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		<title>US-Iran War And Alternative Futures For South Asia</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/us-iran-war-and-alternative-futures-for-south-asia/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Arif Ansar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 25 Jul 2026 17:42:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=10874</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="583" height="428" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/583_Map_of_Middle_East_Jan_13_20103.gif" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" fetchpriority="high" />By Arif Ansar Context The fragile security landscape of South Asia is increasingly tied to the volatile geopolitics of the Middle East. As the tripartite tensions involving the United States, Israel, and Iran simmer, the shockwaves are felt acutely in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and for that matter India as well. To fully comprehend this equation, [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/us-iran-war-and-alternative-futures-for-south-asia/">US-Iran War And Alternative Futures For South Asia</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="583" height="428" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/583_Map_of_Middle_East_Jan_13_20103.gif" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" /><p><img decoding="async" class="alignleft size-full wp-image-2695" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20-04-2011_Pakistan-Iran.jpg" alt="" width="181" height="121" />By Arif Ansar</p>
<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>The fragile security landscape of South Asia is increasingly tied to the volatile geopolitics of the Middle East. As the tripartite tensions involving the United States, Israel, and Iran simmer, the shockwaves are felt acutely in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and for that matter India as well. To fully comprehend this equation, one must analyze the internal regional dynamics of South Asia first and then trace how they intersect with the unfolding Middle Eastern crisis.</p>
<p>The successful negotiation and remote signing of the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/strait-hormuz-reopen-us-lift-iran-sanctions-14-point-deal-seeking-end-rcna350513">Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding</a> (MoU) on June 17, 2026, by U.S. President Donald Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, marked a monumental achievement for Pakistan’s civil-military leadership. If the Islamabad MoU sticks, in its current or reformed form, and transitions into a durable peace agreement, it holds the potential to fundamentally rewrite Pakistan&#8217;s domestic security, energy, and economic paradigms.</p>
<ol>
<li><strong> The Regional Dynamics: South Asia’s Internal Fault Lines</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>The relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan is currently defined by severe friction rather than neighborly cooperation. At the center of this tension is the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an extremist group that has <a href="https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2026/07/15/operation-shaban-toll-rises-to-123-as-security-forces-intensify-offensive-against-terrorists">escalated its terror campaign inside Pakistan</a>. Pakistan accuses the Afghan Taliban of providing safe havens and tacit support to the TTP—a claim the Taliban administration in Kabul denies, though the cross-border nature of TTP attacks remains a persistent flashpoint.</p>
<p>Concurrently, Pakistan’s southwestern province of Balochistan is facing a severe security crisis. The insurgent groups such as Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) are demanding independence for the resource-rich province, has dramatically escalated its attacks against the Pakistani military.</p>
<p>Media reports suggest that the BLA is receiving strategic cooperation and material support from the TTP, creating a combined internal security challenge for Islamabad. Pakistan alleges that the BLA receives external backing from India to destabilize the country. India and Israel are exceptionally close strategic allies, sharing deep defense, intelligence, and counter-terrorism partnerships.</p>
<p>There is great power rivalry part of the equation too. BLA has repeatedly <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/pakistan-what-is-behind-attacks-on-chinese-nationals/a-70425841">targeted Chinese infrastructure projects</a> and personnel associated with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in Balochistan in other parts of the country, aiming to disrupt Pakistan&#8217;s economic lifeline and strain its relationship with Beijing.</p>
<ol start="2">
