How to Deal with Afghanistan’s Extremist Landscape?

Context

Since the full withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan in August 2021, it was assumed that Pakistan’s war against extremism had come to an end. There was a perception that the installation of Afghan Taliban in Kabul will make Pakistan’s regional influence grow. Besides, the nation was blamed for supporting the Taliban and providing them safe havens. Prior to 9/11 attacks, Taliban had extended its control to almost all of Afghanistan – and there were fears of its influence extending even further into Central Asia while threatening Iran. In 1998, 11 Iranian diplomats were killed in Mazar-e-Sharif in a battle between Iranian supported Northern Alliance and the Taliban forces – bringing the two close to a full blown conflict.

What transpired in the aftermath of 9/11 saw the reversal of the Taliban fortunes – and along with them with their supporters, particularly Pakistan. At the peak of the war against extremism, all major cities of the country were targeted by terrorists including its security forces. According to one estimate 83,000 lives were lost with an economic toll of about US$126 billion. The extremists accused Pakistan of supporting the infidels and providing bases and supply lines for NATO forces fighting Taliban.

However, since the US withdrawal, after a brief lull, the situation got progressively worse for Pakistan. Especially since the fall of Imran Khan’s government in April 2022. First came the elimination of Al Qaeda (AQ) mastermind Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul in July 2022, which demonstrated that Taliban were not holding up to their promise of breaking ties with AQ. Second, Pakistan was hoping that after US left Afghanistan, it could convince Taliban to act against Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). TTP had found refuge in Afghanistan since the operations carried out by Pakistan’s military in Swat and other Tribal Areas.

The horrific attack in Peshawar late January this year, which claimed the lives of more than 100 worshiping policemen, has reminded the country of the worse times of the war against extremism. This was followed by an attack on the police headquarters in Karachi on February 17. The country is once again grappling with the question of how to deal with Afghan Taliban and TTP.

Pakistan and TTP

Speaking at the Munich Security Conference on Feb 18, Pakistan’s foreign minister Bilawal Bhutto highlighted the risk:

“The concern is that if we and the interim (Afghan) government don’t take these groups seriously and they don’t demonstrate the will and the capacity to take on terrorist groups then they will conduct terrorist activities in the region first — we are already witnessing an uptick in terrorist activity in Pakistan since the fall of Kabul — but it won’t be long before it reaches somewhere else.”

He went on to add that Pakistan wants to work with Afghan Taliban to deal with TTP and to build its counter-terrorism capabilities, and is not looking to interfere in Afghanistan militarily. However, media reports indicate that Pakistan has targeted TTP linked leadership in Afghanistan several times since last April – and when Afghan Taliban are unwilling to assist. It reportedly carried out air strikes in April 2022 in Eastern Afghanistan. In August 2022, TTP commander Omar Khalid Khorassani was killed in a IED attack.

But it’s not clear if US desires to focus on Afghanistan – as its attention is presently preoccupied with Ukraine, Russia, and China. Even Europe is in the process of decoupling from China. On the other hand, Pakistan claims China to be a strategic partner, and it was the former prime minister Imran Khan’s visit to Moscow in February 2022 that unnerved the US. Soon after, his government fell in April 2022.

Prior to his visit to Moscow and since the US Afghan withdrawal, a debate had been raging about how US would maintain pressure on the global jihadists present in Afghanistan from repeating a 9/11 type attack – or from pulling a serious attack on India. Reportedly, US had wanted bases in Pakistan from where to maintain kinetic pressure on global extremists in Afghanistan. Imran Khan’s government was vehemently against providing any such cooperation since his political mantra was based on a negotiated approach – at least as far as groups like TTP were concerned. Moreover, he had consistently questioned the wisdom of Pakistan’s previous involvement in the campaign against extremism in support of NATO at a tremendous cost of blood and treasure.

During his time in power, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) led government had sought Afghan Taliban assistance in pacifying TTP, resulting in a ceasefire that fell apart in November 2022 – and resumption of TTP attacks against Pakistan. The TTP demands related to release of prisoners were met to some extent. On the other hand, their requirements of decreasing the number of security forces in FATA – and rescinding of FATA merger are more complicated.

These conditions truly show that TTP aspires for a space from where AQ and Afghan Taliban can extend their reach. Moreover, how TTP wants to achieve these demands i.e., through terrorism – as compared to negotiations, needs to be transformed. To change the way TTP is going about its demands will require a change in Afghan Taliban thinking first. While Afghan Taliban were fighting foreign troops, there is no such validity in case of TTP – as it relates to Pakistan. TTP using the argument that it seeks to implement Sharia does not garner much merit.

