<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>Axis of resistance Archives - Politact</title>
	<atom:link href="https://politact.com/tag/axis-of-resistance/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://politact.com/tag/axis-of-resistance/</link>
	<description>Futurist Advisory Firm - Developing multidimensional strategic insights 2 increasingly asymmetric global political, security, and economic realities</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Sun, 30 Aug 2026 16:32:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>
	hourly	</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>
	1	</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=6.7.1</generator>

 
	<item>
		<title>US-Iran War And Alternative Futures For South Asia</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/us-iran-war-and-alternative-futures-for-south-asia/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Arif Ansar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 25 Jul 2026 17:42:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Afghan Reconciliation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global Power Tussles and Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global Realignment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South and Central Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US and Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Pakistan Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US-India Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vantage Point Analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Abraham Accords expansion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Axis of resistance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Baloch Liberation Army]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Baloch Liberation Front]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Board of Peace (BOP)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaza]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaza International Stabilization Force]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IDF ground operations South Lebanon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Implication of US Iran War on South Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Implications of US]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India-Israel strategic defense axis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Islamabad MOU]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Islamabad Peace Process mediation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel War on Pakistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire 2026]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel-UAE defense alignment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East balance of power 2026]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Operation Epic Fury]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Operation Epic Fury strategic analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Oslo Accords]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strait of Hormuz blockade impact]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Subcontinental rivalry in the Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Third Gulf War implications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Iran War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Israel Iran conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Israel relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US-Iran 60-day ceasefire terms]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=10874</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="583" height="428" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/583_Map_of_Middle_East_Jan_13_20103.gif" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" fetchpriority="high" />By Arif Ansar Context The fragile security landscape of South Asia is increasingly tied to the volatile geopolitics of the Middle East. As the tripartite tensions involving the United States, Israel, and Iran simmer, the shockwaves are felt acutely in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and for that matter India as well. To fully comprehend this equation, [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/us-iran-war-and-alternative-futures-for-south-asia/">US-Iran War And Alternative Futures For South Asia</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="583" height="428" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/583_Map_of_Middle_East_Jan_13_20103.gif" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" /><p><img decoding="async" class="alignleft size-full wp-image-2695" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20-04-2011_Pakistan-Iran.jpg" alt="" width="181" height="121" />By Arif Ansar</p>
<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>The fragile security landscape of South Asia is increasingly tied to the volatile geopolitics of the Middle East. As the tripartite tensions involving the United States, Israel, and Iran simmer, the shockwaves are felt acutely in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and for that matter India as well. To fully comprehend this equation, one must analyze the internal regional dynamics of South Asia first and then trace how they intersect with the unfolding Middle Eastern crisis.</p>
<p>The successful negotiation and remote signing of the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/strait-hormuz-reopen-us-lift-iran-sanctions-14-point-deal-seeking-end-rcna350513">Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding</a> (MoU) on June 17, 2026, by U.S. President Donald Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, marked a monumental achievement for Pakistan’s civil-military leadership. If the Islamabad MoU sticks, in its current or reformed form, and transitions into a durable peace agreement, it holds the potential to fundamentally rewrite Pakistan&#8217;s domestic security, energy, and economic paradigms.</p>
<ol>
<li><strong> The Regional Dynamics: South Asia’s Internal Fault Lines</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>The relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan is currently defined by severe friction rather than neighborly cooperation. At the center of this tension is the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an extremist group that has <a href="https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2026/07/15/operation-shaban-toll-rises-to-123-as-security-forces-intensify-offensive-against-terrorists">escalated its terror campaign inside Pakistan</a>. Pakistan accuses the Afghan Taliban of providing safe havens and tacit support to the TTP—a claim the Taliban administration in Kabul denies, though the cross-border nature of TTP attacks remains a persistent flashpoint.</p>
<p>Concurrently, Pakistan’s southwestern province of Balochistan is facing a severe security crisis. The insurgent groups such as Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) are demanding independence for the resource-rich province, has dramatically escalated its attacks against the Pakistani military.</p>
<p>Media reports suggest that the BLA is receiving strategic cooperation and material support from the TTP, creating a combined internal security challenge for Islamabad. Pakistan alleges that the BLA receives external backing from India to destabilize the country. India and Israel are exceptionally close strategic allies, sharing deep defense, intelligence, and counter-terrorism partnerships.</p>
<p>There is great power rivalry part of the equation too. BLA has repeatedly <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/pakistan-what-is-behind-attacks-on-chinese-nationals/a-70425841">targeted Chinese infrastructure projects</a> and personnel associated with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in Balochistan in other parts of the country, aiming to disrupt Pakistan&#8217;s economic lifeline and strain its relationship with Beijing.</p>
<ol start="2">
<li><strong> The Middle East Equation: The Islamabad MoU and Saudi Defense Commitments</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>To understand how these South Asian fault lines link to the Middle East, one must look at Pakistan’s diplomatic balancing act. The nation has historically maintained a delicate equilibrium: keeping close ties with Saudi Arabia, and other GCC nations, while managing a long, porous border with its neighbor, Iran.</p>
<p><strong>The Islamabad MoU</strong></p>
<p>In mid-2026, Pakistan&#8217;s diplomatic corps, alongside Qatar, achieved a historic breakthrough by mediating the Islamabad MoU. This 14-point framework agreement successfully brought the U.S. and Iran to a temporary ceasefire, temporarily halting direct military hostilities, lifting the U.S. naval blockade on Iranian ports, and opening the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz. This diplomatic triumph cemented Pakistan’s role as a vital regional mediator. However, as hostilities have broken again indicating the stability of the Islamabad MoU remains incredibly fragile.</p>
<p><strong>The Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA)</strong></p>
<p>Compounding this fragility is Pakistan&#8217;s security obligation to Riyadh. On September 17, 2025, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/could-pakistani-saudi-defense-pact-be-first-step-toward-nato-style-alliance">Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA)</a>. Echoing NATO’s Article 5 language, the SMDA treats &#8220;any aggression against either country as an aggression against both&#8221;.</p>
