By Arif Ansar

Context

The direct military confrontation between the United States and Iran has expanded far beyond a localized standoff, turning the Persian Gulf and its maritime peripheries into the cockpit of an accelerating global restructuring. Conventional Western security assessments frequently depict the crisis as a binary confrontation: Washington and its historic allies seeking to deter an aggressive, isolated Tehran. Yet beneath missile exchanges and severed supply chains lies a more sophisticated contest of strategic endurance.

At its core sits a geopolitical paradox: Iran’s calibrated pressure against its Arab neighbors is engineered not to conquer them, but to systematically break their operational dependency on the United States. In turn, the Gulf monarchies find themselves trapped between an overstretched superpower and their immediate geographic reality.

This friction is accelerating non-Western security diversification, driving Great Power maneuvers by Beijing and Moscow, splitting Washington’s Indo-Pacific partnerships, and threatening a systemic paralysis of global maritime trade routes.

The Architecture of Pain

Iran’s overarching doctrine does not presuppose an outright conventional military defeat of the United States. Instead, it relies on asymmetric attrition: driving up the political, economic, and logistical costs of the American presence until forward-deployed garrisons become unsustainable liabilities. In this dynamic, the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) serve as the indispensable fulcrum. Whenever Iranian drones or cruise missiles strike military-adjacent infrastructure, logistical staging posts, or energy terminals across the Gulf, Tehran conveys an unmistakable signal: hosting American military bases does not guarantee security.

However, Tehran’s coercive strategy walks a knife-edge, it risks triggering the very scenario it seeks to avoid: forging a combined, offensive Arab-Western coalition. Consequently, Tehran carefully modulates its pressure. The strikes are calibrated to turn Gulf capitals into urgent lobbyists in Washington—demanding American de-escalation and withholding operational clearance for offensive sorties—while Iranian diplomats maintain that regional stability can only be negotiated indigenously.

Sovereignty on Lease

The starkest legal and political contradiction plays out within foreign military installations across the Gulf. Hosting high-value installations—such as Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the U.S. Naval Support Activity in Bahrain, and forward operating facilities in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates—the Persian Gulf remains the most concentrated forward staging hub for American power. In an active war with Iran, these installations have transformed from shields into liabilities.

When American forces utilize these installations to stage strikes, launch aerial surveillance, or fly combat refueling missions, local Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) collide with territorial sovereignty. If offensive sorties depart from an Arab facility against the host government’s stated political wishes, that nation’s sovereignty is exposed as conditional. For Iranian military planners, legal nuances of base agreements are irrelevant: any host territory that facilitates kinetic operations against Iranian soil is treated as an active combatant and a legitimate target.

This vulnerability prompted unprecedented diplomatic measures: several Gulf states formally notified Washington that their airspace and territories cannot be used to stage offensive strikes against Iran. In establishing these restrictions, Gulf monarchies are attempting to insulate themselves from retaliation. Yet the reality remains inescapable: the foreign bases intended to ensure their security have become the primary magnets drawing war to their doorsteps.

Facing strategic distractions in Eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific, Washington has urged its Gulf partners to “own” the confrontation by funding integrated air defense shields and deploying their own forces to the frontline under the promise of American logistical support. The Gulf monarchies, however, have largely declined to step into the vanguard.

This hesitation stems from an acute ideological and strategic divergence. In Arab diplomatic corridors, an open-ended regional confrontation with Iran is viewed not as a fight for Arab stability, but as an operational trap designed to consolidate Israeli military dominance. Across Arab defense establishments, the destruction of Iranian state power is seen as paving the way for unchecked Israeli strategic primacy across West Asia—the military realization of the “Greater Israel” dynamic. Arab leaders understand that removing Iran as a strategic counterweight would leave the region socially volatile, and exposed to an unrestrained, nuclear-capable Israel. Sacrificing national security to destroy a regional neighbor, only to live under foreign strategic hegemony, is an outcome Arab leaders reject.

The Houthi Wildcard

Nowhere is the fragility of this environment more volatile than along the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab strait. The Houthi movement (Ansar Allah) has established an asymmetric chokehold over international maritime commerce, providing Tehran with critical leverage against Western logistics and Saudi Arabia’s southern perimeter.

The simultaneous threat to the Strait of Hormuz (transited by roughly 20% of global petroleum liquids) and the Bab al-Mandab (handling over 10% of seaborne trade) has introduced a historic systemic risk. A coordinated interdiction across both bottlenecks by Iran and the Houthis would trigger an immediate supply shock, pushing crude prices into the $100 to $200 per barrel range.

This dynamic threatens the Suez Canal. The canal does not require a physical blockage to shut down: if commercial vessels cannot navigate the Bab al-Mandab due to missile barrages and prohibitive insurance rates, the Red Sea corridor becomes a dead-end. Traffic is forced to reroute around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope, adding weeks to voyages, inflating freight rates, and driving inflation worldwide. For Egypt, the loss of billions in Suez transit revenues is economically devastating, explaining why Cairo is aggressively courting Chinese diplomatic mediation to stabilize regional waterways.

Yet this dynamic exposes the delicate question of command and autonomy. While Western intelligence frameworks frequently classify the Houthis as simple Iranian subordinates, Ansar Allah operates with its own fierce domestic agenda, theological drivers, and operational momentum. They function as a partner within an asymmetric network rather than an obedient garrison awaiting clerical launch orders.

Attacks targeting critical refining complexes and infrastructure, such as the East-west pipeline, cross red lines. If an autonomous Houthi barrage causes catastrophic damage to Saudi energy infrastructure, Riyadh could face irresistible pressure to retaliate, potentially activating mutual defense clauses of the Mecca Accord. Uncoordinated actions from Sana’a risk derailing years of delicate Iranian-Saudi normalization. An autonomous proxy whose actions ignite a regional conflagration defeats Tehran’s broader diplomatic strategy.

The Great Power Game and BRICS

As Washington finds its regional architecture strained, Beijing and Moscow are capitalizing on the crisis to accelerate a multipolar shift. China has stepped forward with an alternative diplomatic paradigm. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s high-profile state visit to Egypt underscored Beijing’s drive for an indigenously negotiated regional security architecture. During talks in Cairo, Xi articulated that the nations of the region must be the “masters of their own affairs,” proposing security mechanisms free from external meddling.

Beijing’s deepening footprint—evidenced by joint “Eagles of Civilization” military exercises with Egypt, currency swaps, and massive investments in critical infrastructure—offers regional states an alternative security partner. For China, securing West Asian energy flows without assuming the costly military liabilities of the United States represents an ideal strategic balance.

Russia, meanwhile, views the confrontation through the lens of its own showdown with the West. While Washington has initiated quiet diplomatic feelers alongside Ukraine talks to explore avenues for stabilizing global energy flows, Russian hydrocarbons remain encumbered by comprehensive Western sanctions. Moscow has little incentive to relieve global energy distress without major concessions on its own front. By deepening military-technical cooperation with Tehran and redirecting crude flows to non-Western buyers, Russia benefits as American attention and munitions are drained away from the European theater.

The broader diplomatic fallout was on display at the BRICS Summit in New Delhi, where the expanded bloc negotiated a comprehensive joint declaration addressing the West Asian war.  Despite sharp frictions between Iran and the UAE, member states coalesced around a consensus that condemned unilateral warfare, criticized secondary sanctions, and demanded respect for territorial sovereignty.

Most consequential was the signature of India. Despite its close strategic alignment with Washington via the Quad and deep intelligence ties with Tel Aviv, New Delhi chose to sign the declaration alongside Iran.  India’s calculation is dictated by strategic autonomy and non-aligned legacy – that prevents it to be seen by the Global South as an auxiliary to Western interventionism. India’s economic survival premised on energy security necessitates connectivity through Iran’s Chabahar port to access Central Asia and Afghanistan.

For Washington, India’s willingness to endorse a document shielding Iran from unilateral coercion is viewed with frustration. While the U.S. is unlikely to break ties with New Delhi given India’s indispensable role in counterbalancing China, the administration will likely apply asymmetric pressure: slowing critical tech-transfer initiatives, utilizing conditional trade barriers and tariff reviews, and issuing pointed warnings regarding Indian transactions with Iranian and Russian entities.

The Fracture of the Regional Order

The expanding conflict between the United States and Iran has accelerated the transition to a fractured, multipolar regional order. Iran’s strategy is built on existential coercion: applying enough pressure to make forward American bases an untenable liability without pushing regional neighbors into a unified offensive alliance. However, the recent unhinged aggressive actions of Houthis against Saudi Arabia could backfire. On the other hand, while President Trump favors burden-sharing on the part of U.S. allies, America will not take the concept of a retreat from West Asia lightly—particularly in the aftermath of the 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan. The consequences for great-power rivalry are dire and such a move could reflect a trickling effect across other theaters.

Concurrently, the Arab states of the Gulf are pursuing strategic decoupling. By establishing red lines on base access, building security hedges through Pakistan, Turkey, and China, and resisting attempts to pull them into an offensive war on behalf of extra-regional interests, Gulf leaders are fighting for their own survival.

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The post US-Iran War And The Gulf States: How Tehran Is Reshaping Regional Security appeared first on Politact.

