By Furqan Khan
Great Power Politics Fellow, PoliTact

Context

On August 7, Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia signed a joint defense agreement stipulating that an armed attack against one member will be regarded as an attack against all. The agreement, known as the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, is significant because it brings together three powerful Sunni-majority states under a collective-defense framework at a time when the Middle East’s established security order is under considerable strain. Although the pact has attracted attention primarily because of its resemblance to NATO’s Article 5, its broader significance lies in the institutionalization of defense cooperation among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey. The agreement envisages greater political and military coordination and provides a framework for strengthening joint exercises, defense cooperation, and military-industrial collaboration. Turkey has also indicated that the framework could eventually be expanded to include other regional states.

The Mecca agreement should therefore be understood less as a fully developed military alliance than as an emerging regional security mechanism. Its importance derives from the strategic environment in which it was created: declining confidence in the reliability of the existing U.S.-led security architecture, continuing confrontation with Iran, concerns about Israel’s regional conduct, and growing interest among Middle Eastern states in developing greater indigenous capacity for deterrence.

Disordering Regional Security Environment

For nearly five decades, the United States has been the principal external security guarantor for its allies and partners in the Middle East. Its military deployments, defense relationships, and security commitments helped create an environment intended to protect energy infrastructure, maritime routes, and allied governments while preventing any single regional power from dominating the strategic landscape.

The geopolitical changes associated with the Iran war have placed that model under significant pressure. The conflict, which began in February with U.S. and Israeli attacks on Tehran, has exposed limitations in Washington’s ability to simultaneously deter Iran, protect its regional partners, and preserve freedom of action. The resulting uncertainty has encouraged regional states to consider additional security arrangements rather than relying exclusively on American guarantees.

The United States’ difficulties in protecting its Arab partners from Iranian attacks have been particularly consequential for Saudi Arabia. There is growing concern among regional partners about Washington’s reliability. Saudi Arabia has subsequently sought to diversify its security partnerships rather than remain dependent on a single external guarantor. This development is not necessarily inconsistent with the Trump administration’s emphasis on burden-sharing and reducing the costs of U.S. security commitments abroad. A greater willingness by regional partners to assume responsibility for their own defense could, in principle, complement Washington’s objective of reducing its direct military burden.

The problem, however, is one of perception. Burden-sharing produces different strategic effects when it is interpreted as greater allied responsibility and when it is interpreted as evidence that the United States can no longer be relied upon in a crisis. The Mecca agreement is, at least partly, a product of that credibility gap. It reflects Saudi Arabia’s willingness to seek alternative sources of deterrence and Pakistan and Turkey’s willingness to assume larger security roles in the region.

The agreement is also connected to Arab concerns about Israel – and the extent to which regional government’s view Israel’s military policies as another source of instability. Thus, the agreement cannot be explained solely as a response to Iran or solely as a reaction to declining American influence. It reflects a wider reassessment of the regional balance of power.

Mecca Agreement and Board of Peace

The relationship between the Mecca agreement and the Trump administration’s regional strategy is likely to be one of the most consequential questions surrounding the pact. At first glance, the two frameworks could appear competitive. The administration’s earlier regional vision, centered on the Abraham Accords, placed considerable emphasis on Arab-Israeli normalization. A security arrangement centered on Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan could instead encourage a parallel regional bloc whose strategic identity is based more explicitly on collective defense among Muslim-majority states.

Yet the two initiatives need not be mutually exclusive. President Trump reportedly described the Mecca agreement on August 16 as a “big, bold, and important first step”, suggesting that Washington does not necessarily regard the new arrangement as incompatible with its broader regional strategy. The more interesting possibility is that the two frameworks could eventually become complementary. The Board of Peace is accompanied by an International Stabilization Force (ISF) and associated security-architecture components.

The ISF is envisioned as a temporary multinational security and stabilization force, authorized under UN backing, operating under a unified command acceptable to the Board of Peace. Its responsibilities include maintaining public order, protecting reconstruction corridors, supporting humanitarian operations, and coordinating with Egypt and Israel while assisting a newly recruited local Gaza police force. The force is intended to provide an enforcement mechanism for maintaining territorial calm alongside phased Israeli military withdrawals and militant disarmament.

