By Furqan Khan
Great Power Politics Fellow, PoliTact

Context

President Donald Trump is set to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping this week in Beijing, a summit originally scheduled for April and was stalled due to the ongoing US-Iran war. With the conflict carrying enormous economic consequences due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, it is likely to be a major point of discussion at the summit. What was expected to be a reset moment for US-China relations is now overshadowed by the Middle East conflict, which carries significant implications for the global economy.

Conflict at an Impasse Stage

After the initial Islamabad Talks failed to ease tensions between Iran and the United States, Pakistan’s shuttle diplomacy has reopened the lines of communication between Washington and Tehran. Tensions escalated after Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz in response to the US’ refusal to end the blockade of Iranian ports. While a ‘fragile’ truce remains in place, negotiations are stalled and fears of escalation are growing as the two parties recently exchanged fire in the Persian Gulf. After rejecting Iran’s proposal to open the Strait of Hormuz and end the war, which also suggested delaying negotiations over the nuclear program, Trump reviewed another 14-point proposal from Iran, but has expressed doubts – and later rejected another version. Meanwhile, domestic opposition in the US to the war is growing, which has already cost $25 billion. Moreover, the conflict has caused extensive damage to the US military assets across the Middle East and raised the gasoline price to its highest level in four years.

In the big picture, as the US jumps into another war in the Middle East, diverting its resources from the Pacific, it is pertinent to highlight what this conflict means for China, and its interests in the Middle East, as it also embroils in great power competition.

What is at Stake for China?

Since the beginning of this conflict, China has consistently condemned the US-Israel joint strikes on Iran in February that killed Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and demanded an immediate ceasefire. China has released numerous statements criticizing America’s broader approach to international affairs, and calling the US’ blockade of the Strait of Hormuz “dangerous and irresponsible.” Without mentioning the Iran war or blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, President Xi has criticized American actions in the Gulf, saying that the world may be returning to the “law of the jungle.”

China has substantial stakes in this conflict. It relies heavily on the Strait of Hormuz for more than a third of its energy imports. China remains Iran’s largest trading partner, and over 80 percent of its crude goes to Beijing. At the same time, China has deep economic and investment ties in the Gulf states, and the Strait of Hormuz being critical for its energy supplies, Beijing has leveraged diplomacy to seek an end to this conflict.

The China Hand

The US has accused both China and Russia of providing dual-use equipment and satellite imagery enabling Iran to target US positions in the region. The New York Times and CNN reported, citing US intelligence sources, that China was preparing a shipment of weapons, including anti-aircraft missiles, to Tehran. China has denied these claims, calling them “untrue,” and stating that China opposes such “ill-intentioned conduct.”

As he is set to meet President Xi this week, Trump also played down Chinese assistance to Iran, mentioning Chinese President Xi Jinping’s reassurance that China is not providing any weapons to Iran, while warning of “big problems” for Beijing in case they do so.

The war benefits China in many ways. The spike in oil and gas prices is pushing American allies, from the European Union to the United Kingdom – and from South Korea to the Philippines, into China’s clean energy infrastructure. They see it as a long-term solution to protect their economies. China may also be relieved seeing its rival getting bogged down in yet another war with declining credibility among its allies and the diversion of the American fleet from the Pacific. The US military has already expended an enormous amount of critical munitions that could potentially be used in a future conflict with China. China also appears most resilient in terms of energy security, given its huge oil reserves – the largest in the world. According to a recent report, China has enough oil stored to cover seven months of imports via Hormuz.

However, a conflict with wider economic and security risks reverberating throughout the region is not what China wants. Prolonged instability will threaten global markets and cause supply chain challenges. Moreover, the rising oil prices is already hurting the Chinese economy, making the Iran war and opening of the Strait of Hormuz a central concern for the upcoming Trump-Xi meeting.

China’s Leverage Over Iran

China has a strategic partnership with Iran, which is reflected in the 25-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed in March 2021. This included a massive $400 billion Chinese investment in Iran and defense cooperation in exchange for the discounted purchase of Iranian oil. The partnership allows Tehran to bypass Western sanctions while giving Beijing long-term energy security. China has also expanded its diplomatic footprint in the region by brokering a peace agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2021, helping the two rival Gulf states restore diplomatic relations.

Despite strong economic and security ties with Iran, China’s leverage has been limited. Nonetheless, Beijing’s role has been consistent, limited, and largely predictable. Chinese officials have used their conventional shuttle diplomacy, where Foreign Minister Wang Yi dialed nearly all regional partners and played its role in the UN Security Council, calling for a negotiated settlement. Beijing also joined Islamabad, the principal mediator in this conflict, to issue a joint ‘five-point initiative’ to end the war in the Middle East. At the same time, as both the New York Times and the Washington Post reported, China actively pursued the Iranians to agree to the initial two-week-long ceasefire.

A week before the Trump-Xi summit, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi met FM Wang Yi in Beijing, where Araqchi supported President Xi’s four-point proposal to end the conflict, reaffirming his “trust” in China. As part of his regional diplomacy, FM Araqchi also met Russian President Vladmir Putin in Moscow to discuss the war and continue “consultation” on regional and international issues. Trump held his own phone call with Putin during which the later expressed interest in playing an active role in ending hostilities in the US-Iran war. Trump, however, rebuffed the proposal and instead pressed Putin on ending the Ukraine war.

China’s response reflects a cautious great power strategy, where Beijing is concerned about the risks of conflict escalation but is also reaping its limited geopolitical benefits. It has not been pursuing the role of a mediator but rather a great power concerned about its broader interests in the region. Nonetheless, given its diverse energy sources and limited strategic commitment to Iran, China appears to be confident at managing the risks of this conflict.

Trump-Xi Summit 2026

As the two leaders meet this week, the Iran war and the resulting energy crisis will likely be a potential point of discussion. Trump’s announcement to continue the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, which China uses to import one-third of its energy needs, complicates the process of seeking a reset on major issues, including bilateral trade with China.

Tensions are already mounting as the two powers are taking actions against each other’s firms. The Trump administration recently sanctioned China’s largest refiners and threatened secondary sanctions against Chinese banks for facilitating Iran’s economy. Beijing has blocked Meta’s $2 Billion bid to acquire the AI startup Manus, an attempt to keep cutting-edge AI technology inside China.

The rare Trump-Xi summit is an opportunity for both competitors to bring the US-China relations on track following their trade truce in October last year. Trump realizes this and has been seeking a deal with Iran before the Summit. He wants to meet Xi from a position of strength and not with an unresolved conflict he started, alongside Israel, two months ago, which may now be giving the Chinese side an advantage. With the Iran war hanging over the summit, the meeting will may fall short of the expected outcomes in seeking a reset to the US-China bilateral relations.

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The post Iran War Overhangs Trump-Xi 2026 Summit appeared first on Politact.

By Naade Ali
South Asia and Middle East Fellow, PoliTact

Context

The recent brief yet intense escalation between India and Pakistan has further exposed the fragile nature of South Asia’s security landscape. The four-day-long tit-for-tat cross-border military confrontation between the two nuclear-armed rivals has significantly undermined prospects for normalization, redefining the rules of engagement and signaling a shift in how both countries may manage their relationship moving forward. What began as a terrorist attack on Indian tourists in the Pahalgam region of the disputed India-administered Kashmir last month, resulting in the deaths of 26 people, quickly escalated into a significant diplomatic and military crisis.

India’s Strategic Shift: Operation Sindoor and the ‘New Normal

India hastily accused Pakistan of orchestrating the terror attacks and used the incident as justification to revise its military doctrine through the launch of Operation Sindoor.

In a public speech highlighting the goals of Operation Sindoor, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced what he described as reaching a ‘new normal,’ signaling a decisive departure from India’s earlier posture of restraint, long shaped by the perceived threat of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent. He emphasized that the new approach centered on firm and unyielding retaliation against terrorist attacks, including cross-border military operations and a deliberate refusal to distinguish between militant groups and their state sponsors—effectively placing direct responsibility on Pakistan for any acts of terrorism on Indian soil. Modi also stated that India would no longer be deterred by the threat of nuclear escalation, signaling a willingness to pursue bold and proactive actions despite potential risks. Having absorbed the initial Indian strikes, Pakistan, in response to the damage inflicted from Operation Sindoor, initiated its own military campaign named Banyan-Marsoos, targeting key Indian military targets to restore deterrence.

A Pause in Hostilities: U.S. Intervention and the Ceasefire

As the two countries climbed the escalation ladder, a surprise ceasefire announcement by U.S. President Trump on social media temporarily halted the hostilities. While the truce continues to hold, prospects for lasting peace remain uncertain. Inflammatory national rhetoric and the unresolved diplomatic deadlock continue to fuel tensions. At the core of the post-ceasefire period is a significant divide between India and Pakistan, each celebrating their military campaigns as a victory and viewing the outcome of their confrontation through a zero-sum lens. This has made the aftermath more complex and contentious than the conflict itself, while also revealing how both sides intend to manage their ongoing disputes moving forward. In this context, key questions have emerged: what does the temporary truce mean for the India-Pakistan rivalry, and what are its implications for the long-term stability of South Asia?

Experts Respond

On May 12, PoliTact hosted a panel discussion under the auspices of recently formed US-Pakistan Policy Forum titled: “India-Pakistan Tensions and the Way Forward,” moderated by its Chief Analyst, Arif Ansar. The session featured a distinguished panel, including Dr. Hassan Abbas, Chair of the Department of Regional and Analytical Studies at the U.S. National Defense University; Dr. Qamar ul Huda, Michael E. Paul Chair in International Affairs and Distinguished Visiting Professor at the U.S. Naval Academy; and Mr. Khaled Al Maeena, former Editor-in-Chief of Arab News and Saudi Gazette. The discussion centered on the implications of the recent ceasefire between India and Pakistan, the roles of international actors, and the significant obstacles to achieving long-term peace.

Will the Ceasefire Hold?

One of the key questions examined was whether the current ceasefire between India and Pakistan is likely to hold.

