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		<title>US Afghan Withdrawal, Regional Geopolitics, And Biden-Putin Summit</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/us-afghan-withdrawal-regional-geopolitics-and-biden-putin-summit/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 08 Jun 2021 22:49:01 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Afghan Reconciliation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Americas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO' Future Role]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russian and Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US and Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vantage Point Analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Afghan reconciliation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China Russia ties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of Afghan reconciliation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[G7 June Meeting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geoplitics of Coronavirus]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics of Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics of South Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Inter Afghan Dialogue]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran nuclear talks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[JCPOA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO and Afghanistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nord-Stream 2 Pipeliine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Afghanistan relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan India Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Middle East relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[President Biden Putin Meeting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Quad Strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia and NATO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Afghan withdrawal]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Pakistan ties]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=9641</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="453" height="307" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/04-03-2013_Afghan-Reconciliation2.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Afghan Civilian talking with a soldier from the Afghan Security Force" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" fetchpriority="high" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/04-03-2013_Afghan-Reconciliation2.jpg 453w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/04-03-2013_Afghan-Reconciliation2-300x203.jpg 300w" sizes="(max-width: 453px) 100vw, 453px" />Context Now that the Biden administration has definitively announced plans to withdraw militarily from Afghanistan by September 11, the focus has shifted to the post withdrawal scenarios – and what that would look like for the US and other key stakeholders. The most important determinant of that is the status of Afghan reconciliation – and [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/us-afghan-withdrawal-regional-geopolitics-and-biden-putin-summit/">US Afghan Withdrawal, Regional Geopolitics, And Biden-Putin Summit</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="453" height="307" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/04-03-2013_Afghan-Reconciliation2.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Afghan Civilian talking with a soldier from the Afghan Security Force" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/04-03-2013_Afghan-Reconciliation2.jpg 453w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/04-03-2013_Afghan-Reconciliation2-300x203.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 453px) 100vw, 453px" /><p><strong><img decoding="async" class="alignleft size-thumbnail wp-image-9649" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/US-Afghan-Withdrawal-150x150.jpg" alt="A military plane with troops getting on board" width="150" height="150" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/US-Afghan-Withdrawal-150x150.jpg 150w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/US-Afghan-Withdrawal-300x300.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/US-Afghan-Withdrawal-100x100.jpg 100w" sizes="(max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" />Context</strong></p>
<p>Now that the Biden administration has definitively announced plans to withdraw militarily from Afghanistan by September 11, the focus has shifted to the post withdrawal scenarios – and what that would look like for the US and other key stakeholders. The most important determinant of that is the status of Afghan reconciliation – and US-China ties.</p>
<p>Moreover, like has been the precedence, each major shift and decision is followed by a period of lull &#8211; as the other parties interpret what the changed circumstances mean. For many the question remains if US is fully intent on the military withdrawal. After all, the departure of coalition forces does not mean the end of political and security engagement.<br />
As the Biden administration announced that US may not be able to keep the previously agreed May withdrawal deadline, Afghan Taliban has signaled it considers the delay a breach of the treaty signed last year. While they attended the meeting held under the auspices of Russia in March, Afghan Taliban did not show up at the Washington backed peace conference scheduled for April in Istanbul &#8211; and thus it had to be postponed. Notably, India was also invited to the Istanbul moot.</p>
