By Furqan Khan
Great Power Politics Fellow, PoliTact

Context

On August 7, Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia signed a joint defense agreement stipulating that an armed attack against one member will be regarded as an attack against all. The agreement, known as the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, is significant because it brings together three powerful Sunni-majority states under a collective-defense framework at a time when the Middle East’s established security order is under considerable strain. Although the pact has attracted attention primarily because of its resemblance to NATO’s Article 5, its broader significance lies in the institutionalization of defense cooperation among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey. The agreement envisages greater political and military coordination and provides a framework for strengthening joint exercises, defense cooperation, and military-industrial collaboration. Turkey has also indicated that the framework could eventually be expanded to include other regional states.

The Mecca agreement should therefore be understood less as a fully developed military alliance than as an emerging regional security mechanism. Its importance derives from the strategic environment in which it was created: declining confidence in the reliability of the existing U.S.-led security architecture, continuing confrontation with Iran, concerns about Israel’s regional conduct, and growing interest among Middle Eastern states in developing greater indigenous capacity for deterrence.

Disordering Regional Security Environment

For nearly five decades, the United States has been the principal external security guarantor for its allies and partners in the Middle East. Its military deployments, defense relationships, and security commitments helped create an environment intended to protect energy infrastructure, maritime routes, and allied governments while preventing any single regional power from dominating the strategic landscape.

The geopolitical changes associated with the Iran war have placed that model under significant pressure. The conflict, which began in February with U.S. and Israeli attacks on Tehran, has exposed limitations in Washington’s ability to simultaneously deter Iran, protect its regional partners, and preserve freedom of action. The resulting uncertainty has encouraged regional states to consider additional security arrangements rather than relying exclusively on American guarantees.

The United States’ difficulties in protecting its Arab partners from Iranian attacks have been particularly consequential for Saudi Arabia. There is growing concern among regional partners about Washington’s reliability. Saudi Arabia has subsequently sought to diversify its security partnerships rather than remain dependent on a single external guarantor. This development is not necessarily inconsistent with the Trump administration’s emphasis on burden-sharing and reducing the costs of U.S. security commitments abroad. A greater willingness by regional partners to assume responsibility for their own defense could, in principle, complement Washington’s objective of reducing its direct military burden.

The problem, however, is one of perception. Burden-sharing produces different strategic effects when it is interpreted as greater allied responsibility and when it is interpreted as evidence that the United States can no longer be relied upon in a crisis. The Mecca agreement is, at least partly, a product of that credibility gap. It reflects Saudi Arabia’s willingness to seek alternative sources of deterrence and Pakistan and Turkey’s willingness to assume larger security roles in the region.

The agreement is also connected to Arab concerns about Israel – and the extent to which regional government’s view Israel’s military policies as another source of instability. Thus, the agreement cannot be explained solely as a response to Iran or solely as a reaction to declining American influence. It reflects a wider reassessment of the regional balance of power.

Mecca Agreement and Board of Peace

The relationship between the Mecca agreement and the Trump administration’s regional strategy is likely to be one of the most consequential questions surrounding the pact. At first glance, the two frameworks could appear competitive. The administration’s earlier regional vision, centered on the Abraham Accords, placed considerable emphasis on Arab-Israeli normalization. A security arrangement centered on Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan could instead encourage a parallel regional bloc whose strategic identity is based more explicitly on collective defense among Muslim-majority states.

Yet the two initiatives need not be mutually exclusive. President Trump reportedly described the Mecca agreement on August 16 as a “big, bold, and important first step”, suggesting that Washington does not necessarily regard the new arrangement as incompatible with its broader regional strategy. The more interesting possibility is that the two frameworks could eventually become complementary. The Board of Peace is accompanied by an International Stabilization Force (ISF) and associated security-architecture components.

The ISF is envisioned as a temporary multinational security and stabilization force, authorized under UN backing, operating under a unified command acceptable to the Board of Peace. Its responsibilities include maintaining public order, protecting reconstruction corridors, supporting humanitarian operations, and coordinating with Egypt and Israel while assisting a newly recruited local Gaza police force. The force is intended to provide an enforcement mechanism for maintaining territorial calm alongside phased Israeli military withdrawals and militant disarmament.

This creates a potential role for countries participating in the Mecca framework. Muslim-majority states could provide political legitimacy, personnel, equipment, or other forms of support for regional stabilization efforts. The difficulty, however, is Israel’s opposition to certain potential contributors. Israel has previously resisted the presence of Turkish armed forces in Gaza, while Israeli officials have also expressed reservations about Turkey’s participation in a future stabilization force.

The underlying dispute is therefore less about whether Muslim-majority countries can participate in stabilization than about who controls the mandate, composition, and rules of engagement of such a force. Israel has not rejected the ISF concept itself; rather, its principal concern is the identity and mandate of participating forces and whether they can independently influence Gaza’s security environment. Israel insists that Hamas must be disarmed and its military infrastructure dismantled before a full Israeli withdrawal. Prime Minister Netanyahu has continued to reject withdrawal until full disarmament is achieved.

This creates an important tension: Washington and the Board of Peace may see regional Muslim participation as essential to the legitimacy and implementation of the Gaza framework, while Israel remains concerned that participating states could acquire an autonomous security or political role.

What Would Trigger Collective Defense?

The central uncertainty surrounding the Mecca agreement concerns the practical meaning of its collective-defense provision. An attack on one member being treated as an attack on all does not necessarily mean that every member would automatically enter a war. The precise military obligations remain insufficiently defined. Critical questions include whether the provision applies only to attacks by states or also to non-state actors; what threshold constitutes an “attack”; and whether assistance would require combat deployments or could instead involve intelligence, air defense, logistics, maritime surveillance, cyber capabilities, or other forms of support.

The three members also have different threat perceptions. Pakistan’s principal security concerns remain concentrated in South Asia, while Turkey’s strategic interests extend across Syria, Iraq, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Caucasus. Saudi Arabia’s immediate concerns are centered more heavily on Iran, Yemen, missile and drone threats, and the protection of critical infrastructure. For that reason, the agreement should not be interpreted as a guarantee that Pakistan and Turkey would automatically fight every adversary confronting Saudi Arabia. Pakistan’s historical position on Yemen illustrates the distinction between political support for Saudi Arabia and participation in Saudi-led military operations. In 2015, Pakistan’s parliament rejected Riyadh’s request to participate directly in the Yemen intervention. At the same time, Pakistan’s current military relationship with Saudi Arabia demonstrates that limited or defensive assistance can be substantial. Pakistan has already deployed thousands of troops and a fighter-jet squadron to Saudi Arabia during the Iran war, along with other air-defense capabilities, under a separate Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA). The agreement was signed between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia last year.

If a state, or a non-state actor, were to launch a major attack on Saudi territory, critical infrastructure, or if the Kingdom’s sovereignty is threatened, the collective-defense provision would presumably become more relevant. Even then, the most likely initial response could involve defensive assistance: intelligence sharing, air-defense systems, counter-drone capabilities, maritime surveillance, logistics, and other forms of military support rather than immediate offensive operations.

The agreement’s effectiveness will therefore depend less on whether it replicates NATO’s Article 5 literally and more on whether the three governments can establish credible mechanisms for consultation, coordination, intelligence sharing, military interoperability, and crisis response.

What Does the Mecca Agreement Bring Home?

For Saudi Arabia, the agreement offers two strategic benefits: additional deterrence and greater regional leadership. Faced with Iranian and Houti attacks and uncertainty over the reliability of U.S. protection, Riyadh gains an institutional mechanism through which it can diversify its security relationships. For Pakistan and Turkey, the agreement expands their regional strategic profiles. Both countries already possess significant defense relationships with Saudi Arabia, while Pakistan and Turkey have developed extensive bilateral military cooperation. The Mecca agreement gives these relationships a broader institutional framework. According to the Turkish Defense Ministry, the fundamental goal of the agreement is to place existing military ties on a more “institutional and sustainable” basis.

The possibility of additional states joining also gives the agreement longer-term significance. Turkey has indicated that the framework could be expanded, with Egypt among the countries potentially relevant to its future development. The agreement has also been described by Pakistani officials as open to other countries in the region. A larger membership could eventually produce something resembling a “Muslim NATO,” although that comparison should be treated cautiously. NATO’s institutional depth, integrated command structure, standardized forces, and decades of operational experience are not currently replicated by the Mecca framework.

The strategic implications nevertheless extend beyond the three signatories. The emerging security arrangements in West Asia have consequences for American interests and influence. Washington’s declining agency in the regional security architecture could create greater opportunities for China and Russia to expand their diplomatic and strategic influence. More importantly, it signals that regional states increasingly regard security diversification as necessary even while maintaining relationships with the United States.

Conclusion

The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement is best understood as a product of a changing Middle Eastern security environment rather than simply as the creation of a new military alliance. The Iran war, uncertainty surrounding American deterrence, persistent Israeli-Arab tensions, and the wider fragmentation of the regional order have encouraged Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey to institutionalize defense cooperation. The agreement’s collective-defense provision is politically significant, but its military implications remain uncertain. The absence of clearly defined automatic obligations means that it should not yet be equated with NATO. Its immediate value lies in creating mechanisms for consultation, joint exercises, defense cooperation, technology development, and potentially coordinated responses to regional threats. Its durability will depend on whether the three members can reconcile their divergent threat perceptions and translate political solidarity into credible military interoperability.

The larger significance of the Mecca agreement, therefore, is not simply how many troops Pakistan or Turkey might commit in a future conflict. It is that three important regional powers are attempting to create a security mechanism that reduces dependence on any single external guarantor. If the framework expands and develops effective institutional and operational capabilities, it could become an important component of a more pluralistic security order in West Asia.

The emerging arrangement does not necessarily signal the end of American influence. Rather, it indicates that U.S. influence may increasingly operate alongside regional security structures that Washington does not fully control. The Mecca agreement may consequently prove significant not because it immediately creates a “Muslim NATO,” but because it represents another step toward a Middle Eastern security architecture in which regional powers assume a greater share of responsibility for their own deterrence and strategic stability.

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The post The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement: Implications For West Asian Security Architecture appeared first on Politact.

By Arif Ansar

Context

The escalation of open warfare between the United States, Israel, and Iran in early 2026—characterized by some as the “Third Gulf War”—has radically upended the strategic architecture of the Middle East. At the center of pre-war Western diplomatic planning were two highly integrated concepts: the Abraham Accords, aiming to build a normalization bridge between Israel and Arab states, and the Board of Peace (BOP), an international framework established under UN Security Council Resolution 2803 to oversee a post-conflict administration, international stabilization force, and real estate transformation in Gaza.

However, the military campaign launched on February 28, 2026, under the U.S.-Israeli codename “Operation Epic Fury”, fundamentally collided with the core assumptions of these frameworks. Instead of solidifying a prosperous, integrated, and Western-aligned trade bloc, the kinetic conflict exposed deep structural flaws in regional deterrence, shattered the prospects of two-state solution, and triggered an unprecedented shift in the balance of power.

1. The Disintegration of the Pre-War Vision: BOP and Abraham Accords Under Fire

Before the military escalation of 2026, the Abraham Accords and the Board of Peace functioned as a synchronized carrot-and-stick diplomatic strategy. The political objective was clear: circumvent the core issue of Palestinian statehood by offering massive economic, infrastructure, and technological incentives to the Arab world, effectively managing the region from the outside-in. The BOP was envisioned as a multi-layered colonial and financial administration—overseeing a Gaza Executive Board and a Palestinian National Committee—meant to signal a new era of regional co-prosperity.

