The Geography of Stalemate: Risk Thresholds, Narrative Warfare, and the Quest for a New Regional Order

By Naade Ali

Context

Since the war began, it has become clear that the U.S., Israel, and Iran operate with fundamentally different risk thresholds—and those differences shape their strategies. The U.S. is less willing to tolerate prolonged economic strain but more inclined to employ overwhelming force, assuming it will bring the conflict to a swift conclusion. Israel, on the other hand, is betting on a scenario in which Iranian strikes on Gulf states provoke diplomatic backlash, potentially drawing those states into retaliatory action. Such a chain of events could pave the way for the broader regional alignment envisioned by Prime Minister Netanyahu, aimed at countering “radical Shi’a and Sunni forces” and ultimately weakening the Iranian regime. Israel, therefore, is prepared to bear the costs necessary to make this outcome possible.

From Iran’s perspective, the goal is to prevent this scenario from unfolding while influencing on GCC that American military presence on their soil has a cost and no benefit. Iran’s mosaic military doctrine is designed to endure sustained pressure while simultaneously increasing unpredictability and risk, making its actions more dangerous and uncertain. This high-risk tolerance remains one of its few tools to establish and maintain deterrence—something it is unlikely to compromise.

Iran’s geography plays a key role in its Anti-Access/Area-Denial

At present, it appears that the world’s most advanced military systems, equipped with cutting-edge and futuristic capabilities, are fundamentally constrained by geographical realities. Iran’s geography is a central “force multiplier” for its Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategy, effectively turning the country into a natural fortress that complicates any conventional military intervention. The superior airpower fielded by Israel and the United States has not translated into absolute control over critical chokepoints held by Iran, nor has it succeeded in dismantling the undersea and “Undermountain” missile infrastructure that keeps Iran’s defensive network largely operational and difficult to conquer despite relentless bombardment. These deeply embedded installations, carved into the Zagros Mountains, act as fortified nodes that enable Iran to sustain command-and-control functions.

While air strikes can degrade capabilities, complete neutralization requires a high-intensity land campaign—a scenario fraught with risk. Iran’s military doctrine leverages its unique topography, using natural barriers and limited access points to offset an adversary’s technological edge. For any invading force, the combination of logistical hurdles and Iran’s mastery of its difficult terrain makes a quick victory highly improbable. Consequently, U.S. strategy faces a stark trade-off: rely on stand-off strikes that degrade but do not eliminate threats, or escalate toward high-risk options for more decisive results. This geographic and structural advantage effectively cements a strategic stalemate, as Iran’s hardened infrastructure and ‘natural fortress’ prevent any effort from achieving a rapid military outcome.

For Iran, prolonging the conflict appears to be the preferred course at this stage. Tehran has deliberately increased the costs of the war to unprecedented levels so it can have maximum leverage in negotiations with the United States, with its core demands of—financial compensation, the removal of all sanctions, a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region and recognition of its control over strategic maritime chokepoints.

Iran’s use of threat language is particularly significant in this regard. The rhetoric can exert psychological pressure on adversaries, yet it risks backfiring if not supported by actual capability. In Iran’s case, however, its warnings have proven credible rather than symbolic. This is demonstrated by its selective attacks on regional countries and control over the Strait of Hormuz, where only vessels linked to China are permitted passage, effectively transforming global trade into a strategic instrument against the U.S. alliance.

The Narrative Pivot: Trump’s Strategy of Perception Over Conquest

In the conflict with Iran, Trump’s “winning card” is his ability to control the narrative, prioritizing the appearance of victory over the reality of a physical win. He relies on narrative dominance, using the perception of a diplomatic breakthrough to maintain both domestic support and global leverage. While he projects an image of Iran “begging” for a deal, the actual conflict on the ground remains a complex stalemate.

The sudden and highly visible emphasis on diplomacy, initiated under the Islamabad Talks, reflects a calculated effort to manage domestic expectations through narrative control. By steering attention toward backchannel negotiations, President Trump diverts focus from military challenges or internal criticism. It illustrates a broader tactic of strategic distraction: when one narrative weakens, another is introduced to create uncertainty. This deliberate blurring of facts makes it harder for the public to form clear judgments or hold leadership accountable. In this way, confusion becomes a tool—dampening opposition and creating space for an exit framed more by optics than by conventional military success.

On the other side, deeper internal challenges confronting the Trump administration are becoming increasingly evident. Among them is a formal Pentagon request for $200 billion to sustain military operations, a proposal that has provoked strong criticism and concern among both Democrats and fiscal conservatives in Congress. Democrats are actively leveraging the conflict for political advantage, accusing Trump of leading the United States into an unnecessary and prolonged war while positioning themselves ahead of the November midterm elections in hopes of securing a legislative majority. Meanwhile, Republicans with long-term political aspirations—like Vice President JD Vance, widely considered a likely contender for the 2028 presidential race—are encountering increasing challenges in presenting a persuasive “America First” vision as the conflict drags on.

It was during the widespread fatigue and disillusionment from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that Trump originally solidified his “America First” persona. Yet, the prolonged confrontation with Iran threatens to undermine that narrative, as rising casualties, economic strain, and geopolitical entanglements make it harder for emerging Republican leaders to argue for restrained foreign intervention while projecting strength abroad. Vance and others must now navigate a delicate balance: appealing to a voter base that values both national security and fiscal prudence, while demonstrating that they can manage a complex, protracted conflict without repeating the mistakes of previous administrations. This tension illustrates how domestic political ambitions are increasingly intertwined with the outcomes and perception of foreign military engagements.

As a result, the U.S. campaign against Iran has generated numerous challenges and setbacks that outweigh its tactical military achievements to date.

Israeli Game Plan

For Israel, the conflict represents a rare and historic opportunity to significantly weaken Iran. The country appears prepared for a prolonged confrontation; recent surveys indicate that 81% of Israelis support military action, with many willing to endure sustained attacks to see the collapse of the Iranian regime. Years of conflict with Hamas and Hezbollah have conditioned Israel to absorb both psychological and physical strain. In such an environment, hardship becomes normalized, allowing for greater societal resilience. While both Iran and Israel appear capable of enduring prolonged shocks, the United States lacks the same tolerance, creating a possible divergence in strategic trajectories.

In Israel’s view, the objective is to push further toward definitive regime change. However, it recognizes that airstrikes alone are unlikely to achieve this goal, which is why it is increasingly considering the possibility of a ground invasion, potentially with U.S. support. Such a move, however, would likely initiate a prolonged conflict. Israel understands that ending the war prematurely would risk undermining the gains it has already made. While this could help the Israeli government to maintain domestic unity by framing the conflict as an existential necessity, it would not necessarily produce similar political benefits for President Trump or his Republican Party at home.

For the United States, one possible course could involve stepping back and allowing Iran and Israel to confront each other directly. However, Iran appears to have anticipated such a scenario and does not intend for the conflict to remain confined. Its recent shift in military doctrine—confirmed by Major General Ali Abdollahi as a transition from defense to offense—indicates an ambition to expand the effects of the war from a regional to a global scale. By exploiting interconnected vulnerable systems of energy, food, and trade, Iran seeks to create a cascading effect in which damage inflicted upon it reverberates worldwide. Its broader objective appears to be the erosion of U.S. dominance and the restructuring of global power toward a Chinese-centered order.

By encouraging Arab states to align with China’s Global Security Initiative, Iran is promoting an alternative model of security that prioritizes sovereignty over U.S. involvement. In effect, it is attempting to achieve through warfare what China could not accomplish solely through economic means. This strategic gameplay was acknowledged by President Trump himself, who described the situation as a ‘big chess game’ suggesting that Iran is acting as a “smart player, playing high-level chess.”

Iran is striving to ensure that any resolution to the conflict will not restore the pre-war status quo. Instead, it seeks to extract maximum gains whenever negotiations take place. If Iran’s objectives are realized and revenues begin to flow, Iran would not only rebuild its economy but also invest heavily in military modernization, developing capabilities that could prove extremely difficult to counter in any future confrontation.

This prospect is deeply concerning for Israel, which anticipates that a post-war Iran could emerge as a highly militarized and resilient power. From Israel’s perspective, the only viable strategy is to continue the war and ensure that Iran is weakened to such an extent that rebuilding its military strength would take decades. However, such an approach demands sustained endurance, strategic patience, and a high tolerance for risk—traits that Iran has already demonstrated.

Whether Israel can maintain this level of resilience remains uncertain, and this question will become clearer as the conflict continues. This is not a short-term confrontation, but a prolonged struggle likely to reshape regional power dynamics. With diplomatic positions varying and domestic political pressures mounting, the conflict is likely to persist. The result is a negative-sum dynamic in which decisive victory remains unlikely; escalation risks stay high, and any eventual endgame will reflect not shared interests but the relative exhaustion and leverage of the parties involved.

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The post The US-Israel and Iran Conflict: The Interplay of Goals and Strategies appeared first on Politact.

By Arif Ansar

Context

The Middle East’s contemporary realignment did not begin with the war between Iran and Israel, nor with Iranian strikes on U.S. bases across the Gulf. It began earlier, with the slow erosion of faith in a security order built on American primacy, Israeli military overmatch, and the assumption of Arab strategic compliance. The Israeli strike on Doha in September 2025 merely stripped away the last illusions. What followed was not unity, but fragmentation. Instead, the Islamic world entered a phase of deliberate Middle Power alliance‑building, driven by layered threat perceptions and an urgent desire for strategic autonomy.

At the center of this transformation is a paradox. The region is witnessing the rise of new alliances, yet these alliances are not designed to fight a single enemy. They are instead meant to buffer against multiple threats simultaneously: Iranian asymmetry, Israeli unilateralism, and U.S. unpredictability. Complicating this further is the re‑emergence of the “Greater Israel” narrative, which has amplified regional fears that Israeli military power is no longer bounded by defensive logic alone.

From Gulf Unity to Gulf Divergence

For much of the post‑Arab Spring period, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates were viewed as the twin pillars of Arab order. They coordinated in Yemen, aligned against political Islam, and worked closely with Washington. That partnership now seem to have fractured into a structural rivalry rooted in fundamentally different understandings of power and risk.

Saudi Arabia has increasingly embraced a state‑centric, formalized security approach and strategic autonomy. Scarred by years of proxy warfare and conscious of the vulnerability of its economic transformation under Vision 2030, Riyadh has grown wary of open‑ended confrontation—particularly wars triggered by actors outside its control. Iranian attacks on energy infrastructure, U.S. bases, and shipping lanes reinforced Saudi fears not just of Tehran, but of being caught between Washington and Tehran. This explains Riyadh’s pivot toward formal defense guarantees, most notably with Pakistan, and its growing strategic convergence with Turkey.