By Naade Ali

President Trump and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) are redefining the U.S.-Saudi alliance to address China’s rising influence and the Gaza crisis, effectively moving the partnership beyond its traditional foundations. Since their inception, the Saudi-US relations have experienced fluctuations but have been sustained by overlapping strategic interests and mutual dependencies. At the center of their crucible of interaction stood a security–petrodollar arrangement. Even when relations hit their lowest point, the core bargain held: Saudi Arabia continued selling oil in dollars and remained a key supplier to the United States, while Washington preserved its role as the Kingdom’s primary security guarantor and leading defense provider.

However, shifting global dynamics, fueled in part by intensifying great power competition between China and the United States, have pushed middle powers like Saudi Arabia to reduce their dependence on any single major actor and seek greater strategic autonomy. While this shift has broadened their ambitions, it has also uncovered greater opportunities and challenges. The Saudi-US relations are not indifferent to these evolving dynamics, with both countries recalibrating their bilateral ties along new strategic dimensions.

Saudi Arabia as a Swing State in the U.S.–China Rivalry

Today’s Saudi Arabia appears to be hedging away from over reliance on the United States, building a strategy centered on its pragmatic interests and exercising sovereign leverage. This helps in deal-making and to secure the space needed to navigate the great power rivalry. Saudi Arabia’s move to reduce its dependence on the United States gained momentum exactly when ties with Washington soured under the Biden administration. Confronted with the unpredictability of American policy, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) found an attractive alternative in Beijing, which offered strategic engagement without preconditions. Closer ties with China enabled Saudi Arabia to pursue a multidimensional strategy, diversify its partnerships, and maintain the flexibility necessary to manage uncertainties in its relationship with Washington.

For China, Saudi Arabia became a central pillar for expanding regional influence in the Middle East. Riyadh hosted the first-ever China-Arab States Summit and, through Beijing’s mediation, reconciled diplomatic ties with Tehran. Further consolidating their ties with Beijing, both Tehran and Riyadh also integrated into multilateral blocs where China and Russia hold considerable sway, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS. Additionally, China strengthened economic relations with the Kingdom, becoming its largest trading partner and providing robust support for Vision 2030. A major payoff of Saudi Arabia’s strategic pivot toward China was that it transformed Saudi Arabia into a geopolitical swing state. This effectively signaled to Washington it is fully prepared to deepen ties with Beijing unless the U.S. proactively restores its coveted central role.

The Trump–MBS Summit: A Strategic Inflection Point

President Trump’s extraordinary embrace of Mohammed bin Salman during his visit to Washington in November suggests that Riyadh’s calibrated swing-state posture is working. Riyadh now carries significant geostrategic weight and has taken center stage in the U.S.–China competition for influence in the Middle East.

Trump’s approach to strategic competition with China rests on two pillars: credible deterrence and tightening of alignment with key U.S. middle power partners. Within this framework, any complete Saudi drift into Beijing’s orbit is viewed as strategically unacceptable. At the same time, he is acutely aware of the practical limits of attempting to sever Riyadh’s growing relationship with Beijing, recognizing that containment of China cannot succeed solely through coercive pressure on allies to reverse course.

As evidenced by President Trump’s foreign policy conduct, he employs a distinctive blend of generous incentives and far-reaching, exclusive agreements in energy, critical minerals, technology, and defense. These arrangements simultaneously fortify bilateral partnerships and allow middle powers, such as Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to maintain a semblance of strategic autonomy in their relations with China. Beneath this veneer, however, the United States methodically secures alignment on matters of vital national interest, while deliberately imposing significant strategic costs on any partner that leans excessively toward Beijing.

Nevertheless, Trump’s transactional foreign policy has provided Saudi Arabia with an opportunity for adjusting its own strategy, allowing the Kingdom to pursue a more robust, interest-driven relationship with Washington. Riyadh recognizes that being a center of the Islamic holy places provides it immense influence in the Muslim world. United States relies on it not only to balance China in the Middle East but also to help secure a stable regional environment for Israel. This is a goal that, in Trump’s view, could be advanced if Saudi Arabia joins the Abraham Accords, potentially encouraging other Arab and Muslim countries to follow suit.

The Summit Outcome

Through Vision 2030 reforms and skillful diplomatic maneuvering, the Kingdom has transcended its traditional role. This transformation not only redirects the calculus of their bilateral partnership but also carries profound implications for the Middle East’s balance of power and the broader dynamics of great power competition. It has emerged as a pivotal regional powerhouse whose energy resources, vast investment capital, and geopolitical influence make it indispensable to both Washington and Beijing.

During their meeting, President Trump stated he was “the best friend Saudi Arabia has ever had in Washington,” a statement that highlighted his administration’s desire to deepen ties through personal rapport. Nevertheless, the agreements concluded between the two leaders demonstrate that the U.S.-Saudi relationship remains firmly grounded in their respective national interests and strategic imperatives, with both seeking to extract maximum advantage.

President Trump secured a $1 trillion investment pledge from the Crown Prince, alongside the signing of a Strategic Framework for Cooperation. This framework includes Saudi commitments to supply uranium, metals, permanent magnets, and critical minerals essential for U.S. defense and energy sectors. Leveraging Saudi Arabia’s vast deposits of rare earth elements (REEs), Trump advanced his goal of countering China’s dominance in critical minerals.

For his part, Crown Prince achieved major strategic gains: the Kingdom was granted major non-NATO ally status, a defense agreement was finalized, and approval was secured for the purchase of American F-35 fighter jets and other advanced weapons. These acquisitions will strengthen Saudi defense architecture. Additionally, in line with its ambition to become a global hub for artificial intelligence, Saudi Arabia also gained access to advanced AI chips and U.S. technology firms to support the development of its domestic AI infrastructure.

US-Saudi Ties and Gaza Peace Plan

The Washington meeting between President Trump and the Crown Prince highlighted both progress and persistent challenges in U.S.–Saudi relations, with Saudi-Israel normalization remaining a key point of divergence. While Trump pressed Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords, Mohammed bin Salman insisted that any normalization depend on Israel committing to “an irreversible, credible, and time-bound path toward Palestinian statehood.” Following the Israel–Gaza conflict, Riyadh has emerges as a leading advocate for international recognition of Palestine, a position consistently opposed by the U.S. and Israel. Its refusal to yield to Trump’s push for normalization reflects the broader post-war realities in Gaza.

By taking this stance, Crown Prince delivered a twofold message: First, the strengthening of U.S.–Saudi ties must remain entirely independent of any precondition for Saudi–Israeli normalization. Second, while Riyadh is open in principle to normalization, Israel’s refusal to recognize Palestinian statehood remains a major impediment. While Riyadh supports the Trump Gaza peace plan in principle, it rejects full Israeli control over the Gaza territory and insists on concrete conditions: a time-bound Israeli withdrawal, the deployment of an international protection force, and the reinstatement of authority to the Palestinian Authority.

Saudi Arabia’s demands on the Palestinian issue clash directly with Israel’s red lines, leaving Washington struggling to balance relations with both capitals. From Israel’s viewpoint, the rapidly deepening U.S.–Saudi partnership, explicitly decoupled from any obligation of Saudi–Israeli normalization, raises two profound concerns. First, it risks elevating Riyadh’s regional influence while undermining Israel’s primary strategic objective: the expansion of the Abraham Accords. Second, as long as Riyadh continues to regard Israel as a principal source of regional instability, not Iran, the possibility persists that Saudi Arabia could further deepen its relations with Iran.

Historically, the shared enmity toward Iran has been the bedrock of both the U.S.–Israel alliance and U.S.–Saudi security relations. Following their China-brokered détente, Riyadh and Tehran no longer see each other as existential threats. To prevent Washington from viewing improved Saudi–Iranian ties with alarm, Mohammed bin Salman has carefully framed them as potentially beneficial to the United States, offering to help the U.S and Iran reach a deal that could be vital to regional stability. Riyadh can indeed encourage Iran to talk, but persuading Tehran to accept U.S. terms is no less daunting than U.S. convincing Israel to meet Saudi demands on Palestine. The scenario thus exposes the limits of influence on both sides: neither Washington nor Riyadh can fully impose their will on Israel and Iran.

The Washington summit also revealed a deeper convergence: the United States and Saudi Arabia need each other to achieve their core objectives in the Middle East. Under the Trump approach, US appears willing to delegate primary responsibility for preserving and enforcing the U.S.-led order in the Middle East to Saudi Arabia. However, for Riyadh to fully assume the role of America’s pre-eminent regional partner, it will also have to bear the main burden of protecting U.S. interests, containing rivals, and upholding the existing regional architecture.

Such an alignment would signal to Iran that Saudi Arabia had become the de facto guarantor and enforcer of core American interests. A U.S.–Saudi power-sharing arrangement would also carry significant implications for Israel. Confronted with a region increasingly shaped around Saudi primacy, Israel would face a stark choice: either challenge Riyadh and risk damaging its own relationship with Washington, or accommodate Saudi terms and move toward normalization on conditions set by the Kingdom. Under this approach, in which Saudi Arabia and the United States emerge as mutually reinforcing strategic partners, both are able to secure the outcomes they seek from Iran and Israel.

The Saudi-UAE Rivalry and Yemen Conflict

As the new year begins, the region is no longer defined by “Arabs vs. Iran” or “Islamists vs. Monarchies,” but by the fallout of weakening Iran that is creating a power vacuum. Muslim Middle Powers are competing to to fill the space, illustrated by the Saudi-UAE split. In places of old alliances, new ones are taking shape premised on cold, transactional game of national interest. And these tensions are playing out from Yemen to Syria, Sudan, Libya, and Somalia.