When Operation Epic Fury commenced with devastating strikes on Iranian command structures, nuclear sites, and energy facilities, this vision suffered an immediate kinetic shock. Rather than acting as bridges for trade, the Abraham Accords were abruptly tested as raw military alignments. Iran’s retaliatory doctrine did not spare the region; Tehran launched waves of drones and ballistic missiles targeting not only Israeli territory but also Western assets and allies across the Gulf.

The BOP’s ambitious plans for Gaza—such as beachfront hotels and special economic zones—were instantly frozen as global energy markets panicked and global fertilizer and agricultural supply chains broke down. The war exposed an untenable contradiction: attempting to build an institutional framework for peace while simultaneously fighting a total regional war.

2. The Great Divergence: Independent Israeli Maneuvers vs. Joint Strategy

A central complication in the future of the BOP and the Abraham Accords is the apparent divergence between American diplomatic objectives and Israeli kinetic execution. While the United States has continuously attempted to orchestrate a diplomatic off-ramp, Israel has aggressively expanded its military footprint. Israel’s actions in Gaza, its incursions into Lebanon, and its unilateral willingness to strike deep into Iranian territory—even during active diplomatic windows—have created two starkly different strategic interpretations – that pose the most acute risk to the Interim Ceasefire Deal.

Interpretation A: The Maverick State Acting Unilaterally

This perspective argues that Israel is acting in open contradiction to Washington’s goals. Israeli leadership has made it clear that they no longer view the Oslo Accords or a two-state solution as viable frameworks. By pursuing a permanent military solution rather than a political compromise, Israel is explicitly prioritizing the absolute destruction of the “Axis of Resistance” over the long-term diplomatic health of the Abraham Accords. They are gambling that Arab states will eventually be forced to accept a dominant, nuclear-armed Israel as a fait accompli, regardless of the Palestinian issue.

Interpretation B: A Tightly Orchestrated Joint Strategy

Conversely, realism suggests that Israeli actions represent a coordinated, dual-track “Good Cop / Bad Cop” strategy with the United States. While Washington acts as the diplomatic negotiator—offering terms, carrots, and structural limitations—Israel functions as the unhinged kinetic hammer. By maintaining maximum military pressure on Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, Israel forces adversaries to negotiate from a position of acute vulnerability, allowing American diplomats to demand structural concessions that would be nearly impossible to attain through standard statecraft.

Regardless of which interpretation is accurate, the structural fallout is identical: Israel’s complete abandonment of the Palestinian political track has severed the primary artery through which the Abraham Accords were expected to expand to critical Muslim-majority nations like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, who have historically conditioned formal normalization on a viable two-state solution.

3. The 60-Day Ceasefire: Why Iran Emerges in an Enhanced Position

The multi-week diplomatic push that culminated in the temporary cessation of hostilities has set the stage for a potential 60-day extended ceasefire. However, an assessment of the strategic balance indicates that if a prolonged ceasefire is institutionalized under current conditions, Iran will have effectively won the geopolitical argument, shifting the regional balance of power in its favor with far reaching implications.

Despite enduring massive leadership losses and targeted degradation of its conventional military facilities during the initial strikes of Operation Epic Fury, Tehran demonstrated profound asymmetric resilience:

• Weaponization of the Chokepoints: By effectively throttling the Strait of Hormuz and imposing a massive $2 million transit toll on commercial tankers while outright banning American and Israeli vessels, Iran proved it could hold global energy markets hostage. It’s not clear whether the toll or fees will remain in any future deal.
• Surviving Regime Change Ambitions: Iran successfully weathered a decapitation campaign that killed its highest officials, proving that its institutional and proxy network could function and retaliate even under extreme duress.
• Demonstrated Retaliatory Reach: By launching direct, sustained missile strikes against Israel and retaliating against U.S. bases in the region, Iran dismantled the myth of Western invulnerability.

As far as its nuclear program is concerned, while Iran had previously committed to not attain weaponized capability. The major criticism of the earlier agreement with Iran reached in 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) under Obama administration was that it neither addressed Iran’s wider behavior in the region nor its ballistic missile program. On the positive side, JCPOA was backed by P5+1 countries i.e. US, China, Russia, France, UK, and Germany – along with European Union.

In the present context, P5+1 were not in the negotiating loop – but this does not indicate that they may not partake in any future roles. While frictions between NATO and US have increased over Ukraine and military approach towards Iran, President Trump is likely to seek support from the leaders at the G7 Summit meeting held in France, where he electronically signed the Islamabad MOU. However, in the escalating great power rivalries environment, the involvement of G7 nations will be quite nuanced.

Deciphering from the information available so far, nothing within the preliminary terms of the present ceasefire suggests that a 60-day truce will compel Iran to permanently abandon its regional proxy network. For Iran, groups like Hezbollah and Hamas are vital defensive organs. Because forcing their complete dissolution is beyond the scope of a standard ceasefire, Israel will view any finalized U.S.-Iran document with deep suspicion and may ultimately refuse to honor its terms, preferring to continue its military campaign.

4. The South Asian Pivot: Pakistan and India’s Subcontinental Tussle in the Gulf

The 2026 conflict has also manifested the subcontinental rivalry of India and Pakistan directly into the Middle Eastern theater, altering the geopolitical balance of power between the two nuclear-armed neighbors.

With the collapse of direct Western-led communication channels during the peak of the fighting, Pakistan leveraged its historic 900-kilometer border with Iran and its deep institutional ties with the Arab Gulf to emerge as the prime mediator between Washington and Tehran. The resulting “Islamabad Peace Process”—headlined by face-to-face talks in April 2026 between U.S. Vice President JD Vance and Iranian Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—elevated Pakistan into an indispensable global peace broker. By opening up back-channel communication lines via its Interests Section in Washington, Pakistan successfully negotiated the temporary cessation of hostilities, protecting its own vital economic interests, specifically the massive flow of worker remittances from the Gulf.

This diplomatic triumph directly challenges India’s long-term strategic investments in the Middle East. Over the previous decade, New Delhi had built a formidable geopolitical axis anchored on deep technological, defense, and economic ties with Israel and the UAE. India viewed this alignment as a way to project power westward and isolate Pakistan.

However, as Pakistan successfully positions itself as the necessary arbiter of regional stability between the U.S. and Iran, India’s rigid alignment with the Israel-UAE axis risks locking it out of the broader post-war regional consensus. If the Middle East transitions into a managed “cold peace” where Iran’s equities are formally recognized, Pakistan’s diplomatic capital will grow, neutralizing some of the strategic leverage India had accumulated through its partnerships.

5. Conclusion: The Structural Impasse of the Grand Vision

The grand vision originally championed by the Abraham Accords and the Board of Peace has arrived at a structural impasse. The only plausible pathway for these frameworks to move forward as instruments of a durable, comprehensive regional peace requires two simultaneous, seemingly impossible geopolitical concessions:

1. Iran must join the bandwagon, abandoning its regional agenda and accepting a formalized integration into a security architecture alongside Israel. This would be accompanied by the cassation of support for Hezbollah and Hamas.
2. Israel must accept a viable, sovereign two-state solution, ceasing expansion of territory either via settlements or military use.  This will providing the necessary political cover for Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the wider Muslim world to formally normalize ties.

Given current political realities, neither condition is achievable. Israel’s domestic political landscape remains firmly set against territorial compromise, viewing military containment and absolute security dominance as its only viable future. Concurrently, Iran’s clerical and military elite view their asymmetric deterrent power and proxy networks as the sole shield preserving the Islamic Republic from Western-orchestrated regime change.

Consequently, whether the conflict transitions through continued military attrition or a formalized ceasefire, the Board of Peace and the Abraham Accords will be forced to mutate. Rather than tools for authentic peace and regional integration, they will function as a defensive alignment designed not to resolve the region’s core disputes, but to manage an unstable and fractured “cold peace.”

Related Articles:

The US-Israel and Iran Conflict: The Interplay of Goals and Strategies – May 1, 2026
Geopolitics Of Islamic World And Middle Power Alliances After Iran Attack – Mar 22, 2026
The End Of Strategic Altruism: Putin’s Visit And The New US-India Reality – Jan 13, 2026
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China’s Belt And Road Initiative And India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) – Oct 5, 2023
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The post US-Iran Interim Ceasefire Deal, Israel, And The Future of Abraham Accords appeared first on Politact.

How Putin’s Visit, Venezuela Crisis, and Shifts in the Middle East and Afghanistan are Testing New Delhi’s Foreign Policy

By Furqan Khan
Great Power Politics Fellow

When Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived in New Delhi in December last year to attend the 23rd annual India-Russia summit, expectations were ripe for breakthrough agreements in energy and defense. Yet, despite the two countries agreeing to expand economic cooperation and reaffirming their “special and privileged strategic partnership,” no concrete measures were announced in advancing energy and defense cooperation.

Putin’s visit, however, came at a crucial time when the United States is pressing Kremlin to end the war in Ukraine, while India’s relations with Washington are under strain. At the same time, continued US pressure on India’s purchases of Russian crude, the imposition of punitive tariffs, and America’s renewed engagement with Pakistan have pushed India to seek alternative partnerships. This happens alongside a broader shift in American strategy, reflected in the Trump administration’s newly announced 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS), which signals a shift away from the allied-centric leadership to a more transactional, burden-sharing approach.

When viewed against these systemic shifts, Putin’s visit holds greater strategic value for both Moscow and New Delhi, even when the tangible outcomes were limited. Based on the recent developments in January, specifically the US military operation and the subsequent “US-controlled” oil framework, the Venezuela crisis has become a critical lever in US-India relations.

Symbolism – Not So much Substance

Putin’s visit, first by the Russian President since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, attracted widespread attention. Although the two leaders met elsewhere, including in Moscow and Tianjin in 2024 and 2025, respectively, this visit holds a distinct strategic significance. The two countries signed agreements on pharmaceuticals, critical minerals, and tourism, and also finalized an economic cooperation arrangement to increase their bilateral trade to $100 billion by 2030. However, the summit was more significant for what was not announced: oil and weapons deals.

Putin expressed readiness to supply “uninterrupted shipments” of fuel to India; however, New Delhi remained cautious about the offer. According to the Indian foreign secretary, decisions by Indian oil companies are driven by the “evolving market dynamics” and “commercial issues” they confront while sourcing their supplies, signaling US sanctions as a potential challenge. Similarly, defense cooperation also fell short of expectations. There were reports that weapons sales would be on the agenda of President Putin’s visit. In particular, the defense ministers from both sides were expected to discuss the timely delivery of the remaining units of the S-400 air defense system, which India purchased from Russia in 2018. Potential collaboration on the joint production of the next-generation S-500 system was also on the cards. However, no such agreements were finalized.

India was likely concerned by the potential repercussions of any high-profile defense deal over its already strained relations with the US, especially when New Delhi is working to negotiate a favorable trade deal with Washington.

Nonetheless, despite the absence of a substantive breakthrough, Putin’s visit was a symbolic show of strategic recalibration in the face of the American pressure. Greeting Putin with a red carpet offered India an opportunity to display its strategic autonomy and signal that India’s relationship with Russia is far from over. For Putin, as he is navigating tough negotiations to end the war, the visit signaled that despite Western attempts to render Russia a pariah, it still has friends of global significance. Therefore, even though fewer concrete steps were taken, the visit pumped energy into their “special and privileged strategic partnership.”