The UAE, by contrast, has doubled down on a networked, maritime, and technology‑driven security model. Abu Dhabi prefers flexible alignments, proxy leverage, and intelligence dominance over rigid alliance hierarchies. Its deepening ties with Israel and India reflect a desire to hedge not only against Iran, but also against Saudi Arabia’s ambition to re‑centralize Arab leadership. This divergence—well captured in PoliTact’s analysis of Saudi‑UAE power tussles with Turkey and Iran—has become one of the most important drivers of bloc formation in the region. The result is not a split over ideology, but over risk management. Riyadh fears escalation without control; Abu Dhabi fears marginalization within a Saudi‑led order.

As Middle Power alliances harden across the Middle East, the other Gulf states—Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait—illustrate divergent strategies for managing exposure, autonomy, and survival amid the erosion of the U.S.-centric security order. Unlike Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which seek to shape regional outcomes through competing alliance architectures, these states operate primarily as system navigators, each responding differently to rising unilateralism and unmanaged escalation.

Qatar occupies the most exposed position. Its foreign policy has emphasized mediation, diplomatic connectivity, and hosting high‑level interlocutors, allowing Doha to play a central role in ceasefire negotiations and crisis diplomacy. This strategy, however, has carried increasing risk. The Israeli airstrike in Doha in September 2025—widely analyzed as a stress test for Gulf mediation and U.S. security guarantees—demonstrated the limits of protection derived from connectivity alone and raised questions about the durability of mediator immunity in a more permissive strike environment. Mediation provides access and relevance, but as escalation becomes kinetic, it offers diminishing insulation.

Bahrain represents the opposite strategy. Rather than seeking autonomy through flexibility, Manama has embedded itself deeply within Saudi‑led and U.S.‑aligned security structures. Hosting the U.S. Fifth Fleet and relying on external guarantees for regime stability, Bahrain externalizes risk upward to larger patrons, trading strategic maneuverability for protection. This approach offers short‑term stability but reduces Bahrain’s ability to hedge as the regional order fragments.

Oman occupies a quieter middle ground. Like Qatar, Muscat prioritizes mediation, but it does so through deliberate low visibility and strategic restraint. Omani diplomacy is characterized by neutrality, confidentiality, and avoidance of high‑profile military entanglements, allowing it to act as an intermediary without becoming a primary target. This combination has enabled Oman to preserve autonomy with comparatively lower exposure.

Kuwait, meanwhile, adopts a strategy of institutional caution. Its foreign policy emphasizes international law, neutrality, and multilateral legitimacy, shaped in part by domestic constitutional constraints and a historically empowered legislature. Kuwait avoids both alliance leadership and high‑risk mediation, focusing instead on predictability and restraint as a means of survival.

Taken together, these cases highlight the narrowing options available to small states in a region increasingly defined by unilateral force and competitive alignment. Flexibility, dependence, invisibility, and restraint each offer partial protection—but none fully insulate against a security environment in which traditional guarantees no longer reliably constrain escalation.

The Emergence of an “Islamic NATO” and Hexagon Alignment

Out of this environment has emerged what is increasingly described as an Islamic NATO‑style alignment, anchored by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, with Turkey as a central pillar. This bloc is often misunderstood as a purely anti‑Iran coalition. In reality, it is built on three overlapping threat perceptions.

First is Iranian asymmetry: missile forces, drones, and proxies that threaten energy infrastructure and regime stability. Second is U.S. unpredictability—the fear that American military decisions, often aligned closely with Israeli objectives, could entangle Muslim states in wars they neither seek nor control. Third is Israeli strategic autonomy, particularly as Israel demonstrates a willingness to strike across borders without regard for Arab diplomatic calculations.

The Pakistan–Saudi defense agreement reflects this logic. Pakistan offers nuclear credibility and conventional depth; Turkey provides expeditionary experience, NATO interoperability, and drone warfare expertise; Saudi Arabia contributes financial resources and diplomatic weight. Together, they form a deterrence architecture designed less to confront Israel directly than to prevent Muslim states from being involuntary participants in U.S.–Israeli campaigns. This bloc is therefore as much about autonomy as opposition.

Parallel to the perceived Islamic NATO is a looser but influential alignment in infancy, centered on Israel, India, and potentially UAE—often described as a Hexagon Alliance when extended to include additional partners. This bloc is driven by a different hierarchy of threats and economic incentives. For Israel, the priority remains Iran, but also the risk of regional isolation should Sunni states consolidate into a unified security framework. India views the Gulf through the lens of maritime security, energy flows, and competition with China. The UAE sees in this alignment a way to offset Saudi leadership ambitions while retaining access to Israeli technology and U.S. strategic networks. This bloc is not primarily anti‑Islamic. It is anti‑consolidation. Its purpose is to ensure that no single Sunni‑led alliance can dominate the region’s security architecture.

Greater Israel as a Strategic Disruptor
One of the most destabilizing factors shaping alliance behavior today is not a military doctrine, but a narrative: the re‑emergence of the idea of Greater Israel. While not an official policy of the Israeli state, the concept—rooted in religious‑nationalist ideology and echoed by influential political figures—has gained unprecedented visibility during and after the Gaza war. Regional actors interpret this discourse as signaling a rejection of territorial finality and Palestinian sovereignty. Al Jazeera and Middle East Eye have documented how references to biblical borders and permanent Israeli control “from the river to the sea” have triggered alarm across Arab and Muslim capitals.

The destabilizing effect of the Greater Israel narrative is threefold. First, it reframes Israeli military action as potentially expansionist rather than defensive. Second, it undermines the political sustainability of normalization agreements by making it harder for Arab leaders to justify cooperation without a Palestinian resolution. Third, it reinforces the perception that U.S. power in the region is structurally aligned with Israeli territorial objectives rather than regional stability. Even states aligned with Israel, such as the UAE, hedge against this uncertainty. Others respond by accelerating independent deterrence mechanisms.

Great Power Rivalry and the Turn to Hedging

The Islamic world is no longer a passive theater of Great Power rivalry. It is actively shaping a multipolar order in which Middle Powers hedge against everyone—including their allies. The Saudi–UAE split, the rise of Islamic NATO and Hexagon formations, the disruptive force of the Greater Israel narrative, and the quiet advance of China and Russia all point to the same conclusion: the era of uncontested security hierarchies in the Middle East is over. What replaces it is not stability, but agency. And in a region long defined by external control, that may be the most consequential shift of all.

As regional blocs multiply, China and Russia benefit not by conquest but by optionality. China’s deepening involvement in South Asia and the Gulf—through infrastructure, security arrangements, energy, and industrial investment—positions Beijing as an indispensable economic partner to all sides without entanglement in regional wars. Russia, meanwhile, offers selective military alternatives, reinforcing a multipolar security environment in which no single actor dominates. Neither power demands ideological alignment; both profit from fragmentation.

Who Are These Alliances Really Meant to Counter?

The central question—who are these alliances meant to counter—has no single answer. They are not aimed solely at Iran, Israel, or the United States. They seemed designed to manage uncertainty in a system where all three generate risk. Iran threatens through asymmetry. Israel threatens through unilateral escalation and expansionist rhetoric. The United States threatens—not intentionally, but structurally—through unpredictability and alignment choices that subordinate regional interests to global strategy and balance of power calculations.

For Saudi Arabia, Iran is dangerous not only because of missiles and proxies, but because Iranian escalation reliably draws in U.S. and Israeli responses that Riyadh does not command. For the UAE, Iran is disruptive but manageable through deterrence, diversification, and diplomacy. For Israel, Iran is framed as an existential threat demanding pre‑emptive action. For Turkey and Pakistan, Iran is a competitor to be balanced, not annihilated.

Iran’s retaliatory attacks on U.S. bases in GCC states did not unify the region. Instead, they exposed the costs of hosting American power. Gulf monarchies found themselves targeted not for their own actions, but for decisions made in Washington and Tel Aviv. As the Carnegie Endowment has noted, this dynamic has pushed Gulf states toward independent security thinking rather than deeper reliance on U.S. guarantees. In this sense, Iran functions less as the architect of regional order than as its accelerator—forcing others to adapt. The alliances forming across the Islamic world appear to be alliances of insulation, not crusades. They seek to preserve autonomy, reduce exposure, and prevent any single power from dictating outcomes.

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The post Geopolitics Of Islamic World And Middle Power Alliances After Iran Attack appeared first on Politact.

By Naade Ali

President Trump and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) are redefining the U.S.-Saudi alliance to address China’s rising influence and the Gaza crisis, effectively moving the partnership beyond its traditional foundations. Since their inception, the Saudi-US relations have experienced fluctuations but have been sustained by overlapping strategic interests and mutual dependencies. At the center of their crucible of interaction stood a security–petrodollar arrangement. Even when relations hit their lowest point, the core bargain held: Saudi Arabia continued selling oil in dollars and remained a key supplier to the United States, while Washington preserved its role as the Kingdom’s primary security guarantor and leading defense provider.

However, shifting global dynamics, fueled in part by intensifying great power competition between China and the United States, have pushed middle powers like Saudi Arabia to reduce their dependence on any single major actor and seek greater strategic autonomy. While this shift has broadened their ambitions, it has also uncovered greater opportunities and challenges. The Saudi-US relations are not indifferent to these evolving dynamics, with both countries recalibrating their bilateral ties along new strategic dimensions.

Saudi Arabia as a Swing State in the U.S.–China Rivalry

Today’s Saudi Arabia appears to be hedging away from over reliance on the United States, building a strategy centered on its pragmatic interests and exercising sovereign leverage. This helps in deal-making and to secure the space needed to navigate the great power rivalry. Saudi Arabia’s move to reduce its dependence on the United States gained momentum exactly when ties with Washington soured under the Biden administration. Confronted with the unpredictability of American policy, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) found an attractive alternative in Beijing, which offered strategic engagement without preconditions. Closer ties with China enabled Saudi Arabia to pursue a multidimensional strategy, diversify its partnerships, and maintain the flexibility necessary to manage uncertainties in its relationship with Washington.

