abraham Accords expansion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Axis of resistance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Board of Peace (BOP)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaza]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaza International Stabilization Force]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IDF ground operations South Lebanon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India-Israel strategic defense axis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Islamabad MOU]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Islamabad Peace Process mediation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire 2026]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel-UAE defense alignment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East balance of power 2026]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Operation Epic Fury]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Operation Epic Fury strategic analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Oslo Accords]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strait of Hormuz blockade impact]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Subcontinental rivalry in the Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Third Gulf War implications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Israel Iran conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Israel relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US-Iran 60-day ceasefire terms]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=10804</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="696" height="464" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Abraham Accords Signing Ceremony" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-300x200.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-768x512.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-630x420.jpg 630w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-696x464.jpg 696w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" />By Arif Ansar Context The escalation of open warfare between the United States, Israel, and Iran in early 2026—characterized by some as the &#8220;Third Gulf War&#8221;—has radically upended the strategic architecture of the Middle East. At the center of pre-war Western diplomatic planning were two highly integrated concepts: the Abraham Accords, aiming to build a [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/us-iran-interim-ceasefire-deal-israel-and-the-future-of-abraham-accords/">US-Iran Interim Ceasefire Deal, Israel, And The Future of Abraham Accords</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="696" height="464" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Abraham Accords Signing Ceremony" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-300x200.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-768x512.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-630x420.jpg 630w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-696x464.jpg 696w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" /><figure id="attachment_10638" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-10638" style="width: 1024px" class="wp-caption alignleft"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-10638" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords.jpg" alt="Abraham Accords Signing Ceremony" width="1024" height="683" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-300x200.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-768x512.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-630x420.jpg 630w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-696x464.jpg 696w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-10638" class="wp-caption-text">Abraham Accords Signing Ceremony</figcaption></figure>
<p>By Arif Ansar</p>
<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>The escalation of open warfare between the United States, Israel, and Iran in early 2026—characterized by some as the &#8220;Third Gulf War&#8221;—has radically upended the <a href="https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2026-25-southeast-asia-and-the-third-gulf-war-impact-responses-and-implications-by-ian-storey/">strategic architecture</a> of the Middle East. At the center of pre-war Western diplomatic planning were two highly integrated concepts: the Abraham Accords, aiming to build a normalization bridge between Israel and Arab states, and the Board of Peace (BOP), an <a href="https://www.securityincontext.org/posts/colonial-administration-counterinsurgency-pacification-and-disaster-capitalism-in-trumps-plan-for-gaza">international framework</a> established under UN Security Council Resolution 2803 to oversee a post-conflict administration, international stabilization force, and real estate transformation in Gaza.</p>
<p>However, the military campaign launched on February 28, 2026, under the U.S.-Israeli codename &#8220;Operation Epic Fury&#8221;, fundamentally collided with the core assumptions of these frameworks. Instead of solidifying a prosperous, integrated, and Western-aligned trade bloc, the <a href="https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/ResearchAndStudies/Pages/risk-politics-and-the-us-israeli-war-on-iran.aspx">kinetic conflict</a> exposed deep structural flaws in regional deterrence, shattered the prospects of two-state solution, and triggered an unprecedented shift in the balance of power.</p>
<ol>
<li><strong> The Disintegration of the Pre-War Vision: BOP and Abraham Accords Under Fire</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>Before the military escalation of 2026, the Abraham Accords and the Board of Peace functioned as a synchronized carrot-and-stick diplomatic strategy. The political objective was clear: circumvent the core issue of Palestinian statehood by offering massive economic, infrastructure, and technological incentives to the Arab world, effectively managing the region from the <a href="https://politact.com/the-emerging-outside-in-approach-to-israeli-palestinian-conflict-afghan-reconciliation-and-kashmir-issue/">outside-in</a>. The BOP was envisioned as a multi-layered <a href="https://www.securityincontext.org/posts/colonial-administration-counterinsurgency-pacification-and-disaster-capitalism-in-trumps-plan-for-gaza">colonial and financial administration</a>—overseeing a Gaza Executive Board and a Palestinian National Committee—meant to signal a new era of regional co-prosperity.</p>
<p>When <em>Operation Epic Fury</em> commenced with devastating strikes on Iranian command structures, nuclear sites, and energy facilities, this vision suffered an immediate kinetic shock. Rather than acting as bridges for trade, the Abraham Accords were abruptly tested as raw military alignments. Iran’s retaliatory doctrine did not spare the region; Tehran launched waves of drones and ballistic missiles targeting not only Israeli territory but also Western assets and allies across the Gulf.</p>
<p>The BOP’s ambitious plans for Gaza—such as beachfront hotels and special economic zones—were instantly frozen as global energy markets panicked and global fertilizer and agricultural supply chains broke down. The war exposed an untenable contradiction: attempting to build an institutional framework for peace while simultaneously fighting a total regional war.</p>
<ol start="2">
<li><strong> The Great Divergence: Independent Israeli Maneuvers vs. Joint Strategy</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>A central complication in the future of the BOP and the Abraham Accords is the apparent <a href="https://politact.com/the-us-israel-and-iran-conflict-the-interplay-of-goals-and-strategies/">divergence</a> between American diplomatic objectives and Israeli kinetic execution. While the United States has continuously attempted to orchestrate a diplomatic off-ramp, Israel has aggressively expanded its military footprint. Israel’s actions in Gaza, its incursions into Lebanon, and its unilateral willingness to strike deep into Iranian territory—even during active diplomatic windows—have created two starkly different strategic interpretations &#8211; that pose the most acute risk to the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/strait-hormuz-reopen-us-lift-iran-sanctions-14-point-deal-seeking-end-rcna350513">Interim Ceasefire Deal</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Interpretation A: The Maverick State Acting Unilaterally</strong></p>
<p>This perspective argues that Israel is acting in open contradiction to Washington&#8217;s goals. Israeli leadership has made it clear that they <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/un-chief-blasts-israels-unacceptable-rejection-of-two-state-solution/">no longer view</a> the Oslo Accords or a two-state solution as viable frameworks. By pursuing a permanent military solution rather than a political compromise, Israel is explicitly prioritizing the absolute destruction of the &#8220;Axis of Resistance&#8221; over the long-term diplomatic health of the Abraham Accords. They are gambling that Arab states will eventually be forced to accept a dominant, nuclear-armed Israel as a fait accompli, regardless of the Palestinian issue.</p>
<p><strong>Interpretation B: A Tightly Orchestrated Joint Strategy</strong></p>
<p>Conversely, realism suggests that Israeli actions represent a coordinated, dual-track &#8220;Good Cop / Bad Cop&#8221; strategy with the United States. While Washington acts as the diplomatic negotiator—offering terms, carrots, and structural limitations—Israel functions as the unhinged kinetic hammer. By maintaining maximum military pressure on Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, Israel forces adversaries to negotiate from a position of acute vulnerability, allowing American diplomats to demand structural concessions that would be nearly impossible to attain through standard statecraft.</p>
<p>Regardless of which interpretation is accurate, the structural fallout is identical: Israel&#8217;s complete abandonment of the Palestinian political track has severed the primary artery through which the Abraham Accords were expected to expand to critical Muslim-majority nations like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, who have historically conditioned formal normalization on a viable two-state solution.</p>
<ol start="3">
<li><strong> The 60-Day Ceasefire: Why Iran Emerges in an Enhanced Position</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>The multi-week diplomatic push that culminated in the temporary cessation of hostilities has set the stage for a potential <a href="https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-war-ceasefire-deal-e0a9e4e1152ea8da10ea066ad174a23a">60-day extended ceasefire</a>. However, an assessment of the strategic balance indicates that if a prolonged ceasefire is institutionalized under current conditions, Iran will have effectively won the geopolitical argument, shifting the regional balance of power in its favor with far reaching implications.</p>
<p>Despite enduring massive leadership losses and targeted degradation of its conventional military facilities during the initial strikes of Operation Epic Fury, Tehran demonstrated profound <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/operation-epic-fury-a-closer-look-at-iran-s-military-resilience/ar-AA238Rpm">asymmetric resilience</a>:</p>
<ul>
<li>Weaponization of the Chokepoints: By effectively throttling the Strait of Hormuz and imposing a massive $2 million transit toll on commercial tankers while outright banning American and Israeli vessels, Iran proved it could hold global energy markets hostage. It’s not clear whether the toll or fees will remain in any future deal.</li>
<li>Surviving Regime Change Ambitions: Iran successfully weathered a decapitation campaign that killed its highest officials, proving that its institutional and proxy network could function and retaliate even under extreme duress.</li>
<li>Demonstrated Retaliatory Reach: By launching direct, sustained missile strikes against Israel and retaliating against U.S. bases in the region, Iran dismantled the myth of Western invulnerability.</li>
</ul>
<p>As far as its nuclear program is concerned, while Iran had previously committed to not attain weaponized capability. The major criticism of the earlier agreement with Iran reached in 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) under Obama administration was that it neither addressed Iran’s wider behavior in the region nor its ballistic missile program. On the positive side, JCPOA was backed by P5+1 countries i.e. US, China, Russia, France, UK, and Germany – along with European Union.</p>
<p>In the present context, P5+1 were not in the negotiating loop – but this does not indicate that they may not partake in any future roles. While frictions between NATO and US have increased over Ukraine and military approach towards Iran, President Trump is likely to seek support from the leaders at the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/trump-g7-iran-france-india-2b13227bfc63d5c7c92c64488e3e2753">G7 Summit</a> meeting held in France, where he electronically signed the Islamabad MOU. However, in the escalating great power rivalries environment, the involvement of G7 nations will be quite nuanced.</p>
<p>Deciphering from the information available so far, nothing within the preliminary terms of the present ceasefire suggests that a 60-day truce will compel Iran to permanently abandon its regional proxy network. For Iran, groups like Hezbollah and Hamas are vital defensive organs. Because forcing their complete dissolution is beyond the scope of a standard ceasefire, Israel will view any finalized U.S.-Iran document with deep suspicion and may ultimately refuse to honor its terms, preferring to continue its military campaign.</p>
<ol start="4">
<li><strong> The South Asian Pivot: Pakistan and India’s Subcontinental Tussle in the Gulf</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>The 2026 conflict has also manifested the subcontinental rivalry of India and Pakistan directly into the Middle Eastern theater, altering the geopolitical balance of power between the two nuclear-armed neighbors.</p>
<p>With the collapse of direct Western-led communication channels during the peak of the fighting, Pakistan leveraged its historic 900-kilometer border with Iran and its deep institutional ties with the Arab Gulf to emerge as the prime mediator between Washington and Tehran. The resulting &#8220;Islamabad Peace Process&#8221;—headlined by face-to-face talks in April 2026 between U.S. Vice President JD Vance and Iranian Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—elevated Pakistan into an indispensable global peace broker. By opening up back-channel communication lines via its Interests Section in Washington, Pakistan successfully negotiated the temporary cessation of hostilities, protecting its own vital economic interests, specifically the massive flow of worker remittances from the Gulf.</p>
<p>This diplomatic triumph directly challenges <a href="https://politact.com/examining-saudi-iran-tensions-and-its-impact-on-south-asia-china/">India’s long-term strategic investments in the Middle East</a>. Over the previous decade, New Delhi had built a formidable geopolitical axis anchored on deep technological, defense, and economic ties with Israel and the UAE. India viewed this alignment as a way to project power westward and isolate Pakistan.</p>
<p>However, as Pakistan successfully positions itself as the necessary arbiter of regional stability between the U.S. and Iran, India’s rigid alignment with the Israel-UAE axis risks locking it out of the broader post-war regional consensus. If the Middle East transitions into a managed &#8220;cold peace&#8221; where Iran’s equities are formally recognized, Pakistan&#8217;s diplomatic capital will grow, neutralizing some of the strategic leverage India had accumulated through its partnerships.</p>
<ol start="5">
<li><strong> Conclusion: The Structural Impasse of the Grand Vision</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>The grand vision originally championed by the Abraham Accords and the Board of Peace has arrived at a structural impasse. The only plausible pathway for these frameworks to move forward as instruments of a durable, comprehensive regional peace requires two simultaneous, seemingly impossible geopolitical concessions:</p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Iran must join the bandwagon</strong>, abandoning its regional agenda and accepting a formalized integration into a security architecture alongside Israel. This would be accompanied by the cassation of support for Hezbollah and Hamas.</li>
<li><strong>Israel must accept a viable, sovereign two-state solution</strong>, ceasing expansion of territory either via settlements or military use.  This will providing the necessary political cover for Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the wider Muslim world to formally normalize ties.</li>
</ol>
<p>Given current political realities, neither condition is achievable. Israel’s domestic political landscape remains firmly set against territorial compromise, viewing military containment and absolute security dominance as its only viable future. Concurrently, Iran’s clerical and military elite view their asymmetric deterrent power and proxy networks as the sole shield preserving the Islamic Republic from Western-orchestrated regime change.</p>
<p>Consequently, whether the conflict transitions through continued military attrition or a formalized ceasefire, the Board of Peace and the Abraham Accords will be forced to mutate. Rather than tools for authentic peace and regional integration, they will function as a defensive alignment designed not to resolve the region’s core disputes, but to manage an unstable and fractured &#8220;cold peace.&#8221;</p>
<p><strong>Related Articles:<br />
</strong></p>
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<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/us-iran-interim-ceasefire-deal-israel-and-the-future-of-abraham-accords/">US-Iran Interim Ceasefire Deal, Israel, And The Future of Abraham Accords</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>The US-Israel and Iran Conflict: The Interplay of Goals and Strategies</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/the-us-israel-and-iran-conflict-the-interplay-of-goals-and-strategies/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Naade Ali]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 13:29:47 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Core vs Peripheral Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Libya, Palestine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US and Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vantage Point Analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Anti-Access/Area-Denial]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Asymmetric Naval Warfare Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China Iran relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaza]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics of Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Islamabad Talks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Narratives around Iran conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[New regional order for Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Operation Epic Fury]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strait of Hormuz]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Iran relations]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=10780</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="696" height="603" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024.webp" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Strait of Hormuz" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024.webp 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-300x260.webp 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-768x665.webp 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-485x420.webp 485w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-696x603.webp 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-534x462.webp 534w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" />The Geography of Stalemate: Risk Thresholds, Narrative Warfare, and the Quest for a New Regional Order By Naade Ali Context Since the war began, it has become clear that the U.S., Israel, and Iran operate with fundamentally different risk thresholds—and those differences shape their strategies. The U.S. is less willing to tolerate prolonged economic strain [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-us-israel-and-iran-conflict-the-interplay-of-goals-and-strategies/">The US-Israel and Iran Conflict: The Interplay of Goals and Strategies</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="696" height="603" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024.webp" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Strait of Hormuz" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024.webp 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-300x260.webp 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-768x665.webp 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-485x420.webp 485w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-696x603.webp 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-534x462.webp 534w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" /><p><em><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignleft size-medium wp-image-10765" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-300x260.webp" alt="Strait of Hormuz" width="300" height="260" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-300x260.webp 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-768x665.webp 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-485x420.webp 485w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-696x603.webp 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-534x462.webp 534w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024.webp 1024w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" />The Geography of Stalemate: Risk Thresholds, Narrative Warfare, and the Quest for a New Regional Order</em></p>