<p>If an all-out war breaks out in the Middle East, a dangerous chain reaction is highly likely. Ansar Allah (the Houthis) in Yemen are highly likely to <a href="https://www.dropsitenews.com/p/yemen-sanaa-airport-ansarallah-saudi-houthis-bab-al-mandab-bukhaiti">close the Babul Mandab</a> Strait and launch retaliatory ballistic missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia. Faced with direct attacks, Saudi Arabia will almost certainly invoke the SMDA. Reports indicate that under the <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2644094/saudi-arabia">confidential terms</a> of the pact, Pakistan could be required to deploy up to 80,000 troops to secure Saudi borders. Sooner or later, Pakistan will be forced to choose between entering a foreign conflict to defend Saudi Arabia or reneging on its defense pact, which would devastate its economic and strategic relations with the Gulf.</p>
<ol start="3">
<li><strong> Implications of a Worsening Middle East Conflict on Pakistan and Afghanistan</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>If the Middle East situation continues to deteriorate, the consequences will ripple across South Asia, severely impacting Pakistan and Afghanistan, and India across military, economic, and social domains.</p>
<p>Pakistan is already heavily engaged in counter-insurgency operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) against the TTP, and in Balochistan against the BLA and BLF, the Pakistani military is stretched thin. Faced with a domestic security crisis, coming to the active defense of Saudi Arabia would be an immense logistical and military strain. Knowing this, adversaries like India and Israel are highly likely to speed up their destabilizing activities inside Pakistan. By utilizing existing proxies, they can ensure that Pakistan remains too deeply entangled in internal security crises to project military power or assist its Gulf allies.</p>
<p>This regional sabotage directly undermines <a href="https://politact.com/the-future-of-afghan-taliban-pakistan-conflict-implications-for-regional-stability-and-us-interests/">Washington’s strategic goals</a>. The U.S. relies on Pakistan’s diplomatic weight to mediate with Tehran, as seen with the Islamabad MoU. A destabilized Pakistan is a nation that cannot play a constructive role in preventing a wider regional war in the Middle East or contribute towards the success of <a href="https://politact.com/us-iran-interim-ceasefire-deal-israel-and-the-future-of-abraham-accords/">new vision</a> for the Middle East &#8211; under the Abraham Accords and subsequent establishment of Board of Peace.</p>
<p><strong>The Explosion of Sectarian Strife</strong></p>
<p>A direct conflict involving Iran—the primary Shia power—and the U.S., Israel, or Sunni Arab Gulf states will instantly inflame sectarian fault lines in South Asia. Both Pakistan Afghanistan have <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/shia-population-by-country">sizable Shia minorities</a> that have historically been targeted by hardline Sunni extremist groups. While India also has a sizeable Shia population, and while Muslims there face state repression, Shia’s there have not been targeted in a similar fashion.</p>
<p>A worsening Middle East war will be actively exploited by transnational terror networks, most notably Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISIS-K). ISIS-K, which operates across both Afghanistan and Pakistan, views Shia Muslims as heretics and has frequently targeted their mosques, community centers, and schools.</p>
<p>In Afghanistan: The ruling Taliban, while ideologically hardline Sunni, has sought to maintain basic internal stability. However, a regional sectarian war will severely test their control. ISIS-K will use the anti-Iran, anti-Shia rhetoric of the wider conflict to recruit disgruntled fighters, escalating attacks on the Shia Hazara community and challenging Taliban authority.</p>
<p>In Pakistan: Sectarian violence has historically claimed thousands of lives. An active war involving Iran and Saudi Arabia could trigger a revival of sectarian proxy wars on Pakistani soil, pitting localized militant groups against one another and further fracturing the country’s social cohesion.</p>
<ol start="4">
<li><strong> Economic Devastation and Connectivity Collapses</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>The economic fallout of a prolonged Middle East war on Pakistan and Afghanistan would be catastrophic.</p>
<p><strong>Energy and Remittance Shocks</strong></p>
<p>Pakistan imports the <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/pakistan/imports-by-country">vast majority of its oil and gas</a> from the Gulf. A disruption in the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab el-Mandeb would cause global oil prices to skyrocket, triggering hyperinflation in Pakistan&#8217;s fragile, debt-burdened economy. Furthermore, millions of Pakistani expatriates live and work in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. If the Middle East slides into a broader war, many of these workers could be forced to return home, cutting off the vital stream of foreign remittances that keeps Pakistan&#8217;s economy afloat.</p>
<p><strong>The Death of Regional Connectivity</strong></p>
<p>Both Afghanistan and Pakistan have pinned their economic futures on becoming trade hubs. Afghanistan under the Taliban has sought to utilize Iran&#8217;s Chabahar Port and the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) to bypass landlocked constraints and reduce its dependence on Pakistani transit routes.</p>
<p>While the Islamabad MoU briefly revived hopes for these transit corridors, an escalation of the war would render these infrastructure projects dead on arrival. Iranian ports would once again become military targets, isolating Afghanistan economically and pushing it deeper into poverty, which in turn breeds further radicalization and instability. Moreover, in the recent escalation, reports indicate that US has also <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/us-targets-iran-s-chabahar-port-in-fresh-strikes-hegseth-shares-image-of-collapsing-watchtower/ar-AA286DAw">targeted Chabahar port</a> to increase pressure on Iran.</p>
<ol start="5">
<li><strong> Conclusion: A Dangerous Convergence</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>The potential escalation of the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict is not a localized Middle Eastern issue; it is a direct threat to the stability of South Asia. For Pakistan, the war represents an existential geopolitical trap, forcing it to balance a strict mutual defense treaty with Saudi Arabia against the reality of a heavily armed neighbor in Iran and a domestic theater crawling with active insurgencies. For Afghanistan, the conflict threatens to fuel the fires of ISIS-K&#8217;s sectarian violence and destroy any hopes of regional economic integration.</p>
<p>As external actors seek to exploit these vulnerabilities, the line between the Middle East&#8217;s conflicts and South Asia&#8217;s internal wars is rapidly dissolving. If the Islamabad MoU completely unravels, Pakistan and Afghanistan will find themselves directly in the line of fire of a wider, highly destructive regional war.</p>
<p><strong>Conversely:</strong></p>
<p>If the Islamabad MoU &#8220;sticks&#8221; and transitions from a fragile ceasefire into a durable peace agreement, it holds the potential to fundamentally rewrite Pakistan&#8217;s domestic security, energy, and economic paradigms.</p>
<p><strong>a. Security: Strangling Proxies</strong></p>
<p>By capitalizing on its diplomatic leverage from mediating between the U.S. and Iran, Pakistan can demand reciprocal action against cross-border threats. A secure Iran, freed from Western military threats, can work with the Pakistan Army to seal the lawless border, choking the logistics and safe havens of the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) favored by India and Israel. Simultaneously, a stabilized region enables a unified U.S.-Pakistan-Iran diplomatic front to pressure the Afghan Taliban. Highly dependent on Pakistani and Iranian transit trade (like Chabahar Port), Kabul would be forced to dismantle the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). This double clampdown effectively ends the multi-front subversion designed by adversaries to keep Pakistan tactically entrapped.</p>
<p><strong>b. Economy &amp; Energy: Resurrecting the IP Pipeline</strong></p>
<p>A durable reformed MoU triggers the lifting of U.S. sanctions on Iran, allowing Pakistan to complete the Iran-Pakistan (IP) Gas Pipeline without fear of international isolation. This removes the looming $18 billion &#8220;take-or-pay&#8221; penalty from Tehran, while injecting cheap natural gas to end rolling blackouts and slash industrial costs. Moreover, Gwadar Port is likely to take-off.</p>
<p><strong>c. Autonomy: Balancing GCC Ties</strong></p>
<p>Abundant energy and secured Central Asian trade routes drive organic growth, offering financial self-reliance and breaking Pakistan&#8217;s dependency on Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) bailouts. This shields Islamabad from strategic entrapment under its Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) with Riyadh, preserving its neutrality instead of dragging its military into regional proxy wars.</p>
<p><strong>Related Articles</strong></p>