<li><strong> The Middle East Equation: The Islamabad MoU and Saudi Defense Commitments</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>To understand how these South Asian fault lines link to the Middle East, one must look at Pakistan’s diplomatic balancing act. The nation has historically maintained a delicate equilibrium: keeping close ties with Saudi Arabia, and other GCC nations, while managing a long, porous border with its neighbor, Iran.</p>
<p><strong>The Islamabad MoU</strong></p>
<p>In mid-2026, Pakistan&#8217;s diplomatic corps, alongside Qatar, achieved a historic breakthrough by mediating the Islamabad MoU. This 14-point framework agreement successfully brought the U.S. and Iran to a temporary ceasefire, temporarily halting direct military hostilities, lifting the U.S. naval blockade on Iranian ports, and opening the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz. This diplomatic triumph cemented Pakistan’s role as a vital regional mediator. However, as hostilities have broken again indicating the stability of the Islamabad MoU remains incredibly fragile.</p>
<p><strong>The Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA)</strong></p>
<p>Compounding this fragility is Pakistan&#8217;s security obligation to Riyadh. On September 17, 2025, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/could-pakistani-saudi-defense-pact-be-first-step-toward-nato-style-alliance">Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA)</a>. Echoing NATO’s Article 5 language, the SMDA treats &#8220;any aggression against either country as an aggression against both&#8221;.</p>
<p>If an all-out war breaks out in the Middle East, a dangerous chain reaction is highly likely. Ansar Allah (the Houthis) in Yemen are highly likely to <a href="https://www.dropsitenews.com/p/yemen-sanaa-airport-ansarallah-saudi-houthis-bab-al-mandab-bukhaiti">close the Babul Mandab</a> Strait and launch retaliatory ballistic missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia. Faced with direct attacks, Saudi Arabia will almost certainly invoke the SMDA. Reports indicate that under the <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2644094/saudi-arabia">confidential terms</a> of the pact, Pakistan could be required to deploy up to 80,000 troops to secure Saudi borders. Sooner or later, Pakistan will be forced to choose between entering a foreign conflict to defend Saudi Arabia or reneging on its defense pact, which would devastate its economic and strategic relations with the Gulf.</p>
<ol start="3">
<li><strong> Implications of a Worsening Middle East Conflict on Pakistan and Afghanistan</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>If the Middle East situation continues to deteriorate, the consequences will ripple across South Asia, severely impacting Pakistan and Afghanistan, and India across military, economic, and social domains.</p>
<p>Pakistan is already heavily engaged in counter-insurgency operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) against the TTP, and in Balochistan against the BLA and BLF, the Pakistani military is stretched thin. Faced with a domestic security crisis, coming to the active defense of Saudi Arabia would be an immense logistical and military strain. Knowing this, adversaries like India and Israel are highly likely to speed up their destabilizing activities inside Pakistan. By utilizing existing proxies, they can ensure that Pakistan remains too deeply entangled in internal security crises to project military power or assist its Gulf allies.</p>
<p>This regional sabotage directly undermines <a href="https://politact.com/the-future-of-afghan-taliban-pakistan-conflict-implications-for-regional-stability-and-us-interests/">Washington’s strategic goals</a>. The U.S. relies on Pakistan’s diplomatic weight to mediate with Tehran, as seen with the Islamabad MoU. A destabilized Pakistan is a nation that cannot play a constructive role in preventing a wider regional war in the Middle East or contribute towards the success of <a href="https://politact.com/us-iran-interim-ceasefire-deal-israel-and-the-future-of-abraham-accords/">new vision</a> for the Middle East &#8211; under the Abraham Accords and subsequent establishment of Board of Peace.</p>
<p><strong>The Explosion of Sectarian Strife</strong></p>
<p>A direct conflict involving Iran—the primary Shia power—and the U.S., Israel, or Sunni Arab Gulf states will instantly inflame sectarian fault lines in South Asia. Both Pakistan Afghanistan have <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/shia-population-by-country">sizable Shia minorities</a> that have historically been targeted by hardline Sunni extremist groups. While India also has a sizeable Shia population, and while Muslims there face state repression, Shia’s there have not been targeted in a similar fashion.</p>
<p>A worsening Middle East war will be actively exploited by transnational terror networks, most notably Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISIS-K). ISIS-K, which operates across both Afghanistan and Pakistan, views Shia Muslims as heretics and has frequently targeted their mosques, community centers, and schools.</p>