A cautious optimism emerged from Dr. Hassan Abbas, who expressed confidence that the ceasefire between India and Pakistan would likely hold — at least in the short term. He argued that both nations had achieved what they needed politically and militarily to step back from the brink. India could claim it had struck militant targets, while Pakistan could point to a successful air defense response. He emphasized that U.S. mediation had played a key role in facilitating the agreement and that both governments were likely committed to preventing further military action. However, he warned that unless deeper structural issues — particularly the Kashmir dispute and proxy militancy — were addressed diplomatically, this ceasefire would remain fragile.

Dr. Qamar ul Huda shared a more skeptical view. While not dismissing the ceasefire outright, he questioned its substance, noting the absence of a transparent or structured diplomatic process. The ceasefire, in his view, seemed to have emerged from informal channels — tweets and backchannel phone calls — rather than serious, trackable negotiations. He was concerned that such an approach lacked durability and legitimacy. Dr. Huda stressed that a real ceasefire requires more than silence on the battlefield; it demands diplomatic engagement on the root causes of conflict: Kashmir, water disputes, and terrorism. He also noted the potential influence of third-party actors, from China to Gulf states, and expressed concern over the lack of clarity in the U.S. position. In his view, the region wasn’t yet “ripe” for lasting peace, and without a comprehensive approach, this ceasefire might only be a pause rather than a turning point.

From a media and public sentiment angle, Mr. Khaled Al Maeena brought a grounded and people-centered perspective. He voiced deep concern over the role of Indian media, which he accused of fomenting hate and spreading misinformation that inflamed public opinion and made diplomacy politically costly. Drawing on conversations with people across religious and national lines, he asserted that the majority of Indians and Pakistanis want peace, not war. Mr. Al Maeena emphasized that the region’s pressing need was not military confrontation but economic development and political stability. He also highlighted the proactive role of Gulf states — especially Saudi Arabia — in de-escalating tensions. With ties to both India and Pakistan, and a vested interest in regional peace due to economic interdependence, Mr. Al Maeena saw the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia, as a credible mediator. While hopeful about the ceasefire’s potential, he underscored the importance of media responsibility, regional diplomacy, and leadership that prioritizes stability over nationalist bravado.

The panel discussed the evolving role of the Gulf states—particularly Saudi Arabia—as key international mediator. The panelists agreed that Saudi Arabia, with significant interests in both India and Pakistan, could play a constructive role in easing tensions. Mr. Khaled Al Maeena stressed that Saudi Arabia seeks regional stability, including in South Asia, and could facilitate dialogue, if requested, between the two rivals by encouraging both sides to come to the table and accept international mediation.

The panelists agreed that India and Pakistan must move beyond tactical ceasefires and pursue a comprehensive, long-term peace process—ideally supported by third-party mediation. The speakers emphasized that unless the two countries address their domestic challenges and regional rivalries, their aspirations will remain unmet.

What Role should US Play?

Throughout the discussion, the panelists recognized the United States as a pivotal external actor with the capacity to influence the trajectory of the India-Pakistan ceasefire. However, their assessments revealed a shared caution about the limitations and inconsistencies in the U.S. approach.

Dr. Abbas emphasized that U.S. involvement was instrumental in brokering the initial ceasefire, with both India and Pakistan reaching out to Washington behind the scenes. He argued that this reflected the high-level trust and strategic alignment both countries maintain with the U.S., albeit for different reasons. India is a key partner in the Indo-Pacific strategy and a counterbalance to China, while Pakistan has long-standing security and geopolitical ties to the U.S., particularly in the context of Afghanistan. However, Abbas cautioned that the U.S. influence alone cannot guarantee lasting peace. He urged Washington to move beyond tactical mediation and instead support long-term conflict resolution mechanisms, including structured dialogue on Kashmir and militancy. He also noted that U.S. credibility depends on maintaining a balanced posture, especially when public narratives in India resist outside interference.

Dr. Huda took a more critical and analytical stance on the U.S. role. He noted that while President Trump’s tweet announcing the ceasefire was widely reported, it lacked substantive follow-through or diplomatic backing. From his view in Washington, the ceasefire appeared to be the result of sporadic political gestures rather than coordinated U.S. policy. Huda questioned whether the U.S. is truly committed to sustained mediation or simply reacting to crises. He highlighted the ambiguity in U.S. policy—initially appearing indifferent, then suddenly claiming credit—and argued that this inconsistency undermines its ability to lead serious peace efforts. To sustain negotiations, the U.S. would need to invest diplomatically and involve multilateral partners, such as the EU, China, and Gulf states, in creating a legitimate and lasting peace framework.

Mr. Khaled Almaeena provided a regional and Gulf-centered perspective, acknowledging the U.S. role but emphasizing that regional actors—particularly Saudi Arabia—are just as important. He noted that while the U.S. has diplomatic leverage, it should not attempt to dominate the process unilaterally. Instead, he advocated for a collaborative approach, where the U.S. works in concert with Gulf countries and other stakeholders who maintain strong ties with both India and Pakistan. Mr. Al Maeena viewed President Trump’s announcement of the ceasefire with skepticism, suggesting it may have been more performative than strategic. He argued that the U.S. can help facilitate talks, but its influence must be exercised carefully and in support of locally driven, regionally endorsed initiatives.

In summary, the panelists suggested that while the U.S. remains a necessary actor for de-escalation, its role must evolve from crisis management to sustained diplomacy, ideally in partnership with regional powers who have both legitimacy and proximity to the conflict.

Great Power Rivalry and Peace Talks

In the discussion of whether the ceasefire between India and Pakistan could evolve into lasting peace, all three panelists acknowledged that great power dynamics—particularly involving China—play a critical role in shaping the strategic landscape of South Asia.

Dr. Qamar-ul Huda emphasized the geopolitical complexity introduced by China’s growing influence and the competing interests of major powers. He noted that China, along with the Gulf states, the EU, and the U.S., has shown interest in being involved in conflict resolution efforts between India and Pakistan. However, this multiplicity of actors creates a crowded diplomatic space, making coherent mediation more difficult. Dr. Huda pointed out that China’s strategic alignment with Pakistan and its rivalry with India complicate peace efforts. He also raised a broader concern: if India aspires to be a global leader, as envisioned through its role in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategy and the Quad alliance, it must demonstrate stability and responsible leadership in its own region. Repeated border skirmishes and crises with Pakistan, he argued, undermine India’s credibility as a reliable partner in the great power competition with China.

Dr. Hassan Abbas echoed these concerns, observing that China’s influence is an integral part of South Asia’s strategic fabric, particularly through its economic and military ties with Pakistan. He highlighted how Chinese military technology—especially fighter jets used by Pakistan—played a significant role in the recent skirmishes, which helped Pakistan demonstrate parity in air power despite India’s numerical advantage. Dr. Abbas saw China’s indirect support as a factor that emboldens Pakistan to resist Indian pressure and sustain its strategic posture. However, he also noted that the escalation ladder is becoming dangerously steep due to technological advancements and information warfare, increasing the risk of miscalculation in a region already shaped by great power rivalries.

Mr. Khaled Al Maeena took a broader, more diplomatic view, situating China within a network of powerful states — including the U.S. and Gulf nations — that have vested interests in regional stability. While not delving deeply into China’s military role, Mr. Al Maeena acknowledged that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are increasingly aware of China’s regional footprint, particularly through its economic initiatives like the Belt and Road. He suggested that China, like the U.S., could play a constructive role in diffusing tensions if it acts as a responsible stakeholder. However, he warned that foreign involvement, including by great powers, must be invited and balanced, as unilateral or self-interested interventions could backfire.

Collectively, the panelists agreed that China’s strategic position and the broader great power rivalry intensify the stakes in South Asia. While this rivalry may deter full-scale war, it also raises the risk of prolonged instability unless managed through inclusive and multilateral diplomacy.

Nuclear Environment and the Escalation Ladder

In examining how the India-Pakistan conflict unfolds within a nuclear framework, the panelists offered nuanced perspectives on the risks and realities of escalation.

Dr. Hassan Abbas presented a cautiously optimistic view, asserting that while both nations had indeed tested the boundaries of military engagement—through strikes, counterstrikes, and air skirmishes—they ultimately pulled back due to the overarching presence of nuclear deterrence. He emphasized that both sides were able to claim symbolic victories: India asserted it had targeted militant-linked sites, while Pakistan showcased its military preparedness and air defense capabilities, including the successful use of advanced Chinese aircraft. For Dr. Abbas, this demonstration of strength on both sides created the space for de-escalation, as neither nation was willing to push the conflict into full-scale war, knowing the devastating consequences of nuclear engagement. He remained confident that, despite heightened tensions, both countries were rational actors who understood the mutual destruction that a nuclear exchange would bring.

Dr. Qamar-ul Huda, meanwhile, offered a more cautious and critical interpretation. He characterized the pattern of India-Pakistan escalation as a dangerous cycle—an unending loop of skirmishes, retaliations, and brief periods of calm that lacked any strategic architecture. According to him, this repetitive behavior pointed to a fundamental weakness in regional diplomacy and governance. Despite the presence of nuclear weapons acting as a deterrent, he argued that the failure to address root causes—such as the Kashmir dispute, water-sharing tensions, and cross-border terrorism—meant that both countries continued to climb the escalation ladder in an ad hoc and reactive manner. Without institutional reforms or sustained international engagement, he warned, the region remained vulnerable to miscalculations that could spiral beyond control, even in a nuclear context.

Mr. Khaled Almaeena approached the issue from a societal and media perspective, underscoring how misinformation, media sensationalism, and hyper-nationalist rhetoric often play a more dangerous role in escalation than military strategy itself. Drawing comparisons to the “phony war” period of World War II, Mr. Al Maeena argued that the most recent flare-up between India and Pakistan resembled more of a media-fueled standoff than a genuine military confrontation. He criticized the Indian mainstream media in particular for manufacturing a climate of hostility, which in turn pressured political leaders to take aggressive stances to appease domestic audiences. In this environment, the escalation ladder becomes more volatile—not because of formal military decisions, but because public sentiment, stoked by inflammatory media narratives, compels leaders to act out of fear of appearing weak.