Testing the Strength of India-Russia Relations

Putin-Modi talks were watched closely in Washington, where sanctions are testing the strength of this bilateral relationship. The Trump administration has been pressuring Kremlin to end its nearly four-year war in Ukraine, while urging India to stop buying Russian oil, after accusing New Delhi of indirectly financing the war. Trump’s advisor Peter Navarro even called it “Modi’s War,” highlighting the significant rise in India’s purchases of Russian crude, from 0.2 percent before the war to 40 percent today. Consequently, the Trump administration imposed a whopping 50 percent tariff on Indian imports, of which 25 percent is punitive for buying Russian oil and weapons.

India has become the second-largest importer of Russian oil, after China, and more than a third of its oil imports have come from Russia over the past three years. However, this appears to be changing after the American sanctions recently targeted Russia’s two biggest oil giants, Rosneft and Lukoil, which might affect Indian oil companies, some of which have already stopped buying Russian oil. However, the decision to halt oil imports appears to be a temporary move by New Delhi to adjust for a favorable trade deal with Washington. During Putin’s visit, Modi reiterated his careful position on the Ukraine war, saying that India is not neutral in this conflict but stands on the “side of peace.”

Trump’s New Strategic Blueprint in National Security Strategy (NSS-2025)

The Trump administration’s approach towards India and the broader Indo-Pacific region is reinforced by the recently announced NSS, which departs from the strategic competition narrative and recognizes the existence of other “stronger nations” as a “timeless truth of international relations.” It reduces Russia from an “acute threat” to a challenge of managing its relations with the European Union, and downgrades China from a “pacing challenge” to an actor with which the US seeks to balance its economic relationship, avoiding the term strategic competitor. Nonetheless, the strategy expresses a commitment to “work with allies and partners” to preserve the balance of power.

For the last two decades, the American grand strategy has focused on preventing the rise of China as its peer competitor, in which India has been a critical partner. This seems to be changing under the new strategy, which expects India and other allies to address their challenges on their own under the burden-sharing principle. This shift indicates a potential erosion of India’s strategic exceptionalism in America’s strategy that New Delhi has enjoyed over the last two decades.

This shift in strategy is also reflected in the diminishing role of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) – a four-member Indo-Pacific alliance of Australia, Japan, India, and the US, which is losing its momentum. The NSS mentions Quad only once, while calling for improved commercial relations with India to “encourage New Delhi to contribute more” to the Indo-Pacific security. However, described as “more strategically aligned than ever before ” a year ago by President Biden, Quad has drifted into uncertainty under President Trump. Last year’s Quad summit, scheduled to be hosted by India in November and which Trump was reportedly reluctant to attend, did not go through, as India-US relations unraveled.

Trump has apparently broken Biden’s policy of strategic altruism that considered support for India’s major power status consistent with the US national interest. The current approach has been more transactional with the expectation of a direct quid pro quo.

Given these signals, India appears to be adjusting its diplomatic engagement in a hedging mode. Putin’s visit is part of that strategy, but it does not end in Russia. In September 2025, Modi was seen exchanging warm gestures with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Tianjin, both rejecting the notion of rivalry and instead calling each other development partners. China-India trade relations have also improved steadily over time since 2005, even though the US remains India’s largest trading partner. However, many in New Delhi believe that this is not a desirable position for India, one that it does not seek but is forced into by the Trump administration’s policies. At the same time, Washington has criticized India’s BRICS membership for the bloc’s revisionist ambitions against the West.

Against this backdrop, India’s rapprochement with China, and rolling out the red carpet for President Putin can, at best, ensures strategic autonomy for New Delhi without affecting the foundational basis of Indo-US strategic partnership.

US-India Ties and Pakistan

These regional and global shifts have significant consequences for South Asia, particularly as Trump’s embrace of Pakistan in recent months factors into India’s strategic calculations. The way Trump and his advisors have publicly criticized Modi’s government, especially after the May conflict with Pakistan, Modi’s diplomacy is also guided by a sense of political liability, where conceding to the US demands risks domestic political backlash.

After the India-Pakistan conflict in May, following a terrorist attack in Pahalgam (Indian administered Kashmir) last year, Pakistan credited Trump for the ceasefire and backed his nomination for the Nobel Peace prize, unlike India, which refused to give a similar credit. Trump’s reaction to the Pahalgam attack was a break from the past American presidents, who supported India and pressured Pakistan to crack down on militants allegedly operating from its soil. Instead, Trump showered praise on Pakistan’s civil-military leadership, credited Islamabad for the ceasefire in Gaza, and invested heavily in the country’s untapped critical minerals reserves.

Additionally, America’s defense cooperation with Pakistan, which India has consistently opposed, especially the recent US approval for the sale in support of Pakistan’s F-16 fleet worth $686 million, is likely to be received poorly in New Delhi. Washington has justified close defense cooperation with Islamabad as essential to counterterrorism, saying that the sale will “not alter the basic military balance” in South Asia. Taken together, the growing US tilt towards Pakistan potentially revokes Indian monopoly over Washington’s South Asia policy, creating space for Pakistan to maneuver while encouraging New Delhi to seek partnerships away from the US.

Evolving Middle East and Afghanistan

India’s foreign policy is also facing challenges in the evolving geopolitics of the Middle East and Afghanistan. The nation maintains good relations with both Russia and Iran, yet it is also growing its ties, particularly in the defense sector, with Israel, which puts New Delhi in a critical position to navigate this balancing challenge. This dilemma is also visible in the recent tensions between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in Yemen, where Iran is a major actor. As India’s energy, trade, and diaspora interests are deeply embedded in the Gulf states, navigating the conflict between the Gulf states as well as maintaining its relations with Israel and Iran becomes a critical challenge.

On the other hand, while only Russia recognizes the Taliban regime in Kabul, India is also expanding its ties with the Taliban regime in Kabul, recognizing the latter’s strategic relevance vis-à-vis Pakistan. This has happened in parallel to Pakistan’s continuing loss of leverage in Kabul, driven by the Taliban regime’s inability to crack down on anti-Pakistan terrorist groups in Afghanistan. These dynamics, along with the changing great power alignment in South Asia, are creating a complex regional environment for both India and Pakistan.

Conclusion

Putin’s visit to India was not a breakthrough in the India-Russia bilateral relationship, yet it occurred at a crucial time of global strategic recalibration. The 2025 NSS presents a new blueprint for the US foreign policy, one that downplays the Russia and China threat while calling for greater burden-sharing from allies and partners, including India, to preserve the balance of power. This, when read alongside the transactional turn in Washington’s approach towards New Delhi over the last few months, signals that the period of strategic altruism for India is eroding.

By welcoming Putin in New Delhi and opening up to China, India adopted a hedging approach rooted in strategic autonomy. The message from India is clear: it neither aligns exclusively with Russia nor allows the Western pressure to dictate its policy choices. This is also visible in India’s approach towards the Middle East, where it is faces the balancing challenge of maintaining competing ties in the Middle East and Afghanistan as it also maintains good relations with Russia and Iran. Particularly with the US, as Washington’s approach turns transactional under the Trump administration, the upward trends seen in US-India relations over the last two decades face a potential erosion.

Moreover, the Venezuela crisis has given Washington the leverage it lacked previously. It is resolving the “India-Russia oil problem” by creating a “India-Venezuela solution”—but one that keeps the remote control firmly in the White House. The White has indicated that it will permit India to buy oil from Venezuela under the newly unveiled system.

As India begins to lose its privileged position in Trump’s strategy, at least in the near term, space opens for Pakistan, which was previously sidelined given New Delhi’s centrality in America’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Irrespective, Trump’s NSS is only an intent and not a concrete policy shift, which warrants cautious scrutiny to assess its potential impact on the future of South Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region.

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The post The End Of Strategic Altruism: Putin’s Visit And The New US-India Reality appeared first on Politact.

PoliTact’s Analysis of Perceptions and Perspectives

With inputs from Naade Ali and Arif Ansar

Context

Since the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan in August 2021, there was a perception the installation of Afghan Taliban in Kabul will make Pakistan’s regional influence grow. However, Afghan Taliban-TTP nexus continues to bedevil the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) remains the central source of friction and a key driver of the persistent cross-border violence. There is no indication that the group has endorsed the ceasefire reached in Istanbul; its ongoing attacks suggest that it remains active despite the interstate truce. The next round of talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan are scheduled for November 6 in Istanbul.

Islamabad accuses the Afghan Taliban of providing support and sanctuary to the TTP, designated as a terror group by both UN and the U.S., while Kabul dismisses these allegations. Qatar and Turkey are closely observing the ceasefire, marking their first substantive involvement in mediating between Islamabad and Kabul after previous efforts—including those led by China—failed to achieve meaningful results. While the agreement commits Pakistan to refrain from launching strikes inside Afghanistan, it does not neutralize the TTP threat. Under the deal, Pakistan is expected to avoid cross-border operations but retains the right to target TTP militants attempting to infiltrate its territory.

For the Afghan Taliban, the ceasefire offers a degree of peace and reduces the risk of cross-border strikes. However, relinquishing support for the TTP is not a decision that rests with any single Taliban leader, not even the defense minister. The authority to determine the Taliban’s stance toward the TTP lies solely with their Supreme Leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada. There have been no reports to date indicating that he has issued any directive against the group. Although the ceasefire may temporarily pause the infiltration of TTP militants from Afghanistan into Pakistan, it could simultaneously prompt the group’s factions within Pakistan to become more active, fighting independently in the absence of reinforcement from their Afghan counterparts.

Why do Afghan Taliban Support TTP?

The Afghan Taliban’s support for the TTP stems from their shared combat experience, religious ideology, and tribal ties. The TTP’s leadership has sworn allegiance to the Taliban’s Supreme Leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, granting the group significant autonomy to operate without interference from the Kabul-based Taliban faction.

This arrangement allows the TTP to pursue strategic and geopolitical objectives on behalf of the Taliban, such as challenging Pakistan’s control over territories beyond the Durand Line, which the Taliban considers part of Afghanistan. The Durand Line, a colonial-era border, remains a contentious issue, as the Afghan Taliban rejects its legitimacy, fueling tensions with Pakistan. Despite the recent Afghanistan-Pakistan agreement emphasizing mutual respect for territorial integrity, ambiguity persists regarding both sides’ interpretations of their sovereign boundaries.

Afghanistan’s Defense Minister, Mullah Yaqoob Mujahid, recently described the Durand line as an “imaginary border”, reinforcing the impression that the Afghan Taliban do not consider it a legitimate border. Similarly, the Deputy Interior Minister Nabi Omari expressed hopes of reclaiming “Afghanistan’s old lands” currently under Pakistani control, stating, “By Allah’s will, this land will return to us.”

It is important to note that, unlike the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP), which directly challenges Taliban rule, the TTP does not pose an immediate threat. Instead, it contributes to the Taliban-led Afghan economy by purchasing weapons and sharing profits from smuggling, extortion, and other illicit activities, making the TTP a significant stakeholder in Afghanistan’s economy. In fact, TTP also acts as a Taliban ally against ISKP.