<p>Subsequent to the announced delay, US has actively engaged Pakistan to help convince Afghan Taliban that slight delay in military withdrawal should not short circuit the overall plan. The country has already played a major role in facilitating talks with the Taliban. In this regard, the security advisors of Pakistan and US met in Geneva recently, and other direct communications have also taken place between the senior security leadership of both nations.</p>
<p>Media reports indicated that these contacts were geared towards securing the air and ground lines of access (ALOC and GLOC) during and after the US withdrawal. The controversy is already brewing if US has requested bases in Pakistan. And reports also reflect that under the Biden administration budget request for fiscal year 2022, some military training and economic assistance for Pakistan is forthcoming &#8211; but the overall suspension of military aid that came about in May 2018 remains intact. While the US is withdrawing militarily, the budget still asks for $3.3bn to support and sustain the Afghan Security Forces, a jump of 9.2 percent from 2021.</p>
<p>At the same time, violence has increased in Afghanistan and there are no signs of permanent cease fire that was being hoped for – as US agrees to leave albeit with a slight delay. But what can a few months accomplish which was not achieved in almost two decades?</p>
<p><strong>The Spring Offensive</strong></p>
<p>Seemingly, a delay of a few months should not matter, but when world events are moving with lightning speed, and added to that the Coronavirus related dynamics, postponements could create a new set of calculations. Perhaps the most important consideration would be the pace of fighting. Summer and Spring are usually the heaviest fighting season, with Afghan Taliban and coalition forces both launching operations.</p>
<p>Based on the agreement reached on Feb 29, 2020, Taliban are not targeting the coalition and American troops but that does not include the Afghan government forces. Therefore, one of the key assumptions that is likely to be tested is that if the Afghan forces can hold on their own – and thus indicate with some level of certainty what can transpire in the future. As US continues to close bases, Afghan Taliban are gaining in the vacuum that’s generated. Commenting on the situation, Foreign Minister of Pakistan showed concern that Afghan forces may not be able to hold on, and without political settlement, the country is heading towards a civil war.</p>
<p>This drastic prospect is not what Pakistan would hope for and has supported the concept of responsible withdrawal. Pakistan will likely increase pressure on Afghan Taliban to get on with the new reality &#8211; provided it get some concessions from the US. Pakistan wants US to take a <a href="https://politact.com/broader-implications-of-pakistans-omission-from-bidens-climate-summit/">broader view of its ties with Pakistan</a> &#8211; and not just from the security prism of Afghanistan. Thus one of the key element at stake is the nature of <a href="https://politact.com/us-pakistan-relations-and-afghanistan-under-biden/">US-Pakistan ties</a> in the aftermath of US withdrawal &#8211; and what role Pakistan can offer while it takes place.</p>
<p><strong>Blinken’s Proposal and Afghan Peace Process</strong></p>
<p>Second causality to be tested by the delay is how the US withdrawal influences the Afghan Peace Process. One would assume that the momentous decision would have created a sense of urgency, as Secretary Blinken’s letter to Ashraf Ghani had specifically conveyed. And if the talks had progressed, perhaps a ceasefire could have been established before the full US departure.</p>
<p>According to Secretary Blinken’s proposal, the postponed April conference UN was going to convene in Istanbul, was to be followed by a 90-day reduction in violence. Moreover, the envisioned concept of interim government appears to have landed flatly in Afghanistan, with President Ashraf Ghani strongly resisting. The Ghani government prefers a new election to decide the fate of existing set-up &#8211; not a transitional government that includes power sharing with Afghan Taliban.</p>
<p>Thus, the delay in talks, and speedy US withdrawal, adds to the pressure on the Ghani government. The option it is utilizing is to blame Pakistan for what ails Afghanistan, and let the situation worsen dramatically &#8211; so as to cause a rethink on the part of the US and coalition forces.</p>
<p><strong>Pakistan-India Ties</strong></p>
<p>Another key dimension of the Afghan quagmire is the continued Indian intransigence towards the budding peace process. According to the Indian strategic thinking, Afghan Taliban gaining the upper hand would not bode well for the Kashmir conflict &#8211; and the insurgency there could likely gain more momentum. And thus, India would like Pakistan to remain distracted with Afghanistan while continuing to support groups such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other Baloch insurgents, and prevent CPEC related projects from maturing.</p>
<p>While India has also been working to <a href="https://politact.com/examining-saudi-iran-tensions-and-its-impact-on-south-asia-china/">distance Pakistan from its traditional Arab allies</a>, for the first time, India has to consider tensions on its northern border with China – and this is where the India-US strategic ties and the Quad alliance comes in to play.</p>