This creates a potential role for countries participating in the Mecca framework. Muslim-majority states could provide political legitimacy, personnel, equipment, or other forms of support for regional stabilization efforts. The difficulty, however, is Israel’s opposition to certain potential contributors. Israel has previously resisted the presence of Turkish armed forces in Gaza, while Israeli officials have also expressed reservations about Turkey’s participation in a future stabilization force.

The underlying dispute is therefore less about whether Muslim-majority countries can participate in stabilization than about who controls the mandate, composition, and rules of engagement of such a force. Israel has not rejected the ISF concept itself; rather, its principal concern is the identity and mandate of participating forces and whether they can independently influence Gaza’s security environment. Israel insists that Hamas must be disarmed and its military infrastructure dismantled before a full Israeli withdrawal. Prime Minister Netanyahu has continued to reject withdrawal until full disarmament is achieved.

This creates an important tension: Washington and the Board of Peace may see regional Muslim participation as essential to the legitimacy and implementation of the Gaza framework, while Israel remains concerned that participating states could acquire an autonomous security or political role.

What Would Trigger Collective Defense?

The central uncertainty surrounding the Mecca agreement concerns the practical meaning of its collective-defense provision. An attack on one member being treated as an attack on all does not necessarily mean that every member would automatically enter a war. The precise military obligations remain insufficiently defined. Critical questions include whether the provision applies only to attacks by states or also to non-state actors; what threshold constitutes an “attack”; and whether assistance would require combat deployments or could instead involve intelligence, air defense, logistics, maritime surveillance, cyber capabilities, or other forms of support.

The three members also have different threat perceptions. Pakistan’s principal security concerns remain concentrated in South Asia, while Turkey’s strategic interests extend across Syria, Iraq, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Caucasus. Saudi Arabia’s immediate concerns are centered more heavily on Iran, Yemen, missile and drone threats, and the protection of critical infrastructure. For that reason, the agreement should not be interpreted as a guarantee that Pakistan and Turkey would automatically fight every adversary confronting Saudi Arabia. Pakistan’s historical position on Yemen illustrates the distinction between political support for Saudi Arabia and participation in Saudi-led military operations. In 2015, Pakistan’s parliament rejected Riyadh’s request to participate directly in the Yemen intervention. At the same time, Pakistan’s current military relationship with Saudi Arabia demonstrates that limited or defensive assistance can be substantial. Pakistan has already deployed thousands of troops and a fighter-jet squadron to Saudi Arabia during the Iran war, along with other air-defense capabilities, under a separate Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA). The agreement was signed between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia last year.

If a state, or a non-state actor, were to launch a major attack on Saudi territory, critical infrastructure, or if the Kingdom’s sovereignty is threatened, the collective-defense provision would presumably become more relevant. Even then, the most likely initial response could involve defensive assistance: intelligence sharing, air-defense systems, counter-drone capabilities, maritime surveillance, logistics, and other forms of military support rather than immediate offensive operations.

The agreement’s effectiveness will therefore depend less on whether it replicates NATO’s Article 5 literally and more on whether the three governments can establish credible mechanisms for consultation, coordination, intelligence sharing, military interoperability, and crisis response.

What Does the Mecca Agreement Bring Home?

For Saudi Arabia, the agreement offers two strategic benefits: additional deterrence and greater regional leadership. Faced with Iranian and Houti attacks and uncertainty over the reliability of U.S. protection, Riyadh gains an institutional mechanism through which it can diversify its security relationships. For Pakistan and Turkey, the agreement expands their regional strategic profiles. Both countries already possess significant defense relationships with Saudi Arabia, while Pakistan and Turkey have developed extensive bilateral military cooperation. The Mecca agreement gives these relationships a broader institutional framework. According to the Turkish Defense Ministry, the fundamental goal of the agreement is to place existing military ties on a more “institutional and sustainable” basis.