While Al Qaeda (AQ) presence in Afghanistan has significantly diminished, the most significant evidence of continued ties with the Taliban was the U.S. drone strike that killed Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahri in July 2022 in a safe house in Kabul. In the February 2020 Doha Agreement with the U.S., the Taliban pledged to prevent international terrorist groups, including AQ, from using Afghan territory to threaten the U.S. and its allies. However, evidence strongly suggests the Taliban leadership has violated this pledge.

Disarming these battle-hardened TTP militants, who lack alternative livelihoods due to their combat-focused skill set, appears to be a costly and complex endeavor for the Afghan Taliban. Fully integrating them into Afghan security forces could also undermine the Taliban’s public denials of supporting the TTP and risk internal discord.

The present circumstances suggest that the Taliban have chosen to continue supporting the TTP, enabling them to focus on external rather than internal operations. Moreover, by continuing this backing, raises serious questions about the Taliban motivations and world view. Irrespective, this risky strategy jeopardizes the Taliban’s pursuit of international recognition and complicates their relations with Pakistan.

The Key Demands of TTP

While the TTP’s focus has tactically shifted over the years (for instance, limiting attacks on civilians after 2018), their fundamental goal remains the enforcement of their interpretation of Sharia and the withdrawal of the state’s writ from Pakistan’s merged tribal areas. Based on their stated objectives presented during past negotiations, the key demands of the TTP include:

1. Implementation of Sharia

The TTP’s long-term goal is the establishment of a state based on its own strict interpretation of Islamic law (Sharia), mirroring the system of the Afghan Taliban.

2. Restoring Autonomy and Demilitarization

The TTP demands the reversal of the 2018 constitutional amendment that merged the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) into Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. The TTP seeks to restore the semi-autonomous or independent status of these tribal regions.

A frequent demand is the complete withdrawal of the Pakistani military and security forces from the tribal belt (the former FATA and surrounding regions), allowing the TTP to establish control and implement its own governance system.

3. Prisoner and Amnesty Demands

The TTP consistently demands the release of all its imprisoned members and commanders held by Pakistani authorities. This has often been a precondition for engaging in ceasefires or peace talks. The group demands full amnesty for its fighters who have committed acts of terror against the Pakistani state and its citizens.

Pakistan’s Evolving Policy Towards Afghan Taliban and TTP

Pakistan has long tried to convince Afghan Taliban to act against the TTP. While Afghan Taliban offered to facilitate talks between TTP and Pakistan and relocate it from the border regions – it has restrained from taking any serious actions against it. Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) led government had sought Afghan Taliban assistance in pacifying TTP, resulting in a ceasefire that fell apart in November 2022 – and resumption of TTP attacks against Pakistan. The TTP demands related to release of prisoners were also met to some extent. On the other hand, their requirements of decreasing the number of security forces in FATA – and rescinding of FATA merger are more complicated.

The situation now seems different. By conducting military strikes in Afghanistan and killing dozens of Taliban fighters, Islamabad has set a new precedent, signaling that the Afghans must face consequences for supporting its enemies. Though, Pakistan’s carrot-and-stick strategy was designed to change the Taliban cost-benefit calculus, forcing them to choose between Pakistan or TTP. To date, the Afghan Taliban have chosen the latter, a course they may continue to follow, as tensions with Islamabad neither threaten their domestic control nor hinder their growing engagement with other regional actors, including India.

The Taliban has yet to craft an effective framework to regulate the TTP, restrict its autonomy, or halt its cross-border operations. Instead, growing friction with Pakistan has only deepened the alignment between the two. Afghan Deputy Minister of Interior Affairs, Mawlawi Muhammad Nabi Omari, was reported to have issued a stark warning to Pakistan, stating that if Afghan tribes and the nation declare Pakistan an invader by religious decree, “by God, you will not find safety even up to the Indian border.”

These anti-Pakistan sentiments cast doubts about the Afghan Taliban intentions. The combined pride of the Afghan Taliban and TTP in their perceived triumphs over major powers like the U.S. and NATO, and in reclaiming Afghanistan after decades of war, reinforces their determination and stubbornness.

Afghan Taliban support alone does not fully explain the TTP’s survival and expansion. A significant portion of its fighters are disenfranchised and radicalized youth from Pakistan’s impoverished regions, particularly Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. In a security briefing to KP lawmakers, the provincial police chief once revealed that around 4,000 militants, including 35% Afghan nationals, were operating in the province, often blending in with civilians by day and carrying out attacks at night.

A belief reportedly exists within the TTP that, with support from local tribes, it can seize Pakistani territory by force and eventually transform from a non-state actor into a legitimate state actor, like their Afghan counterpart. This perception boosts the morale of its fighters and encourages the group’s continued expansion. These characteristics truly indicate that TTP aspires for a space from where Afghan Taliban can extend their reach.

Pakistan’s security establishment accuses India of using Afghanistan as a base for launching terror operations against Pakistan – and the availability of modern weapons in Afghanistan has enhanced militants’ capabilities. At the same time, the military recognizes that Pakistan’s terrorism problem is not purely external but also internally facilitated. In his recent remarks, Pakistan Army Chief urged Kabul to prioritize mutual security over ongoing violence, calling on the Afghan Taliban regime to “rein in the proxies who have sanctuaries in Afghanistan.”

An Alliance of Ideology vs. State Necessity

The current crisis surrounding the ceasefire reveals a fundamental and seemingly unresolvable conflict: while Pakistan demands the Afghan Taliban choose state necessity (diplomatic recognition and regional trade) over ideological loyalty, the leadership in Kabul has consistently chosen the latter.

The TTP is more than just an operational proxy; it is a vital ideological ally and an economic stakeholder that reinforces the Afghan Taliban’s own anti-state identity and vision for a borderless Islamic Emirate. Pakistan’s previous posture of limited intervention in Afghanistan, coupled with the TTP’s growing recruitment base among disenfranchised Pakistani youth, means that Islamabad’s carrot-and-stick strategy has failed to alter the Taliban’s calculus.

While the Pakistani government has previously pursued political solutions, the TTP’s extremist demands and uncompromising approach have rendered sustained negotiations nearly impossible. The current strategic pivot toward a military approach—which carries the inherent risk of seeking regime change in Afghanistan—is equally unlikely to yield a long-term roadmap. For any military pressure to be effective, it must be integrated with political steps that foster public ownership and address long-held local grievances. This sophisticated, multi-pronged strategy offers the best chance to definitively dismantle the Taliban-TTP nexus.

Any attempt at regime change is heavily contingent upon securing the explicit support of key regional players, most notably China. A full-scale war directly jeopardizes substantial Chinese investments, particularly those under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and risks creating a dangerous new front amid Pakistan’s ongoing tensions with India. Furthermore, escalating border conflicts are likely to severely complicate the recent reset in U.S.-Pakistan relations, which is premised on cooperation in trade, strategic minerals, and technology.

Internationally, being mired in internal and border conflicts would significantly erode Pakistan’s capacity to play a credible regional role, hindering its ability to support allies like Saudi Arabia or contribute to broader stability efforts, such as a Gaza peace plan. Even with powerful backing from both China and the U.S., attempting to alter the ethnic balance of power within Afghanistan remains an extremely high-risk gamble that could easily spiral into a prolonged, devastating civil war.

In the absence of a truly sophisticated methodology—one that moves beyond binary military or political options—Pakistan risks becoming entangled in a protracted proxy guerrilla warfare within an era of escalating great power rivalry. The recent Istanbul ceasefire, therefore, provides only a temporary and fragile pause. This strategic impasse casts a long, enduring shadow over the future of South Asian security.

Related Articles:

The Fragile Truce Between Pakistan And Afghanistan And The War Of Narratives – Nov 2, 2025
Afghanistan’s Strategic Outlook And New Geopolitical Realities – Aug 18, 2025
Afghanistan, Pakistan Relations and Great Power Rivalry – Jul 21, 2025
Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions, Trump, And Wakhan Corridor – Feb 3, 2025
Political Or Military Solution; Pakistan’s New Counter-Terrorism Operation Azm-e-Istehkam – Aug 1, 2024
Convergences in US Pakistan Ties and Afghanistan – Jan 1, 2024
Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP – Feb 22, 2023
Post Withdrawal Campaign Against Extremism In Afghanistan And US-Pakistan Relations – Sep 7, 2022
Emerging US Policy Towards Afghanistan After Withdrawal – March 2, 2022
Recalibrating The US-Pakistan Partnership In Afghanistan – Jun 22, 2021
US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden – Mar 2, 2021

The post The Unbroken Alliance: Why the Afghan Taliban-TTP Nexus Is Dooming Peace with Pakistan appeared first on Politact.

PoliTact’s Analysis of Perception and Perspective

Context

President Donald Trump’s second term has ushered in a foreign policy that departs sharply from the liberal internationalist consensus of the post–Cold War era. Instead of multilateralism and institution-building, the Trump administration has embraced transactional diplomacy, tariff-based leverage, and a CEO-style approach to global power. The guiding logic is less about sustaining a rules-based order than about extracting concessions in a world Trump views as fundamentally zero-sum.

This orientation—the so-called Trump Doctrine—is reshaping the United States’ posture toward rivals and allies alike. He frames his foreign policy as an extension of his populist domestic agenda: “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) through trade realignment, industrial re-shoring, and hard bargaining. Yet while tariffs and deal-making remain his preferred tools, Trump also harbors ambitions for statesmanship, including a quixotic pursuit of a Nobel Peace Prize. His attempts to mediate conflicts from Ukraine to South Asia illustrate both the promise and the peril of his approach. The result is a high-risk strategy that could redefine America’s global role—and shape the political landscape of the next U.S. elections.

Tariffs as Tools of Statecraft

During his first term, as Robert Blackwill of the Council on Foreign Relations had noted, Trump consistently makes major foreign policy decisions against the advice of seasoned advisors, amid unprecedented turnover in senior defense and diplomatic posts. A 2020 Senate Democratic report accused him of transforming U.S. foreign policy into a tool of personal and business interests, undermining alliances and institutions alike.

At the heart of Trump’s foreign policy is the use of tariffs and trade leverage. Where previous presidents relied on sanctions or diplomatic pressure, Trump employs tariffs as his signature instrument—against adversaries and allies alike.

During his first term, tariffs targeted China, the EU, and even Canada and Mexico. His second term has expanded this logic into a global bargaining strategy: tariffs are cast not merely as economic tools but as instruments of national security. Trump argues that tariffs protect American workers, pressure foreign governments into concessions, and restore industrial self-sufficiency.

The long-term effects remain uncertain. Economists warn that trade wars increase consumer costs and disrupt supply chains. Yet Trump has succeeded in re-framing tariffs as patriotic policy, appealing to swing-state voters who see globalization as a betrayal. Going into the next election cycle, this rhetoric will be central to his pitch: only a tariff-wielding America, he claims, can reclaim greatness.

French observer of American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville, once warned that democracies risk losing their moral compass when governed solely for material gain. Trump’s America First agenda, rooted in tariffs and short-term bargaining, embodies this danger. For him, alliances and norms are not ends in themselves but bargaining chips.

Trump as Peace and Deal Maker

The Ukraine-Russia Stalemate

Trump’s most high-profile attempt at statesmanship came with the August 2025 Alaska Summit, where he hosted Vladimir Putin on U.S. soil—the first such visit since 2007. Styled as CEO-style deal-making, the summit bypassed traditional diplomats. Analysts at Chatham House concluded that the meeting emboldened Putin, who intensified his war aims rather than compromising. The Council on Foreign Relations reported that Putin’s demands remained maximalist: Ukrainian neutrality, demilitarization, and recognition of annexed territories.

