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		<title>Hamas Attack On Israel, Abraham Accords, And South Asia</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/hamas-attack-on-israel-abraham-accords-and-south-asia/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 25 Oct 2023 21:02:25 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Churchil Picket Reports]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Chinese role in Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics of Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hamas]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="259" height="194" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Al-Aqsa-Mosque.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Al Aqsa Mosque" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" fetchpriority="high" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Al-Aqsa-Mosque.jpg 259w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Al-Aqsa-Mosque-80x60.jpg 80w" sizes="(max-width: 259px) 100vw, 259px" />Context In the previous articles, we have been examining the various dimensions of the Arab-Israeli rapprochement that got underway as a consequence of the Abraham Accords, signed during the Trump administration in 2020. As a result, UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco officially recognized Israel. Progressively alarmed by the growing Chinese involvement in the region, demonstrated [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/hamas-attack-on-israel-abraham-accords-and-south-asia/">Hamas Attack On Israel, Abraham Accords, And South Asia</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="259" height="194" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Al-Aqsa-Mosque.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Al Aqsa Mosque" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Al-Aqsa-Mosque.jpg 259w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Al-Aqsa-Mosque-80x60.jpg 80w" sizes="(max-width: 259px) 100vw, 259px" /><p><strong><img decoding="async" class="alignleft size-medium wp-image-10292" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Hamas-Attack-300x170.jpg" alt="Israeli and Palestinian Protestors " width="300" height="170" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Hamas-Attack-300x170.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Hamas-Attack-1024x580.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Hamas-Attack-768x435.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Hamas-Attack-1536x870.jpg 1536w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Hamas-Attack-2048x1159.jpg 2048w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Hamas-Attack-696x394.jpg 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Hamas-Attack-1068x605.jpg 1068w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Hamas-Attack-742x420.jpg 742w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Hamas-Attack-600x340.jpg 600w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" />Context</strong></p>
<p>In the previous articles, we have been examining the various dimensions of the Arab-Israeli rapprochement that got underway as a consequence of the Abraham Accords, signed during the Trump administration in 2020. As a result, UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco officially recognized Israel.</p>
<p>Progressively alarmed by the <a href="https://politact.com/will-the-fear-of-china-aid-middle-east-peace/">growing Chinese involvement in the region</a>, demonstrated by the Chinese facilitated <a href="https://politact.com/saudi-iran-detente-syria-and-changing-mena/">Saudi-Iran Détente</a> reached in March, Biden administration had fasten its efforts to normalize ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel as well. Another factor of concern has been the changing politics of Israel &#8211; as Netanyahu seemed to have lost interest with the two-state solution.</p>
<p>During his visit to the US to attend the UN General Assembly meetings in September, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman indicated that the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-crown-prince-says-getting-closer-israel-normalization-fox-interview-2023-09-20/">normalization process</a> was moving along well, a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/20/israel-saudi-arabia-normalisation-deal-in-reach-netanyahu-tells-biden">sentiment shared</a> at the time by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. However, since the signing of Abraham Accords, the paranoia on the Palestinian side had been mounting. All along, it was not clear what the Accords would mean for the Palestinians. Will it include a statehood for Palestinians and cessation of settlements?</p>
<p>While the first <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2023-09-26/saudi-delegation-visits-palestinian-territories-as-israel-and-saudi-arabia-eye-normalization">Saudi envoy for Palestinian Authority</a> Nayef al-Sudairi did visit West Bank in September – it proved to be a little late in taming Palestinian concerns, especially Hamas. From a purely Israeli point of view, if the Arab states that have traditionally supported the Palestinian cause, agree to recognize Israel &#8211; the leverage of Palestinians in any negotiations is greatly reduced.</p>
<p>Things finally blew up on October 7 when Hamas members stormed into Israel killing almost <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67039975">1400 and taking about 200 hostages</a>. In reprisal, close to 7,000 Palestinians have been killed to date by Israeli bombardments – and the ground operation is imminent. Fears are growing the Israeli ground operation into Gaza will likely result in Hezbollah also becoming fully entangled, and thus widening the war. Moreover, the street pressure in Sunni Arab capitals is likely to push the respective governments to respond – especially if Iran holds true to its statements of not holding back if Israeli military actions continue.</p>
<p>Since the attack, President <a href="https://time.com/6326332/president-biden-israel-hamas-war/">Biden has offered full support</a> to Israel towards its aim to  eliminate Hamas, and at the same time he clarified that all Palestinians are not Hamas: “The vast majority of Palestinians are not Hamas. Hamas does not represent the Palestinian people.”</p>
<p>In his October 19 Speech, Biden stated: “History has taught us that when terrorists don’t pay a price for their terror, when dictators don’t pay a price for their aggression, they cause more chaos and death and more destruction.”</p>
<p>“As hard as it is, we cannot give up on peace. We cannot give up on a two-state solution,” Biden added.</p>
<p><strong>Response from BRICS<br />
</strong></p>