<p>The External Minister of India, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, met with the US officials and Secretary Blinken on May 28 to emphasize its case. Clearly, a quandary for the US would be to balance withdrawal from Afghanistan with securing Indian interests, calming Pakistan’s security concerns, while obtaining more cooperation from India as it relates to the Quad strategy.</p>
<p><strong>China-Iran and JCPOA</strong></p>
<p>The sixth round of Iran nuclear talks are scheduled in Vienna this week. As the likelihood of US lifting sanctions on Iran increase, what role can Iran play in the post US Afghan withdrawal scenario, and will the results of Iranian elections make a difference?</p>
<p>It remains doubtful how much Iran can act as a calming force in Afghanistan. Iran’s trust with US and India is quite low. And that prospect has been made if even more remote due to its strategic closeness to China and Russia; the recent <a href="https://politact.com/bidens-middle-east-policy-china-iran-ties-and-cpec/">$400 billion China-Iran deal</a> is a case in point. With this far-reaching treaty, Iran is likely to become more a conduit in extending Chinese influence in the Middle East.</p>
<p>If the Iran nuclear talks with Biden administration prove to be successful, it would likely play out of its of its own historical aspirations, in Afghanistan and the wider Middle East. But that also means <a href="https://politact.com/future-islamic-world/">relegation of the Sunni Arabs and Turks</a> &#8211; and more importantly, this will require Israeli acquiescence.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>The crux of the matter remains, will the US withdrawal from Afghanistan result in China-Russia dominated region, or the one under US-India. Remaining engage with the Afghanistan and Pakistan will provide some room to maneuver.</p>
<p>As alluded to by PoliTact in previous assessments, the window for Chinese and Russian cooperation on Afghanistan is narrowing quickly – and depends a lot on the cross leverages US, China, and Russia have on each other in other regions and matters. In this, the sequencing of events is of crucial significance. While Secretary Blinken’s meeting in March with Chinese counterparts held in Anchorage had a stark tone – the one with Foreign Minister Lavrov in May seemed more amenable, leading to the waiving of sanctions on Nord-Stream 2 pipeline.</p>
<p>The Biden-Putin summit, coming after the G7, EU, and NATO meetings, will demonstrate the state of play between US and Russia. The G7 agenda is expected to cover areas such as strategic stability, Ukraine, Belarus, Cyberattacks and cooperation in the areas of Coronavirus and climate change.</p>
<p><img decoding="async" class="alignleft size-thumbnail wp-image-9647" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Flags-Afghan-US-Nato-150x150.jpg" alt="Flags of Afghanistan, US, and NATO" width="150" height="150" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Flags-Afghan-US-Nato-150x150.jpg 150w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Flags-Afghan-US-Nato-300x300.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Flags-Afghan-US-Nato-100x100.jpg 100w" sizes="(max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" />On the other hand, NATO’s website indicates the June 14 NATO leadership Summit will discuss Afghanistan. Speaking at an Atlantic Council event on June 7, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated the organization will continue to support and train Afghan military, while clarifying that most of this will be taking place ‘outside Afghanistan’. He went on to add: “at some stage Afghans had to take responsibility for their own future, and that’s what they’re doing with continued support from NATO allies.”</p>
<p>Stoltenberg commented that China is not an adversary, rhyming with the opinion piece President Biden wrote in the Washington Post on June 5th. He further added that they are looking at the possibility of re-initiating the otherwise defunct NATO-Russia Council.</p>
<p>Biden wrote in his price, “we want a stable and predictable relationship with Russia on issues like strategic stability and arms control. When he meets Putin, he will be taking a holistic approach &#8211; gauging how much is Russia willing to play ball on a whole gamut of matters dear to Russia &#8211; and then see how Russia can assist towards Afghan withdrawal. How China perceives any give and take, is part of the ongoing <a href="https://politact.com/the-war-against-extremism-and-the-return-of-new-great-game/">great power rivalry</a>.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/us-afghan-withdrawal-regional-geopolitics-and-biden-putin-summit/">US Afghan Withdrawal, Regional Geopolitics, And Biden-Putin Summit</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>The War Against Extremism And The Return Of New Great Game</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/the-war-against-extremism-and-the-return-of-new-great-game/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Mar 2021 16:47:53 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Afghan Reconciliation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Americas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Campaign Against Extremism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global Power Tussles and Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global Realignment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO' Future Role]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pivot