Far from resolving the conflict, Trump’s intervention muddled U.S. messaging while alienating allies and NATO. Reuters called the summit a tilt toward Moscow, while AP noted it granted Putin undeserved legitimacy. European leaders have since moved to fill the vacuum, training Ukrainian forces and planning “reassurance forces” with limited U.S. backing. The Ukraine episode illustrates Trump’s foreign policy paradox: eager for dramatic breakthroughs, he often undercuts long-term credibility in pursuit of short-term optics.

Iran and the Quest for a Nobel Prize

Trump has repeatedly hinted that he seeks a Nobel Peace Prize, viewing it as the ultimate validation of his leadership. His prior efforts—such as the Abraham Accords in the Middle East—bolstered his claim but fell short of Nobel recognition.

Looking ahead, Trump is likely to focus on Iran’s nuclear program as the most dramatic arena for a potential peace deal. He has oscillated between threats of military action and promises of “the best deal ever.” His critics note that scrapping the 2015 JCPOA nuclear accord in his first term weakened U.S. leverage and pushed Iran closer to enrichment thresholds. Yet Trump now suggests he alone can broker a new accord, one tougher than his predecessors achieved.

Israel, Palestine, and the Limits of Transactionalism

Trump’s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains deeply shaped by his earlier recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and the Abraham Accords. In his second term, he presents himself as uniquely capable of brokering a “grand bargain” between Israel and Arab states.

Yet Palestinians remain sidelined, and violence in Gaza and the West Bank has escalated. European analysts argue that Trump’s transactional diplomacy—focused on Arab-Israeli normalization—ignores the structural roots of Palestinian grievances. Without addressing Palestinian claims to sovereignty, however, any settlement risks being cosmetic.

The recent Israeli attack on Hamas negotiators in Doha has threatened the entire architecture of U.S. strategy in the Middle East. GCC now confronts the reality that Washington either could not—or would not—prevent Israel from striking within their borders. The strike risks driving Gulf nations to reconsider their reliance on U.S. guarantees and to explore alternative security alignments, as Saudi Arabia demonstrated by concluding a defense treaty with Pakistan.

Not only that, on the domestic front, the incident has reinforced the MAGA-Israeli rift. Many America First voters have started to question Trump’s policy of prioritizing Israeli support over American interests. How this plays out will be utterly consequential for the future of American politics.

India and Pakistan Tensions

Trump has also cited his efforts to mediate between India and Pakistan, two nuclear-armed rivals, as evidence of his unique statesmanship. After the recent four-day conflict, he offered to broker talks over Kashmir, even claiming that Prime Minister Narendra Modi requested U.S. intervention. While India denied such overtures, Trump continued to highlight his role in lowering tensions during border skirmishes. Irrespective, Trump revives this narrative, portraying himself as the only leader willing to bring two nuclear powers to the table.

For domestic audiences, the image of Trump as peacemaker between two nuclear states reinforces his argument that he alone can prevent catastrophic wars—an argument likely to feature prominently in his re-election campaign.

No More Soft Power

Traditional presidents—including many of the Founders—understood that America’s influence lay in both persuasion and force. George Washington counseled avoiding entangling alliances, but also promoting republican values. Trump’s policy inverts this balance: U.S. soft power—the tools of USAID, VOA—is slashed, replaced by tariffs, threats, and military posturing.

Removing soft power tools weakens long-term credibility. A legislative report warned Trump’s instincts make U.S. a “bystander in international efforts,” undermining democracy promotion and global cooperation. Institutions like WHO, climate accords, and multilateral forums are dismissed, even as authoritarian players fill the void.

Trump’s defense of using military power against Iran’s nuclear program—despite ongoing talks—underscores reliance on hard tools over diplomacy. His use of economic coercion—tariffs on allies and adversaries alike—challenges norms of trade reciprocity.

At home, this approach reflects his populist stance: reclaiming leverage against countries like India by imposing tariffs and stricter oversight of H1B Visa Program, while demanding Europe meet NATO obligations. While Trump distances U.S. from multilateralism, countries like China and Russia are deepening cooperation via BRICS, SCO, and other forums. Meanwhile, U.S. has alienated NATO and EU—evident in the diplomatic backlash after Alaska.

On the other hand, European efforts to assure Ukraine’s security—a potential buffer zone, peacekeepers—are gaining momentum and autonomy, though still needing U.S. support. Emerging countries view Trump’s U.S. as transactional and surveys by the European Council on Foreign Relations indicated that global responses to his second term reflect hedging, not alliance-building.

Trump’s foreign policy represents a break with the post-1991 liberal order, which emphasized collective security, open markets, and democratic values. Instead, his worldview echoes 19th-century great-power politics, in which spheres of influence and economic coercion dominate.

Trump’s posture harks back to classic great-power thinking. Scholars have noted that U.S. resistance to Russian or Chinese spheres of influence is a post–Cold War construct. Historically, the U.S. itself wielded Monroe Doctrine-style influence and accepted postwar spheres such as Eastern Europe under Soviet control. He appears to embrace that tradition—viewing global competition through the lens of zero-sum regional hierarchies, especially across Eurasia. He prioritizes a strategy of wedge-driving between Russia and China, rather than accepting a multi-polar order.

The conventional wisdom in think-tank literature—a world moving towards multi-polarity, with diplomatic messiness but strategic balance—is largely ignored. Some argue multipolarity may be more hazardous than bipolarity. However, Trump avoids such debates: instead, he seems to seek a revival of bilateral leverage, playing off great powers to U.S. advantage where possible.

Election Implications: Tariffs and Populism at Home

Trump’s foreign policy represents a radical experiment in realpolitik. It replaces liberal order with transactional bargaining, elevates tariffs to tools of statecraft, and prizes symbolic breakthroughs—especially peace deals that might burnish Trump’s legacy.

For the next election, Trump’s tariff-driven populism may prove a potent political weapon at home. His campaign will emphasize tariffs, industrial re-shoring, and economic nationalism as proof of “America First” success. Swing-state voters, especially in the Midwest, may respond favorably to tariff-driven protection of steel, autos, and manufacturing. Yet suburban and business constituencies could rebel against higher consumer prices and global instability.

But internationally, America risks being seen less as a reliable leader than as a transactional actor chasing deals and prestige. Allies face uncertainty about whether U.S. commitments will endure. The credibility gap—created by Trump’s personalized, ad-hoc decision-making—risks long-term erosion of American leadership, regardless of who wins in the next election.

Equally, it’s critical to keep in perspective the sense of exploitation which resulted in the America First Mantra, using which President Trump came into power for the second time. If America First policy does not produce economic dividends for common Americans in the short and long term, it will further complicate the domestic politics and confusion regarding its global role and future direction. In this, how Trump balances his foreign policy regarding Israel will be critical.

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The post The End of Liberal Internationalism? Trump’s Foreign Policy Revolution and Its Electoral Implications appeared first on Politact.

Policy Brief – Analysis of Perceptions and Perspectives

Navigating India, Pakistan, Iran, and U.S. Pressures

Context

Afghanistan’s strategic outlook is undergoing a dramatic overhaul amid escalating connectivity disputes, geopolitical realignments, and regional conflicts. The combined pressures of India–Pakistan instability, U.S. trade friction with India, Iran-Israel hostilities, and Pakistan’s rising diplomatic leverage are forcing Kabul into a balanced posture—nurturing Indian, Iranian, Chinese, and Pakistani ties while maintaining neutrality in broader conflicts.

Fallout from the India–Pakistan Escalation

The recent missile and drone escalation between India and Pakistan, while brief, sent strong ripples across Afghanistan’s strategic thinking. For Kabul, the clashes underscored both the volatility of its neighborhood and the fragility of its trade lifelines. Afghanistan’s heavy dependence on Pakistani corridors for access to Indian markets became immediately apparent when border closures stranded hundreds of trucks and brought transit under the Afghanistan–Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement to a halt. This economic disruption has reinforced the Taliban government’s determination to diversify its trade routes and reduce over reliance on Pakistan, with particular focus on accelerating use of Iran’s Chabahar port—an initiative backed by India and bolstered by Kabul’s recent investment in the facility.

Diplomatically, Afghanistan responded with a careful balancing act, calling for restraint on both sides while deepening engagement with India. Meetings earlier in 2025 between Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi and Indian officials signaled a renewed willingness to explore closer economic ties, particularly through the Chabahar route, which would allow Afghanistan to bypass Pakistani territory entirely. This outreach also served to assert Kabul’s independence in regional diplomacy, reducing the perception of Pakistan as the sole gateway for Afghan connectivity.

At the same time, China seized the moment to mediate and position itself as an economic partner. Through Chinese facilitation in June 2025, Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed to restore ambassador-level diplomatic ties, with Kabul invited to formally participate in the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This not only offered Afghanistan access to infrastructure funding and regional integration but also came with commitments from the Taliban to address Pakistan’s concerns over cross-border militancy—particularly activity by the Pakistani Taliban (TTP). While Afghan officials have long denied harboring such groups, the inclusion of security assurances in the deal signaled a cautious willingness to engage on this sensitive issue.

However, the credibility of these pledges remains under scrutiny. Pakistan continues to voice concerns about militant sanctuaries on Afghan soil, and incidents of TTP-linked violence persist. For Afghanistan, managing this security profile will be central to sustaining the diplomatic thaw with Islamabad and maximizing the economic benefits of regional projects like CPEC.

In the end, the India–Pakistan conflict served as both a warning and an opportunity for Afghanistan. It highlighted the risks of over-dependence on a single trade corridor, incentivized diversification through Iranian and Indian partnerships, and opened doors for Chinese-backed connectivity initiatives. Yet, it also reinforced that regional credibility is not solely a function of military capability but also of sustained economic reliability and security cooperation.

US-India Economic Tensions

Against this backdrop, rising trade tensions between the United States and India are adding another layer of complexity to South Asia’s connectivity politics. Washington’s imposition of tariffs of up to 50% on Indian exports—including textiles, jewelry, and footwear—is expected to slow India’s growth, intensify pressure on its export industries, and strain the once-warm personal rapport between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and former President Donald Trump. The tariff amount includes 25% penalty for importing Russian oil and military equipment – and thus energizing its war machine in Ukraine. In response, India has delayed certain U.S. defense procurements, expanded outreach to BRICS partners, and signaled a more assertive, independent foreign policy stance.

For Afghanistan, this shift may mean a more determined Indian push to limit Kabul’s integration into China-led connectivity projects like CPEC. In the aftermath of the May 2025 India–Pakistan clashes, Indian strategists are reportedly concerned that closer Afghan–China ties could deepen Pakistan’s leverage in the region. New Delhi’s outreach to Kabul—centered on expanding trade via Chabahar—fits within this broader effort to offer alternatives to Chinese-backed corridors.

Yet, India’s evolving stance is not entirely about containment. Modi is expected to travel to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin from August 31 to September 1—his first visit since the deadly 2020 Galwan Valley clashes. The visit comes amid signs of a tentative thaw in relations, including the resumption of direct flights, new pilgrimage agreements, and eased Chinese export restrictions to India. While Modi’s presence at the SCO will be closely watched, Indian analysts stress this is not a wholesale pivot toward Beijing but rather an exercise in strategic autonomy—leveraging engagement with China to balance U.S. pressure without committing to China’s broader geopolitical vision.