<p>As opposed to the US, China and Russia have stopped short of blaming Hamas while demanding cease fire and offering to mediate. Both have also affirmed that they’ll coordinate their policy for the Middle East. In essence, their position is close to those adopted by the Arab nations. According to <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/china-strengthens-ties-russia-israel-130026302.html?fr=yhssrp_catchall">media reports</a>, China’s Middle East envoy Zhai Jun told his Russian counterpart, Mikhail Bogdanov, during his current trip to the region: “The fundamental reason the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has reached its current state is that the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people have not been protected.”</p>
<p>On the other hand, South Africa has adopted a more nuanced approach and has stated that its backing for Palestine cause does not mean it supports Hamas. It generally equates its own experience under apartheid as the same as being experienced by the Palestinians. South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) commented that its <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/south-africa-says-it-discussed-aid-with-hamas-leader-denies-reports-support-2023-10-18/">Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor got a request</a> to speak with Ismail Haniyeh – and that the call was in line with nations policy to “engage will all parties in facilitating dialogue.”</p>
<p>On the other hand, India seems to have reversed its position of backing the Palestinians and has stood squarely with Israel. One of the reasons for that could be because ruling Bahartiya Janata Party (BJP) <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/12/israel-hamas-gaza-war-modi-response-shift/#cookie_message_anchor">has given up any hope of receiving Muslim vote</a> in the election next year. This seems similar to the United States where because of the policies adopted by Democratic Party in the Middle East and South Asia, Democratic American Muslims are thinking to shift in mass to the Republican Party. The dilemma being the Republican Party is even more hard-line when it comes to Iran and the Palestinian Issue. It was during the Trump administration in 2018 that the US decided to transfer its embassy to Jerusalem and withdraw from Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA). The agreement was painstakingly reached during Obama&#8217;s tenure. However, Trump did develop good relations with Saudi Arabia and Imran Khan in Pakistan.</p>
<p>India may also be evaluating the postures of the Arab world against Hamas vis a vis the Kashmir situation &#8211; and what it terms as cross-border terrorism from Pakistan.</p>
<p><strong>Changing Middle East and South Asia</strong></p>
<p>The recognition of Israel by Saudi Arabia would have represented a titanic event in the Islamic world – especially as it relates to the <a href="https://politact.com/global-power-tussles-war-extremism-means-core-peripheral-islamic-regions/">Core versus the Peripheral Islamic world</a>. As a result of Abraham Accords, Pakistan’s other Arab and GCC allies were moving closer to Israel as well. It would have brought tremendous pressure on the peripheral Islamic nations, especially Pakistan, which takes clues from Saudi Arabia when it comes to the maters of Palestinians. On the one hand, Pakistan is China’s closest strategic partner, which is also expanding ties with Iran.</p>
<p>In earlier assessment, PoliTact had noted: “While most of the GCC nations are autocratic – a broken democracy still exists in Pakistan. Irrespective, under the present circumstances, Saudi recognition of Israel anytime soon, will gravely unsettle the political and security situation of the country, particularly if it were to be accompanied by economic and political pressure from Saudi Arabia, and other GCC nations, to follow suit. As for the timeline, President Biden would want an agreement before the US elections next year.</p>
<p>These high-stake decisions need public debate and political ownership – that are presently missing in Pakistan. In fact, the crackdown against PTI hardly creates a conducive environment to build consensus on these fast moving regional and global changes.”</p>
<p>Since the October 7 attack, the scenario has switched, and the Saudi-Israel normalization has all but collapsed. A whole lot will now depend on if Israel launches a ground operation in Gaza. If the war theater expands, the following pressures are likely to play out for Pakistan:</p>
<ul>
<li>Most likely the country will have to side with the Arab world and that will make it stand at odds with US and Israel. Pakistan’s caretaker foreign minister <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1779826">Jalil Abbas Jilani had stated</a> on October 8, “We stand in solidarity with Palestinians and call for an immediate end to the violence and oppression by Israeli occupation forces. A viable and sovereign state of Palestine must be established on the basis of pre-1967 borders and UN resolutions.”</li>
<li>If Pakistan sides with US and Israel – it will put it at odds with its other ally China, its neighbor Iran, and its own public opinion. A lot will depend on If Iran directly or indirectly intervenes in the conflict &#8211; and what position Arab states take at that point. China and Russia will likely both support Iran.</li>
<li>Moreover, if Pakistan stays idle it would greatly dent its stance on Kashmir. And if in the future India takes a similar approach towards Kashmir &#8211; as Israel has now on Gaza – it will gravely complicate options for Pakistan.</li>
</ul>
<p>The future of Abraham Accords and Saudi-Israel normalization now hangs on if Israel will launch a ground operation in Gaza. Reportedly, President <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/19/opinion/biden-speech-israel-gaza.html">Biden is doing his utmost to restrain Israel</a> &#8211; and that was one of the aims of his visit. And if that can be accomplished &#8211; then the Palestinians would have to be at the dead center of any future negotiations. In other words, there can be no Arab-Israel normalization without first settling the Palestinian issue.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/hamas-attack-on-israel-abraham-accords-and-south-asia/">Hamas Attack On Israel, Abraham Accords, And South Asia</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply?</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/what-does-president-bidens-visit-to-israel-and-saudi-arabia-imply/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 04 Aug 2022 20:51:24 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[American Experiment]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Vantage Point Analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Abraham Accords]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arab Israeli conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arab NATO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Belt and Road Initiative]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[BIden's visit to Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Biden's visit to Saudi Arabia]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="669" height="377" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/23-02-2015_Salman-bin-Abdul-Aziz.