To alleviate the source of TTP’s appeal requires integration of FATA into the mainstream while improving the infrastructure and economic wherewithal of the areas involved. Moreover, to empower groups like Pashtun Tahafaz Movement (PTM) in helping to bring the disgruntled towards political inclusion and addressing grievances.

US and TTP

The presence and elimination of AQ mastermind Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul was a clear violation of Doha Agreement reached in February 2020. One of the key terms of the treaty stipulated Taliban will not allow Al Qaeda, ISIS-K and other International terrorist groups and individuals to use Afghan territory to launch attacks against US and its allies.

These allies could be interpreted to mean India and Pakistan. Over the years Afghanistan has become a hotbed for extremists from all brands. For example, AQ and Daesh (ISIS-K) targeting the US prior to withdrawal, TTP carrying out attacks against Pakistan, Lashker-e-Taiba (LeT) and related groups striking India, while East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) was linked to terrorist activities in China. What Bilawal’s comments quoted above may be referring to is the nightmare scenario of a terrorist attack occurring in India which can trigger a wider regional war.

A report published by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) recently indicates that on one hand US does not consider TTP to be a direct threat to US – but at the same time worsening security situation of nuclear Pakistan is deemed a security concern for the US.

The reality is there is an ominous lack of public support and political consensus in Pakistan on how to deal with extremists, especially with the likes of TTP. Additionally, the economic woes of the country prevents it from dealing aggressively with extremism. This could change if TTP were to launch and claim more deadly attacks within Pakistan. On the other hand, if the threat perception from TTP were to change towards being perceived as a direct threat to the US – the calculus could alter. Moreover, if fresh elections are held in Pakistan, and Imran Khan governments returns to the helm, he may take a different approach to dealing with TTP and galvanize public support.

While it remains unclear where the assets used for eliminating Ayman al-Zawahiri were based, it’s clear that US retains the capability to deal with risks from global extremists that directly threaten it. Will US allow these assets to be used against TTP, like in the past, remains ambiguous. Pakistan needs to develop a wider political consensus on how it wants to deal with extremism and reevaluate its ties with Afghan Taliban. This is very difficult to do for a nation amidst political and economic meltdown.

Understanding Afghan Taliban

The evolving extremism landscape in Afghanistan provide hints towards the future of the campaign against extremism. As Afghan Taliban have settled in – it’s not clear if they are willing to break ties with global extremists such as AQ, or act against local affiliates like TTP. On the other hand, its ability to counter ISIS-K is also questionable. So far, it’s not accepted any assistance in this regard fearing being labelled as a Western collaborator. Attacks from Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) in Pakistan are also on the rise, especially related to CPEC.

The opportunistic postures of Afghan Taliban are meant to exploit the fears of stakeholders like US, China, Russia, Pakistan, India, and Iran – and by maintaining a leverage of extremism over all of them. For example, it has kept the TTP gambit over Pakistan, while at the same time offering India to keep a check on LeT and Al Qaeda in the Indian Sub Continent (AQIS), and then delicately adjusting its policy towards global extremists (AQ and ISIS-K) and other Western concerns – including women rights and inclusion of minorities in governance.

Writing in the National Interest after his recent visit to Afghanistan, former senior policy advisor to the US State Department Secretary’s Office of Religion and Global Affairs, Qamar-ul Huda commented: “Washington must realize that religious-political actors like the Taliban are acutely aware of their value in regional politics; they understand that local governments and global coalitions are seeking them out to counterbalance the weight of violent extremism and build multilateral ties for stability and economic benefits. The key question is whether the Taliban can transform from militia-minded fighters to nation-building technocrats and deliver for Afghanistan.”

Speaking at a webinar organized by Karachi Council on Foreign Relations on January 11, 2022 Taliban’s Representative in Pakistan Sardar Ahmed Khan Sakeeb took a stance on Durand Line that is not much different from the Ashraf Ghani and Karzai governments. He stated that his administration wants to take the matter to the Afghan people and then discuss the matter further.

On relations with India and Pakistan’s apprehensions, the Taliban representative explained that they wanted to pursue economic and political relations with India, and will not make it an enemy because of Pakistan, or make anyone else an adversary because of India – and this is beneficial for all. Replying to criticism for not speaking up for Indian atrocities in Kashmir, he added that they will speak out whether the atrocities are being committed by India or anyone else. He advised on solving all matters though negotiations.