For Pakistan, India’s maneuvering presents a mixed picture. On one hand, a more China-friendly India could soften some of the sharpest India–Pakistan tensions in multilateral forums. On the other, if India doubles down on keeping Afghanistan out of CPEC’s orbit, Islamabad could see increased competition for influence in Kabul. For Afghanistan, the outcome will likely hinge on whether New Delhi’s engagement translates into viable alternatives to Chinese-backed connectivity—or whether it remains largely symbolic in the face of China’s economic weight.

In short, the twin developments of India–Pakistan border tensions and U.S.–India trade frictions are accelerating New Delhi’s pursuit of a multi-vector foreign policy: resisting over-dependence on Washington, engaging with Beijing when tactically useful, and asserting itself more forcefully in regional connectivity debates involving Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Iran and Tensions in the Middle East

The June Iran–Israel war and the continuing Gaza crisis have spilled into Afghanistan’s neighborhood in very tangible ways. Iran’s internal security clampdown after the twelve-day war coincided with a surge in forced returns of Afghans from Iran—UNHCR estimated average daily deportations jumped to roughly 30,000 per day during the fighting—creating new humanitarian strain on western Afghanistan and exposing Kabul’s dependence on cross-border labor flows.

Politically, the Taliban sought a posture of guarded alignment with Tehran without direct entanglement: Kabul condemned Israeli strikes (and later U.S.) on Iran while calling for regional restraint—signals aimed at maintaining Iranian goodwill for trade and transit via the Chabahar route, but also at avoiding open confrontation with larger powers.

Against this volatile backdrop, a rare and highly symbolic development occurred: Pakistan Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir was invited for a private lunch at the White House—a groundbreaking move that was quickly interpreted as a U.S. outreach toward Islamabad during rising Middle East tensions. As Trump reportedly praised Munir for helping avert an outright war with India, he also acknowledged Pakistan’s crucial insight into the Iran–Israel conflict—signaling potential U.S. interest in leveraging Pakistani mediation efforts in a region on the brink of broader conflict.

Munir’s meeting—and Pakistan’s positioning—reflect Islamabad’s growing role as an interlocutor in the Iran–Israel standoff, balancing ties with both Tehran and Washington while contending with regional instability. Islamabad has publicly condemned Israeli strikes on Iran and underscored the need for diplomatic solutions, deepening its appeal as mediator.

At the same time, the Iran-Israeli tensions and Pakistan’s growing diplomatic role complicates Afghanistan’s reliance on the Chabahar Port as an alternative trade route to Pakistan, which US had previously exempted from sanctions on Iran. The Port is being developed by Iran in partnership with India. President Trump has already conveyed his dismay to India for buying oil from Russia, benefiting the country in sustaining its policies towards Ukraine. Some experts claim that if the high-stake meeting between President Trump and Putin goes well on August 15, the pressure on India will likely ease as well.

Conclusion

As Afghan Taliban celebrate 4^th year in power, the nation now finds itself at a crossroads of competing currents. The net effect is a cautious, multi-prong stance: keep Iranian channels open for trade and energy, nurture Indian economic alternatives through Chabahar, avoid burning bridges with Pakistan as it courts Washington, and remain pragmatically receptive to Chinese infrastructure where it serves Afghan interests. In practice, that means neutral rhetoric on Middle East tensions, practical cooperation with Iran on border management amid deportations, and transactional engagement with India, Pakistan, and China to keep multiple corridors viable despite shifting great-power winds. However, as it stands now, U.S. pressure on Iran and India have restricted options for Afghanistan.

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The post Afghanistan’s Strategic Outlook And New Geopolitical Realities appeared first on Politact.

By Naade Ali and Guest Analyst Mohammad Siraj Khan

Context

The three-phase ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, brokered in January 2025, aimed to end the protracted conflict in Gaza. Despite initial progress, the deal collapsed by late February due to disagreements over its implementation. Soon Israeli forces resumed a ground invasion into central and southern Gaza and expanded into the north of the enclave.

Phase One of the agreement had envisioned initial ceasefire and humanitarian measures to last 42 days. This was to be accompanied by hostage and prisoner exchanges and partial withdrawal of Israeli forces from populated areas in Gaza, with significant increase in humanitarian assistance to Gaza. Phase Two would include comprehensive agreements with negotiations for the release of remaining hostages and full military withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza – accompanied by formal cessation of hostilities. It was Phase Three that focused on reconstruction and long-term stability with international support, along with security guarantees to ensure long-term peace while averting future flare-ups.

Israel claimed that the negotiations with Hamas were ineffective, and Netanyahu warned that continued military pressure on Hamas was essential for hostage release and maintained that the current actions were ‘just the beginning.’ As tensions continue to rise, the Israeli cabinet approved an escalation of military pressure on Hamas, with Prime Minister Netanyahu asserting that the approach was “working” to secure a deal for the release of hostages held in the Gaza Strip.

Subsequently, Hamas agreed to accept an Egyptian-mediated proposal to release five living hostages in exchange for a 50-day ceasefire in Gaza. However, Israel rejected the offer, insisting on the release of 10 or 11 hostages as a prerequisite for resuming the truce.

Netanyahu also indicated his readiness to negotiate the final phase of the deal on his terms, which would see Hamas leaders permanently leave Gaza. “Hamas will lay down its weapons. Its leaders will be allowed to leave [Gaza]. We will take care of general security in the Gaza Strip and enable the implementation of the Trump plan, the voluntary immigration plan… That’s the plan. We’re not hiding it,” he stated. Adding to the Prime Minister’s warnings, Defense Minister Katz has also earlier threatened Hamas with the progressive annexation of Gaza, stating that “the more Hamas persists in its refusal to release the hostages, the more territory it will lose, which will be annexed to Israel.”

U.S President Donald Trump who took credit for the initial ceasefire also backed Israel’s recent military action. White House Press Secretary while blaming Hamas for Israel’s decision to renew its offensive confirmed that President Trump “fully supports Israel“. Upon assuming power, Trump has already ensured Netanyahu that securing Israel’s long-term national security remains a Washington’s key objective.

Trump’s support for Netanyahu was evident in his proposal to neutralize the Hamas threat in Gaza by displacing the entire population and permanently resettling them in countries such as Egypt and Jordan, while also suggesting long-term U.S. control over the strip in the post-conflict period.

Arab Plan for Gaza and Disarmament of Hamas

In response to backlash from Muslim-majority countries within the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Trump abandoned his mass displacement plan announced earlier. Still cautious of his intentions, members of the Arab League proposed an alternative post-war plan for Gaza, advocating for its reconstruction at a cost of $53 billion under the administration of a temporary committee of independent experts, along with the deployment of UN peacekeepers to prevent further escalation of the crisis.

The Palestinian Authority and Hamas have both endorsed the Arab plan. Western nations, including France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, have also supported it, viewing the end of Hamas’s control in Gaza as a step toward eliminating the threat to Israel.

However, the U.S. and Israel have rejected the proposal, arguing that it does not prioritize Gaza’s disarmament, fails to address Hamas’s future in the region, and allows the Palestinian Authority to return without sufficient security guarantees to Israel. Meanwhile, Israel plans to establish a government agency under the Defense Ministry to oversee the “voluntary departure” of Palestinians from Gaza.

Saudi Arabia and other states have condemned Israel’s actions, calling them ongoing violations of international law that pave the way for colonial settlements. These states have consistently advocated for a “two-state solution” to the Gaza-Israel conflict, emphasizing the need for an independent Palestinian state.

Netanyahu’s push to displace Palestinians, coupled with his threats to annex Gaza and Trump’s endorsement, has raised concerns among policymakers in the Muslim world that Trump may abandon the two-state framework in favor of a one-state solution.

Iran-U.S. Standoff And Future of Negotiated Settlement

Adding further complexity to the Middle Eastern geopolitical landscape is the ongoing standoff between Iran and the U.S.-Israel alliance. Iranian nuclear ambitions remain a major concern for both the U.S. and Israel. In response, President Trump has reached out to Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei, offering negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, but with a threatening tone. Trump has set a two-month deadline for compliance, warning of severe consequences for Tehran, indirectly referencing potential airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. “My big preference is that we work it out with Iran, but if we don’t work it out, bad things are gonna happen to Iran,” Trump stated.

In turn, Iran has warned the U.S. of a strong response, suggesting that any attack would turn American bases and its regional allies into “powder kegs.” Recently, Iran showcased its growing military power by revealing an expansive underground missile facility known as “Missile City,” complete with missiles, launchers, engines, and other advanced weapons. Iran’s ballistic missile force remains the largest in the Middle East, offering a strategic deterrent and signaling that any conflict with Tehran would be costly and protracted.

To ramp up pressure, the U.S. has been bolstering its military presence in the Middle East. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth recently deployed a second aircraft carrier, the USS Carl Vinson, to join the USS Harry S. Truman strike group, whose deployment was also extended. Additionally, the U.S. sent two B-2 stealth bombers to the Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean, a direct warning to both Iran and Yemen’s Houthi militia. These bombers, capable of carrying 30,000-pound “bunker buster” bombs, are now positioned within striking range of Iran.

U.S. officials have sent mixed signals to Iran. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff has advocated for a diplomatic resolution, while White House National Security Advisor Mike Waltz has adopted a more aggressive tone, stating that the administration aims for the “complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program.”

Iran views Trump’s nuclear talks as an attempt to force Tehran into relinquishing its defense capabilities. “The U.S. means disarmament when it says negotiation,” said Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Speaker of Iran’s Parliament. Despite the tense environment, Tehran has responded to Trump’s letter, stating that while it would not negotiate “under pressure and threats or increased sanctions,” it is open to indirect talks with the U.S. through third-party mediation. The letter was delivered via Oman.

This suggests that despite the threatening rhetoric between the U.S. and Iran, there is some hope for engagement, as both Washington and Tehran seem intent on avoiding a larger confrontation. Although Iran has not identified the third-party mediator, it is speculated that indirect talks may already be underway through channels in the UAE, and potentially with Saudi Arabia, which has previously offered to mediate talks between Iran and the U.S.

Reports have also surfaced of President Trump visiting Saudi Arabia in May. The Kingdom has emerged as a key diplomatic player, having hosted talks between Russia and the U.S. over the Ukraine issue. It holds significant potential to play a similar role in Iran-U.S. negotiations. Recently, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan engaged in discussions on regional developments with his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, signaling a more reconciliatory tone between Riyadh and Tehran. The Saudi Defense Minister also recently visited Iran and hand delivered a letter from King Salman to Ayatollah Khamanei emphasizing collaboration.

A U.S.-Iran deal would offer Saudi Arabia a prominent role at the negotiation table, aligning with its “positive neutrality” foreign policy. This would further elevate Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic weight, positioning it as a major middle power in global statecraft. Through diplomatic mediation, economic investments, and strategic alliances, the Kingdom has demonstrated its commitment to stability and development

Conclusion

The internationalization of the Gaza conflict has further deepened divisions between the U.S.-Israel bloc and Arab states, overshadowing any prospects for normalization. The once-stable U.S.-Middle East partnership that long served as a cornerstone of the international order, is now experiencing a profound paradigm shift as new alliances and strategic realignments begin to emerge.