For China, Saudi Arabia became a central pillar for expanding regional influence in the Middle East. Riyadh hosted the first-ever China-Arab States Summit and, through Beijing’s mediation, reconciled diplomatic ties with Tehran. Further consolidating their ties with Beijing, both Tehran and Riyadh also integrated into multilateral blocs where China and Russia hold considerable sway, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS. Additionally, China strengthened economic relations with the Kingdom, becoming its largest trading partner and providing robust support for Vision 2030. A major payoff of Saudi Arabia’s strategic pivot toward China was that it transformed Saudi Arabia into a geopolitical swing state. This effectively signaled to Washington it is fully prepared to deepen ties with Beijing unless the U.S. proactively restores its coveted central role.

The Trump–MBS Summit: A Strategic Inflection Point

President Trump’s extraordinary embrace of Mohammed bin Salman during his visit to Washington in November suggests that Riyadh’s calibrated swing-state posture is working. Riyadh now carries significant geostrategic weight and has taken center stage in the U.S.–China competition for influence in the Middle East.

Trump’s approach to strategic competition with China rests on two pillars: credible deterrence and tightening of alignment with key U.S. middle power partners. Within this framework, any complete Saudi drift into Beijing’s orbit is viewed as strategically unacceptable. At the same time, he is acutely aware of the practical limits of attempting to sever Riyadh’s growing relationship with Beijing, recognizing that containment of China cannot succeed solely through coercive pressure on allies to reverse course.

As evidenced by President Trump’s foreign policy conduct, he employs a distinctive blend of generous incentives and far-reaching, exclusive agreements in energy, critical minerals, technology, and defense. These arrangements simultaneously fortify bilateral partnerships and allow middle powers, such as Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to maintain a semblance of strategic autonomy in their relations with China. Beneath this veneer, however, the United States methodically secures alignment on matters of vital national interest, while deliberately imposing significant strategic costs on any partner that leans excessively toward Beijing.

Nevertheless, Trump’s transactional foreign policy has provided Saudi Arabia with an opportunity for adjusting its own strategy, allowing the Kingdom to pursue a more robust, interest-driven relationship with Washington. Riyadh recognizes that being a center of the Islamic holy places provides it immense influence in the Muslim world. United States relies on it not only to balance China in the Middle East but also to help secure a stable regional environment for Israel. This is a goal that, in Trump’s view, could be advanced if Saudi Arabia joins the Abraham Accords, potentially encouraging other Arab and Muslim countries to follow suit.

The Summit Outcome

Through Vision 2030 reforms and skillful diplomatic maneuvering, the Kingdom has transcended its traditional role. This transformation not only redirects the calculus of their bilateral partnership but also carries profound implications for the Middle East’s balance of power and the broader dynamics of great power competition. It has emerged as a pivotal regional powerhouse whose energy resources, vast investment capital, and geopolitical influence make it indispensable to both Washington and Beijing.

During their meeting, President Trump stated he was “the best friend Saudi Arabia has ever had in Washington,” a statement that highlighted his administration’s desire to deepen ties through personal rapport. Nevertheless, the agreements concluded between the two leaders demonstrate that the U.S.-Saudi relationship remains firmly grounded in their respective national interests and strategic imperatives, with both seeking to extract maximum advantage.

President Trump secured a $1 trillion investment pledge from the Crown Prince, alongside the signing of a Strategic Framework for Cooperation. This framework includes Saudi commitments to supply uranium, metals, permanent magnets, and critical minerals essential for U.S. defense and energy sectors. Leveraging Saudi Arabia’s vast deposits of rare earth elements (REEs), Trump advanced his goal of countering China’s dominance in critical minerals.

For his part, Crown Prince achieved major strategic gains: the Kingdom was granted major non-NATO ally status, a defense agreement was finalized, and approval was secured for the purchase of American F-35 fighter jets and other advanced weapons. These acquisitions will strengthen Saudi defense architecture. Additionally, in line with its ambition to become a global hub for artificial intelligence, Saudi Arabia also gained access to advanced AI chips and U.S. technology firms to support the development of its domestic AI infrastructure.

US-Saudi Ties and Gaza Peace Plan

The Washington meeting between President Trump and the Crown Prince highlighted both progress and persistent challenges in U.S.–Saudi relations, with Saudi-Israel normalization remaining a key point of divergence. While Trump pressed Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords, Mohammed bin Salman insisted that any normalization depend on Israel committing to “an irreversible, credible, and time-bound path toward Palestinian statehood.” Following the Israel–Gaza conflict, Riyadh has emerges as a leading advocate for international recognition of Palestine, a position consistently opposed by the U.S. and Israel. Its refusal to yield to Trump’s push for normalization reflects the broader post-war realities in Gaza.

By taking this stance, Crown Prince delivered a twofold message: First, the strengthening of U.S.–Saudi ties must remain entirely independent of any precondition for Saudi–Israeli normalization. Second, while Riyadh is open in principle to normalization, Israel’s refusal to recognize Palestinian statehood remains a major impediment. While Riyadh supports the Trump Gaza peace plan in principle, it rejects full Israeli control over the Gaza territory and insists on concrete conditions: a time-bound Israeli withdrawal, the deployment of an international protection force, and the reinstatement of authority to the Palestinian Authority.

Saudi Arabia’s demands on the Palestinian issue clash directly with Israel’s red lines, leaving Washington struggling to balance relations with both capitals. From Israel’s viewpoint, the rapidly deepening U.S.–Saudi partnership, explicitly decoupled from any obligation of Saudi–Israeli normalization, raises two profound concerns. First, it risks elevating Riyadh’s regional influence while undermining Israel’s primary strategic objective: the expansion of the Abraham Accords. Second, as long as Riyadh continues to regard Israel as a principal source of regional instability, not Iran, the possibility persists that Saudi Arabia could further deepen its relations with Iran.

Historically, the shared enmity toward Iran has been the bedrock of both the U.S.–Israel alliance and U.S.–Saudi security relations. Following their China-brokered détente, Riyadh and Tehran no longer see each other as existential threats. To prevent Washington from viewing improved Saudi–Iranian ties with alarm, Mohammed bin Salman has carefully framed them as potentially beneficial to the United States, offering to help the U.S and Iran reach a deal that could be vital to regional stability. Riyadh can indeed encourage Iran to talk, but persuading Tehran to accept U.S. terms is no less daunting than U.S. convincing Israel to meet Saudi demands on Palestine. The scenario thus exposes the limits of influence on both sides: neither Washington nor Riyadh can fully impose their will on Israel and Iran.

The Washington summit also revealed a deeper convergence: the United States and Saudi Arabia need each other to achieve their core objectives in the Middle East. Under the Trump approach, US appears willing to delegate primary responsibility for preserving and enforcing the U.S.-led order in the Middle East to Saudi Arabia. However, for Riyadh to fully assume the role of America’s pre-eminent regional partner, it will also have to bear the main burden of protecting U.S. interests, containing rivals, and upholding the existing regional architecture.

Such an alignment would signal to Iran that Saudi Arabia had become the de facto guarantor and enforcer of core American interests. A U.S.–Saudi power-sharing arrangement would also carry significant implications for Israel. Confronted with a region increasingly shaped around Saudi primacy, Israel would face a stark choice: either challenge Riyadh and risk damaging its own relationship with Washington, or accommodate Saudi terms and move toward normalization on conditions set by the Kingdom. Under this approach, in which Saudi Arabia and the United States emerge as mutually reinforcing strategic partners, both are able to secure the outcomes they seek from Iran and Israel.

The Saudi-UAE Rivalry and Yemen Conflict

As the new year begins, the region is no longer defined by “Arabs vs. Iran” or “Islamists vs. Monarchies,” but by the fallout of weakening Iran that is creating a power vacuum. Muslim Middle Powers are competing to to fill the space, illustrated by the Saudi-UAE split. In places of old alliances, new ones are taking shape premised on cold, transactional game of national interest. And these tensions are playing out from Yemen to Syria, Sudan, Libya, and Somalia.

While the Trump-MBS summit secured vital U.S. interests in energy and defense, it exposed the fragility of the broader regional architecture. Saudi Arabia is acting like a state, prioritizing borders, stability, and institutions to protect Vision 2030. The UAE resembles a corporation, prioritizing ports, trade routes, and resource extraction. Turkey and Qatar are navigating the space between them, leveraging their military and ideological assets to carve out their own spheres of influence.

Similarly, President Trump’s “20-Point Peace Plan,” unveiled in September 2025, was predicated on a unified regional architecture: Gulf capital would fund reconstruction, Egyptian-Turkish logistics would secure the ground, Pakistan-Indonesia-Turkey may be part of the International Stabilization Force (ISF), and Israeli-Saudi normalization would provide the political horizon.

As of late December 2025, the dramatic rupture between Saudi Arabia and the UAE—culminating in the Saudi airstrike on UAE-backed assets in Mukalla, Yemen—has shattered the “Sunni Coalition” prerequisite for the plan’s success. The 20-point framework is now being pulled apart by the competing power centers and Israel may find itself the short-term beneficiary of Arab fragmentation. Unless Washington can repair the rupture within the Gulf Cooperation Council, its grand strategy for the Middle East risks becoming a two-legged stool: supported by a strong U.S.-Saudi bilateral deal, but lacking the regional stability required to stand.

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The post Saudi Arabia as a Rising Middle Power: The Trump-MBS Summit, China, and the Future of Gaza appeared first on Politact.

PoliTact’s Global Security Study

With inputs from Naade Ali and Arif Ansar

Context

Negotiations on the Trump’s 20-point Gaza Peace Package has been ongoing in Egypt since Monday, and the deal on the first phase between Hamas and Israel was announced on October 8th. At first glance, the focus appears to be on tactical choices, such as cease-fires, hostage exchanges, the future of Gaza, the fate of Hamas, and whether the Abraham Accords survive the region’s new trauma. Trump’s plan is pragmatic: a phased cease-fire, hostage-prisoner swaps, an interim technocratic authority to oversee Gaza reconstruction and demilitarization. However, it’s much vaguer where the politics bite: long-term political status, refugee questions, and Palestinian statehood.

The leaders of eight Muslim-majority states: Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Türkiye, Indonesia, Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan, who met Trump on the sidelines of the 80th UN General Assembly in New York, had expressed support for the plan in a joint statement, praising his “sincere efforts to end the war in Gaza” and expressing confidence in his ability to achieve peace. However, the text of the plan released subsequently has raised concerns among Arab countries and drawn significant domestic criticism, as it deviates from the proposals of the foreign ministers of the eight Muslim states. Reports indicate that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu secured “the last word,” persuading Washington to make additional changes at a stage when it was harder for the Muslim countries to intervene.