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/23-02-2015_Salman-bin-Abdul-Aziz.jpg 669w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/23-02-2015_Salman-bin-Abdul-Aziz-600x338.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/23-02-2015_Salman-bin-Abdul-Aziz-300x169.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 669px) 100vw, 669px" />Great Power Rivalry in the Middle East &#8211; What it means for South Asia? Context The New Cold War paradigm and great power rivalry framework is settling in and beginning to define international affairs. After Europe and Pacific, Middle East is emerging as another hotly contested theater between the global powers. While Ukraine has been [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/what-does-president-bidens-visit-to-israel-and-saudi-arabia-imply/">What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="669" height="377" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/23-02-2015_Salman-bin-Abdul-Aziz.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/23-02-2015_Salman-bin-Abdul-Aziz.jpg 669w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/23-02-2015_Salman-bin-Abdul-Aziz-600x338.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/23-02-2015_Salman-bin-Abdul-Aziz-300x169.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 669px) 100vw, 669px" /><p>Great Power Rivalry in the Middle E<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignleft size-medium wp-image-2764" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/23-02-2015_Saudi-Arabia-300x211.png" alt="Map of Suadi Arabia" width="300" height="211" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/23-02-2015_Saudi-Arabia-300x211.png 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/23-02-2015_Saudi-Arabia-600x423.png 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/23-02-2015_Saudi-Arabia-768x541.png 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/23-02-2015_Saudi-Arabia-1024x721.png 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/23-02-2015_Saudi-Arabia-100x70.png 100w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/23-02-2015_Saudi-Arabia-696x490.png 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/23-02-2015_Saudi-Arabia-596x420.png 596w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/23-02-2015_Saudi-Arabia.png 1032w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" />ast &#8211; What it means for South Asia?</p>
<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>The <a href="https://politact.com/emerging-great-power-rivalry-how-will-the-new-cold-war-unfold-as-ukraine-simmers/">New Cold War</a> paradigm and great power rivalry framework is settling in and beginning to define international affairs. After Europe and Pacific, Middle East is emerging as another hotly contested theater between the global powers. While Ukraine has been consuming most of the media bandwidth, matters related to Iran’s nuclear program and Israeli-Palestinian conflict had taken more of a back seat. Nonetheless, after the War Against Terror, Ukraine has become the new pivot increasingly defining geopolitics, and meanwhile galvanizing NATO and EU.</p>
<p>President Biden’s visit to Israel and Palestinian territories in July, and then to Saudi Arabia, signaled that US aspires to reinvigorate its traditional ties with the Arab world – as it attempts to harness their support against Russia and China. And this was stated by none other than the President himself while <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/07/five-takeaways-bidens-visit-middle-east">speaking to the GCC</a> during his visit to Saudi Arabia,</p>
<p>“We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia or Iran &#8230; We will seek to build on this moment with active, principled, American leadership.”</p>
<p>US withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, and from Afghanistan in 2021, gave the impression that America was no longer interested in the Middle East – a perception that was reinforced by mantras such as ‘Pivot to Asia’ used during the Obama administration (2009-2017). Moreover, Iran nuclear deal (also known as JCPOA) reached in July 2015 had greatly unnerved the Israelis and the Gulf States regarding the balance of power in the region and US intent.</p>
<p>After coming to power, one of the first nation visited by former president Trump in 2017 was Saudi Arabia. However, he withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018. During his tenure, US once again established cordial ties with Israel that have been damaged during the Obama presidency. One of the common themes that brought the Arabs and Israel closer has been the expanding influence of Iran in the region. Trump also applied maximum pressure on Iran. In a drone strike in January 2020, Iranian intelligence chief Qasem Soleimani was eliminated in Baghdad. On the other hand, Israel also kept the pressure on the country to stall its nuclear ambitions. The chief of Iran’s nuclear program, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, was assassinated in November 2020.</p>
<p>In parallel and on the diplomatic front, Trump administration worked towards improving ties between the Arabs and Israel, which culminated in Abraham Accords in August 2020. As a result, UAE, Bahrain, and subsequently Sudan and Morocco, also normalized ties with Israel. It was believed that Saudi Arabia will also soon follow, and according to some analysts, other key non-Arab nations, like Pakistan, are also being pressured towards this reorientation of the regional threat perception. The other key Muslim state, Turkey, already has normal ties with Israel.</p>
<p><strong>Revitalized NATO</strong></p>
<p>While Trump was exerting pressure on Iran, pulling out of the nuclear deal also alienated American European allies who had strived greatly to secure the deal. Moreover, not contributing enough towards NATO has also been a persistent source of tension between the US and its European allies. The Ukraine crisis has helped reverse this while attracting new aspirants, like Sweden and Finland, for NATO membership. Just before travelling to the Middle East, Biden was in Europe attending the NATO and G7 gatherings. One of the top-most agenda during the NATO meetings was to come up with a new concept that unites and define the NATO alliance for the future. <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/30/politics/joe-biden-nato-day-3/index.html">NATO’s updated mission statement</a> for the first time mentions Russia as the greatest threat and China-Russian alliance as a counter to its values.</p>
<p>While NATO looks to thwart Russia in Ukraine, Middle East represents the other flank. There is less consensus on how much time and resources it will take to achieve the goals in Ukraine and elsewhere. Disruption of supply chains and rising energy costs are some of the direct consequences of the conflict, including inflation, when nations were just beginning to come out of Covid-19 induced economic woes.</p>