Recent developments indicate that both Western and Arab capitals are preparing to make pivotal decisions regarding their stances on Gaza and Ukraine. Arab states are seeking Western support for Gaza’s reconstruction and governance, while Western powers, in turn, are expecting Arab backing on the Ukraine conflict. These shifting dynamics are unfolding in response to President Trump’s high-stakes geopolitical gambits, as he remains determined to pursue his unconventional foreign policy approach—applying pressure and demanding concessions from traditional allies and adversaries alike—moves that are already influencing his evolving Middle East strategy.

Mohammad Siraj Khan is a lecturer, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Prince Mohammad Bin Fahd University, Saudi Arabia

The post Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions appeared first on Politact.

By Naade Ali
South Asia and Middle East Fellow

Context

In the post October 7, 2023, Hamas led attack on Israel, the geopolitics of Middle East is fast evolving. This has been accompanied by the loss of Hezbollah leadership in Lebanon and the fall of Assad regime in Syria in December 2024. The inauguration of President Trump on January 20, 2025, has presented unique threats and opportunities regarding the future of two-state solution and Iran.

The likelihood of a broader conflict between Iran and Israel hangs in balance as President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have forged a strong strategic alignment. Meeting with Trump on Feb 4, Netanyahu tried to ensure that U.S. policy remained closely aligned with Israel’s objective of weakening Iran’s defense capabilities, particularly preventing it from ever acquiring nuclear missile power. On the other hand, Iran had hoped that Trump would adopt a pragmatic approach and revive nuclear talks leading to easing of economic pressure. To Iran’s disappointment, Trump pursued the reinstatement of “maximum pressure” policy on Tehran.

However, difference of opinion exists where Netanyahu, sensing an opportunity, is lobbying for a military solution towards Iran. Conversely, Trump is vying for a negotiated settlement while keeping hopes alive for a two-state solution. This he is doing by raising the stakes for the Gulf and Arab nations, who met in Riyadh on February 21 to discuss the future of Gaza. A follow-up emergency meeting of the Arab League is planned on March 4th in Egypt, to present a counter plan to what Trump has proposed.

Trump’s Carrot-and-Stick Approach

The “maximum pressure” doctrine portrays Iran as a destabilizing force and a significant threat to U.S. national interests, centered on three key objectives:

First, it seeks to cripple Iran’s nuclear program through harsh diplomatic and economic sanctions. Second, it aims to weaken Iran’s regional influence by dismantling its network of “proxies” and axis of resistance. This objective has taken on additional significance with the on-going Gaza crisis, elimination of Hezbollah leadership, and the fall Assad regime in Syria. Third, it strives to isolate Iran on the global stage, a move Iran’s president condemned as an attempt to “bring Iran to its knees.”

Justifying his approach, Trump claimed the timing was ideal, stating, “Iran, terrified after losing almost all its air defenses, would love to make a deal with the United States.” Confident that relentless pressure would force Iran into submission, he remains committed to a strategy of economic and diplomatic coercion.

Despite his tough rhetoric, Trump ruled out military intervention, dismissing reports of a potential U.S.-Israel strike as “greatly exaggerated.” While acknowledging Iran’s military ambitions—describing it as “very militant”—he firmly rejected the idea of bombing Iran, stating, “I would much prefer a Verified Nuclear Peace Agreement, which will let Iran peacefully grow and prosper.”

Meanwhile, key Republican leaders, including U.S. Rep. Mike Turner, have stated that Trump’s strategy is designed to “secure a long-term solution that guarantees Israel’s security by preventing Iran and its proxies from ever threatening its sovereignty.” Likewise, Rep. Joe Wilson has praised the maximum pressure campaign, asserting that it would ultimately weaken Iran and dismantle its network of terror proxies.

Israeli Plans

While U.S. President Donald Trump has shown reluctance to engage in direct military action against Iran, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has taken a more assertive approach. According to multiple credible reports, with Iran’s air defense systems significantly weakened and its regional proxies under strain, Netanyahu sees a strategic window to target Iran’s nuclear facilities—whether or not the U.S. supports the move. The American intelligence assessments indicate that Israel is actively considering large-scale strikes on Iranian nuclear sites in the latter half of the year, with Israeli officials expected to urge the Trump administration and key Republican leaders to endorse their plans.

The recent approval by the U.S. State Department of a $7.4 billion arms sale to Israel—including thousands of bombs and missiles set for delivery this year—suggests a broader effort to reinforce Israel’s military capabilities against potential regional threats. Israel already possesses U.S.-made bunker-busting munitions capable of striking Iran’s underground nuclear sites, particularly those concealed within the mountainous terrain of Fordow near Qom. This growing military buildup highlights Israel’s preparedness to neutralize Iran’s security infrastructure if necessary.

Israeli officials have repeatedly affirmed that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are fully prepared to launch strikes on Iranian nuclear sites. Defense Minister Israel Katz has hinted at the possibility of an attack in the coming months. In a letter to incoming U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, Katz wrote:

“The months ahead present both challenges that demand military readiness and opportunities to advance our strategic objectives.” He has previously stated that “Iran’s nuclear facilities are more vulnerable than ever,” suggesting that this moment may offer the best chance to neutralize what Israel perceives as an existential threat.

In essence, the emphasis of the approach is twofold: Israel exerting military pressure while the U.S. working on the economic squeeze. The outcome of the two would either result in a regime change led by the Iranian people – or push the Iranian government to strike a deal with Trump. According to some media reports, if Tehran does not reach an agreement with the U.S. by October, Israel is likely to initiate a military action.

How is Iran Preparing?

President Masoud Pezeshkian has warned that while Israel or its allies “may succeed in damaging Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, they will not be able to strip the country of its ability to rebuild.” His statement came after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected negotiations with the Trump administration, asserting that past talks had neither been rational nor honorable. “Negotiations with America do not solve any of our problems,” Khamenei declared.

President Pezeshkian has accused Trump of engaging in deceptive diplomacy while simultaneously working to undermine his government. While reaffirming that Iran does not seek war, he warned that “Iran will never bow to foreign pressure.” Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi echoed this sentiment, stating that negotiating with Trump would amount to surrender. He further cautioned that any military action by Israel or the U.S. against Iran’s nuclear facilities would trigger an “all-out war,” calling it one of the greatest strategic miscalculations Washington could make.

Last year, Iran announced plans to triple its military budget. Western think tanks estimate that Iran was the fourth-largest military spender in the Middle East in 2023, with a defense budget of approximately $10.3 billion.

On the other hand, Iran has deepened its military and economic cooperation with China and Russia. Despite crippling U.S. sanctions, Iran has found alternative economic mechanisms to sustain itself and remains a key player in the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS.

Some reports suggest that Iran is ramping up its missile program, with a vessel carrying 1,000 tons of Chinese-made chemicals—potentially crucial for missile fuel—recently arriving at an Iranian port. Furthermore, Iranian military has launched its first drone carrier ship, capable of launching stealth attacks, and has acquired Russian Sukhoi-35 fighter jets to modernize its aging air force. A strategic cooperation agreement signed with Moscow in January has further reinforced Tehran’s defense ties. Despite Israel’s escalating rhetoric, Iranian military officials insist that the country’s air defense remains intact and more resilient than ever.

Conclusion

For years, Israel and Iran have been engaged in a shadow conflict, carefully calibrating their actions to avoid all-out war. Recently, Iran has adopted a strategic paradigm described as ‘strategic patience’—a calculated approach that has shielded it from large-scale destruction while reinforcing its self-sufficiency. Iranian Vice President Javad Zarif has dismissed speculation that Iran might resort to nuclear weapons as a last-ditch effort for survival or deterrence. Instead, he emphasized that the nation’s self-reliant defense strategy ensures resilience against external pressure.

However, The New York Times has reported that Iran may be discreetly exploring the possibility of developing nuclear weapons should its leadership decide to take that path. According to the report, since resuming fuel production, Iran has accumulated enough enriched uranium to construct at least four nuclear bombs. While Iran has the technical expertise to develop a basic nuclear device relatively quickly, it currently lacks the capability to integrate such a weapon into a ballistic missile system. Nonetheless, a successful nuclear test could allow Iran to declare itself a nuclear-armed state, significantly altering the strategic balance in the region.

While Iran’s conventional military strength does not match that of Israel or the U.S., it retains the capability to inflict serious damage on both adversaries. As the main supporter of Hamas and Hezbollah, the question of Iran is directly linked to the present Gaza crisis and what comes next. While many Gulf and Arab nations have privately loathed Hamas for the Oct 7, 2023, attack on Israel and for disrupting the progress achieved through Abraham Accords, the Trump plan to take over Gaza, has forced them to back up their sentiments with action. It also represents the final step in the full culmination of the Outside-In approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Related Articles:

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The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump – Dec 5, 2024
Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences – Aug 30, 2024
The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities – Sep 27, 2024

The post Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran appeared first on Politact.

By Arif Ansar

Context

Since the removal of Imran Khan’s government in April 2022 through a no confidence vote, Pakistan’s interim government finally held the election of the 16th National Parliament on February 8^th. This was significantly past the constitutional requirement to conduct balloting three months after the government had been dissolved. According to one estimate, nearly 60 million voters participated to elect 266 representatives for the National Parliament and 749 representatives for the four provincial assemblies.

However, the election results are widely seen to be rigged, raising doubts about the legitimacy of the whole process. This has further exacerbated political polarization, as the events before and after the elections appear to be particularly designed for keeping Imran Khan and his party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) out of power. The circumstances align well with what is informally known as the London Plan.

The controversial nature of Pakistan’s recent elections has also raised international concerns, particularly from the US, UK, and European Union, prompting calls for investigations into reported irregularities. In the US alone, bipartisan lawmakers, including Democrats and Republicans, have urged President Joe Biden not to recognize Pakistan’s election results until allegations of irregularities are thoroughly investigated.

Though Pakistan’s government has defended the conduct of elections as fair and free and downplayed the concerns of the international community.

The Evolving Political Landscape

PTI

According to reports, the PTI-backed independents secured 93 seats. However, PTI claims victory in over 180 seats, alleging that the total vote counts were tampered with by the Election Commission. This has prevented it from attaining a simple majority and forming the government. Challenging the elections results, PTI has resorted to legal action against the alleged rigging, flooding Pakistan’s courts with petitions seeking judicial intervention as a last resort.

As political maneuvering intensifies in the quest for power, army chief Gen. Munir has urged politicians to form a unified government, stressing that the nation needs “stable hands and a healing touch to move on from the politics of anarchy and polarization.” In response to the army chief’s remarks, PTI leadership has emphasized the release of political prisoners, including Imran Khan, and the acceptance of its mandate to rule as crucial steps towards national reconciliation.

PTI leader Imran Khan has signaled a willingness to mend relations with the military establishment, asserting no ill-will towards any party while cautioning against allowing Nawaz Sharif to lead another coalition government. He has announced plans to form governments in the provinces of KPK and Punjab, as well as at the federal level, having secured a lead in the elections.

PML-N and PPP

In contrast, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), with 75 and 54 seats respectively, has chosen to accept the election results. Despite engaging in heated exchanges and running vengeful political campaigns against each other, both agree on the urgent need to move on, claiming that reconciliation is necessary to address the current political instability.