How the Gaza question is resolved — whether as a primarily security-led stabilization by disarming, re-building, and technocratic governance or as a political settlement that recognizes Palestinian political rights in a durable way — is yet to be seen. An Israeli-U.S. approach that produces security and normalization without a credible, enforceable pathway to Palestinian political rights and without addressing refugee claims, settlements or permanent borders risks locking in a durable, managed status quo that advantageously cements Israeli gains and rewards Arab normalization while leaving Palestinian grievances unresolved.

For critics and many Palestinians, the plan’s biggest flaw is that it recapitulates the old “deal by omission” problem — postpone the hard political questions and hope that security fixes suffice. Robert Malley’s long reflection on the failure of past peace processes is a timely reminder that postponing core issues almost guarantees revival of conflict rather than durable peace.

Shift in the Middle East Balance of Power

Since Trump’s first term in power led to Abraham Accords in September 2020, the Middle East is undergoing tumultuous shift in the balance of power. This shift is away from Iran’s axis of resistance and towards those that signed the Abraham Accords – and others that were moving towards accepting it. Highlighting plans to expand the signatories to the Abraham Accord and emphasizing the strategic and economic benefits of cooperating with Israel, Trump recently stated:

“History has shown us that those who establish relations with Israel have thrived, while those who devote resources and attention toward the destruction — even the annihilation — of Israel have languished. Israel is not going anywhere. They are going to coexist with other peoples and countries in the region. The Abraham Accords demonstrate that nations are better off when they communicate, work together, and embrace new opportunities.”

The last five years have seen aggressive Israeli campaigns and intelligence operations directed at damaging — sometimes decisively — Iran’s regional network: kinetic blows, targeted assassinations of key operatives in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, and continued pressure on Iran’s enlistment of militias. Another focus has been the degrading of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, whether by eliminating key scientists, or by cyberattacks on its nuclear facility. In June, US also carried out bombing of the Iran’s nuclear facilities in Fordow, Isfahan, and Nanatz sites.

The net effect has been to cripple Iran’s reach: Hezbollah was weakened on the battlefield during the 2023–24 rounds of fighting; Iran’s Quds Force lost its most iconic commander in Qasem Soleimani in January 2020. Recently, Isreal shifted its focus to the political leadership, which lead to the assassination of Ismael Haniyeh on Iranian soil in July 2024, followed by elimination of Hassan Nasrullah in Lebanon in September 2024. However, it was the Israeli attack on Hamas negotiators in Doha last month that many experts believe may have broken the camel’s back. It blurred the line of who is Israel after – and what does it want to achieve with all the mayhem that followed Oct 7, 2023, tragic Hamas attack on Israel. The campaign against Iran has demonstrated that Israel can play with international rules at will and without any consequences. This will have grave long-term consequences for global order.

But degradation does not mean elimination — proxies adapt, civilian costs grow, and local politics evolve in unpredictable ways. Alongside coercion and violence, normalization diplomacy has quietly reshaped the balance. The Abraham Accords proved that several Arab states were prepared to prioritize trade, technology, and counter-Iran cooperation, over the old formula that required Palestinian statehood before normalization. This bargain created an “outside-in” model of Israeli influence — Israel’s security and economic ties extend into the Arab world even as its control over Palestinian territories and the facts on the ground become more entrenched.

That model has a dual consequence: it strengthens Israel’s regional legitimacy and deterred coalitions, but it also delegitimizes the Palestinian cause in some Arab capitals. Unless meaningful political concessions accompany normalization under the current rounds of peace accords – the situation may plan in the hands of hardliners in the longer run.

Reshaping the New Middle East

The 20-point Trump plan thus revolve around two linked wagers.

First: can an externally led, security-first approach end immediate bloodshed and create a stable environment for reconstruction? Second: can that short-term security compact be turned into a politically legitimate, durable settlement that includes Palestinian rights and prevents radicalization? If the answer to the second question is “no,” then any tactical success will be ephemeral — the security gains will ossify into new grievances and a renewed cycle of violence.

If the American-Israeli tack succeeds in producing a stable Gaza that is demilitarized, internationally managed and economically rebuilt — but without a credible pathway to Palestinian statehood, refugee resolution, or substantive political participation — the regional consequence is likely to be twofold:

(a) the anti-Abraham Accord camp will consolidate, and (b) the Palestinian national cause shifts from mainstream diplomacy back to asymmetric forms of resistance and transnational advocacy. That benefits actors that can exploit grievances — whether non-state actors in the region or international rivals that seek influence by presenting themselves as alternatives to the U.S. model.

Middle East and the Global Balance of Power

Potential failure of the U.S.-Israeli approach does not automatically favor China and Russia — but it creates openings. China and Russia are playing a long game: both have expanded political and economic ties in the Middle East, offering infrastructure, arms, and diplomatic cover without the political conditionalities the West often attaches. Beijing’s economic footprint, growing role in regional institutions, including BRICS partners, and willingness to court Gulf states for energy and investment means it can offer attractive alternatives to American dependency.

Moscow, for its part, remains an arms supplier and a diplomatic interlocutor (especially in Syria), and it relishes opportunities to undercut U.S. influence. If Washington’s approach produces stability without justice, public sentiment may turn away from the U.S. narrative and look to non-Western partners who promise investments or political balance-as as has already started to occur. That said, China and Russia do not currently possess the same depth of security integration with Israel or the same network of alliances that would let them ‘replace’ American influence overnight — what they can do is exploit U.S. credibility gaps to gain economic and political footholds.

The Way Forward

Three practical conclusions emerge from a realistic appraisal of Trump’s 20-point plan:

1. Security outcomes are necessary but not sufficient. Short-term stabilization that includes hostage releases, ceasefires, and reconstruction, is important and politically urgent — but by itself it will not end the conflict’s structural drivers. The old lesson of Oslo remains: postponing core grievances breeds future crises.
2. Normalization without a political track is a strategic accelerant for some actors and a strategic liability for others. States that prioritize economic and security ties with Israel will gain leverage; however, the Arab and Muslim Street will judge outcomes by whether justice is achieved for Palestinians.
3. Geopolitically, every gap left by U.S. leadership, or perceived U.S. indifference to justice, creates space for China and Russia to expand influence — primarily through diplomacy and investment, and secondarily through arms and political support. But neither Beijing nor Moscow offers a ready-made substitute for U.S. regional security guarantees; rather, they offer alternative hedges that regional states will use in pursuit of their own short-term interests.

If Cairo deal and the Trump package are to avoid merely delaying the next crisis they must do three things simultaneously:

Secure an immediate end to mass killing and human suffering; create an inclusive, accountable reconstruction process that gives Palestinians meaningful agency; and set out an enforceable, internationally backed political roadmap that addresses, not postpones, refugee claims, borders and sovereignty – as was done in the Oslo Accords. Without that tripod, any “victory” will be tactical, not strategic — and the balance of power will keep shifting unpredictably, with winners among states and non-state actors who are best at exploiting unresolved grievances.

Related Articles:

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The post From Oslo To Trump’s Abraham Accords And 20-Point Peace Plan For Gaza appeared first on Politact.

By Naade Ali and Guest Analyst Mohammad Siraj Khan

Context

The three-phase ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, brokered in January 2025, aimed to end the protracted conflict in Gaza. Despite initial progress, the deal collapsed by late February due to disagreements over its implementation. Soon Israeli forces resumed a ground invasion into central and southern Gaza and expanded into the north of the enclave.

Phase One of the agreement had envisioned initial ceasefire and humanitarian measures to last 42 days. This was to be accompanied by hostage and prisoner exchanges and partial withdrawal of Israeli forces from populated areas in Gaza, with significant increase in humanitarian assistance to Gaza. Phase Two would include comprehensive agreements with negotiations for the release of remaining hostages and full military withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza – accompanied by formal cessation of hostilities. It was Phase Three that focused on reconstruction and long-term stability with international support, along with security guarantees to ensure long-term peace while averting future flare-ups.

Israel claimed that the negotiations with Hamas were ineffective, and Netanyahu warned that continued military pressure on Hamas was essential for hostage release and maintained that the current actions were ‘just the beginning.’ As tensions continue to rise, the Israeli cabinet approved an escalation of military pressure on Hamas, with Prime Minister Netanyahu asserting that the approach was “working” to secure a deal for the release of hostages held in the Gaza Strip.

Subsequently, Hamas agreed to accept an Egyptian-mediated proposal to release five living hostages in exchange for a 50-day ceasefire in Gaza. However, Israel rejected the offer, insisting on the release of 10 or 11 hostages as a prerequisite for resuming the truce.

Netanyahu also indicated his readiness to negotiate the final phase of the deal on his terms, which would see Hamas leaders permanently leave Gaza. “Hamas will lay down its weapons. Its leaders will be allowed to leave [Gaza]. We will take care of general security in the Gaza Strip and enable the implementation of the Trump plan, the voluntary immigration plan… That’s the plan. We’re not hiding it,” he stated. Adding to the Prime Minister’s warnings, Defense Minister Katz has also earlier threatened Hamas with the progressive annexation of Gaza, stating that “the more Hamas persists in its refusal to release the hostages, the more territory it will lose, which will be annexed to Israel.”

U.S President Donald Trump who took credit for the initial ceasefire also backed Israel’s recent military action. White House Press Secretary while blaming Hamas for Israel’s decision to renew its offensive confirmed that President Trump “fully supports Israel“. Upon assuming power, Trump has already ensured Netanyahu that securing Israel’s long-term national security remains a Washington’s key objective.

Trump’s support for Netanyahu was evident in his proposal to neutralize the Hamas threat in Gaza by displacing the entire population and permanently resettling them in countries such as Egypt and Jordan, while also suggesting long-term U.S. control over the strip in the post-conflict period.

Arab Plan for Gaza and Disarmament of Hamas

In response to backlash from Muslim-majority countries within the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Trump abandoned his mass displacement plan announced earlier. Still cautious of his intentions, members of the Arab League proposed an alternative post-war plan for Gaza, advocating for its reconstruction at a cost of $53 billion under the administration of a temporary committee of independent experts, along with the deployment of UN peacekeepers to prevent further escalation of the crisis.

The Palestinian Authority and Hamas have both endorsed the Arab plan. Western nations, including France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, have also supported it, viewing the end of Hamas’s control in Gaza as a step toward eliminating the threat to Israel.

However, the U.S. and Israel have rejected the proposal, arguing that it does not prioritize Gaza’s disarmament, fails to address Hamas’s future in the region, and allows the Palestinian Authority to return without sufficient security guarantees to Israel. Meanwhile, Israel plans to establish a government agency under the Defense Ministry to oversee the “voluntary departure” of Palestinians from Gaza.