Conclusion

The unfolding scenario of Afghanistan is directly impacting the political and security situation of Pakistan. Its ability to convince Afghan Taliban to act against TTP has only produced facilitation of negotiations. This has greatly frustrated the new Pakistan government and perhaps has pressured it towards more counter-terrorism cooperation with the US – for which there is little public buy-in in Pakistan. And this puts the economically fragile nation in a quandary.

Faced with growing US-India strategic partnership, counter-terrorism cooperation with the US could provide the security and economic lifeline Pakistan desperately needs. However, US has shifted away from counter-terrorism to strategic competition with China and Russia. And thus, the question becomes where do Afghan Taliban, including regional and global extremists, and for that matter Pakistan, fit in the great power rivalry equation. On the other hand, it’s likely the joint pressure of China and Pakistan, to protect their common interests, could nudge the Afghan Taliban in the direction of more serious action and curtailing the activities of TTP, ETIM, and BLF.

Correction: A previous version had stated Omar Khalid Khorassani was killed in a drone strike – he died in an IED attack.

The post Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP appeared first on Politact.

By Dr. Syed Mohammad Ali

Context

While longstanding, relations between the US and Pakistan have experienced much turbulence especially since 9/11. It looks like the unceremonious American exit after two decades of intervention in Afghanistan is going to become another source of contention for this troubled bilateral relationship. Yet, some opportunities still exist for the US and Pakistan to cooperate, especially with regards to ensuring long-term stabilization in Afghanistan.

The story of Pakistan working with Saudi Arabia and the US to help wage a holy war against the Soviets in the 80s is well known. But Pakistan’s security cooperation with US goes back much earlier. Pakistan joined Cold War alliances like the Baghdad Pact in 1955 and the Central Treaty Alliance in 1959. In 1958, Dwight D. Eisenhower even requested Pakistan’s Prime Minister Feroze Khan Noon for a secret facility, to fly reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union. This arrangement was only uncovered when an American U2 spy plane which flew from Peshawar was shot down in May 1960 by Soviet forces.

In the Global War Against Terror (GWOT), Pakistan was pressured to become a ‘frontline’ state, and to help the US fight the same hardliners it helped create in Afghanistan during the 1980s. Pakistan has repeatedly complained of being embroiled in GWOT and not being adequately appreciated for its cooperation and sacrifices. On the other hand, the US has long suspected Pakistan of being duplicitous and not doing enough to ensure stabilization in Afghanistan.

It took the US almost twenty years to realize that there is no military solution to the Afghan crisis. While American talks with the Taliban have produced lackluster results, these ‘peace’ talks did allow President Trump an opportunity to announce a US military withdrawal. Once the withdrawal decision was made, it has proven very difficult for the incoming Biden administration to reverse course, despite his claims of wanting a ‘responsible exit’.

The US and other NATO allies will probably continue proving financial assistance to Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, including funds to the national army that they created. While the US is withdrawing militarily, the budget request for the next fiscal year is still asking Congress for $3.3bn to support and sustain the Afghan Security Forces, a jump of 9.2 percent from 2021. In addition, the US intends to keep ‘over the horizon’ counter terrorism capabilities in neighboring countries to ensure that ISIS and Al Qaeda are not able to gain enough ground in Afghanistan that they become an international threat again.

Pakistan would logistically have been an ideal base for US counter-terrorism operations, but the Pakistani government has categorically rejected the possibility of such cooperation. Pakistan’s refusal to give the US military bases to undertake operations in Afghanistan is understandable. Such a move would be deeply unpopular given the controversy surrounding tacit Pakistani endorsement of US drone strikes despite the collateral damage caused by them. It may risk fueling extremist attacks within Pakistan, and it may irk the Taliban who have warned neighboring countries of hosting an American military presence.

Media reports reflect that under the Biden administration budget request for fiscal year 2022, some military training and economic assistance for Pakistan is forthcoming, but the overall suspension of military aid that came about in May 2018 remains intact. What will be the actual size of US aid to Pakistan next year, especially if it does not succumb to American pressure to provide it military bases to operate in Afghanistan remains to be seen. Pakistan could be pressured by the US via lending agencies like the IMF. Threatening to blacklist Pakistan using the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) if it refuses to allow the US to operate military bases on its soil would not be fair. But in the realpolitik world, states can often resort to such tactics to try and get what they need.