The possibility of additional states joining also gives the agreement longer-term significance. Turkey has indicated that the framework could be expanded, with Egypt among the countries potentially relevant to its future development. The agreement has also been described by Pakistani officials as open to other countries in the region. A larger membership could eventually produce something resembling a “Muslim NATO,” although that comparison should be treated cautiously. NATO’s institutional depth, integrated command structure, standardized forces, and decades of operational experience are not currently replicated by the Mecca framework.

The strategic implications nevertheless extend beyond the three signatories. The emerging security arrangements in West Asia have consequences for American interests and influence. Washington’s declining agency in the regional security architecture could create greater opportunities for China and Russia to expand their diplomatic and strategic influence. More importantly, it signals that regional states increasingly regard security diversification as necessary even while maintaining relationships with the United States.

Conclusion

The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement is best understood as a product of a changing Middle Eastern security environment rather than simply as the creation of a new military alliance. The Iran war, uncertainty surrounding American deterrence, persistent Israeli-Arab tensions, and the wider fragmentation of the regional order have encouraged Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey to institutionalize defense cooperation. The agreement’s collective-defense provision is politically significant, but its military implications remain uncertain. The absence of clearly defined automatic obligations means that it should not yet be equated with NATO. Its immediate value lies in creating mechanisms for consultation, joint exercises, defense cooperation, technology development, and potentially coordinated responses to regional threats. Its durability will depend on whether the three members can reconcile their divergent threat perceptions and translate political solidarity into credible military interoperability.

The larger significance of the Mecca agreement, therefore, is not simply how many troops Pakistan or Turkey might commit in a future conflict. It is that three important regional powers are attempting to create a security mechanism that reduces dependence on any single external guarantor. If the framework expands and develops effective institutional and operational capabilities, it could become an important component of a more pluralistic security order in West Asia.

The emerging arrangement does not necessarily signal the end of American influence. Rather, it indicates that U.S. influence may increasingly operate alongside regional security structures that Washington does not fully control. The Mecca agreement may consequently prove significant not because it immediately creates a “Muslim NATO,” but because it represents another step toward a Middle Eastern security architecture in which regional powers assume a greater share of responsibility for their own deterrence and strategic stability.

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The post The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement: Implications For West Asian Security Architecture appeared first on Politact.

 Context

By Dr Claude Rakisits

The royal rulers of Saudi Arabia must feel somewhat nervous of late. Seen from Riyadh, externally, the neighbourhood is not looking very hospitable and rather hostile towards the kingdom. And, internally, while matters appear to be under control under the newly-installed monarch, King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, there must be a sense that domestically things could unravel if not handled properly in the future.

If matters worsen on either of these two fronts, the future of the country as we know it could look rather bleak. And any threat to the stability of Saudi Arabia is not only bad news for the future of the Saud dynasty but, given the pivotal geostrategic importance of the country, would be bad news for the region and the world. Accordingly, it is critical for all that Saudi Arabia navigate through these difficult and unchartered times as smoothly and successfully as possible.

Analysis

To The North

To the north, DAESH (Al Dawla al-Islamyia fil Iraq wa’al Sham) is lapping on the northern border of the kingdom. And even though the Saudis have built a high-tech barrier along the 1000 kilometres border which is made up of multi-layers of fencing, watchtowers and motion sensors and has deployed an additional 30,000 troops along the Iraqi border, DAESH fighters are successfully conducting raids against the Saudi security forces, killing soldiers and slipping into the kingdom. And while these armed engagements are limited today, the Saudi authorities’ bigger, long-term worry is the return to Saudi Arabia of some of the men who have joined DAESH in Syria and Iraq.

These battle-hardened and ideologically-driven fighters have already conducted terrorist attacks inside the kingdom. And while a number of plots have been thwarted before they were executed, we can expect more to follow and, inevitably, some will be successful. Worryingly, Saudi men represent one of the largest contingents of foreign fighters having joined the terrorist group. Reportedly, some 2500 Saudi men have already joined DAESH. And there is no indication that this recruitment pipeline is drying up.