<p class="entry-title"><a href="https://politact.com/us-iran-interim-ceasefire-deal-israel-and-the-future-of-abraham-accords/">US-Iran Interim Ceasefire Deal, Israel, And The Future of Abraham Accords</a> &#8211; June 18, 2026<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/the-us-israel-and-iran-conflict-the-interplay-of-goals-and-strategies/">The US-Israel and Iran Conflict: The Interplay of Goals and Strategies</a> – May 1, 2026<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/geopolitics-of-islamic-world-and-middle-power-alliance-building-after-iran-attack/">Geopolitics Of Islamic World And Middle Power Alliances After Iran Attack</a> – Mar 22, 2026<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/the-end-of-strategic-altruism-putins-visit-and-the-new-us-india-reality/">The End Of Strategic Altruism: Putin’s Visit And The New US-India Reality</a> – Jan 13, 2026<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/from-oslo-to-trumps-abraham-accords-and-20-point-peace-plan-for-gaza/">From Oslo To Trump’s Abraham Accords And 20-Point Peace Plan For Gaza</a> – Oct 12, 2025<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/israel-airstrike-targets-hamas-negotiators-in-doha-threatening-gaza-ceasefire-talks/">Israel Airstrike Targets Hamas Negotiators In Doha, Threatening Gaza Ceasefire Talks</a> – Sep 15, 2025<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/gaza-ceasefire-plan-and-us-iran-tensions/">Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions</a> – April 26, 2025<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/two-state-solution-future-of-gaza-and-iran/">Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran</a> – February 25, 2025<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/assads-demise-and-the-shifting-balance-of-power-in-middle-east/">Assad’s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East</a> – Dec 26, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/the-escalating-middle-east-crisis-and-president-elect-trump/">The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump</a> – Dec 5, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-and-india-middle-east-europe-corridor-imec/">China’s Belt And Road Initiative And India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC)</a> – Oct 5, 2023<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/irans-potential-retaliation-for-haniyehs-killing-and-wider-consequences/">Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences</a> – Aug 30, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/the-iran-pakistan-gas-pipeline-project-economic-and-geopolitical-realities/">The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities</a> – Sep 27, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/great-power-rivalry-and-chinas-deepening-involvement-in-south-asia-gulf-states/">Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States</a> – Aug 4, 2023<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/what-does-president-bidens-visit-to-israel-and-saudi-arabia-imply/">What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply?</a> – Aug 4, 2022</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/us-iran-war-and-alternative-futures-for-south-asia/">US-Iran War And Alternative Futures For South Asia</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>US-Iran Interim Ceasefire Deal, Israel, And The Future of Abraham Accords</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/us-iran-interim-ceasefire-deal-israel-and-the-future-of-abraham-accords/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Arif Ansar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 20:54:56 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[American Experiment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Americas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Analysis of Perception and Perspective]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US and Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Abraham Accords expansion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Axis of resistance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Board of Peace (BOP)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaza]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaza International Stabilization Force]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IDF ground operations South Lebanon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India-Israel strategic defense axis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Islamabad MOU]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Islamabad Peace Process mediation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire 2026]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel-UAE defense alignment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East balance of power 2026]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Operation Epic Fury]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Operation Epic Fury strategic analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Oslo Accords]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strait of Hormuz blockade impact]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Subcontinental rivalry in the Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Third Gulf War implications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Israel Iran conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Israel relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US-Iran 60-day ceasefire terms]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=10804</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="696" height="464" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Abraham Accords Signing Ceremony" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-300x200.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-768x512.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-630x420.jpg 630w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-696x464.jpg 696w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" />By Arif Ansar Context The escalation of open warfare between the United States, Israel, and Iran in early 2026—characterized by some as the &#8220;Third Gulf War&#8221;—has radically upended the strategic architecture of the Middle East. At the center of pre-war Western diplomatic planning were two highly integrated concepts: the Abraham Accords, aiming to build a [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/us-iran-interim-ceasefire-deal-israel-and-the-future-of-abraham-accords/">US-Iran Interim Ceasefire Deal, Israel, And The Future of Abraham Accords</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="696" height="464" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Abraham Accords Signing Ceremony" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-300x200.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-768x512.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-630x420.jpg 630w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-696x464.jpg 696w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" /><figure id="attachment_10638" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-10638" style="width: 1024px" class="wp-caption alignleft"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-10638" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords.jpg" alt="Abraham Accords Signing Ceremony" width="1024" height="683" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-300x200.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-768x512.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-630x420.jpg 630w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-696x464.jpg 696w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-10638" class="wp-caption-text">Abraham Accords Signing Ceremony</figcaption></figure>
<p>By Arif Ansar</p>
<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>The escalation of open warfare between the United States, Israel, and Iran in early 2026—characterized by some as the &#8220;Third Gulf War&#8221;—has radically upended the <a href="https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2026-25-southeast-asia-and-the-third-gulf-war-impact-responses-and-implications-by-ian-storey/">strategic architecture</a> of the Middle East. At the center of pre-war Western diplomatic planning were two highly integrated concepts: the Abraham Accords, aiming to build a normalization bridge between Israel and Arab states, and the Board of Peace (BOP), an <a href="https://www.securityincontext.org/posts/colonial-administration-counterinsurgency-pacification-and-disaster-capitalism-in-trumps-plan-for-gaza">international framework</a> established under UN Security Council Resolution 2803 to oversee a post-conflict administration, international stabilization force, and real estate transformation in Gaza.</p>
<p>However, the military campaign launched on February 28, 2026, under the U.S.-Israeli codename &#8220;Operation Epic Fury&#8221;, fundamentally collided with the core assumptions of these frameworks. Instead of solidifying a prosperous, integrated, and Western-aligned trade bloc, the <a href="https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/ResearchAndStudies/Pages/risk-politics-and-the-us-israeli-war-on-iran.aspx">kinetic conflict</a> exposed deep structural flaws in regional deterrence, shattered the prospects of two-state solution, and triggered an unprecedented shift in the balance of power.</p>
<ol>
<li><strong> The Disintegration of the Pre-War Vision: BOP and Abraham Accords Under Fire</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>Before the military escalation of 2026, the Abraham Accords and the Board of Peace functioned as a synchronized carrot-and-stick diplomatic strategy. The political objective was clear: circumvent the core issue of Palestinian statehood by offering massive economic, infrastructure, and technological incentives to the Arab world, effectively managing the region from the <a href="https://politact.com/the-emerging-outside-in-approach-to-israeli-palestinian-conflict-afghan-reconciliation-and-kashmir-issue/">outside-in</a>. The BOP was envisioned as a multi-layered <a href="https://www.securityincontext.org/posts/colonial-administration-counterinsurgency-pacification-and-disaster-capitalism-in-trumps-plan-for-gaza">colonial and financial administration</a>—overseeing a Gaza Executive Board and a Palestinian National Committee—meant to signal a new era of regional co-prosperity.</p>