<p>In Afghanistan: The ruling Taliban, while ideologically hardline Sunni, has sought to maintain basic internal stability. However, a regional sectarian war will severely test their control. ISIS-K will use the anti-Iran, anti-Shia rhetoric of the wider conflict to recruit disgruntled fighters, escalating attacks on the Shia Hazara community and challenging Taliban authority.</p>
<p>In Pakistan: Sectarian violence has historically claimed thousands of lives. An active war involving Iran and Saudi Arabia could trigger a revival of sectarian proxy wars on Pakistani soil, pitting localized militant groups against one another and further fracturing the country’s social cohesion.</p>
<ol start="4">
<li><strong> Economic Devastation and Connectivity Collapses</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>The economic fallout of a prolonged Middle East war on Pakistan and Afghanistan would be catastrophic.</p>
<p><strong>Energy and Remittance Shocks</strong></p>
<p>Pakistan imports the <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/pakistan/imports-by-country">vast majority of its oil and gas</a> from the Gulf. A disruption in the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab el-Mandeb would cause global oil prices to skyrocket, triggering hyperinflation in Pakistan&#8217;s fragile, debt-burdened economy. Furthermore, millions of Pakistani expatriates live and work in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. If the Middle East slides into a broader war, many of these workers could be forced to return home, cutting off the vital stream of foreign remittances that keeps Pakistan&#8217;s economy afloat.</p>
<p><strong>The Death of Regional Connectivity</strong></p>
<p>Both Afghanistan and Pakistan have pinned their economic futures on becoming trade hubs. Afghanistan under the Taliban has sought to utilize Iran&#8217;s Chabahar Port and the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) to bypass landlocked constraints and reduce its dependence on Pakistani transit routes.</p>
<p>While the Islamabad MoU briefly revived hopes for these transit corridors, an escalation of the war would render these infrastructure projects dead on arrival. Iranian ports would once again become military targets, isolating Afghanistan economically and pushing it deeper into poverty, which in turn breeds further radicalization and instability. Moreover, in the recent escalation, reports indicate that US has also <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/us-targets-iran-s-chabahar-port-in-fresh-strikes-hegseth-shares-image-of-collapsing-watchtower/ar-AA286DAw">targeted Chabahar port</a> to increase pressure on Iran.</p>
<ol start="5">
<li><strong> Conclusion: A Dangerous Convergence</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>The potential escalation of the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict is not a localized Middle Eastern issue; it is a direct threat to the stability of South Asia. For Pakistan, the war represents an existential geopolitical trap, forcing it to balance a strict mutual defense treaty with Saudi Arabia against the reality of a heavily armed neighbor in Iran and a domestic theater crawling with active insurgencies. For Afghanistan, the conflict threatens to fuel the fires of ISIS-K&#8217;s sectarian violence and destroy any hopes of regional economic integration.</p>
<p>As external actors seek to exploit these vulnerabilities, the line between the Middle East&#8217;s conflicts and South Asia&#8217;s internal wars is rapidly dissolving. If the Islamabad MoU completely unravels, Pakistan and Afghanistan will find themselves directly in the line of fire of a wider, highly destructive regional war.</p>
<p><strong>Conversely:</strong></p>
<p>If the Islamabad MoU &#8220;sticks&#8221; and transitions from a fragile ceasefire into a durable peace agreement, it holds the potential to fundamentally rewrite Pakistan&#8217;s domestic security, energy, and economic paradigms.</p>
<p><strong>a. Security: Strangling Proxies</strong></p>
<p>By capitalizing on its diplomatic leverage from mediating between the U.S. and Iran, Pakistan can demand reciprocal action against cross-border threats. A secure Iran, freed from Western military threats, can work with the Pakistan Army to seal the lawless border, choking the logistics and safe havens of the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) favored by India and Israel. Simultaneously, a stabilized region enables a unified U.S.-Pakistan-Iran diplomatic front to pressure the Afghan Taliban. Highly dependent on Pakistani and Iranian transit trade (like Chabahar Port), Kabul would be forced to dismantle the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). This double clampdown effectively ends the multi-front subversion designed by adversaries to keep Pakistan tactically entrapped.</p>