to Asia and South, Central Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South and Central Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vantage Point Analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Afghan Peace process]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AQ and Associates]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arab Spring]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Belt and Road Initiative]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Biden's China strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[BRI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[BRICS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chechnya]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China Russia ties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CPEC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Daesh]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dagestan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of NATO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Great Game]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indo Pacific Strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ISIS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Joe Biden's Pacific Strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[New Great Game]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Quad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SCO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US China Alasks talks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US India relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War against extremism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Xinjiang Muslims]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=9577</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="240" height="210" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Modi-and-Ghani.jpeg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" />Context PoliTact has consistently maintained that the longer the Afghan imbroglio continues it is bound to intersect with the other regional and global flashpoints &#8211; and the larger balance of power tussles. Not that it had not been in the past, but to a lesser degree. Since 9/11, and the subsequent war against extremism, the [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-war-against-extremism-and-the-return-of-new-great-game/">The War Against Extremism And The Return Of New Great Game</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="240" height="210" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Modi-and-Ghani.jpeg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" /><p><strong><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-9587 alignleft" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/US-China-Trade-Tesions.png" alt="" width="271" height="186" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/US-China-Trade-Tesions.png 271w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/US-China-Trade-Tesions-218x150.png 218w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/US-China-Trade-Tesions-100x70.png 100w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 271px) 100vw, 271px" />Context</strong></p>
<p>PoliTact has consistently maintained that the longer the Afghan imbroglio continues it is bound to intersect with the other regional and global flashpoints &#8211; and the larger balance of power tussles. Not that it had not been in the past, but to a lesser degree.<br />
Since 9/11, and the subsequent war against extremism, the global politics has been primarily shaped by cooperation in dealing with extremism. So much so that even legitimate struggles against oppression conveniently got linked with terrorism, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Kashmir.</p>
<p>As mentioned above, it would be wrong to assume that global power games, and the linked regional dimensions, had gone dormant as the campaign against extremism was being waged. It just had taken a different form. Consider the example of Arab Spring. As the uprising spread through the Arab world, it soon became apparent that the regime change that accompanied the popular revolts were risking the interests of Russia and China more.<br />
And thus, the Spring came to a stop in the case of Syria, where Russia intervened militarily to save Bashar al-Assad, and by default its naval facility in Tartus. Syrian example also illustrated that different groups of extremists were being backed by array of state players, and thus it become a full fledge proxy war.</p>
<p>In the case of Egypt, the then General Fatah el-Sisi ousted democratically elected Islamist Mohammed Morsi in 2013. Morsi had arrived at the helm after the removal of Hosni Mubarak, as a result of the Egyptian revolution in 2011.</p>
<p>Libya provided another case where a different configuration of regional and global players emerged in the aftermath of the removal of Muammar Qaddafi, attempting to restore a semblance of order. Russia got involved militarily in Libya through its version of Black Water type mercenaries.</p>
<p>In most cases, China has remained on the sidelines. Instead, it has focused on economic route and developing strategic deals with both the Shia and Sunni states. It spoke in favor of state sovereignty and against foreign interventions.</p>