<p>When <em>Operation Epic Fury</em> commenced with devastating strikes on Iranian command structures, nuclear sites, and energy facilities, this vision suffered an immediate kinetic shock. Rather than acting as bridges for trade, the Abraham Accords were abruptly tested as raw military alignments. Iran’s retaliatory doctrine did not spare the region; Tehran launched waves of drones and ballistic missiles targeting not only Israeli territory but also Western assets and allies across the Gulf.</p>
<p>The BOP’s ambitious plans for Gaza—such as beachfront hotels and special economic zones—were instantly frozen as global energy markets panicked and global fertilizer and agricultural supply chains broke down. The war exposed an untenable contradiction: attempting to build an institutional framework for peace while simultaneously fighting a total regional war.</p>
<ol start="2">
<li><strong> The Great Divergence: Independent Israeli Maneuvers vs. Joint Strategy</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>A central complication in the future of the BOP and the Abraham Accords is the apparent <a href="https://politact.com/the-us-israel-and-iran-conflict-the-interplay-of-goals-and-strategies/">divergence</a> between American diplomatic objectives and Israeli kinetic execution. While the United States has continuously attempted to orchestrate a diplomatic off-ramp, Israel has aggressively expanded its military footprint. Israel’s actions in Gaza, its incursions into Lebanon, and its unilateral willingness to strike deep into Iranian territory—even during active diplomatic windows—have created two starkly different strategic interpretations &#8211; that pose the most acute risk to the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/strait-hormuz-reopen-us-lift-iran-sanctions-14-point-deal-seeking-end-rcna350513">Interim Ceasefire Deal</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Interpretation A: The Maverick State Acting Unilaterally</strong></p>
<p>This perspective argues that Israel is acting in open contradiction to Washington&#8217;s goals. Israeli leadership has made it clear that they <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/un-chief-blasts-israels-unacceptable-rejection-of-two-state-solution/">no longer view</a> the Oslo Accords or a two-state solution as viable frameworks. By pursuing a permanent military solution rather than a political compromise, Israel is explicitly prioritizing the absolute destruction of the &#8220;Axis of Resistance&#8221; over the long-term diplomatic health of the Abraham Accords. They are gambling that Arab states will eventually be forced to accept a dominant, nuclear-armed Israel as a fait accompli, regardless of the Palestinian issue.</p>
<p><strong>Interpretation B: A Tightly Orchestrated Joint Strategy</strong></p>
<p>Conversely, realism suggests that Israeli actions represent a coordinated, dual-track &#8220;Good Cop / Bad Cop&#8221; strategy with the United States. While Washington acts as the diplomatic negotiator—offering terms, carrots, and structural limitations—Israel functions as the unhinged kinetic hammer. By maintaining maximum military pressure on Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, Israel forces adversaries to negotiate from a position of acute vulnerability, allowing American diplomats to demand structural concessions that would be nearly impossible to attain through standard statecraft.</p>
<p>Regardless of which interpretation is accurate, the structural fallout is identical: Israel&#8217;s complete abandonment of the Palestinian political track has severed the primary artery through which the Abraham Accords were expected to expand to critical Muslim-majority nations like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, who have historically conditioned formal normalization on a viable two-state solution.</p>
<ol start="3">
<li><strong> The 60-Day Ceasefire: Why Iran Emerges in an Enhanced Position</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>The multi-week diplomatic push that culminated in the temporary cessation of hostilities has set the stage for a potential <a href="https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-war-ceasefire-deal-e0a9e4e1152ea8da10ea066ad174a23a">60-day extended ceasefire</a>. However, an assessment of the strategic balance indicates that if a prolonged ceasefire is institutionalized under current conditions, Iran will have effectively won the geopolitical argument, shifting the regional balance of power in its favor with far reaching implications.</p>
<p>Despite enduring massive leadership losses and targeted degradation of its conventional military facilities during the initial strikes of Operation Epic Fury, Tehran demonstrated profound <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/operation-epic-fury-a-closer-look-at-iran-s-military-resilience/ar-AA238Rpm">asymmetric resilience</a>:</p>
<ul>
<li>Weaponization of the Chokepoints: By effectively throttling the Strait of Hormuz and imposing a massive $2 million transit toll on commercial tankers while outright banning American and Israeli vessels, Iran proved it could hold global energy markets hostage. It’s not clear whether the toll or fees will remain in any future deal.</li>
<li>Surviving Regime Change Ambitions: Iran successfully weathered a decapitation campaign that killed its highest officials, proving that its institutional and proxy network could function and retaliate even under extreme duress.</li>
<li>Demonstrated Retaliatory Reach: By launching direct, sustained missile strikes against Israel and retaliating against U.S. bases in the region, Iran dismantled the myth of Western invulnerability.</li>
</ul>
<p>As far as its nuclear program is concerned, while Iran had previously committed to not attain weaponized capability. The major criticism of the earlier agreement with Iran reached in 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) under Obama administration was that it neither addressed Iran’s wider behavior in the region nor its ballistic missile program. On the positive side, JCPOA was backed by P5+1 countries i.e. US, China, Russia, France, UK, and Germany – along with European Union.</p>
<p>In the present context, P5+1 were not in the negotiating loop – but this does not indicate that they may not partake in any future roles. While frictions between NATO and US have increased over Ukraine and military approach towards Iran, President Trump is likely to seek support from the leaders at the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/trump-g7-iran-france-india-2b13227bfc63d5c7c92c64488e3e2753">G7 Summit</a> meeting held in France, where he electronically signed the Islamabad MOU. However, in the escalating great power rivalries environment, the involvement of G7 nations will be quite nuanced.</p>
<p>Deciphering from the information available so far, nothing within the preliminary terms of the present ceasefire suggests that a 60-day truce will compel Iran to permanently abandon its regional proxy network. For Iran, groups like Hezbollah and Hamas are vital defensive organs. Because forcing their complete dissolution is beyond the scope of a standard ceasefire, Israel will view any finalized U.S.-Iran document with deep suspicion and may ultimately refuse to honor its terms, preferring to continue its military campaign.</p>
<ol start="4">
<li><strong> The South Asian Pivot: Pakistan and India’s Subcontinental Tussle in the Gulf</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>The 2026 conflict has also manifested the subcontinental rivalry of India and Pakistan directly into the Middle Eastern theater, altering the geopolitical balance of power between the two nuclear-armed neighbors.</p>
<p>With the collapse of direct Western-led communication channels during the peak of the fighting, Pakistan leveraged its historic 900-kilometer border with Iran and its deep institutional ties with the Arab Gulf to emerge as the prime mediator between Washington and Tehran. The resulting &#8220;Islamabad Peace Process&#8221;—headlined by face-to-face talks in April 2026 between U.S. Vice President JD Vance and Iranian Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—elevated Pakistan into an indispensable global peace broker. By opening up back-channel communication lines via its Interests Section in Washington, Pakistan successfully negotiated the temporary cessation of hostilities, protecting its own vital economic interests, specifically the massive flow of worker remittances from the Gulf.</p>
<p>This diplomatic triumph directly challenges <a href="https://politact.com/examining-saudi-iran-tensions-and-its-impact-on-south-asia-china/">India’s long-term strategic investments in the Middle East</a>. Over the previous decade, New Delhi had built a formidable geopolitical axis anchored on deep technological, defense, and economic ties with Israel and the UAE. India viewed this alignment as a way to project power westward and isolate Pakistan.</p>
<p>However, as Pakistan successfully positions itself as the necessary arbiter of regional stability between the U.S. and Iran, India’s rigid alignment with the Israel-UAE axis risks locking it out of the broader post-war regional consensus. If the Middle East transitions into a managed &#8220;cold peace&#8221; where Iran’s equities are formally recognized, Pakistan&#8217;s diplomatic capital will grow, neutralizing some of the strategic leverage India had accumulated through its partnerships.</p>
