By Arif Ansar

Context

The direct military confrontation between the United States and Iran has expanded far beyond a localized standoff, turning the Persian Gulf and its maritime peripheries into the cockpit of an accelerating global restructuring. Conventional Western security assessments frequently depict the crisis as a binary confrontation: Washington and its historic allies seeking to deter an aggressive, isolated Tehran. Yet beneath missile exchanges and severed supply chains lies a more sophisticated contest of strategic endurance.

At its core sits a geopolitical paradox: Iran’s calibrated pressure against its Arab neighbors is engineered not to conquer them, but to systematically break their operational dependency on the United States. In turn, the Gulf monarchies find themselves trapped between an overstretched superpower and their immediate geographic reality.

This friction is accelerating non-Western security diversification, driving Great Power maneuvers by Beijing and Moscow, splitting Washington’s Indo-Pacific partnerships, and threatening a systemic paralysis of global maritime trade routes.

The Architecture of Pain

Iran’s overarching doctrine does not presuppose an outright conventional military defeat of the United States. Instead, it relies on asymmetric attrition: driving up the political, economic, and logistical costs of the American presence until forward-deployed garrisons become unsustainable liabilities. In this dynamic, the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) serve as the indispensable fulcrum. Whenever Iranian drones or cruise missiles strike military-adjacent infrastructure, logistical staging posts, or energy terminals across the Gulf, Tehran conveys an unmistakable signal: hosting American military bases does not guarantee security.

However, Tehran’s coercive strategy walks a knife-edge, it risks triggering the very scenario it seeks to avoid: forging a combined, offensive Arab-Western coalition. Consequently, Tehran carefully modulates its pressure. The strikes are calibrated to turn Gulf capitals into urgent lobbyists in Washington—demanding American de-escalation and withholding operational clearance for offensive sorties—while Iranian diplomats maintain that regional stability can only be negotiated indigenously.

Sovereignty on Lease

The starkest legal and political contradiction plays out within foreign military installations across the Gulf. Hosting high-value installations—such as Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the U.S. Naval Support Activity in Bahrain, and forward operating facilities in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates—the Persian Gulf remains the most concentrated forward staging hub for American power. In an active war with Iran, these installations have transformed from shields into liabilities.

When American forces utilize these installations to stage strikes, launch aerial surveillance, or fly combat refueling missions, local Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) collide with territorial sovereignty. If offensive sorties depart from an Arab facility against the host government’s stated political wishes, that nation’s sovereignty is exposed as conditional. For Iranian military planners, legal nuances of base agreements are irrelevant: any host territory that facilitates kinetic operations against Iranian soil is treated as an active combatant and a legitimate target.

This vulnerability prompted unprecedented diplomatic measures: several Gulf states formally notified Washington that their airspace and territories cannot be used to stage offensive strikes against Iran. In establishing these restrictions, Gulf monarchies are attempting to insulate themselves from retaliation. Yet the reality remains inescapable: the foreign bases intended to ensure their security have become the primary magnets drawing war to their doorsteps.

Facing strategic distractions in Eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific, Washington has urged its Gulf partners to “own” the confrontation by funding integrated air defense shields and deploying their own forces to the frontline under the promise of American logistical support. The Gulf monarchies, however, have largely declined to step into the vanguard.

This hesitation stems from an acute ideological and strategic divergence. In Arab diplomatic corridors, an open-ended regional confrontation with Iran is viewed not as a fight for Arab stability, but as an operational trap designed to consolidate Israeli military dominance. Across Arab defense establishments, the destruction of Iranian state power is seen as paving the way for unchecked Israeli strategic primacy across West Asia—the military realization of the “Greater Israel” dynamic. Arab leaders understand that removing Iran as a strategic counterweight would leave the region socially volatile, and exposed to an unrestrained, nuclear-capable Israel. Sacrificing national security to destroy a regional neighbor, only to live under foreign strategic hegemony, is an outcome Arab leaders reject.

The Houthi Wildcard

Nowhere is the fragility of this environment more volatile than along the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab strait. The Houthi movement (Ansar Allah) has established an asymmetric chokehold over international maritime commerce, providing Tehran with critical leverage against Western logistics and Saudi Arabia’s southern perimeter.

The simultaneous threat to the Strait of Hormuz (transited by roughly 20% of global petroleum liquids) and the Bab al-Mandab (handling over 10% of seaborne trade) has introduced a historic systemic risk. A coordinated interdiction across both bottlenecks by Iran and the Houthis would trigger an immediate supply shock, pushing crude prices into the $100 to $200 per barrel range.

This dynamic threatens the Suez Canal. The canal does not require a physical blockage to shut down: if commercial vessels cannot navigate the Bab al-Mandab due to missile barrages and prohibitive insurance rates, the Red Sea corridor becomes a dead-end. Traffic is forced to reroute around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope, adding weeks to voyages, inflating freight rates, and driving inflation worldwide. For Egypt, the loss of billions in Suez transit revenues is economically devastating, explaining why Cairo is aggressively courting Chinese diplomatic mediation to stabilize regional waterways.

Yet this dynamic exposes the delicate question of command and autonomy. While Western intelligence frameworks frequently classify the Houthis as simple Iranian subordinates, Ansar Allah operates with its own fierce domestic agenda, theological drivers, and operational momentum. They function as a partner within an asymmetric network rather than an obedient garrison awaiting clerical launch orders.

Attacks targeting critical refining complexes and infrastructure, such as the East-west pipeline, cross red lines. If an autonomous Houthi barrage causes catastrophic damage to Saudi energy infrastructure, Riyadh could face irresistible pressure to retaliate, potentially activating mutual defense clauses of the Mecca Accord. Uncoordinated actions from Sana’a risk derailing years of delicate Iranian-Saudi normalization. An autonomous proxy whose actions ignite a regional conflagration defeats Tehran’s broader diplomatic strategy.

The Great Power Game and BRICS

As Washington finds its regional architecture strained, Beijing and Moscow are capitalizing on the crisis to accelerate a multipolar shift. China has stepped forward with an alternative diplomatic paradigm. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s high-profile state visit to Egypt underscored Beijing’s drive for an indigenously negotiated regional security architecture. During talks in Cairo, Xi articulated that the nations of the region must be the “masters of their own affairs,” proposing security mechanisms free from external meddling.

Beijing’s deepening footprint—evidenced by joint “Eagles of Civilization” military exercises with Egypt, currency swaps, and massive investments in critical infrastructure—offers regional states an alternative security partner. For China, securing West Asian energy flows without assuming the costly military liabilities of the United States represents an ideal strategic balance.

Russia, meanwhile, views the confrontation through the lens of its own showdown with the West. While Washington has initiated quiet diplomatic feelers alongside Ukraine talks to explore avenues for stabilizing global energy flows, Russian hydrocarbons remain encumbered by comprehensive Western sanctions. Moscow has little incentive to relieve global energy distress without major concessions on its own front. By deepening military-technical cooperation with Tehran and redirecting crude flows to non-Western buyers, Russia benefits as American attention and munitions are drained away from the European theater.

The broader diplomatic fallout was on display at the BRICS Summit in New Delhi, where the expanded bloc negotiated a comprehensive joint declaration addressing the West Asian war.  Despite sharp frictions between Iran and the UAE, member states coalesced around a consensus that condemned unilateral warfare, criticized secondary sanctions, and demanded respect for territorial sovereignty.

Most consequential was the signature of India. Despite its close strategic alignment with Washington via the Quad and deep intelligence ties with Tel Aviv, New Delhi chose to sign the declaration alongside Iran.  India’s calculation is dictated by strategic autonomy and non-aligned legacy – that prevents it to be seen by the Global South as an auxiliary to Western interventionism. India’s economic survival premised on energy security necessitates connectivity through Iran’s Chabahar port to access Central Asia and Afghanistan.

For Washington, India’s willingness to endorse a document shielding Iran from unilateral coercion is viewed with frustration. While the U.S. is unlikely to break ties with New Delhi given India’s indispensable role in counterbalancing China, the administration will likely apply asymmetric pressure: slowing critical tech-transfer initiatives, utilizing conditional trade barriers and tariff reviews, and issuing pointed warnings regarding Indian transactions with Iranian and Russian entities.