In essence, the three panelists painted a complex picture of escalation in South Asia. While they all agreed that nuclear deterrence plays a restraining role in preventing all-out war, they also highlighted different drivers of danger—be it military miscalculation, diplomatic failure, or media manipulation. The consensus was clear: the region may be protected by the logic of mutual destruction, but without responsible leadership, institutional dialogue, and media accountability, the rungs of the escalation ladder remain all too easy to climb.

Domestic Politics and Sustained Political Dialogue

As the conversation shifted from immediate military de-escalation to the prospect of sustained political dialogue, all three panelists highlighted domestic political dynamics in both India and Pakistan as central to whether the ceasefire could evolve into meaningful negotiations.

Dr. Abbas offered a deep dive into the Pakistani domestic landscape, emphasizing that the ceasefire had inadvertently strengthened the military establishment’s standing at a time when it was under intense public and political criticism—especially over its handling of the Imran Khan-led Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) movement. He noted that the military’s effective management of the immediate crisis had boosted its credibility and given the current coalition government some breathing room. However, he warned that without broader political consensus and constitutional legitimacy, Pakistan could not sustain a serious peace process. He stressed that internal unity, political stability, and inclusiveness—particularly reconciling with PTI’s large support base—would be necessary if Pakistan hoped to engage in long-term diplomacy with India.

Dr. Huda placed domestic politics within a broader governance and institutional context, particularly in Pakistan. He saw the moment as an opportunity for political re-examination, noting that recurring conflict cycles had revealed the deep fractures in the country’s political system. He emphasized the need for Pakistan’s political institutions to commit to constitutionalism and inclusivity, warning that sidelining popular political parties (such as PTI) or suppressing dissent only deepens instability. For Dr. Huda, sustainable negotiations—whether about the ceasefire or Kashmir—would require a bipartisan or multiparty consensus. In his view, the absence of such internal coherence would make Pakistan an unreliable negotiating partner, especially in the eyes of international actors.

Mr. Khaled Al Maeena focused more broadly on the popular mood and societal divide within both India and Pakistan. He warned that rising hate rhetoric, media manipulation, and political polarization—particularly in India—create an environment where leaders are constrained by nationalist pressures. In both countries, he argued, the public appetite for peace exists, but political elites often exploit nationalist sentiment for short-term gain. He called for leadership that could rise above partisanship and media-driven hysteria, emphasizing that economic development and social stability should be the common goals uniting political factions. Mr. Al Maeena also stressed that peace efforts cannot be externally imposed; they must be grounded in domestic political will and legitimacy.

The panelists agreed that no ceasefire or peace process can succeed without strong, credible, and inclusive domestic political foundations. While foreign mediation may help broker talks, lasting peace must come from within, supported by political leadership that reflects the will and aspirations of their people.

Related Research

Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States August 4, 2023
Examining Saudi-Iran Tensions And Its Impact On South Asia, China Jan 4, 2019

The post India-Pakistan Ceasefire And The Way Forward appeared first on Politact.

Context

The saga of the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline project is a stark illustration of how geopolitical complexities can impede critical infrastructure development, even when the need is dire. For Pakistan, a country grappling with chronic energy shortages, this pipeline has long represented a beacon of hope for economic stability and growth. Yet, for decades, it has remained tantalizing out of reach, a victim of international pressures, regional rivalries, and economic challenges.

The story begins in 2010 when Pakistan, facing an escalating energy crisis, signed a landmark deal with Iran to construct a 2,750-kilometer pipeline. Initially valued at $7.5 billion, the project promised to be a game-changer for Pakistan’s energy sector. The potential impact was significant: according to a USIP report, Pakistan’s persistent power crisis was trimming off about 2 percent of the country’s annual domestic product[1]. Furthermore, a World Bank study estimated that power shortages in developing countries like Pakistan could reduce business profitability by up to 40 percent[2]. These figures underscored the critical nature of the project for Pakistan’s economic well-being and future growth prospects.

Economic and Geopolitical Realities

From its inception, the project has been shadowed by the looming threat of U.S. sanctions. Unlike India, which received exemptions for its involvement in Iran’s Chabahar port, or Afghanistan, which was granted allowances for trade through Iran, Pakistan has consistently faced stern warnings from Washington about the consequences of proceeding with the pipeline. This disparity in treatment reflects the complex web of U.S. strategic interests in the region. India is viewed as a potential counterweight to China’s growing influence, while for Afghanistan Chabahar represents and alternative for its dependence on Pakistan. Pakistan, with its complex relationship with the U.S. and close ties to China, finds itself in a less favorable position.

The US policy towards Pakistan, Iran, and India have different ambitions. The situation demonstrates the complexity of international relations, where strict policy adherence often gives way to strategic exceptions based on broader geopolitical goals. The American approach has been criticized for its inconsistency, but from the U.S. perspective, it reflects a nuanced balancing of various strategic interests in the region. Using exceptions and restrictions as tools allows U.S, to influence foreign policy choices of regional players.

The geopolitical landscape has further complicated Pakistan’s position. Historically, tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran meant that Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations were hesitant to support a project that could increase Iran’s influence and decrease Pakistan’s financial dependence on them. Especially because Iran’s influence in the Middle East has consistently been increasing. China and Iran also signed $400 billion-dollar strategic economic agreement in 2021.

While the Chinese facilitated Saudi-Iran détente reached in 2023 offered a glimmer of hope, it has not significantly altered the dynamics surrounding the pipeline project. This hesitation from traditional allies has left Pakistan in a precarious position, caught between its energy needs and its diplomatic relationships. Moreover, the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel has further hardened positions against Iran.

Pakistan’s economic instability has added another layer of difficulty. The country’s frequent need for IMF bailouts and its struggle to finance large-scale infrastructure projects have made the pipeline’s completion seem increasingly elusive. As years passed, the project’s costs escalated, and the global political and security environment became even more convoluted, making it more challenging for Pakistan to move forward. In August 2023, Pakistan announced the suspension of the project due to the threat of U.S. sanctions, highlighting the ongoing pressures and uncertainties surrounding the initiative.

The failure of alternative energy projects has exacerbated Pakistan’s predicament. Initiatives like TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline) and CASA 1000 (Central Asia-South Asia power project) have stalled, often citing security concerns in Afghanistan and Baluchistan. Consequently, Pakistan remains heavily reliant on expensive Independent Power Producers (IPPs), a situation that undermines the competitiveness of its exports in the global market. This dependence on costly energy sources creates a vicious cycle, hampering economic growth and making it even more difficult for Pakistan to invest in long-term energy solutions.

Meanwhile, regional dynamics have shifted dramatically. India has made significant strides in enhancing its connectivity to Central Asia through the Chabahar port, effectively bypassing Pakistan. In May 2024, India signed a 10-year agreement to develop and operate Iran’s strategic Chabahar Port, committing $120 million, along with an additional $250 million loan credit facility for related projects. This development not only provides India with strategic advantages but also highlights the opportunities Pakistan is missing due to its inability to complete the pipeline project. The Chabahar port offers India an opportunity to reestablish its presence in Afghanistan and enhance its access to Central Asian markets, areas where Pakistan could have played a pivotal role had the pipeline project moved forward.

The Opportunity Cost

The opportunity cost for Pakistan is substantial and multifaceted. Economically, the completion of the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline could have significantly reduced Pakistan’s energy import bill. Conservative estimates suggest that access to Iranian natural gas could have saved Pakistan billions of dollars annually in energy costs[3]. This reduction in energy expenses would have had a cascading positive effect on the economy, potentially boosting GDP growth by 1-2% per annum[4].

Moreover, the availability of reliable and affordable energy would have been a boon for Pakistan’s industrial sector. Many industries, particularly textiles – a key export sector for Pakistan – have suffered due to inconsistent power supply. With a steady supply of natural gas, these industries could have operated at full capacity, potentially increasing export revenues by 15-20% annually[5].

The pipeline could have also played a crucial role in reducing Pakistan’s dependence on the IMF. By stabilizing energy costs and boosting industrial output, Pakistan could have improved its foreign exchange reserves and reduced its current account deficit. Economic projections suggest that over a 10-year period, the pipeline could have contributed to reducing Pakistan’s external debt by 20-25%, significantly altering its financial landscape and reducing the need for frequent IMF interventions[6].

Furthermore, the project had the potential to transform Pakistan into an energy corridor, linking Iran to the vast markets of South Asia. This role could have brought in significant transit fees and positioned Pakistan as a key player in regional energy dynamics. Conservative estimates put potential transit fee earnings at $500 million to $1 billion annually, a substantial boost to Pakistan’s foreign exchange earnings[7].

The environmental impact is another overlooked aspect. Natural gas, being a cleaner fuel compared to oil and coal, could have helped Pakistan meet its climate change commitments more effectively. The shift to gas could have reduced carbon emissions by 15-20% in the power sector alone, contributing to global climate goals while also improving local air quality[8].

Navigating the Future

As Pakistan grapples with these lost opportunities and ongoing challenges, it finds itself at a critical juncture. The country must navigate the escalating great power rivalry between the United States and China while addressing its pressing energy needs. In this context, Pakistan could consider a multi-faceted approach to move forward.

Firstly, Pakistan should intensify its diplomatic efforts with the United States, emphasizing the project’s importance for regional stability and economic development. Framing the pipeline as a crucial element for broader international goals in the region might help in securing exemptions or finding a middle ground. This approach could involve highlighting how energy security in Pakistan contributes to overall regional stability, a key U.S. foreign policy objective. A more economically stable Pakistan could be a more effective partner in fighting extremism and promoting regional security.

Engaging with Iran through economic projects could provide more diplomatic leverage for the international community in negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program. While the pipeline would benefit Iran, it would also make Iran more dependent on its neighbors for economic stability, potentially increasing leverage in nuclear negotiations.

Secondly, Pakistan could leverage the improved Saudi-Iran relations to garner support from GCC countries. This diplomatic outreach should be coupled with a renewed focus on diversifying energy sources, including accelerating the development of domestic resources and exploring alternative gas import options. The recent geopolitical shifts in the Middle East offer a unique opportunity for Pakistan to reposition itself in regional energy dynamics.