While the Trump-MBS summit secured vital U.S. interests in energy and defense, it exposed the fragility of the broader regional architecture. Saudi Arabia is acting like a state, prioritizing borders, stability, and institutions to protect Vision 2030. The UAE resembles a corporation, prioritizing ports, trade routes, and resource extraction. Turkey and Qatar are navigating the space between them, leveraging their military and ideological assets to carve out their own spheres of influence.

Similarly, President Trump’s “20-Point Peace Plan,” unveiled in September 2025, was predicated on a unified regional architecture: Gulf capital would fund reconstruction, Egyptian-Turkish logistics would secure the ground, Pakistan-Indonesia-Turkey may be part of the International Stabilization Force (ISF), and Israeli-Saudi normalization would provide the political horizon.

As of late December 2025, the dramatic rupture between Saudi Arabia and the UAE—culminating in the Saudi airstrike on UAE-backed assets in Mukalla, Yemen—has shattered the “Sunni Coalition” prerequisite for the plan’s success. The 20-point framework is now being pulled apart by the competing power centers and Israel may find itself the short-term beneficiary of Arab fragmentation. Unless Washington can repair the rupture within the Gulf Cooperation Council, its grand strategy for the Middle East risks becoming a two-legged stool: supported by a strong U.S.-Saudi bilateral deal, but lacking the regional stability required to stand.

Related Articles:

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The post Saudi Arabia as a Rising Middle Power: The Trump-MBS Summit, China, and the Future of Gaza appeared first on Politact.

Policy Brief – Vantage Point Analysis

Context

The recent meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Field Marshal Asim Munir, has stirred considerable global attention in particularly regarding what led to the meeting and what could have been discussed. It marks the first-ever instance of a sitting U.S. president holding a one-on-one meeting with Pakistan’s top military leader—an unprecedented move that reveals deeper shifts in regional strategy and global alignments.

Great Power Rivalry

U.S.-Pakistan relations have always been shaped by broader global dynamics, and the context now is the intensifying great power rivalry, primarily between the U.S., China, and Russia. The escalating Iran-Israel conflagration has added to this.

One of the persistent suggestions coming out of some DC based think-tanks is to avert pushing Pakistan into the full embrace of China. On the other hand, Pakistan has been messaging insistently that it wants to maintain close ties to the US despite its strategic ties to China. The meeting between President Trump and Field Marshal Asim Munir – and what follows – will likely test this. In the unfolding international relations maintaining a balance between great powers is becoming increasingly untenable.

Another critical dimension is the ongoing Iran-Israel conflict. In the post October 7, 2023, Hamas led attack on Israel, the geopolitics of Middle East is fast evolving. This has been accompanied by the loss of Hamas and Hezbollah leadership and the fall of Assad regime in Syria in December 2024, as part of what many consider the Outside-in Approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The likelihood of a broader conflict between Iran and Israel hangs in balance as President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have forged a strong strategic alignment. Netanyahu has tried to ensure that U.S. policy remained closely aligned with Israel’s objective of weakening Iran’s defense capabilities, particularly preventing it from ever acquiring nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Iran had hoped that Trump would adopt a pragmatic approach and revive nuclear talks leading to easing of economic pressure. To Iran’s disappointment, Trump pursued the reinstatement of “maximum pressure” policy on Tehran – culminating into an attack on its nuclear sites on June 22.

Pakistan has maintained the policy of siding with Iran. In his speech to the diaspora in Washington DC, Field Marshal Asim Munir reportedly cited Pakistan’s ‘clear and strong support’ for Iran in war against Israel. President Trump would have likely discussed Pakistan’s intent and the scope of its support in the background of expanding Israeli-Iran conflict, especially if US gets engaged, as it did on June 22, in eliminating Iran’s nuclear program – or any endeavors to change the regime.

From what has been reported since the meeting, Pakistan has offered to mediate with Iran and to assist President Trump pursue a negotiated solution, as he did with its recent short war with India. After meeting with Field Marshal Asim Munir, Trump had given two weeks window to arrive at a decision on if the US will get directly involved in the war against Iran. However, the attack on Iran’s nuclear sites occurred much before the window for negotiated solution was to expire.

According to some estimates, about 15%-20% of Pakistan’s population belong to Shia sect. Any attack on Iran, regime change, or any subsequent insurgency can have serious consequences for the ethnic and religious harmony in Pakistan and the Islamic regions. A foreign policy alignment too closely with Western military actions against Iran could inflame sectarian tensions at home. It would also put Pakistan and Chinese strategic alignment to the test – as Iran is also an ally of China and Russia. Additionally, the aforementioned nations shared membership in the China dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

US Pakistan Relations

Under President Biden, Pakistan was often viewed critically and often through an India-centric lens, particularly in the context of counter-terrorism. In contrast, the Trump administration was initially expected to adopt a hardline stance toward Pakistan, recent events suggest a pragmatic recalibration driven by strategic needs. Moreover, Pakistan’s government has carried out an active trade and security outreach with the U.S. administration to demonstrate its economic and security potential. In remarks by CENTCOM Commander Gen. Michael Kurilla, or Trump’s own statements, there’s been notable recognition of Pakistan’s role beyond the narrow counterterrorism framework.

The performance of the Pakistani military during the brief conflict with India in May has raised its global stature. While both sides de-escalated after Trump administration negotiated a cease fire, Pakistan’s ability to outmaneuver a much larger adversary, despite its plaguing political and economic challenges, captured international attention and enhanced the credibility of its defense establishment. This strengthened perception has also prompted the US to reconfigure its engagement with Pakistan’s power centers—primarily its military—based on shared regional interests, particularly as tensions in the Middle East escalate.

Allied with the U.S., Pakistan has played a decisive security role in the Cold War and the Campaign Against Extremism. Due to this partnership, it received western economic and military assistance. Pakistan once again stands at the juncture of another critical role involving the change in global balance of power. U.S. would once again desire security relation with Pakistan and furthering of the future envisioned under the Abraham Accords. As the security situation related to Iran worsens, it’s possible that different brands of non-state actors operating from the region and beyond attempt to exploit the situation. Pakistan’s experience in managing extremists could become very useful. For this cooperation, U.S. could potentially assist in dealing with India, undo the suspension of Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), while moving forward with the trade deals.

Civil-Military Imbalance: A Familiar Pattern

While the Trump-Munir meeting may elevate Pakistan’s global profile, it also underscores a persistent internal challenge: the civil-military imbalance. The fact that such a high-level bilateral meeting involved the military chief—and not the elected civilian leadership—highlights the dominance of Pakistan’s military in both foreign policy and national security.

This imbalance perpetuates a troubling precedent in which strategic decisions of national consequence have to be made in private without discussion, consensus, or public ownership. Such secrecy has historically resulted in policies with long-term political, economic, and social consequences—often to the detriment of public trust and national cohesion.

The Trump-Munir meeting is emblematic of a shifting global landscape in which Pakistan finds itself once again at a strategic crossroads. The potential for a renewed, multifaceted partnership with the U.S. is real, but it hinges on careful diplomacy, a balance between competing alliances, and a rethinking of how power is exercised at home. As great power competition intensifies and both the Subcontinent and the Middle East become more volatile, Pakistan may well reemerge as a pivotal actor—if it can navigate both its external relations and internal governance with foresight and integrity.

The post What Does Trump-Munir Meeting Means for US-Pakistan Relations – As Iran-Israel Conflict Escalates? appeared first on Politact.

Context

On May 13, India signed a 10-year agreement to develop and operate Iran’s strategic Chabahar Port, committing $120 million, along with an additional $250 million loan credit facility for related projects. This landmark deal between Iran and India has unsettled the US and threatened China and Pakistan by India’s full-scale presence next to Gwadar port.

Defying Western warnings, Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar defended the agreement. He asserted that the broader significance of Chabahar Port, and the advantages of an Indian presence there, would likely garner a positive response from the US. The US did provide a narrow exemption to the Indian development of the port in 2019 citing the humanitarian needs of Afghanistan and allowing it to diversify opportunities for its exports.

On the contrary, responding to the latest deal on May 14, the US State Department Deputy Spokesperson Vedant Patel stated the US sanctions on Iran were still in place and would be enforced. “Any entity, anyone considering business deals with Iran – they need to be aware of the potential risks that they are opening themselves up to and the potential risk of sanctions,” he stated. The warning is similar to what Pakistan receives whenever it expresses a desire to move forward with the long dormant Iran-Pakistan Pipeline project.

India’s long-term acquisition of Chabahar comes after securing a naval base at the strategic port of Duqm in Oman, situated in the Western Indian Ocean. The strategic location of Chabahar port in the Gulf of Oman, with access to the Arabian Sea, offers several significant advantages to India.

Analysis

Connectivity to Central Asia

Firstly, it supports India’s ‘Connect Central Asia’ policy, fulfilling the long-held aspiration of establishing regional connectivity and trade corridors with the landlocked Central Asian countries. These nations possess rich natural resources that are commercially valuable to India for its energy demands and essential for maintaining its economic momentum. However, India’s ability to fully capitalize on opportunities in Central Asia have been hampered by security sensitivities of its arch-rival Pakistan. The country has prevented easy Indian reach into Central Asia, through land route via Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Chabahar mitigates India’s geographic vulnerability and provides India with direct access to Afghanistan and Central Asian states, thereby activating the unutilized International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). INSTC is a 7,200 km-long multimodal connectivity project linking India to Europe through the Caucasus, Iran, Russia, and Central Asia. Incorporating Chabahar into the INSTC will reduce transit time between India and Europe by 40% and transit costs by 30%.