<p>By Naade Ali</p>
<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>Since the war began, it has become clear that the U.S., Israel, and Iran operate with fundamentally different risk thresholds—and those differences shape their strategies. The U.S. is less willing to tolerate prolonged economic strain but more inclined to employ overwhelming force, assuming it will bring the conflict to a swift conclusion. Israel, on the other hand, is betting on a scenario in which Iranian strikes on Gulf states provoke diplomatic backlash, potentially drawing those states into retaliatory action. Such a chain of events could pave the way for the broader regional alignment <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260223-netanyahu-speaks-of-forming-alliance-against-sunni-and-shia-axes-including-arab-states/">envisioned by Prime Minister Netanyahu</a>, aimed at countering “radical Shi’a and Sunni forces” and ultimately weakening the Iranian regime. Israel, therefore, is prepared to bear the costs necessary to make this outcome possible.</p>
<p>From Iran’s perspective, the goal is to prevent this scenario from unfolding while influencing on GCC that American military presence on their soil has a cost and no benefit. Iran’s <a href="https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2026-march-9a/">mosaic military doctrine</a> is designed to endure sustained pressure while simultaneously increasing unpredictability and risk, making its actions more dangerous and uncertain. This high-risk tolerance remains one of its few tools to establish and maintain deterrence—something it is unlikely to compromise.</p>
<p><strong>Iran&#8217;s geography plays a key role in its Anti-Access/Area-Denial </strong></p>
<p>At present, it appears that the world’s most advanced military systems, equipped with cutting-edge and futuristic capabilities, are fundamentally constrained by geographical realities. Iran&#8217;s geography is a central &#8220;force multiplier&#8221; for its Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategy, effectively turning the country into a natural fortress that complicates any conventional military intervention. The superior airpower fielded by Israel and the United States has not translated into absolute control over critical chokepoints held by Iran, nor has it succeeded in dismantling the undersea and &#8220;Undermountain&#8221; missile infrastructure that keeps Iran’s defensive network largely operational and difficult to conquer despite relentless bombardment. These deeply embedded installations, carved into the Zagros Mountains, act as <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2026/03/natural-fortress-how-geography-protects-irans-regime/">fortified nodes</a> that enable Iran to sustain command-and-control functions.</p>
<p>While air strikes can degrade capabilities, complete neutralization requires a high-intensity land campaign—a scenario fraught with risk. Iran’s military doctrine leverages its unique topography, using natural barriers and limited access points to offset an adversary&#8217;s technological edge. For any invading force, the combination of logistical hurdles and Iran’s mastery of its difficult terrain makes a quick victory highly improbable. Consequently, U.S. strategy faces a stark trade-off: rely on stand-off strikes that degrade but do not eliminate threats, or escalate toward high-risk options for more decisive results. This geographic and structural advantage effectively cements a strategic stalemate, as Iran’s hardened infrastructure and &#8216;natural fortress&#8217; prevent any effort from achieving a rapid military outcome.</p>
<p>For Iran, prolonging the conflict appears to be the preferred course at this stage. Tehran has deliberately increased the costs of the war to unprecedented levels so it can have maximum leverage in negotiations with the United States, with its core demands of—financial compensation, the removal of all sanctions, a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region and recognition of its control over strategic maritime chokepoints.</p>
<p>Iran’s use of threat language is particularly significant in this regard. The rhetoric can exert psychological pressure on adversaries, yet it risks backfiring if not supported by actual capability. In Iran’s case, however, its warnings have proven credible rather than symbolic. This is demonstrated by its selective attacks on regional countries and <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-says-it-maintains-firm-control-over-hormuz-foreign-powers-have-no-right-to-interfere-in-gulf-security/3876469">control over</a> the Strait of Hormuz, where only vessels linked to China are permitted passage, effectively transforming global trade into a strategic instrument against the U.S. alliance.</p>
<p><strong>The Narrative Pivot: Trump’s Strategy of Perception Over Conquest</strong></p>
<p>In the conflict with Iran, Trump’s “winning card” is his ability to control the narrative, prioritizing the appearance of victory over the reality of a physical win. He relies on narrative dominance, using the perception of a <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/23/trump-iran-war-power-plants-energy-infrastructure-middle-east.html">diplomatic breakthrough</a> to maintain both domestic support and global leverage. While he projects an image of Iran “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/26/as-trump-claims-us-winning-tehran-asserts-legal-right-over-hormuz-strait">begging</a>” for a deal, the actual conflict on the ground remains a complex stalemate.</p>
<p>The sudden and highly visible emphasis on diplomacy, initiated under the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/9/us-iran-talks-in-pakistan-whos-attending-whats-on-the-agenda">Islamabad Talks</a>, reflects a calculated effort to manage domestic expectations through narrative control. By steering attention toward <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/26/trump-postpones-us-strikes-on-iranian-power-grid-to-april-6-amid-talks">backchannel negotiations</a>, President Trump diverts focus from military challenges or internal criticism. It illustrates a broader tactic of strategic distraction: when one narrative weakens, another is introduced to create uncertainty. This deliberate blurring of facts makes it harder for the public to form clear judgments or hold leadership accountable. In this way, confusion becomes a tool—dampening opposition and creating space for an exit framed more by optics than by conventional military success.</p>
<p>On the other side, deeper internal challenges confronting the Trump administration are becoming increasingly evident. Among them is a <a href="https://time.com/article/2026/03/20/republican-democrat-lawmakers-condemn-pentagon-iran-war-funding-request/">formal Pentagon request for $200 billion</a> to sustain military operations, a proposal that has provoked strong criticism and concern among both Democrats and fiscal conservatives in Congress. Democrats are actively leveraging the conflict for political advantage, <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/us-israel-war-on-iran-enters-4th-week-democrats-accuse-trump-of-lying-about-talks-with-tehran/3876928">accusing</a> Trump of leading the United States into an unnecessary and prolonged war while positioning themselves ahead of the November midterm elections in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/mar/17/midwest-swing-states-iran-war">hopes</a> of securing a legislative majority. Meanwhile, Republicans with long-term political aspirations—like Vice President JD Vance, widely considered a likely contender for the 2028 presidential race—are encountering increasing challenges in presenting a persuasive “America First” vision as the conflict drags on.</p>
<p>It was during the widespread fatigue and disillusionment from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that Trump originally solidified his “America First” persona. Yet, the prolonged confrontation with Iran threatens to undermine that narrative, as rising casualties, economic strain, and geopolitical entanglements make it harder for emerging Republican leaders to argue for restrained foreign intervention while projecting strength abroad. Vance and others must now navigate a delicate balance: appealing to a voter base that values both national security and fiscal prudence, while demonstrating that they can manage a complex, protracted conflict without repeating the mistakes of previous administrations. This tension illustrates how domestic political ambitions are increasingly intertwined with the outcomes and perception of foreign military engagements.</p>
<p>As a result, the U.S. campaign against Iran has generated numerous challenges and setbacks that outweigh its tactical military achievements to date.</p>
<p><strong>Israeli Game Plan</strong></p>
<p>For Israel, the conflict represents a rare and historic opportunity to significantly weaken Iran. The country appears prepared for a prolonged confrontation; <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/poll-most-jewish-israelis-support-iran-war-toppling-regime-arab-backing-far-lower/">recent surveys</a> indicate that 81% of Israelis support military action, with many willing to endure sustained attacks to see the collapse of the Iranian regime. Years of conflict with Hamas and Hezbollah have conditioned Israel to absorb both psychological and physical strain. In such an environment, hardship becomes normalized, allowing for greater societal resilience. While both Iran and Israel appear capable of enduring prolonged shocks, the United States lacks the same tolerance, creating a possible divergence in strategic trajectories.</p>
<p>In Israel’s <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-891001">view,</a> the objective is to push further toward definitive regime change. However, it recognizes that airstrikes alone are unlikely to achieve this goal, which is why it is increasingly <a href="https://www.gbnews.com/news/world/benjamin-netanyahu-ground-invasion-israel-iran-us">considering</a> the possibility of a ground invasion, potentially with U.S. support. Such a move, however, would likely initiate a prolonged conflict. Israel understands that ending the war prematurely would risk undermining the gains it has already made. While this could help the Israeli government to maintain domestic unity by framing the conflict as an existential necessity, it would not necessarily produce similar political benefits for President Trump or his Republican Party at home.</p>
<p>For the United States, one possible course could involve stepping back and allowing Iran and Israel to confront each other directly. However, Iran appears to have anticipated such a scenario and does not intend for the conflict to remain confined. Its recent shift in military doctrine—<a href="https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2026/03/22/765699/Iran-s-military-doctrine-shifts-from-defensive-to-offensive-Senior-commander">confirmed by Major General Ali Abdollahi</a> as a transition from defense to offense—indicates an ambition to expand the effects of the war from a regional to a global scale. By exploiting interconnected vulnerable systems of energy, food, and trade, Iran seeks to create a cascading effect in which damage inflicted upon it reverberates worldwide. Its broader objective appears to be the erosion of U.S. dominance and the restructuring of global power toward a Chinese-centered order.</p>
<p>By encouraging Arab states to align with China’s <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202603/1356948.shtml">Global Security Initiative</a>, Iran is promoting an alternative model of security that prioritizes sovereignty over U.S. involvement. In effect, it is attempting to achieve through warfare what China could not accomplish solely through economic means. This strategic gameplay was acknowledged by President Trump himself, who <a href="https://upstox.com/news/business-news/latest-updates/big-chess-game-dealing-with-very-smart-players-trump-s-iran-war-comments-raise-questions-on-endgame/article-190789/">described</a> the situation as a ‘big chess game’ suggesting that Iran is acting as a &#8220;smart player, playing high-level chess.&#8221;</p>
<p>Iran is striving to ensure that any resolution to the conflict will not restore the pre-war status quo. Instead, it seeks to extract maximum gains whenever negotiations take place. If Iran’s objectives are realized and revenues begin to flow, Iran would not only rebuild its economy but also invest heavily in military modernization, developing capabilities that could prove extremely difficult to counter in any future confrontation.</p>
<p>This prospect is deeply concerning for Israel, which anticipates that a post-war Iran could emerge as a highly militarized and resilient power. From Israel’s perspective, the only viable strategy is to continue the war and ensure that Iran is weakened to such an extent that rebuilding its military strength would take decades. However, such an approach demands sustained endurance, strategic patience, and a high tolerance for risk—traits that Iran has already demonstrated.</p>
<p>Whether Israel can maintain this level of resilience remains uncertain, and this question will become clearer as the conflict continues. This is not a short-term confrontation, but a prolonged struggle likely to reshape regional power dynamics. With diplomatic positions varying and domestic political pressures mounting, the conflict is likely to persist. The result is a negative-sum dynamic in which decisive victory remains unlikely; escalation risks stay high, and any eventual endgame will reflect not shared interests but the relative exhaustion and leverage of the parties involved.</p>
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<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-us-israel-and-iran-conflict-the-interplay-of-goals-and-strategies/">The US-Israel and Iran Conflict: The Interplay of Goals and Strategies</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>Geopolitics Of Islamic World And Middle Power Alliances After Iran Attack</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/geopolitics-of-islamic-world-and-middle-power-alliance-building-after-iran-attack/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Arif Ansar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 22 Mar 2026 15:57:18 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Core vs Peripheral Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global Power Tussles and Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global Realignment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Libya, Palestine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US-Islamic World Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vantage Point Analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Balance of power of Middle East and Iran war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China Islamic world relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of GCC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[GCC Iran Tensions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics of Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[geopolitics of the Islamic world]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Greater Israel and Iran War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hexagon Alliance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran War and Future of Palestine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Islamic Middle Power Alliance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Islamic NATO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia and Islamic World relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strait of Hormuz]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Two State Solution]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Islamic word relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Israel attack on Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Saudi Arabia relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vision 2030]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Will GCC attack Iran]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=10757</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="696" height="464" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Hormuz.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Hormuz.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Hormuz-300x200.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Hormuz-768x512.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Hormuz-630x420.jpg 630w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Hormuz-696x464.jpg 696w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" />By Arif Ansar Context The Middle East’s contemporary realignment did not begin with the war between Iran and Israel, nor with Iranian strikes on U.S. bases across the Gulf. It began earlier, with the slow erosion of faith in a security order built on American primacy, Israeli military overmatch, and the assumption of Arab strategic [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/geopolitics-of-islamic-world-and-middle-power-alliance-building-after-iran-attack/">Geopolitics Of Islamic World And Middle Power Alliances After Iran Attack</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="696" height="464" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Hormuz.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Hormuz.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Hormuz-300x200.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Hormuz-768x512.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Hormuz-630x420.jpg 630w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Hormuz-696x464.jpg 696w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" /><p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignleft size-medium wp-image-10765" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-300x260.webp" alt="Strait of Hormuz" width="300" height="260" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-300x260.webp 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-768x665.webp 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-485x420.webp 485w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-696x603.webp 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024-534x462.webp 534w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-and-vicinity-1024.webp 1024w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" />By Arif Ansar</p>
<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>The Middle East’s <a href="https://politact.com/whats-next-in-the-growing-saudi-uae-power-tussles-with-turkey-iran/">contemporary realignment</a> did not begin with the war between Iran and Israel, nor with Iranian strikes on U.S. bases across the Gulf. It began earlier, with the slow erosion of faith in a security order built on American primacy, Israeli military overmatch, and the assumption of Arab strategic compliance. The <a href="https://politact.com/israel-airstrike-targets-hamas-negotiators-in-doha-threatening-gaza-ceasefire-talks/">Israeli strike on Doha</a> in September 2025 merely stripped away the last illusions. What followed was not unity, but fragmentation. Instead, the Islamic world entered a phase of deliberate <a href="https://politact.com/saudi-arabia-as-a-rising-middle-power-the-trump-mbs-summit-china-and-the-future-of-gaza/">Middle Power alliance‑building</a>, driven by layered threat perceptions and an urgent desire for strategic autonomy.</p>
<p>At the center of this transformation is a paradox. The region is witnessing the rise of new alliances, yet these alliances are not designed to fight a single enemy. They are instead meant to buffer against multiple threats simultaneously: Iranian asymmetry, Israeli unilateralism, and U.S. unpredictability. Complicating this further is the re‑emergence of the “Greater Israel” narrative, which has amplified regional fears that Israeli military power is no longer bounded by defensive logic alone.</p>