<p><strong>b. Economy &amp; Energy: Resurrecting the IP Pipeline</strong></p>
<p>A durable reformed MoU triggers the lifting of U.S. sanctions on Iran, allowing Pakistan to complete the Iran-Pakistan (IP) Gas Pipeline without fear of international isolation. This removes the looming $18 billion &#8220;take-or-pay&#8221; penalty from Tehran, while injecting cheap natural gas to end rolling blackouts and slash industrial costs. Moreover, Gwadar Port is likely to take-off.</p>
<p><strong>c. Autonomy: Balancing GCC Ties</strong></p>
<p>Abundant energy and secured Central Asian trade routes drive organic growth, offering financial self-reliance and breaking Pakistan&#8217;s dependency on Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) bailouts. This shields Islamabad from strategic entrapment under its Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) with Riyadh, preserving its neutrality instead of dragging its military into regional proxy wars.</p>
<p><strong>Related Articles</strong></p>
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<a href="https://politact.com/the-us-israel-and-iran-conflict-the-interplay-of-goals-and-strategies/">The US-Israel and Iran Conflict: The Interplay of Goals and Strategies</a> – May 1, 2026<br />
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<a href="https://politact.com/two-state-solution-future-of-gaza-and-iran/">Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran</a> – February 25, 2025<br />
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<a href="https://politact.com/irans-potential-retaliation-for-haniyehs-killing-and-wider-consequences/">Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences</a> – Aug 30, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/the-iran-pakistan-gas-pipeline-project-economic-and-geopolitical-realities/">The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities</a> – Sep 27, 2024<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/great-power-rivalry-and-chinas-deepening-involvement-in-south-asia-gulf-states/">Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States</a> – Aug 4, 2023<br />
<a href="https://politact.com/what-does-president-bidens-visit-to-israel-and-saudi-arabia-imply/">What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply?</a> – Aug 4, 2022</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/us-iran-war-and-alternative-futures-for-south-asia/">US-Iran War And Alternative Futures For South Asia</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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			</item>
		<item>
		<title>US-Iran Interim Ceasefire Deal, Israel, And The Future of Abraham Accords</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/us-iran-interim-ceasefire-deal-israel-and-the-future-of-abraham-accords/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Arif Ansar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 20:54:56 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[American Experiment]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=10804</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="696" height="464" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Abraham Accords Signing Ceremony" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-300x200.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-768x512.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-630x420.jpg 630w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-696x464.jpg 696w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" />By Arif Ansar Context The escalation of open warfare between the United States, Israel, and Iran in early 2026—characterized by some as the &#8220;Third Gulf War&#8221;—has radically upended the strategic architecture of the Middle East. At the center of pre-war Western diplomatic planning were two highly integrated concepts: the Abraham Accords, aiming to build a [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/us-iran-interim-ceasefire-deal-israel-and-the-future-of-abraham-accords/">US-Iran Interim Ceasefire Deal, Israel, And The Future of Abraham Accords</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="696" height="464" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Abraham Accords Signing Ceremony" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-300x200.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-768x512.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-630x420.jpg 630w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-696x464.jpg 696w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" /><figure id="attachment_10638" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-10638" style="width: 1024px" class="wp-caption alignleft"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-10638" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords.jpg" alt="Abraham Accords Signing Ceremony" width="1024" height="683" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-300x200.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-768x512.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-630x420.jpg 630w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Abraham-Accords-696x464.jpg 696w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-10638" class="wp-caption-text">Abraham Accords Signing Ceremony</figcaption></figure>