The approximately $2 billion worth of trade between India, Central Asia and Afghanistan has remained stagnant due to its reliance on Chinese and Pakistani routes for market access. In contrast, China’s trade turnover with Central Asian states, including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, reached $89.4 billion in 2023, marking a 27% year-on-year increase. Additionally, China’s trade with Afghanistan amounted to $1.33 billion last year.

The Chabahar port offers India an opportunity to reestablish its presence in Afghanistan, which has traditionally relied heavily on Pakistan for access to the Indian Ocean. With Pakistan-Afghanistan relations at a low point, India is capitalizing by offering an alternative sea route through Chabahar. Unlike the unfavorable trade regime and tariffs imposed by Pakistan, Iran has extended a free trade zone at Chabahar port to the Taliban regime. These incentives prompted the Afghan Taliban to invest a $35 million in Chabahar in late February, aligning Afghanistan with Iran and India while bypassing the Pakistan-China Economic Corridor.

Militarization of Chabahar Port

Secondly, while India may use the Chabahar port primarily for commercial purposes, it also enhances India’s strategic autonomy by allowing for the potential establishment of a naval base that could counterbalance Chinese military presence.

At present, state-owned Chinese firms oversee operations at seven ports in South Asia and seventeen ports across the Indian Ocean region. The Indian Ocean is crucial for India, as about 80% of its crude oil and 95% of its trade (by volume) pass through it. India’s maritime fleet currently comprises only 132 warships and aims to expand it to 175 by 2035. On the other hand, China’s fleet consists of 370 warships, projected to increase to 435 by 2030. Furthermore, Chinese new type 096 nuclear-armed submarines, known for their exceptional stealth, present a significant challenge not only to India but also to the United States and its allies.

India’s ambition to match Chinese military capabilities in the Indian Ocean underscores the strategic significance of Chabahar, located just 76 nautical miles from the Chinese-controlled Gwadar port, which is part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. This proximity allows India to closely monitor China’s naval activities. India views the expansion of Gwadar port as a direct threat to its naval security in the Arabian Sea and to its energy imports through the Gulf of Oman.

Given Pakistan’s strong alliance with China, especially concerning their shared foreign policy objectives towards India, tensions in the Arabian Sea could potentially escalate into a conflict. In such an eventuality, India’s presence in Chabahar positions it to potentially disrupt Chinese imports passing through the Strait of Hormuz.

Moreover, Iran and India have initiated discussions on enhancing military cooperation across various domains. In April of this year, Iranian Defense Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza and Indian Defense Secretary Giridhar Aramane met in Kazakhstan and agreed to strengthen military ties. This will include naval operations, joint exercises, defense research collaborations, educational exchanges, and student programs. Such a robust military partnership provides India with leverage over Iran’s military, which can benefit the US and its allies.

Balochistan and Chabahar Port

Thirdly, the geographical proximity of the Chabahar and Gwadar sea port to the volatile Balochistan region, inflicted with separatist militancy and terrorism, creates a different dynamic for India compared to Pakistan. Many Pakistan-wanted Baloch militants reside in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchistan Province near the Chabahar port. Pakistan fears that India, which it already accuses of supporting Baloch insurgency, could use its presence in Chabahar to bolster anti-state activities against Pakistan. The disruptions caused by Baloch insurgency have hindered the CPEC from realizing its full potential, and the undermining of Gwadar port works in the benefit of Chabahar Port.

Modi’s Foreign Policy and Chabahar Port

Under Prime Minister Modi’s leadership, India follows a foreign policy guided by “multi-alignment” and “strategic autonomy,” demonstrating its readiness to capitalize on opportunities that advance its national interests. Strengthening defense and economic prowess remains a top priority in India’s foreign policy agenda. Towards this goal, collaboration with the United States is seen as a pathway to acquiring advanced technology and bolstering the defense industry. Simultaneously, India’s engagement with Iran is part of a broader regional strategy aimed at countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative, leveraging the Chabahar port to enhance Indian naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

Modi’s administration is already making progress in its maritime defense strategy and forging partnerships with countries outside the US camp. On the one hand, India has been developing its own maritime defense strategy, called the ‘Necklace of Diamonds.’ The aim is to establish military bases in the Indian Ocean to encircle China and creating Indian-led alternative regional connectivity corridors countering the multi-billion-dollar Chinese Belt and Road Initiative.  On the other hand, India has redefined its strategic focus, prioritizing ‘Neighborhood First’ under its ‘Think West’ foreign policy. The objective is to engage the Gulf countries to India’s west. In this context, India, taking exception to the US’s long-standing policy of sanctions against Iran, is actively seeking to establish cordial relations with Tehran.

In recent statements, External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar emphasized India’s commitment to an independent stance that protects its interests and allows it to find its own solutions, rather than depending on the West or the US. Similar sentiments have been echoed by Defense Minister Rajnath Singh. He promised to modernize the Indian armed forces, especially the navy, and increase indigenous defense production for self-reliance. India regards its naval strength as fundamental for fortifying strategic autonomy in the Indo-Pacific region. While acknowledging it cannot directly match or fully constrain China, India aims to pose significant challenges and potentially delay China’s rise. In this context, Chabahar assumes a pivotal role as a strategic outpost for India, facilitating close monitoring of China’s naval activities in the Arabian Sea and safeguarding India’s interests in the Indo-Pacific.

However, Indian opportunistic outlook is essentially flawed. While connectivity with India helps limits Iranian international isolation, Iran is also a key partner of both China and Russia. In March 2021, China and Iran entered a $400 billion 25 year economic and security deal that would lead to enhanced military and trade relations. The agreement ensures Chinese investment in Iranian telecommunication, transportation, and military fields. The China-Iran military cooperation includes exercises, intelligence sharing, and joint research and development of weapons. China will also procure its energy needs from Iran on discounted price for over next 25 years.

It’s unrealistic to expect that Iran will risk its strategic ties to China and Russia by allowing India to serve western interests through Chabahar. Especially when China, Russia, and Iran represent the anti-western grouping in the present global balance of power tussles. While India has traditionally been close to Russia, as US-China rivalry escalates, it will also complicate India’s stance on Ukraine and the Gaza Crisis, where it’s maintaining a delicate balancing act up to now.

PoliTact’s South Asia Fellow Naad-e-Ali Sulehria contributed to this piece.

The post Chabahar Port, Iran, And Regional Ambitions Of India appeared first on Politact.

Context

Voting began on April 19^th in India and the results will be announced in the first week of June. With over 986 million eligible voters, elections in India have been described as the largest democratic exercise in the world. However, despite all the fanfare, the results of the Indian balloting seem all but a foregone conclusion. Prime Minister Modi has perfected the art of turning India into an ethno-majoritarian state over his past two terms in office. Modi continues to subjugate the minorities, while simultaneously working to turn India into a powerful Hindu state.

Modi is now seeking to secure a third term in office using the same playbook which enabled him to secure a landslide victory in 2019, namely by stifling dissenting voices, undermining the political opposition, terrorizing religious minorities, and acting tough against neighboring China and Pakistan.

Under Modi, India has rapidly undermined its credentials of being a secular democracy. Just because the country holds elections regularly, and its military does not intervene in politics, does not make the Indian polity automatically tolerant. In recent years, Modi has expedited economic growth, but inequality remains a major problem since the top 10% of the population now owns 77% of the nation’s wealth. Modi deflects economic disgruntlement of the masses by infusing in them a xenophobic sense of Hindu pride, which undermines the rights of all other religious minorities.

The inauguration of the Ram temple on the site of the razed mosque in Ayodhya, and the operationalization of the controversial Citizenship Amendment Act of 2019, have become overt symbols of Modi’s continued desire to repress India’s sizeable Muslim population. The Supreme Court’s decision this past December to endorse Modi’s revocation of Kashmir’s autonomous status has further boosted his image as a decisive leader who will not allow any insurgent movement, especially one spearheaded by Muslims, to threaten India’s territorial integrity.

Nonetheless, despite once being considered an international pariah for his role in the Gujrat communal massacre, Modi now rubs shoulders with the most powerful leaders in the world. Under his leadership, India became the first nation to land a spacecraft on the south pole of the moon. To top it all, Modi is now actively working with the US to help contain Chinese influence across South Asia. With these impressive credentials, most political pundits agree that Modi is likely to make a comeback in the next round of elections.

Pakistan-India Rapprochement

With India most likely remaining under the grip of Modi’s ultranationalism for another five years, and Pakistan struggling with multiple domestic security and economic challenges, as well as a crisis of political legitimacy, it is worth taking stock of how these two largest South Asian countries may respond to each other in coming years.

In the emerging geopolitical environment due to the ongoing Gaza crisis, the future of Pakistan India ties appears more challenging. Learning from Israel, India may also take on more heavy-handed policies and unilateral approaches.

The new leadership in Pakistan has at least demonstrated its intent to attempt rapprochement with India. The foreign minister appointed by the Sharif brothers recently hinted at the possibility of resuming trade with India, even though the Foreign Office then quickly reiterated Pakistan’s stance of not resuming trading with India till its government restores Kasmir’s special status. Despite these mixed signals, trying to improve trade relations with India is plausible. Cross-border tensions have not flared up between the two neighboring rivals since the past three years.

Pressure from Gulf States

The Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have strong ties with both India and Pakistan, also seem keen to help mend ties between these neighboring rivals. The UAE, is reported to have helped broker the 2021 ceasefire between India and Pakistan, and it has also been engaging in backchannel diplomacy to help improve ties between India and Pakistan.