<p><strong>From Gulf Unity to Gulf Divergence</strong></p>
<p>For much of the post‑Arab Spring period, <a href="https://politact.com/saudi-arabia-as-a-rising-middle-power-the-trump-mbs-summit-china-and-the-future-of-gaza/">Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates</a> were viewed as the twin pillars of Arab order. They coordinated in Yemen, aligned against political Islam, and worked closely with Washington. That partnership now seem to have fractured into a structural rivalry rooted in fundamentally different understandings of power and risk.</p>
<p>Saudi Arabia has increasingly embraced a state‑centric, formalized security approach and strategic autonomy. Scarred by years of proxy warfare and conscious of the vulnerability of its economic transformation under Vision 2030, Riyadh has grown wary of open‑ended confrontation—particularly wars triggered by actors outside its control. Iranian attacks on energy infrastructure, U.S. bases, and shipping lanes reinforced Saudi fears not just of Tehran, but of being caught between Washington and Tehran. This explains Riyadh’s pivot toward formal defense guarantees, most notably with Pakistan, and its growing strategic convergence with Turkey.</p>
<p>The UAE, by contrast, has doubled down on a networked, maritime, and technology‑driven security model. Abu Dhabi prefers flexible alignments, proxy leverage, and intelligence dominance over rigid alliance hierarchies. Its deepening ties with Israel and India reflect a desire to hedge not only against Iran, but also against Saudi Arabia’s ambition to re‑centralize Arab leadership. This divergence—well captured in <a href="https://politact.com/whats-next-in-the-growing-saudi-uae-power-tussles-with-turkey-iran/">PoliTact’s analysis</a> of Saudi‑UAE power tussles with Turkey and Iran—has become one of the most important drivers of bloc formation in the region. The result is not a split over ideology, but over risk management. Riyadh fears escalation without control; Abu Dhabi fears marginalization within a Saudi‑led order.</p>
<figure id="attachment_10770" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-10770" style="width: 378px" class="wp-caption alignright"><a href="https://politact.com/whats-next-in-the-growing-saudi-uae-power-tussles-with-turkey-iran/"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-10770 size-full" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Middle-Power-Ties-3.jpg" alt="Islamic Middle Powers Balance of Power " width="378" height="345" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Middle-Power-Ties-3.jpg 378w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Middle-Power-Ties-3-300x274.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 378px) 100vw, 378px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-10770" class="wp-caption-text">Islamic Middle Powers Balance of Power</figcaption></figure>
<p>As Middle Power alliances harden across the Middle East, the other Gulf states—Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait—illustrate divergent strategies for managing exposure, autonomy, and survival amid the erosion of the U.S.-centric security order. Unlike Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which seek to shape regional outcomes through competing alliance architectures, these states operate primarily as system navigators, each responding differently to rising unilateralism and unmanaged escalation.</p>
<p>Qatar occupies the most exposed position. Its foreign policy has emphasized mediation, diplomatic connectivity, and hosting high‑level interlocutors, allowing Doha to play a central role in ceasefire negotiations and crisis diplomacy. This strategy, however, has carried increasing risk. The Israeli airstrike in Doha in September 2025—widely analyzed as a <a href="https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/09/12/israels-strike-in-doha-a-stress-test-for-gulf-mediation-and-u-s-security-commitments/">stress test for Gulf mediation</a> and U.S. security guarantees—demonstrated the limits of protection derived from connectivity alone and raised questions about the <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/policy-briefs/qatar%E2%80%99s-role-challenges-mediation-hostile-environment">durability of mediator immunity</a> in a more permissive strike environment. Mediation provides access and relevance, but as escalation becomes kinetic, it offers diminishing insulation.</p>
<p>Bahrain represents the opposite strategy. Rather than seeking autonomy through flexibility, Manama has embedded itself deeply within Saudi‑led and <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-bahrain/">U.S.‑aligned security structures</a>. Hosting the U.S. Fifth Fleet and relying on external guarantees for regime stability, Bahrain externalizes risk upward to larger patrons, trading strategic maneuverability for protection. This approach offers short‑term stability but reduces Bahrain’s ability to hedge as the regional order fragments.</p>
<p>Oman occupies a quieter middle ground. Like Qatar, Muscat prioritizes mediation, but it does so through deliberate low visibility and strategic restraint. <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2076-0760/14/9/511">Omani diplomacy</a> is characterized by neutrality, confidentiality, and avoidance of high‑profile military entanglements, allowing it to <a href="https://www.orfonline.org/research/between-mediation-and-advocacy-oman-s-shifting-role-in-gulf-iran-relations">act as an intermediary</a> without becoming a primary target. This combination has enabled Oman to preserve autonomy with comparatively lower exposure.</p>
<p>Kuwait, meanwhile, adopts a strategy of <a href="https://www.mofa.gov.kw/en/pages/kuwait-foreign-policy">institutional caution</a>. Its foreign policy emphasizes international law, neutrality, and multilateral legitimacy, shaped in part by domestic constitutional constraints and a historically empowered legislature. Kuwait avoids both alliance leadership and high‑risk mediation, focusing instead on predictability and restraint as a means of survival.</p>
<p>Taken together, these cases highlight the narrowing options available to small states in a region increasingly defined by unilateral force and competitive alignment. Flexibility, dependence, invisibility, and restraint each offer partial protection—but none fully insulate against a security environment in which traditional guarantees no longer reliably constrain escalation.</p>
<p><strong>The Emergence of an “Islamic NATO” and Hexagon Alignment</strong></p>
<p>Out of this environment has emerged what is increasingly described as an Islamic <a href="https://politact.com/emerging-alliances-in-the-middle-east-connection-between-arab-nato-and-cpec/">NATO‑style alignment</a>, anchored by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, with Turkey as a central pillar. This bloc is often misunderstood as a purely anti‑Iran coalition. In reality, it is built on three overlapping threat perceptions.</p>
<p>First is Iranian asymmetry: missile forces, drones, and proxies that threaten energy infrastructure and regime stability. Second is U.S. unpredictability—the fear that American military decisions, often aligned closely with Israeli objectives, could entangle Muslim states in wars they neither seek nor control. Third is Israeli strategic autonomy, particularly as Israel demonstrates a willingness to strike across borders without regard for Arab diplomatic calculations.</p>
<p>The Pakistan–Saudi defense agreement reflects this logic. Pakistan offers nuclear credibility and conventional depth; Turkey provides expeditionary experience, NATO interoperability, and drone warfare expertise; Saudi Arabia contributes financial resources and diplomatic weight. Together, they form a deterrence architecture designed less to confront Israel directly than to prevent Muslim states from being involuntary participants in U.S.–Israeli campaigns. This bloc is therefore as much about autonomy as opposition.</p>
<p>Parallel to the perceived Islamic NATO is a looser but influential alignment in infancy, centered on Israel, India, and potentially UAE—often described as a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/23/whats-netanyahus-planned-hexagon-alliance-and-can-it-work">Hexagon Alliance</a> when extended to include additional partners. This bloc is driven by a different hierarchy of threats and <a href="https://politact.com/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-and-india-middle-east-europe-corridor-imec/">economic incentives</a>. For Israel, the priority remains Iran, but also the risk of regional isolation should Sunni states consolidate into a unified security framework. India views the Gulf through the lens of maritime security, energy flows, and competition with China. The UAE sees in this alignment a way to offset Saudi leadership ambitions while retaining access to Israeli technology and U.S. strategic networks. This bloc is not primarily anti‑Islamic. It is anti‑consolidation. Its purpose is to ensure that no single Sunni‑led alliance can dominate the region’s security architecture.</p>
<p><strong>Greater Israel as a Strategic Disruptor<br />
</strong>One of the most destabilizing factors shaping alliance behavior today is not a military doctrine, but a narrative: the re‑emergence of the idea of Greater Israel. While not an official policy of the Israeli state, the concept—rooted in religious‑nationalist ideology and echoed by influential political figures—has gained unprecedented visibility during and after the Gaza war. Regional actors interpret this discourse as signaling a rejection of territorial finality and Palestinian sovereignty. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/26/what-is-greater-israel-and-how-popular-is-it-among-israelis">Al Jazeera</a> and <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/explainers/what-greater-israel">Middle East Eye</a> have documented how references to biblical borders and permanent Israeli control “from the river to the sea” have triggered alarm across Arab and Muslim capitals.</p>
<p><iframe loading="lazy" title="YouTube video player" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/7P2HySqO0Lg?si=LblhB3Anw0kWwevJ" width="560" height="315" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen"></iframe></p>
<p>The destabilizing effect of the Greater Israel narrative is threefold. First, it reframes Israeli military action as potentially expansionist rather than defensive. Second, it undermines the political sustainability of normalization agreements by making it harder for Arab leaders to justify cooperation without a <a href="https://politact.com/from-oslo-to-trumps-abraham-accords-and-20-point-peace-plan-for-gaza/">Palestinian resolution</a>. Third, it reinforces the perception that U.S. power in the region is structurally aligned with Israeli territorial objectives rather than regional stability. Even states aligned with Israel, such as the UAE, hedge against this uncertainty. Others respond by accelerating independent deterrence mechanisms.</p>
<p><strong>Great Power Rivalry and the Turn to Hedging </strong></p>
<p>The Islamic world is no longer a passive theater of Great Power rivalry. It is actively shaping a multipolar order in which Middle Powers hedge against everyone—including their allies. The Saudi–UAE split, the rise of Islamic NATO and Hexagon formations, the disruptive force of the Greater Israel narrative, and the quiet advance of China and Russia all point to the same conclusion: the era of uncontested security hierarchies in the Middle East is over. What replaces it is not stability, but agency. And in a region long defined by external control, that may be the most consequential shift of all.</p>
<p>As regional blocs multiply, China and Russia benefit not by conquest but by optionality. <a href="https://politact.com/great-power-rivalry-and-chinas-deepening-involvement-in-south-asia-gulf-states/">China’s deepening involvement in South Asia and the Gulf</a>—through infrastructure, security arrangements, energy, and industrial investment—positions Beijing as an indispensable economic partner to all sides without entanglement in regional wars. Russia, meanwhile, offers selective military alternatives, reinforcing a multipolar security environment in which no single actor dominates. Neither power demands ideological alignment; both profit from fragmentation.</p>
<p><strong>Who Are These Alliances Really Meant to Counter?</strong></p>
<p>The central question—<em>who are these alliances meant to counter</em>—has no single answer. They are not aimed solely at Iran, Israel, or the United States. They seemed designed to manage uncertainty in a system where all three generate risk. Iran threatens through asymmetry. Israel threatens through unilateral escalation and expansionist rhetoric. The United States threatens—not intentionally, but structurally—through unpredictability and alignment choices that subordinate regional interests to global strategy and balance of power calculations.</p>
<p>For Saudi Arabia, Iran is dangerous not only because of missiles and proxies, but because Iranian escalation reliably draws in U.S. and Israeli responses that Riyadh does not command. For the UAE, Iran is disruptive but manageable through deterrence, diversification, and diplomacy. For Israel, Iran is framed as an existential threat demanding pre‑emptive action. For Turkey and Pakistan, Iran is a competitor to be balanced, not annihilated.</p>
<p>Iran’s retaliatory attacks on U.S. bases in GCC states did not unify the region. Instead, they exposed the costs of hosting American power. Gulf monarchies found themselves targeted not for their own actions, but for decisions made in Washington and Tel Aviv. As the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2026/03/gulf-states-iran-war-security">Carnegie Endowment has noted</a>, this dynamic has pushed Gulf states toward independent security thinking rather than deeper reliance on U.S. guarantees. In this sense, Iran functions less as the architect of regional order than as its accelerator—forcing others to adapt. The alliances forming across the Islamic world appear to be alliances of insulation, not crusades. They seek to preserve autonomy, reduce exposure, and prevent any single power from dictating outcomes.</p>
<p><strong>Related Articles:<br />
</strong></p>
<p class="entry-title"><a href="https://politact.com/the-end-of-strategic-altruism-putins-visit-and-the-new-us-india-reality/">The End Of Strategic Altruism: Putin’s Visit And The New US-India Reality</a> &#8211; Jan 13, 2026<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/from-oslo-to-trumps-abraham-accords-and-20-point-peace-plan-for-gaza/">From Oslo To Trump’s Abraham Accords And 20-Point Peace Plan For Gaza</a> &#8211; Oct 12, 2025<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/israel-airstrike-targets-hamas-negotiators-in-doha-threatening-gaza-ceasefire-talks/">Israel Airstrike Targets Hamas Negotiators In Doha, Threatening Gaza Ceasefire Talks</a> – Sep 15, 2025<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/gaza-ceasefire-plan-and-us-iran-tensions/">Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions</a> – April 26, 2025<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/two-state-solution-future-of-gaza-and-iran/">Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran</a> – February 25, 2025<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/assads-demise-and-the-shifting-balance-of-power-in-middle-east/">Assad’s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East</a> – Dec 26, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/the-escalating-middle-east-crisis-and-president-elect-trump/">The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump</a> – Dec 5, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-and-india-middle-east-europe-corridor-imec/">China’s Belt And Road Initiative And India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC)</a> &#8211; Oct 5, 2023<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/irans-potential-retaliation-for-haniyehs-killing-and-wider-consequences/">Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences</a> – Aug 30, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/the-iran-pakistan-gas-pipeline-project-economic-and-geopolitical-realities/">The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities</a> – Sep 27, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/great-power-rivalry-and-chinas-deepening-involvement-in-south-asia-gulf-states/">Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States</a> – Aug 4, 2023<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/what-does-president-bidens-visit-to-israel-and-saudi-arabia-imply/">What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply?</a> – Aug 4, 2022</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/geopolitics-of-islamic-world-and-middle-power-alliance-building-after-iran-attack/">Geopolitics Of Islamic World And Middle Power Alliances After Iran Attack</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>Saudi Arabia as a Rising Middle Power: The Trump-MBS Summit, China, and the Future of Gaza</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/saudi-arabia-as-a-rising-middle-power-the-trump-mbs-summit-china-and-the-future-of-gaza/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Naade Ali]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2026 23:23:12 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Core vs Peripheral Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global Power Tussles and Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Libya, Palestine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Arab Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Iran Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Turkey Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US and Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vantage Point Analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[20-Point Gaza Peace Plan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics of Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Great Power Rivalry]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International Stabilization Force]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mukalla Airstrike 2025]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Muslim Middle Powers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Post-Petrodollar Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Saudi Arabia Rising Middle Power]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Saudi China Relations vs US]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Saudi Israel normalization]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Saudi Major Non-NATO Ally Status]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Saudi UAE Rift Yemen]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Saudi Vision 2030 Foreign Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump Gaza peace plan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump MBS Summit 2025]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Saudi Relations 2025]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=10713</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="696" height="904" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Middle-East-Map-2.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Map of Middle East" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Middle-East-Map-2.jpg 788w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Middle-East-Map-2-600x780.jpg 600w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" />By Naade Ali President Trump and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) are redefining the U.S.-Saudi alliance to address China’s rising influence and the Gaza crisis, effectively moving the partnership beyond its traditional foundations. Since their inception, the Saudi-US relations have experienced fluctuations but have been sustained by overlapping strategic interests and mutual dependencies. At [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/saudi-arabia-as-a-rising-middle-power-the-trump-mbs-summit-china-and-the-future-of-gaza/">Saudi Arabia as a Rising Middle Power: The Trump-MBS Summit, China, and the Future of Gaza</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="696" height="904" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Middle-East-Map-2.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Map of Middle East" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Middle-East-Map-2.jpg 788w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Middle-East-Map-2-600x780.jpg 600w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" /><p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignleft size-full wp-image-8470" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Trump-and-MBS.jpeg" alt="" width="1280" height="720" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Trump-and-MBS.jpeg 1280w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Trump-and-MBS-600x338.jpeg 600w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1280px) 100vw, 1280px" />By Naade Ali</p>