The Fracture of the Regional Order

The expanding conflict between the United States and Iran has accelerated the transition to a fractured, multipolar regional order. Iran’s strategy is built on existential coercion: applying enough pressure to make forward American bases an untenable liability without pushing regional neighbors into a unified offensive alliance. However, the recent unhinged aggressive actions of Houthis against Saudi Arabia could backfire. On the other hand, while President Trump favors burden-sharing on the part of U.S. allies, America will not take the concept of a retreat from West Asia lightly—particularly in the aftermath of the 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan. The consequences for great-power rivalry are dire and such a move could reflect a trickling effect across other theaters.

Concurrently, the Arab states of the Gulf are pursuing strategic decoupling. By establishing red lines on base access, building security hedges through Pakistan, Turkey, and China, and resisting attempts to pull them into an offensive war on behalf of extra-regional interests, Gulf leaders are fighting for their own survival.

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The post US-Iran War And The Gulf States: How Tehran Is Reshaping Regional Security appeared first on Politact.

Chinese investments, trade relations, diplomatic overtures, and geopolitical penetration of the Gulf and South Asia are broadly altering the economic and political landscapes of local countries. Notable developments like the Chinese-brokered Saudi Arabia-Iran agreement signed in March 2023, the roughly $300 billion economic and security pact China reached with Iran in 2021, and ongoing work on the $65 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) have all reshaped strategic thinking across the region.

PoliTact and MEI cordially invites you to virtual event that will examine the growing multifaceted impact of Beijing’s outreach to the wider Middle East  — namely the countries of the Gulf and South Asia. In what ways did Pakistan’s close relations and economic dependency on China influence its reaction to the growing Chinese involvement with Saudi Arabia and Iran? What has a more regionally engaged China meant for Afghanistan’s Taliban government? And how has India, with its expanding economic links to Arab countries and Iran as well as long-running defense ties with Russia, reacted to increased Chinese involvement in all those key partners? Please join us as our assembled scholars discuss these questions, think through the possible consequences of China’s policies for the unfolding Great Power competition across the region, and consider whether and how the United States should reprioritize its global strategic and security interests in response.

Speakers

Yun Sun
Senior Fellow and Co-Director, China, East Asia, Stimson Center

Daniel Markey
Senior Advisor, South Asia Programs, USIP

Khaled Almaeena
Fmr. Editor-in-Chief, Arab News; Saudi Gazette

Syed Mohammad Ali
Non-Resident Scholar, Middle East Institute

Gerald M. Feierstein, moderator
Distinguished Senior Fellow on U.S. Diplomacy; Director, Arabian Peninsula Program, Middle East Institute

When:
May 22, 2023
10:00 am-11:30 am

Related Events:

Biden’s Middle East Policy, China-Iran Ties, and CPEC, December 28, 2020

Examining Saudi-Iran Tensions And Its Impact On South Asia, China
January 4, 2019

The post China’s Expanding Involvement in South Asia and the Saudi-Iran Détente appeared first on Politact.

How is Ukraine Conflict Impacting South Asia?

Context

One of the key theaters of the shifting balance of power is Europe, where Russia and China had been gradually encroaching. Europe has primarily been under the American Sphere of Influence since the World War II. Corona pandemic and ‘Decoupling from China’ was already impacting the global supply chains, but the Ukraine conflict has thrown in an added wrench.

The question is – how is Ukraine war and its tentacles impacting the balance of power in South Asia? The region already has a fair share of fault lines, to include Pakistan-India tensions, dealing with extremism – especially after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, and growing China-India border tensions. Moreover, the geopolitics of the neighboring Middle East is likely to have a profound impact on what transpires in South Asia, especially as China establishes its role as the global peace maker.

While India is a key pivot of the Indo-Pacific strategy, it’s not a member of NATO. However, it is a part of BRICS and recently joined Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as well.

Analysis

Majority of nations from South Asia abstained from the UNGA vote which took place in February 2023, and was critical of Russian invasion of Ukraine and demanded that its forces withdrew. Generally, three main characters factored in the equation.

Big Versus Small Nations

The smaller nations have usually voted in favor of Ukraine – because of the threats posed by larger powers. For example, fearing China and India, Bhutan and Nepal, have sided with the US.

Multipolarity

On the other hand, other nations of South Asia gave more weight to multipolarity and abstained from condemning Russia. They want to avoid being dependent on any one power when the global balance of power is in flux.

This can be stated for Pakistan, which is also a strategic partner of China and hosting one of the key arteries of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The country has one more challenge to contemplate, it has been an ally of the West since its creation in 1947. It played a decisive role in bringing down Soviet Union by supporting the jihadist in Afghanistan in the 80s – concluding the Cold War.

However, Pakistan is doing itself a big disservice by not criticizing Russia, especially if India were to make aggressive maneuvers towards Pakistan Administered Kashmir – as some Indian politicians have often proclaimed in relation to Gilgit-Baltistan.

On the contrary, India has refrained from condemning Russia while at the same time being a strategic partner of the US. As opposed to Pakistan, India has had long cordial ties with Russia while it remained part of the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War. In the last five years, Russia has supplied India more than $13 billion worth of arms – and depends on it for 60 percent of its military equipment. As opposed to the emerging untested ties with the West, veto yielding Russia has traditionally proven to be a dependable ally of India. The country simply cannot burn these relations because of Ukraine.

In essence, India is pulling a balancing act by assisting West to prevent the rise of China, but at the same time having Russia on its side as a taming influence over China. All three players are part of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa).

Prominent Indian foreign affairs experts think that this is a risky posture for the country. Shashi Tharoor recently stated in an interview on Wire channel, by not opposing Russian invasion of Ukraine, the nation is setting itself up if China-India border tensions were to escalate. He went on to add that usually India stands for non-intervention and state sovereignty, which it is not doing in the case of Russian invasion of Ukraine.

In short, as international actors switch alliances or attempt to balance them – there is also the assessment of who is likely to prevail – and how that’s related to maintaining the existing ties and alliances.

Meanwhile, as the global attention has shifted to Ukraine, it has provided Afghan Taliban space. The opportunistic postures of Afghan Taliban are meant to exploit the fears of stakeholders like US, China, Russia, Pakistan, India, and Iran – and by maintaining a leverage of extremism over all of them. For example, it has kept the TTP gambit over Pakistan, while at the same time offering India to keep a check on LeT and Al Qaeda in the Indian Sub Continent (AQIS), and then delicately adjusting its policy towards global extremists (AQ and ISIS-K) and other Western concerns – including women rights and inclusion of minorities in governance.

And thus, the question becomes where do Afghan Taliban, including the regional and global extremists that operate from Afghanistan, fit in the great power rivalry equation. Since the US withdrawal, both China and Russia are attempting to build trade ties with Afghanistan.

BRICS and SCO

One of the biggest casualties of the Ukraine conflict are the organizations representing the emerging powers, the SCO and BRICS, in which India has emerged as a major detractor.

US and Indian interests are convergent when it comes to Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, India has consistently taken a position against foreign intervention, in places like Libya and Syria, just as China, Russia, and Pakistan. India is also aligned with the Indo-Pacific strategy and that is what complicates its role in both the SCO and BRICS. It simply cannot be a member of both the emerging power club, and established powers, at the same time. This was evident at the recently held G-20 foreign ministers meetings in India, which were marred by differences over Ukraine – and attempted Indian balancing act while maintaining strategic autonomy.

Like in Europe, Ukraine has also become a test case for the tussles of the balance of power in South Asia. European dependency on Russian energy needs coupled with China’s economic penetration was considered a liability. As the Ukraine war unfolded, Europe is having to manage by using other energy resources – and Decoupling from China is also underway.

In the South Asia theater, before the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan – the nation had become the epicenter of the balance of power struggle. It was believed that if Afghan Taliban were to prevail, the influence of its backer Pakistan, and its strategic ally China, would multiply. However, things have not necessarily played out that way. In fact, the great power competition has left the country turned completely inward while facing an economic meltdown.

Moreover, in recent years the China-India border tensions have increased but both nations have remained engaged in trade. Just as European powers of Germany and France do not want to completely burn bridges with Russia, similarly, India does not desire to turn entirely against China, especially when it shares memberships in two major platforms, SCO and BRICS. Moreover, India conducted more than $135 billion of trade with China in 2022 while buying military equipment and cheap energy resources from Russia, and thus the prospects for decoupling from China or Russia are not looking good.

On the other hand, US-India trade amounts to more than $700 billion. India remains a US ally while doing business with Iran and Russia. It has received waivers from different US sanctions for building the Iranian Chabahar Port, buying Cheap Russian oil, and acquiring Russian S-400 air defense system. The hope is that ultimately India will recognize that being allied with the West is more beneficial.