<p>In the emerging environment, the extremists with global aspirations, such as Al Qaeda (AQ) and Deash (ISIS), remained in the pariah status. However, the same could not be claimed for groups that came to be known as the associates of AQ and Daesh. These factions often had regional ambitions, grievances, and causes, which were either beneficial or detrimental to the interests of the regional and global stakeholders. In essence, the new reality was reflective of the political and security dynamics that existed before 9/11. And as the Cold War like situation returns, these local grievances and ambitions are likely to play a pivotal role.</p>
<p><strong>The New Global Power Calculus</strong></p>
<p>The metamorphosis of the war against extremism also applies to the South Asia region. While US and NATO have been doing the heavy lifting when it comes to the situation of Afghanistan, China and Russia have played a reconciliatory role. In the post 9/11 environment, and even before, China and Russia were threatened by their own brand of Islamic extremists, in Xinjiang, and Dagestan and Chechnya region, respectively. And they have remained worried about their extremists getting hooked up with the global extremists or their associates. In essence, helping in the war against extremism also diminished the domestic threats for these powers.</p>
<p>However, as we enter an era where the global power tussles will define politics once more, the reconciliatory role in Afghanistan is likely to evaporate. This does not bode well for the peace process. At the same time, it does not reflect well for Russia and China either. The theater for the Great Game is likely to get extended where the Pacific, including the Ladakh region, are already active. In short, Afghanistan, could become a quid pro quo on a much larger canvas.</p>
<p><strong>Revitalizing NATO</strong></p>
<p>As history teaches us, one of the critical steps in fighting global rivalries is by solidifying alliances and weakening those of the adversaries. And linked with that is an assessment of the kinds of threats being confronted. The type of alliance needed to fight non-state extremists is markedly different than the one to counter state actors.</p>
<p>The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came into being in 1949 in the aftermath of World War II. The first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay, had famously stated the organization’s goal was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” With the end of the Cold War and the Warsaw Pact, one of the main premises upon which the NATO military alliance was formulated was gone. The alliance began to look for a new purpose and identity that would keep it united against the emerging threats. The war against terror has proven to be one such unifying factor, as has dealing with rogue dictators and nations that threaten western interests, such as Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qaddafi and recently Iran. However, these motives have proven to be short lived in the present multi-polar world. But the return of great power politics, and Cold War like dynamics, can reinvigorate the alliance.</p>
<p>After the neglect suffered during the Trump’s presidency, the Biden Administration is busy strengthening alliances. To assure allies, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken visited Japan, South Korea, and NATO headquarters in Brussels. On the other hand, Secretary of Defense Loyd Johnson was in India and Afghanistan.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, on March 12 a virtual meeting of the QUAD leaders was held between the leaders of US, India, Japan, and Australia. In the press briefing after the meeting, US affirmed the ‘centrality of the Indo-Pacific in the US national security’. And, this was accompanied by the US-China strategic talks held in Alaska, that set the tone for the ties under Biden.</p>
<p><strong>The Future of BRICS, SCO</strong></p>
<p>On the other hand, an organization representing the emerging powers of Brazil, Russia, China, and India (BRICS) started off in 2011 with much fanfare, promoting commercial, political, and cultural cooperation. Its primary motive was to give voice to the realities of the multipolar world. In 2013, BRICS agreed to create global institutions to rival those of Western controlled IMF and World Bank. However, the economic recession of 2008 and the fluctuating global market has impacted the BRICS disproportionately. While China and India have continued to grow, the economies of Russia and Brazil have had a tougher time. This has obviously impacted the wherewithal of the organization.</p>
<p>More recently, China has been successful in handling the coronavirus pandemic and has been the least impacted economically &#8211; as compared to the West. This could also be the reason why the tensions between US and China have escalated.</p>
<p>The Chinese dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was formed in 2001 mainly as a security forum. The member governments have common security concerns, with emphasis on tackling terrorism, religious extremism, and ethnic separatism. In 2017, the organizing reached a milestone when India and Pakistan joined the organization as full members. Other members include China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Afghanistan and Iran have an observer status while Turkey is a dialogue partner of SCO.</p>
<p>As the global focus shifts from the campaign against extremism and towards great power challenges, the nature of BRICS and SCO is likely to morph as well. No other issue is more consequential to the future of these organizations than the role of India. The nation is also aligned with the Indo-Pacific strategy and QUAD. It simply cannot be a member of the emerging power club while supporting the established powers at the same time. Sooner or later, India would have to choose.</p>