<p><strong>China- Russia and Middle East</strong></p>
<p>China and Russia both have been extending their influence in the Middle East. The $400 billion China–Iran treaty signed in March 2021 must have been an ominous development from the perspective of the Gulf Arabs and the US. However, the talks have been proceeding for a while, as has been the <a href="https://politact.com/the-emerging-outside-in-approach-to-israeli-palestinian-conflict-afghan-reconciliation-and-kashmir-issue/">‘Outside-In Approach’ to the Arab-Israeli conflict</a>.</p>
<p>Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has become an active player in the Middle East with strategic ties with a number of regional players, to include Saudi Arabia. As its influence increases gradually, it could become an active interlocutor between Israel and the Palestinians, and other conflicts of the Middle East. However, it’s not clear if China desires to get involved in the security affairs of the region, like Russia has in Syria &#8211; as far as the Middle East is concerned<strong>. </strong>Soon after Biden’s visit to the Middle East, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-visits-iran-first-trip-outside-former-ussr-since-ukraine-war-2022-07-18/">Putin and Erdogan visited Iran</a> and discussed the evolving situation in Syria, and allowing shipment of Ukrainian grain through the Black Sea. According to media reports, Khamenei called for long-term cooperation between Russia and Iran and to guard against ‘Western deception’.</p>
<p><iframe loading="lazy" title="YouTube video player" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/zB2BsfOzGJc" width="400" height="315" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen"><span style="display: inline-block; width: 0px; overflow: hidden; line-height: 0;" data-mce-type="bookmark" class="mce_SELRES_start">﻿</span></iframe></p>
<p>Chinese analysts present a case the nation wants to be more involved in providing economic support than engaging in the security affairs of the Middle East. Nonetheless, it has good political and military relations with both Iran and Israel. As part of BRI, China has been extending its trade relations with Israel and lately US has objected strongly to some of them citing security concerns – such as the Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) running a container terminal at the Port of Haifa – near an Israeli naval base that is frequently visited by the US Sixth Fleet. The Secretary of State <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/pompeo-warns-us-could-curb-security-ties-with-israel-over-china-relations/">Mike Pompeo had warned Israel</a> in 2019 to reduce its economic and security ties with China or risk reduced security cooperation from US.</p>
<p>If the China-Israeli economic ties are allowed to strengthen uninhibited, overtime China will be able to build leverages that can potentially undercut US primacy in the affairs of the Middle East. The Israelis disagree on this, stating the nature of its ties with China and the US are of totally different nature.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>Thus, Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia represents a push to counter China and Russia and meanwhile providing continuity to the policy undertaken by Trump, which resulted in Abraham Accords. At the same time, engaging and supporting the Palestinian authorities, and reiterating that two-state solution remains the best way forward to resolving the conflict.</p>
<p>The fresh engagement also envisions a new security architecture for the region that some have called the Arab NATO. During the G7 meeting held in the Bavarian Alps, the leaders also announced the $600 billion <a href="https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/g7-leaders-unveil-600-bn-plan-to-rival-china-s-bri-in-developing-nations-122062700931_1.html">Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment</a> program, seen as an alternative to Chinese BRI.</p>
<p>With their energy resources UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, have also come to play an increasingly critical role when it comes to the affairs South Asia, most recently exhibited in Afghanistan. Then there are the <a href="https://politact.com/examining-saudi-iran-tensions-and-its-impact-on-south-asia-china/">expanding Indian ties with the Gulf nations</a> that have overshadowed the traditional Pakistan’s influence. And this change has undercut the financial support from the region Pakistan had relied upon in the past. PoliTact had covered this shift in a <a href="https://youtu.be/Wq7cWEsaqcs">joint event with the Middle East Institute</a> in November 2018.</p>
<p>The reoriented US engagement with the Arab world will also have a profound impact on the affairs of South Asia – and the present political and economic turbulence in Pakistan could be the direct result of this flux in Middle East &#8211; and surge of great power tussles there.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/what-does-president-bidens-visit-to-israel-and-saudi-arabia-imply/">What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>Iran Nuclear Talks And Struggle For Influence In Middle East</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/iran-nuclear-talks-and-struggle-for-influence-in-middle-east/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Nov 2021 17:28:19 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Core vs Peripheral Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global Power Tussles and Islamic World]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Biden and Iran Nuclear Talks]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Iran Nuclear talks Vienna]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=9762</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="696" height="390" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Ebrahim_Raisi_at_Naja_headquarter_1.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Ebrahim_Raisi_at_Naja_headquarter_1.jpg 1000w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Ebrahim_Raisi_at_Naja_headquarter_1-300x168.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Ebrahim_Raisi_at_Naja_headquarter_1-768x431.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Ebrahim_Raisi_at_Naja_headquarter_1-696x390.jpg 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Ebrahim_Raisi_at_Naja_headquarter_1-749x420.jpg 749w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Ebrahim_Raisi_at_Naja_headquarter_1-600x337.jpg 600w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" />Context The future of Iran’s nuclear deal is the single most consequential factor related to the balance of power in Middle East. The nation’s nuclear program has been at the center of contention between Israel and Iran, and by that connection to the US. After quite a bit of deliberation, P5+1 (US, Russia, China, France, [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/iran-nuclear-talks-and-struggle-for-influence-in-middle-east/">Iran Nuclear Talks And Struggle For Influence In Middle East</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="696" height="390" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Ebrahim_Raisi_at_Naja_headquarter_1.