China the Peace Maker

The recent development of Chinese acting as peacemaker between Iran and Saudi Arabia could be a game changer in the dynamics of regional balance of power. China has also presented a 12 point paper to resolve Ukraine conflict. As the power tussles in the Middle East playout, China is likely to assert more and act as a mediator in other longstanding conflicts, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the larger Middle East Peace Process, as noted by PoliTact previously.

In fact, in Chinese assessment road to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict likely runs through the Iran-Saudi rapprochement. Just like Iran and Saudi Arabia, China also enjoys cordial ties with Israel. This approach stands in contrast to the Outside-In approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Chinese peacemaker role could undercut US influence in the Middle East, which can restrict space for India as well. As China and Russia reach out to manifest their influence, they seem to be having more success in countries that do not have democratic forms of government. Meanwhile, democracy and democratic norms are faltering in Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh.

Related Articles:

• What Does The China, Iran Economic and Security Deal Mean?
• In November 16, 2018, PoliTact collaborated with the Middle East Institute’s Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies Center to examine the political, security, and economic interconnections between South Asia and the Gulf States, and one of the subsets, Pakistan and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

The post Great Power Rivalry In South Asia And Ukraine appeared first on Politact.

The Return of ‘Spheres of Influence’ Politics

Context

While there are different angles to interpret the fast-moving flux in the global political, economic and security situation, the great power rivalry perspective is clearly ascendant.

There is usually a period of calm when one power dominates or when there is stability in the balance of power equation. The rapid economic rise of China and infringement into the traditional American spheres of Influence, like Europe, has clearly been a cause of alarm. Moreover, Trump administration took certain actions that were seen as weakening the Western alliance – deemed essential to deal with emerging global rivals, to include Russia. Europe is critical to American power projection, and it was becoming progressively tied to Russia and China via trade. The present European energy dependence is a case point. Trumps admiration for Putin, and other authoritarian rulers, was seen as a vulnerability. Accompanied by his threats to NATO members to increase defense spending confused the Europeans on American reliability.

Under Biden, US is actively countering the expanding influence of China and Russia – and to reverse the Sino-Russian penetration in different regions. And one of the casualty of this reversal will be the phenomena known as globalization. Security concerns arising from aggressive Chinese posturing in the Indo-Pacific, events unfolding in Ukraine, and COVID-19 related supply chain disruptions have further weakened the case for globalization.

Additionally, these factors have helped eliminate American ambiguity on who is benefiting most from free trade presently. Going against laissez-faire principle is not an easy undertaking when the capitalist system is anchored around the very premise and has tremendously benefited the multinational corporations.

This context begs the question of what future security and trade system is the world shifting towards – and what phase of this transfer the present circumstances represent. It was WWI and II that moved the world to the nation-state system and the creation of United Nations. The answers are not readily available.

Analysis

New Cold War and Spheres of Influence

As these global rivalries escalate, they are being classified as related to the new Cold War. The previous one being between US dominated Western Sphere of Influence – with USSR mostly influencing Eastern Europe. China at that time was not as close of an ally of Russia as it is now.

The Sino-Soviet ties have had their ups and down historically. For example, during the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 Chinese Beiyang government had supported the Whites, like the West, and sent in forces to fight the Reds. Conversely, in 1923 Soviets provided support to groups opposing the Beiyang government. In 1949, with Soviet backed communists won the Chinese civil war leading to the creation of People’s Republic of China. Soviets and Chinese were even involved in a brief border conflict in 1969.

Irrespective, as the new Cold War gets underway, and no near-term Ukraine solution on the horizon, what will this emerging Cold War look like?

The first thing is obvious, the Spheres of Influence was the key character of the old Cold War – dividing the world into communist USSR and capitalist America. The Soviet system was associated with autocratic closed security states, with strict regulations controlling the lives of the citizens. On the contrary, the hallmark of Western democratic states was freedom of expression and trade that led to creativity, innovation, and greater economic prosperity. And these attributes ultimately became the reasons for the success of West against the closed Soviet system.

The new Cold War would likely create similar spheres of influence between US and China-Russia aligned states. While some would argue that this new Cold War is only between US and China. To understand these alignments – how the spheres of influence evolved after the Soviet Union collapsed need to be understood.

NATO’s Evolution

As Soviet Union dissolved during the period of 1988-1991, 15 Soviet republics opted for independence with the Baltic states leading. The former Eastern European states applied and became members of Western security alliance, NATO. A trajectory that has continued to this day – and one of the reasons for Ukraine conflict to erupt, which is also causing Finland and Sweden to move towards NATO.

Another element of this post-Soviet period was that Russia and China both adopted policies that has made Western system stronger, for example allowing foreign investments and free trade. But they did not embrace the democratic political system. So, while China and Russia benefited from free trade, their respective restricting political governance models remained in place. This has been a cause of continuous friction when it comes to for example, state controlling the currency values, protecting minorities and human rights etc.

Conclusion

Moving forward, the roles seem to be reversing. The US and West are shifting away from globalization and altering the supply chains that were created for maximum profitability. On the other hand, China is championing globalization. In May, Chinese Xi Jinping had urged the organization of emerging nations BRICS to, “reject Cold War mentality and bloc confrontation, and work together to build a global community of security for all”.

Two properties of the new supply chains are: they have to be from friendly nations and pose no economic and security implications for the dominant power of the alliance. In other words, the concept that evolved after WWII that economic interdependence can resolve security issues – is being put to rest.

While China has been attracting states through Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and associated large infrastructure projects, the US, EU, and Japan have begun to counter with their own infrastructure projects. At the recently held G7 conference in Germany, President Biden announced US will help finance $200 billion from public and private sectors to counter Chinese projects.

The question then is how will the emerging respective spheres of influence be monitored and policed. The energy supply lines provide one example where sanctions are playing a critical role. In this, US using its influence in moving Europeans away from Russian energy dependence and building trade relations with China. Meanwhile, it is allowing India flexibility to acquire cheap energy from Russia, however, coercing weaker nations to stay away.

US is also resetting its ties with Saudi Arabia to use the enhance its energy leverage and to keep energy dependent states in-line. President Biden is scheduled to visit Saudi Arabia in July and ask for increase in oil production to compensate for Russian oil shortfall. He will also be attending the meeting of Gulf Cooperation Council. Meanwhile King Abdullah of Jordan has supported the idea of Middle East version of NATO. It’s not clear though what threat perception would the NATO of Middle East counter, Iran, Russia or China? Clearly, it cannot be Israel.

In other words, the balance of power tussles now involve use of economic influence to attract and discipline states. During the previous Cold War, USSR did not have the type of economic prowess that the US and West enjoyed, but in the emerging Cold War the case of China is different.

Thus, there will likely be a China-Russia dominated supply lines and economic zone and the US-Europe controlled one. Ultimately, China and Russia will likely use tactics similar to the West i.e., if the new Cold War persists and matures. The Domino Theory and the associated dynamics that were the underpinning of the old Cold War, will become relevant once more. This will fundamentally alter the way present global trade is conducted, and this will significantly impact the working of the UN Security Council.

The post Emerging Great-Power Rivalry; How Will The New Cold War Unfold As Ukraine Simmers? appeared first on Politact.

Context

Why did Putin Invade Ukraine?

Many interpretations have come to the fore on why Putin invaded Ukraine on February 22. One of the recurring one is the ever-expanding NATO presence in Eastern Europe, which was now about to include Ukraine itself, right on the Russian border. Russia has often cited the unwritten understanding that came about at the time when Soviet Union was getting dissolved from 1989-1991 – suggesting NATO will not expand further. The cessation of Soviet Union eliminated the reason for NATO to expand in what Russia considers it to be its traditional sphere of influence, also known as its ‘Near Abroad’. US has denied that any such understanding existed.

On the other hand, Western scholars have long maintained that Putin aspires to revive the union of former Soviet republics – and the invasion of Ukraine may be another step along that path. Previously, he occupied Georgian states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russo-Georgian War of 2008. Had it not been due to the intervention of France to negotiate the truce, and subsequent US financial support in which then Senator Joe Biden played a key role, Georgia may very well had lost its sovereignty. Many believe that what happened in 2008, and the lame Western response, emboldened Putin.