<p>President Trump and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) are redefining the U.S.-Saudi alliance to address China’s rising influence and the Gaza crisis, effectively moving the partnership beyond its traditional foundations. Since their inception, the Saudi-US relations have experienced fluctuations but have been sustained by overlapping strategic interests and mutual dependencies. At the center of their crucible of interaction stood a <a href="https://www.democraticac.de/?p=107380">security–petrodollar arrangement</a>. Even when relations hit their lowest point, the core bargain held: Saudi Arabia continued selling oil in dollars and remained a key supplier to the United States, while Washington preserved its role as the Kingdom’s primary security guarantor and leading defense provider.</p>
<p>However, shifting global dynamics, fueled in part by intensifying<a href="https://politact.com/great-power-rivalry-and-chinas-deepening-involvement-in-south-asia-gulf-states/"> great power competition</a> between China and the United States, have pushed middle powers like Saudi Arabia to reduce their dependence on any single major actor and seek greater strategic autonomy. While this shift has broadened their ambitions, it has also uncovered greater opportunities and challenges. The Saudi-US relations are not indifferent to these evolving dynamics, with both countries recalibrating their bilateral ties along new strategic dimensions.</p>
<h2><strong>Saudi Arabia as a Swing State in the U.S.–China Rivalry</strong></h2>
<p>Today’s Saudi Arabia appears to be hedging away from over reliance on the United States, building a strategy centered on its pragmatic interests and exercising sovereign leverage. This helps in deal-making and to secure the space needed to navigate the great power rivalry. Saudi Arabia’s move to reduce its dependence on the United States gained momentum exactly when ties with Washington <a href="https://mideastdc.org/publication/broken-promises-bidens-retreat-from-saudi-arabia-accountability/">soured</a> under the Biden administration. Confronted with the unpredictability of American policy, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) found an attractive alternative in Beijing, which offered strategic engagement without preconditions. <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2025/01/how-china-aligned-itself-with-saudi-arabias-vision-2030?lang=en">Closer ties</a> with China enabled Saudi Arabia to pursue a multidimensional strategy, diversify its partnerships, and maintain the flexibility necessary to manage uncertainties in its relationship with Washington.</p>
<p>For China, Saudi Arabia became a central pillar for expanding regional influence in the Middle East. Riyadh hosted the first-ever <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zy/jj/2022/xjpcxfh/202212/t20221210_10988406.html">China-Arab States Summit</a> and, through <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/21/china-brokered-saudi-iran-deal-driving-wave-of-reconciliation-says-wang">Beijing’s mediation</a>, reconciled diplomatic ties with Tehran. Further consolidating their ties with Beijing, both Tehran and Riyadh also integrated into multilateral blocs where China and Russia hold considerable sway, including the <a href="https://gulfif.org/iran-and-saudi-arabia-in-sco-a-strategic-shift-in-gulf-alliances/">Shanghai Cooperation Organization</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/brics-invites-six-countries-including-saudi-arabia-iran-be-new-members-2023-08-24/">BRICS</a>. Additionally, China strengthened economic relations with the Kingdom, becoming its <a href="https://investinchina.chinadaily.com.cn/s/202511/27/WS6927ada3498e23165e06b0ad/china-tops-saudi-arabias-trading-partners-in-q3.html">largest trading partner</a> and providing robust support for Vision 2030. A major payoff of Saudi Arabia’s strategic pivot toward China was that it transformed Saudi Arabia into a <a href="https://www.cnas.org/research/global-swing-states">geopolitical swing state</a>. This effectively signaled to Washington it is fully prepared to deepen ties with Beijing unless the U.S. proactively restores its coveted central role.</p>
<h2><strong>The Trump–MBS Summit: A Strategic Inflection Point </strong></h2>
<p>President Trump’s <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/11/trumps-embrace-crown-prince-ushers-new-era-us-saudi-ties">extraordinary embrace</a> of Mohammed bin Salman during his visit to Washington in November suggests that Riyadh’s calibrated swing-state posture is working. Riyadh now carries significant geostrategic weight and has taken center stage in the U.S.–China competition for influence in the Middle East.</p>
<p>Trump’s approach to strategic competition with China rests on two pillars: credible deterrence and tightening of alignment with key U.S. middle power partners. Within this framework, any complete Saudi drift into Beijing’s orbit is viewed as strategically unacceptable. At the same time, he is acutely aware of the practical limits of attempting to sever Riyadh’s growing relationship with Beijing, recognizing that containment of China cannot succeed solely through coercive pressure on allies to reverse course.</p>
<p>As evidenced by President Trump’s foreign policy conduct, he employs a distinctive blend of generous incentives and far-reaching, exclusive agreements in energy, critical minerals, technology, and defense. These arrangements simultaneously fortify bilateral partnerships and allow middle powers, such as Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to maintain a semblance of strategic autonomy in their relations with China. Beneath this veneer, however, the United States methodically secures alignment on matters of vital national interest, while deliberately imposing significant strategic costs on any partner that leans excessively toward Beijing.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, Trump’s transactional foreign policy has provided Saudi Arabia with an opportunity for adjusting its own strategy, allowing the Kingdom to pursue a more robust, interest-driven relationship with Washington. Riyadh recognizes that being a center of the Islamic holy places provides it immense influence in the Muslim world. United States relies on it not only to balance China in the Middle East but also to help secure a stable regional environment for Israel. This is a goal that, in <a href="https://caliber.az/en/post/trump-eyes-saudi-arabia-joining-abraham-accords-in-upcoming-talks">Trump’s view</a>, could be advanced if Saudi Arabia joins the Abraham Accords, potentially encouraging other Arab and Muslim countries to follow suit.</p>
<h2><strong>The Summit Outcome</strong></h2>
<p>Through <a href="https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/media/rc0b5oy1/saudi_vision203.pdf">Vision 2030 reforms</a> and skillful diplomatic maneuvering, the Kingdom has transcended its traditional role. This transformation not only redirects the calculus of their bilateral partnership but also carries profound implications for the Middle East’s balance of power and the broader dynamics of great power competition. It has emerged as a pivotal regional powerhouse whose energy resources, vast investment capital, and geopolitical influence make it indispensable to both Washington and Beijing.</p>
<p>During their meeting, President Trump <a href="https://www.democrats.senate.gov/newsroom/trump-transcripts/transcript-president-trump-hosts-a-dinner-for-mohammed-bin-salman-of-saudi-arabia-111825">stated</a> he was “the best friend Saudi Arabia has ever had in Washington,” a statement that highlighted his administration’s desire to deepen ties through personal rapport. Nevertheless, the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/11/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-solidifies-economic-and-defense-partnership-with-the-kingdom-of-saudi-arabia/">agreements</a> concluded between the two leaders demonstrate that the U.S.-Saudi relationship remains firmly grounded in their respective national interests and strategic imperatives, with both seeking to extract maximum advantage.</p>
<p>President Trump secured a $1 trillion investment pledge from the Crown Prince, alongside the signing of a <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-era-us-saudi-minerals-cooperation">Strategic Framework for Cooperation</a>. This framework includes Saudi commitments to supply uranium, metals, permanent magnets, and critical minerals essential for U.S. defense and energy sectors. Leveraging Saudi Arabia’s vast deposits of rare earth elements (REEs), Trump advanced his goal of countering China’s dominance in critical minerals.</p>
<p>For his part, Crown Prince achieved major strategic gains: the Kingdom was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/19/saudi-arabia-designated-major-non-nato-ally-of-us-gets-f-35-warplanes-deal">granted major non-NATO ally status</a>, a defense agreement was finalized, and approval was secured for the purchase of American F-35 fighter jets and other advanced weapons. These acquisitions will strengthen Saudi defense architecture. Additionally, in line with its ambition to become a global hub for artificial intelligence, Saudi Arabia also <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2025/11/20/us-approves-ai-chip-exports-to-gulf-after-saudi-crown-prince-visit.html">gained access to advanced</a> AI chips and U.S. technology firms to support the development of its domestic AI infrastructure.</p>
<h2><strong>US-Saudi Ties and Gaza Peace Plan</strong></h2>
<p>The Washington meeting between President Trump and the Crown Prince highlighted both progress and persistent challenges in U.S.–Saudi relations, with Saudi-Israel normalization remaining a key point of divergence. While Trump pressed Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords, Mohammed bin Salman insisted that any normalization depend on Israel committing to “an irreversible, credible, and time-bound path toward Palestinian statehood.” Following the Israel–Gaza conflict, Riyadh has emerges as a <a href="https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/N2404416">leading advocate</a> for international recognition of Palestine, a position consistently opposed by the U.S. and Israel. Its refusal to yield to Trump’s push for normalization reflects the broader post-war realities in Gaza.</p>
<p>By taking this stance, Crown Prince delivered a twofold message: First, the strengthening of U.S.–Saudi ties must remain entirely independent of any precondition for Saudi–Israeli normalization. Second, while Riyadh is open in principle to normalization, Israel’s refusal to recognize Palestinian statehood remains a major impediment. While Riyadh <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/saudi-arabia-welcomes-trump-s-gaza-plan-says-ready-to-cooperate-with-us-to-end-israeli-war/3703366">supports</a> the Trump Gaza peace plan in principle, it <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/before-talks-with-trump-saudi-arabia-doubles-down-on-terms-for-israel-ties/">rejects</a> full Israeli control over the Gaza territory and insists on concrete conditions: a time-bound Israeli withdrawal, the deployment of an international protection force, and the reinstatement of authority to the Palestinian Authority.</p>
<p>Saudi Arabia’s demands on the Palestinian issue clash directly with Israel’s red lines, leaving Washington struggling to balance relations with both capitals. From Israel’s <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/2025-11-19/ty-article/.premium/a-new-u-s-saudi-partnership-takes-shape-leaving-israel-to-watch-from-the-sidelines/0000019a-9b7f-d607-ab9e-9bff29b50000">viewpoint</a>, the rapidly deepening U.S.–Saudi partnership, explicitly decoupled from any obligation of Saudi–Israeli normalization, raises two profound concerns. First, it risks elevating Riyadh’s regional influence while undermining Israel’s primary strategic objective: the expansion of the Abraham Accords. Second, as long as Riyadh continues to regard Israel as a principal source of regional instability, not Iran, the possibility persists that Saudi Arabia could further deepen its relations with Iran.</p>
<p>Historically, the shared enmity toward Iran has been the bedrock of both the U.S.–Israel alliance and U.S.–Saudi security relations. Following their China-brokered détente, Riyadh and Tehran no longer see each other as existential threats. To prevent Washington from viewing improved Saudi–Iranian ties with alarm, Mohammed bin Salman has carefully framed them as potentially beneficial to the United States, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/trump-iran-nuclear-deal-saudi-arabia-mbs-11071293">offering</a> to help the U.S and Iran reach a deal that could be vital to regional stability. Riyadh can indeed encourage Iran to talk, but persuading Tehran to accept U.S. terms is no less daunting than U.S. convincing Israel to meet Saudi demands on Palestine. The scenario thus exposes the limits of influence on both sides: neither Washington nor Riyadh can fully impose their will on Israel and Iran.</p>
<p>The Washington summit also revealed a deeper convergence: the United States and Saudi Arabia need each other to achieve their core objectives in the Middle East. Under the Trump approach, US appears willing to delegate primary responsibility for preserving and enforcing the U.S.-led order in the Middle East to Saudi Arabia. However, for Riyadh to fully assume the role of America’s pre-eminent regional partner, it will also have to bear the main burden of protecting U.S. interests, containing rivals, and upholding the existing regional architecture.</p>
<p>Such an alignment would signal to Iran that Saudi Arabia had become the de facto guarantor and enforcer of core American interests. A U.S.–Saudi power-sharing arrangement would also carry significant implications for Israel. Confronted with a region increasingly shaped around Saudi primacy, Israel would face a stark choice: either challenge Riyadh and risk damaging its own relationship with Washington, or accommodate Saudi terms and move toward normalization on conditions set by the Kingdom. Under this approach, in which Saudi Arabia and the United States emerge as mutually reinforcing strategic partners, both are able to secure the outcomes they seek from Iran and Israel.</p>
<h2><strong>The Saudi-UAE Rivalry and Yemen Conflict</strong></h2>
<p>As the new year begins, the region is no longer defined by &#8220;Arabs vs. Iran&#8221; or &#8220;Islamists vs. Monarchies,&#8221; but by the fallout of weakening Iran that is creating a power vacuum. Muslim Middle Powers are competing to to fill the space, illustrated by the Saudi-UAE split. In places of old alliances, new ones are taking shape premised on cold, transactional game of national interest. And these tensions are playing out from Yemen to Syria, Sudan, Libya, and Somalia.</p>
<p>While the Trump-MBS summit secured vital U.S. interests in energy and defense, it exposed the fragility of the broader regional architecture. Saudi Arabia is acting like a state, prioritizing borders, stability, and institutions to protect Vision 2030. The UAE resembles a corporation, prioritizing ports, trade routes, and resource extraction. Turkey and Qatar are navigating the space between them, leveraging their military and ideological assets to carve out their own spheres of influence.</p>
<p>Similarly, President Trump’s <a href="https://politact.com/from-oslo-to-trumps-abraham-accords-and-20-point-peace-plan-for-gaza/">&#8220;20-Point Peace Plan,&#8221;</a> unveiled in September 2025, was predicated on a unified regional architecture: Gulf capital would fund reconstruction, Egyptian-Turkish logistics would secure the ground, Pakistan-Indonesia-Turkey may be part of the International Stabilization Force (ISF), and Israeli-Saudi normalization would provide the political horizon.</p>
<p>As of late December 2025, the dramatic rupture between Saudi Arabia and the UAE—culminating in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/dec/30/saudi-arabia-uae-tension-future-yemen-boiling-point">Saudi airstrike on UAE-backed assets in Mukalla, Yemen</a>—has shattered the &#8220;Sunni Coalition&#8221; prerequisite for the plan’s success. The 20-point framework is now being pulled apart by the competing power centers and Israel may find itself the short-term beneficiary of Arab fragmentation. Unless Washington can repair the rupture within the Gulf Cooperation Council, its grand strategy for the Middle East risks becoming a two-legged stool: supported by a strong U.S.-Saudi bilateral deal, but lacking the regional stability required to stand.</p>
<p><strong>Related Articles:<br />
</strong></p>
<p class="entry-title"><a href="https://politact.com/israel-airstrike-targets-hamas-negotiators-in-doha-threatening-gaza-ceasefire-talks/">Israel Airstrike Targets Hamas Negotiators In Doha, Threatening Gaza Ceasefire Talks</a> – Sep 15, 2025<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/gaza-ceasefire-plan-and-us-iran-tensions/">Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions</a> – April 26, 2025<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/two-state-solution-future-of-gaza-and-iran/">Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran</a> – February 25, 2025<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/assads-demise-and-the-shifting-balance-of-power-in-middle-east/">Assad’s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East</a> – Dec 26, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/the-escalating-middle-east-crisis-and-president-elect-trump/">The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump</a> – Dec 5, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/irans-potential-retaliation-for-haniyehs-killing-and-wider-consequences/">Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences</a> – Aug 30, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/the-iran-pakistan-gas-pipeline-project-economic-and-geopolitical-realities/">The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities</a> – Sep 27, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/great-power-rivalry-and-chinas-deepening-involvement-in-south-asia-gulf-states/">Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States</a> &#8211; Aug 4, 2023<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/what-does-president-bidens-visit-to-israel-and-saudi-arabia-imply/">What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply?</a> – Aug 4, 2022</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/saudi-arabia-as-a-rising-middle-power-the-trump-mbs-summit-china-and-the-future-of-gaza/">Saudi Arabia as a Rising Middle Power: The Trump-MBS Summit, China, and the Future of Gaza</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>From Oslo To Trump’s Abraham Accords And 20-Point Peace Plan For Gaza</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/from-oslo-to-trumps-abraham-accords-and-20-point-peace-plan-for-gaza/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Naade Ali]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 12 Oct 2025 16:30:01 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Core vs Peripheral Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Countering Extremism and Homeland Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global Power Tussles and Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global Realignment]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Future of Hamas and Gaza reconstruction]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=10635</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="259" height="194" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Al-Aqsa-Mosque.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Al Aqsa Mosque" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Al-Aqsa-Mosque.jpg 259w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Al-Aqsa-Mosque-80x60.jpg 80w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 259px) 100vw, 259px" />PoliTact&#8217;s Global Security Study With inputs from Naade Ali and Arif Ansar Context Negotiations on the Trump’s 20-point Gaza Peace Package has been ongoing in Egypt since Monday, and the deal on the first phase between Hamas and Israel was announced on October 8th. At first glance, the focus appears to be on tactical choices, [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/from-oslo-to-trumps-abraham-accords-and-20-point-peace-plan-for-gaza/">From Oslo To Trump’s Abraham Accords And 20-Point Peace Plan For Gaza</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="259" height="194" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Al-Aqsa-Mosque.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Al Aqsa Mosque" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Al-Aqsa-Mosque.jpg 259w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Al-Aqsa-Mosque-80x60.jpg 80w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 259px) 100vw, 259px" /><figure id="attachment_10638" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-10638" style="width: 300px" class="wp-caption alignleft"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-10638" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-300x200.jpg" alt="Abraham Accords Signing Ceremony" width="300" height="200" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-300x200.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-768x512.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-630x420.jpg 630w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-696x464.jpg 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords.jpg 1024w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-10638" class="wp-caption-text">Abraham Accords Signing Ceremony</figcaption></figure>