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Ebrahim_Raisi_at_Naja_headquarter_1.jpg 1000w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Ebrahim_Raisi_at_Naja_headquarter_1-300x168.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Ebrahim_Raisi_at_Naja_headquarter_1-768x431.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Ebrahim_Raisi_at_Naja_headquarter_1-696x390.jpg 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Ebrahim_Raisi_at_Naja_headquarter_1-749x420.jpg 749w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Ebrahim_Raisi_at_Naja_headquarter_1-600x337.jpg 600w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" /><p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignleft size-medium wp-image-9768" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Ebrahim_Raisi_at_Naja_headquarter_1-300x168.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="168" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Ebrahim_Raisi_at_Naja_headquarter_1-300x168.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Ebrahim_Raisi_at_Naja_headquarter_1-768x431.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Ebrahim_Raisi_at_Naja_headquarter_1-696x390.jpg 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Ebrahim_Raisi_at_Naja_headquarter_1-749x420.jpg 749w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Ebrahim_Raisi_at_Naja_headquarter_1-600x337.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Ebrahim_Raisi_at_Naja_headquarter_1.jpg 1000w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></p>
<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>The future of Iran’s nuclear deal is the single most consequential factor related to the balance of power in Middle East. The nation’s nuclear program has been at the center of contention between Israel and Iran, and by that connection to the US.</p>
<p>After quite a bit of deliberation, P5+1 (US, Russia, China, France, UK, Germany and EU) finally reached a landmark agreement with Iran in 2015, which came to be known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). As a result, nuclear related economic sanctions were lifted, and $100 billion worth of Iranian assets were unfrozen by the US and EU. The combined approach of European allies, including Russia and China, worked in convincing Iran it was better off by accepting the terms of the treaty, containing its nuclear program and uranium enrichment, and bringing nuclear facilities under IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) monitoring.</p>
<p>However, President Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear agreement in 2018 calling it an embarrassment. The critics of the deal which included the Republican Party, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, have pointed to the omission of Iran’s ballistic missile program, the sunset clauses, and wider behavior in the region. The ‘wider behavior’ is a reference to Iran’s influence in nations like Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen &#8211; and supporting other non-state actors like Hezbollah, Houthis, and Hamas. The support for Hezbollah and Hamas has complicated the Middle East Peace Process, while Houthis are increasingly a big headache for Saudi Arabia &#8211; carrying a hefty humanitarian cost.</p>
<p><strong>The Future of Nuclear Talks</strong></p>
<p>As Iran and other major powers engage with Iran in a fresh round of indirect talks starting November 29 in Vienna, the challenge is can the deal be restored or amended? Iran has stated that all sanctions should be lifted before it would return to full compliance &#8211; and that US should provide guarantee that <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2021-11-16/nuclear-iran-not-inevitable">any future US president will not</a> leave the treaty. Iran is presently enriching uranium at 60 percent as compared to 3.67 percent prescribed by the agreement.</p>
<p>On the other hand, US and Gulf allies are demanding Iran return to full compliance to pave the way for resumption of diplomacy. Meanwhile Israel has threatened to use force at any moment due to Iran’s not abiding by the treaty, and US officials have stated to use other means if diplomacy fails. Israel is also worried that <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-fears-us-will-settle-for-less-for-less-iran-nuclear-deal-report/">US may agree to less</a> than what is sufficient, especially after how the Afghan withdrawal transpired.</p>
<p>The US Iran policy has circled around two approaches: the negotiated settlement was adopted by President Obama by signing the JCPOA in 2015, which sidelined the aggressive route against Iran supported by Israel and Saudi Arabia. Trump took on the more aggressive alternative and nullified the treaty while reimposing sanctions. He also moved away from the two-state solution as it relates to the Middle East Peace Process, with recognition of Israel from the GCC and Arab States under Abraham Accords &#8211; and as linked to the <a href="https://politact.com/the-emerging-outside-in-approach-to-israeli-palestinian-conflict-afghan-reconciliation-and-kashmir-issue/">Outside-In</a> approach.</p>
<p><strong>Options to Deal with Iran’s Nuclear Program</strong></p>
<p>In essence, to address Iran’s nuclear program, the policy has swung between these approaches:</p>
<ol>
<li>To engage with Iran and negotiate with it. Recognizing that the use of force to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program has serious consequences which makes it not practical. The attempt here is to reinforce on Iran its intent to develop nuclear weapons as more costly than the benefits of the incentives being offered – and thus bring about a change in the ‘wider behavior’.</li>
<li>If other approaches do not work, application of military solution. This is especially propagated by Israel; it believes promises made by Iran under any deal cannot be trusted. Additionally, the accord and its sunset clauses only limit Iran’s nuclear program for some time – while the economic incentives will boost its support for proxy players &#8211; and offer resources to modernize its nuclear program and military.</li>
<li>Using covert methods continue to set back Iran’s nuclear program. This was evidenced by cyber-attacks and elimination of Iran’s top nuclear scientist recently, which were attributed to Israel.</li>
<li>Pressuring and isolating Iran using economic sanctions. Such as by preventing the export of its oil resources or making trade deals with the nation. Iran also accuses the West of using sanctions and economic pressure to bring about a revolt and regime change.</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>Great Power Rivalry, Iran Nuclear Deal, and Struggle for Influence in Middle East</strong></p>