After much political wrangling and theatrics, PML-N and PPP announced forming a united coalition government on February 20, akin to their earlier Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) alliance government. However, their reluctance to compromise on key political demands has complicated the durability of such an alliance. Moreover, it’s not clear how they can formulate the government while the results of so many seats are controversial.

Future Government

According to the results that are known, not a single political party secured the simple majority of 169 seats required to form a government, making the formation of a coalition government inevitable.

Much depends on the actions of the PTI-backed independents. The process of wooing independents by the PML-N and PPP is underway, with at least four already expressing interest in joining these parties. The challenge for the PTI is twofold: to reclaim its lost mandate and to safeguard its candidates from shifting allegiances.

Should the PML-N form the government, as it did on February 20, the PTI has threatened to initiate country-wide agitation, sparking fears of a recurrence of the riots witnessed on May 9th last year. At the same time, PTI also appear to be settling in to take on the strong opposition role. Meanwhile, PTI has announced Alliance with Islamic Parties such as Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC) and Muslim Wahdate-i-Muslimeen (MWM).

Dealing with Challenges

As PML-N and PPP announced an agreement to form the government – with Shahbaz Sharif nominated for the Prime Minister and Asif Ali Zardari for the President, it’s not clear how they plan to address the formidable economic, security, and political challenges. Pakistan will soon have to approach the IMF to enter in to a new program and manage the $25-$30 billion in annual external debt, which will require making a number of unpopular decisions. One thing is clear, without political stability there can be little headway on the economic front. Dismal economic prospects are sure to further polarize society, escalating ethnic fissures and finger pointing.

None of the political parties have provided a clear roadmap on how they will tackle the serious foreign policy issues. The nation is entangled in an acute great power rivalry in which China and Russia stand as strategic partners at one end of the pole, while US, Europe and India occupy the other pole. In this, the Gulf nation, which are the major financial backers of the last resort for Pakistan, are also swaying between the Great Powers.

Two of Pakistan’s neighbors Iran and archenemy India are not only involved in the Middle East but are players in the regional proxy war, which involves Afghanistan. This led to the recent unprecedented tit for tat strikes Iran and Pakistan launched at each other. This dynamics could easily pull in Pakistan to the intricate non-state actors playhouse of the Middle East.

The October 7 Hamas attack and the subsequent Israeli operation in Gaza has further complicated the international environment. Israeli offensive has brought larger scale human loss with close to 30,000 Palestinians dead, and destruction of Gaza. Any future ceasefire will be accompanied by rebuilding phase – likely to be led by Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. On the other hand, the Ukraine conflict has consumed quite a bit of the European and American financial bandwidth – and this will have a direct impact on what kind of attention and assistance may be available for others.

As the election cycles heat up in the US, there are indications that what transpired in Pakistan could become a hot topic between the Democrats and Republicans, further eroding credence for the local set-up there.

Policy Implications

The domestic turmoil in Pakistan is directly connected to the great power rivalry presently playing out. The election results indicate the gradual shift in the societal balance in Pakistan towards the nationalist and conservative forces. As noted by PoliTact in 2014, the organic political alliance that would emerge from the changing ecosystem is between the nationalists and the conservatives of different colors – an outcome not seen favorably in the West.

Ironically, the campaign against extremism has played a significant role in altering the traditional societal balance. It resulted in the shrinking space for the liberals in the Islamic world, and the steady rise of the nationalists and conservatives. The nationalists and conservatives have become increasingly vocal on the supremacy of state sovereignty and noninterference of external players in other countries, a cause championed by China and Russia as well.

This poses serious implications; Western allies cannot hold on to power long while being oblivious to the popular feelings and worsening economic prospects. Their interests, and those of the West, are served better by accommodating the change in the societal balance as opposed to holding on to what is archaic and the customary.

PoliTact’s South Asia Fellow Naad-e-Ali Sulehria contributed to this article.

The post Pakistan Post Election Crisis, Great Power Rivalry, and Societal Imbalance appeared first on Politact.

Context

As Israel continues its military campaign and air bombardments on the Gaza Strip and retaliates against Palestinians for the October 7 Hamas ambush, fears are mounting the conflict was widening to include Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and beyond. According to media reports, to date close to 26,000 Palestinians have been killed and 70,000 wounded.

For its part, it’s not clear if Israel is trying to contain or widen the conflict – towards its declared aim of eliminating Hamas and getting the hostages released. The strategic puzzle is, how to eliminate Hamas without also eradicating its backer, and that of Hezbollah as well, Iran. Israel has recently targeted Hezbollah commanders in Lebanon. Not only that, Israel has also gone after Iranian military advisors in Syria. These are seen as highly provocative actions.

Meanwhile, Iran backed Houthis are making the Red Sea unusable for cargo ships. Houthis have declared they are especially targeting merchant ships belonging to Israel and the powers supporting it in the Gaza operation. To address the deteriorating situation, US and UK launched missile and air raids against Houthi targets in Yemen that are continuing.

Iran has also seen increased attacks on the domestic front. On January 4, two bombs exploded at the memorial service for Qassem al Soleimani in Kerman in which about 80 people died. The Afghanistan based ISIS-K claimed responsibility for the attack. In December last year, 11 Iranian policemen were killed in an assault on a police station in Sistan-Balochistan province, and claimed by Jaish al-Adl.

However, the most dramatic escalation occurred when Iran launched counter strikes not only in Syria and Iraq, but also in its nuclear powered neighbor Pakistan, striking Jaish-al-Adl hideouts. These raids essentially connected the conflict that was mainly pestering the Middle East – to South Asia. Pakistan retaliated next day on January 18, by attacking Baloch nationalist groups operating from Iran and launching attacks against its security forces.

No one had expected the tentacles of Gaza conflict to reach as far as Pakistan, and entangle two proxy-war powers, one belonging to South Asia and the other, Middle East. Several angles have thus emerged, why did Iran strike Jaesh al-Adl in Pakistan at a time when it has so much to focus on in the Middle East.

While the ties have not always been amicable, often because of the cross-border activities of the non-state actors, neither Iran, nor Pakistan, consider each other an enemy. The puzzle becomes even more complex since the attacks at the memorial for the former intelligence chief, Qassem Soleimani, were claimed by ISIS-K based in Afghanistan. It is also noteworthy, the Iranian strikes in Pakistan came soon after the visit of Indian foreign minister, S. Jaishunker, to Iran.

Analysis

ISIS-K, Taliban, And Jaesh al-Adl,

There are some key plausible reasons why Iran may have decided to strike Jaesh al-Adl in Pakistan.

For some time, the risk has been growing regarding the level of collaboration that exists between Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Balouch separatist groups, as they both have been targeting the security forces of Pakistan. Pakistan has been consistently pressurizing Afghan Taliban to act against TTP that has taken refuge in Afghanistan. While the Afghan Taliban has acted against ISIS-K, as demanded by the US too, they have not exerted such pressure against TTP. This has strained the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The apprehension on the Afghan Taliban side is: if they operate against TTP, it is likely to drift towards ISIS-K.

At the same time, there is also the possibility that Jaesh al-Adl is receiving support from ISIS-K for attacks against Iran. ISIS-K has been expanding its reach and is responsible for a number of deadly attacks in Pakistan, and some in Iran as well. This is especially true when ISIS-K claimed responsibility for the bombings at the Qassem Soleimani’s commemoration. Iran must have deliberated on targeting ISIS-K in Afghanistan or Jaesh al-Adl in Pakistan.

In the past, Jaesh al-Adl, and it earlier version, Jundullah, was allegedly receiving support from US, Israel, and other Gulf nations. In the aftermath of the bombings at the Soleimani’s memorial, Iran gave less credit to ISIS-K claim and more to the involvement of US and Israel. In a tweet on X, Iranian president’s political deputy, Mohammad Jamshidi, wrote:

“Make no mistake. The responsibility for this crime lies with the US and Zionist regimes (Israel) and terrorism is just a tool.”

By striking Jaesh al-Adl, the impression emerges that the organization is once again enjoying some level of outside support. It could also be a signal to Pakistan to not extend any assistance towards targeting Iran.

The Role of India

Although a brief escalation, this recent episode has underscored the fundamental challenges Iran and Pakistan face in countering terrorism, with mutual distrust playing a significant role.

Both nations have long accused each other of providing safe havens to their respective enemies. Pakistan consistently maintains that India’s intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), is operating from Iranian soil, orchestrates attacks in Pakistan’s Balochistan region – and supports the anti-Pakistan Baloch separatist movement. Conversely, Iran blames Pakistan for its inaction against anti-Iran terrorist sanctuaries in the Balochistan bordering region, and for not taking decisive action against infiltrators into its territory through human trafficking and smuggling of weapons.

In 2016 Pakistan had arrested what it clams to be an Indian spy, posing as an Iranian businessman. There are different versions of how and where Kulbhusan Yadav was captured.  Indian media had claimed, Kulbhushan was abducted by Jaesh al-Adl and handed over to Pakistan’s intelligence organizations. However, in a confession statement made under Pakistan’s custody, Kulbushan stated his main task was to sabotage CPEC (China, Pakistan Economic Corridor) and create unrest in Karachi and Balochistan. For this mission, he was in touch with leaders belonging to Baloch separatist groups. Thus, India has already been a player when it comes to regional proxy games involving Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan.

Recently, for its support of Israel, Indian cargo ships have come under attack in the Red Sea, threatening its energy supplies. This has pulled India into the conflict as well and has caused it to send three guided missile destroyer ships to the Arabian Sea.

Conclusion

As the Gaza conflict unfolds, the focus has mainly been on the Shiite and Sunni non-state actors in the Middle East. The Iranian strike on Jaesh al-Adl reflects the complexity of the non-state actor landscape that exist in South Asia, particularly as it relates to the politics of Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and Iran. However, the Iranian raids and Pakistan’s response have connected the geopolitics of Middle East and South Asia – in a way that it did not in the past. This obviously will have far reaching consequences.

Sunni religious leaders have been voicing support for Hamas in Pakistan, and the group leadership has also appeared virtually in different rallies organized in support of Gaza. Speaking at a conference in Islamabad in December via video link, Ismail Haniyah stated: “If Israel faced resistance from Pakistan, the perpetration of cruelty could cease.”

The leader of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI-F) Mowlana Fazl-ur-Rehman even travelled to Qatar last November to meet with Hamas leader Ismail Haniyah and Khaled Mashal. He was quoted as commenting: “Palestinians are not only fighting for their own land but on behalf of the Muslim Ummah, are fulfilling their duty by fighting for the freedom of the first Qibla.”

The crackdown against Muslim Brotherhood under Sisi in Egypt has meant that Sunni Hamas has had to rely on Shiite Hezbollah and Iran for support, especially when Hamas and Salafi jihadist, like ISIS, hate each other. In the aftermath of October 7 attack, Israel has attempted to showcase Hamas to be the same as ISIS – but this carries dangerous consequences. Moreover, since Abraham Accords were reached, Palestinians also appear to be losing hope with the Gulf Arabs. In this context, Hamas reaching out to religious groups in Pakistan is significant. How will Iran, India, Israel, and other western powers interpret such outreach by Hamas is not clear. The longer the Gaza crisis lasts the greater will be the blow back – while also allowing for the potential reconfiguring of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The post Pakistan-Iran Cross Border Strikes, Gaza Conflict, And Expanding Proxy Wars appeared first on Politact.