<p>By Arif Ansar</p>
<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>The escalation of open warfare between the United States, Israel, and Iran in early 2026—characterized by some as the &#8220;Third Gulf War&#8221;—has radically upended the <a href="https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2026-25-southeast-asia-and-the-third-gulf-war-impact-responses-and-implications-by-ian-storey/">strategic architecture</a> of the Middle East. At the center of pre-war Western diplomatic planning were two highly integrated concepts: the Abraham Accords, aiming to build a normalization bridge between Israel and Arab states, and the Board of Peace (BOP), an <a href="https://www.securityincontext.org/posts/colonial-administration-counterinsurgency-pacification-and-disaster-capitalism-in-trumps-plan-for-gaza">international framework</a> established under UN Security Council Resolution 2803 to oversee a post-conflict administration, international stabilization force, and real estate transformation in Gaza.</p>
<p>However, the military campaign launched on February 28, 2026, under the U.S.-Israeli codename &#8220;Operation Epic Fury&#8221;, fundamentally collided with the core assumptions of these frameworks. Instead of solidifying a prosperous, integrated, and Western-aligned trade bloc, the <a href="https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/ResearchAndStudies/Pages/risk-politics-and-the-us-israeli-war-on-iran.aspx">kinetic conflict</a> exposed deep structural flaws in regional deterrence, shattered the prospects of two-state solution, and triggered an unprecedented shift in the balance of power.</p>
<ol>
<li><strong> The Disintegration of the Pre-War Vision: BOP and Abraham Accords Under Fire</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>Before the military escalation of 2026, the Abraham Accords and the Board of Peace functioned as a synchronized carrot-and-stick diplomatic strategy. The political objective was clear: circumvent the core issue of Palestinian statehood by offering massive economic, infrastructure, and technological incentives to the Arab world, effectively managing the region from the <a href="https://politact.com/the-emerging-outside-in-approach-to-israeli-palestinian-conflict-afghan-reconciliation-and-kashmir-issue/">outside-in</a>. The BOP was envisioned as a multi-layered <a href="https://www.securityincontext.org/posts/colonial-administration-counterinsurgency-pacification-and-disaster-capitalism-in-trumps-plan-for-gaza">colonial and financial administration</a>—overseeing a Gaza Executive Board and a Palestinian National Committee—meant to signal a new era of regional co-prosperity.</p>
<p>When <em>Operation Epic Fury</em> commenced with devastating strikes on Iranian command structures, nuclear sites, and energy facilities, this vision suffered an immediate kinetic shock. Rather than acting as bridges for trade, the Abraham Accords were abruptly tested as raw military alignments. Iran’s retaliatory doctrine did not spare the region; Tehran launched waves of drones and ballistic missiles targeting not only Israeli territory but also Western assets and allies across the Gulf.</p>
<p>The BOP’s ambitious plans for Gaza—such as beachfront hotels and special economic zones—were instantly frozen as global energy markets panicked and global fertilizer and agricultural supply chains broke down. The war exposed an untenable contradiction: attempting to build an institutional framework for peace while simultaneously fighting a total regional war.</p>
<ol start="2">
<li><strong> The Great Divergence: Independent Israeli Maneuvers vs. Joint Strategy</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>A central complication in the future of the BOP and the Abraham Accords is the apparent <a href="https://politact.com/the-us-israel-and-iran-conflict-the-interplay-of-goals-and-strategies/">divergence</a> between American diplomatic objectives and Israeli kinetic execution. While the United States has continuously attempted to orchestrate a diplomatic off-ramp, Israel has aggressively expanded its military footprint. Israel’s actions in Gaza, its incursions into Lebanon, and its unilateral willingness to strike deep into Iranian territory—even during active diplomatic windows—have created two starkly different strategic interpretations &#8211; that pose the most acute risk to the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/strait-hormuz-reopen-us-lift-iran-sanctions-14-point-deal-seeking-end-rcna350513">Interim Ceasefire Deal</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Interpretation A: The Maverick State Acting Unilaterally</strong></p>