<p>A case can be made that the present border tensions between India and China are a direct result of Indian decision to revoke the special status of Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019. Under the garb of US-China rivalry it attempted to settle an internationally recognized dispute unilaterally.</p>
<p>The Great Game of the earlier times was about the dangers of Russian invasion on British India via Afghanistan, the emerging one appears to be about protecting American India against Chinese penetration. While US would want to weaken the Sino-Russian partnership, a successful strategy would likely work by placating one of them, not by alienating both at the same time.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-war-against-extremism-and-the-return-of-new-great-game/">The War Against Extremism And The Return Of New Great Game</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>China-India Border Skirmishes; BRICS Versus Quad</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/china-india-border-skirmishes-brics-versus-quad/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Jun 2020 03:56:09 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Asia Pacific]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emerging, Established Power Ties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global Realignment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pivot to Asia and South, Central Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South and Central Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US-China Relations]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.politact.com/?p=9301</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="300" height="168" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ModiXi.jpeg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" />What Is Pushing India to Extreme Policies? Context In the COVID-19 environment, the Asia Pacific is increasingly an active theater. A number of inquiries are being contemplated on the role and policy of China as the world grapples on how to deal with the pandemic. Then there is the angle of how China was able [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/china-india-border-skirmishes-brics-versus-quad/">China-India Border Skirmishes; BRICS Versus Quad</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="300" height="168" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ModiXi.jpeg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" /><p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-9273" src="https://www.politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/putinmodijinping-300x169.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="169" /></p>
<figure id="attachment_9276" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-9276" style="width: 300px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-9276" src="https://www.politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Xi-and-Modi-300x184.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="184" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Xi-and-Modi-300x184.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Xi-and-Modi-356x220.jpg 356w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Xi-and-Modi-600x368.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Xi-and-Modi.jpg 640w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-9276" class="wp-caption-text">GOA, INDIA OCTOBER 16, 2016: Russia&#8217;s President Vladimir Putin, India&#8217;s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and China&#8217;s President Xi Jinping (L-R) at a meeting of the BRICS leaders with BRICS Business Council members. Mikhail Metzel/TASS (Photo by Mikhail MetzelTASS via Getty Images)</figcaption></figure>
<p>What Is Pushing India to Extreme Policies?<br />
<strong>Context</strong><br />
In the COVID-19 environment, the Asia Pacific is increasingly an active theater. A number of inquiries are being contemplated on the role and policy of China as the world grapples on how to deal with the pandemic. Then there is the angle of how China was able to tackle the virus quickly while others are faltering? And thus perhaps indicating Beijing is the net beneficiary so far &#8211; as others are being economically weakened.<br />
The focus had shifted to the Pacific long before the arrival of Coronavirus. With a pre COVID-19 annual growth rate of more than 6%, China has been on the trajectory to challenge the US for a while now. And that is the reason substantial intellectual capital has been committed to devise approaches to counter its rise. These discussions have revolved around coexistence to competition, and containment.<br />
During the Obama administration the emphasis was on economic collaboration with allies through trade deals like TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) and emphasis on the military Pivot to Asia. Under the American First doctrine, Trump quickly annulled TPP and increased economic pressure on China. On the other hand, <a href="https://www.politact.com/the-impact-of-trumps-victory-on-us-australia-alliance-pivot-to-asia/">Pivot to Asia</a> has morphed into the Indo-Pacific strategy.<br />