Thirdly, Pakistan should consider a phased implementation of the pipeline project, starting with sections less likely to trigger immediate sanctions. This approach could be complemented by exploring technical solutions that might mitigate sanctions risks, such as processing Iranian gas at the border. By breaking the project into smaller, more manageable phases, Pakistan might be able to demonstrate progress and build momentum while navigating complex international regulations.

Furthermore, Pakistan needs to reduce political polarization and strengthen its economic foundations through structural reforms. Improving the investment climate to attract foreign investment in the energy sector and reducing dependence on external financial support would put Pakistan in a stronger position to pursue its energy security goals. These reforms could include streamlining bureaucratic processes, enhancing transparency in the energy sector, and developing a clear, long-term energy policy that prioritizes sustainable and affordable energy sources.

In the broader context of great power rivalry, Pakistan should maintain a balanced approach between the U.S. and China. Leveraging relationships with both nations, while also exploring multilateral forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and potentially BRICS, could open new avenues for support and cooperation on energy projects. This balanced approach could involve positioning the pipeline project as part of a broader regional connectivity initiative that benefits multiple stakeholders, potentially making it more palatable to international partners.

The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline project remains a symbol of unfulfilled potential in regional cooperation and energy security. Its completion could catalyze a transformation in Pakistan’s economic landscape, potentially adding 2-3% to annual GDP growth, creating hundreds of thousands of jobs, and significantly reducing the country’s carbon footprint. The ripple effects would extend beyond Pakistan’s borders, fostering regional integration and potentially contributing to stability in a volatile region.

As Pakistan continues to navigate the complex interplay of domestic needs and international pressures, the path forward requires astute diplomacy, economic resilience, and strategic foresight. By addressing these challenges head-on and adapting to the evolving geopolitical landscape, Pakistan may yet find a way to turn this long-delayed project into a reality. The stakes are high – not just for Pakistan’s energy security, but for its economic future and its role in an increasingly interconnected region.

The coming years will be crucial in determining whether Pakistan can overcome the hurdles that have long delayed this project. Success would not only secure a more stable energy future for its people but could also redefine Pakistan’s position in the regional and global economic order. The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline, therefore, represents more than just an energy project; it is a test of Pakistan’s ability to navigate complex geopolitical waters and emerge as a key player in the changing dynamics of South and Central Asia.

References:

[1] United States Institute of Peace (USIP) report on Pakistan’s energy crisis (2023)

[2] World Bank study on power shortages in developing countries (2022)

[3] Asian Development Bank (ADB) report on South Asian energy trade (2021)

[4] International Monetary Fund (IMF) country report on Pakistan (2023)

[5] Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Annual Export Data (2023)

[6] Economic projections by Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) (2022)

[7] Estimates from Pakistan’s Ministry of Energy (Petroleum Division) (2021)

[8] Pakistan’s Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to the Paris Agreement (2021)

Related Links:

Iran-Pakistan Cross-Border Clashes And Deep-Rooted Challenges

Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States

The Future and Politics of Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project

The post The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities appeared first on Politact.

Context

On May 13, India signed a 10-year agreement to develop and operate Iran’s strategic Chabahar Port, committing $120 million, along with an additional $250 million loan credit facility for related projects. This landmark deal between Iran and India has unsettled the US and threatened China and Pakistan by India’s full-scale presence next to Gwadar port.

Defying Western warnings, Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar defended the agreement. He asserted that the broader significance of Chabahar Port, and the advantages of an Indian presence there, would likely garner a positive response from the US. The US did provide a narrow exemption to the Indian development of the port in 2019 citing the humanitarian needs of Afghanistan and allowing it to diversify opportunities for its exports.

On the contrary, responding to the latest deal on May 14, the US State Department Deputy Spokesperson Vedant Patel stated the US sanctions on Iran were still in place and would be enforced. “Any entity, anyone considering business deals with Iran – they need to be aware of the potential risks that they are opening themselves up to and the potential risk of sanctions,” he stated. The warning is similar to what Pakistan receives whenever it expresses a desire to move forward with the long dormant Iran-Pakistan Pipeline project.

India’s long-term acquisition of Chabahar comes after securing a naval base at the strategic port of Duqm in Oman, situated in the Western Indian Ocean. The strategic location of Chabahar port in the Gulf of Oman, with access to the Arabian Sea, offers several significant advantages to India.

Analysis

Connectivity to Central Asia

Firstly, it supports India’s ‘Connect Central Asia’ policy, fulfilling the long-held aspiration of establishing regional connectivity and trade corridors with the landlocked Central Asian countries. These nations possess rich natural resources that are commercially valuable to India for its energy demands and essential for maintaining its economic momentum. However, India’s ability to fully capitalize on opportunities in Central Asia have been hampered by security sensitivities of its arch-rival Pakistan. The country has prevented easy Indian reach into Central Asia, through land route via Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Chabahar mitigates India’s geographic vulnerability and provides India with direct access to Afghanistan and Central Asian states, thereby activating the unutilized International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). INSTC is a 7,200 km-long multimodal connectivity project linking India to Europe through the Caucasus, Iran, Russia, and Central Asia. Incorporating Chabahar into the INSTC will reduce transit time between India and Europe by 40% and transit costs by 30%.

The approximately $2 billion worth of trade between India, Central Asia and Afghanistan has remained stagnant due to its reliance on Chinese and Pakistani routes for market access. In contrast, China’s trade turnover with Central Asian states, including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, reached $89.4 billion in 2023, marking a 27% year-on-year increase. Additionally, China’s trade with Afghanistan amounted to $1.33 billion last year.

The Chabahar port offers India an opportunity to reestablish its presence in Afghanistan, which has traditionally relied heavily on Pakistan for access to the Indian Ocean. With Pakistan-Afghanistan relations at a low point, India is capitalizing by offering an alternative sea route through Chabahar. Unlike the unfavorable trade regime and tariffs imposed by Pakistan, Iran has extended a free trade zone at Chabahar port to the Taliban regime. These incentives prompted the Afghan Taliban to invest a $35 million in Chabahar in late February, aligning Afghanistan with Iran and India while bypassing the Pakistan-China Economic Corridor.

Militarization of Chabahar Port

Secondly, while India may use the Chabahar port primarily for commercial purposes, it also enhances India’s strategic autonomy by allowing for the potential establishment of a naval base that could counterbalance Chinese military presence.

At present, state-owned Chinese firms oversee operations at seven ports in South Asia and seventeen ports across the Indian Ocean region. The Indian Ocean is crucial for India, as about 80% of its crude oil and 95% of its trade (by volume) pass through it. India’s maritime fleet currently comprises only 132 warships and aims to expand it to 175 by 2035. On the other hand, China’s fleet consists of 370 warships, projected to increase to 435 by 2030. Furthermore, Chinese new type 096 nuclear-armed submarines, known for their exceptional stealth, present a significant challenge not only to India but also to the United States and its allies.

India’s ambition to match Chinese military capabilities in the Indian Ocean underscores the strategic significance of Chabahar, located just 76 nautical miles from the Chinese-controlled Gwadar port, which is part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. This proximity allows India to closely monitor China’s naval activities. India views the expansion of Gwadar port as a direct threat to its naval security in the Arabian Sea and to its energy imports through the Gulf of Oman.

Given Pakistan’s strong alliance with China, especially concerning their shared foreign policy objectives towards India, tensions in the Arabian Sea could potentially escalate into a conflict. In such an eventuality, India’s presence in Chabahar positions it to potentially disrupt Chinese imports passing through the Strait of Hormuz.

Moreover, Iran and India have initiated discussions on enhancing military cooperation across various domains. In April of this year, Iranian Defense Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza and Indian Defense Secretary Giridhar Aramane met in Kazakhstan and agreed to strengthen military ties. This will include naval operations, joint exercises, defense research collaborations, educational exchanges, and student programs. Such a robust military partnership provides India with leverage over Iran’s military, which can benefit the US and its allies.

Balochistan and Chabahar Port

Thirdly, the geographical proximity of the Chabahar and Gwadar sea port to the volatile Balochistan region, inflicted with separatist militancy and terrorism, creates a different dynamic for India compared to Pakistan. Many Pakistan-wanted Baloch militants reside in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchistan Province near the Chabahar port. Pakistan fears that India, which it already accuses of supporting Baloch insurgency, could use its presence in Chabahar to bolster anti-state activities against Pakistan. The disruptions caused by Baloch insurgency have hindered the CPEC from realizing its full potential, and the undermining of Gwadar port works in the benefit of Chabahar Port.

Modi’s Foreign Policy and Chabahar Port

Under Prime Minister Modi’s leadership, India follows a foreign policy guided by “multi-alignment” and “strategic autonomy,” demonstrating its readiness to capitalize on opportunities that advance its national interests. Strengthening defense and economic prowess remains a top priority in India’s foreign policy agenda. Towards this goal, collaboration with the United States is seen as a pathway to acquiring advanced technology and bolstering the defense industry. Simultaneously, India’s engagement with Iran is part of a broader regional strategy aimed at countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative, leveraging the Chabahar port to enhance Indian naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

Modi’s administration is already making progress in its maritime defense strategy and forging partnerships with countries outside the US camp. On the one hand, India has been developing its own maritime defense strategy, called the ‘Necklace of Diamonds.’ The aim is to establish military bases in the Indian Ocean to encircle China and creating Indian-led alternative regional connectivity corridors countering the multi-billion-dollar Chinese Belt and Road Initiative.  On the other hand, India has redefined its strategic focus, prioritizing ‘Neighborhood First’ under its ‘Think West’ foreign policy. The objective is to engage the Gulf countries to India’s west. In this context, India, taking exception to the US’s long-standing policy of sanctions against Iran, is actively seeking to establish cordial relations with Tehran.