To The South

To the south, Houthi fighters, who are drawn from a Shiite minority which used to rule a 1000-year old kingdom in Yemen’s highlands until 1962, have militarily defeated Yemen’s regular armed forces and now run the country. The former president, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who was a close ally of the US in its fight against Al Qaeda forces in Yemen, has fled the country. Compounding an already bad situation, the Houthi guerrilla group is backed by Iran, Saudi Arabia’s arch competitor for regional dominance. Moreover, not only has the violent Houthi take-over not been welcomed by Yemeni society, but it has re-ignited the secessionist tendency in the south of the country. Although it is still too early to know how things will develop in Yemen, the odds are that Yemen will be a source of instability for the foreseeable future. This is bad news for Saudi Arabia.

To The East

To the east, Shiite Iran looms large on Saudi Arabia’s radar screen. Strategic competition between the two Gulf countries has been a permanent regional feature for several generations, but it has recently deepened with Tehran’s significant military engagement in Iraq to assist the government in Baghdad counter militarily the threat of DAESH. This latest development is in addition to Iran’s long-standing military assistance, advice and hardware to Shiite Hezbollah in Lebanon, its continued similar support to the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria who is allied with Hezbollah, and its supports for Hamas in Gaza. Compounding the discomfort such widespread Iranian involvement creates in Riyadh is Tehran’s not so covert nuclear arms program. And while the present negotiations between Tehran and the P5 + 1 dialogue partners may have slowed down Iran’s nuclear weapons program, Saudi Arabia remains unconvinced that the nuclear threat has diminished in the long-term. Finally, Iran’s ever-present influence and inspiration among the restive Shiite population in Bahrain and the eastern part of Saudi Arabia continues to worry the Saudi royal family.

The Blame Game

Seen from Riyadh, these external worries and problems could have been avoided had the Obama administration taken a different approach to the region. The late King Abdullah was not impressed with Washington’s eagerness to embrace the Arab ‘Spring’, particularly in the case of Egypt. Against the advice of the Saudis, President Obama decided not to support President Mubarak in his suppression of the Egyptian uprising. The Saudi monarchy took a very deep view of this position given that Mubarak had been a staunch supporter of the US in the Middle East for well over 30 years. Ironically, the US government ultimately acquiesced in General al-Sisi’s overthrow of the democratically-elected Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood president. Needless to say, the thought would have crossed the minds of the Saudi royals that the same lack of American support for a long-standing ally may well happen to them as well in the future.

The Obama administration’s approach towards Syria is another sore point in the bilateral relationship. Early on in the Syrian uprising the Saudis urged President Obama to support the moderate opposition but the US administration refused to get involved. And to make matters worse, when Syrian President al-Assad did cross the famous ‘red line’ with his use of chemical weapons against the civilian population, the Americans did not respond militarily as they said they would. By the time the US put together the multi-nation coalition to counter DAESH in autumn 2014, the Syrian opposition had been degraded and was no longer a credible military threat to the Syrian army.

Finally, the Obama Administration’s keenness to enter into never-ending negotiations with Iran over its covert nuclear weapons program did not please the Saudis either. From Riyadh’s point of view it looked as if Washington was more interested in accommodating Tehran’s concerns than looking after the interests of Saudi Arabia. Needless to say, President Obama’s approach to the region and overall handling of the Arab ‘Spring’ complicated an already inherently prickly bilateral relationship.

The Transition

Given this challenging external environment, it was essential that the transition to the new monarch following the recent – but not completely unexpected – death of King Abdullah be as smooth as possible. And seamless it was; transition plans were implemented to the letter and efficiently. This was vital to avoid any possibility by some restive sections of the Saudi population critical of the royal family to take advantage of this period. And although there does not appear to be any Arab ‘Spring’ in the making in Saudi Arabia, as with most Arab countries, Saudi Arabia has to cope with a large young population bulge, many of them unemployed. And with diminishing oil revenue, it is becoming increasingly more difficult to keep these young people satisfied. It is therefore not surprising that so many of these young people join DAESH in the misplaced hope that this will give meaning to their lives. The Saudi authorities will need to deal with this potentially explosive situation very adroitly.