Emerging Complications and Compulsions

While Pakistan keeps insisting that it is open to any permutation of power sharing which are acceptable to the Afghans, the nation is widely suspected of preferring a hardline Afghan state which would rebuff Indian attempts to encircle Pakistan. The latest Congressional Research Service Report’s assessment of Islamabad’s motives are not too rosy. It concludes that Pakistan will prefer a weak and destabilized Afghanistan, instead of a strong Pashtun-dominated government (which would continue to resist the status of the Durand Line and appeal to Pakistan’s own restive Pashtun minority). Such suspicions are questionable, however, given that destabilization in Afghanistan would incur the hefty cost of another large wave of Afghan refugees pouring into Pakistan. Unfortunately, there are no easy solutions when it comes to ensuring a semblance of order and stability in Afghanistan. The Tajiks will probably continue to resist the Taliban’s attempt to gain complete power over the country, and they will again look towards different regional backers to challenge the Taliban. Turkey’s recent offer to take a lead role in ensuring the security of Kabul airport after the American departure is an interesting twist in this regard, hinting at an expanded Turkish role in Afghanistan in the foreseeable future.

US attempts to support the Afghan national army from being overrun by the Taliban may compel the Taliban to increasingly rely on Al Qaeda’s support. The CIA has also built-up counter-terrorism militias over these past several years, which have problematic human rights records, and these militias may now back varied factions motivated by personal gains. The presence of major illicit arms and drug trade cartels operating in the region could add to the threat of worsening violence.

While Pakistan can play an important role in helping create stability and economic prosperity in Afghanistan, the US continues to view Pakistan from the narrow lens of achieving its own counter-terrorism goals. Pakistan has not done much either to provide alternative pathways to working with the US which could help improve the lives of ordinary people in Afghanistan.

The Way Forward

Recent Pakistani attempts to reboot relations with the US are perhaps too ambitious given US suspicion of China, and the Biden administration’s decision to continue working with India to contain Chinese influence. Instead, Pakistan now needs to focus on more pragmatic and mutually beneficial opportunities for collaboration, such as the need to enable much needed stabilization in Afghanistan.

One possibility in this regard is the activation of the much discussed but still not operationalized reconstruction opportunity zone (ROZ) on both sides of the Durand Line, via which jointly produced Afghan and Pakistani products could be given preferential access to US markets. A well-functioning ROZ could create a strong incentive for Pakistan and Afghanistan to cooperate and it could provide the means for boosting economic sustainability within Afghanistan.

There is ample room for the US and Pakistan to work together to avert escalating chaos in Afghanistan. In his June 21 article in the Washington Post, Prime Minister Khan reiterated his desire to be a willing partner for ensuring peace in conflict-ridden Afghanistan, even though his government is unwilling to host US military bases. He also significantly asserted that Pakistan would reject attempts to impose a government in Kabul though the use of force.

The need for promoting economic connectivity and regional trade to promote lasting peace and security in Afghanistan is well recognized. Within this context, an ROZ between Pakistan and Afghanistan is an idea whose time has come. There is need to show pro-activeness in articulating parameters of such an ROZ, so that needed incentives are in place for boosting economic cooperation between the neighboring states as soon as a power-sharing formula emerges in post-withdrawal Afghanistan.

The post Recalibrating The US-Pakistan Partnership In Afghanistan appeared first on Politact.

The Leverages of US and Pakistan

With the announcement of Trump’s South Asia policy, the US-Pakistan ties have once again entered a period of tumult. His speech had all the ingredients that would put Pakistan in a state of paranoia, and perhaps that was one of the immediate intensions of the new policy.

His speech was followed up by a strong reaction from Pakistan, where the civil-military relations are at an all time low. And then came the congressional hearings where General Jim Mattis informed the Armed Services Committee US will try to work with Pakistan ‘one more time’. Earlier, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford iterated that Pakistan’s military intelligence has links with the terrorist groups. This statement was not much different than what Mike Mullen had stated in 2012 on the same matter. Pakistan’s former Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani was known to have close comradery with Mike Mullen, and that still it did not prevent from what transpired.

The political leverages for the US include cutting off support for Pakistan’s non-military financial assistance, downgrading its major non-NATO ally status, imposing sanctions, and declaring it a state sponsor of terror. On the military side, the options include reactivating the drone strikes, and hot pursuits, which is also known as the troops on the ground option. A combination of these tactics have been employed in the past, some even before 9/11 in connection with Pakistan’s nuclear program. If they were successful, is less clear.