<ol start="5">
<li><strong> Conclusion: The Structural Impasse of the Grand Vision</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>The grand vision originally championed by the Abraham Accords and the Board of Peace has arrived at a structural impasse. The only plausible pathway for these frameworks to move forward as instruments of a durable, comprehensive regional peace requires two simultaneous, seemingly impossible geopolitical concessions:</p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Iran must join the bandwagon</strong>, abandoning its regional agenda and accepting a formalized integration into a security architecture alongside Israel. This would be accompanied by the cassation of support for Hezbollah and Hamas.</li>
<li><strong>Israel must accept a viable, sovereign two-state solution</strong>, ceasing expansion of territory either via settlements or military use.  This will providing the necessary political cover for Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the wider Muslim world to formally normalize ties.</li>
</ol>
<p>Given current political realities, neither condition is achievable. Israel’s domestic political landscape remains firmly set against territorial compromise, viewing military containment and absolute security dominance as its only viable future. Concurrently, Iran’s clerical and military elite view their asymmetric deterrent power and proxy networks as the sole shield preserving the Islamic Republic from Western-orchestrated regime change.</p>
<p>Consequently, whether the conflict transitions through continued military attrition or a formalized ceasefire, the Board of Peace and the Abraham Accords will be forced to mutate. Rather than tools for authentic peace and regional integration, they will function as a defensive alignment designed not to resolve the region’s core disputes, but to manage an unstable and fractured &#8220;cold peace.&#8221;</p>
<p><strong>Related Articles:<br />
</strong></p>
<p class="entry-title"><a href="https://politact.com/the-us-israel-and-iran-conflict-the-interplay-of-goals-and-strategies/">The US-Israel and Iran Conflict: The Interplay of Goals and Strategies</a> &#8211; May 1, 2026<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/geopolitics-of-islamic-world-and-middle-power-alliance-building-after-iran-attack/">Geopolitics Of Islamic World And Middle Power Alliances After Iran Attack</a> – Mar 22, 2026<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/the-end-of-strategic-altruism-putins-visit-and-the-new-us-india-reality/">The End Of Strategic Altruism: Putin’s Visit And The New US-India Reality</a> – Jan 13, 2026<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/from-oslo-to-trumps-abraham-accords-and-20-point-peace-plan-for-gaza/">From Oslo To Trump’s Abraham Accords And 20-Point Peace Plan For Gaza</a> – Oct 12, 2025<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/israel-airstrike-targets-hamas-negotiators-in-doha-threatening-gaza-ceasefire-talks/">Israel Airstrike Targets Hamas Negotiators In Doha, Threatening Gaza Ceasefire Talks</a> – Sep 15, 2025<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/gaza-ceasefire-plan-and-us-iran-tensions/">Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions</a> – April 26, 2025<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/two-state-solution-future-of-gaza-and-iran/">Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran</a> – February 25, 2025<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/assads-demise-and-the-shifting-balance-of-power-in-middle-east/">Assad’s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East</a> – Dec 26, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/the-escalating-middle-east-crisis-and-president-elect-trump/">The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump</a> – Dec 5, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-and-india-middle-east-europe-corridor-imec/">China’s Belt And Road Initiative And India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC)</a> – Oct 5, 2023<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/irans-potential-retaliation-for-haniyehs-killing-and-wider-consequences/">Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences</a> – Aug 30, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/the-iran-pakistan-gas-pipeline-project-economic-and-geopolitical-realities/">The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities</a> – Sep 27, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/great-power-rivalry-and-chinas-deepening-involvement-in-south-asia-gulf-states/">Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States</a> – Aug 4, 2023<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/what-does-president-bidens-visit-to-israel-and-saudi-arabia-imply/">What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply?</a> – Aug 4, 2022</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/us-iran-interim-ceasefire-deal-israel-and-the-future-of-abraham-accords/">US-Iran Interim Ceasefire Deal, Israel, And The Future of Abraham Accords</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>From Oslo To Trump’s Abraham Accords And 20-Point Peace Plan For Gaza</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/from-oslo-to-trumps-abraham-accords-and-20-point-peace-plan-for-gaza/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Naade Ali]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 12 Oct 2025 16:30:01 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Core vs Peripheral Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Countering Extremism and Homeland Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global Power Tussles and Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global Realignment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global Security Advisor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Libya, Palestine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US-Islamic World Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Abraham Accords]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arab Street]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Axis of resistance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China and Russia influence in Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of Hamas and Gaza reconstruction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics of Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global balance of power]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hamas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hezbollah]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran's nuclear program]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel Hamas ceasefire Egypt talks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East Balance of Power]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Muslim Street]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Oslo Accord lessons for Gaza]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Outside In Approach to Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Palestinian statehood negotiations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shaaping the new Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump 20-point peace proposal]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump Gaza peace plan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Two State Solution]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U.S.-Israel relations and regional stability]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=10635</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="259" height="194" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Al-Aqsa-Mosque.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Al Aqsa Mosque" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Al-Aqsa-Mosque.jpg 259w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Al-Aqsa-Mosque-80x60.jpg 80w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 259px) 100vw, 259px" />PoliTact&#8217;s Global Security Study With inputs from Naade Ali and Arif Ansar Context Negotiations on the Trump’s 20-point Gaza Peace Package has been ongoing in Egypt since Monday, and the deal on the first phase between Hamas and Israel was announced on October 8th. At first glance, the focus appears to be on tactical choices, [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/from-oslo-to-trumps-abraham-accords-and-20-point-peace-plan-for-gaza/">From Oslo To Trump’s Abraham Accords And 20-Point Peace Plan For Gaza</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="259" height="194" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Al-Aqsa-Mosque.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Al Aqsa Mosque" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Al-Aqsa-Mosque.jpg 259w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Al-Aqsa-Mosque-80x60.jpg 80w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 259px) 100vw, 259px" /><figure id="attachment_10638" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-10638" style="width: 300px" class="wp-caption alignleft"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-10638" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-300x200.jpg" alt="Abraham Accords Signing Ceremony" width="300" height="200" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-300x200.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-768x512.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-630x420.jpg 630w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-696x464.jpg 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords.jpg 1024w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-10638" class="wp-caption-text">Abraham Accords Signing Ceremony</figcaption></figure>