<p>There was initial optimism that Biden administration will be able to restore the treaty when in office. However, the new hardline Ebrahem Raisi’s government in Iran needed time to settle in. Additionally, the trust deficit that ensued because of unilateral American pullout in 2018 – has slowed the indirect negotiations.</p>
<p>The distance created between US and European allies as a result of Trump’s America First doctrine, which has also changed the American domestic politics, have further complicated matters for President Biden. Moreover, escalating global rivalry with China and Russia, with which Iran has close ties to, make reinstating the intricately crafted treaty difficult.</p>
<p>China and Iran entered in to a <a href="https://politact.com/bidens-middle-east-policy-china-iran-ties-and-cpec/">$400 billion 25 year economic and security deal</a> in March 2021 that would lead to enhanced military and trade relations. The pact is seen as a lifeline for Iran. The agreement ensures Chinese investment in Iranian telecommunication, transportation, and military fields. The military cooperation includes exercises, intelligence sharing, and joint research and development of weapons. China will also procure its energy needs from Iran on discounted price for over next 25 years.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/19/iran-shanghai-cooperation-organisation">Iran’s membership</a> in the China and Russia dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in September has further increased its economic and security ties with the non-Western UN Security Council members.</p>
<p>In the mounting great power rivalry, a military solution towards Iran would be unacceptable for both China and Russia. The potential reenactment of the JCPOA, along with China-Iran pact, will make China a stronger player in the Middle East. It could potentially utilize its clout to bring about Israeli-Palestinian agreement.</p>
<p>In the aftermath of Afghan withdrawal, China and Russia will likely try to boost their influence in the affairs of the Middle East. The GCC states themselves are trying to hedge their bets and this was recently exhibited by the <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/1974286/saudi-arabia">Saud-Russia strategic meeting</a> held on November 24. The Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has visited Moscow in 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018. The <a href="https://www.chinadailyhk.com/article/161376">GCC-China free trade talks</a> are also making progress and there are hopes that they deal will be reached soon. At the same time, the Gulf nations are attempting to <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/1798966">build influence with China</a> to restrict Iranian behavior.</p>
<p>Both China and Russia area increasing their involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by first attempting to bring about unity amongst the Palestinian leadership and give attention to the humanitarian crisis. China has even presented a framework to address the Palestinian issue premised on these principles and direct talks between Israel and Palestinian authorities. At the same time, Israel is China’s third largest trading partner and Chinese investments in Israel, especially in the technology sector, are a <a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/05/26/chinese-investments-in-israel/">growing concern for the US</a>.</p>
<p>Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas met Vladimir Putin on November 23 in Sochi in efforts to organize an international conference under the Quartet, which includes US, Russia, UN, and EU. <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/abbas-meets-putin-seeks-quartet-role-in-peace-process-685783">Quoting Palestinian officials</a>, media sources indicate revitalizing the Quartet was an effort focused on preventing the US from having an exclusive role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the budding China, Russia strategic partnership, both nations have started <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/russia-china-see-eye-eye-approach-end-israeli-palestinian-fighting-1615944">regular consultations</a> on Iran nuclear deal, Afghanistan, and humanitarian situation in Syria.</p>
<p>In short, the Iran nuclear deal is more and more about how it fits with in the construct of great power rivalry. While the negotiated settlement reached in 2015 was abandoned, the global environment is different and not conducive for a military strike now &#8211; and without lifting of sanctions, Iran is unlikely to budge. And this is why the Israeli and GCC fears are real, that US and the Democratic Party may try to align with Iran and may settle for ‘less for less’. But then Iranian fears are also on the mark, if the Republican Party returns to power in the next election – matters will return to square one.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/iran-nuclear-talks-and-struggle-for-influence-in-middle-east/">Iran Nuclear Talks And Struggle For Influence In Middle East</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>US Afghan Withdrawal, Regional Geopolitics, And Biden-Putin Summit</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/us-afghan-withdrawal-regional-geopolitics-and-biden-putin-summit/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 08 Jun 2021 22:49:01 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Afghan Reconciliation]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO' Future Role]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Future of Afghan reconciliation]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[NATO and Afghanistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nord-Stream 2 Pipeliine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Afghanistan relations]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=9641</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="453" height="307" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/04-03-2013_Afghan-Reconciliation2.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Afghan Civilian talking with a soldier from the Afghan Security Force" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/04-03-2013_Afghan-Reconciliation2.jpg 453w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/04-03-2013_Afghan-Reconciliation2-300x203.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 453px) 100vw, 453px" />Context Now that the Biden administration has definitively announced plans to withdraw militarily from Afghanistan by September 11, the focus has shifted to the post withdrawal scenarios – and what that would look like for the US and other key stakeholders. The most important determinant of that is the status of Afghan reconciliation – and [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/us-afghan-withdrawal-regional-geopolitics-and-biden-putin-summit/">US Afghan Withdrawal, Regional Geopolitics, And Biden-Putin Summit</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="453" height="307" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/04-03-2013_Afghan-Reconciliation2.