In recent statements, External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar emphasized India’s commitment to an independent stance that protects its interests and allows it to find its own solutions, rather than depending on the West or the US. Similar sentiments have been echoed by Defense Minister Rajnath Singh. He promised to modernize the Indian armed forces, especially the navy, and increase indigenous defense production for self-reliance. India regards its naval strength as fundamental for fortifying strategic autonomy in the Indo-Pacific region. While acknowledging it cannot directly match or fully constrain China, India aims to pose significant challenges and potentially delay China’s rise. In this context, Chabahar assumes a pivotal role as a strategic outpost for India, facilitating close monitoring of China’s naval activities in the Arabian Sea and safeguarding India’s interests in the Indo-Pacific.

However, Indian opportunistic outlook is essentially flawed. While connectivity with India helps limits Iranian international isolation, Iran is also a key partner of both China and Russia. In March 2021, China and Iran entered a $400 billion 25 year economic and security deal that would lead to enhanced military and trade relations. The agreement ensures Chinese investment in Iranian telecommunication, transportation, and military fields. The China-Iran military cooperation includes exercises, intelligence sharing, and joint research and development of weapons. China will also procure its energy needs from Iran on discounted price for over next 25 years.

It’s unrealistic to expect that Iran will risk its strategic ties to China and Russia by allowing India to serve western interests through Chabahar. Especially when China, Russia, and Iran represent the anti-western grouping in the present global balance of power tussles. While India has traditionally been close to Russia, as US-China rivalry escalates, it will also complicate India’s stance on Ukraine and the Gaza Crisis, where it’s maintaining a delicate balancing act up to now.

PoliTact’s South Asia Fellow Naad-e-Ali Sulehria contributed to this piece.

The post Chabahar Port, Iran, And Regional Ambitions Of India appeared first on Politact.

Context

Voting began on April 19^th in India and the results will be announced in the first week of June. With over 986 million eligible voters, elections in India have been described as the largest democratic exercise in the world. However, despite all the fanfare, the results of the Indian balloting seem all but a foregone conclusion. Prime Minister Modi has perfected the art of turning India into an ethno-majoritarian state over his past two terms in office. Modi continues to subjugate the minorities, while simultaneously working to turn India into a powerful Hindu state.

Modi is now seeking to secure a third term in office using the same playbook which enabled him to secure a landslide victory in 2019, namely by stifling dissenting voices, undermining the political opposition, terrorizing religious minorities, and acting tough against neighboring China and Pakistan.

Under Modi, India has rapidly undermined its credentials of being a secular democracy. Just because the country holds elections regularly, and its military does not intervene in politics, does not make the Indian polity automatically tolerant. In recent years, Modi has expedited economic growth, but inequality remains a major problem since the top 10% of the population now owns 77% of the nation’s wealth. Modi deflects economic disgruntlement of the masses by infusing in them a xenophobic sense of Hindu pride, which undermines the rights of all other religious minorities.

The inauguration of the Ram temple on the site of the razed mosque in Ayodhya, and the operationalization of the controversial Citizenship Amendment Act of 2019, have become overt symbols of Modi’s continued desire to repress India’s sizeable Muslim population. The Supreme Court’s decision this past December to endorse Modi’s revocation of Kashmir’s autonomous status has further boosted his image as a decisive leader who will not allow any insurgent movement, especially one spearheaded by Muslims, to threaten India’s territorial integrity.

Nonetheless, despite once being considered an international pariah for his role in the Gujrat communal massacre, Modi now rubs shoulders with the most powerful leaders in the world. Under his leadership, India became the first nation to land a spacecraft on the south pole of the moon. To top it all, Modi is now actively working with the US to help contain Chinese influence across South Asia. With these impressive credentials, most political pundits agree that Modi is likely to make a comeback in the next round of elections.

Pakistan-India Rapprochement

With India most likely remaining under the grip of Modi’s ultranationalism for another five years, and Pakistan struggling with multiple domestic security and economic challenges, as well as a crisis of political legitimacy, it is worth taking stock of how these two largest South Asian countries may respond to each other in coming years.

In the emerging geopolitical environment due to the ongoing Gaza crisis, the future of Pakistan India ties appears more challenging. Learning from Israel, India may also take on more heavy-handed policies and unilateral approaches.

The new leadership in Pakistan has at least demonstrated its intent to attempt rapprochement with India. The foreign minister appointed by the Sharif brothers recently hinted at the possibility of resuming trade with India, even though the Foreign Office then quickly reiterated Pakistan’s stance of not resuming trading with India till its government restores Kasmir’s special status. Despite these mixed signals, trying to improve trade relations with India is plausible. Cross-border tensions have not flared up between the two neighboring rivals since the past three years.

Pressure from Gulf States

The Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have strong ties with both India and Pakistan, also seem keen to help mend ties between these neighboring rivals. The UAE, is reported to have helped broker the 2021 ceasefire between India and Pakistan, and it has also been engaging in backchannel diplomacy to help improve ties between India and Pakistan.

The Saudi Crown Prince has also explicitly stressed the need for an India-Pakistan dialogue, during Prime Minister Shabaz Sharif’s visit to Saudi Arabia, in the bid to secure more Saudi financial support and investments. In addition to the desire to broker a dangerous conflict between two close allies, the Saudis want Pakistan to focus on economic growth and regional cooperation, instead of expending further energies on contending with India’s growing military might.

Kashmir and Cross Border Militancy

Indian repression in Kashmir continues to persist, and Pakistan has little chance of pressing India to walk back on its Kashmir policy, even if this mistreatment of Kashmiri Muslims remains a major source of friction. Moreover, on the heels of Canadian and American accusations of India sanctioning targeted killings of Sikh dissidents on their soil, Pakistan has also accused India of engaging in extraterritorial killings of Kashmiri and other extremist militants based within Pakistan.

The fact that India has moved swiftly to build ties with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and its suspected ability to continue aiding Baluch insurgents and TTP terror attacks on Pakistani soil via Afghanistan, also remain issues of major concern for Pakistan  While its recent hostilities with Iran did not escalate, Pakistan does need to focus more on its western border to prevent cross-border militancy to spark another crisis with Iran. Due to the broader insecurity emanating from the Israeli war on Gaza, Iranian sensitivity regarding the activities of Jaysh ul-Adl (formerly Jundallah) have increased tremendously.

On the other hand, regional experts have warned American policy makers to be wary of exacerbating Pakistani insecurities in the bid to bolster Indian military capabilities meant to stand up to China. The US is no longer considered a neutral arbitrator by Pakistan, which increases the risk of another cross-border crisis between India and Pakistan escalating into a catastrophic conflict. The danger of a terror attack in India, which is blamed on Pakistan, could quickly re-escalate tensions between the nuclear armed neighbors.

Economic Dimension

Besides these emergent security challenges on its other borders, which would make it very difficult for Pakistan to simultaneously cope with renewed tensions with India, the Pakistani economy is also experiencing major problems. Improving economic conditions in the country may in fact be the biggest priority for the country’s establishment and politicians, due to which resuming trade with India has become a more palatable option.

Pakistan was importing around $2 billion worth of Indian imports and exported neared $500 million worth of goods back in 2018. The countries suspended trade in 2019 after the suicide attack on Indian soldiers in Pulwama district which led India to revoke Pakistan’s most favored nation status – granted back in 1996.

Pakistan then cut trade ties completely after India revoked Kashmir’s special status a few months later. Thus, formal trade between the two countries came to a grinding halt and all cross- border goods must now be funneled through neutral places like Dubai, which significantly increases costs. Research by entities such as the World Bank suggests that fully opening up trade with India could increase Pakistani exports by as much as 80 percent, which could do wonders for its slugging economy.

India now has a much larger economy, and it is well integrated with other South Asian states, so it also has less need to normalize trade ties with Pakistan. Yet, given that India could significantly increase its exports by trading with Pakistani’s burgeoning market is also a reasonably attractive incentive. Currently, Modi is too preoccupied with the elections, but he may be willing to try improving ties with Pakistan under the Sharifs again, as was attempted during the last Nawaz Sharif premiership, over a decade ago.

Critical Pathways to Improving India and Pakistan Ties

In the prevailing geopolitical environment, India is unlikely to bolster the economy of its arch-rival without a wider rapprochement with Pakistan which would include Kashmir. Irrespective of who is to blame, the cross border threats from non-state actors to Pakistan, India, Iran, and Afghanistan – pose the single most potent risk to the region – and to the mutual ties of these nations. The recent spat between Pakistan and Iran involving Jaysh -ul-Adl, attack on a music concert hall in Russia in March linked to ISIS-K, and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) affiliated strikes in Pakistan, are prime examples.

In the context of great power rivalry, there seem to be two significant mutually exclusive pathways – with one leading to the improvement in Pakistan-India ties and the other towards deterioration.

1 The continuation of CPEC and Iran Pakistan Gas Pipeline Projects are unlikely to produce improvement in Pakistan-India ties – unless there is US-China detents of some sorts.

2. In the aftermath of the on-going Gaza conflict, the future of Abraham Accords is uncertain. However, if the two-state solution prevails – pressure on Pakistan will likely increase in the future to recognize Israel. With the close trade ties between GCC and India, this will likely improve chances of India-Pakistan détente as well.

However, if there is a direct conflict between Iran and Israel and the Abraham Accords dismantle, the pressure will increase on the GCC and Arab nations to either side with Iran or Israel. This quandary will be the same for Pakistan and India. However, the role of China and Russia would become paramount to preserve the Saudi-Iran détente reached in March this year. This is the context which makes the upcoming visit of the Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi to Pakistan all the more consequential.

The post Indian Elections, Future of Pakistan-India Ties And Centrality of Iran appeared first on Politact.

Context

As the new government settles in Pakistan, in addition to the economy, one of the key questions is how it will handle the relations with its neighbors and extremism. Pakistan’s ties with India have always been tense, now Iran and Afghanistan have been added to the list. However, while the border with India is untraditionally calm, that cannot be stated for Iran and Afghanistan.