Saudi Arabia and other states have condemned Israel’s actions, calling them ongoing violations of international law that pave the way for colonial settlements. These states have consistently advocated for a “two-state solution” to the Gaza-Israel conflict, emphasizing the need for an independent Palestinian state.

Netanyahu’s push to displace Palestinians, coupled with his threats to annex Gaza and Trump’s endorsement, has raised concerns among policymakers in the Muslim world that Trump may abandon the two-state framework in favor of a one-state solution.

Iran-U.S. Standoff And Future of Negotiated Settlement

Adding further complexity to the Middle Eastern geopolitical landscape is the ongoing standoff between Iran and the U.S.-Israel alliance. Iranian nuclear ambitions remain a major concern for both the U.S. and Israel. In response, President Trump has reached out to Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei, offering negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, but with a threatening tone. Trump has set a two-month deadline for compliance, warning of severe consequences for Tehran, indirectly referencing potential airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. “My big preference is that we work it out with Iran, but if we don’t work it out, bad things are gonna happen to Iran,” Trump stated.

In turn, Iran has warned the U.S. of a strong response, suggesting that any attack would turn American bases and its regional allies into “powder kegs.” Recently, Iran showcased its growing military power by revealing an expansive underground missile facility known as “Missile City,” complete with missiles, launchers, engines, and other advanced weapons. Iran’s ballistic missile force remains the largest in the Middle East, offering a strategic deterrent and signaling that any conflict with Tehran would be costly and protracted.

To ramp up pressure, the U.S. has been bolstering its military presence in the Middle East. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth recently deployed a second aircraft carrier, the USS Carl Vinson, to join the USS Harry S. Truman strike group, whose deployment was also extended. Additionally, the U.S. sent two B-2 stealth bombers to the Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean, a direct warning to both Iran and Yemen’s Houthi militia. These bombers, capable of carrying 30,000-pound “bunker buster” bombs, are now positioned within striking range of Iran.

U.S. officials have sent mixed signals to Iran. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff has advocated for a diplomatic resolution, while White House National Security Advisor Mike Waltz has adopted a more aggressive tone, stating that the administration aims for the “complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program.”

Iran views Trump’s nuclear talks as an attempt to force Tehran into relinquishing its defense capabilities. “The U.S. means disarmament when it says negotiation,” said Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Speaker of Iran’s Parliament. Despite the tense environment, Tehran has responded to Trump’s letter, stating that while it would not negotiate “under pressure and threats or increased sanctions,” it is open to indirect talks with the U.S. through third-party mediation. The letter was delivered via Oman.

This suggests that despite the threatening rhetoric between the U.S. and Iran, there is some hope for engagement, as both Washington and Tehran seem intent on avoiding a larger confrontation. Although Iran has not identified the third-party mediator, it is speculated that indirect talks may already be underway through channels in the UAE, and potentially with Saudi Arabia, which has previously offered to mediate talks between Iran and the U.S.

Reports have also surfaced of President Trump visiting Saudi Arabia in May. The Kingdom has emerged as a key diplomatic player, having hosted talks between Russia and the U.S. over the Ukraine issue. It holds significant potential to play a similar role in Iran-U.S. negotiations. Recently, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan engaged in discussions on regional developments with his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, signaling a more reconciliatory tone between Riyadh and Tehran. The Saudi Defense Minister also recently visited Iran and hand delivered a letter from King Salman to Ayatollah Khamanei emphasizing collaboration.

A U.S.-Iran deal would offer Saudi Arabia a prominent role at the negotiation table, aligning with its “positive neutrality” foreign policy. This would further elevate Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic weight, positioning it as a major middle power in global statecraft. Through diplomatic mediation, economic investments, and strategic alliances, the Kingdom has demonstrated its commitment to stability and development

Conclusion

The internationalization of the Gaza conflict has further deepened divisions between the U.S.-Israel bloc and Arab states, overshadowing any prospects for normalization. The once-stable U.S.-Middle East partnership that long served as a cornerstone of the international order, is now experiencing a profound paradigm shift as new alliances and strategic realignments begin to emerge.

Recent developments indicate that both Western and Arab capitals are preparing to make pivotal decisions regarding their stances on Gaza and Ukraine. Arab states are seeking Western support for Gaza’s reconstruction and governance, while Western powers, in turn, are expecting Arab backing on the Ukraine conflict. These shifting dynamics are unfolding in response to President Trump’s high-stakes geopolitical gambits, as he remains determined to pursue his unconventional foreign policy approach—applying pressure and demanding concessions from traditional allies and adversaries alike—moves that are already influencing his evolving Middle East strategy.

Mohammad Siraj Khan is a lecturer, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Prince Mohammad Bin Fahd University, Saudi Arabia

The post Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions appeared first on Politact.

By Naade Ali
South Asia and Middle East Fellow

Context

In the post October 7, 2023, Hamas led attack on Israel, the geopolitics of Middle East is fast evolving. This has been accompanied by the loss of Hezbollah leadership in Lebanon and the fall of Assad regime in Syria in December 2024. The inauguration of President Trump on January 20, 2025, has presented unique threats and opportunities regarding the future of two-state solution and Iran.

The likelihood of a broader conflict between Iran and Israel hangs in balance as President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have forged a strong strategic alignment. Meeting with Trump on Feb 4, Netanyahu tried to ensure that U.S. policy remained closely aligned with Israel’s objective of weakening Iran’s defense capabilities, particularly preventing it from ever acquiring nuclear missile power. On the other hand, Iran had hoped that Trump would adopt a pragmatic approach and revive nuclear talks leading to easing of economic pressure. To Iran’s disappointment, Trump pursued the reinstatement of “maximum pressure” policy on Tehran.

However, difference of opinion exists where Netanyahu, sensing an opportunity, is lobbying for a military solution towards Iran. Conversely, Trump is vying for a negotiated settlement while keeping hopes alive for a two-state solution. This he is doing by raising the stakes for the Gulf and Arab nations, who met in Riyadh on February 21 to discuss the future of Gaza. A follow-up emergency meeting of the Arab League is planned on March 4th in Egypt, to present a counter plan to what Trump has proposed.

Trump’s Carrot-and-Stick Approach

The “maximum pressure” doctrine portrays Iran as a destabilizing force and a significant threat to U.S. national interests, centered on three key objectives:

First, it seeks to cripple Iran’s nuclear program through harsh diplomatic and economic sanctions. Second, it aims to weaken Iran’s regional influence by dismantling its network of “proxies” and axis of resistance. This objective has taken on additional significance with the on-going Gaza crisis, elimination of Hezbollah leadership, and the fall Assad regime in Syria. Third, it strives to isolate Iran on the global stage, a move Iran’s president condemned as an attempt to “bring Iran to its knees.”

Justifying his approach, Trump claimed the timing was ideal, stating, “Iran, terrified after losing almost all its air defenses, would love to make a deal with the United States.” Confident that relentless pressure would force Iran into submission, he remains committed to a strategy of economic and diplomatic coercion.

Despite his tough rhetoric, Trump ruled out military intervention, dismissing reports of a potential U.S.-Israel strike as “greatly exaggerated.” While acknowledging Iran’s military ambitions—describing it as “very militant”—he firmly rejected the idea of bombing Iran, stating, “I would much prefer a Verified Nuclear Peace Agreement, which will let Iran peacefully grow and prosper.”

Meanwhile, key Republican leaders, including U.S. Rep. Mike Turner, have stated that Trump’s strategy is designed to “secure a long-term solution that guarantees Israel’s security by preventing Iran and its proxies from ever threatening its sovereignty.” Likewise, Rep. Joe Wilson has praised the maximum pressure campaign, asserting that it would ultimately weaken Iran and dismantle its network of terror proxies.

Israeli Plans

While U.S. President Donald Trump has shown reluctance to engage in direct military action against Iran, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has taken a more assertive approach. According to multiple credible reports, with Iran’s air defense systems significantly weakened and its regional proxies under strain, Netanyahu sees a strategic window to target Iran’s nuclear facilities—whether or not the U.S. supports the move. The American intelligence assessments indicate that Israel is actively considering large-scale strikes on Iranian nuclear sites in the latter half of the year, with Israeli officials expected to urge the Trump administration and key Republican leaders to endorse their plans.

The recent approval by the U.S. State Department of a $7.4 billion arms sale to Israel—including thousands of bombs and missiles set for delivery this year—suggests a broader effort to reinforce Israel’s military capabilities against potential regional threats. Israel already possesses U.S.-made bunker-busting munitions capable of striking Iran’s underground nuclear sites, particularly those concealed within the mountainous terrain of Fordow near Qom. This growing military buildup highlights Israel’s preparedness to neutralize Iran’s security infrastructure if necessary.

Israeli officials have repeatedly affirmed that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are fully prepared to launch strikes on Iranian nuclear sites. Defense Minister Israel Katz has hinted at the possibility of an attack in the coming months. In a letter to incoming U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, Katz wrote:

“The months ahead present both challenges that demand military readiness and opportunities to advance our strategic objectives.” He has previously stated that “Iran’s nuclear facilities are more vulnerable than ever,” suggesting that this moment may offer the best chance to neutralize what Israel perceives as an existential threat.

In essence, the emphasis of the approach is twofold: Israel exerting military pressure while the U.S. working on the economic squeeze. The outcome of the two would either result in a regime change led by the Iranian people – or push the Iranian government to strike a deal with Trump. According to some media reports, if Tehran does not reach an agreement with the U.S. by October, Israel is likely to initiate a military action.

How is Iran Preparing?

President Masoud Pezeshkian has warned that while Israel or its allies “may succeed in damaging Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, they will not be able to strip the country of its ability to rebuild.” His statement came after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected negotiations with the Trump administration, asserting that past talks had neither been rational nor honorable. “Negotiations with America do not solve any of our problems,” Khamenei declared.

President Pezeshkian has accused Trump of engaging in deceptive diplomacy while simultaneously working to undermine his government. While reaffirming that Iran does not seek war, he warned that “Iran will never bow to foreign pressure.” Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi echoed this sentiment, stating that negotiating with Trump would amount to surrender. He further cautioned that any military action by Israel or the U.S. against Iran’s nuclear facilities would trigger an “all-out war,” calling it one of the greatest strategic miscalculations Washington could make.

Last year, Iran announced plans to triple its military budget. Western think tanks estimate that Iran was the fourth-largest military spender in the Middle East in 2023, with a defense budget of approximately $10.3 billion.