<p><strong>PoliTact&#8217;s Global Security Study</strong></p>
<p>With inputs from Naade Ali and Arif Ansar</p>
<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>Negotiations on the Trump’s 20-point Gaza Peace Package has been ongoing in Egypt since Monday, and the <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/after-two-years-of-war-israel-and-hamas-agree-to-first-phase-of-trump-s-20-point-peace-framework/ar-AA1O7MSx">deal on the first phase</a> between Hamas and Israel was announced on October 8th. At first glance, the focus appears to be on tactical choices, such as cease-fires, hostage exchanges, the future of Gaza, the fate of Hamas, and whether the Abraham Accords survive the region’s new trauma. Trump’s plan is pragmatic: a phased cease-fire, hostage-prisoner swaps, an interim technocratic authority to oversee Gaza reconstruction and demilitarization. However, it’s much vaguer where the politics bite: long-term political status, refugee questions, and Palestinian statehood.</p>
<p>The leaders of eight Muslim-majority states: Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Türkiye, Indonesia, Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan, who met Trump on the sidelines of the 80th UN General Assembly in New York, had expressed support for the plan in a <a href="https://mofa.gov.pk/press-releases/joint-statement-by-the-foreign-ministers-of-jordan-united-arab-emirates-indonesia-pakistan-turkiye-saudi-arabia-qatar-and-egypt">joint statement</a>, praising his “<em>sincere efforts to end the war in Gaza</em>” and expressing confidence in his ability to achieve peace. However, the text of the plan released subsequently has raised concerns among Arab countries and drawn significant domestic criticism, as it deviates from the proposals of the foreign ministers of the eight Muslim states. <a href="https://www.axios.com/2025/09/30/trump-gaza-peace-plan-israel-changes-hamas-response">Reports</a> indicate that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu secured “the last word,” persuading Washington to make additional changes at a stage when it was harder for the Muslim countries to intervene.</p>
<p>How the Gaza question is resolved — whether as a primarily security-led stabilization by disarming, re-building, and technocratic governance or as a political settlement that recognizes Palestinian political rights in a durable way — is yet to be seen. An Israeli-U.S. approach that produces security and normalization without a credible, enforceable pathway to Palestinian political rights and without addressing refugee claims, settlements or permanent borders risks locking in a durable, managed status quo that advantageously cements Israeli gains and rewards Arab normalization while leaving Palestinian grievances unresolved.</p>
<p>For critics and many Palestinians, the plan’s biggest flaw is that it recapitulates the old “deal by omission” problem — postpone the hard political questions and hope that security fixes suffice. Robert Malley’s long reflection on the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/10/01/gaza-peace-process-history-robert-malley/">failure of past peace processes</a> is a timely reminder that postponing core issues almost guarantees revival of conflict rather than durable peace.</p>
<p><iframe loading="lazy" title="YouTube video player" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/7P2HySqO0Lg?si=VP7TMdVolLF3V3NT" width="560" height="315" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen"></iframe></p>
<p><strong>Shift in the Middle East Balance of Power</strong></p>
<p>Since Trump’s first term in power led to Abraham Accords in September 2020, the Middle East is undergoing tumultuous shift in the balance of power. This shift is away from Iran’s axis of resistance and towards those that signed the Abraham Accords &#8211; and others that were moving towards accepting it. Highlighting plans to expand the signatories to the Abraham Accord and emphasizing the strategic and economic benefits of cooperating with Israel, Trump recently stated:</p>
<p>“<em>History has shown us that those who establish relations with Israel have thrived, while those who devote resources and attention toward the destruction — even the annihilation — of Israel have languished. Israel is not going anywhere. They are going to coexist with other peoples and countries in the region. The Abraham Accords demonstrate that nations are better off when they communicate, work together, and embrace new opportunities.</em>”</p>
<p>The last five years have seen aggressive Israeli campaigns and intelligence operations directed at damaging — sometimes decisively — Iran’s regional network: kinetic blows, targeted assassinations of key operatives in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, and continued pressure on Iran’s enlistment of militias. Another focus has been the degrading of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, whether by eliminating key scientists, or by cyberattacks on its nuclear facility. In June, US also carried out <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/world/middle-east/2025/06/22/how-effective-was-the-us-attack-on-irans-nuclear-sites/">bombing of the Iran’s nuclear facilities</a> in Fordow, Isfahan, and Nanatz sites.</p>
<p>The net effect has been to cripple Iran’s reach: Hezbollah was weakened on the battlefield during the 2023–24 rounds of fighting; Iran’s Quds Force lost its most iconic commander in Qasem Soleimani in January 2020. Recently, Isreal shifted its focus to the political leadership, which lead to the <a href="https://politact.com/irans-potential-retaliation-for-haniyehs-killing-and-wider-consequences/">assassination of Ismael Haniyeh</a> on Iranian soil in July 2024, followed by elimination of Hassan Nasrullah in Lebanon in September 2024. However, it was the <a href="https://politact.com/israel-airstrike-targets-hamas-negotiators-in-doha-threatening-gaza-ceasefire-talks/">Israeli attack on Hamas negotiators in Doha</a> last month that many experts believe may have broken the camel’s back. It blurred the line of who is Israel after &#8211; and what does it want to achieve with all the mayhem that followed Oct 7, 2023, tragic Hamas attack on Israel. The campaign against Iran has demonstrated that Israel can play with international rules at will and without any consequences. This will have grave long-term consequences for global order.</p>
<p>But degradation does not mean elimination — proxies adapt, civilian costs grow, and local politics evolve in unpredictable ways. Alongside coercion and violence, normalization diplomacy has quietly reshaped the balance. The Abraham Accords proved that several Arab states were prepared to prioritize trade, technology, and counter-Iran cooperation, over the old formula that required Palestinian statehood before normalization. This bargain created an “outside-in” model of Israeli influence — Israel’s security and economic ties extend into the Arab world even as its control over Palestinian territories and the facts on the ground become more entrenched.</p>
<p>That model has a dual consequence: it strengthens Israel’s regional legitimacy and deterred coalitions, but it also delegitimizes the Palestinian cause in some Arab capitals. Unless meaningful political concessions accompany normalization under the current rounds of peace accords – the situation may plan in the hands of hardliners in the longer run.</p>
<p><strong>Reshaping the New Middle East</strong></p>
<p>The 20-point Trump plan thus revolve around two linked wagers.</p>
<p>First: can an externally led, security-first approach end immediate bloodshed and create a stable environment for reconstruction? Second: can that short-term security compact be turned into a politically legitimate, durable settlement that includes Palestinian rights and prevents radicalization? If the answer to the second question is “no,” then any tactical success will be ephemeral — the security gains will ossify into new grievances and a renewed cycle of violence.</p>
<p>If the American-Israeli tack succeeds in producing a stable Gaza that is demilitarized, internationally managed and economically rebuilt — but without a credible pathway to Palestinian statehood, refugee resolution, or substantive political participation — the regional consequence is likely to be twofold:</p>
<p>(a) the anti-Abraham Accord camp will consolidate, and (b) the Palestinian national cause shifts from mainstream diplomacy back to asymmetric forms of resistance and transnational advocacy. That benefits actors that can exploit grievances — whether non-state actors in the region or international rivals that seek influence by presenting themselves as alternatives to the U.S. model.</p>
<p><strong>Middle East and the Global Balance of Power</strong></p>
<p>Potential failure of the U.S.-Israeli approach does not automatically favor China and Russia — but it creates openings. China and Russia are playing a long game: both have expanded political and economic ties in the Middle East, offering infrastructure, arms, and diplomatic cover without the political conditionalities the West often attaches. Beijing’s economic footprint, growing role in regional institutions, including BRICS partners, and willingness to court Gulf states for energy and investment means it can offer attractive alternatives to American dependency.</p>
<p>Moscow, for its part, remains an arms supplier and a diplomatic interlocutor (especially in Syria), and it relishes opportunities to undercut U.S. influence. If Washington’s approach produces stability without justice, public sentiment may turn away from the U.S. narrative and look to non-Western partners who promise investments or political balance-as as has already started to occur. That said, China and Russia do not currently possess the same depth of security integration with Israel or the same network of alliances that would let them ‘replace’ American influence overnight — what they can do is <a href="https://peacediplomacy.org/2025/02/24/chinas-expanding-influence-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa">exploit U.S. credibility gaps</a> to gain economic and political footholds.</p>
<p><strong>The Way Forward</strong></p>
<p>Three practical conclusions emerge from a realistic appraisal of Trump’s 20-point plan:</p>
<ol>
<li>Security outcomes are necessary but not sufficient. Short-term stabilization that includes hostage releases, ceasefires, and reconstruction, is important and politically urgent — but by itself it will not end the conflict’s structural drivers. The old lesson of Oslo remains: <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/10/01/gaza-peace-process-history-robert-malley/">postponing core grievances breeds future crises</a>.</li>
<li><a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/04/the-abraham-accords-after-gaza-a-change-of-context?lang=en">Normalization without a political track</a> is a strategic accelerant for some actors and a strategic liability for others. States that prioritize economic and security ties with Israel will gain leverage; however, the Arab and Muslim Street will judge outcomes by whether justice is achieved for Palestinians.</li>
<li>Geopolitically, <a href="https://politact.com/what-does-president-bidens-visit-to-israel-and-saudi-arabia-imply/">every gap left by U.S. leadership</a>, or perceived U.S. indifference to justice, creates space for China and Russia to expand influence — primarily through diplomacy and investment, and secondarily through arms and political support. But neither Beijing nor Moscow offers a ready-made substitute for U.S. regional security guarantees; rather, <a href="https://peacediplomacy.org/2025/02/24/chinas-expanding-influence-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa">they offer alternative hedges</a> that regional states will use in pursuit of their own short-term interests.</li>
</ol>
<p>If Cairo deal and the Trump package are to avoid merely delaying the next crisis they must do three things simultaneously:</p>
<p>Secure an immediate end to mass killing and human suffering; create an inclusive, accountable reconstruction process that gives Palestinians meaningful agency; and set out an enforceable, internationally backed political roadmap that addresses, not postpones, refugee claims, borders and sovereignty – as was done in the Oslo Accords. Without that tripod, any “victory” will be tactical, not strategic — and the balance of power will keep shifting unpredictably, with winners among states and non-state actors who are best at exploiting unresolved grievances.</p>
<p><strong>Related Articles:<br />
</strong></p>
<p class="entry-title"><a href="https://politact.com/israel-airstrike-targets-hamas-negotiators-in-doha-threatening-gaza-ceasefire-talks/">Israel Airstrike Targets Hamas Negotiators In Doha, Threatening Gaza Ceasefire Talks</a> &#8211; Sep 15, 2025<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/gaza-ceasefire-plan-and-us-iran-tensions/">Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions</a> – April 26, 2025<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/two-state-solution-future-of-gaza-and-iran/">Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran</a> – February 25, 2025<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/assads-demise-and-the-shifting-balance-of-power-in-middle-east/">Assad’s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East</a> – Dec 26, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/the-escalating-middle-east-crisis-and-president-elect-trump/">The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump</a> – Dec 5, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/irans-potential-retaliation-for-haniyehs-killing-and-wider-consequences/">Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences</a> – Aug 30, 2024<br />
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<a href="https://politact.com/what-does-president-bidens-visit-to-israel-and-saudi-arabia-imply/">What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply?</a> &#8211; Aug 4, 2022</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/from-oslo-to-trumps-abraham-accords-and-20-point-peace-plan-for-gaza/">From Oslo To Trump’s Abraham Accords And 20-Point Peace Plan For Gaza</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>Israel Airstrike Targets Hamas Negotiators In Doha, Threatening Gaza Ceasefire Talks</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/israel-airstrike-targets-hamas-negotiators-in-doha-threatening-gaza-ceasefire-talks/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2025 03:18:03 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Campaign Against Extremism]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=10595</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="696" height="464" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ChatGPT-Image-Sep-13-2025-03_49_22-PM-1-1024x683.png" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Israeli airstrike targets negotiators in Doha" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ChatGPT-Image-Sep-13-2025-03_49_22-PM-1-1024x683.png 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ChatGPT-Image-Sep-13-2025-03_49_22-PM-1-300x200.png 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ChatGPT-Image-Sep-13-2025-03_49_22-PM-1-768x512.png 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ChatGPT-Image-Sep-13-2025-03_49_22-PM-1-630x420.png 630w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ChatGPT-Image-Sep-13-2025-03_49_22-PM-1-696x464.png 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ChatGPT-Image-Sep-13-2025-03_49_22-PM-1-1068x712.png 1068w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ChatGPT-Image-Sep-13-2025-03_49_22-PM-1.png 1536w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" />Risk Assessment Israel Strike in Doha Shakes Middle East Stability Context Israel struck Doha on September 9th—an attack that targeted Hamas political leaders during Gaza ceasefire negotiations and has pushed the Middle East into a new phase of instability. The incident killed at least six people, including a Qatari security officer and the son of [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/israel-airstrike-targets-hamas-negotiators-in-doha-threatening-gaza-ceasefire-talks/">Israel Airstrike Targets Hamas Negotiators In Doha, Threatening Gaza Ceasefire Talks</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="696" height="464" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ChatGPT-Image-Sep-13-2025-03_49_22-PM-1-1024x683.png" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Israeli airstrike targets negotiators in Doha" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ChatGPT-Image-Sep-13-2025-03_49_22-PM-1-1024x683.png 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ChatGPT-Image-Sep-13-2025-03_49_22-PM-1-300x200.png 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ChatGPT-Image-Sep-13-2025-03_49_22-PM-1-768x512.png 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ChatGPT-Image-Sep-13-2025-03_49_22-PM-1-630x420.png 630w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ChatGPT-Image-Sep-13-2025-03_49_22-PM-1-696x464.png 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ChatGPT-Image-Sep-13-2025-03_49_22-PM-1-1068x712.png 1068w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ChatGPT-Image-Sep-13-2025-03_49_22-PM-1.png 1536w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" /><p><strong><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignleft size-medium wp-image-10598" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ChatGPT-Image-Sep-13-2025-03_49_22-PM-1-300x200.png" alt="Israeli airstrike targets negotiators in Doha" width="300" height="200" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ChatGPT-Image-Sep-13-2025-03_49_22-PM-1-300x200.png 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ChatGPT-Image-Sep-13-2025-03_49_22-PM-1-1024x683.png 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ChatGPT-Image-Sep-13-2025-03_49_22-PM-1-768x512.png 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ChatGPT-Image-Sep-13-2025-03_49_22-PM-1-630x420.png 630w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ChatGPT-Image-Sep-13-2025-03_49_22-PM-1-696x464.png 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ChatGPT-Image-Sep-13-2025-03_49_22-PM-1-1068x712.png 1068w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ChatGPT-Image-Sep-13-2025-03_49_22-PM-1.png 1536w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></strong></p>
<p><strong>Risk Assessment</strong></p>
<p><strong>Israel Strike in Doha Shakes Middle East Stability</strong></p>
<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>Israel struck Doha on September 9th—an attack that targeted Hamas political leaders during Gaza ceasefire negotiations and has pushed the Middle East into a new phase of instability. The <a href="https://apnews.com/article/qatar-explosion-doha-e319dd51b170161372442831a8023db5">incident killed</a> at least six people, including a Qatari security officer and the son of a senior Hamas negotiator, and sent shockwaves through the already fragile Gaza peace process. The strike was remarkable not only for its timing, but for its location: an unprecedented Israeli operation on the sovereign soil of Qatar, a key player in Israel-Hamas mediation.</p>
<p>The immediate impact on the Gaza ceasefire talks has been devastating. Hamas <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-says-israels-doha-strike-against-leaders-sought-derail-ceasefire-efforts-2025-09-11/">quickly announced</a> that its demands had not changed—insisting on a full ceasefire, Israeli withdrawal, humanitarian aid, and a prisoner-hostage exchange—while condemning Israel for sabotaging negotiations. Qatar, which has long played host to Hamas’ political bureau and served as a linchpin in past ceasefire talks, declared that the attack had <a href="https://nypost.com/2025/09/11/world-news/israel-strike-on-doha-killed-any-hope-of-hostage-deal-qatar-says">“killed any hope”</a> of a near-term agreement. The perception is now widespread that Israel is prioritizing <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/israel-strikes-hamas-qatar">military elimination of adversaries</a> over a negotiated solution, a view reinforced by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s repeated calls for the “total defeat” of Hamas. This narrative threatens to undermine confidence in ongoing Gaza peace initiatives.</p>