The Saudi Crown Prince has also explicitly stressed the need for an India-Pakistan dialogue, during Prime Minister Shabaz Sharif’s visit to Saudi Arabia, in the bid to secure more Saudi financial support and investments. In addition to the desire to broker a dangerous conflict between two close allies, the Saudis want Pakistan to focus on economic growth and regional cooperation, instead of expending further energies on contending with India’s growing military might.

Kashmir and Cross Border Militancy

Indian repression in Kashmir continues to persist, and Pakistan has little chance of pressing India to walk back on its Kashmir policy, even if this mistreatment of Kashmiri Muslims remains a major source of friction. Moreover, on the heels of Canadian and American accusations of India sanctioning targeted killings of Sikh dissidents on their soil, Pakistan has also accused India of engaging in extraterritorial killings of Kashmiri and other extremist militants based within Pakistan.

The fact that India has moved swiftly to build ties with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and its suspected ability to continue aiding Baluch insurgents and TTP terror attacks on Pakistani soil via Afghanistan, also remain issues of major concern for Pakistan  While its recent hostilities with Iran did not escalate, Pakistan does need to focus more on its western border to prevent cross-border militancy to spark another crisis with Iran. Due to the broader insecurity emanating from the Israeli war on Gaza, Iranian sensitivity regarding the activities of Jaysh ul-Adl (formerly Jundallah) have increased tremendously.

On the other hand, regional experts have warned American policy makers to be wary of exacerbating Pakistani insecurities in the bid to bolster Indian military capabilities meant to stand up to China. The US is no longer considered a neutral arbitrator by Pakistan, which increases the risk of another cross-border crisis between India and Pakistan escalating into a catastrophic conflict. The danger of a terror attack in India, which is blamed on Pakistan, could quickly re-escalate tensions between the nuclear armed neighbors.

Economic Dimension

Besides these emergent security challenges on its other borders, which would make it very difficult for Pakistan to simultaneously cope with renewed tensions with India, the Pakistani economy is also experiencing major problems. Improving economic conditions in the country may in fact be the biggest priority for the country’s establishment and politicians, due to which resuming trade with India has become a more palatable option.

Pakistan was importing around $2 billion worth of Indian imports and exported neared $500 million worth of goods back in 2018. The countries suspended trade in 2019 after the suicide attack on Indian soldiers in Pulwama district which led India to revoke Pakistan’s most favored nation status – granted back in 1996.

Pakistan then cut trade ties completely after India revoked Kashmir’s special status a few months later. Thus, formal trade between the two countries came to a grinding halt and all cross- border goods must now be funneled through neutral places like Dubai, which significantly increases costs. Research by entities such as the World Bank suggests that fully opening up trade with India could increase Pakistani exports by as much as 80 percent, which could do wonders for its slugging economy.

India now has a much larger economy, and it is well integrated with other South Asian states, so it also has less need to normalize trade ties with Pakistan. Yet, given that India could significantly increase its exports by trading with Pakistani’s burgeoning market is also a reasonably attractive incentive. Currently, Modi is too preoccupied with the elections, but he may be willing to try improving ties with Pakistan under the Sharifs again, as was attempted during the last Nawaz Sharif premiership, over a decade ago.

Critical Pathways to Improving India and Pakistan Ties

In the prevailing geopolitical environment, India is unlikely to bolster the economy of its arch-rival without a wider rapprochement with Pakistan which would include Kashmir. Irrespective of who is to blame, the cross border threats from non-state actors to Pakistan, India, Iran, and Afghanistan – pose the single most potent risk to the region – and to the mutual ties of these nations. The recent spat between Pakistan and Iran involving Jaysh -ul-Adl, attack on a music concert hall in Russia in March linked to ISIS-K, and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) affiliated strikes in Pakistan, are prime examples.

In the context of great power rivalry, there seem to be two significant mutually exclusive pathways – with one leading to the improvement in Pakistan-India ties and the other towards deterioration.

1 The continuation of CPEC and Iran Pakistan Gas Pipeline Projects are unlikely to produce improvement in Pakistan-India ties – unless there is US-China detents of some sorts.

2. In the aftermath of the on-going Gaza conflict, the future of Abraham Accords is uncertain. However, if the two-state solution prevails – pressure on Pakistan will likely increase in the future to recognize Israel. With the close trade ties between GCC and India, this will likely improve chances of India-Pakistan détente as well.

However, if there is a direct conflict between Iran and Israel and the Abraham Accords dismantle, the pressure will increase on the GCC and Arab nations to either side with Iran or Israel. This quandary will be the same for Pakistan and India. However, the role of China and Russia would become paramount to preserve the Saudi-Iran détente reached in March this year. This is the context which makes the upcoming visit of the Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi to Pakistan all the more consequential.

The post Indian Elections, Future of Pakistan-India Ties And Centrality of Iran appeared first on Politact.

Context

As the new government settles in Pakistan, in addition to the economy, one of the key questions is how it will handle the relations with its neighbors and extremism. Pakistan’s ties with India have always been tense, now Iran and Afghanistan have been added to the list. However, while the border with India is untraditionally calm, that cannot be stated for Iran and Afghanistan.

The most dramatic escalation occurred when Iran launched counter strikes for the terrorist attacks at the funeral of Qassem Soleimani on January 4 – not only in Syria and Iraq, but on January 16 on its nuclear-powered neighbor Pakistan, going after Jaish-al-Adl hideouts. These raids essentially connected the conflict that was mainly pestering the Middle East – to South Asia. Pakistan retaliated on January 18, by launching missiles at Baloch nationalist groups operating from Iran.

Barely two months after responding to the Iranian strike, Pakistan retaliated against extremists hideouts in Afghanistan on March 18 for attacks on its forces near its north-west border that killed 7 soldiers. Pakistan accused Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) which takes refuge in Afghanistan, for the attack. The country also accuses Afghan Taliban for harboring TTP and alleges India’s intelligence agency, RAW, for funding and training them through Afghan proxies.

Stocking further tensions, India seized a Pakistan-bound cargo ship on January 23 for allegedly carrying materials usable for its nuclear program, which Pakistan refutes. The ship was travelling from China to Karachi and had stopped at Navi Mumbai’s Nhava Sheva port. This has been followed up by three coordinated strikes on Chinese interests in Pakistan when terrorists struck the Gwadar port, Turbat Naval base, and a convoy travelling towards Dasu dam resulting in the death of five Chinese workers. The Baloch Liberation Army claimed responsibility for the attack on a government facility in Gwadar and the naval base.

The recent incidents highlights Pakistan’s worsening relations with Afghanistan and Iran, which inadvertently benefit India’s strategic goals in the region. It pushes Pakistan to normalize ties with India. However, significant challenges remain in normalizing ties with India.

Analysis

New Government and India

The recent political changes in Pakistan, marked by Shehbaz Sharif’s ascension to the Prime Minister’s office and the return of Asif Zardari as President, have sparked renewed interest in the future direction of India-Pakistan relations. Both Sharif and Zardari, with past experiences of engagement with India, offer a glimmer of hope for resetting ties. During his previous tenure, Shehbaz Sharif expressed his desire for peaceful ties and later offered to open talks with India. While President Zardari, also known for his reconciliatory approach during his previous term in the office, earned a reputation for prioritizing peace with India.

After Shehbaz Sharif’s inauguration, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi extended his felicitations, reciprocated positively by Shehbaz. The US also added its expression of support for facilitating “productive and peaceful talks” between the two neighbors. Nonetheless, translating these aspirations into action remains a challenge. The path forward remains fraught with historical baggage, proxy wars, and the ever-present influence of hostile domestic politics.

The Point of Contentions

For Pakistan, the 2019 Indian revocation of Jammu & Kashmir’s special status stands as a significant issue. The country vehemently opposes this step, seeing it as a violation of Kashmiri rights and prior international agreements. Consequently, Pakistan halted its bilateral trade and downgraded diplomatic relations with India. As the trade suspension began to affect Pakistan’s economy, then Prime Minister Imran Khan briefly reinstated trade ties with India in 2021. However, political pressure led to a reversal of this decision. Meanwhile, India remains concerned about Pakistan’s ongoing support for Kashmiri separatists.

Prime Minister Sharif has conditioned any talks with India to the restoration of Kashmir’s autonomy, like his predecessor, while India demands Pakistan to stop cross-border terrorism before engaging in any dialogue. These conditionalities have created a seemingly insurmountable impasse. Furthermore, India’s success last year in securing a joint statement with the US which condemns Pakistan’s alleged role in terrorism further strained their relations. Pakistan rejects these accusations, instead terming India a state sponsor of terror for supporting groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Baloch separatists.

Areas of Cooperation

Despite these tensions, some crucial steps highlight a commitment to de-escalation. For instance, both countries continue to adhere to a decades-long protocol of exchanging nuclear installation lists, showcasing their commitment to prevent nuclear war.

The ceasefire agreement along the Line of Control in Kashmir, albeit fragile, has been held for several years, marking one of the longest periods of relative calm in the region’s history. Even with severed diplomatic ties, Pakistan issued visas to Indian pilgrims in 2023, demonstrating a willingness to facilitate cultural exchange.

Both nations face numerous shared challenges, including climate change, air pollution, and water scarcity. Addressing these issues requires cooperation, not confrontation.

India, Iran, and Pakistan

The recent unprecedented incidents of cross border strikes Iran and Pakistan carried out at against each other has underscored the fundamental challenges Iran and Pakistan face in countering terrorism and highlights Indian role.