Then came Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. It occurred soon after President Victor Yanukovych fled to Russia and the new acting Ukrainian president pledged to move closer to Europe by signing the association agreement of European Union. At the time Putin claimed Russia wants to ensure proper conditions for the people of Crimea, 60 percent of which were of Russian ethnicity, to freely express their views.

Whatever the reason for the present offensive on Ukraine i.e., NATO’s expansion in Russian Near Abroad or Putin’s desire to revive the Soviet Union, the timing of his move is deliberate.

His decision to move into Ukraine is likely based on a sense of Western weakness. The manner in which US withdrew from Afghanistan, economic situation resulting from Corona pandemic, and the status of European cohesion, are all likely playing a part in his decision. Perhaps the most critical aspect of his calculation is the future of American domestic politics and the Trump phenomenon. US has accused Russia of meddling in American elections through social media and by launching cyber-attacks.

Why the West has to React?

From an American perspective, while there may have been reasons to not counter Russia aggressively previously, in the case of Ukraine that is not the case. Short of sending troops to Ukraine, all other options are being evaluated.

While Russia and China alone do not pose a serious threat to the US and the Western political system, put together they are formidable adversaries. Since 9/11 US has been engaged in one conflict after the other, and this has provided an opportunity for Russia and China to grow their military and economic wherewithal. US simply cannot allow them to build a stronger military alliance.

Moreover, US depends on Europe for its global power projection. A growing concern recently has been the dependability on NATO and other allies to counter threats emanating from global adversaries – such as China and Russia. European nations and other allies have increasingly been seen dealing with both – building trade and military relations with China and Russia at the expense of US. For example:

• Under US pressure, UK banned Huawei from developing the 5G networks in 2020 due to security concerns, resulting in strong criticism from Chinese officials. Huawei had been operation in UK for at least 20 years and was an integral part of its 4G network.
• In 2015, France backed away from selling two high tech Mistral warships to Russia, a deal worth $1.6 billion, reportedly due to Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. The deal was highly criticized by US since France is a NATO member and supplying of the ship would have augmented Russian military capabilities.
• Then there is the controversial Nord Stream 2 Gas Pipeline that goes from Russia to Germany. Merkel government averted sanctions and reached a deal with the Biden Administration in July last year. The agreement involved investing more than 200 million euros in energy security of Ukraine and sustainable energy across Europe. US-Germany ties were strained considerably when Trump administration decided to pull out 9,500 US troops based in Germany.
• NATO member, Turkey, bought S-400 missile defense system from Russia in 2017. This resulted in Countering American Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAASTA) kicking in, claiming the deal would threaten NATO alliance and F-35 fighter jets in Turkish fleet. Enacted in 2017, CAASTA urged American allies and partners to not engage in transactions with Russia, Iran, and North Korea or risk sanctions. This has also prevented Pakistan from moving forward with Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project.
• Another American ally, India, has also acquired the S-400 air defense system at the cost of $5 billion but so far US has not been highly critical.
• In December 2019, US gave a waiver to India to jointly develop the Chabahar Port with Iran, which is seen as a counter to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port – being erected with Chinese investment. While the US strategic partnership with India has been evolving, the nation has remained reluctant in talking stronger role against China. Not only that, India is also ironically a full member of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). And thus, serious questions continue to be raised about the efficacy of QUAD alliance in which India is a member as well.
• As part of BRI, China has been extending its trade relations with Israel and US objected strongly to some of them citing security concerns – such as the Chinese company Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) running a container terminal at the Port of Haifa. The terminal is located near an Israeli naval base that is frequently visited by the US Sixth Fleet.

China, Russia Alliance – Sanctions and Soft Power

Due to events related to the War against Extremism, American perception and Soft Power has suffered in different parts of the world, which has also been exploited by China and Russia. China has projected its Belt and Road initiative as a win-win as it takes on large infrastructure projects in many nations.

For example, in addition to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China and Iran have signed a $400 billion 25 year economic and security deal that would lead to enhanced military and trade relations. The agreement ensures Chinese investment in Iranian telecommunication, transportation, and military fields. The military cooperation includes exercises, intelligence sharing, and joint research and development of weapons. China will also procure its energy needs from Iran on discounted price for over next 25 years.

The questioned has remained how will China implement the deal while sanctions on Iran remain – which have also delayed the much-needed Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project (IPI). In addition to CAASTA, the new sanctions on Russia will further complicate the China-Russia strategic cooperation.

As negotiations continue on the revived Iran nuclear deal, China could emerge as the big beneficiary if the Iran nuclear deal is reached, which US had left in 2015 during the Trump administration. But then, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed that he has received ‘written guarantees’ from US that Ukraine sanctions will not restrict Russian participation in nuclear projects and trade under the revised nuclear agreement with Iran. It was only after this assurance that Russia dropped its last-minute objections to the deal.

Russian invasion of Ukraine has provided an opportunity to the US to recover the Soft Power reserves, reinvigorate the NATO alliance, and by using sanctions undercut the growing strategic China-Russia alliance.

Emerging Scenarios

As the Ukrainian situation evolves a couple of possibilities are emerging. One of them is for negotiations between Ukrainian and Russian officials to succeed, with Ukraine declaring neutrality and forgoing its aspirations to join NATO. Afterall there are several other nations that have been in the neutral status – just to avoid the type of situation Ukraine now finds itself in. These nations include Austria, Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, and Ireland.

The second scenario is more dreadful and involves Russia getting bog down in Ukraine. As NATO nations supply sophisticated weaponry to Ukraine – leading to increasing loses for Russia. In this scenario, as Russia faces the brunt of sanctions, it reaches out to its strategic partner China for economic and military assistance. According to media reports Russia may have already done this. Talking to a news conference on March 23, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg stated, “China has provided Russia with political support, including by spreading blatant lies and misinformation.” He added there is concern that this could shift to material support. Earlier, US officials threatened China that there will consequences for any Chinese military and economic support to Russia.

One of the benefits of Ukraine crisis for China has been the shift of US focus away from the Pacific. However, if Russian is weakened in the crisis, it represents a strategic loss for China in the long run. In the grand scheme of affairs, Russia could keep Europe busy, if the things take a turn for the worse in the Pacific. But then, why should China face sanctions for what Russia has done. After all, China believes in non-intervention and respect for state sovereignty.

The post NATO, Sino-Russian Strategic Alliance, And Future Of Ukraine appeared first on Politact.

Context

PoliTact has consistently maintained that the longer the Afghan imbroglio continues it is bound to intersect with the other regional and global flashpoints – and the larger balance of power tussles. Not that it had not been in the past, but to a lesser degree.
Since 9/11, and the subsequent war against extremism, the global politics has been primarily shaped by cooperation in dealing with extremism. So much so that even legitimate struggles against oppression conveniently got linked with terrorism, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Kashmir.

As mentioned above, it would be wrong to assume that global power games, and the linked regional dimensions, had gone dormant as the campaign against extremism was being waged. It just had taken a different form. Consider the example of Arab Spring. As the uprising spread through the Arab world, it soon became apparent that the regime change that accompanied the popular revolts were risking the interests of Russia and China more.
And thus, the Spring came to a stop in the case of Syria, where Russia intervened militarily to save Bashar al-Assad, and by default its naval facility in Tartus. Syrian example also illustrated that different groups of extremists were being backed by array of state players, and thus it become a full fledge proxy war.

In the case of Egypt, the then General Fatah el-Sisi ousted democratically elected Islamist Mohammed Morsi in 2013. Morsi had arrived at the helm after the removal of Hosni Mubarak, as a result of the Egyptian revolution in 2011.

Libya provided another case where a different configuration of regional and global players emerged in the aftermath of the removal of Muammar Qaddafi, attempting to restore a semblance of order. Russia got involved militarily in Libya through its version of Black Water type mercenaries.

In most cases, China has remained on the sidelines. Instead, it has focused on economic route and developing strategic deals with both the Shia and Sunni states. It spoke in favor of state sovereignty and against foreign interventions.

In the emerging environment, the extremists with global aspirations, such as Al Qaeda (AQ) and Deash (ISIS), remained in the pariah status. However, the same could not be claimed for groups that came to be known as the associates of AQ and Daesh. These factions often had regional ambitions, grievances, and causes, which were either beneficial or detrimental to the interests of the regional and global stakeholders. In essence, the new reality was reflective of the political and security dynamics that existed before 9/11. And as the Cold War like situation returns, these local grievances and ambitions are likely to play a pivotal role.