The most dramatic escalation occurred when Iran launched counter strikes for the terrorist attacks at the funeral of Qassem Soleimani on January 4 – not only in Syria and Iraq, but on January 16 on its nuclear-powered neighbor Pakistan, going after Jaish-al-Adl hideouts. These raids essentially connected the conflict that was mainly pestering the Middle East – to South Asia. Pakistan retaliated on January 18, by launching missiles at Baloch nationalist groups operating from Iran.

Barely two months after responding to the Iranian strike, Pakistan retaliated against extremists hideouts in Afghanistan on March 18 for attacks on its forces near its north-west border that killed 7 soldiers. Pakistan accused Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) which takes refuge in Afghanistan, for the attack. The country also accuses Afghan Taliban for harboring TTP and alleges India’s intelligence agency, RAW, for funding and training them through Afghan proxies.

Stocking further tensions, India seized a Pakistan-bound cargo ship on January 23 for allegedly carrying materials usable for its nuclear program, which Pakistan refutes. The ship was travelling from China to Karachi and had stopped at Navi Mumbai’s Nhava Sheva port. This has been followed up by three coordinated strikes on Chinese interests in Pakistan when terrorists struck the Gwadar port, Turbat Naval base, and a convoy travelling towards Dasu dam resulting in the death of five Chinese workers. The Baloch Liberation Army claimed responsibility for the attack on a government facility in Gwadar and the naval base.

The recent incidents highlights Pakistan’s worsening relations with Afghanistan and Iran, which inadvertently benefit India’s strategic goals in the region. It pushes Pakistan to normalize ties with India. However, significant challenges remain in normalizing ties with India.

Analysis

New Government and India

The recent political changes in Pakistan, marked by Shehbaz Sharif’s ascension to the Prime Minister’s office and the return of Asif Zardari as President, have sparked renewed interest in the future direction of India-Pakistan relations. Both Sharif and Zardari, with past experiences of engagement with India, offer a glimmer of hope for resetting ties. During his previous tenure, Shehbaz Sharif expressed his desire for peaceful ties and later offered to open talks with India. While President Zardari, also known for his reconciliatory approach during his previous term in the office, earned a reputation for prioritizing peace with India.

After Shehbaz Sharif’s inauguration, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi extended his felicitations, reciprocated positively by Shehbaz. The US also added its expression of support for facilitating “productive and peaceful talks” between the two neighbors. Nonetheless, translating these aspirations into action remains a challenge. The path forward remains fraught with historical baggage, proxy wars, and the ever-present influence of hostile domestic politics.

The Point of Contentions

For Pakistan, the 2019 Indian revocation of Jammu & Kashmir’s special status stands as a significant issue. The country vehemently opposes this step, seeing it as a violation of Kashmiri rights and prior international agreements. Consequently, Pakistan halted its bilateral trade and downgraded diplomatic relations with India. As the trade suspension began to affect Pakistan’s economy, then Prime Minister Imran Khan briefly reinstated trade ties with India in 2021. However, political pressure led to a reversal of this decision. Meanwhile, India remains concerned about Pakistan’s ongoing support for Kashmiri separatists.

Prime Minister Sharif has conditioned any talks with India to the restoration of Kashmir’s autonomy, like his predecessor, while India demands Pakistan to stop cross-border terrorism before engaging in any dialogue. These conditionalities have created a seemingly insurmountable impasse. Furthermore, India’s success last year in securing a joint statement with the US which condemns Pakistan’s alleged role in terrorism further strained their relations. Pakistan rejects these accusations, instead terming India a state sponsor of terror for supporting groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Baloch separatists.

Areas of Cooperation

Despite these tensions, some crucial steps highlight a commitment to de-escalation. For instance, both countries continue to adhere to a decades-long protocol of exchanging nuclear installation lists, showcasing their commitment to prevent nuclear war.

The ceasefire agreement along the Line of Control in Kashmir, albeit fragile, has been held for several years, marking one of the longest periods of relative calm in the region’s history. Even with severed diplomatic ties, Pakistan issued visas to Indian pilgrims in 2023, demonstrating a willingness to facilitate cultural exchange.

Both nations face numerous shared challenges, including climate change, air pollution, and water scarcity. Addressing these issues requires cooperation, not confrontation.

India, Iran, and Pakistan

The recent unprecedented incidents of cross border strikes Iran and Pakistan carried out at against each other has underscored the fundamental challenges Iran and Pakistan face in countering terrorism and highlights Indian role.

Both Pakistan and Iran have long accused each other of providing safe havens to their respective enemies. Pakistan consistently maintains that India’s intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), is operating from Iranian soil, orchestrates attacks in Pakistan’s Balochistan region – and supports the anti-Pakistan Baloch separatist movement. Conversely, Iran blames Pakistan for its inaction against anti-Iran terrorist sanctuaries in the Balochistan bordering region, and for not taking decisive action against infiltrators into its territory through human trafficking and smuggling of weapons.

In 2016 Pakistan had arrested what it claims to be an Indian spy, posing as an Iranian businessman. There are different versions of how and where Kulbhusan Yadav was captured. Indian media had claimed, Kulbhushan was abducted by Jaesh al-Adl and handed over to Pakistan’s intelligence organizations. However, in a confession statement made under Pakistan’s custody, Kulbushan stated his main task was to sabotage CPEC (China, Pakistan Economic Corridor) and create unrest in Karachi and Balochistan. For this mission, he was in touch with leaders belonging to Baloch separatist groups. These dynamics indicate, India has been a player when it comes to regional proxy games involving Afghanistan and Iran and targeting Pakistan interests.

Future Expectations And Challenges

The future of India-Pakistan relations depends a whole lot on the outcome of India’s upcoming elections scheduled from April 19 to June 1 – and the posture the new government adopts. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) heavily depends on anti-Pakistan rhetoric for its political campaigns and voter appeal. Offering an olive branch to Pakistan during election cycle would be viewed as political suicide. In fact, just before the last balloting in 2019, India had launched an air raid in Balakot, Pakistan, to rile up nationalist voter sentiments.

On the other hand, Pakistan’s powerful military establishment exerts significant influence over the nation’s foreign policy, and it has traditionally opposed rapprochement with India. Along those lines, Shehbaz Sharif’s reliance on the support from military establishment limits his ability to pursue a more conciliatory approach towards India. However, Pakistan’s economic predicament and dependence on IMF may change this outlook and necessitate peace with India. Additionally, Pakistan’s financial backer of the last resort, such as Saudi Arabia and UAE, have also expanded trade and security ties with India. This would further pressurize the new government to mend ties with its archrival.

The greatest challenge is likely going to be the absence of public narrative to pursue peace. For instance, the prevalence of hate culture and growing hostile political rhetoric especially in India – towards peace with Pakistan. Conversely, the new government in Pakistan lacks credibility, due to allegations of election rigging, to pursue any sensitive initiatives. Both nations would have to build public support if reconciliation is to ensue. And if Pakistan-India ties do not normalize, it’s likely the proxy-war being waged against Pakistan through Afghanistan and Iran would continue. India would want to keep Pakistan busy so it cannot pose a threat on the Line of Control (LOC) with India. This would also mitigate tensions with China on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), which many believe are designed to prevent India from projecting power towards the South China Sea.

PoliTact’s South Asia Fellow Naad-e-Ali Sulehria contributed to this piece.

The post Pakistan’s Flareup With Afghanistan, Iran Clashes, Intensifying Attacks On Chinese Interests, And Role of India appeared first on Politact.

The Race for Building Trade Corridors and Connectivity

Context

When laying out the master plan for Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China must have grappled with two strategic considerations. One, what would a potential future conflict with US, or more generally with the West, mean for its security and economic interests. Second, how it would secure the energy needs if the strategic sea pathways, through which much of its present-day trade passes, were to become unstable.

These worries are not unique to China alone, every major international actor is attempting to find their respective answers to these growing risks in era of great power competition. The dynamics around the politics of trade corridors and energy pipelines can be understood by the following three factors:

1. Which countries have the energy reserves and other products to export?
2.  Which nations have the most need for these energy reserves and products and,
3. The intermediate countries whose strategic location relative to these trade corridors increases their leverage vis a vis the global and regional powers.

Post globalization and post Covid international commerce is governed by a new principle. A nation should not have supply lines and trade, especially of strategic nature, with a country that could become an adversary in the future. President Biden has called it de-risking when it comes to trade between US and its allies with China. The reason for this is that Free Trade can provide tremendous leverage to a potential adversary and create a dependency.

Belt and Road Initiative

In view of these strategic considerations, China’s BRI and its various tributaries, appear to provide alternative routes for the sustenance of its trade and the steady supply of energy needs to maintain its growth. BRI is a combination of two routes; the New Silk Road Economic Belt will run westward overland through Central Asia and onward to Europe. The second route, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR), will run south and westward through sea to Europe, with stops in South East Asia, South Asia and Africa.

Under the auspices of BRI, at least six arteries are being developed, with CPEC being one of them:

1. The China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridor will be built with China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region as its starting point
   2. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will be built to connect the ports of Pakistan’s Gwadar with Xinjiang’s Kashi
   3. The northern China-Mongolia-Russia Land Corridor will connect Russia to China and starts from the Chinese province of Heilongjiang, and
   4. The south running China-India-Bangladesh-Myanmar Corridor (BCIM), will be built with Kolkata as its starting point
   5. The Indochina Peninsula Corridor
   6. The New Eurasian Land Bridge, running from central China to Europe via Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus

BRI will allow China to consolidate its access to Eurasia, Central Asia, South East Asia, including Africa. More significantly, it will help its penetration into the maritime regions, especially the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Sea. These regions are estimated to include 4.4 billion people, constituting 63% of the world population, and US $2.1 trillion in gross production that makes up 29% of the world GDP. Considering this, BRI will provide lucrative opportunities for China, expanding its trade with the littoral and inland states.

CPEC in Relation to China’s BRI

While CPEC is just one of the tributaries of the Chinese BRI vision, it is perhaps the most important one. Ideally, China would desire all the corridors to operate as envisioned. However, the success of each strategic passage is dependent on mitigating several key security risks.