In order to underline their understanding for Saudi Arabia’s challenging situation – externally and internally, and to underscore the critically important role Saudi Arabia plays in bringing stability to the region, many heads of state and government, including President Obama, President Hollande and Prime Minister Cameron, flew to Riyadh to show their support for the new king. It was also an opportunity for them to thank King Salman for his country’s participation in the coalition against DAESH. They did not need to remind King Salman of the importance of Saudi Arabia’s participation in this war against DAESH.

The Saudi royals would be the first to realise that an undefeated DAESH would pose an existentialist threat to the Saud dynasty. Given this potentially very toxic mix of a difficult neighbourhood and a delicate transition period domestically, this was not the appropriate time for the foreign dignitaries to bring up the subject of the desperate need to reform the Saudi political system, one that is utterly anachronistic in the 21st Century. However, in the not too distant future the Saudi monarchy will need to address honestly and fully the legitimate concerns raised by sections of its population and increasingly raised by its foreign friends and partners. Failure to do so may well bring about a greater existentialist threat to the monarchy than DAESH fighters knocking at the northern gates of the kingdom.

Saudi Arabia is a critically important player in one of the most important geostrategic regions of the world. It is in the interest of the region, in particular, and the international community, in general, that it deal successfully with the whole gamut of challenges it is now confronted with. Everyone would lose if it failed to do so.

The post Saudi Arabia: External And Internal Threats Looming appeared first on Politact.

King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia met with Turkish President Abdullah Gul on Sunday at the royal palace in Jeddah. They discussed the ongoing international and regional developments as well as the prospects of ties between the two nations and ways of boosting them. President Gul’s trip comes within an understanding between Ankara and Riyadh regarding the need to put an end to the brutal crackdown on peaceful demonstrators in Syria. King Abdullah demanded a halt to the violence in Syria last week and called back the Saudi ambassador from Damascus.

The post Saudi Arabia and Turkey Discuss Bilateral Ties And Syria appeared first on Politact.

The beheading of Ruutu Binti Satubi—who was executed in Saudi Arabia in June for murdering her allegedly insulting Saudi employer—sparked such a backlash in Indonesia. Even the biggest supporters of Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi Islam in Indonesia are questioning how the guardians of the most sacred Islamic sites be so neglectful of their religion’s call for sympathy. The beheading triggered angry protests in front of the Saudi Embassy and in another places.

The Indonesian government, complaining it didn’t receive any advance notification of Satubi’s beheading, called back its ambassador from Riyadh. The country also declared a halt to labor exports to Saudi Arabia from August 1st.

The post Saudi Beheading Stirs Hostile Reaction In Indonesia appeared first on Politact.

Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani left for a two day trip to Saudi Arabia on Sunday.
He is also due to hold meeting with King Abdullah bin Abdullah Aziz during his stay. Some of the matters Gillani is expected to discuss with the Saudi leaders include oil facility, improving bilateral trade relations and issues pertaining to the Pakistani citizens residing in Saudi Arabia. The trip comes after President Zardari’s visit to the Kingdom to ease tensions between Tehran and Riyadh.

The post Gillani Visits Saudi Arabia appeared first on Politact.

Islamist activists have criticized Saudi government’s plan to approve an anti-terror law, which rights group believe will be used against opposition in the kingdom. The unofficial Islamist Umma party, which was founded in February, posted a message on its website calling for religious scholars to denounce what it described as “laws that aim to seize the citizens’ right to criticize the government.” On Friday, Amnesty International published a smuggled copy of the Draft Penal Law for Terrorism Crimes and Financing Terrorism, claiming it would legalize extended detentions without trial that can be used against nonviolent opposition. Riyadh has rejected the allegation, saying that, if enacted, the law will be used against militants.

The post Saudi Arabia: Islamist Activists Condemn Anti-Terror Law appeared first on Politact.