The New Global Power Calculus

The metamorphosis of the war against extremism also applies to the South Asia region. While US and NATO have been doing the heavy lifting when it comes to the situation of Afghanistan, China and Russia have played a reconciliatory role. In the post 9/11 environment, and even before, China and Russia were threatened by their own brand of Islamic extremists, in Xinjiang, and Dagestan and Chechnya region, respectively. And they have remained worried about their extremists getting hooked up with the global extremists or their associates. In essence, helping in the war against extremism also diminished the domestic threats for these powers.

However, as we enter an era where the global power tussles will define politics once more, the reconciliatory role in Afghanistan is likely to evaporate. This does not bode well for the peace process. At the same time, it does not reflect well for Russia and China either. The theater for the Great Game is likely to get extended where the Pacific, including the Ladakh region, are already active. In short, Afghanistan, could become a quid pro quo on a much larger canvas.

Revitalizing NATO

As history teaches us, one of the critical steps in fighting global rivalries is by solidifying alliances and weakening those of the adversaries. And linked with that is an assessment of the kinds of threats being confronted. The type of alliance needed to fight non-state extremists is markedly different than the one to counter state actors.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came into being in 1949 in the aftermath of World War II. The first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay, had famously stated the organization’s goal was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” With the end of the Cold War and the Warsaw Pact, one of the main premises upon which the NATO military alliance was formulated was gone. The alliance began to look for a new purpose and identity that would keep it united against the emerging threats. The war against terror has proven to be one such unifying factor, as has dealing with rogue dictators and nations that threaten western interests, such as Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qaddafi and recently Iran. However, these motives have proven to be short lived in the present multi-polar world. But the return of great power politics, and Cold War like dynamics, can reinvigorate the alliance.

After the neglect suffered during the Trump’s presidency, the Biden Administration is busy strengthening alliances. To assure allies, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken visited Japan, South Korea, and NATO headquarters in Brussels. On the other hand, Secretary of Defense Loyd Johnson was in India and Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, on March 12 a virtual meeting of the QUAD leaders was held between the leaders of US, India, Japan, and Australia. In the press briefing after the meeting, US affirmed the ‘centrality of the Indo-Pacific in the US national security’. And, this was accompanied by the US-China strategic talks held in Alaska, that set the tone for the ties under Biden.

The Future of BRICS, SCO

On the other hand, an organization representing the emerging powers of Brazil, Russia, China, and India (BRICS) started off in 2011 with much fanfare, promoting commercial, political, and cultural cooperation. Its primary motive was to give voice to the realities of the multipolar world. In 2013, BRICS agreed to create global institutions to rival those of Western controlled IMF and World Bank. However, the economic recession of 2008 and the fluctuating global market has impacted the BRICS disproportionately. While China and India have continued to grow, the economies of Russia and Brazil have had a tougher time. This has obviously impacted the wherewithal of the organization.

More recently, China has been successful in handling the coronavirus pandemic and has been the least impacted economically – as compared to the West. This could also be the reason why the tensions between US and China have escalated.

The Chinese dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was formed in 2001 mainly as a security forum. The member governments have common security concerns, with emphasis on tackling terrorism, religious extremism, and ethnic separatism. In 2017, the organizing reached a milestone when India and Pakistan joined the organization as full members. Other members include China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Afghanistan and Iran have an observer status while Turkey is a dialogue partner of SCO.

As the global focus shifts from the campaign against extremism and towards great power challenges, the nature of BRICS and SCO is likely to morph as well. No other issue is more consequential to the future of these organizations than the role of India. The nation is also aligned with the Indo-Pacific strategy and QUAD. It simply cannot be a member of the emerging power club while supporting the established powers at the same time. Sooner or later, India would have to choose.

A case can be made that the present border tensions between India and China are a direct result of Indian decision to revoke the special status of Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019. Under the garb of US-China rivalry it attempted to settle an internationally recognized dispute unilaterally.

The Great Game of the earlier times was about the dangers of Russian invasion on British India via Afghanistan, the emerging one appears to be about protecting American India against Chinese penetration. While US would want to weaken the Sino-Russian partnership, a successful strategy would likely work by placating one of them, not by alienating both at the same time.

The post The War Against Extremism And The Return Of New Great Game appeared first on Politact.

What Is Pushing India to Extreme Policies?
Context
In the COVID-19 environment, the Asia Pacific is increasingly an active theater. A number of inquiries are being contemplated on the role and policy of China as the world grapples on how to deal with the pandemic. Then there is the angle of how China was able to tackle the virus quickly while others are faltering? And thus perhaps indicating Beijing is the net beneficiary so far – as others are being economically weakened.
The focus had shifted to the Pacific long before the arrival of Coronavirus. With a pre COVID-19 annual growth rate of more than 6%, China has been on the trajectory to challenge the US for a while now. And that is the reason substantial intellectual capital has been committed to devise approaches to counter its rise. These discussions have revolved around coexistence to competition, and containment.
During the Obama administration the emphasis was on economic collaboration with allies through trade deals like TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) and emphasis on the military Pivot to Asia. Under the American First doctrine, Trump quickly annulled TPP and increased economic pressure on China. On the other hand, Pivot to Asia has morphed into the Indo-Pacific strategy.
And then there is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that China has launched to reconfigure the world based on its vision – and is perceived as highly threatening by the West. The scientific and technological advancement is another dimension of the risk, such as the next generation 5G technologies. US is vehement in impressing upon its allies to avoid these Chinese technologies as that would create vulnerabilities for the western economic and security alliances.
Weakened America
The increasing tension in the Asia Pacific is a reflection of the COVID-19 related defense and security reassessments that different players are conducting. The perception that China was able to deal with the Coronavirus early on – has reinforced the impression that it has emerged a little unblemished under the changing geopolitical and geostrategic context. On the other hand, the inept handling of the pandemic, followed by inter-racial riots, has created an image that US is imploding and losing its global preeminence. And thus the American allies are recalibrating on how to position and place their bets, while other powers consider what a weakened and inward-focused America would mean for the world.
China-India Border Tensions
If it is assessed that US has indeed been weakened by the Coronavirus, it represents an opportunity for other players to exert and test new scenarios. And this may be what has transpired on the China, India border as it relates to the broader disputed region of Kashmir. However, it was India that triggered the recent action-reaction cycle.
In August 2019, India had revoked the special status of Jammu and Kashmir, granted under article 370 and 35A of the constitution, and divided it into union territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh. Following the move, India sent additional troops and placed Jammu and Kashmir in a complete lockdown, cut-off telecommunications and Internet, and jailed political leaders. India removed the ‘permanent status’ clause demonstrating it wanted to change the facts on the ground to bring about the desired outcome.
Since revoking the special status of Kashmir, Indian officials repeatedly made claims regarding the Pakistan administered Kashmir, suggesting it was ready to tackle it head on. The neighbors of India wearily looked on these aggressive Indian actions, especially China. To them the message was clear; under the garb of Quad and its strategic alliance with the US, India was trying to change the status of these border disputes in violation of previous treaties and historical understandings.
Why is India Provoking its Neighbors?
The question becomes why is India acting rashly? The nation has recently suffered a series of humiliating setbacks to economically and militarily punish Pakistan for its role in Kashmir.
In February 2019, India claimed to have carried out a preemptive attack inside Pakistan while destroying the terrorist training camp located there. This was after it blamed Pakistan for the Pulwama attack. International media widely discrediting the Indian claims that any such camp was hit in Balakot. Subsequently, Modi government continued the jingoism even in the face of a dogfight with Pakistani jets that resulted in two of Indian fighter planes crashing – and a pilot being captured.
Before this escalation, in 2016 India asserted to have carried out surgical strikes, a term usually reserved for the US in its campaign against extremism, on Pakistan’s side of the Kashmir. These claims were mostly unverifiable. India attempts to link instability on its side of Kashmir with Pakistan supported terrorism, while Pakistan claims it to be a locally supported insurgency against Indian brutality – and recognized by UN as the unsettled business of the 1947 partition.
New Delhi has also been unable to globally isolate and economically marginalize Pakistan, though it made inroads to put distance between Pakistan and its traditional support emanating from the Gulf States. However, Pakistan was mostly able to counter that via China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a major tributary of the BRI. Moreover, despite considerable efforts India was unsuccessful in diminishing the centrality of Pakistan in the Afghan peace process.
All of this is pushing India towards riskier steps and behavior– example being the disastrous step of revoking the special status of Jammu and Kashmir- that possibly led to the deadly June 15^th skirmishes in Galwan Valley with China.
Indian Strategic Narrative and China
As the events unfold, Indian strategic narrative is revealing. It portrays the border skirmishes with China as a consequence of its brazen regional and global policy, which includes Hong Kong and Taiwan. India attempts to link the cause of the clashes with China with the raison d’être for the Indo-Pacific strategy and Quad alliance, which includes US, Japan, and Australia. While this may benefit the full stake membership of India to the Quad, it will make Indian economic outlook less diversified – while firmly pegging its dependence.
For China it is hard to understand why India would continue to undermine its interests while they have considerable convergences. India and China have significant economic stakes with bilateral trade expected to cross $100 billion in 2020. More importantly, they both are members of the club of emerging nations known as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). India, like Pakistan, is also now a full member of the China and Russia dominated SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization).
Despite the convergences, India rattled China by toying with the idea of supporting Taiwan for an observer status in the World Health Organization (WHO) in May. New Delhi has also been contemplating linking Chinese support for Kashmir in the Security Council – to lending more support for Taiwan and challenging the ‘One-China’ policy. Moreover, India has backed calls for WHO to investigate Chinese role in the spread of Coronavirus.
And thus, just like in the US Coronavirus related vilifying of China has impacted the Wall Street and started a larger debate about reorienting the supply chains – India may be heading in the same direction – leading to internal polarization regarding its future outlook.
In changing the status of Ladakh, India miscalculated and seriously provoked Beijing. While India has played macho on border disputes with smaller neighbors like Pakistan and Nepal, China is a different ball game altogether. The Israeli style annexations only work when there is no big party with direct involvement in the conflict. Through its unilateral action on August 2019, India has linked LOC with LAC like never before, and for this it has no one else to blame.
In the aftermath of the present border skirmishes, India may question the efficacy of the Quad alliance and the significance of Russia is likely to be escalated, which Putin will surely leverage against the US. According to the media reports, President Trump is likely to invite Russia, including India, Australia, and South Korea, to the expanded G7 meeting in September. Trump has proposed extending the grouping to G10 or G11 – for dealing with China. President Trump revealed his intentions to invite Russia after Angela Merkel had declined to attend the G7 meeting mentioning Coronavirus concerns. Canada and UK have also resisted the inclusion of Russia. It’s also questionable if Russia would want to play any role to counter China – when it’s one of its closest strategic ally.
Also read:
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Watch video: PoliTact’s Collaboraion with the Middle East Instutute – Pakistan’s Deepening Involvement in the Gulf