<p>For Qatar and the broader Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the strike represents not only a political affront but a strategic shock. Doha has convened emergency consultations, and GCC states from Saudi Arabia to the UAE have <a href="https://apnews.com/article/qatar-israel-hamas-attack-uae-us-gaza-380034326d3158e8f40462c87abc36ec">summoned Israeli envoys</a> to protest the violation of sovereignty. An <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/politics/government/arab-islamic-summit-to-back-qatar-after-israeli-attack/ar-AA1MwCeJ?ocid=BingNewsVerp">Arabic-Islamic leaders’ summit</a> is scheduled for September 15 to discuss the situation created by the Israel strike. The summit will be attended by members of Arab League and Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).</p>
<p>After decades of multibillion-dollar arms purchases and hosting of U.S. military bases, the GCC now confronts the reality that Washington either could not—or would not—<a href="https://gulfif.org/israels-strike-on-qatar-gulf-experts-perspectives">prevent Israel from striking</a> within their borders. The strike risks driving Gulf nations to reconsider their reliance on U.S. guarantees and to explore alternative security alignments. The Israeli strike has shaken Gulf confidence in the American security umbrella. Qatar’s Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani also <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/politics/government/trump-meets-with-qatari-prime-minister-after-israeli-strikes-in-doha/ar-AA1MtvfF?ocid=BingNewsVerp">met with President Trump</a> in New York on September 12 but the details of the meeting were not disclosed.</p>
<p><strong>The Future of Hamas</strong></p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignleft size-medium wp-image-10503" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Caeasefire-now-300x200.jpg" alt="People holding banners of Ceasefire now" width="300" height="200" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Caeasefire-now-300x200.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Caeasefire-now-768x511.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Caeasefire-now-696x463.jpg 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Caeasefire-now-631x420.jpg 631w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Caeasefire-now-600x400.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Caeasefire-now.jpg 850w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" />Whether Hamas keeps political and military control or is replaced in Gaza, and how any post-conflict governance would work, remains <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/18/hamas-gaza-proposed-ceasefire-hostage-release-deal-israel">the key stumbling block</a>. Israel has pressed for assurances related to demilitarization while Hamas rejects disarmament demands or removing its political authority without a full agreement.</p>
<p>For Hamas, its armed wing is more than just a military tool—it is central to its <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/02/26/gaza-ceasefire-disarm-hamas-phase-two/">political identity</a>. The group insists that its “weapon of resistance” is sacred and non-negotiable. In recent ceasefire discussions, Hamas has repeatedly declined to give up its military capabilities without a comprehensive deal that includes guarantees of Palestinian statehood, Israeli withdrawal, and full respect for humanitarian and governance rights. Any demilitarization demand, from this perspective, is seen as a demand for surrender.</p>
<p>On the Israeli side, demilitarization is non-negotiable. Israel views Hamas’s military and governing structure as the main <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/publication/strategy-gaza">obstacle to peace and security</a>. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other officials have made clear that any viable ceasefire or peace agreement must include: the destroying or dismantling of Hamas’s military infrastructure; the exclusion of Hamas from any future governance of Gaza; and the establishment of long-term oversight or guarantees that Gaza will not again become a base for armed attack.</p>
<p>For Israel, the demilitarization demand serves several purposes: a way to neutralize threats (rockets, tunnels, armed operations), to reassure its domestic political coalition especially hardline elements who see any compromise as weakness, and to prevent the recurrence of another large-scale conflict.</p>
<p>Third-party mediators, including Egypt, Qatar, and the United States, recognize that full instantaneous demilitarization is extremely unlikely. Hamas is deeply embedded in Gaza society, not only militarily but also through governance, social services, charities, religious institutions, and local legitimacy. Stripping it of arms without offering political, security, and governance compensations risks collapse of both trust and order.</p>
<p>The Israeli strike on Hamas negotiator&#8217;s in Doha can be seen as a tactics to pressure Qatar, and other Arab interlocutors, to support the demand for not only disarming Hamas-but to prevent any future role for the group in governance. Not doing so, now risks their own security.</p>
<p><strong>Religious Dimension</strong></p>
<p>By striking Hamas negotiators on Sunni Arab soil, Israel risks reframing its conflict as a broader war against Islam. For years, Israel’s regional clashes were directed largely against Shiite state actors such as Iran and groups affiliated with it. By striking Hamas leaders on Sunni Arab soil, Israel may have inadvertently broadened perceptions: that its war is not just against specific militant or extremist groups, but against Islam itself.</p>
<p>This is precisely the narrative that the U.S. sought to avoid during the War on Terror when American officials took pains to distinguish between global extremist movements like Al Qaeda and Daesh, and groups with localized political grievances like the Afghan Taliban. Ironically, the Taliban peace deal that the U.S. eventually negotiated was known as the <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf">Doha Accords</a>, named for the very city that has now been bombed by Israel. The targeting of Hamas negotiators in Doha erodes the perception that there are safe spaces for diplomacy, and risks fueling extremist narratives.</p>
<p>Netanyahu’s own trajectory adds fuel to this interpretation. In recent weeks, he has doubled down on settlement expansion in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, bluntly <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/11/israels-netanyahu-says-there-will-be-no-palestinian-state">declaring</a> that “there will be no Palestinian state.” Reports suggest he has ordered preparations for a full military takeover of Gaza, with evacuation of civilian populations and consolidation of Israeli control.</p>
<p>At the same time, momentum is building at the United Nations for <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/un-general-assembly-israel-palestine-two-state-solution-2129372">recognition of Palestinian statehood</a>. The non-binding resolution sponsored by France and Saudi Arabia, named the ‘New York Declaration’, was presented on September 12. The resolution supporting the two-state solution was endorsed by 142 states with 12 nations abstaining. U.S. and Israel voted against the resolution. Netanyahu is expected to reject such recognition outright, portraying it as a reward for terrorism and a betrayal of Israeli security. Indeed, his government may respond by accelerating annexation policies to establish irreversible “facts on the ground.”</p>
<p><strong>Implications for US</strong></p>
<p>For the United States, the diplomatic fallout is complex. Qatar has been a vital partner in Hamas mediation and hostage negotiations and hosts the largest U.S. airbase in the Middle East. The GCC’s strategic importance to U.S. energy, counter-terrorism, and anti-Iran strategies makes the Israeli strike particularly sensitive.</p>
<p>Israel, meanwhile, remains Washington’s closest regional ally. The strike in Doha thus forces U.S. policymakers to confront the uncomfortable question: will American policy sacrifice credibility with Arab allies to defend Israel’s unilateral actions? The Trump administration’s own dismay was evident when President Trump declared himself <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-attacks-hamas-leaders-qatar-trump-says-hes-very-unhappy-about-strike-2025-09-09">“very unhappy”</a> with the strike. The incident comes at a critical time for the Abraham Accords, the Trump initiative carried over from his first term, to normalize Israel’s relations with Arab states, potentially undermining Israel-Gulf diplomatic relations.</p>
<p>The implications for U.S. strategy are stark. Washington risks losing its credibility as a mediator, damaging its relations with the Gulf, and undermining its own long-term vision for Middle Eastern stability while benefiting China and Russia. More dangerously, it risks fueling the perception that Israel—and by extension its American backer—is engaged in a wider war against Islam. This perception could radicalize new generations across the Arab and Muslim world, erasing the careful distinctions that U.S. officials have drawn for decades between extremist groups and sovereign states.</p>
<p>The Israeli strike on Qatar is a wake-up call. It threatens not only the Gaza peace process, but the entire architecture of U.S. strategy in the Middle East. Unless Washington can re-balance its approach—standing firm on sovereignty, reviving diplomacy, and reaffirming its partnerships—it risks watching both the peace process and its regional influence collapse.</p>
<p><strong>Related Articles:</strong></p>
<p class="entry-title"><a href="https://politact.com/gaza-ceasefire-plan-and-us-iran-tensions/">Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions</a> &#8211; April 26, 2025<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/two-state-solution-future-of-gaza-and-iran/">Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran</a> &#8211; February 25, 2025<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/assads-demise-and-the-shifting-balance-of-power-in-middle-east/">Assad’s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East</a> – Dec 26, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/the-escalating-middle-east-crisis-and-president-elect-trump/">The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump</a> – Dec 5, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/irans-potential-retaliation-for-haniyehs-killing-and-wider-consequences/">Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences</a> – Aug 30, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/the-iran-pakistan-gas-pipeline-project-economic-and-geopolitical-realities/">The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities</a> – Sep 27, 2024</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/israel-airstrike-targets-hamas-negotiators-in-doha-threatening-gaza-ceasefire-talks/">Israel Airstrike Targets Hamas Negotiators In Doha, Threatening Gaza Ceasefire Talks</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/gaza-ceasefire-plan-and-us-iran-tensions/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 26 Apr 2025 18:04:53 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Analysis of Perception and Perspective]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="696" height="569" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-1024x837.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Map of Middle East" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-600x490.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-300x245.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-768x628.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-696x569.jpg 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-514x420.jpg 514w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" />By Naade Ali and Guest Analyst Mohammad Siraj Khan Context The three-phase ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, brokered in January 2025, aimed to end the protracted conflict in Gaza. Despite initial progress, the deal collapsed by late February due to disagreements over its implementation. Soon Israeli forces resumed a ground invasion into central and [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/gaza-ceasefire-plan-and-us-iran-tensions/">Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="696" height="569" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-1024x837.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Map of Middle East" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-600x490.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-300x245.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-768x628.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-696x569.jpg 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-514x420.jpg 514w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" /><p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignleft size-medium wp-image-3592" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-300x245.jpg" alt="Map of Middle East" width="300" height="245" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-300x245.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-600x490.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-768x628.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-696x569.jpg 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-514x420.jpg 514w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" />By Naade Ali and Guest Analyst Mohammad Siraj Khan</p>
<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.american.edu/sis/news/20250129-understanding-the-israel-hamas-ceasefire-agreement.cfm?utm_source=chatgpt.com">three-phase ceasefire agreement</a> between Israel and Hamas, brokered in January 2025, aimed to end the protracted conflict in Gaza. Despite initial progress, the deal collapsed by late February due to disagreements over its implementation. Soon Israeli forces resumed a ground invasion into central and southern Gaza and expanded into the north of the enclave.</p>
<p>Phase One of the agreement had envisioned initial ceasefire and humanitarian measures to last 42 days. This was to be accompanied by hostage and prisoner exchanges and partial withdrawal of Israeli forces from populated areas in Gaza, with significant increase in humanitarian assistance to Gaza. Phase Two would include comprehensive agreements with negotiations for the release of remaining hostages and full military withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza &#8211; accompanied by formal cessation of hostilities. It was Phase Three that focused on reconstruction and long-term stability with international support, along with security guarantees to ensure long-term peace while averting future flare-ups.</p>
<p>Israel claimed that the negotiations with Hamas were ineffective, and Netanyahu warned that continued military pressure on Hamas was essential for hostage release and maintained that the current actions were &#8216;just the beginning.’ As tensions continue to rise, the <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/pm-says-cabinet-voted-to-step-up-military-pressure-on-hamas-in-gaza/">Israeli cabinet approved an escalation</a> of military pressure on Hamas, with Prime Minister Netanyahu asserting that the approach was “working” to secure a deal for the release of hostages held in the Gaza Strip.</p>
<p>Subsequently, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2025/03/29/middleeast/hamas-agrees-to-egyptian-ceasefire-proposal-israel-counters/index.html">Hamas agreed to accept an Egyptian-mediated proposal</a> to release five living hostages in exchange for a 50-day ceasefire in Gaza. However, Israel rejected the offer, insisting on the release of 10 or 11 hostages as a prerequisite for resuming the truce.</p>
<p>Netanyahu also <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/netanyahu-says-hamas-leaders-will-be-allowed-to-leave-gaza/a-72088327">indicated his readiness to negotiate the final phase</a> of the deal on his terms, which would see Hamas leaders permanently leave Gaza. “Hamas will lay down its weapons. Its leaders will be allowed to leave [Gaza]. We will take care of general security in the Gaza Strip and enable the implementation of the Trump plan, the voluntary immigration plan… That’s the plan. We’re not hiding it,” he stated. Adding to the Prime Minister&#8217;s warnings, Defense Minister Katz has also earlier threatened Hamas with the progressive <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/israeli-minister-threatens-to-annex-parts-of-gaza/a-72001916">annexation of Gaza</a>, stating that “the more Hamas persists in its refusal to release the hostages, the more territory it will lose, which will be annexed to Israel.”</p>
<p>U.S President Donald Trump who took <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/program/newsfeed/2025/1/20/video-us-president-elect-trump-hails-gaza-ceasefire-deal">credit</a> for the initial ceasefire also backed Israel’s recent military action. White House Press Secretary while blaming Hamas for Israel’s decision to renew its offensive confirmed that President Trump &#8220;<a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/white-house-says-trump-fully-supports-israel-as-it-renews-attacks-on-gaza/3515626">fully supports Israel</a>&#8220;. Upon assuming power, Trump has already ensured Netanyahu that securing Israel&#8217;s long-term national security remains a Washington&#8217;s key objective.</p>
<p>Trump’s support for Netanyahu was evident in his proposal to neutralize the Hamas threat in Gaza by displacing the entire population and permanently resettling them in countries such as Egypt and Jordan, while also suggesting long-term U.S. control over the strip in the post-conflict period.</p>
<p><strong>Arab Plan for Gaza and Disarmament of Hamas </strong></p>
<p>In response to backlash from Muslim-majority countries within the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Trump abandoned his mass displacement plan announced earlier. Still cautious of his intentions, members of the <a href="https://www.palestine-studies.org/en/node/1657135">Arab League proposed an alternative post-war plan for Gaza</a>, advocating for its reconstruction at a cost of $53 billion under the administration of a temporary committee of independent experts, along with the deployment of UN peacekeepers to prevent further escalation of the crisis.</p>
<p>The Palestinian Authority and Hamas have both endorsed the Arab plan. Western nations, including France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/france-germany-italy-uk-back-arab-plan-gaza-reconstruction-2025-03-08/">have also supported</a> it, viewing the end of Hamas’s control in Gaza as a step toward eliminating the threat to Israel.</p>
<p>However, the U.S. and Israel have <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn7vd4pnxx3o">rejected the proposal</a>, arguing that it does not prioritize Gaza’s disarmament, fails to address Hamas’s future in the region, and allows the Palestinian Authority to return without sufficient security guarantees to Israel. Meanwhile, Israel plans to establish a government agency under the Defense Ministry to oversee the &#8220;voluntary departure&#8221; of Palestinians from Gaza.</p>
<p>Saudi Arabia and other states <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2594022/saudi-arabia">have condemned Israel’s actions</a>, calling them ongoing violations of international law that pave the way for colonial settlements. These states have consistently advocated for a &#8220;two-state solution&#8221; to the Gaza-Israel conflict, emphasizing the need for an independent Palestinian state.</p>
<p>Netanyahu’s push to displace Palestinians, coupled with his threats to annex Gaza and Trump’s endorsement, has raised concerns among policymakers in the Muslim world that Trump may abandon the two-state framework in favor of a one-state solution.</p>
<p><strong>Iran-U.S. Standoff And Future of Negotiated Settlement</strong></p>
<p>Adding further complexity to the Middle Eastern geopolitical landscape is the ongoing standoff between Iran and the U.S.-Israel alliance. Iranian nuclear ambitions remain a major concern for both the U.S. and Israel. In response, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2025/03/26/middleeast/trump-offers-new-nuclear-talks-iran-weighs-cost-mime-intl/index.html">President Trump has reached out to Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei</a>, offering negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, but with a threatening tone. Trump has set a two-month deadline for compliance, warning of severe consequences for Tehran, indirectly referencing potential airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. &#8220;My big preference is that we work it out with Iran, but if we don’t work it out, bad things are gonna happen to Iran,&#8221; Trump <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-bad-things-iran-missile-city-bombs-us">stated</a>.</p>