Ever since the nation acquired nuclear weapons, it has become even more crucial for it to be seen as a rational player. It simply can’t afford to be perceived as the first Muslim nation with nuclear weapons acting unreasonably. In this regard, any attempts to isolate or sanction it, sets the alarm bells ringing in Islamabad

On the other hand, Pakistan has traditionally maneuvered skillfully to play with the American sensitivities, create a need for itself, and meanwhile rejuvenate the ties. Whether it is countering a global power through Jihad, or the campaign against extremism, they have provided opportunities for the geo-strategically situated Pakistan, and its political and military leaders, to reset ties with the US.

Why Pakistan Failed to Build Its Case?

While some in Pakistan, and few in the US were shocked by the newly unveiled US South Asia policy, the groundwork for this approach was laid down over a period of time. Whether it be the congressional hearings or think tank discussions, the discourse was quite clear. The primary focus has remained on building pressure on its military to cease its alleged support of Afghan Taliban (Haqqani Network) in Afghanistan and other groups oriented towards India.

An impression one gets in Washington for some time now is that the country had given up countering the narrative that has been building for some time, including on the social media front. One may ask why that has been the case. Was it that the situation was misrepresented to the government back home, or could it be incompetence? To the stoics amongst the crowd, perhaps it was deemed to be inevitable. Perhaps the divisiveness between the political and military establishment is more to be blamed for this. Speaking at the USIP in early October, the newly appointed Foreign Minister Khawaja Asif came to Washington all guns blazing. The performance, however, should have occurred many years ago.

Pakistan’s response to the developing situation can be divided along the liberal, conservative and nationalist schools of thoughts. Those representing the liberal school in Pakistan, or abroad, have supported the argument the Pakistan’s powerful military needs to be reined in. They have felt threatened by the trajectory that the nation got set on in the 80s during the Afghan Jihad, which has already made things combustible for them and the minorities. The war against extremism has further minimized the breathing space for liberals. The West interprets this fear as the Islamization of Pakistan’s military with nuclear weapons in its possession. This apprehension has been exploited by Pakistan’s adversaries, and coincidentally by Pakistan’s own political parties for their own purposes. Memogate was perhaps the first outward expression of this. In the present times, the Dawn Leaks has generated similar controversy.

While the interests of the liberals are resonating with the Western governments, the nationalist sentiments and religious conservatism are gaining on the ground. And this dilemma is not unique just to Pakistan, other parts of the world, including the West, face similar trends.

Turkey, Iran, And Saudi Arabia

Turkey

As the shift in the global balance of power speeds up, and the manifestations of the America First doctrine start appearing, Pakistan would have to measure how its response compares to that of other Islamic nations.

The war against terror is now fully intertwined with global power tussles and is unlikely to subside any time soon. It has already produced a dramatic shift in the case of Turkey, where after the failed coup attempt, thousands of people have been arrested for conspiring against Erdogan’s government. The purge is focused against a whole segment of the society, as opposed to few hundred individuals involved directly in the debacle.

On the external front, its interests are being stepped on when it comes to the matter of Kurds, and it has no choice but to drift towards Russia and Iran for political and military support. On the other hand its ties with the US and the West are in a nosedive. Nonetheless, it’s a tremendous shift from where the country stood at about few years ago, when it was presented as an Islamic economic powerhouse and a NATO member. The matters have never looked the same after Gaza Flotilla incident in 2010.

Iran

Iran stands on the other end of the spectrum. The country has been classified as an international pariah for sometime now. It has been blamed for supporting Hezbollah and Hamas, and for continuing to threaten Israel. However, it’s also on the frontlines in Syria fighting ISIS, along with Russia, US, and Turkey, while supporting the preservation of the Assad regime.

It was only after the P5+1 deal reached in 2015 that it began to see light at the end of the tunnel. While there is a threat of religious conservatives taking the helm of power in other parts of the Muslim world, in Iran that already happened in 1979. With the nuclear deal there was optimism that lifting of sanctions will lead to the emergence of moderate Iran. However, the chances for that are diminishing now, as Trump administration appears moving towards nullifying the deal. In all likelihood, if the treaty is dissolved, the hardliners in Iran will be vindicated.