<p><strong>PoliTact&#8217;s Global Security Study</strong></p>
<p>With inputs from Naade Ali and Arif Ansar</p>
<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>Negotiations on the Trump’s 20-point Gaza Peace Package has been ongoing in Egypt since Monday, and the <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/after-two-years-of-war-israel-and-hamas-agree-to-first-phase-of-trump-s-20-point-peace-framework/ar-AA1O7MSx">deal on the first phase</a> between Hamas and Israel was announced on October 8th. At first glance, the focus appears to be on tactical choices, such as cease-fires, hostage exchanges, the future of Gaza, the fate of Hamas, and whether the Abraham Accords survive the region’s new trauma. Trump’s plan is pragmatic: a phased cease-fire, hostage-prisoner swaps, an interim technocratic authority to oversee Gaza reconstruction and demilitarization. However, it’s much vaguer where the politics bite: long-term political status, refugee questions, and Palestinian statehood.</p>
<p>The leaders of eight Muslim-majority states: Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Türkiye, Indonesia, Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan, who met Trump on the sidelines of the 80th UN General Assembly in New York, had expressed support for the plan in a <a href="https://mofa.gov.pk/press-releases/joint-statement-by-the-foreign-ministers-of-jordan-united-arab-emirates-indonesia-pakistan-turkiye-saudi-arabia-qatar-and-egypt">joint statement</a>, praising his “<em>sincere efforts to end the war in Gaza</em>” and expressing confidence in his ability to achieve peace. However, the text of the plan released subsequently has raised concerns among Arab countries and drawn significant domestic criticism, as it deviates from the proposals of the foreign ministers of the eight Muslim states. <a href="https://www.axios.com/2025/09/30/trump-gaza-peace-plan-israel-changes-hamas-response">Reports</a> indicate that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu secured “the last word,” persuading Washington to make additional changes at a stage when it was harder for the Muslim countries to intervene.</p>
<p>How the Gaza question is resolved — whether as a primarily security-led stabilization by disarming, re-building, and technocratic governance or as a political settlement that recognizes Palestinian political rights in a durable way — is yet to be seen. An Israeli-U.S. approach that produces security and normalization without a credible, enforceable pathway to Palestinian political rights and without addressing refugee claims, settlements or permanent borders risks locking in a durable, managed status quo that advantageously cements Israeli gains and rewards Arab normalization while leaving Palestinian grievances unresolved.</p>
<p>For critics and many Palestinians, the plan’s biggest flaw is that it recapitulates the old “deal by omission” problem — postpone the hard political questions and hope that security fixes suffice. Robert Malley’s long reflection on the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/10/01/gaza-peace-process-history-robert-malley/">failure of past peace processes</a> is a timely reminder that postponing core issues almost guarantees revival of conflict rather than durable peace.</p>
<p><iframe loading="lazy" title="YouTube video player" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/7P2HySqO0Lg?si=VP7TMdVolLF3V3NT" width="560" height="315" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen"></iframe></p>
<p><strong>Shift in the Middle East Balance of Power</strong></p>
<p>Since Trump’s first term in power led to Abraham Accords in September 2020, the Middle East is undergoing tumultuous shift in the balance of power. This shift is away from Iran’s axis of resistance and towards those that signed the Abraham Accords &#8211; and others that were moving towards accepting it. Highlighting plans to expand the signatories to the Abraham Accord and emphasizing the strategic and economic benefits of cooperating with Israel, Trump recently stated:</p>
<p>“<em>History has shown us that those who establish relations with Israel have thrived, while those who devote resources and attention toward the destruction — even the annihilation — of Israel have languished. Israel is not going anywhere. They are going to coexist with other peoples and countries in the region. The Abraham Accords demonstrate that nations are better off when they communicate, work together, and embrace new opportunities.</em>”</p>
<p>The last five years have seen aggressive Israeli campaigns and intelligence operations directed at damaging — sometimes decisively — Iran’s regional network: kinetic blows, targeted assassinations of key operatives in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, and continued pressure on Iran’s enlistment of militias. Another focus has been the degrading of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, whether by eliminating key scientists, or by cyberattacks on its nuclear facility. In June, US also carried out <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/world/middle-east/2025/06/22/how-effective-was-the-us-attack-on-irans-nuclear-sites/">bombing of the Iran’s nuclear facilities</a> in Fordow, Isfahan, and Nanatz sites.</p>
<p>The net effect has been to cripple Iran’s reach: Hezbollah was weakened on the battlefield during the 2023–24 rounds of fighting; Iran’s Quds Force lost its most iconic commander in Qasem Soleimani in January 2020. Recently, Isreal shifted its focus to the political leadership, which lead to the <a href="https://politact.com/irans-potential-retaliation-for-haniyehs-killing-and-wider-consequences/">assassination of Ismael Haniyeh</a> on Iranian soil in July 2024, followed by elimination of Hassan Nasrullah in Lebanon in September 2024. However, it was the <a href="https://politact.com/israel-airstrike-targets-hamas-negotiators-in-doha-threatening-gaza-ceasefire-talks/">Israeli attack on Hamas negotiators in Doha</a> last month that many experts believe may have broken the camel’s back. It blurred the line of who is Israel after &#8211; and what does it want to achieve with all the mayhem that followed Oct 7, 2023, tragic Hamas attack on Israel. The campaign against Iran has demonstrated that Israel can play with international rules at will and without any consequences. This will have grave long-term consequences for global order.</p>
<p>But degradation does not mean elimination — proxies adapt, civilian costs grow, and local politics evolve in unpredictable ways. Alongside coercion and violence, normalization diplomacy has quietly reshaped the balance. The Abraham Accords proved that several Arab states were prepared to prioritize trade, technology, and counter-Iran cooperation, over the old formula that required Palestinian statehood before normalization. This bargain created an “outside-in” model of Israeli influence — Israel’s security and economic ties extend into the Arab world even as its control over Palestinian territories and the facts on the ground become more entrenched.</p>
<p>That model has a dual consequence: it strengthens Israel’s regional legitimacy and deterred coalitions, but it also delegitimizes the Palestinian cause in some Arab capitals. Unless meaningful political concessions accompany normalization under the current rounds of peace accords – the situation may plan in the hands of hardliners in the longer run.</p>
<p><strong>Reshaping the New Middle East</strong></p>
<p>The 20-point Trump plan thus revolve around two linked wagers.</p>
<p>First: can an externally led, security-first approach end immediate bloodshed and create a stable environment for reconstruction? Second: can that short-term security compact be turned into a politically legitimate, durable settlement that includes Palestinian rights and prevents radicalization? If the answer to the second question is “no,” then any tactical success will be ephemeral — the security gains will ossify into new grievances and a renewed cycle of violence.</p>
<p>If the American-Israeli tack succeeds in producing a stable Gaza that is demilitarized, internationally managed and economically rebuilt — but without a credible pathway to Palestinian statehood, refugee resolution, or substantive political participation — the regional consequence is likely to be twofold:</p>
<p>(a) the anti-Abraham Accord camp will consolidate, and (b) the Palestinian national cause shifts from mainstream diplomacy back to asymmetric forms of resistance and transnational advocacy. That benefits actors that can exploit grievances — whether non-state actors in the region or international rivals that seek influence by presenting themselves as alternatives to the U.S. model.</p>
<p><strong>Middle East and the Global Balance of Power</strong></p>
<p>Potential failure of the U.S.-Israeli approach does not automatically favor China and Russia — but it creates openings. China and Russia are playing a long game: both have expanded political and economic ties in the Middle East, offering infrastructure, arms, and diplomatic cover without the political conditionalities the West often attaches. Beijing’s economic footprint, growing role in regional institutions, including BRICS partners, and willingness to court Gulf states for energy and investment means it can offer attractive alternatives to American dependency.</p>