The post China-India Border Skirmishes; BRICS Versus Quad appeared first on Politact.

By Arif Ansar

Context

As the alliances associated with the global balance of power remain in the heightened state of flux, the organizations through which these tectonic shifts are being manifested, such as the United Nations, BRICS, NATO and SCO, are critical to observe. An inquiry that goes along with this examination is to understand the purposes of these multinational entities.

Analysis

NATO and Europe

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came into being in 1949 in the aftermath of World War II. The first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay, famously stated the organization’s goal was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” With the end of the Cold War and the Warsaw Pact, one of the main premises upon which the NATO military alliance was formulated was gone. The alliance began to look for a new purpose and identity that would keep it united against the emerging threats. The war against terror has proven to be one such unifying factor, as has dealing with rogue dictators and nations that threaten western interests, such as Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qaddafi and recently Iran.

However, these motives have proven to be short lived in the present multi-polar world and with the return of great power politics and the Cold War like dynamics. The established powers are now directly challenging the emerging power players, even at the extent of undoing the existing political, security, and economic systems that the established powers had themselves helped to set up at the end of World War II. It can be contended that the overwhelming emphasis on fighting the extremists has weakened and distracted the western alliance.

Moreover, the abuses of the very capitalist system that was a source of strength for the western nations, are proving to be its Achilles heels. The multinational corporations while generated enormous profits have also weakened the Middle Class, the backbone of any vibrant democratic society. Additionally, the technological edge the West and the US enjoyed is being eaten away by the emerging powers such as China.

None of these changes are as fundamental as the present transformation of Europe and its identity. Since the end of World War II, Europe has represented the pillar of American power projection around the globe. With Brexit and emergence of nationalist tendencies – this reliance can no longer be taken as given. Moreover, the change in what Europe reflected in the American strategic calculus has been adversely impacted by the America First doctrine. The doctrine has created skepticism in the minds of the European powers and that the US can no longer be trusted as provider of its security. This has resulted in Europe increasingly caught between its traditional ally US, and the pull of the emerging powers such as China and Russia. Meanwhile, the traditional European power tussles between France, Germany and UK also appears to be resurging.

What is the Evolving Role of SCO?

On the other hand, the Chinese have given more importance to the economic and trade leverages in its foreign policy as opposed to military means, which seems to be the preferable US choice in recent conflicts. Chinese One Belt One Road (OBOR) is an example of this. It is only under Trump that the focus has shifted to using American economic tools against adversaries, but that has resulted in the prospects of trade wars, which in return also impacts American economy.

The emerging powers are now represented by organizations such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). Additionally the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) reflects the interests of the Central Asian states, and is thought of as the security arm of BRICS.

The SCO was formed in 2001 mainly as a security forum. The member governments have common security concerns, with emphasis on tackling terrorism, religious extremism, and ethnic separatism. In 2017, the organizing reached a milestone when India and Pakistan joined the organization as full members. Other members include China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Afghanistan and Iran have an observer status while Turkey is a dialogue partner of SCO.

It is especially interesting to study the connection between BRICS and SCO, and their reaction to events in countries impacted by the Arab Spring – and their position on the developments of the AfPak region. In matters related to Libya, Syria, and Iran, the positions of BRICS and SCO nations were in stark contrast to those adopted by the western powers – and Russia and China have both used their veto powers in the UN in this regard.

This is particularly at display as it relates to the present crisis over Iran and the US decision to withdraw from JCPOA. The European powers had advised the US to stay within the agreement to influence Iran, and even after the American withdrawal, the European powers have tried to salvage the agreement.

BRICS, SCO and Evolution of its Role in Afghanistan

PoliTact has been keenly observing the evolution of these budding organizations. To explore the role of BRICS and SCO towards the AfPak region further, we examined the views expressed at a conference held at the Woodrow Wilson Center in June 2011, titled, BRICS: Shaping the New Global Architecture. We especially focused on the comments of Da Wei, who was at the time the Director of the Presidents Office, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR); Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor in Chief of Russia in Global Affairs; and Inderjit Singh, a Professor of National Strategy at the National War College, US National Defense University.

In expressing his views, Da Wei distinguished the role of BRICS countries and the SCO, and avoided making any comparison of the SCO with NATO, or to comment on the role of the SCO in Afghanistan. He clarified that the BRICS are focused on global economic and political affairs while the SCO is more concerned with security issues. He added that BRICS membership is open to other countries and is a forum for emerging powers to dialogue amongst member countries and with other institutions like the SCO. He clarified further that both BRICS and the SCO are not very “strict-tight” organizations.

On the other hand, Fyodor Lukyanov emphasized saw the role of SCO in Afghanistan and stated that, “The SCO now is primarily about Afghanistan because this [is] a matter of huge concern for all countries of Central Euro Asia [because of the question of] what will happen in Afghanistan after American and NATO exit, and nobody can answer it.” He added that NATO should be very much interested and should encourage the SCO to take over the settlement of this issue and that it’s the only organization that is very well-placed to take on this responsibility.

In contrast, while speaking to PoliTact, Dr Inderjist Singh stressed a regional solution to Afghanistan that includes the interests of India, Russia, China, and Iran. He had noted at the time that Afghan interest to join SCO did not carry much significance, as the country cannot yet ensure its own security – and that’s why the role of Pakistan is important. He commented that Pakistan should not attempt to marginalize the interests of the Northern Alliance and India through the Haqqani network because a stable solution for Afghanistan would have to involve regional powers and the route of negotiations would be better than the use of force.

Future Role of SCO

The Chinese have clearly adopted a more cautious posture on the role of SCO as opposed to the more aggressive Russian stance. The differences in their respective approach is directly connected with their threat perceptions vis-à-vis the United States and Europe. The tense US ties with both Russian and China have pushed both strategically closer.

Moreover, the Chinese have given more credence to the economic and trade leverages in its foreign policy as opposed to military means. Chinese One Belt One Road (OBOR) is an example of this.

Since its inception, SCO has held a number of military exercises. However, at this stage it is not in a position to match the interoperability prowess of NATO.