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Afghan Civilian talking with a soldier from the Afghan Security Force" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/04-03-2013_Afghan-Reconciliation2.jpg 453w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/04-03-2013_Afghan-Reconciliation2-300x203.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 453px) 100vw, 453px" /><p><strong><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignleft size-thumbnail wp-image-9649" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/US-Afghan-Withdrawal-150x150.jpg" alt="A military plane with troops getting on board" width="150" height="150" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/US-Afghan-Withdrawal-150x150.jpg 150w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/US-Afghan-Withdrawal-300x300.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/US-Afghan-Withdrawal-100x100.jpg 100w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" />Context</strong></p>
<p>Now that the Biden administration has definitively announced plans to withdraw militarily from Afghanistan by September 11, the focus has shifted to the post withdrawal scenarios – and what that would look like for the US and other key stakeholders. The most important determinant of that is the status of Afghan reconciliation – and US-China ties.</p>
<p>Moreover, like has been the precedence, each major shift and decision is followed by a period of lull &#8211; as the other parties interpret what the changed circumstances mean. For many the question remains if US is fully intent on the military withdrawal. After all, the departure of coalition forces does not mean the end of political and security engagement.<br />
As the Biden administration announced that US may not be able to keep the previously agreed May withdrawal deadline, Afghan Taliban has signaled it considers the delay a breach of the treaty signed last year. While they attended the meeting held under the auspices of Russia in March, Afghan Taliban did not show up at the Washington backed peace conference scheduled for April in Istanbul &#8211; and thus it had to be postponed. Notably, India was also invited to the Istanbul moot.</p>
<p>Subsequent to the announced delay, US has actively engaged Pakistan to help convince Afghan Taliban that slight delay in military withdrawal should not short circuit the overall plan. The country has already played a major role in facilitating talks with the Taliban. In this regard, the security advisors of Pakistan and US met in Geneva recently, and other direct communications have also taken place between the senior security leadership of both nations.</p>
<p>Media reports indicated that these contacts were geared towards securing the air and ground lines of access (ALOC and GLOC) during and after the US withdrawal. The controversy is already brewing if US has requested bases in Pakistan. And reports also reflect that under the Biden administration budget request for fiscal year 2022, some military training and economic assistance for Pakistan is forthcoming &#8211; but the overall suspension of military aid that came about in May 2018 remains intact. While the US is withdrawing militarily, the budget still asks for $3.3bn to support and sustain the Afghan Security Forces, a jump of 9.2 percent from 2021.</p>
<p>At the same time, violence has increased in Afghanistan and there are no signs of permanent cease fire that was being hoped for – as US agrees to leave albeit with a slight delay. But what can a few months accomplish which was not achieved in almost two decades?</p>
<p><strong>The Spring Offensive</strong></p>
<p>Seemingly, a delay of a few months should not matter, but when world events are moving with lightning speed, and added to that the Coronavirus related dynamics, postponements could create a new set of calculations. Perhaps the most important consideration would be the pace of fighting. Summer and Spring are usually the heaviest fighting season, with Afghan Taliban and coalition forces both launching operations.</p>
<p>Based on the agreement reached on Feb 29, 2020, Taliban are not targeting the coalition and American troops but that does not include the Afghan government forces. Therefore, one of the key assumptions that is likely to be tested is that if the Afghan forces can hold on their own – and thus indicate with some level of certainty what can transpire in the future. As US continues to close bases, Afghan Taliban are gaining in the vacuum that’s generated. Commenting on the situation, Foreign Minister of Pakistan showed concern that Afghan forces may not be able to hold on, and without political settlement, the country is heading towards a civil war.</p>
<p>This drastic prospect is not what Pakistan would hope for and has supported the concept of responsible withdrawal. Pakistan will likely increase pressure on Afghan Taliban to get on with the new reality &#8211; provided it get some concessions from the US. Pakistan wants US to take a <a href="https://politact.com/broader-implications-of-pakistans-omission-from-bidens-climate-summit/">broader view of its ties with Pakistan</a> &#8211; and not just from the security prism of Afghanistan. Thus one of the key element at stake is the nature of <a href="https://politact.com/us-pakistan-relations-and-afghanistan-under-biden/">US-Pakistan ties</a> in the aftermath of US withdrawal &#8211; and what role Pakistan can offer while it takes place.</p>
<p><strong>Blinken’s Proposal and Afghan Peace Process</strong></p>
<p>Second causality to be tested by the delay is how the US withdrawal influences the Afghan Peace Process. One would assume that the momentous decision would have created a sense of urgency, as Secretary Blinken’s letter to Ashraf Ghani had specifically conveyed. And if the talks had progressed, perhaps a ceasefire could have been established before the full US departure.</p>
<p>According to Secretary Blinken’s proposal, the postponed April conference UN was going to convene in Istanbul, was to be followed by a 90-day reduction in violence. Moreover, the envisioned concept of interim government appears to have landed flatly in Afghanistan, with President Ashraf Ghani strongly resisting. The Ghani government prefers a new election to decide the fate of existing set-up &#8211; not a transitional government that includes power sharing with Afghan Taliban.</p>
<p>Thus, the delay in talks, and speedy US withdrawal, adds to the pressure on the Ghani government. The option it is utilizing is to blame Pakistan for what ails Afghanistan, and let the situation worsen dramatically &#8211; so as to cause a rethink on the part of the US and coalition forces.</p>
<p><strong>Pakistan-India Ties</strong></p>