<p>This perspective argues that Israel is acting in open contradiction to Washington&#8217;s goals. Israeli leadership has made it clear that they <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/un-chief-blasts-israels-unacceptable-rejection-of-two-state-solution/">no longer view</a> the Oslo Accords or a two-state solution as viable frameworks. By pursuing a permanent military solution rather than a political compromise, Israel is explicitly prioritizing the absolute destruction of the &#8220;Axis of Resistance&#8221; over the long-term diplomatic health of the Abraham Accords. They are gambling that Arab states will eventually be forced to accept a dominant, nuclear-armed Israel as a fait accompli, regardless of the Palestinian issue.</p>
<p><strong>Interpretation B: A Tightly Orchestrated Joint Strategy</strong></p>
<p>Conversely, realism suggests that Israeli actions represent a coordinated, dual-track &#8220;Good Cop / Bad Cop&#8221; strategy with the United States. While Washington acts as the diplomatic negotiator—offering terms, carrots, and structural limitations—Israel functions as the unhinged kinetic hammer. By maintaining maximum military pressure on Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, Israel forces adversaries to negotiate from a position of acute vulnerability, allowing American diplomats to demand structural concessions that would be nearly impossible to attain through standard statecraft.</p>
<p>Regardless of which interpretation is accurate, the structural fallout is identical: Israel&#8217;s complete abandonment of the Palestinian political track has severed the primary artery through which the Abraham Accords were expected to expand to critical Muslim-majority nations like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, who have historically conditioned formal normalization on a viable two-state solution.</p>
<ol start="3">
<li><strong> The 60-Day Ceasefire: Why Iran Emerges in an Enhanced Position</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>The multi-week diplomatic push that culminated in the temporary cessation of hostilities has set the stage for a potential <a href="https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-war-ceasefire-deal-e0a9e4e1152ea8da10ea066ad174a23a">60-day extended ceasefire</a>. However, an assessment of the strategic balance indicates that if a prolonged ceasefire is institutionalized under current conditions, Iran will have effectively won the geopolitical argument, shifting the regional balance of power in its favor with far reaching implications.</p>
<p>Despite enduring massive leadership losses and targeted degradation of its conventional military facilities during the initial strikes of Operation Epic Fury, Tehran demonstrated profound <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/operation-epic-fury-a-closer-look-at-iran-s-military-resilience/ar-AA238Rpm">asymmetric resilience</a>:</p>
<ul>
<li>Weaponization of the Chokepoints: By effectively throttling the Strait of Hormuz and imposing a massive $2 million transit toll on commercial tankers while outright banning American and Israeli vessels, Iran proved it could hold global energy markets hostage. It’s not clear whether the toll or fees will remain in any future deal.</li>
<li>Surviving Regime Change Ambitions: Iran successfully weathered a decapitation campaign that killed its highest officials, proving that its institutional and proxy network could function and retaliate even under extreme duress.</li>
<li>Demonstrated Retaliatory Reach: By launching direct, sustained missile strikes against Israel and retaliating against U.S. bases in the region, Iran dismantled the myth of Western invulnerability.</li>
</ul>
<p>As far as its nuclear program is concerned, while Iran had previously committed to not attain weaponized capability. The major criticism of the earlier agreement with Iran reached in 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) under Obama administration was that it neither addressed Iran’s wider behavior in the region nor its ballistic missile program. On the positive side, JCPOA was backed by P5+1 countries i.e. US, China, Russia, France, UK, and Germany – along with European Union.</p>
<p>In the present context, P5+1 were not in the negotiating loop – but this does not indicate that they may not partake in any future roles. While frictions between NATO and US have increased over Ukraine and military approach towards Iran, President Trump is likely to seek support from the leaders at the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/trump-g7-iran-france-india-2b13227bfc63d5c7c92c64488e3e2753">G7 Summit</a> meeting held in France, where he electronically signed the Islamabad MOU. However, in the escalating great power rivalries environment, the involvement of G7 nations will be quite nuanced.</p>