The future of the US presence in the South and Central Asia, and increasingly Middle East region, have remained the focus of SCO. In June 2011 Medvedev had commented that the future of Afghanistan was directly relational to security and stability in all SCO countries and most observer countries, and that the SCO must endeavor to increase cooperation and involvement in Afghanistan to try and ensure stability in a post-US scenario.

At a UN Security Council meeting in September 2011, Russia insisted Afghanistan must stay neutral after troops withdraw from the region. Moreover, Russian deputy ambassador to the UN at the time, Alexander Pankin had stated, “if Kabul sets a goal of restoring neutrality as early as now, this can ease the reconciliation dialogue with the opposition.” The diplomat told UN members that military means were not enough to stabilize Afghanistan. Pankin criticized NATO’s ineffectiveness in controlling the situation and warned militancy networks could spread to bordering countries. Russia and China both fear the situation in Afghanistan could destabilize the Central Asian states.

On the other hand, India has warned against any hasty withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. India has maintained the stability of the region can only be achieved once terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and Taliban are rooted out of Afghanistan.

India, Pakistan, and SCO

US and Indian interests are no doubt convergent when it comes to the AfPak region, however, India has consistently taken a position against foreign intervention, in places like Libya and Syria, just as China, Russia, and Pakistan. India is also aligned with the Indo-Pacific strategy and that is what complicates its role in both the SCO and BRICS. It simply cannot be a member of both the emerging power club, and established powers, at the same time, and sooner or later it would have to choose. This is the same predicament the European powers are finding themselves in, especially as it relates to the affairs of Iran, while the UK remains entangled in the on-going Brexit saga.

This is also true to Indian role in SCO. The SAARC organization become dysfunctional because of the Pakistan-India tensions, and the Chinese do not desire a similar fate for the SCO platform. However, without taking on a larger security role and diplomatic posture in mediating long-standing conflicts, whether it is Kashmir or Palestine, SCO cannot rise to a truly respected organization – in par with NATO.

The post The Evolving Power Shift; Multilateral Organization, Conflicts And Role of SCO appeared first on Politact.

By Arif Ansar and Dr Claude Rakisits 

Context

As President-elect Donald Trump puts together his cabinet that will shape the new American outlook, international actors are anxiously attempting to decipher what his presidency would mean for them, and meanwhile attempt to put a positive spin on it.

Some are taking his election rhetoric and statements literally, but then he has little experience about the subject matter he is commenting on. This often leads to more scrutiny i.e., if he consulted his respective advisors, and the current officials, before presenting his views. The situation becomes even more puzzling because he is not necessarily following the Republican Party playbook on various issues.

Others are attempting to interpret his future policies by the appointments he is making, and nominations he puts forward for the key positions. The background of these candidates whether they are from the corporate world, or military, suggests a lot too.

To whomever it may concern, the major worry is: will Trump continue with the current US policies, or break with them and take a new approach to address present challenges. Moreover, to assess how dramatic or ‘disruptive’ the new approach would be.

When it comes to the realm of foreign policy, reset with Russia perhaps is one of the key clues to understand his worldview and a good point to start from.

The other reality to comprehend is the relative American economic weakness, and what according to Trump and his team, is the perceived cause for it.

Trump-Nawaz Phone Conversation

Of all the eccentric conversations President-elect Trump has had with foreign heads of state and government since winning the election, the one he had with Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of Pakistan, ranks as one of the more unusual ones.

Breaking protocol, the Pakistani government released a transcript of the telephone conversation which the PM initiated. That’s highly unusual, in that a government doesn’t generally release what the foreign interlocutor said in the exchange.

According to the Pakistani version of the conversation, Trump was utterly effusive about the ‘amazing’ work the Prime Minister was doing for his country and what a ‘terrific guy’ he was. Upon being invited to visit Pakistan, Trump reportedly said that ‘he would love to come to a fantastic country, fantastic place of fantastic people.’ He added that ‘…all Pakistani people I have known are exceptional people’.

That seriously jars with some of his earlier views about Pakistan. Back in 2012, using his favorite social media platform, he tweeted that ‘Pakistan is not our friend. We’ve given them billions and billions of dollars, and what did we get? Betrayal and disrespect—and much worse.’ And more recently, he got into a public scrap with a Pakistani-American family who had lost their son in Iraq while serving as an officer in the US military. The Khans criticized Trump’s suggestion during his election campaign that all Muslims should be banned from coming into the US.

Many American commentators and analysts have ridiculed Trump’s call with Sharif because it further confirms Trump’s obvious lack of knowledge of international affairs. However, Islamabad intends to build on that conversation to try to improve a bilateral relationship which hasn’t tracked well under President Obama.

Accordingly, PM Sharif’s main adviser on foreign policy, Tariq Fatemi, was sent to Washington to talk to the Trump team and members of Congress to move the bilateral agenda forward. There’s a sense among political leaders in Pakistan that given Trump’s unorthodox approach to foreign affairs and his rejection of Washington’s traditional playbook—at least for the moment—perhaps there’s a window of opportunity to get back in America’s good books. Team members close to Trump informally endorse the view that surprises can be expected.

Dealing With Afghanistan

As with much of his foreign policy possibilities, it’s difficult to know what decision Trump will take on Afghanistan, having said virtually nothing about the issue during the election campaign. Back in 2011 he stated that the US should get out of Afghanistan because the Taliban would in any case eventually return to power. He also indicated then that he wasn’t keen to commit troops overseas if it’s not in America’s direct interest.

The fact remains that the same issues confronting the US today will need to be addressed by the new administration. And one of those which will need to be dealt with soon after Trump’s inauguration will be how many of the 10,000 American troops now in Afghanistan should be withdrawn. According to the latest US assessment, the Afghan security forces only control some 60% of the national territory, and they’re losing ground every day. The rest is either controlled or contested by the Taliban, al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and other foreign fighters.

Given the lack of reference points, it’s difficult to predict what approach a Trump administration will take towards Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, General (ret.) James Mattis and Lieutenant General (ret.) Michael Flynn, Trump’s nominees for Secretary of Defense and National Security Adviser, respectively, have both served in Afghanistan. They should know what a wicked problem Afghanistan is.

Judging from the appointment of Michael Flynn as the national security advisor, the focus will be more on strategic and ideological issues, especially radical Islam, as oppose to tactical matters. And in this there will be agreement with China and Russia, both worried about the growing threat from Daesh/ISIL/ISIS in different parts of the world. The nomination of ExxonMobil chief Rex W. Tillerson, who has close ties with Putin, further solidifies Trump’s pivot to Russia.

What It Means For Pakistan?

The pressure on Pakistan will likely continue to deliver Afghan Taliban to the negotiation table, exert military and financial pressure on them – especially Haqqani network, and eliminate any remaining presence of Afghan Taliban in the FATA region. However, the emerging position of China and Russia is increasingly different from that of the US. Both now view Afghan Taliban as a bulwark against the spreading influence of Daesh/ISIS/ISIL and are willing to work with it. Thus the room for the US and NATO to maneuver in Afghanistan is consistently shrinking. But that does not mean US does not have leverages – but their impact is minimal.

Due to the ongoing military operation in Pakistan’s North Waziristan tribal agency for the last two and half years, many Taliban fighters have fled Pakistan and have resettled in Afghanistan. However, indications are that elements of the Pakistan army or intelligence service are either still providing support or aren’t vigorously pursuing some of those terrorist groups, in particular the Haqqani Network.

Accordingly, US$300 million worth of American military assistance earmarked for Pakistan couldn’t be disbursed last year because US Defense Secretary, Ashton Carter, couldn’t certify to Congress that the Pakistan military was ‘taking demonstrable steps’ against the Haqqani Network. Carter needs to again provide such a certification if US$450 million is to be paid out as part of the current US National Defense Authorization Act. It’s unlikely that he’ll do so.

Implications Of An Emboldened Russia

President-elect Trump may offer to work with Russia on Afghanistan as well, as he is expected to do with Russia on the Syrian affairs. China obviously is already involved economically in Afghanistan and as part of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG).

But this conflicts directly with the role India is striving to play in Afghanistan, and will cause difficulties for Indo-Russian relations. Additionally, it will complicate Indian role in the BRICS and SCO, which is already straining because of the emerging tight US-India strategic cooperation.