On the other hand, Iran has deepened its military and economic cooperation with China and Russia. Despite crippling U.S. sanctions, Iran has found alternative economic mechanisms to sustain itself and remains a key player in the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS.

Some reports suggest that Iran is ramping up its missile program, with a vessel carrying 1,000 tons of Chinese-made chemicals—potentially crucial for missile fuel—recently arriving at an Iranian port. Furthermore, Iranian military has launched its first drone carrier ship, capable of launching stealth attacks, and has acquired Russian Sukhoi-35 fighter jets to modernize its aging air force. A strategic cooperation agreement signed with Moscow in January has further reinforced Tehran’s defense ties. Despite Israel’s escalating rhetoric, Iranian military officials insist that the country’s air defense remains intact and more resilient than ever.

Conclusion

For years, Israel and Iran have been engaged in a shadow conflict, carefully calibrating their actions to avoid all-out war. Recently, Iran has adopted a strategic paradigm described as ‘strategic patience’—a calculated approach that has shielded it from large-scale destruction while reinforcing its self-sufficiency. Iranian Vice President Javad Zarif has dismissed speculation that Iran might resort to nuclear weapons as a last-ditch effort for survival or deterrence. Instead, he emphasized that the nation’s self-reliant defense strategy ensures resilience against external pressure.

However, The New York Times has reported that Iran may be discreetly exploring the possibility of developing nuclear weapons should its leadership decide to take that path. According to the report, since resuming fuel production, Iran has accumulated enough enriched uranium to construct at least four nuclear bombs. While Iran has the technical expertise to develop a basic nuclear device relatively quickly, it currently lacks the capability to integrate such a weapon into a ballistic missile system. Nonetheless, a successful nuclear test could allow Iran to declare itself a nuclear-armed state, significantly altering the strategic balance in the region.

While Iran’s conventional military strength does not match that of Israel or the U.S., it retains the capability to inflict serious damage on both adversaries. As the main supporter of Hamas and Hezbollah, the question of Iran is directly linked to the present Gaza crisis and what comes next. While many Gulf and Arab nations have privately loathed Hamas for the Oct 7, 2023, attack on Israel and for disrupting the progress achieved through Abraham Accords, the Trump plan to take over Gaza, has forced them to back up their sentiments with action. It also represents the final step in the full culmination of the Outside-In approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

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The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump – Dec 5, 2024
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The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities – Sep 27, 2024

The post Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran appeared first on Politact.

By Naade Ali

Context

The chain reaction that got underway in the aftermath of Hamas October 7, 2023 attack on Isreal, continues to unfold at a tremendous speed. The fall of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime, a key ally in Iran’s axis of resistance against Israel, has triggered profound geopolitical changes in the Middle East, reshaping regional power dynamics. These shifts are not merely reactions to Assad’s fall but are also a reflection of broader ambitions and vulnerabilities of the regional and global powers. The Syrian Civil War’s devastating impact has left a fractured nation with competing factions vying for influence, complicating any resolution of the crisis.

The coalition of Turkey-backed Islamist and nationalist militant factions that toppled Assad has emerged as a pivotal force. Assad’s downfall represents a significant blow to Iran’s fragile axis of resistance, undermining its influence across the Levant. With Iran effectively expelled from Syria and Hezbollah’s reach significantly diminished in Lebanon, Israel has seized the opportunity to expand its strategic foothold.

Meanwhile, a transitional interim government led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Islamist group ideologically linked to Al-Qaeda, has assumed control in Syria. The country, however, remains in a state of chaos as multiple actors, including rebel factions, Turkey, and Israel, seek to consolidate their gains.

Although the civil war has officially ended, the shadow of potential conflict continues to loom over Syria. The involvement of external powers—ranging from Russia and China to the United States and Gulf States—adds another layer of complexity to Syria’s future. Each stakeholder has its own interests, and their competing agendas have made Syria a geopolitical chessboard. These developments underscore a pivotal moment for the Middle East, as the region grapples with shifting alliances and evolving power structures.

What to Expect from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham?

The newly formed interim government in Syria, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and composed of various rebel factions, faces the daunting task of navigating a fractured and war-torn nation. HTS has announced its intention to govern until March 1 next year, at which point new elections are expected to formalize its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, as Syria’s next president. Al-Sharaa has outlined a three-stage roadmap for the country’s transition to stability. The first stage involves legitimizing the interim government, followed by convening a national conference to address constitutional reforms and governance. The final stage aims to organize elections and restore full citizenship to displaced Syrians.

Despite these ambitious plans, the likelihood of elections occurring by March remains slim. HTS’s dominance suggests that it may continue to govern Syria for the foreseeable future. In an effort to gain legitimacy both domestically and internationally, HTS has launched a rebranding campaign to distance itself from its radical jihadist roots. This campaign emphasizes governance, state-building, and inclusivity.

Al-Sharaa and interim Prime Minister Mohammad Al-Bashir have outlined a five-point agenda focused on national unification, strengthening state institutions, rebuilding infrastructure, gaining international recognition, and fostering diplomatic ties with neighboring countries and the West.

One of the most significant challenges facing HTS is unifying Syria’s diverse political and ideological factions. The country’s political landscape includes Islamist and secular nationalist groups representing a broad spectrum of ethnic and religious communities. HTS, which historically drew support from radical Salafist elements, may encounter resistance from groups advocating for a secular democratic state. Its governance model in Idlib, where it established centralized control after defeating rival factions, raises concerns about its willingness to share power. Secular factions fear that HTS may impose an Islamist authoritarian regime, alienating Syria’s diverse population.

Some analysts caution that Syria risks becoming an Islamic Emirate akin to Afghanistan, with HTS governing in a manner reminiscent of the Taliban. Although HTS has demonstrated administrative competence in Idlib and appointed self-styled technocrats like Mohammad Al-Bashir, applying this model to Syria’s complex socio-political landscape will be far more challenging. Protests demanding secular governance have already erupted in Damascus, reflecting widespread skepticism about HTS’s intentions. Within HTS itself, hardliners may oppose Al-Sharaa’s attempts to adopt a more moderate stance, further complicating efforts to stabilize the nation.

To address these challenges, Al-Sharaa has promised to shift away from a revolutionary mindset, emphasizing unity, stability, and institutional reform. He has pledged to disband rebel factions, integrate trained fighters into the Syrian army, and grant citizenship to foreign fighters willing to pledge loyalty to the new government. Internationally, HTS has sought to portray itself as pragmatic and inclusive, emphasizing human rights and good governance. However, reports of extrajudicial killings of former regime members by the HTS local commanders paint a different picture of the group. Notably, HTS has announced the establishment of tribunals to prosecute ex-officials of the Assad regime, despite initially granting them amnesty. This move has raised concerns about the group’s double standards and the potential for acts of vengeance will present a critical test for its leadership.

Another major challenge is economic reconstruction. Years of war have left Syria’s infrastructure in ruins, and millions of refugees are anticipated to return in search of better opportunities. To gain public trust, HTS would need to focus on rebuilding the economy and meeting the needs of Syrians. However, the current leadership of HTS is primarily focused on securing international support, including lifting sanctions and removing itself from terrorism designations. Al-Sharaa has assured the international community that Syria will not serve as a base for attacks against neighboring countries, to include Israel and Turkey. These assurances are part of HTS’s broader strategy to seek international recognition and restore trust.

Israel’s Strategic Response to Assad’s Fall

Israel has significantly benefited from Assad’s downfall, exploiting the power vacuum to further its strategic goals. Within just one week, Israel carried out over 350 airstrikes on Syrian military installations, neutralizing 80% of Assad’s critical military assets. Additionally, Israel has seized strategic positions in southern Syria, establishing a 400-square-kilometer demilitarized buffer zone that includes Mount Hermon—a vital vantage point for monitoring regional threats. These newly occupied positions provide Israel with a tactical advantage, enabling it to target Iran’s assets without the threat of Syrian anti-missile radar systems. By controlling key areas in Syria, Israel has bolstered its deterrence against Iran and other adversaries.

The fall of Assad and the subsequent weakening of Iran’s influence have allowed Israel to consolidate its position as a dominant regional player. Israeli leaders have framed Assad’s removal as a historic achievement, celebrating the collapse of an adversarial regime. Moving forward, Israel has extended a cautious diplomatic overture to the HTS-led government, signaling a willingness to explore avenues for peace and cooperation. However, any potential rapprochement with Israel will depend on HTS’s ability to demonstrate its commitment to Israeli-led security order in the region.

Turkey’s Expanding Role in Syria

Turkey has emerged as another significant player in the post-Assad era. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a long-time opponent of Assad, has used the opportunity to expand Turkey’s influence in Syria. By supporting opposition factions, Turkey aims to secure its southern border, exploit Syria’s resources, and establish the country as a client state. This strategic expansion aligns with Erdoğan’s broader ambition to position Turkey as a leading power in the Muslim world, challenging the traditional dominance of Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Turkey’s involvement in Syria also serves domestic political purposes, allowing Erdoğan to strengthen his nationalist base by portraying himself as a defender of Sunni Muslims. However, Turkey’s actions have not been without controversy. Its military interventions and support for Islamist factions have drawn criticism from both Russia and China. On the other hand, its opposition to US supported Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has put it at odds with the NATO alliance. Despite these challenges, Turkey’s influence in Syria continues to grow, making it a key stakeholder in the country’s future.

Iran and Hezbollah: Reeling from Setbacks

The fall of Assad’s regime has dealt a severe blow to Iran and its proxy, Hezbollah. For years, Syria served as a critical link in Iran’s axis of resistance, providing a conduit for arms shipments to Hezbollah in Lebanon. With Assad’s removal, Iran has lost a key ally, and its influence in the region has diminished significantly. Hezbollah, which has suffered heavy losses in the Syrian conflict, now faces an uncertain future. The group’s ability to project power in Lebanon and beyond has been severely weakened, raising questions about its long-term viability.

Iran, meanwhile, faces a critical situation. The loss of its strategic foothold in Syria has forced Tehran to reconsider its regional strategy. Some analysts speculate that Iran may pursue pragmatic diplomacy with the West to offset its losses, while others argue that it could escalate its nuclear program to establish deterrence against Israel. Regardless of the path Iran chooses its diminished role in Syria marks a turning point for the axis of resistance.

The Rise of Transnational Jihadist Movements

The victory of HTS in Syria has emboldened global jihadist movements, inspiring groups such as the Taliban and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Islamist groups from across the globe, like Afghan Taliban and various factions of Muslim Brotherhood, have sent congratulatory notes to HTS.