<p>In turn, Iran has warned the U.S. of a strong response, suggesting that any attack would turn American bases and its regional allies into &#8220;<a href="https://www.newsweek.com/united-states-iran-nuclear-warning-2051988">powder kegs.</a>&#8221; Recently, Iran showcased its growing military power by revealing an expansive underground missile facility known as &#8220;<a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/03/29/iran-unveils-latest-massive-underground-missile-facility/">Missile City,</a>&#8221; complete with missiles, launchers, engines, and other advanced weapons. Iran’s ballistic missile force remains the largest in the Middle East, offering a strategic deterrent and signaling that any conflict with Tehran would be costly and protracted.</p>
<p>To ramp up pressure, the U.S. has been bolstering its military presence in the Middle East. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth <a href="https://news.usni.org/2025/03/21/secdef-hegseth-extends-uss-harry-s-truman-deployment-in-middle-east-carl-vinson-heading-to-centcom">recently deployed a second aircraft carrier</a>, the USS Carl Vinson, to join the USS Harry S. Truman strike group, whose deployment was also extended. Additionally, the U.S. sent two B-2 stealth bombers to the Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean, a direct warning to both Iran and Yemen&#8217;s Houthi militia. These bombers, capable of carrying 30,000-pound &#8220;bunker buster&#8221; bombs, are now positioned within striking range of Iran.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/511193/Trump-s-retreat-after-repeated-threats-Is-it-genuine">U.S. officials have sent mixed signals to Iran.</a> Special Envoy Steve Witkoff has advocated for a diplomatic resolution, while White House National Security Advisor Mike Waltz has adopted a more aggressive tone, stating that the administration aims for the &#8220;complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program.&#8221;</p>
<p>Iran views Trump’s nuclear talks as an attempt to force Tehran into relinquishing its defense capabilities. &#8220;The U.S. means disarmament when it says negotiation,&#8221; <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202503283054">said</a> Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Speaker of Iran&#8217;s Parliament. Despite the tense environment, <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202503271161">Tehran has responded to Trump’s letter,</a> stating that while it would not negotiate &#8220;under pressure and threats or increased sanctions,&#8221; it is open to indirect talks with the U.S. through third-party mediation. The letter was delivered via Oman.</p>
<p>This suggests that despite the threatening rhetoric between the U.S. and Iran, there is some hope for engagement, as both Washington and Tehran seem intent on avoiding a larger confrontation. Although Iran has not identified the third-party mediator, it is speculated that indirect talks may already be underway through channels in the UAE, and potentially with Saudi Arabia, which has previously <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/saudi-arabia-iran-usa-nuclear-talks/33320726.html">offered to mediate</a> talks between Iran and the U.S.</p>
<p>Reports have also surfaced of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-planning-visit-saudi-arabia-mid-may-axios-reports-2025-03-30/">President Trump visiting Saudi Arabia in May</a>. The Kingdom has <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/ukraine-talks-show-saudi-arabia-now-major-diplomatic-player">emerged as a key diplomatic player</a>, having hosted talks between Russia and the U.S. over the Ukraine issue. It holds significant potential to play a similar role in Iran-U.S. negotiations. Recently, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/saudi-arabia-iran-hold-talks-on-regional-developments/3517612">engaged in discussions</a> on regional developments with his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, signaling a more reconciliatory tone between Riyadh and Tehran. The <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/saudi-arabia/2025/04/17/saudi-defense-minister-arrives-in-tehran-ahead-of-iran-us-talks">Saudi Defense Minister also recently visited Iran</a> and hand delivered a letter from King Salman to Ayatollah Khamanei emphasizing collaboration.</p>
<p>A U.S.-Iran deal would offer Saudi Arabia a prominent role at the negotiation table, aligning with its &#8220;<a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/new-saudi-doctrine-positive-neutrality-pays">positive neutrality&#8221; foreign policy.</a> This would further elevate Saudi Arabia&#8217;s diplomatic weight, positioning it as a major middle power in global statecraft. Through diplomatic mediation, economic investments, and strategic alliances, the Kingdom has demonstrated its commitment to stability and development</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>The internationalization of the Gaza conflict has further deepened divisions between the U.S.-Israel bloc and Arab states, overshadowing any prospects for normalization. The once-stable U.S.-Middle East partnership that long served as a cornerstone of the international order, is now experiencing a profound paradigm shift as new alliances and strategic realignments begin to emerge.</p>
<p>Recent developments indicate that both Western and Arab capitals are preparing to make <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/macron-saudi-crown-prince-discuss-gaza-ukraine-peace-process-2025-03-19/">pivotal decisions regarding their stances</a> on Gaza and Ukraine. Arab states are seeking Western support for Gaza’s reconstruction and governance, while Western powers, in turn, are expecting Arab backing on the Ukraine conflict. These shifting dynamics are unfolding in response to President Trump’s high-stakes geopolitical gambits, as he remains determined to pursue his <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/trumps-recast-us-power-risks-undercutting-middle-east-stability">unconventional foreign policy approach</a>—applying pressure and demanding concessions from traditional allies and adversaries alike—moves that are already influencing his evolving Middle East strategy.</p>
<p>Mohammad Siraj Khan is a lecturer, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Prince Mohammad Bin Fahd University, Saudi Arabia</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/gaza-ceasefire-plan-and-us-iran-tensions/">Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/two-state-solution-future-of-gaza-and-iran/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 25 Feb 2025 01:49:50 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=10493</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="696" height="463" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Caeasefire-now.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="People holding banners of Ceasefire now" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Caeasefire-now.jpg 850w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Caeasefire-now-300x200.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Caeasefire-now-768x511.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Caeasefire-now-696x463.jpg 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Caeasefire-now-631x420.jpg 631w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Caeasefire-now-600x400.jpg 600w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" />By Naade Ali South Asia and Middle East Fellow Context In the post October 7, 2023, Hamas led attack on Israel, the geopolitics of Middle East is fast evolving. This has been accompanied by the loss of Hezbollah leadership in Lebanon and the fall of Assad regime in Syria in December 2024. The inauguration of [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/two-state-solution-future-of-gaza-and-iran/">Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="696" height="463" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Caeasefire-now.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="People holding banners of Ceasefire now" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Caeasefire-now.jpg 850w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Caeasefire-now-300x200.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Caeasefire-now-768x511.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Caeasefire-now-696x463.jpg 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Caeasefire-now-631x420.jpg 631w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Caeasefire-now-600x400.jpg 600w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" /><p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignleft size-medium wp-image-2803" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/24-03-2011_israel_lebanon_map-300x276.jpg" alt="Map of Israel and region" width="300" height="276" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/24-03-2011_israel_lebanon_map-300x276.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/24-03-2011_israel_lebanon_map.jpg 400w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" />By Naade Ali<br />
South Asia and Middle East Fellow</p>
<p><strong>Context<br />
</strong><br />
In the post October 7, 2023, Hamas led attack on Israel, the geopolitics of Middle East is fast evolving. This has been accompanied by the loss of Hezbollah leadership in Lebanon and the <a href="https://politact.com/assads-demise-and-the-shifting-balance-of-power-in-middle-east/">fall of Assad regime</a> in Syria in December 2024. The inauguration of President Trump on January 20, 2025, has presented unique threats and opportunities regarding the future of two-state solution and Iran.</p>
<p>The likelihood of a broader conflict between Iran and Israel hangs in balance as President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/02/trump-netanyahu-have-full-understanding-iran-israel-mulls-strikes-nuclear-sites">forged a strong strategic alignment</a>. Meeting with Trump on Feb 4, Netanyahu tried to ensure that U.S. policy remained closely aligned with Israel’s objective of weakening Iran’s defense capabilities, particularly preventing it from ever acquiring nuclear missile power. On the other hand, Iran had hoped that Trump would adopt a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/davos-irans-zarif-says-he-hopes-trump-will-choose-rationality-2025-01-22/">pragmatic approach</a> and revive nuclear talks leading to easing of economic pressure. To Iran’s disappointment, Trump pursued the reinstatement of <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/national-security-presidential-memorandum-nspm-2/">&#8220;maximum pressure&#8221;</a> policy on Tehran.</p>
<p>However, difference of opinion exists where Netanyahu, sensing an opportunity, is lobbying for a military solution towards Iran. Conversely, Trump is vying for a negotiated settlement while keeping hopes alive for a two-state solution. This he is doing by raising the stakes for the Gulf and Arab nations, who met in Riyadh on February 21 to discuss the future of Gaza. A follow-up emergency meeting of the Arab League is planned on March 4th in Egypt, to present a counter plan to what <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/21/us/politics/trump-gaza-egypt-jordan.html">Trump has proposed</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Trump&#8217;s Carrot-and-Stick Approach</strong></p>
<p>The &#8220;maximum pressure&#8221; doctrine portrays Iran as a destabilizing force and a significant threat to U.S. national interests, centered on three key objectives:</p>
<p>First, it seeks to cripple Iran’s nuclear program through harsh diplomatic and economic sanctions. Second, it aims to weaken Iran’s regional influence by dismantling its network of “proxies” and axis of resistance. This objective has taken on additional significance with the on-going Gaza crisis, elimination of Hezbollah leadership, and the fall Assad regime in Syria. Third, it strives to isolate Iran on the global stage, a move <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250210-iran-president-says-trump-aiming-to-bring-country-to-its-knees">Iran’s president condemned</a> as an attempt to “bring Iran to its knees.”</p>
<p>Justifying his approach, <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202502116954">Trump claimed</a> the timing was ideal, stating, “Iran, terrified after losing almost all its air defenses, would love to make a deal with the United States.” Confident that relentless pressure would force Iran into submission, he remains committed to a strategy of economic and diplomatic coercion.</p>
<p>Despite his tough rhetoric, Trump ruled out military intervention, <a href="https://www.jns.org/trump-prefers-deal-with-iran-to-blowing-it-to-smithereens/">dismissing reports</a> of a potential U.S.-Israel strike as “greatly exaggerated.” While acknowledging Iran’s military ambitions—describing it as “very militant”—he firmly <a href="https://www.niacouncil.org/news/can-trump-and-iran-sign-a-verified-nuclear-peace-agreement/">rejected the idea of bombing Iran</a>, stating, “I would much prefer a Verified Nuclear Peace Agreement, which will let Iran peacefully grow and prosper.”</p>
<p>Meanwhile, key Republican leaders, including U.S. Rep. Mike Turner, have stated that Trump’s strategy is designed to “secure a long-term solution that guarantees Israel’s security by preventing Iran and its proxies from ever threatening its sovereignty.” Likewise, Rep. Joe Wilson has <a href="https://x.com/RepJoeWilson/status/1886802954184712472">praised the maximum pressure campaign</a>, asserting that it would ultimately weaken Iran and dismantle its network of terror proxies.</p>
<p><strong>Israeli Plans</strong></p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignleft size-full wp-image-2959" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/30-03-2011_Arab-Israeli-conflict.jpg" alt="" width="283" height="178" />While U.S. President Donald Trump has shown reluctance to engage in direct military action against Iran, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has taken a more assertive approach. According to multiple credible reports, with <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2025/02/13/politics/us-intelligence-israel-strike-iran-nuclear/index.html">Iran’s air defense systems significantly weakened</a> and its regional proxies under strain, Netanyahu sees a strategic window to target Iran’s nuclear facilities—whether or not the U.S. supports the move. The American intelligence assessments indicate that <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-sees-opening-for-strikes-on-iranian-nuclear-sites-u-s-intelligence-warned-76a7fa24">Israel is actively considering large-scale strikes</a> on Iranian nuclear sites in the latter half of the year, with Israeli officials expected to urge the Trump administration and key Republican leaders to endorse their plans.</p>
<p>The recent approval by the U.S. State Department of a $7.4 billion <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2025/02/07/politics/us-israel-arms-sale-circumvent-review-process/index.html">arms sale to Israel</a>—including thousands of bombs and missiles set for delivery this year—suggests a broader effort to reinforce Israel’s military capabilities against potential regional threats. Israel <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-824803">already possesses U.S.-made bunker-busting munitions</a> capable of striking Iran’s underground nuclear sites, particularly those concealed within the mountainous terrain of Fordow near Qom. This growing military buildup highlights Israel’s preparedness to neutralize Iran’s security infrastructure if necessary.</p>
<p>Israeli officials have repeatedly affirmed that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are fully prepared to launch strikes on Iranian nuclear sites. Defense Minister Israel Katz has hinted at the possibility of an attack in the coming months. In a <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-842069">letter to incoming U.S. Secretary of Defense</a> Pete Hegseth, Katz wrote:</p>
<p>“The months ahead present both challenges that demand military readiness and opportunities to advance our strategic objectives.” He has <a href="https://www.ynetnews.com/article/r15bfyv00jl">previously stated</a> that “Iran’s nuclear facilities are more vulnerable than ever,” suggesting that this moment may offer the best chance to neutralize what Israel perceives as an existential threat.</p>
<p>In essence, the emphasis of the approach is twofold: Israel exerting military pressure while the U.S. working on the economic squeeze. The outcome of the two would either result in a regime change led by the Iranian people &#8211; or push the Iranian government to strike a deal with Trump. According to some media reports, if <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202502156529">Tehran does not reach an agreement</a> with the U.S. by October, Israel is likely to initiate a military action.</p>
<p><strong>How is Iran Preparing?</strong></p>
<p>President Masoud <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-says-it-can-build-new-nuclear-facilities-if-enemies-strike-2025-02-13/">Pezeshkian has warned</a> that while Israel or its allies “may succeed in damaging Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, they will not be able to strip the country of its ability to rebuild.” His statement came after Supreme Leader <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/iran-supreme-leader-khamenei-nuclear-deal-trump-obama-oil-sanctions-rcna191142">Ali Khamenei categorically rejected negotiations</a> with the Trump administration, asserting that past talks had neither been rational nor honorable. “Negotiations with America do not solve any of our problems,” Khamenei declared.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignleft size-medium wp-image-2596" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/16-07-2015_US-Iran-Deal2-300x187.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="187" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/16-07-2015_US-Iran-Deal2-300x187.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/16-07-2015_US-Iran-Deal2-600x375.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/16-07-2015_US-Iran-Deal2.jpg 620w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" />President <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/10/irans-pezeshkian-accuses-trump-of-fake-diplomacy">Pezeshkian has accused Trump</a> of engaging in deceptive diplomacy while simultaneously working to undermine his government. While reaffirming that Iran does not seek war, <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202502126314">he warned</a> that “Iran will never bow to foreign pressure.” Foreign Minister <a href="https://irangov.ir/detail/458024">Abbas Araghchi echoed this sentiment</a>, stating that negotiating with Trump would amount to surrender. He further cautioned that any military action by Israel or the U.S. against Iran’s nuclear facilities would trigger an “all-out war,” calling it one of the greatest strategic miscalculations Washington could make.</p>
<p>Last year, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/iran-plans-to-triple-military-budget/a-70625332">Iran announced plans to triple its military budget</a>. Western think tanks estimate that Iran was the fourth-largest military spender in the Middle East in 2023, with a defense budget of approximately $10.3 billion.</p>
<p>On the other hand, Iran has deepened its military and economic cooperation with China and Russia. Despite crippling U.S. sanctions, Iran has found alternative economic mechanisms to sustain itself and remains a key player in the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS.</p>
<p>Some reports suggest that <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2025/02/13/middleeast/iran-is-rearming-its-missile-program-and-a-ship-of-supplies-just-arrived-from-china-western-sources-say/index.html">Iran is ramping up its missile program</a>, with a vessel carrying 1,000 tons of Chinese-made chemicals—potentially crucial for missile fuel—recently arriving at an Iranian port. Furthermore, Iranian military has <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/iran-war-israel-united-states-us-unveils-first-drone-carrier-warship-2027677">launched its first drone carrier ship</a>, capable of launching stealth attacks, and has <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2025/01/iranian-official-says-tehran-has-purchased-russian-fighter-jets-reports/">acquired Russian Sukhoi-35 fighter jets</a> to modernize its aging air force. A strategic cooperation <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c87dd4n4jd0o">agreement signed with Moscow</a> in January has further reinforced Tehran’s defense ties. Despite Israel’s escalating rhetoric, Iranian military officials insist that the country’s air defense remains intact and more resilient than ever.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>For years, Israel and Iran have been engaged in a shadow conflict, carefully calibrating their actions to avoid all-out war. Recently, Iran has adopted a strategic paradigm described as ‘strategic patience’—a calculated approach that has shielded it from large-scale destruction while reinforcing its self-sufficiency. Iranian Vice President <a href="https://irangov.ir/detail/457176">Javad Zarif has dismissed speculation</a> that Iran might resort to nuclear weapons as a last-ditch effort for survival or deterrence. Instead, he emphasized that the nation’s self-reliant defense strategy ensures resilience against external pressure.</p>