Both Pakistan and Iran have long accused each other of providing safe havens to their respective enemies. Pakistan consistently maintains that India’s intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), is operating from Iranian soil, orchestrates attacks in Pakistan’s Balochistan region – and supports the anti-Pakistan Baloch separatist movement. Conversely, Iran blames Pakistan for its inaction against anti-Iran terrorist sanctuaries in the Balochistan bordering region, and for not taking decisive action against infiltrators into its territory through human trafficking and smuggling of weapons.

In 2016 Pakistan had arrested what it claims to be an Indian spy, posing as an Iranian businessman. There are different versions of how and where Kulbhusan Yadav was captured. Indian media had claimed, Kulbhushan was abducted by Jaesh al-Adl and handed over to Pakistan’s intelligence organizations. However, in a confession statement made under Pakistan’s custody, Kulbushan stated his main task was to sabotage CPEC (China, Pakistan Economic Corridor) and create unrest in Karachi and Balochistan. For this mission, he was in touch with leaders belonging to Baloch separatist groups. These dynamics indicate, India has been a player when it comes to regional proxy games involving Afghanistan and Iran and targeting Pakistan interests.

Future Expectations And Challenges

The future of India-Pakistan relations depends a whole lot on the outcome of India’s upcoming elections scheduled from April 19 to June 1 – and the posture the new government adopts. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) heavily depends on anti-Pakistan rhetoric for its political campaigns and voter appeal. Offering an olive branch to Pakistan during election cycle would be viewed as political suicide. In fact, just before the last balloting in 2019, India had launched an air raid in Balakot, Pakistan, to rile up nationalist voter sentiments.

On the other hand, Pakistan’s powerful military establishment exerts significant influence over the nation’s foreign policy, and it has traditionally opposed rapprochement with India. Along those lines, Shehbaz Sharif’s reliance on the support from military establishment limits his ability to pursue a more conciliatory approach towards India. However, Pakistan’s economic predicament and dependence on IMF may change this outlook and necessitate peace with India. Additionally, Pakistan’s financial backer of the last resort, such as Saudi Arabia and UAE, have also expanded trade and security ties with India. This would further pressurize the new government to mend ties with its archrival.

The greatest challenge is likely going to be the absence of public narrative to pursue peace. For instance, the prevalence of hate culture and growing hostile political rhetoric especially in India – towards peace with Pakistan. Conversely, the new government in Pakistan lacks credibility, due to allegations of election rigging, to pursue any sensitive initiatives. Both nations would have to build public support if reconciliation is to ensue. And if Pakistan-India ties do not normalize, it’s likely the proxy-war being waged against Pakistan through Afghanistan and Iran would continue. India would want to keep Pakistan busy so it cannot pose a threat on the Line of Control (LOC) with India. This would also mitigate tensions with China on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), which many believe are designed to prevent India from projecting power towards the South China Sea.

PoliTact’s South Asia Fellow Naad-e-Ali Sulehria contributed to this piece.

The post Pakistan’s Flareup With Afghanistan, Iran Clashes, Intensifying Attacks On Chinese Interests, And Role of India appeared first on Politact.

Context

As Israel continues its military campaign and air bombardments on the Gaza Strip and retaliates against Palestinians for the October 7 Hamas ambush, fears are mounting the conflict was widening to include Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and beyond. According to media reports, to date close to 26,000 Palestinians have been killed and 70,000 wounded.

For its part, it’s not clear if Israel is trying to contain or widen the conflict – towards its declared aim of eliminating Hamas and getting the hostages released. The strategic puzzle is, how to eliminate Hamas without also eradicating its backer, and that of Hezbollah as well, Iran. Israel has recently targeted Hezbollah commanders in Lebanon. Not only that, Israel has also gone after Iranian military advisors in Syria. These are seen as highly provocative actions.

Meanwhile, Iran backed Houthis are making the Red Sea unusable for cargo ships. Houthis have declared they are especially targeting merchant ships belonging to Israel and the powers supporting it in the Gaza operation. To address the deteriorating situation, US and UK launched missile and air raids against Houthi targets in Yemen that are continuing.

Iran has also seen increased attacks on the domestic front. On January 4, two bombs exploded at the memorial service for Qassem al Soleimani in Kerman in which about 80 people died. The Afghanistan based ISIS-K claimed responsibility for the attack. In December last year, 11 Iranian policemen were killed in an assault on a police station in Sistan-Balochistan province, and claimed by Jaish al-Adl.

However, the most dramatic escalation occurred when Iran launched counter strikes not only in Syria and Iraq, but also in its nuclear powered neighbor Pakistan, striking Jaish-al-Adl hideouts. These raids essentially connected the conflict that was mainly pestering the Middle East – to South Asia. Pakistan retaliated next day on January 18, by attacking Baloch nationalist groups operating from Iran and launching attacks against its security forces.

No one had expected the tentacles of Gaza conflict to reach as far as Pakistan, and entangle two proxy-war powers, one belonging to South Asia and the other, Middle East. Several angles have thus emerged, why did Iran strike Jaesh al-Adl in Pakistan at a time when it has so much to focus on in the Middle East.

While the ties have not always been amicable, often because of the cross-border activities of the non-state actors, neither Iran, nor Pakistan, consider each other an enemy. The puzzle becomes even more complex since the attacks at the memorial for the former intelligence chief, Qassem Soleimani, were claimed by ISIS-K based in Afghanistan. It is also noteworthy, the Iranian strikes in Pakistan came soon after the visit of Indian foreign minister, S. Jaishunker, to Iran.

Analysis

ISIS-K, Taliban, And Jaesh al-Adl,

There are some key plausible reasons why Iran may have decided to strike Jaesh al-Adl in Pakistan.

For some time, the risk has been growing regarding the level of collaboration that exists between Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Balouch separatist groups, as they both have been targeting the security forces of Pakistan. Pakistan has been consistently pressurizing Afghan Taliban to act against TTP that has taken refuge in Afghanistan. While the Afghan Taliban has acted against ISIS-K, as demanded by the US too, they have not exerted such pressure against TTP. This has strained the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The apprehension on the Afghan Taliban side is: if they operate against TTP, it is likely to drift towards ISIS-K.

At the same time, there is also the possibility that Jaesh al-Adl is receiving support from ISIS-K for attacks against Iran. ISIS-K has been expanding its reach and is responsible for a number of deadly attacks in Pakistan, and some in Iran as well. This is especially true when ISIS-K claimed responsibility for the bombings at the Qassem Soleimani’s commemoration. Iran must have deliberated on targeting ISIS-K in Afghanistan or Jaesh al-Adl in Pakistan.

In the past, Jaesh al-Adl, and it earlier version, Jundullah, was allegedly receiving support from US, Israel, and other Gulf nations. In the aftermath of the bombings at the Soleimani’s memorial, Iran gave less credit to ISIS-K claim and more to the involvement of US and Israel. In a tweet on X, Iranian president’s political deputy, Mohammad Jamshidi, wrote:

“Make no mistake. The responsibility for this crime lies with the US and Zionist regimes (Israel) and terrorism is just a tool.”

By striking Jaesh al-Adl, the impression emerges that the organization is once again enjoying some level of outside support. It could also be a signal to Pakistan to not extend any assistance towards targeting Iran.

The Role of India

Although a brief escalation, this recent episode has underscored the fundamental challenges Iran and Pakistan face in countering terrorism, with mutual distrust playing a significant role.

Both nations have long accused each other of providing safe havens to their respective enemies. Pakistan consistently maintains that India’s intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), is operating from Iranian soil, orchestrates attacks in Pakistan’s Balochistan region – and supports the anti-Pakistan Baloch separatist movement. Conversely, Iran blames Pakistan for its inaction against anti-Iran terrorist sanctuaries in the Balochistan bordering region, and for not taking decisive action against infiltrators into its territory through human trafficking and smuggling of weapons.

In 2016 Pakistan had arrested what it clams to be an Indian spy, posing as an Iranian businessman. There are different versions of how and where Kulbhusan Yadav was captured.  Indian media had claimed, Kulbhushan was abducted by Jaesh al-Adl and handed over to Pakistan’s intelligence organizations. However, in a confession statement made under Pakistan’s custody, Kulbushan stated his main task was to sabotage CPEC (China, Pakistan Economic Corridor) and create unrest in Karachi and Balochistan. For this mission, he was in touch with leaders belonging to Baloch separatist groups. Thus, India has already been a player when it comes to regional proxy games involving Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan.

Recently, for its support of Israel, Indian cargo ships have come under attack in the Red Sea, threatening its energy supplies. This has pulled India into the conflict as well and has caused it to send three guided missile destroyer ships to the Arabian Sea.

Conclusion

As the Gaza conflict unfolds, the focus has mainly been on the Shiite and Sunni non-state actors in the Middle East. The Iranian strike on Jaesh al-Adl reflects the complexity of the non-state actor landscape that exist in South Asia, particularly as it relates to the politics of Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and Iran. However, the Iranian raids and Pakistan’s response have connected the geopolitics of Middle East and South Asia – in a way that it did not in the past. This obviously will have far reaching consequences.

Sunni religious leaders have been voicing support for Hamas in Pakistan, and the group leadership has also appeared virtually in different rallies organized in support of Gaza. Speaking at a conference in Islamabad in December via video link, Ismail Haniyah stated: “If Israel faced resistance from Pakistan, the perpetration of cruelty could cease.”