<p>Moscow, for its part, remains an arms supplier and a diplomatic interlocutor (especially in Syria), and it relishes opportunities to undercut U.S. influence. If Washington’s approach produces stability without justice, public sentiment may turn away from the U.S. narrative and look to non-Western partners who promise investments or political balance-as as has already started to occur. That said, China and Russia do not currently possess the same depth of security integration with Israel or the same network of alliances that would let them ‘replace’ American influence overnight — what they can do is <a href="https://peacediplomacy.org/2025/02/24/chinas-expanding-influence-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa">exploit U.S. credibility gaps</a> to gain economic and political footholds.</p>
<p><strong>The Way Forward</strong></p>
<p>Three practical conclusions emerge from a realistic appraisal of Trump’s 20-point plan:</p>
<ol>
<li>Security outcomes are necessary but not sufficient. Short-term stabilization that includes hostage releases, ceasefires, and reconstruction, is important and politically urgent — but by itself it will not end the conflict’s structural drivers. The old lesson of Oslo remains: <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/10/01/gaza-peace-process-history-robert-malley/">postponing core grievances breeds future crises</a>.</li>
<li><a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/04/the-abraham-accords-after-gaza-a-change-of-context?lang=en">Normalization without a political track</a> is a strategic accelerant for some actors and a strategic liability for others. States that prioritize economic and security ties with Israel will gain leverage; however, the Arab and Muslim Street will judge outcomes by whether justice is achieved for Palestinians.</li>
<li>Geopolitically, <a href="https://politact.com/what-does-president-bidens-visit-to-israel-and-saudi-arabia-imply/">every gap left by U.S. leadership</a>, or perceived U.S. indifference to justice, creates space for China and Russia to expand influence — primarily through diplomacy and investment, and secondarily through arms and political support. But neither Beijing nor Moscow offers a ready-made substitute for U.S. regional security guarantees; rather, <a href="https://peacediplomacy.org/2025/02/24/chinas-expanding-influence-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa">they offer alternative hedges</a> that regional states will use in pursuit of their own short-term interests.</li>
</ol>
<p>If Cairo deal and the Trump package are to avoid merely delaying the next crisis they must do three things simultaneously:</p>
<p>Secure an immediate end to mass killing and human suffering; create an inclusive, accountable reconstruction process that gives Palestinians meaningful agency; and set out an enforceable, internationally backed political roadmap that addresses, not postpones, refugee claims, borders and sovereignty – as was done in the Oslo Accords. Without that tripod, any “victory” will be tactical, not strategic — and the balance of power will keep shifting unpredictably, with winners among states and non-state actors who are best at exploiting unresolved grievances.</p>
<p><strong>Related Articles:<br />
</strong></p>
<p class="entry-title"><a href="https://politact.com/israel-airstrike-targets-hamas-negotiators-in-doha-threatening-gaza-ceasefire-talks/">Israel Airstrike Targets Hamas Negotiators In Doha, Threatening Gaza Ceasefire Talks</a> &#8211; Sep 15, 2025<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/gaza-ceasefire-plan-and-us-iran-tensions/">Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions</a> – April 26, 2025<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/two-state-solution-future-of-gaza-and-iran/">Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran</a> – February 25, 2025<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/assads-demise-and-the-shifting-balance-of-power-in-middle-east/">Assad’s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East</a> – Dec 26, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/the-escalating-middle-east-crisis-and-president-elect-trump/">The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump</a> – Dec 5, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/irans-potential-retaliation-for-haniyehs-killing-and-wider-consequences/">Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences</a> – Aug 30, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/the-iran-pakistan-gas-pipeline-project-economic-and-geopolitical-realities/">The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities</a> – Sep 27, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/what-does-president-bidens-visit-to-israel-and-saudi-arabia-imply/">What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply?</a> &#8211; Aug 4, 2022</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/from-oslo-to-trumps-abraham-accords-and-20-point-peace-plan-for-gaza/">From Oslo To Trump’s Abraham Accords And 20-Point Peace Plan For Gaza</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/irans-potential-retaliation-for-haniyehs-killing-and-wider-consequences/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 30 Aug 2024 12:16:56 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Core vs Peripheral Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US and Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vantage Point Analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arab Israeli conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Axis of resistance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China and Iran ties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China Israel Ties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chinese role in the Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics of Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Great Power Rivalry]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hamas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hezbollah]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Houthis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran Israel conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Killing of Ismail Haniyeh]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[October 7 Gaza Attack]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[OIC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia Iran Ties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russian Role in the Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Saudi Iran tensions]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=10416</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="275" height="183" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Khomenei-and-Haniyeh.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" />Naad-e-Ali Sulehria Context The assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31st has brought Iran and Israel, and the larger Middle East, to the brink of all-out conflict. Not only that, it has also escalated the great power rivalry, which was already simmering over the situation of Ukraine. For the first time, [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/irans-potential-retaliation-for-haniyehs-killing-and-wider-consequences/">Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="275" height="183" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Khomenei-and-Haniyeh.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" /><p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignleft size-full wp-image-10418" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Khomenei-and-Haniyeh.jpg" alt="" width="275" height="183" />Naad-e-Ali Sulehria</p>
<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-chief-ismail-haniyeh-killed-iran-hamas-says-statement-2024-07-31/">assassination</a> of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31st has brought Iran and Israel, and the larger Middle East, to the brink of all-out conflict. Not only that, it has also escalated the great power rivalry, which was already simmering over the situation of Ukraine. For the first time, Ukrainian forces have <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/08/07/europe/russia-ukrainian-troops-cross-border-intl/index.html">crossed the Russian border</a> in the Kursk region and have taken over a few border cities.</p>
<p>Iran has <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2024/jul/31/irans-khamenei-vows-revenge-against-israel-over-ki/">threat</a>en retaliation against Israel. While Israel has previously targeted other high profile Iranian figures, such as its nuclear scientists. However, for various reasons the country <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/04/14/middle-east-iran-israel-war-00152138">failed</a> to give a proportionate response. One of the main one being that Iran does not want a full-blown conflict which can result in a strike against its nuclear program.</p>
<p>It was just on April 14 this year that <a href="https://apnews.com/article/strait-of-hormuz-vessel-33fcffde2d867380e98c89403776a8ac">Iran launched a barrage</a> of missiles at Israel for assassinating two of its generals, targeted at the Iranian consular building in Syria. Most of these projectiles were intercepted. The Iranian reaction this time may be different. Iran&#8217;s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, has vowed to punish Israel and recently denounced what he described as Israel&#8217;s psychological warfare, intended to make Iran reconsider its reprisal. He also offered a religious justification, declaring that any retreat—whether military, political, or economic—would be a grave sin in the eyes of God, inviting &#8220;<a href="https://english.khamenei.ir/news/11045/Nontactical-retreat-in-the-face-of-enemy-will-bring-divine-wrath">divine wrath</a>.&#8221;</p>