This development marks a significant shift in the nature of jihadist organizations, with non-state actors evolving into state entities. HTS’s success in Syria—achieving what ISIS could not—raises concerns about the rise of transnational jihadist states. While HTS has promised governance and reform, its ability to deliver stability remains uncertain.

Conclusion

Syria stands at a crossroads. The fall of Russian supported Assad’s regime has created a vacuum in the Middle East and upset the tender balance of power, which was already in tatters with the weakening of Iranian backed Hezbollah and Hamas.
The nation is torn between the promise of renewal and the threat of further devastation. The actions of HTS and other key stakeholders will determine whether Syria can overcome its challenges or succumb to further conflict. For now, the future remains blurred, but one thing is clear: the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East will never be the same.

The post Assad’s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East appeared first on Politact.

Context

Syria has emerged as one of the most critical fault line for the global balance of power struggles. It is perhaps the only place in the world where both the global and regional powers have boots on the ground – such as US, Russia, and Turkey. US has about 900 soldiers based there, while Russian presence constitutes about 5,000 troops, and Turkey according to some estimates has more than 10,000 soldiers in northern Syria carrying out military operations.

Syria is also home to Iranian backed proxies which includes Shiite Hezbollah, and Sunni extremist groups such as ISIL and Al Qaeda. Moreover, there are other local non-state actors that are fighting against the Assad regime, such as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Free Syria Army (FSA), with western support and backing of Turkey and other Arab nations, such as UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. And then there is legacy business of Kurds, Syrian Kurds (YPG) operate from northern Syria against Turkey while also receiving US support for the fight against ISIL.

Arab Spring and Syria

The Arab Spring protests in Syria began in March 2011 as part of a series of pro-democracy demonstrations that swept across the Middle East. The protests initially called for increased civil liberties, greater freedom of speech, and the end of the Ba’ath Party’s rule. The Syrian government responded with a brutal crackdown on protesters, resulting in hundreds of deaths and thousands of arrests. As the protests continued, the government’s reaction grew increasingly violent, and the conflict escalated into a full-scale civil war and millions of refugees. Close to 3.5 million Syrian refugees migrated to Turkey while others went to different places in MENA region, Europe, and the US.

The threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) emerged in Syria around 2011. The group joined forces with other extremist groups in the region to fight against the Assad government – and quickly gained control over large swathes of territory in the country. ISIL was eventually defeated in Syria in March 2019.

The Assad regime in Syria was able to survive largely due to support from Russia, Iran, Hezbollah. They provided the Assad regime with military and financial support, enabling it to remain in power despite the civil war and international sanctions. Iran sent thousands of militiamen to fight alongside Syrian government forces in their fight against ISIL, SDF, and FSA that were operating to topple the Syrian government. Additionally, the Assad regime was able to rely on its strong security apparatus to repress domestic opposition and maintain control over the country. At the same time, while US, Turkey, and UAE were backing groups such as SDF and FSA to remove Assad, they were also fighting against ISIL.

As the extremist threat diminished, which was a common threat for state actors operating in Syria, the fissures became apparent along the respective geopolitical interests that are tied to the great power competition.

The Fight to Remove Assad’s Regime and Iran

Since the beginning of Arab Spring, one of the overarching aspirations has been to do deal with the wider Iranian behavior and influence in the Middle East, and constraining its nuclear and missile program. From the perspective of Israel and the US, any potential regime change in Syria would have undermined Iran and its control over Hezbollah – that extends its influence into Lebanon and Palestinian territories. Moreover, Iranian proxies also complicate the Middle East Peace Process between Israel and Palestine.

To counter this, Israel has simultaneously been working on what has come to be known as the Outside-In Approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and associated with it the ‘War between Wars’ strategy. The premise of the Outside-In approach has been to alter the regional dynamics to such an extent that it leads to diminished Arab support for the Palestinian cause – this would make the Palestinian more amenable to accept peace on Israeli terms. The approach also envisions undermining Iran’s nuclear and missile program while maintaining the threat of military action against Iran. This overtime led to the agreements which came to be known as Abraham Accords in 2020 and normalization of ties between UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco and Israel.

One the other hand, the main focus of the ‘War between Wars’ strategy is to prevent Iran from getting entrenched in Syria and thus threatened Israel directly via Lebanon. According to some estimates close to 2500 Iranian Revolutionary Guard members are operating in Syria.

Russian Role in Syria

The Russian support of Assad’s government and military intervention in 2015, directly undercuts the objective of regime change. Moreover, Israeli strikes against Iranian targets and Hezbollah in Syria risks hurting ties with Russia. Yet Israel has maintained close ties with Russia despite their differences over the Syrian conflict. Israel and Russia cooperate on a variety of matters, including security and trade. Additionally, the two countries have developed a mechanism to de-conflict their operations in Syria and ensure that their forces do not come into conflict with one another. Despite their differences, Israel and Russia have managed to maintain a good working relationship.

On the other hand, Russia has provided the Assad regime with military, financial, and political support, helping to keep it in power despite international sanctions and widespread opposition. Additionally, Russia has deployed thousands of troops and airpower to support the government in its fight against the FSA, SDF, and ISIL. To keep amicable ties with Turkey, Russia has generally maintained a neutral stance towards the Kurdish-led YPG in Syria.

In addition to air bases, Russia also maintains a naval base in Tartous. The larger Russian strategy is not only to protect the Assad regime but also maintain a foothold in the larger Middle East and North Africa. Russia is also military involved directly or through mercenaries in Libya and Sudan. But the conflict in Ukraine has had a significant impact on Russia’s military presence in Syria. Following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2014, the United States and its allies imposed economic sanctions on Russia hitting its economy. As a result, Russia has had to reduce its military presence in Syria and focus its resources on the conflict in Ukraine.

Turkey, YPG, PKK and Syria

Turkey is another stakeholder to the conflict in Syria, it has carried out military operations against the Kurdish-led YPG. Additionally, Turkey has sought to maintain a buffer zone along its border with Syria, which has been opposed by the YPG. Turkey’s actions against the YPG have caused tensions with the United States since it supports the group in its fight against ISIL – and YPG has collaboration with SDF and FSA to topple Assad’s regime. Being a NATO member, Turkey has also provided the SDF and FSA with arms, training, and financial support in their fight against the Assad regime.

On the other hand, both Russia and Iran have not directly engaged in the conflict between YPG and the Assad government and accused the group of cooperating with the United States and other foreign powers.

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Kurdish-led YPG in Syria have a close ideological and organizational relationship. The PKK has provided the YPG with military and financial support in its fight against ISIL, as well as political and diplomatic support in international forums. Additionally, many members of the PKK have joined the YPG in its fight against ISIL.

Like Turkey, US and EU consider PKK a terrorist organization. This approach which supports YPG in Syria but considers PKK a terrorist group, complicates US and European ties with Turkey and NATO – and raises Turkish concerns about the real intent behind supporting separatist YPG.

Saudi-Iran Detente

The question becomes how the situation of Syria will impact the Chinese facilitated Saudi-Iran truce reached in March. Or, in other words, what are the key terms of the détente reached by Saudi Arabia and Iran, that will facilitate establishing a regional balance of power and resolve proxy wars in places like Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, and Palestine. Moreover, what does it imply for the budding great power rivalry in South Asia.

One of the immediate benefits of the truce has been the ceasefire in Yemen, followed up by exchange of prisoners. The foreign minister of Syria has also visited Saudi Arabia, reciprocated by the Saudi Foreign Minister’s trip to Syria – raising hopes for potential reentry of Syria into the Arab League. Earlier in March, Assad had also visited UAE to rebuild ties that had been cut-off due to the support provided by Gulf States to anti-Assad Forces.

Iran’s nuclear program and the threat posed by its wider behavior in the region, represented the threat perception that had moved the Arab world closer to Israel – and by extension to the US. Additionally, the criticism of the Abraham Accord, reached in 2020, has been that it has not resulted in any quid-pro-quo when it comes to Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In fact, with the return of Netanyahu’s right-wing government and the aggressive actions it has taken, has reversed the gains made under the Abraham agreement. This has adversely impacted Israeli ties with the US.

However, it is also a fact that US interests in the Middle East have transformed in the aftermath of the campaign against extremism, and military withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan. It is no longer dependent on the energy resources of the region, as China is, but it is engaged head on in the great power rivalry with China and Russia. The Middle Powers are caught in the middle of these power tussles. According to the White House Coordinator for MENA, Brett McGurk, the main objectives of US in Syria are to reduce the violence, maintain a check on the activities of ISIL, help the Syrian humanitarian crisis, and back Israel.

The shift in UAE and Saudi position reflects a realization the Assad’s regime has survived the worse with Russian and Iranian support. The China, Iran Economic and Security Deal reached in 2020 demonstrated that China was also throwing its weight behind Iran, which has traditionally been also backed by Russia. PoliTact had pointed out at that time that the pact represented China’s pivot to the Middle East. With the China facilitating the Saudi-Iran truce, the balance of power appear to be shifting away from the US, which is increasingly been seen as an unreliable partner. Commenting on the deal, former Israeli prime minister commented that “This is a fatal blow to the effort to build a regional coalition against Iran.”

Will Israel counter or accept any potential guarantees from China that it can manage Iranian nuclear program and wider behavior in the region, remains to be seen. The new Chinese foreign minister Qin Gang recently stated that it is ready to mediate peace talks between Israel and Palestine.

Meanwhile, the Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had warned Israel in 2019 to reduce its economic and security ties with China or risk reduced security cooperation from US. During his visit to Saudi Arabia in 2022, President Biden had stated, “We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia or Iran … We will seek to build on this moment with active, principled, American leadership.”

Related:

• What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply? Aug 4, 2022
• Biden’s Middle East Policy, China-Iran Ties, and CPEC
  On July 28, 2020, PoliTact held a webinar to discuss the potential China-Iran economic deal and its impact on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

• PoliTact’s Chief Analyst Arif Ansar’s interview on the situation of Syria on Pakistan Television, March 2023

• The Emerging ‘Outside In’ Approach To Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Afghan Reconciliation, And Kashmir Issue. July 15, 2015

The post Saudi-Iran Détente, Syria, And Changing MENA appeared first on Politact.

Context

The Core versus Peripheral Islamic world theory is one of the key themes PoliTact has been following for over a decade. One of the premises of this construct is that the Core of the Islamic world represented mainly by the Arab Gulf states, including Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, have been gradually loosing influence. On the other hand, the peripheral Islamic world constituted by states like Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia, have been slowly gaining sway. This increase in influence is not necessarily in material respect, but has more to do with the relevance and connection to the causes dear to the Muslim street.