The leader of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI-F) Mowlana Fazl-ur-Rehman even travelled to Qatar last November to meet with Hamas leader Ismail Haniyah and Khaled Mashal. He was quoted as commenting: “Palestinians are not only fighting for their own land but on behalf of the Muslim Ummah, are fulfilling their duty by fighting for the freedom of the first Qibla.”

The crackdown against Muslim Brotherhood under Sisi in Egypt has meant that Sunni Hamas has had to rely on Shiite Hezbollah and Iran for support, especially when Hamas and Salafi jihadist, like ISIS, hate each other. In the aftermath of October 7 attack, Israel has attempted to showcase Hamas to be the same as ISIS – but this carries dangerous consequences. Moreover, since Abraham Accords were reached, Palestinians also appear to be losing hope with the Gulf Arabs. In this context, Hamas reaching out to religious groups in Pakistan is significant. How will Iran, India, Israel, and other western powers interpret such outreach by Hamas is not clear. The longer the Gaza crisis lasts the greater will be the blow back – while also allowing for the potential reconfiguring of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The post Pakistan-Iran Cross Border Strikes, Gaza Conflict, And Expanding Proxy Wars appeared first on Politact.

Naad-e-Ali Sulehria – South Asia Fellow, PoliTact

On January 16, in an unexpected twist Iran launched airstrikes into Pakistan’s Balochistan province, claiming to have targeted two strongholds of the anti-Iran militant group Jaesh al-Adl (Army of Justice). In less than two days, Pakistan responded with a tit-for-tat strike, hitting hideouts of ethno-nationalist Baloch separatists within Iranian territory. This abrupt eruption of cross-border military hostilities severely strained the otherwise amicable relations between the neighboring countries, with Pakistan condemning Iran for violating its territorial sovereignty and subsequently severing diplomatic ties as well.

In the aftermath of Pakistan’s counterstrikes, Iran found itself exposed, raising concerns that the situation could be exploited by Iran’s adversaries. To counter, Iran conducted air defense drills using drones designed for intercepting hostile targets along its southwestern to southeastern coasts.

Tensions between Pakistan and Iran sparked fears of a regional conflict. However, both nations eventually de-escalated the situation by stressing that issues should be resolved through dialogue, and agreed to enhance counter-terrorism cooperation utilizing existing communication channels.

Although a brief escalation, the recent episode has underscored the fundamental challenges both countries face in conducting counter-terrorism – with mutual distrust and security concerns persisting over time. Pakistan and Iranian governments have struggled to fully secure this volatile region, as people on both sides of the 559 miles long border feel deprived of basic necessities, face discrimination, and demand a larger share of their resources.

Both nations have long accused each other of providing safe havens to their respective enemies. Pakistan consistently alleges that India’s intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), operating from Iranian soil, orchestrates attacks in Pakistan’s Balochistan region and supports the anti-Pakistan Baloch separatist movement. Conversely, Iran blames Pakistan for inaction against anti-Iran elements with sanctuaries on its side of the border – and not controlling infiltration that results from human trafficking and smuggling of weapons.

Pakistan is also wary of Iran’s increasing involvement in fomenting sectarian violence within the country. Recently, Pakistani security forces apprehended a top commander of an Iranian-backed militant group, Zanabiyoun, in Karachi, accusing him of carrying out targeted killings of prominent Sunni clerics on behalf of Iranian intelligence.

Sanctions imposed on Iran due to its nuclear program and support for non-state actors, especially in the Middle East, have also complicated its relations with Pakistan. Projects such as Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline could not move forward due to these sanctions. Despite its fluctuating ties with the US and strategic ties with China, Pakistan is still considered a close American ally. On the other hand, Iran has had long term relations with both China and Russia.

Meanwhile, Pakistan faces a fresh wave of Baloch protests, calling for government action on enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. These ongoing protests have triggered a stern response from the Pakistani interim government, with caretaker Prime Minister Anwarul Haq Kakar dismissing the Baloch protests as supporters and relatives of those opposing the state.

Pakistan anticipates a high-level visit from the Iranian Foreign Minister in the near future. However, despite their commitment to collaborate against a common enemy, the root causes of Iran-Pakistan tensions persist and are exploited by outside powers.

Naad-e-Ali Sulehria – South Asia Fellow, PoliTact

The post Iran-Pakistan Cross-Border Clashes And Deep-Rooted Challenges appeared first on Politact.

Context

Since the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, the Afghan Taliban character has been evolving and so are ties with Pakistan. The widely held apprehension that US exit will make Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) bolder is coming to fruition – as the number of TTP linked extremist attacks continue to rise in Pakistan with Baloch insurgency also simmering.

At the same time, there is a role reversal. While in the past US relied on Pakistan in dealing with matters related to the Afghan Taliban. Now, as Pakistan’s ties with Afghan Taliban deteriorate, it is resorting to seek US help to address the extremist menace emanating from Afghan soil. Pakistan’s Army Chief’s visit to the US reportedly was primarily to seek military cooperation to tackle the TTP threat. Conversely, the US emphasis is on economics and climate change.

There are a few significant grievances between Pakistan and Afghanistan. One, Pakistan has consistently demanded that Afghan Taliban deal sternly with TTP and Islamic State’s Khorasan branch (IS-K) operating from Afghanistan. US shares concerns related to IS-K but not necessarily on TTP. Although, in the past, US has assisted Pakistan in going after high value TTP targets through drone strikes. Pakistan’s decision to deport illegal Afghan refugees has added stress to the bilateral ties.

On the other hand, US seems to be increasingly satisfied with Afghan Taliban for pressure on IS-K, which makes them less likely to act against its erstwhile ally TTP. This creates a dilemma for Pakistan. Additionally, US intelligence indicates that Al Qaeda (AQ) has been weakened to the point of extinction. Pakistan is thus looking for convergences in its ties with the US to confront TTP by exerting pressure on Afghan Taliban.

Since the removal of Pakistan’s Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government in 2022, the government policy has shifted away from negotiating with TTP and towards using force – and has thus sought more counter-terrorism assistance. Ironically, the former Prime Minister had refused any military cooperation with the US in dealing with the extremist threat in Afghanistan – and some analysts pointed to this as the main reason for his removal – in addition to ill-timed trip to Russia to meet Putin.

Analysis

Zia-ul-Haq, Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, and Iranian Revolution

Since the Afghan Jihad of the 80s, Pakistan’s security perils have largely been linked to the situation of Afghanistan and periodic military escalation with India. While traditionally political unanimity has existed when it comes to handling India, the case of Afghanistan has led to political polarization and instability in the country – and has impacted its foreign relations in ways that have proved extremely detrimental to the social and economic wellbeing of the nation in the long run.

For example, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 provided the military ruler Zia-ul-Haq an opportunity to reset his utility for the West. He had earlier removed the political government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1977, who was later hanged in 1979. The Iranian Revolution and fall of Pahlavi dynasty, also in 1979, had greatly unnerved the US – and Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan fit well with the Domino Theory. These dramatic events in 1979 assisted Zia-ul-Haq to reset ties with the West.

The removal of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, with which US had cordial ties, represented a shift in the Middle East balance of power. Zia capitalized on the changing winds. With help from the Gulf Arabs and the US, Sunni proxies were created to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan – they also served as an ideological counterweight to the Shiite revolutionaries in Iran. This process also linked Pakistan more closely to the Arabs.

The Iranian revolution also initiated a chain of events in the Middle East. Fearing the repercussions on Iraq’s ethnic mix, Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in 1980, a war that lasted until 1988. He also wanted to establish Iraq as the primary force in the Arab world. Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990, leading to the First Gulf War in 1991. Pakistan sided with the Gulf Arabs and even deployed forces on the Saudi border with Iraq to prevent any invasion.

It was on September 11, 2001, when the Sunni-non state actors that fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets launched a horrendous attack on American soil – and thus started the Global War Against Terrorism (GWOT) that sucked in Pakistan once again.

Pervez Musharraf, 9/11, and Global War Against Terror (GWOT)

9/11 provided an opportunity to another military ruler in Pakistan to gain international credibility and reset ties with the US. In the aftermath of the 1999 short and bloody Kargil conflict, Gen Pervez Musharraf had overthrown the civilian government in October 1999, removing Nawaz Sharif from power. For this US had slapped sanctions, which were in addition to the ones imposed on Pakistan and India in the aftermath of 1998 nuclear tests. For Musharraf’s support in Afghanistan after 9/11, Bush lifted all sanctions on Pakistan in October 2001.

Prior to 9/11, Pakistan had been one of the few nations, including UAE and Saudi Arabia, that recognized the Taliban government. As the campaign against terrorism progressed, Pakistan focused its efforts more or Al Qaeda and less on Afghan Taliban – and was accused of providing safe havens for them.

While US got distracted by going into Iraq again in 2003 (Second Gulf War), Bush administration mounted pressure on Pakistan to launch military operations in FATA and eliminate what it termed as safe havens. Pakistan moved nearly hundred thousand troops from the Indian border towards Afghanistan to conduct operation which led to internal dislocation of up to 5 million people. US also conducted thousands of drone strikes in FATA between 2004 and 2018 chasing extremist leaders hiding there.

Pakistan’s military operations in FATA, including the Lal Masjid operation in July 2007, accompanied by drone strikes, started to create an ominous backlash internally. It was unclear if the US drone strikes were occurring with Pakistan’s acquiescence – but it would publicly protest the strikes vehemently as violation of its sovereignty.