And then there is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that China has launched to reconfigure the world based on its vision – and is perceived as highly threatening by the West. The scientific and technological advancement is another dimension of the risk, such as the next generation 5G technologies. US is vehement in impressing upon its allies to avoid these Chinese technologies as that would create vulnerabilities for the western economic and security alliances.<br />
<strong>Weakened America</strong><br />
The increasing tension in the Asia Pacific is a reflection of the COVID-19 related defense and security reassessments that different players are conducting. The perception that China was able to deal with the Coronavirus early on &#8211; has reinforced the impression that it has emerged a little unblemished under the changing geopolitical and geostrategic context. On the other hand, the inept handling of the pandemic, followed by <a href="https://www.politact.com/coronavirus-race-relations-and-upcoming-elections-in-the-us/">inter-racial riots</a>, has created an image that US is imploding and losing its global preeminence. And thus the American allies are recalibrating on how to position and place their bets, while other powers consider what a weakened and inward-focused America would mean for the world.<br />
<strong>China-India Border Tensions</strong><br />
If it is assessed that US has indeed been weakened by the Coronavirus, it represents an opportunity for other players to exert and test new scenarios. And this may be what has transpired on the China, India border as it relates to the broader disputed region of Kashmir. However, it was India that triggered the recent action-reaction cycle.<br />
In August 2019, India had revoked the special status of Jammu and Kashmir, granted under article 370 and 35A of the constitution, and divided it into union territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh. Following the move, India sent additional troops and placed Jammu and Kashmir in a complete lockdown, cut-off telecommunications and Internet, and jailed political leaders. India removed the ‘permanent status’ clause demonstrating it wanted to change the facts on the ground to bring about the desired outcome.<br />
Since revoking the special status of Kashmir, Indian officials repeatedly made claims regarding the Pakistan administered Kashmir, suggesting it was ready to tackle it head on. The neighbors of India wearily looked on these aggressive Indian actions, especially China. To them the message was clear; under the garb of Quad and its strategic alliance with the US, India was trying to change the status of these border disputes in violation of previous treaties and historical understandings.<br />
<strong>Why is India Provoking its Neighbors?</strong><br />
The question becomes why is India acting rashly? The nation has recently suffered a series of humiliating setbacks to economically and militarily punish Pakistan for its role in Kashmir.<br />
In February 2019, India claimed to have carried out a preemptive attack inside Pakistan while destroying the terrorist training camp located there. This was after it blamed Pakistan for the <a href="https://www.politact.com/pulwana-attack-and-the-indian-strategic-calculus-against-pakistan-from-cold-start-to-surgical-strikes/">Pulwama attack</a>. International media widely discrediting the Indian claims that any such camp was hit in Balakot. Subsequently, Modi government continued the jingoism even in the face of a dogfight with Pakistani jets that resulted in two of Indian fighter planes crashing &#8211; and a pilot being captured.<br />
Before this escalation, in 2016 India asserted to have carried out surgical strikes, a term usually reserved for the US in its campaign against extremism, on Pakistan’s side of the Kashmir. These claims were mostly unverifiable. India attempts to link instability on its side of Kashmir with Pakistan supported terrorism, while Pakistan claims it to be a locally supported insurgency against Indian brutality – and recognized by UN as the unsettled business of the 1947 partition.<br />
New Delhi has also been unable to globally isolate and economically marginalize Pakistan, though it made inroads to put distance between Pakistan and its traditional support emanating from the <a href="https://www.politact.com/core-versus-peripheral-islamic-world-and-covid-19-pandemic/">Gulf States</a>. However, Pakistan was mostly able to counter that via China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a major tributary of the BRI. Moreover, despite considerable efforts India was unsuccessful in diminishing the centrality of Pakistan in the Afghan peace process.<br />
All of this is pushing India towards riskier steps and behavior– example being the disastrous step of revoking the special status of Jammu and Kashmir- that possibly led to the deadly June 15<sup>th</sup> skirmishes in Galwan Valley with China.<br />
<strong>Indian Strategic Narrative and China</strong><br />
As the events unfold, Indian strategic narrative is revealing. It portrays the border skirmishes with China as a consequence of its brazen regional and global policy, which includes Hong Kong and Taiwan. India attempts to link the cause of the clashes with China with the raison d’être for the Indo-Pacific strategy and Quad alliance, which includes US, Japan, and Australia. While this may benefit the full stake membership of India to the Quad, it will make Indian economic outlook less diversified – while firmly pegging its dependence.<br />