Another aspect of this theory is the interrelation of the Core and Peripheral states to the emerging and established powers. This is a key distinction since not even the oil rich Islamic states belong to what is commonly referred to as the emerging powers, such as Brazil, Russia, China, India and South Africa (BRICS). The Muslim states have had to coexist between the emerging and established powers and position their own existence with in this tussle.

It’s no secret that the western world has found itself increasingly challenged by the growing economic, military, and technological advancement of China. While Russia does not pose such an alarming threat, it is its strategic alliance with China that makes Russia more ominous on the world stage. On the other hand, India has aligned itself more with the West even while maintaining a close defense relationship with Russia.

Analysis

Who Benefits and Looses from the Pandemic?

Under the present circumstances, one of the key questions to contemplate on is how will the COVID-19 impact the Core versus Periphery theory and its interconnection with the emerging and established power relations. And related to this inquiry is who benefits and looses as the pandemic runs its course.

Obviously, one would think that the nations least impacted by the infectious disease are likely to benefit and come out on top. However, this is also related to where they stood on the totem pole before the crisis started. As would be expected, so far the coronavirus has not differentiated between the haves and have nots, but we are still at the early stages. Moreover, the virus is not fully understood yet and no vaccine is available to control it – and to arrive at that stage will take time. The economic, health, and defense implications are still being evaluated before a sound determination can be made about who has benefited, if anyone.

However, there are some anomalies, which may be due first to the staggered nature in which the virus has operated. Secondly, some nations are also controlling the information regarding its adverse consequences. For example, based on media reports it appears that South Asia, to include Pakistan and India, have not been as severely impact as China, Italy, Iran, or the US.

How did the virus spread quickly from China to Iran and Europe, and onwards to the US, but has not replicated this character when it comes to India and Pakistan, where the nations were slow in implementing effective quarantining just like the US. This has led some to conclude that some races may have a genetic immunity or advantage as compared to the others.

There are other unanswered questions and challenges:

• When it comes to understanding the spread of coronavirus, there is a consistent issue of the number of people tested for the infection and those that have recovered or died. In absence of complete testing it’s impossible to ascertain the true magnitude.
• How was China able to control the spread of virus and contain it but others are having considerable challenge? As China opens up its economy, will the virus spread increase again?
• Does higher population density make the virus more deadly just because it can spread easily, which is one of the hallmarks of COVID-19?
• Once one has had the infection and recovers, can they get the disease again or does that leads them to develop immunity.
• Is there going to be a second wave of the pandemic as many medical experts are predicting?

These inquiries complicate the answer to who will benefit and who will loose, when all is said and done. There is however the secondary question of who can best cope with not only the virus itself, but the second and third degree consequences that are likely to emerge. Consider for example the crash in oil prices.

Gulf States and COVID-19

Previous assessments on the dynamics of the Core versus Periphery theory have noted that US ties have slowly been deteriorating with the Islamic world, especially with the states of the periphery that include Pakistan, Iran and even the NATO member Turkey. And this has by default augmented American reliance on the oil rich Gulf states, with Saudi Arabia leading.

In the aftermath of 9/11, American ties to the Muslim world have revolved around seeking cooperation in the war against extremism and protection of Israel. While in the past it had dependent on the energy supplies from the region, this is no longer the case. From Afghanistan to Iraq and Syria, US involvement is either related to the fight against extremists or protecting Israel from regional threats, which puts Iran on the top of the list.

And for its cooperation, US has reciprocated by providing security assurances and equipment to the Gulf states. However, it has also expected these nations to take the lead in the fight again extremists, after all majority of the 9/11 attackers had come from Saudi Arabia. But UAE and Saudi Arabia have focused more in rivaling Iran in places like Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon, and in this they shared the interests of Israel.

In the South Asia theater, a different dynamics emerged. While traditionally UAE and Saudi Arabia had been close to Pakistan, as the economic clout of India grew, the Gulf states, minus Qatar, also began to tilt their positions in favor of India, especially on Kashmir. This transformation was similar to how their position changed on matters related to Palestine and the Middle East Peace Process.

The curtailment of oil demand associated with pandemic link shutdowns, has put severe pressure on these energy rich Gulf states. According to Aljazeera TV, Saudi oil revenues have dropped as much as 24% since January, and the prospects are not likely to improve in the near future. Even before the impact of the virus had hit, the price of oil dropped considerably due to squabbling between Russia and Saudi Arabia, and the subsequent deal on production levels, which was reached with US pressure on Saudi Arabia, went into effect on May 1st. It’s yet to be seen if this agreement will stabilize the oil prices.

American, Israeli, and Indian Interests

The drop in oil revenue is occurring at the same time as Gulf states have to provide more assistance domestically to deal with the coronavirus. The downward turn in energy use and prices may push Gulf states to revisit their foreign policy positions – and this carries direct implications for the US, Israeli, and Indian interests.

These pressures will likely lead to less emphasis on Iran and fighting extremists. In fact in the longer run the Gulf states may actually need more assistance of the peripheral Islamic nations for their security needs, and thus they may become less useful for the US – and present more of an opportunity for ingress from Russia and China.

On the other hand, the economies of the peripheral Muslim states, especially Pakistan and India, are likely to suffer from the return of expatriate workers, and source of foreign remittances, from the Gulf states. At the same, these peripheral nations are likely to benefit from the low oil prices and this will compensate for the economic losses suffered at the hands of coronavirus.

Nonetheless, the changing landscape will likely make Gulf states more reliant towards the peripheral Muslim states for the first time in recent history, and push them to revaluate their positions towards the newly unveiled Middle East Peace Process and Kashmir. This will in turn make the US try to improve its ties with the peripheral Islamic states – but that is less conceivable because these nations have already been penetrated by China. And thus, one of the options would be to attempt to untie the Russian strategic alliance with China.

The post Core Versus Peripheral Islamic World And COVID-19 Pandemic appeared first on Politact.

Context

As the reach of the coronavirus deepens – so does the need to understand the extent of its geopolitical implications. While the most recent focus has been on the health and economic shock, little has been understood about the geopolitical and defense related repercussions.

Some of this could be due to the time needed to assess the damage; the other may have to do with safeguarding the strategic policies and postures. Some recent estimates suggest that over 10 years, the economic loses for US could add up to about $11 trillion in an optimistic scenario, and $19 trillion in a worse case scenario.

Obviously, economic prowess influences the political dynamics and defense postures. If one reveals how a nations defense capabilities have been compromised, then possibly this could become a leverage for the adversary. Since all nations have been negatively impacted by the still spreading coronavirus, the question becomes what capabilities are affected more. And associated with this exercise is the process of exploring options to recover or replace such capabilities – for the short and long term.

While there are many dimensions of this assessment, the main attempt is to recalibrate the global balance power. For example, one such critical inquiry relates to the campaign against extremism that is being fought in various theaters, but primarily in the Middle East, North Africa, and South and Central Asia. As noted before, the war against extremism has been intertwined for some time now with the global balance of power of tussle.

Some of the key related questions in this regard are:

1. How will the Syrian conflict be impacted if the major stakeholders like Iran, Turkey, and Russia are busy dealing with the COVID-19 issues? The civil war is brewing there and the nation’s health care systems is in ruins. According to UN Refugee Agency, there 6.6 internally displaced persons in Syria, while 5.6 million people have fled Syria since the conflict began in 2011, seeking refuge in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordon and beyond.
2. How will the situation of Yemen evolve, as Iran and Saudi Arabia now have to deal with challenges deriving from COVID-19? According to Save the Children charity organization 85,000 children may have died between 2015 and 2018 due to severe malnutrition. About 80% of Yemen’s 24 million population needed humanitarian assistance even before the coronavirus arrived. While Iran was already under sanctions, the drop of oil prices will likely curtail Saudi ambitions. Meanwhile, there are media reports that Yemen peace process is making major headway.
3. In Libya, a previously agreed temporary peace has fallen apart and hostilities between the warring factions have escalated. A UN migration agency has indicated that Libya is ill prepared to deal with coronavirus and it could be catastrophic for the internally displaced people (IDP) and about 700,000 refugees and migrants there.
4. The Iraq situation was already under political stress with the government unable to deliver to people resulting in protests. The Iraqi officials are concealing the real number of infections because that could once again ignite public disorder. Iraq’s neighbor Iran was hit hard early by the pandemic and Iraq receives many religious pilgrims from across the region. Both Iran and the US may have to reevaluate their positions in Iraq as they deal with the aftershocks of coronavirus. Meanwhile, reports indicate that Iran militants have increased rocket attacks on US bases.
5. The peace agreement was reached between the US and Taliban on February 29, just as coronavirus was picking pace in Europe. This is pressurizing all immediate stakeholders, to include the Afghan government, Taliban, Pakistan and the US, to not let the peace process stall under the circumstances.
   
   For example, since the agreement was reached the disunity of the Afghan government has been apparent. More so, it refused to release 5,000 Afghan Taliban prisoners promised in the US-Taliban deal. To pressure the Ashraf Ghani’s government, US went as far as threatening to withhold $2 billion dollars of US aid to Afghanistan. The American patience is likely to decrease even further in the evolving situation resulting from the coronavirus.
6. At this stage, it is not clear how much will with the pandemic impact India and Pakistan related matters. Nonetheless, focus on dealing with the pandemic could mean less Indian focus on Afghanistan, and increased militant activity in Indian held Kashmir, where India has put the entire population under a security lockdown since 2019 for different sets of reasons. Recent easing of the security and communication lockdown in Kashmir is direclty linked to the pressures exerted by the infectious disease.

Non-State Actors

While the impact on state actors overtime is measurable, it’s unclear how the non-state actors and proxies will be handling the indiscriminate reach of the virus. With lack of immediate medical assistance, and the backers of various proxies distracted by their own economic woes, one can assume dismal consequences.

However, past conflicts indicate that while there may be a temporary slowdown in conflicts due to the spread of disease, such as notably during Spanish Flu of 1918, ultimately the rivalries continued with each side trying to exploit the circumstances. Nonetheless, at least in Afghanistan and Yemen there is movement towards peace. However, there is also a risk of Arab Spring style public disturbances if the governments involved in the campaign against extremism are unable to deal amicably with the reach of coronavirus. And the refugees and internally displaced persons are likely to suffer greatly.

While US is busy dealing with its own health and economic emergency, its China that is extending its geopolitical influence by offering medical and humanitarian assistance to the needy in the war ravaged nations.

The post COVID-19 And Campaign Against Extremism appeared first on Politact.