<p>Deciphering from the information available so far, nothing within the preliminary terms of the present ceasefire suggests that a 60-day truce will compel Iran to permanently abandon its regional proxy network. For Iran, groups like Hezbollah and Hamas are vital defensive organs. Because forcing their complete dissolution is beyond the scope of a standard ceasefire, Israel will view any finalized U.S.-Iran document with deep suspicion and may ultimately refuse to honor its terms, preferring to continue its military campaign.</p>
<ol start="4">
<li><strong> The South Asian Pivot: Pakistan and India’s Subcontinental Tussle in the Gulf</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>The 2026 conflict has also manifested the subcontinental rivalry of India and Pakistan directly into the Middle Eastern theater, altering the geopolitical balance of power between the two nuclear-armed neighbors.</p>
<p>With the collapse of direct Western-led communication channels during the peak of the fighting, Pakistan leveraged its historic 900-kilometer border with Iran and its deep institutional ties with the Arab Gulf to emerge as the prime mediator between Washington and Tehran. The resulting &#8220;Islamabad Peace Process&#8221;—headlined by face-to-face talks in April 2026 between U.S. Vice President JD Vance and Iranian Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—elevated Pakistan into an indispensable global peace broker. By opening up back-channel communication lines via its Interests Section in Washington, Pakistan successfully negotiated the temporary cessation of hostilities, protecting its own vital economic interests, specifically the massive flow of worker remittances from the Gulf.</p>
<p>This diplomatic triumph directly challenges <a href="https://politact.com/examining-saudi-iran-tensions-and-its-impact-on-south-asia-china/">India’s long-term strategic investments in the Middle East</a>. Over the previous decade, New Delhi had built a formidable geopolitical axis anchored on deep technological, defense, and economic ties with Israel and the UAE. India viewed this alignment as a way to project power westward and isolate Pakistan.</p>
<p>However, as Pakistan successfully positions itself as the necessary arbiter of regional stability between the U.S. and Iran, India’s rigid alignment with the Israel-UAE axis risks locking it out of the broader post-war regional consensus. If the Middle East transitions into a managed &#8220;cold peace&#8221; where Iran’s equities are formally recognized, Pakistan&#8217;s diplomatic capital will grow, neutralizing some of the strategic leverage India had accumulated through its partnerships.</p>
<ol start="5">
<li><strong> Conclusion: The Structural Impasse of the Grand Vision</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>The grand vision originally championed by the Abraham Accords and the Board of Peace has arrived at a structural impasse. The only plausible pathway for these frameworks to move forward as instruments of a durable, comprehensive regional peace requires two simultaneous, seemingly impossible geopolitical concessions:</p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Iran must join the bandwagon</strong>, abandoning its regional agenda and accepting a formalized integration into a security architecture alongside Israel. This would be accompanied by the cassation of support for Hezbollah and Hamas.</li>
<li><strong>Israel must accept a viable, sovereign two-state solution</strong>, ceasing expansion of territory either via settlements or military use.  This will providing the necessary political cover for Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the wider Muslim world to formally normalize ties.</li>
</ol>
<p>Given current political realities, neither condition is achievable. Israel’s domestic political landscape remains firmly set against territorial compromise, viewing military containment and absolute security dominance as its only viable future. Concurrently, Iran’s clerical and military elite view their asymmetric deterrent power and proxy networks as the sole shield preserving the Islamic Republic from Western-orchestrated regime change.</p>
<p>Consequently, whether the conflict transitions through continued military attrition or a formalized ceasefire, the Board of Peace and the Abraham Accords will be forced to mutate. Rather than tools for authentic peace and regional integration, they will function as a defensive alignment designed not to resolve the region’s core disputes, but to manage an unstable and fractured &#8220;cold peace.&#8221;</p>
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<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/us-iran-interim-ceasefire-deal-israel-and-the-future-of-abraham-accords/">US-Iran Interim Ceasefire Deal, Israel, And The Future of Abraham Accords</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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