For example, the Gwadar Port situated very close to the Strait of Hormuz, will allow China the shortest access to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. Moreover, it will provide an alternative route to the conflict prone and crowded Malacca Strait, sandwiched between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Obviously, this carries economic and security implications. Writing in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, PoliTact’s strategist Claude Rakisits pointed out in 2015:

“However, in geo-strategic terms the success of CPEC would not be good news for the US: it would displace the US as Pakistan’s major external patron in favor of China. Most importantly, it would provide China with a firm and reliable long-term beachhead in the Indian Ocean close to the Persian Gulf, effectively making China a two-ocean power. This would be a red rag to India.”

Thus, if tensions between India and China, and matters related to the South China Sea, were to escalate, the BCIM strategic corridor is likely to become nonfunctional. In this case, CPEC would take on an added emphasis.

Then there are concerns regarding the stability of Middle East. The Middle East reigns as China’s largest supply of oil and energy: 60% of China’s oil comes from the Middle East. These supplies travel from the Strait of Hormuz to Strait of Malacca, curling through the Indian Ocean and reaching China while passing through South China Sea, East China Sea and the Yellow Sea. However, if the situation of Middle East deteriorates due to extremism and continuing worries regarding Iran’s nuclear program, it is possible that the Strait of Hormuz itself becomes quite insecure.

BRI and IMEC

Discussions have been brewing for a while that the US needs to counter BRI and provide an alternative. And for this – various names and formulations have come to the fore – the latest one being the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC). The new corridor was announced at the recently concluded G-20 meeting held in India. It will be a combination of a rail and shipping route covering two continents – and two corridors. The Eastern Corridor will connect India to the Arabian Gulf and the Northern corridor connecting the Gulf to Europe.

But the question is how IMEC compares to the BRI tributaries. The connectivity corridors have become another tangent of the escalating global power tussles between US, China, and Russia.

While CPEC provides the shortest route to connect the Gulf States, IMEC bypasses Pakistan. Not only that, there already exists a 5,981 km train transit route completed in 2022 – which connects Pakistan to Turkey via Iran, called ITI (Islamabad, Tehran, Istanbul). The cargo train takes 13 days to reach Istanbul from Islamabad. The path envisioned by IMEC also by passes Turkey. Turkish president Erdogan recently commented “the most convenient line for traffic from east to west has to pass through Turkey.” And that there is no corridor without Turkey.

On the other hand, IMEC envisions a train route through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel – bypassing the Suez Canal. From Israel, the Northern shipping route will connect with Greece.

IMEC seems to be promoting an alternative connectivity offered by Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey – and configure the world that is suitable for Western alliance and maintaining of its influence over the Middle East. Moreover, to use that sway over the Core Arab Muslim nations, towards pressuring Peripheral Muslim states to join IMEC. To reap the benefits of IMEC, necessitates normalization of ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel, which is being actively pursued by the Biden administration. This will undercut the growing Chinese penetration of the Middle East, as witnessed be the facilitation of Saudi-Iran peace deal – and around $400 billion China-Iran Security deal reached in March 2021.

The post China’s Belt And Road Initiative And India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) appeared first on Politact.

Saudi-Israel Normalization and Beyond

Context

In a previous article we focused on understanding the changing geopolitics of the Middle East. Especially, the political, security, and economic interconnections between South Asia and the Gulf States, and one of the subsets, Pakistan and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This relationship has taken on added significance in the context of ongoing great power rivalry and China’s wider engagement with the Middle East, which resulted in the Saudi-Iran détente in March.

On July 28, 2020, PoliTact held a webinar to discuss the potential China-Iran $400 billion economic deal and its impact on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). China-Iran defense cooperation has been growing in the aftermath of President Trump’s decision in 2018 to unilaterally withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal reached in 2015 – which was a hallmark achievement of the Obama administration.

Moreover, additional Muslim states, such as UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco officially recognizing the state of Israel as a consequence of Abraham Accords, reached during the Trump’s presidency in 2020.These developments resulted in deepening of the contradictory pressures for Pakistan. On the one hand, the nation is China’s closest strategic partner, which was also expanding its ties with Iran. On the other hand, Pakistan’s other Arab allies, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar were moving closer to Israel.

In an event held on May 22 in collaboration with the Middle East Institute, the growing role of China in the Middle East was examined. The panelists had made the policy recommendations that US should not completely disengage or overreact to Chinese influence in a state of anxiety. Instead, the US should adopt a clearer approach to its political, economic, and security interests in the Middle East. Viewing US relations with its partners in the Middle East and Asia within the framework of great power competition with China may negatively impact the US approach and its interests.

Saudi-Israel Normalization

Progressively alarmed by the fast-moving dynamics of the Middle East and growing Chinese involvement has meant that the US administration could not sit idly. President Biden has launched an aggressive diplomatic engagement with Saudi Arabia, the country being seen as acting ever more unpredictably. At the same time, the changing politics of Israel is also a complicating factor as Netanyahu loses interest with the two-state solution.

According to New York Times, in at least two trips taken in the last couple of months by the national security adviser Jack Sullivan, Saudis have demanded a civil nuclear program in which they could enrich their own Uranium, not like UAE where they are shipped enriched material. In addition, they want a NATO style mutual security agreement in return for recognition of Israel. On the other hand, China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) has proposed to Saudi Arabia building a nuclear plant near its borders with Qatar and UAE. The move is to pressure the US to be more flexible in aiding its nuclear program.

According to a White House statement, Sullivan traveled to Jeddah:

“to discuss bilateral and regional matters, including initiatives to advance a common vision for a more peaceful, secure, prosperous, and stable Middle East region interconnected with the world.”

The gist of the Biden administrations diplomatic blitzkrieg is to keep Saudi’s from moving closer to China or Russia, build its ties with Israel, and coordinate against Iran. In the BRICS conference held in Johannesburg, Saudi Arabia and Iran were both invited to join BRICS. UAE and Egypt are also set to become BRICS members from January 2024.

Wider Implications

The normalization of Saudi ties with Israel would be the extension of the Abraham Accord. The recognition of Israel by Saudi Arabia would be a titanic event in the Islamic world – especially as it relates to the Core versus the Peripheral Islamic world. It would bring tremendous pressure on the peripheral Islamic nations, especially Pakistan which takes clues from Saudi Arabia when it comes to the maters of Palestinians. According to the polls conducted by the Washington Institute in 2022, public opinion in Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain that were initially favorable towards Abraham Accords have become less so ever since.

If a such a transformation is indeed achieved, a lot will depend on the scope of concessions provided to the Palestinians as part of the deal. Will it include a statehood for the Palestinians and cessation of settlements? With the right-wing government in Israel, why would it agree to any of such demands, especially when the outside-in approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has largely proven to be successful.

While most of the GCC nations are autocratic – a broken democracy still exists in Pakistan. Irrespective, under the present circumstances, Saudi recognition of Israel anytime soon, will gravely unsettle the political and security situation of the country, particularly if it were to be accompanied by economic and political pressure from Saudi Arabia, and other GCC nations, to follow suit. As for the timeline, President Biden would want an agreement before the US elections next year.

Pakistan is overwhelmed by domestic affairs presently, there is little bandwidth for a public debate on this fast-moving situation of the Middle East. Pakistan’s traditional position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was reiterated by its former Prime Minister Imran Khan presently in incarceration:

“Whatever any country does, our position is very clear. And our position was made clear by [Pakistan’s founder] Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah … in 1948: that we cannot ever accept Israel as long as Palestinians are not given their rights and there is no just settlement.”

Moreover, such a transformational step will also have a direct effect on the narrative of extremist organizations such as AQ, Daesh and their Associates. After all, the Palestinian predicament was one of the primary motivation behind why founders of these groups lobbied for violent means to achieve justice.

These extremist organizations targeted governments of the Islamic nations because they were believed to be complicit with the West, and with their support Israel was committing atrocities against Palestinians. Thus, if the justice is delivered, and is seen as such, this could pose far reaching consequences for the future of Islamic extremists – and for the relations of the Islamic world with Israel and the West.

It could also convince those groups that are active on the Kashmir front, that the rise of China could force peaceful resolution of long-standing conflicts – seen to be the unfinished business from when the balance of power shifted last. However, if the deal if reached without much public support or debate and is perceived as a sell off, it would pose tremendous risks for the future of normal governance in the Islamic regions.

This is what happened in the case of Libya recently, when its foreign minister Najla Mangoush met secretly with Israeli counterpart in Rome to normalize ties. The news of the meeting was made public by Israeli foreign minister Eli Cohen and ignited strong street protests in Libya. This caused Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah to suspend Mangoush claiming that she has acted individually and Libya feels strongly for the Palestinian cause.

The post Will The Fear Of China Aid Middle East Peace? appeared first on Politact.

Context

In an endeavor to understand the emerging geopolitical realities, PoliTact partners with leading thought centers to understand the longitudinal multi-faceted tangents of a particular theme. One such topic is the political, security, and economic interconnections between South Asia and the Gulf States, and one of the subsets, Pakistan and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This relationship has taken on added significance in the context of ongoing great power rivalry and China’s wider engagement with the Middle East, which resulted in the Saudi-Iran détente in March.

This article presents a summary of three events held to date, especially the most recent one that took place on May 22.

US Presence in Afghanistan

The first event to cover this theme was held on November 16, 2018 in collaboration with the Middle East Institute. With US still present in Afghanistan, obviously influenced the perspectives, but it was clear this interrelationship would become more pronounced in the future. The GCC nations, especially Qatar, was facilitating the peace talks between the Afghan Taliban and the US, which later led to the Doha Agreement in February 2021.

One of the other significant trends was the continuing Indian economic encroachment of GCC, from where Pakistan has traditionally drawn support. One of the Panelist, former director for Pakistan and Afghanistan at the White House’s National Security Council, Shamila Chaudhary, had commented then:

“Pakistan does need to pay attention to the growing nexus between India and the Gulf States, especially when its transitioning from purely economic and into security and defense domains.

China-Iran Economic Deal and Abraham Accords

On July 28, 2020, PoliTact held a webinar to discuss the potential China-Iran $400 billion economic deal and its impact on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). China-Iran defense cooperation has been growing in the aftermath of President Trump’s decision in 2018 to unilaterally withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal reached in 2015 – which was a hallmark achievement of the Obama administration.