Similarly, while Trump is willing to deal with Russia on Syria, ultimately he would have to reconcile on his hard stance towards Iran and the P5+1 nuclear deal. Or may be he expects that after the Russian reset, Putin would be more willing to negotiate with the US in taking a hard line towards Iran. A more likely outcome is an emboldened Russia, and that may be the desired goal. As Europe and EU are in a weaken state, it makes sense to partner with Russia.

Ultimately, one of the strategic US objectives would be to pull Russia away from China and diminish their growing strategic alliance. This may involve taking a harder position towards China, as witnessed by Trump’s statements regarding US ‘One China’ policy and by talking with the Taiwanese leader.

An empowered Russia is likely to become even more assertive in other theaters and threaten Chinese aspirations. However, for the time being this posture will greatly unnerve American allies such as India, the Europeans, and the Gulf States.

For all intents and purposes, US under Trump appear to be making a temporary retreat in world affairs, relegating some of the influence to Russia for the time being. And this retreat will face considerable policy challenge from with in the American establishment.

A version of this article also appeared in The Strategist, a blog for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, and Defense Journal Pakistan.

The post Trump’s Pivot To Russia And US Foreign Policy appeared first on Politact.

Context

By Kulsoom Belal

This article is part of PoliTact’s recently launched initiative to look at the events of the Pacific region from the vantage point of South Asia. In order to do this, one has to also study where South Asia belongs in the larger strategy of major international powers. Under this theme, various political, security and economic implications of the events of the wider region will be explored.

At one level, there is a need to understand how the recently announced China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) fits in the larger Chinese One Belt One Road (OBOR) vision. Since the announcement of OBOR strategy, a considerable number of countries, around 65, have signed up already.

At another level, there is the question of how OBOR and CPEC compare to the American New Silk Road architecture for South and Central Asia and the Indian ‘Act East’ and ‘Connect Central Asia’ policy. Then there is the US-India ‘Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean’ that is exploring the leverage offered by connecting the Indo-Pacific region with the Asia-Pacific, such as through the associated Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor (IPEC).

In this context, a number of questions are raised, are these different visions complementary or contradictory. Moreover, what would the US and Chinese strategic considerations mean for South Asia in good and bad case scenarios.

Equally important is the distinction between land and sea access. A Chinese White Paper released in May highlights its military strategy and has added emphasis on access and protection of sea routes. The paper states, “the traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned.” The document adds that China will develop “a modern maritime military force structure commensurate with its national security and development interests [and] safeguard its national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.”

Both US and China have publicly claimed these are complementary visions. For example, in South and Central Asia, US is promoting interoperability by helping to streamline customs, transit, and taxation policies of various states and this will certainly help the Chinese. However, US is faced with its own strategic imperatives as it implements the Pivot to Asia strategy. If it allows the present trajectory of China, it could reconfigure the balance of power in the region in a way that may not be favorable towards the US.

Then there is the question of how Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) are likely to play out in contrast to what BRICS is attempting to shape via institutions like Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). These are immensely intricate agreements, but are seen as giving advantage to one or the other player.

Moreover, in July India and Pakistan both have acquired full membership of the China and Russian dominated SCO, which has added another layer of complexity to the ongoing economic and security balancing act in the region.

In retrospect, the shape of present day trade and economic corridors were largely shaped by geographical proximity, historical linkages, and political realties. As a rising power with energy needs, China intends to realign them in its favor. And when one does that, it has the potential to unveil immense economic opportunities and security risks that previously did not exist.
In a series of articles we will discern, synthesize and interpret the above laid out dynamics. In part one, the attempt is to understand the OBOR vision and how CPEC fits in it.

ANALYSIS

China’s One Belt One Road Vision

When laying out the master plan for OBOR, China must be grappling with two strategic considerations. One, what would a potential future conflict with US, or more generally with the West, mean for its security and economic interests. Second, how it would secure the energy needs if the strategic sea pathways, through which much of its present day trade passes, were to become unstable. These worries are not unique to China alone, every major international actor is attempting to find their respective answers to these growing risks.
In view of these strategic considerations, China’s OBOR and its various tributaries, appear to provide alternative routes for the sustenance of its trade and the steady supply of energy needs to maintain its growth.

OBOR is a combination of two routes; the New Silk Road Economic Belt will run westward overland through Central Asia and onward to Europe. The second route, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR), will run south and westward through sea to Europe, with stops in South East Asia, South Asia and Africa.

Under the auspices of OBOR, at least six arteries are being developed, with CPEC being one of them:

1. The China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridor will be built with China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region as its starting point
2. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will be built to connect the ports of Pakistan’s Gwadar with Xinjiang’s Kashi
3. The northern China-Mongolia-Russia Land Corridor will connect Russia to China and starts from the Chinese province of Heilongjiang, and
4. The south running China-India-Bangladesh-Myanmar Corridor (BCIM), will be built with Kolkata as its starting point
5. The Indochina Peninsula Corridor
6. The New Eurasian Land Bridge, running from central China to Europe via Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus

OBOR will allow China to consolidate its access to Eurasia, Central Asia, South East and East Asia, including Africa. More significantly, it will help its penetration in to the maritime regions, especially the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Sea. These regions are estimated to include 4.4 billion people, constituting 63 percent of the world population, and US $2.1 trillion in gross production that makes up 29 % of the world GDP.

China’s trade with the US and the Western Europe, its traditional markets, has seemed to stagnate. Considering this, OBOR will provide lucrative opportunities for China, expanding its trade with the littoral and inland states. According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, China’s bilateral trade with countries along the Silk Road aggregated to 26 percent of China’s total in the first quarter of 2015.

CPEC in Relation To China’s One Belt One Road

Thus, it is clear that while CPEC is just one of the tributaries of the Chinese OBOR vision, it is perhaps the most important one. Ideally, China would desire all of the corridors to operate as envisioned. However, the success of each strategic passage is dependent on mitigating several key security risks.

The Gwadar Port situated very close to the Strait of Hormuz, will allow China the shortest access to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. Moreover, it will provide an alternative route to the conflict prone and crowded Malacca Strait, sandwiched between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Obviously this carries economic and security implications.

Writing in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in June, PoliTact’s strategist Claude Rakisits pointed out:

“However, in geostrategic terms the success of CPEC would not be good news for the US: it would displace the US as Pakistan’s major external patron in favor of China. Most importantly, it would provide China with a firm and reliable long-term beachhead in the Indian Ocean close to the Persian Gulf, effectively making China a two-ocean power. This would be a red rag to India.”

Thus if tensions between India and China, and matters related to the South China Sea, were to escalate, the BCIM strategic corridor is likely to become nonfunctional. In this case, CPEC would take on an added emphasis.

Then there are concerns regarding the stability of Middle East. The Middle East reigns as China’s largest supply of oil and energy: sixty percent of China’s oil comes from the Middle East, of which eighty percent originate in the Persian Gulf. These supplies travel from the Strait of Hormuz to Strait of Malacca, curling through the Indian Ocean and reaching China while passing through South China Sea, East China Sea and the Yellow Sea.

However, if the situation of Middle East continues to deteriorate due to extremism and continuing worries regarding Iran’s nuclear program, it is possible that the Strait of Hormuz itself becomes quite insecure. It is perhaps this assessment that led to the Russia-China $400 billion 30-year gas deal in May.

Where Does CPEC Fit In Pakistan’s Calculus?

While there is the tangent of how CPEC corresponds to the overall Chinese OBOR vision, the other angle has to do with the strategic importance of the economic corridor for Pakistan. Equally critical is how the Arab world and Central Asia would balance the various forces at play.

In a letter released at the opening ceremony of China-Arab expo 2015 on September 10, 2010, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated, “China and the Arab States are good friends with mutual trust, as well as good partners in seeking common prosperity,” adding that the Arab States have been reacting actively to his Belt and Road Initiative.

On the other hand, the potential mainstreaming of Iran as a result of the nuclear deal has created a new variable. Iran’s initial backing of Pakistan and Chinese supported peace talks in Afghanistan must be of concern to India.
These aspects, along with those described above, will be explored further in the upcoming articles.

About the Author

Kulsoom Belal is a South Asia and Asia Pacific (SAAP) Fellow at PoliTact.
Her research focus includes the impact of cruise missiles on South Asian ‘strategic stability’ and ‘stability-instability paradox’; military doctrines in South Asia, and is currently monitoring Iran for a think tank based in Islamabad. Her M Phil dissertation concentrated on US-China-India strategic triangle in the Asia Pacific and its implications for Pakistan’s Nuclear Deterrence.

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