Saudi Arabia

Then there is the case of Saudi Arabia, which is the most conservative and non-democratic of the Islamic states. Nonetheless, it has been able to garner the support of the US and has developed convergence of interests with Israel. As the campaign against extremism has evolved, its threat perception has aligned with that of Israel and the US, especially when it comes to countering the growing Iranian influence in the region. In this regard, an attempt is afoot to start differentiating between Persian and Arab Shiites.

To protect itself, the Kingdom has gotten directly involved in Yemen, and now with the help of GCC nations, and Egypt, is also attempting to isolate Qatar. Moreover, with facilitation and pressure from Egypt, Hamas and Fatah reconciliation is also in the works. Obviously, this will entail renunciation of violence on the part of the Hamas. Will this lead to some type of rapprochement between Israel and Palestine, is too early to tell. It should be mentioned though that Hamas had lately received more support from Iran, Turkey, and Qatar, especially in the aftermath of Gaza blockade that started in 2007.

Drawing the Lessons

Keeping these examples in perspective draws one to the following lessons:

The three nations of Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have had to project power beyond their borders in order to protect their interests. All three are involved directly or via proxies In Syria. In the case of Yemen, its Iran and Saudi Arabia. However, this involvement comes at a tremendous risks and costs.

Due to the environment created by the campaign against extremists, nationalist and conservative segments of the societies are resurgent in the West as well, while creating polarization. And, this dynamics could create a dangerous confrontation between the East and the West. Extreme nationalism can lead to jingoism and risky mistakes. The key question becomes how to mitigate these risks.

To contemplate the future course for the US-Pakistan ties, one has to look at the short-term hick-ups that seem to pop-up frequently and spoil the ties, and the long-term strategic context. While it is customary to point to issues related to Afghanistan, and Indian role there, as the cause of mistrust between US and Pakistan, it is actually the differing strategic visions.

Approaching the future in a zero-sum manner result in the recurring tensions between US and Pakistan. There is a need to craft win-win scenarios amongst the various stakeholders and for dealing with extremists of different colors.

The post The Conflicting Strategic Visions And US-Pakistan Relations appeared first on Politact.

In efforts to provide targeted and timely insights on evolving issues, PoliTact has started a special series. This series is carefully designed for policy and decision makers, analysts, academics, media anchors, columnists, journalists, and students attempting to make sense of the increasingly chaotic and complex world.

This particular brief covers Pakistan’s efforts to fight extremists and the regional and global dynamics. Pakistan’s decision to conduct surgical operations against Taliban has come at a critical time and will have an impact on the Afghan reconciliation as well as the upcoming US-Pakistan strategic dialogue.

See below a list of in-depth action oriented analyses that go a long way towards understanding the multidimensional situation and developing a holistic perspective.

Entropy Alert

Pakistan’s Counter Terrorism Strategy And Emerging Threats
Transformation of Al Qaeda And Implications

Global Security Studies

Why Pakistan Needs To Manage Its National Strategic Narrative
Pakistan’s National Security Policy: What Can Be Done?
The Stumbling Blocks Towards Afghan Reconciliation
The Correlation Between Pakistan’s Threat Perception And Regional Economics
Pakistan’s Other Foreign Policy Challenge; Managing Ties Between Iran, Gulf States

Vantage Point Analysis

Post 2014 Afghanistan, Reconciliation And Central Asia
Russian Strategy For The Islamic World And Pakistan
China, US And The Balancing Act In South Asia
The AfPak Vision And North Waziristan Operation
Afghan Reconciliation And The Perilous Outlook For TTP

Analysis of Perception and Perspective

Karzai’s Strategic Intent And Bilateral Security Agreement
The Mysterious Killings Of Hakimullah Mehsud And Nasiruddin Haqqani
Nawaz Sharif’s US Mission And Death Of Hakimullah Mehsud
The Dilemma Of Afghan Representation And Reconciliation
The Security, Economic Calculus Of Pakistan’s New Government
Sino, Indian Role In Afghanistan; Implications For Pakistan
Afghan Reconciliation, War On Terror And Future Politics of Pakistan

PoliTact’s Forecasts

The Context To Understand The Emerging World – 2014 Forecast, Part I
Discerning Change Produced By The War Against Extremists – 2014 Forecast, Part II
The Western Vantage Point And War On Terror 2.0 – 2014 Forecast, Part II

Analysis

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The post Understanding Pakistan’s War on Terror; What Can Be Done? appeared first on Politact.