<p>However, The New York Times has reported that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/03/us/politics/iran-nuclear-weapon.html">Iran may be discreetly exploring</a> the possibility of developing nuclear weapons should its leadership decide to take that path. According to the report, since resuming fuel production, Iran has accumulated enough enriched uranium to construct at least four nuclear bombs. While Iran has the technical expertise to develop a basic nuclear device relatively quickly, it currently lacks the capability to integrate such a weapon into a ballistic missile system. Nonetheless, a successful nuclear test could allow Iran to declare itself a nuclear-armed state, significantly altering the strategic balance in the region.</p>
<p>While Iran’s conventional military strength does not match that of Israel or the U.S., it retains the capability to inflict serious damage on both adversaries. As the main supporter of Hamas and Hezbollah, the question of Iran is directly linked to the present Gaza crisis and what comes next. While many Gulf and Arab nations have privately loathed Hamas for the Oct 7, 2023, attack on Israel and for disrupting the <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords">progress achieved through Abraham Accords</a>, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn4z32y12jpo">Trump plan to take over Gaza</a>, has forced them to back up their sentiments with action. It also represents the final step in the full culmination of the <a href="https://politact.com/the-emerging-outside-in-approach-to-israeli-palestinian-conflict-afghan-reconciliation-and-kashmir-issue/">Outside-In approach</a> to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.</p>
<p><strong>Related Articles:</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://politact.com/assads-demise-and-the-shifting-balance-of-power-in-middle-east/">Assad’s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East</a> &#8211; Dec 26, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/the-escalating-middle-east-crisis-and-president-elect-trump/">The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump</a> &#8211; Dec 5, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/irans-potential-retaliation-for-haniyehs-killing-and-wider-consequences/">Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences</a> &#8211; Aug 30, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/the-iran-pakistan-gas-pipeline-project-economic-and-geopolitical-realities/">The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities</a> &#8211; Sep 27, 2024</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/two-state-solution-future-of-gaza-and-iran/">Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>Assad&#8217;s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/assads-demise-and-the-shifting-balance-of-power-in-middle-east/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 26 Dec 2024 04:54:16 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Global Power Tussles and Islamic World]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=10452</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="696" height="522" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad-300x225.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad-768x576.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad-696x522.jpg 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad-560x420.jpg 560w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad-80x60.jpg 80w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad-265x198.jpg 265w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad-600x450.jpg 600w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" />By Naade Ali Context The chain reaction that got underway in the aftermath of Hamas October 7, 2023 attack on Isreal, continues to unfold at a tremendous speed. The fall of Bashar Al-Assad&#8217;s regime, a key ally in Iran&#8217;s axis of resistance against Israel, has triggered profound geopolitical changes in the Middle East, reshaping regional [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/assads-demise-and-the-shifting-balance-of-power-in-middle-east/">Assad&#8217;s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="696" height="522" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad-300x225.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad-768x576.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad-696x522.jpg 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad-560x420.jpg 560w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad-80x60.jpg 80w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad-265x198.jpg 265w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad-600x450.jpg 600w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" /><p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignleft size-medium wp-image-10453" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad-300x225.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="225" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad-300x225.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad-768x576.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad-696x522.jpg 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad-560x420.jpg 560w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad-80x60.jpg 80w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad-265x198.jpg 265w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad-600x450.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad.jpg 1024w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" />By Naade Ali</p>
<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>The chain reaction that got underway in the aftermath of Hamas October 7, 2023 attack on Isreal, continues to unfold at a tremendous speed. The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/syria-civil-war-rebels.html">fall</a> of Bashar Al-Assad&#8217;s regime, a key ally in Iran&#8217;s axis of resistance against Israel, has triggered profound geopolitical changes in the Middle East, reshaping regional power dynamics. These shifts are not merely reactions to Assad’s fall but are also a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/12/15/syria-assad-foreign-powers-iran-russia-isarel/">reflection</a> of broader ambitions and vulnerabilities of the regional and global powers. The Syrian Civil War’s devastating impact has left a fractured nation with competing factions vying for influence, complicating any resolution of the crisis.</p>
<p>The coalition of <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/12/18/nx-s1-5232122/turkey-role-syria-post-assad">Turkey-backed</a> Islamist and nationalist militant factions that toppled Assad has emerged as a pivotal force. Assad’s downfall represents a significant <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/12/fall-assad-has-exposed-extent-damage-irans-axis-resistance">blow</a> to Iran’s fragile axis of resistance, undermining its influence across the Levant. With Iran effectively expelled from Syria and Hezbollah’s reach significantly <a href="https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-syria-iran-hezbollah-assad-hts-israel-fadc4fa97f2036a24f821f51e4eb6634">diminished</a> in Lebanon, Israel has seized the opportunity to expand its strategic foothold.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, a transitional interim government led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Islamist group ideologically linked to Al-Qaeda, has <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2024/12/18/hts-gains-a-foothold-on-key-sectors-in-syria-only-10-days-after-toppling-bashar-al-assad">assumed</a> control in Syria. The country, however, remains in a state of chaos as multiple actors, including rebel factions, Turkey, and Israel, seek to consolidate their gains.</p>
<p>Although the civil war has officially ended, the shadow of potential conflict continues to loom over Syria. The involvement of external powers—ranging from Russia and China to the United States and Gulf States—adds another layer of complexity to Syria’s future. Each stakeholder has its own interests, and their competing agendas have made Syria a geopolitical chessboard. These developments underscore a pivotal moment for the Middle East, as the region grapples with shifting alliances and evolving power structures.</p>
<p><strong>What to Expect from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham?</strong></p>
<p>The newly formed interim government in Syria, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and composed of various rebel factions, <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/12/syrias-challenges-are-even-greater-those-libya-faced-2011">faces</a> the daunting task of navigating a fractured and war-torn nation. HTS has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2024/12/15/what-to-know-about-syrias-new-caretaker-government">announced</a> its intention to govern until March 1 next year, at which point new elections are expected to formalize its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, as Syria’s next president. Al-Sharaa has <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SYhCjXSNUIY">outlined</a> a three-stage roadmap for the country’s transition to stability. The first stage involves legitimizing the interim government, followed by convening a national conference to address constitutional reforms and governance. The final stage aims to organize elections and restore full citizenship to displaced Syrians.</p>
<p>Despite these ambitious plans, the likelihood of elections occurring by March remains slim. HTS’s dominance suggests that it may continue to govern Syria for the foreseeable future. In an effort to gain legitimacy both domestically and internationally, HTS has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0q0w1g8zqvo.amp">launched</a> a rebranding campaign to distance itself from its radical jihadist roots. This campaign emphasizes governance, state-building, and inclusivity.</p>
<p>Al-Sharaa and interim Prime Minister Mohammad Al-Bashir have outlined a five-point agenda focused on national unification, strengthening state institutions, rebuilding infrastructure, gaining international recognition, and fostering diplomatic ties with neighboring countries and the West.</p>
<p>One of the most significant challenges facing HTS is unifying Syria’s diverse political and ideological factions. The country’s political landscape includes Islamist and secular nationalist groups representing a broad spectrum of ethnic and religious communities. HTS, which historically drew support from radical Salafist elements, may encounter resistance from groups advocating for a secular democratic state. Its governance model in Idlib, where it established centralized control after defeating rival factions, raises <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/governing-day-after-syria">concerns </a>about its willingness to share power. Secular factions fear that HTS may impose an Islamist authoritarian regime, alienating Syria’s diverse population.</p>
<p>Some analysts <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/governing-day-after-syria">caution</a> that Syria risks becoming an Islamic Emirate akin to Afghanistan, with HTS governing in a manner reminiscent of the Taliban. Although HTS has demonstrated administrative competence in Idlib and appointed self-styled technocrats like Mohammad Al-Bashir, applying this model to Syria’s complex socio-political landscape will be far more challenging. Protests demanding secular governance have already <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2583687/amp">erupted</a> in Damascus, reflecting widespread skepticism about HTS’s intentions. Within HTS itself, hardliners may oppose Al-Sharaa’s attempts to adopt a more moderate stance, further complicating efforts to stabilize the nation.</p>
<p>To address these challenges, Al-Sharaa has <a href="https://syrianobserver.com/syrian-actors/ahmad-al-sharaa-shifting-from-a-revolutionary-to-a-state-building-mentality-in-leading-syria.html">promised</a> to shift away from a revolutionary mindset, emphasizing unity, stability, and institutional reform. He has <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2024/12/17/syrias-hts-leader-says-rebel-groups-will-be-disbanded-to-join-one-army">pledged</a> to disband rebel factions, integrate trained fighters into the Syrian army, and grant citizenship to foreign fighters willing to pledge loyalty to the new government. Internationally, HTS has sought to portray itself as pragmatic and inclusive, emphasizing human rights and good governance. However, reports of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/12/18/syria-revenge-killings-hts-damascus-assad/">extrajudicial killings</a> of former regime members by the HTS local commanders paint a different picture of the group. Notably, HTS has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2024/12/19/syrias-interim-govt-pledges-justice-jobs-and-security-in-new-era">announced</a> the establishment of tribunals to prosecute ex-officials of the Assad regime, despite initially granting them amnesty. This move has raised concerns about the group’s double standards and the potential for acts of vengeance will present a critical test for its leadership.</p>
<p>Another major challenge is economic reconstruction. Years of war have left Syria&#8217;s infrastructure in ruins, and millions of refugees are anticipated to return in search of better opportunities. To gain public trust, HTS would need to focus on rebuilding the economy and meeting the needs of Syrians. However, the current leadership of HTS is primarily focused on securing international support, including <a href="https://english.news.cn/20241219/550050c30fee48aa89ccb62f4c95e5ba/c.html">lifting sanctions</a> and removing itself from terrorism designations. Al-Sharaa has assured the international community that Syria will not serve as a base for attacks against neighboring countries, to include Israel and Turkey. These assurances are part of HTS&#8217;s broader strategy to seek international recognition and restore trust.</p>
<p><strong>Israel’s Strategic Response to Assad’s Fall</strong></p>
<p>Israel has significantly benefited from Assad&#8217;s downfall, exploiting the power vacuum to further its strategic goals. Within just one week, Israel <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdx921zreweo.amp">carried out</a> over 350 airstrikes on Syrian military installations, neutralizing 80% of Assad&#8217;s critical military assets. Additionally, Israel has seized strategic positions in southern Syria, <a href="https://amp.dw.com/en/israel-has-new-middle-east-bargaining-chip-in-golan-heights/a-71119876">establishing</a> a 400-square-kilometer demilitarized buffer zone that includes Mount Hermon—a vital vantage point for monitoring regional threats. These newly occupied positions provide Israel with a tactical advantage, enabling it to target Iran&#8217;s assets without the threat of Syrian anti-missile radar systems. By controlling key areas in Syria, Israel has bolstered its deterrence against Iran and other adversaries.</p>
<p>The fall of Assad and the subsequent weakening of Iran’s influence have allowed Israel to consolidate its position as a dominant regional player. Israeli leaders have <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20241208-israel-pm-helped-to-topple-assad-but-it-wasn-t-planned-analysts-say">framed</a> Assad’s removal as a historic achievement, celebrating the collapse of an adversarial regime. Moving forward, Israel has <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/israeli-military-golan-heights-benjamin-netanyahu-militants-damascus-border-idf-airstrikes/">extended</a> a cautious diplomatic overture to the HTS-led government, signaling a willingness to explore avenues for peace and cooperation. However, any potential rapprochement with Israel will depend on HTS’s ability to demonstrate its commitment to Israeli-led security order in the region.</p>
<p><strong>Turkey’s Expanding Role in Syria</strong></p>
<p>Turkey has <a href="https://amp.dw.com/en/amid-syrias-upheaval-how-will-turkey-benefit/a-71017654">emerged</a> as another significant player in the post-Assad era. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a long-time opponent of Assad, has used the opportunity to expand Turkey’s influence in Syria. By supporting opposition factions, Turkey aims to secure its southern border, exploit Syria’s resources, and establish the country as a client state. This strategic expansion aligns with Erdoğan’s broader <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-seeks-saudi-arabia-and-uae-support-new-syria">ambition</a> to position Turkey as a leading power in the Muslim world, challenging the traditional dominance of Saudi Arabia and the UAE.</p>
<p>Turkey’s involvement in Syria also serves domestic political purposes, allowing Erdoğan to strengthen his nationalist base by portraying himself as a defender of Sunni Muslims. However, Turkey’s actions have not been without controversy. Its military interventions and support for <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2024/12/china-has-cause-to-be-terrified-of-rebel-run-syria/">Islamist factions</a> have <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-turkey-putin-erdogan-syria-assad-afbfc5a271438c0c61142f8cb9fcb6f4">drawn criticism</a> from both Russia and China. On the other hand, its opposition to US supported Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has put it at odds with the NATO alliance. Despite these challenges, Turkey’s influence in Syria continues to grow, making it a key stakeholder in the country’s future.</p>
<p><strong>Iran and Hezbollah: Reeling from Setbacks</strong></p>
<p>The fall of Assad’s regime has dealt a severe blow to Iran and its proxy, Hezbollah. For years, Syria served as a critical link in Iran’s axis of resistance, providing a conduit for arms shipments to Hezbollah in Lebanon. With Assad’s removal, Iran has lost a key ally, and its influence in the region has diminished significantly. Hezbollah, which has suffered heavy losses in the Syrian conflict, now faces an uncertain future. The group’s ability to project power in Lebanon and beyond has been severely weakened, raising questions about its long-term viability.</p>
<p>Iran, meanwhile, faces a critical situation. The loss of its strategic foothold in Syria has forced Tehran to reconsider its regional strategy. Some analysts <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/how-iran-sees-path-peace">speculate</a> that Iran may pursue pragmatic diplomacy with the West to offset its losses, while others <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/khamenei-aide-warns-iran-may-review-nuclear-doctrine-if-facing-existential-threat/amp/">argue</a> that it could escalate its nuclear program to establish deterrence against Israel. Regardless of the path Iran chooses its diminished role in Syria marks a turning point for the axis of resistance.</p>
<p><strong>The Rise of Transnational Jihadist Movements</strong></p>
<p>The victory of HTS in Syria has emboldened global jihadist movements, <a href="https://newsvibesofindia.com/ttp-hails-conquest-of-syria-by-mujahideen-hopes-to-replicate-it-in-pakistan/">inspiring</a> groups such as the Taliban and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/11/islamist-groups-from-across-the-world-congratulate-hts-on-victory-in-syria">Islamist groups</a> from across the globe, like Afghan Taliban and various factions of Muslim Brotherhood, have sent congratulatory notes to HTS.</p>
<p>This development marks a significant shift in the nature of jihadist organizations, with non-state actors evolving into state entities. HTS’s success in Syria—achieving what ISIS could not—raises concerns about the rise of transnational jihadist states. While HTS has promised governance and reform, its ability to deliver stability remains uncertain.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>Syria stands at a crossroads. The fall of Russian supported Assad’s regime has created a vacuum in the Middle East and upset the tender balance of power, which was already in tatters with the weakening of Iranian backed Hezbollah and Hamas.<br />
The nation is torn between the promise of renewal and the threat of further devastation. The actions of HTS and other key stakeholders will determine whether Syria can overcome its challenges or succumb to further conflict. For now, the future remains blurred, but one thing is clear: the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East will never be the same.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/assads-demise-and-the-shifting-balance-of-power-in-middle-east/">Assad&#8217;s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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