For China it is hard to understand why India would continue to undermine its interests while they have considerable convergences. India and China have significant economic stakes with bilateral trade expected to cross $100 billion in 2020. More importantly, they both are members of the club of emerging nations known as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). India, like Pakistan, is also now a full member of the China and Russia dominated SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization).<br />
Despite the convergences, India rattled China by toying with the idea of supporting Taiwan for an observer status in the World Health Organization (WHO) in May. New Delhi has also been contemplating linking Chinese support for Kashmir in the Security Council &#8211; to lending more support for Taiwan and challenging the ‘One-China’ policy. Moreover, India has backed calls for WHO to investigate Chinese role in the spread of Coronavirus.<br />
And thus, just like in the US Coronavirus related vilifying of China has impacted the Wall Street and started a larger debate about reorienting the supply chains – India may be heading in the same direction &#8211; leading to internal polarization regarding its future outlook.<br />
In changing the status of Ladakh, India miscalculated and seriously provoked Beijing. While India has played macho on border disputes with smaller neighbors like Pakistan and Nepal, China is a different ball game altogether. The Israeli style annexations only work when there is no big party with direct involvement in the conflict. Through its unilateral action on August 2019, India has linked LOC with LAC like never before, and for this it has no one else to blame.<br />
In the aftermath of the present border skirmishes, India may question the efficacy of the Quad alliance and the significance of Russia is likely to be escalated, which Putin will surely leverage against the US. According to the media reports, President Trump is likely to invite Russia, including India, Australia, and South Korea, to the expanded G7 meeting in September. Trump has proposed extending the grouping to G10 or G11 &#8211; for dealing with China. President Trump revealed his intentions to invite Russia after Angela Merkel had declined to attend the G7 meeting mentioning Coronavirus concerns. Canada and UK have also resisted the inclusion of Russia. It’s also questionable if Russia would want to play any role to counter China &#8211; when it’s one of its closest strategic ally.<br />
Also read:<br />
<a href="https://www.politact.com/examining-saudi-iran-tensions-and-its-impact-on-south-asia-china/">Examining Saudi-Iran Tensions And Its Impact On South Asia, China</a><br />
Watch video: PoliTact&#8217;s Collaboraion with the Middle East Instutute &#8211; Pakistan&#8217;s Deepening Involvement in the Gulf</p>
<p><iframe loading="lazy" width="696" height="392" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Wq7cWEsaqcs?feature=oembed" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen></iframe></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/china-india-border-skirmishes-brics-versus-quad/">China-India Border Skirmishes; BRICS Versus Quad</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>Pakistan To Invite Russian President For A Visit</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/pakistan-to-invite-russian-president-for-a-visit/</link>
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		<pubDate>Thu, 26 Jan 2012 10:54:21 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Context Pakistan is moving toward a paradigm shift in its decade old foreign policy by extending formal invitation to the Russian President to visit Pakistan. This is occurring at a time when its relationship with US has become uncertain. Khar will visit Russia to formally invite Russian President for a visit. The move is part [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/pakistan-to-invite-russian-president-for-a-visit/">Pakistan To Invite Russian President For A Visit</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>Pakistan is moving toward a paradigm shift in its decade old foreign policy by extending formal invitation to the Russian President to visit Pakistan. This is occurring at a time when its relationship with US has become uncertain. Khar will visit Russia to formally invite Russian President for a visit. The move is part of Pakistan’s effort to make fresh alliances with countries like Russia. If Dmitry Medvedev accepts the invitation, he will be the first Russian head of state to visit Islamabad.</p>
<p>After the NATO Mohmand attack, Pakistan initiated a review of its policy towards US. The parliamentary panel has put forth recommendations for resetting terms of engagement with US. Additionally, it also proposed to upgrade relationship with Moscow. China is also pressing Pakistan and Moscow for reconciliation.<br />
In an unprecedented statement following the NATO attacks on Pakistani check posts, Russia publicly denounced the incident and said that the nation’s sovereignty should always be honored even when hunting terrorists.</p>
<p>A number of high level exchanges have taken place between the two countries. Last year, President Zardari made a trip to Russia. Colonel General Alexander Postnikov, Commander -in-Chief Russian Ground Forces visited Pakistan recently and was given a guard of honor upon arrival.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/pakistan-to-invite-russian-president-for-a-visit/">Pakistan To Invite Russian President For A Visit</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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