<p>While the nations response is inevitable, the uncertainty around its timing and scale, have intensified psychological strain and war fatigue in Israel. While some <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-delay-israel-attack-hamas/33078726.html">see</a> this delay as reflecting Iran’s dilemma—caught between the need to respond decisively to Israel and the desire to avoid being drawn into a catastrophic regional war. This is especially true when the U.S. is fully <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/08/03/nx-s1-5062390/us-military-deployment-middle-east-israel-iran">backing</a> Israel. However, others <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/eye-on-the-middle-east-iran-s-revival-of-strategic-patience-amid-slow-burn-ceasefire-negotiations-101724073390999.html">interpret</a> the delay as a sign of Iran’s strategic patience, possibly preparing a more powerful and calculated response than before.</p>
<p><strong>Why the Delay in Response?</strong></p>
<p>Recently, Ali Mohammad Naini, spokesperson for Iran&#8217;s Revolutionary Guards, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/waiting-period-irans-retaliation-against-israel-could-be-long-revolutionary-2024-08-20/">disclosed</a> that the nation is unlikely to repeat previous style of operations and that there might be a significant pause. Two factors are likely contributing as Iran deliberates.</p>
<p>First, the annual &#8216;<a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202408174462">Arbaeen Walk</a>,&#8217; a major Shiite pilgrimage to Iraq is underway, with over 2.6 million Iranian pilgrims crossing the border. <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Iran-operates-100-flights-to-Iraq-for-Arbaeen-Pilgrimage-millions-expected-in-Karbala">According</a> to the Iranian Airport Authority, more than 100 flights have operated between Iran and Iraq over the past days, transporting thousands of Iranian pilgrims. With over 20 million pilgrims from Iran, Iraq, and other countries participating this year, Tehran is highly <a href="https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/502744/Arbaeen-a-display-of-Islamic-power-Gen-Baqeri">focused</a> on securing this major event and is hesitant to engage in a conflict with Israel. Once the pilgrimage concludes, Iran will likely be able to refocus.</p>
<p>The second factor involves Iran&#8217;s continued efforts to secure international support for what it <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c14znyrdkrmo">views</a> as its legal right to defend its sovereignty and deter any further Israeli aggression on its territory.</p>
<p><strong>Efforts towards Cease Fire</strong></p>
<p>In the midst of heightened tensions, the U.S. has put forward a bridge <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/aug/19/blinken-says-gaza-ceasefire-talks-maybe-last-opportunity-for-hostage-deal">ceasefire proposal</a> for Gaza, contingent on the release of Israeli hostages held by Hamas. At the same time, the U.S. has <a href="https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-august-7-2024/">called</a> on OIC member states to urge Tehran to show restraint, cautioning that regional escalation could undermine the chances of securing a truce. To reach a deal between Hamas and Israel, the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken also <a href="https://il.usembassy.gov/secretary-blinken-is-on-travel-to-israel-egypt-and-qatar/">visit</a>ed the region again.</p>
<p>Following pressure from the U.S, reportedly Israel <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5y3xzex72no">accepted</a> the terms of the deal on 19 August. The U.S. is now counting on its Arab partners Qatar and Egypt to persuade Hamas to comply as well. While these efforts aim to prevent a broader conflict, Iran has downplayed these developments, <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202408191484">insisting</a> that a ceasefire will not deter Tehran’s plans for retaliation against Israel, indicating that it&#8217;s a matter of when, not if.</p>
<p>Experts <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/08/13/iran-assassinations-united-state-israel/">estimate</a> that instead of launching costly missile strikes, Iran may copy Israel&#8217;s tactic and may attempt to target  top Israeli officials. Whatever form Iran&#8217;s reaction takes, it is clear that such an action would <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202408182882">provoke</a> a full-scale response from Israel, significantly impacting regional security, particularly for its neighbors, including the GCC countries and Pakistan.</p>
<p><strong>China and Russia</strong></p>
<p>Both Russia and China have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china-supports-iran-defending-security-says-foreign-minister-2024-08-11/">echoed</a> Tehran’s narrative on protecting its &#8220;sovereignty, security, and national dignity.&#8221; <a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/08/19/iran-seeks-purchase-of-advanced-spy-satellites-from-china/">Reports</a> suggest that Iran is seeking to acquire Chinese spy satellites to enhance its capability to target U.S. and Israeli forces. This latest deal builds on the 25-year strategic agreement signed between Iran and China in 2021, in which both countries <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/25-year-iran-china-agreement-endangering-2500-years-heritage">committed</a> to advancing military, security, and economic cooperation.</p>
<p>Similarly, following the assassination of Haniyah, Russia’s Secretary of the Security Council <a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/08/05/head-of-russian-security-council-arrives-in-iran/">visited</a> Tehran to discuss enhanced security ties and pledged to increase military contracts between Tehran and Moscow. Subsequently, <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-iran-weapons-arms-ballistic-missiles-drones-defense-war-in-ukraine-war-in-gaza/">reports</a> emerged that Russia had transferred Iskander missile systems and Murmansk-BN electronic warfare systems to Iran, adding to its already extensive <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/iran-has-3000-ballistic-missiles-ready-war-210622">arsenal</a> of over 3,000 ballistic missiles. Russia will likely counteract NATO supplying assistance and weapons to Ukraine by bolstering its ally Iran and use this as a leverage against the West.</p>
<p><strong>OIC, GCC, Turkey and Pakistan </strong></p>
<p>Additionally, 57 Muslim-majority countries <a href="https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20240808_03/">expressed</a> their support for Iran during an emergency meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) on August 7th. While all member states <a href="https://thefrontierpost.com/oic-says-israel-fully-responsible-for-hamas-leaders-death/">condemned</a> Haniyah&#8217;s killing as a blatant violation of Iran’s sovereignty, Pakistan <a href="https://en.mfa.gov.ir/portal/newsview/751274/Pakistan-expresses-full-support-for-Iran-in-confronting-threats">voiced</a> the strongest support for Iran in confronting Israeli aggression.</p>
<p>GCC countries with <a href="https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-following-the-ministerial-meeting-of-the-united-states-and-the-gulf-cooperation-council-gcc-2/">strategic partnerships</a> with the U.S. are likely to avoid coming to Iran’s aid, as their agreements prohibit them from attacking a key U.S. ally. The same applies to Turkey, which could risk its NATO membership if it sides with Iran. However, Turkey’s recent stance towards Israel suggests it might be willing to take that risk. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/07/29/world/politics/turkey-erdogan-israel-intervention/">issued</a> early warnings suggesting its military may get involved on the side of the Palestinians. Additionally, Turkish Ambassador to Iran has reportedly <a href="https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/502685/Turkey-s-objectives-in-Caucasus-will-not-compromise-Iran-s-interests">indicated</a> support for Iran’s response, implying that Turkey and other Muslim-majority countries bear a shared responsibility to respond to Haniya’s assassination.</p>
<p>If Turkey becomes entangled in the conflict, Pakistan, with one of the strongest military forces in the Muslim world, would face immense pressure to take sides. This would create a strategic dilemma for the country, in the same way as it has for Turkey, which may want to defend Iran against Israel but also avoid jeopardizing ties with its key security partner, the U.S.</p>
<p>Supporting Iran could help Pakistan’s military restore its declining domestic reputation and advance the objective of fostering religiously inspired stability in the country. Even opposition figures like Imran Khan, whose <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/pakistans-political-scene-looks-increasingly-unsettled-and-complicated">standoff</a> with the military establishment remains a major factor in Pakistan&#8217;s political polarization, might alter his position and support the military.</p>
<p>Alternatively, if bull blown conflict erupts in the Middle East and Pakistan supports remains lackluster for Iran, the country could face protests, especially from the religious groups. While the state might resort to cracking down on political dissent to contain domestic unrest, this could widen the gap between the civil-military establishment and the public.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/irans-potential-retaliation-for-haniyehs-killing-and-wider-consequences/">Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