Refiners in India have asked the country’s biggest supplier Saudi Arabia to provide more oil in August, according to sources, as they fear that Iran will block shipments of some 400,000 barrels per day in protest against a seven-month payment delay triggered by US pressure. Tehran has threatened to halt supply in August with New Delhi’s $5bn debt for unpaid oil rising. The dispute erupted in December last year when Indian central bank stopped approving payments through a former payment system. UN and US sanctions don’t forbid purchasing Iranian oil, but they have certainly made it difficult to trade.

The post India in Need of More Saudi Oil as Iran Threatens to Block Shipments appeared first on Politact.

Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari will arrive in Riyadh on Wednesday for a two-day trip to the kingdom, meant to improve Pak-Saudi ties. Anti-terrorism campaign, security, stability, Iran and other regional issues are expected to dominate the talks that Zardari will hold. The trip, apparently planned at the last stage, wasn’t scheduled until recently. It comes as the regional focus on Tehran is growing. Diplomatic sources in Saudi Arabia believe that Iran will be the main topic of discussion during the president’s visit.

The post After Iran and Afghanistan, President Zardari Visits Saudi Arabia appeared first on Politact.

Context

Turkey began the year already considered a runner for increasing influence in the Middle East and North Africa. With the aftermath of the May 2010 Freedom Flotilla incident positing Turkey in a new, unfriendly dynamic with Israel and increasing cooperation with Iran, Turkey was seen to be positioning itself for undertaking a leadership role in the Arab world with an eye for an anti western-influence approach.

The NATO efforts in Libya were opposed by Turkey at the onset and the nation seemed to be following through on its new Arab-centric route, however, in recent times the tone coming out of Ankara has been markedly different from that of the beginning of the year, especially as affairs in Syria started to deteriorate. Indeed the Turkish perspective appears to have shifted much more to a pro-NATO, Israel-friendly one. This article looks at the evolving role of Turkey and what it means for other regional contenders, Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Analysis

As the US starts to withdraw forces from Iraq and Afghanistan and initiates negotiations on the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) with these countries, the irredentist claims presented by the Kurds, Pastuns and Baluchs are likely to escalate. These claims present an opportunity to keep the regional powers off balance.

(The article includes a map.)

The Syria Factor

The shift invariably came with the onset of trouble in Syria. Syria and Turkey have traditionally been friendly and the border they share relatively peaceful. With Iran and Syria having close ties, the initial Turkish approach would have included warmer ties with these two countries, which necessitates a position away from western influence and good ties with Israel. However, civil unrest and crackdown by the Syrian government against civilians has presented a moral dilemma for Turkey. Assad has continued to ignore requests from Ankara to stop the brutalities against protesters and enter into meaningful reforms, pushing Ankara towards a breaking point in its relationship with Syria.

Perhaps Turkey has seen that with a change in tone it could now enjoy the backing of the EU, the US and even Russia in its stance as a new regional leader. Its nearest competitor, Iran, would never be able to gain such support, with conceivably the exception of Russia. That being said, Turkey is by no means aiming to blindside Iranian relations. Turkish and Persian relations have been steadily building over the past two or three years, with Turkey maintaining close economic ties with Iran, notably in the energy sector.

Turkey’s role as a mediator in the 2010 nuclear swap deal with Iran was a clear demonstration of Turkey’s ability to play a significant part in affairs of the region and sets a precedent for its inclusion into the stagnant Middle East Peace Process. Turkish prowess in mediatory roles was also showcased in talks between Israel and Syria back in 2008. However, Syria is increasingly becoming a thorn complicating Turkeys relations with Iran and other Arab countries.

Turkey’s Evolving Positions

The other factor pushing Turkey to the fore in the Middle East is the loss of credibility in other Arab nations such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. These countries previously held a strong position in regional affairs, but the Arab Spring, and the reasons that led to it, has taken its toll on their standing. Egypt is still coming to grips with the change in its internal circumstances and Saudi Arabia is trying to balance turmoil on its borders with Yemen as well as unrest in Bahrain with its own civil unrest.