Moreover, additional Muslim states, such as UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco officially recognizing the state of Israel as a consequence of Abraham Accords, reached during the Trump’s presidency in 2020.

These developments resulted in deepening of the contradictory pressures for Pakistan. On the one hand, the country is China’s closest strategic partner, which was also expanding its ties with Iran. On the other hand, Pakistan’s closest Arab allies, UAE and Saudi Arabia, were moving closer to Israel.

When it comes to the Indian alignment with Israel and its growing ties with the Gulf nations, a question was again assessed about how these relations undercut the traditional support Pakistan has generated from the Gulf region, as referenced above.

Commenting on this during the webinar, panelist and former Editor-in-Chief of Arab News and Saudi Gazette, Khaled Almaeena, stated: “Pakistan’s position has been undermined by the negative economic and security news consistently emanating from the country. And this has been occurring at a time when India has positioned itself as an information technology and economic powerhouse, and by investing in Saudi Arabia that brought jobs to the Kingdom.” He further added, “the younger leadership of KSA do not hold the same kind of affinity towards Pakistan as past leaders had.”

China and Saudi-Iran Detente

PoliTact collaborated with the Middle East Institute again on May 22 to analyze the South Asia and GCC connection in the aftermath of China facilitated Saudi-Iran détente announced in March.

The panel discussion, led by Gerald M. Feierstein, Director of MEI’s Arabian Peninsula Program, assessed Chinese foreign policy within the framework of the Arabian Gulf and South Asia, with a specific emphasis on great power competition. Gerald Feirstein highlighted that much of the attention surrounding the intensifying competition between the US and China has been focused on the Asia-Pacific region. However, China’s growing involvement in the Middle East and South Asia has increasingly become a significant concern for the US.

The panelists were Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the East Asia Program and Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center, Yun Sun; Senior Advisor on South Asia at the United States Institute of Peace, Dr. Daniel Markey; veteran Saudi journalist, Khaled Almaeena; and Syed Muhammad Ali; the South Asia expert Non-Residence Scholar at the Middle East Institute.

The panelists examined several key questions:

1. Are China’s objectives in the region primarily driven by economic interests or do they have political and security dimensions as well?

2. How do countries in the wider Middle East perceive their relationships with China?

3. How does the US-India partnership influence China’s regional initiatives and impact    Pakistan’s interests in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor?

4. What is China’s vision and long-term goals in the region?

Chinese Perspective

Yun Sun emphasized that Chinese foreign policy is well structured, viewing the Middle East and South Asia as distinct regions. China’s focus on the Middle East is primarily driven by its reliance on energy imports, with 52 percent of its energy sourced from the region. Beijing has effectively pursued its objectives in the Middle East by employing a diplomatic approach that seeks to balance economic and political engagements with all significant parties, including those in conflict with each other.

It is important to note that China does not see itself as a mediator responsible for the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the assumption that China will replace the United States as the primary security provider in the Middle East is premature – but this is an overarching perception.

She pointed out this perception in the Middle East that US will disengage with the region and pivot to Asia does play out well in the long run and needs to be countered. Overtime people will start believing this.

She went on to add, China lacks the necessary political, security, and military engagement in the region. Conversely, China’s interests in South Asia mainly revolve around regional security concerns, particularly counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as maintaining its influence by counterbalancing India at a sub-regional level.

While China aims to preserve a certain level of affinity with India to prevent it from completely aligning with the United States against China’s ambitions, Pakistan plays a crucial role in China’s South Asia regional strategy. There are two notable aspects in China’s foreign policy formulation concerning the Middle East and South Asia.

Firstly, due to its energy requirements, China aspires to establish an energy transportation corridor linking the two regions.

Secondly, China advances its commercial and political goals by considering the shared interests among Muslim-majority countries in the Gulf and South Asia.

The other panelists, Daniel Markey reiterated that China’s interests in the Middle East are primarily driven by energy, while its interests in South Asia are focused on security matters and partially aimed at counterbalancing India.

Markey highlighted that China is gradually displaying an opportunistic willingness to assume an active leadership role, leveraging its economic influence to gain political influence. Additionally, all countries in the Middle East and South Asia have their own unique interests and perceive collaboration with China as a mutual opportunity. This applies not only to India and Pakistan but also to Iran and Saudi Arabia. As different countries engage with China, its prospects for exerting political influence multiply.

Moreover, Daniel acknowledged that China has surpassed the need for relying solely on Pakistan’s support to maintain its favorable relations with the Muslim world.

Pakistan’s Perspective

Syed Muhammad Ali, providing the Pakistani perspective on the country’s increasing dependence on China, emphasized that Pakistan’s relationship with China has predominantly revolved around security concerns. However, Pakistan aims to transform its geo-strategic position from being primarily security-oriented to becoming a geo-economic actor. Despite facing multiple crises such as political instability, terrorism, and economic challenges, Pakistan is actively pursuing engagement with the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. At the same time, US is the biggest market for Pakistan’s exports and China is never going to replace that.

Moreover, the Saudi-Iran détente provides it with the breathing space – as in the past the tensions between the two have played out in Pakistan. This could result in more focus on the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline.

Syed also pointed out that as the US-India strategic partnership grows, it will increasingly make US unable to play the mediator role between India and Pakistan. This will only increase Pakistan’s insecurity.

Gulf Perspective

Khaled Almaeena presented the perspective of Gulf countries regarding China. He emphasized that in comparison to the West, these nations have overtime come to view China as a reliable economic partner and an impartial political mediator. China has gradually strengthened its diplomatic influence in the Middle East through a methodical and gradual approach.

Daniel Markey noted that the US decoupling from the Middle East, if it is happening, will take time to unfold, especially because of the military dimension. Furthermore, as China engages more with these nations, it may confront the same challenges and sentiments that US has had to deal with.

Uyghur Issue and China

When its comes to the Uyghur issue, Daniel Markey commented that China has skillfully portrayed it as an internal matter related to national security. Furthermore, the significant economic interests shared between Muslim countries and China are of such magnitude that China’s political oppression of the Uyghur population does not jeopardize their relations.

Yun Sun added that although anti-China ethnic movements are gaining momentum in Central Asian countries, however, the involvement of Russia in Ukraine has led these countries to increase their reliance on China. As a result, they are unlikely to pose a potential threat to Chinese security and economic interests soon.

She also noted that in light of the Taliban’s takeover in Afghanistan, China has prioritized its security interests in Central and South Asia, leading to enhanced security cooperation with regional countries. Such as the Quadrilateral Group on Afghanistan which include Pakistan, Iran, and Russia.

 China-Russia Relations

Daniel Markey argued that Russia has become a junior partner to China in the region, but countries like India are attempting to maintain a balance between China and Russia based on their own strategic interests – and wedge between the two helps India.

On the other hand, Yun Sun stated that China views Russia as a helpful partner and has benefited from Russia’s involvement in the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia. China has found Russia’s strategy of creating chaos indirectly advantageous, providing China with more leverage. However, chaos in Ukraine can become a liability for China.

The discussion concluded by noting that China’s leadership role and influence in the Gulf and Asia regions are growing, with these countries welcoming China more favorably compared to the West, as pointed out by Khaled Almaeena earlier. China has become a significant player in geopolitical bloc politics. At the same time, many Arab nations aspire to become members of SCO. At the same time, Yun Sun stated that it’s not clear what tangible successes the organization has achieved.

Meanwhile United States has also formed alternative regional groupings driven by geopolitics, such as I2U2 and QUAD, but their effectiveness is questionable as well. As Daniel Markey commented, there is a question of rhetoric and reality when it comes to these organizations.

Recommendations for US Policy

Recommendations were made for US policy, with panelists agreeing that the US should not completely disengage or overreact to Chinese influence in a state of anxiety. Instead, the US should adopt a clearer approach to its political, economic, and security interests in the region. Viewing US relations with its partners in the Middle East and Asia within the framework of great power competition with China may negatively impact the US approach and its interests.

The post Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States appeared first on Politact.

Chinese investments, trade relations, diplomatic overtures, and geopolitical penetration of the Gulf and South Asia are broadly altering the economic and political landscapes of local countries. Notable developments like the Chinese-brokered Saudi Arabia-Iran agreement signed in March 2023, the roughly $300 billion economic and security pact China reached with Iran in 2021, and ongoing work on the $65 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) have all reshaped strategic thinking across the region.

PoliTact and MEI cordially invites you to virtual event that will examine the growing multifaceted impact of Beijing’s outreach to the wider Middle East  — namely the countries of the Gulf and South Asia. In what ways did Pakistan’s close relations and economic dependency on China influence its reaction to the growing Chinese involvement with Saudi Arabia and Iran? What has a more regionally engaged China meant for Afghanistan’s Taliban government? And how has India, with its expanding economic links to Arab countries and Iran as well as long-running defense ties with Russia, reacted to increased Chinese involvement in all those key partners? Please join us as our assembled scholars discuss these questions, think through the possible consequences of China’s policies for the unfolding Great Power competition across the region, and consider whether and how the United States should reprioritize its global strategic and security interests in response.

Speakers

Yun Sun
Senior Fellow and Co-Director, China, East Asia, Stimson Center

Daniel Markey
Senior Advisor, South Asia Programs, USIP

Khaled Almaeena
Fmr. Editor-in-Chief, Arab News; Saudi Gazette

Syed Mohammad Ali
Non-Resident Scholar, Middle East Institute

Gerald M. Feierstein, moderator
Distinguished Senior Fellow on U.S. Diplomacy; Director, Arabian Peninsula Program, Middle East Institute

When:
May 22, 2023
10:00 am-11:30 am

Related Events:

Biden’s Middle East Policy, China-Iran Ties, and CPEC, December 28, 2020

Examining Saudi-Iran Tensions And Its Impact On South Asia, China
January 4, 2019

The post China’s Expanding Involvement in South Asia and the Saudi-Iran Détente appeared first on Politact.