Many high value targets were hit in Pakistan as extremist reprisal spread, with thousands of civilian and soldiers killed and maimed. According to Dawn newspaper, Pakistan’s economic loss in the war against terror was a figure around $126.79 billion. The security and political turmoil, including the civil-military divide, was reflected by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007.

The internal politics of Pakistan had gotten fully intertwined with the support it was providing to the US in the war against extremism, and more importantly, at what cost. While Musharraf had become gradually unpopular, and US grievances with him grew, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto demonstrated that this was a battle for Pakistan’s survival too. The Mumbai Attack in November 2008 created fresh headaches for Pakistan on how it was dealing with what are called good and bad extremists.

General Asim Munir, Post US Withdrawal Afghanistan, and US Pakistan Relations

As Pakistan’s new Amry Chief Asif Munir visits US to reset ties, the above historical context needs to be considered. While the nation’s position to counter threat from TTP has been shifting between a negotiated solution to a military one, with different global powers moving in and out of Afghanistan overtime, Pakistan’s own political polarization is swelling, economic prospects dwindling, and social fiber in tatters. Ukraine may have been imagined as the new Cold War that could help reset ties with the US. However, the events unfolding in Gaza have checked that conceptualization. Meanwhile, China facilitated Saudi, Iran detente has provided temporary relief and prevent ethnic tensions from boiling.

In retrospect, 1979 was a tumultuous year – the demise of western supported regime in Iran initiated the transfer of the regional balance of power towards the Sunni Gulf Arabs – with Saddam the casualty in the long run. The collapse of Soviet Union and end of Cold War by the beginning of 90s meant that the US had won the great power rivalry – with Pakistan’s pivotal role. However, in October 1990, US imposed sanctions in the form of Pressler Amendment. The amendment made military and economic aid to Pakistan conditional on it not acquiring nuclear weapons – and for US administration to certify that to be true. US apparently did not want Pakistan to benefit from their shared victory in Afghanistan.

Stalemate ensued as in-fighting between former mujahadeen leaders and factions in Afghanistan continued in the aftermath of Soviet withdrawal. The affairs finally came to climax as Taliban took control of almost entire Afghanistan. The popular Taliban opposition leader, Ahmad Shah Mehsud, was assassinated two days before 9/11 attack. If 9/11 had not occurred, Pakistan and Gulf State supported Taliban would have potentially extended influence further into Central Asia.

What can be expected in the aftermath of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, especially when Pakistan has built strategic ties with China, and India has become a strong American ally towards the ambition of countering global rival China? Moreover, unlike Soviet withdrawal in late 80s, following US departure, Taliban are in complete control of Afghanistan, with other players engaging directly with them. Burning bridges with Afghanistan will come at Pakistan’s own expense – and prevent it from gaining any mileage for the immense cost in blood and treasure the nation has paid over almost half a century. While the nation cannot delink from Afghanistan, patient diplomacy is the only way forward to engage and resolve the thorny issues.

The post Convergences In US-Pakistan Ties And Afghanistan appeared first on Politact.

Context

In the previous articles, we have been examining the various dimensions of the Arab-Israeli rapprochement that got underway as a consequence of the Abraham Accords, signed during the Trump administration in 2020. As a result, UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco officially recognized Israel.

Progressively alarmed by the growing Chinese involvement in the region, demonstrated by the Chinese facilitated Saudi-Iran Détente reached in March, Biden administration had fasten its efforts to normalize ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel as well. Another factor of concern has been the changing politics of Israel – as Netanyahu seemed to have lost interest with the two-state solution.

During his visit to the US to attend the UN General Assembly meetings in September, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman indicated that the normalization process was moving along well, a sentiment shared at the time by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. However, since the signing of Abraham Accords, the paranoia on the Palestinian side had been mounting. All along, it was not clear what the Accords would mean for the Palestinians. Will it include a statehood for Palestinians and cessation of settlements?

While the first Saudi envoy for Palestinian Authority Nayef al-Sudairi did visit West Bank in September – it proved to be a little late in taming Palestinian concerns, especially Hamas. From a purely Israeli point of view, if the Arab states that have traditionally supported the Palestinian cause, agree to recognize Israel – the leverage of Palestinians in any negotiations is greatly reduced.

Things finally blew up on October 7 when Hamas members stormed into Israel killing almost 1400 and taking about 200 hostages. In reprisal, close to 7,000 Palestinians have been killed to date by Israeli bombardments – and the ground operation is imminent. Fears are growing the Israeli ground operation into Gaza will likely result in Hezbollah also becoming fully entangled, and thus widening the war. Moreover, the street pressure in Sunni Arab capitals is likely to push the respective governments to respond – especially if Iran holds true to its statements of not holding back if Israeli military actions continue.

Since the attack, President Biden has offered full support to Israel towards its aim to  eliminate Hamas, and at the same time he clarified that all Palestinians are not Hamas: “The vast majority of Palestinians are not Hamas. Hamas does not represent the Palestinian people.”

In his October 19 Speech, Biden stated: “History has taught us that when terrorists don’t pay a price for their terror, when dictators don’t pay a price for their aggression, they cause more chaos and death and more destruction.”

“As hard as it is, we cannot give up on peace. We cannot give up on a two-state solution,” Biden added.

Response from BRICS

As opposed to the US, China and Russia have stopped short of blaming Hamas while demanding cease fire and offering to mediate. Both have also affirmed that they’ll coordinate their policy for the Middle East. In essence, their position is close to those adopted by the Arab nations. According to media reports, China’s Middle East envoy Zhai Jun told his Russian counterpart, Mikhail Bogdanov, during his current trip to the region: “The fundamental reason the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has reached its current state is that the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people have not been protected.”

On the other hand, South Africa has adopted a more nuanced approach and has stated that its backing for Palestine cause does not mean it supports Hamas. It generally equates its own experience under apartheid as the same as being experienced by the Palestinians. South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) commented that its Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor got a request to speak with Ismail Haniyeh – and that the call was in line with nations policy to “engage will all parties in facilitating dialogue.”

On the other hand, India seems to have reversed its position of backing the Palestinians and has stood squarely with Israel. One of the reasons for that could be because ruling Bahartiya Janata Party (BJP) has given up any hope of receiving Muslim vote in the election next year. This seems similar to the United States where because of the policies adopted by Democratic Party in the Middle East and South Asia, Democratic American Muslims are thinking to shift in mass to the Republican Party. The dilemma being the Republican Party is even more hard-line when it comes to Iran and the Palestinian Issue. It was during the Trump administration in 2018 that the US decided to transfer its embassy to Jerusalem and withdraw from Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA). The agreement was painstakingly reached during Obama’s tenure. However, Trump did develop good relations with Saudi Arabia and Imran Khan in Pakistan.

India may also be evaluating the postures of the Arab world against Hamas vis a vis the Kashmir situation – and what it terms as cross-border terrorism from Pakistan.

Changing Middle East and South Asia

The recognition of Israel by Saudi Arabia would have represented a titanic event in the Islamic world – especially as it relates to the Core versus the Peripheral Islamic world. As a result of Abraham Accords, Pakistan’s other Arab and GCC allies were moving closer to Israel as well. It would have brought tremendous pressure on the peripheral Islamic nations, especially Pakistan, which takes clues from Saudi Arabia when it comes to the maters of Palestinians. On the one hand, Pakistan is China’s closest strategic partner, which is also expanding ties with Iran.

In earlier assessment, PoliTact had noted: “While most of the GCC nations are autocratic – a broken democracy still exists in Pakistan. Irrespective, under the present circumstances, Saudi recognition of Israel anytime soon, will gravely unsettle the political and security situation of the country, particularly if it were to be accompanied by economic and political pressure from Saudi Arabia, and other GCC nations, to follow suit. As for the timeline, President Biden would want an agreement before the US elections next year.

These high-stake decisions need public debate and political ownership – that are presently missing in Pakistan. In fact, the crackdown against PTI hardly creates a conducive environment to build consensus on these fast moving regional and global changes.”

Since the October 7 attack, the scenario has switched, and the Saudi-Israel normalization has all but collapsed. A whole lot will now depend on if Israel launches a ground operation in Gaza. If the war theater expands, the following pressures are likely to play out for Pakistan:

• Most likely the country will have to side with the Arab world and that will make it stand at odds with US and Israel. Pakistan’s caretaker foreign minister Jalil Abbas Jilani had stated on October 8, “We stand in solidarity with Palestinians and call for an immediate end to the violence and oppression by Israeli occupation forces. A viable and sovereign state of Palestine must be established on the basis of pre-1967 borders and UN resolutions.”
• If Pakistan sides with US and Israel – it will put it at odds with its other ally China, its neighbor Iran, and its own public opinion. A lot will depend on If Iran directly or indirectly intervenes in the conflict – and what position Arab states take at that point. China and Russia will likely both support Iran.
• Moreover, if Pakistan stays idle it would greatly dent its stance on Kashmir. And if in the future India takes a similar approach towards Kashmir – as Israel has now on Gaza – it will gravely complicate options for Pakistan.

The future of Abraham Accords and Saudi-Israel normalization now hangs on if Israel will launch a ground operation in Gaza. Reportedly, President Biden is doing his utmost to restrain Israel – and that was one of the aims of his visit. And if that can be accomplished – then the Palestinians would have to be at the dead center of any future negotiations. In other words, there can be no Arab-Israel normalization without first settling the Palestinian issue.

The post Hamas Attack On Israel, Abraham Accords, And South Asia appeared first on Politact.