This month’s meeting of the Libyan Transitional National Council (TNC) in Istanbul sends another message of Turkish dominance in Middle Eastern affairs. It also signifies Turkey’s stepping more into line with the NATO alliance and their actions in Libya. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu officially recognized the rebel government in Libya and pledged $200mn in aid during a trip to the rebel stronghold of Benghazi last Sunday. “Gaddafi should leave power and a genuine political change based on the demands and aspirations of the Libyan people should be realized,” Davutoglu said during the trip. “The unity of Libya must be protected.” The recognition comes just one day after the Turkish government announced it is closing down its embassy in the Libyan capital Tripoli.

Compare the above statements to the ones Turkish leaders made towards the start of the Libyan crisis: “Reporters have been asking me whether or not NATO should intervene in Libya. It is such nonsense. What does NATO have to do with Libya? NATO’s intervention in Libya is out of the question. We are against such a thing,” Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had stated while delivering a speech to the Turkish-German Economy Congress in Hanover, Germany.

When the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on Libya in February, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has stated, “Sanctions, an intervention, would force the Libyan people, who are already up against hunger and violence, into a more desperate situation. We call on the international community to act with conscience, justice, laws and universal humane values – not out of oil concerns.”

On Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) intervention in Bahrain Turkish PM Erdogan had said it could not be termed as foreign intrusion since it is a regional task force that is recognized internationally. On the other hand, speaking on the Middle East revolt, Erdogan had earlier stated that the Arab leaders need to realize that they can’t suppress the demand for change through violence or force.

Neo-Ottoman Ambitions

While Ankara is very keen to give off the impression of a benevolent benefactor, its growing presence in the region is not without concern for many Arab countries, suspecting a rise in neo-Ottoman ambitions. It important to note that so far Turkey has sided with the protesters in Egypt, Libya and Syria while it has backed the Saudi led GC intervention in Bahrain. The Iranians would have certainly noted this inconsistency.

In this vein there have been rumors of closed-door talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu just concluded a visit to Saudi Arab followed by a surprise trip to Tehran. Turkey certainly appears to be domineering the affairs of Middle East and North Africa. Three important US Senators John McCain, Lindsey Graham and Joseph Lieberman recently conveyed to the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that only Turkey can persuade the Palestinian group Hamas to participate in peace negotiations with Israel.

On the other hand, Iran appears to be strengthening its role in the affairs of Afghanistan, which must be of great concern to the Saudi’s. President Ahmadinejad of Iran, Zardari of Pakistan and Karzai of Afghanistan shared the stage with Al-Bashir of Sudan, Rahmon of Tajikistan and Talabani of Iraq last month for the “anti terror” conference in Tehran to discuss how they would react when the US and NATO withdraw from Afghanistan. In a trilateral meeting between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan, the leaders of these three countries discussed a number of issues that may arise after the West exits Afghanistan. All three seemed determined to take matters into their own hands and exercise their sovereignty to boost cultural, political and economic cooperation.

As the US starts to withdraw forces from Iraq and Afghanistan and initiates negotiations on the Status of Forces Agreements with these countries, the irredentist claims presented by the Kurds, Pastuns and Baluchs are likely to escalate. These claims present an opportunity to keep the regional powers off balance.

PoliTact intends to closely monitor the Turkish response to the changing situation in the Middle East, especially as it pertains to the conflicts in Libya and Syria, as these two dynamics and Turkish involvement therein will give clues to how the new Middle East balance of power will evolve.

The post The Evolving Role of Turkey in the Middle East and the Arab and Persian Response appeared first on Politact.

British Foreign Secretary William Hague met his Saudi Arabian counterpart Prince Saud al-Faisal in Jeddah on Wednesday to discuss hotspots in the Middle East and North Africa including Syria and Libya. “At a time of great upheaval and change in the region, our constructive cooperation on regional issues including Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, Iran, and the Middle East peace process, is even more critical,” Hague said during a joint press conference with Prince Saud. He also stressed the need for resolving the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict, saying, “Prince Saud and I agree, I think, that the unfolding events in the region show the need for meaningful negotiation.”

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