<p>Another key dimension of the Afghan quagmire is the continued Indian intransigence towards the budding peace process. According to the Indian strategic thinking, Afghan Taliban gaining the upper hand would not bode well for the Kashmir conflict &#8211; and the insurgency there could likely gain more momentum. And thus, India would like Pakistan to remain distracted with Afghanistan while continuing to support groups such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other Baloch insurgents, and prevent CPEC related projects from maturing.</p>
<p>While India has also been working to <a href="https://politact.com/examining-saudi-iran-tensions-and-its-impact-on-south-asia-china/">distance Pakistan from its traditional Arab allies</a>, for the first time, India has to consider tensions on its northern border with China – and this is where the India-US strategic ties and the Quad alliance comes in to play.</p>
<p>The External Minister of India, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, met with the US officials and Secretary Blinken on May 28 to emphasize its case. Clearly, a quandary for the US would be to balance withdrawal from Afghanistan with securing Indian interests, calming Pakistan’s security concerns, while obtaining more cooperation from India as it relates to the Quad strategy.</p>
<p><strong>China-Iran and JCPOA</strong></p>
<p>The sixth round of Iran nuclear talks are scheduled in Vienna this week. As the likelihood of US lifting sanctions on Iran increase, what role can Iran play in the post US Afghan withdrawal scenario, and will the results of Iranian elections make a difference?</p>
<p>It remains doubtful how much Iran can act as a calming force in Afghanistan. Iran’s trust with US and India is quite low. And that prospect has been made if even more remote due to its strategic closeness to China and Russia; the recent <a href="https://politact.com/bidens-middle-east-policy-china-iran-ties-and-cpec/">$400 billion China-Iran deal</a> is a case in point. With this far-reaching treaty, Iran is likely to become more a conduit in extending Chinese influence in the Middle East.</p>
<p>If the Iran nuclear talks with Biden administration prove to be successful, it would likely play out of its of its own historical aspirations, in Afghanistan and the wider Middle East. But that also means <a href="https://politact.com/future-islamic-world/">relegation of the Sunni Arabs and Turks</a> &#8211; and more importantly, this will require Israeli acquiescence.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>The crux of the matter remains, will the US withdrawal from Afghanistan result in China-Russia dominated region, or the one under US-India. Remaining engage with the Afghanistan and Pakistan will provide some room to maneuver.</p>
<p>As alluded to by PoliTact in previous assessments, the window for Chinese and Russian cooperation on Afghanistan is narrowing quickly – and depends a lot on the cross leverages US, China, and Russia have on each other in other regions and matters. In this, the sequencing of events is of crucial significance. While Secretary Blinken’s meeting in March with Chinese counterparts held in Anchorage had a stark tone – the one with Foreign Minister Lavrov in May seemed more amenable, leading to the waiving of sanctions on Nord-Stream 2 pipeline.</p>
<p>The Biden-Putin summit, coming after the G7, EU, and NATO meetings, will demonstrate the state of play between US and Russia. The G7 agenda is expected to cover areas such as strategic stability, Ukraine, Belarus, Cyberattacks and cooperation in the areas of Coronavirus and climate change.</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignleft size-thumbnail wp-image-9647" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Flags-Afghan-US-Nato-150x150.jpg" alt="Flags of Afghanistan, US, and NATO" width="150" height="150" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Flags-Afghan-US-Nato-150x150.jpg 150w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Flags-Afghan-US-Nato-300x300.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Flags-Afghan-US-Nato-100x100.jpg 100w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" />On the other hand, NATO’s website indicates the June 14 NATO leadership Summit will discuss Afghanistan. Speaking at an Atlantic Council event on June 7, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated the organization will continue to support and train Afghan military, while clarifying that most of this will be taking place ‘outside Afghanistan’. He went on to add: “at some stage Afghans had to take responsibility for their own future, and that’s what they’re doing with continued support from NATO allies.”</p>
<p>Stoltenberg commented that China is not an adversary, rhyming with the opinion piece President Biden wrote in the Washington Post on June 5th. He further added that they are looking at the possibility of re-initiating the otherwise defunct NATO-Russia Council.</p>
<p>Biden wrote in his price, “we want a stable and predictable relationship with Russia on issues like strategic stability and arms control. When he meets Putin, he will be taking a holistic approach &#8211; gauging how much is Russia willing to play ball on a whole gamut of matters dear to Russia &#8211; and then see how Russia can assist towards Afghan withdrawal. How China perceives any give and take, is part of the ongoing <a href="https://politact.com/the-war-against-extremism-and-the-return-of-new-great-game/">great power rivalry</a>.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/us-afghan-withdrawal-regional-geopolitics-and-biden-putin-summit/">US Afghan Withdrawal, Regional Geopolitics, And Biden-Putin Summit</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>Biden’s Middle East Policy, China-Iran Ties, and CPEC</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/bidens-middle-east-policy-china-iran-ties-and-cpec/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 28 Dec 2020 01:22:46 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[China and Islamic World]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Chabahar Port]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=9435</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="696" height="392" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-1024x576.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-1024x576.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-300x169.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-768x432.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-696x392.jpg 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-1068x601.jpg 1068w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-747x420.jpg 747w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-600x338.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault.jpg 1280w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" />Guest Analyst Muhammad Siraj ul Huda Khan assisted in researching and developing this article. Context PoliTact periodically invites leading regional and global experts to understand the changing geopolitical situations and significant emerging themes. One such theme is the budding China-Iran economic and security partnership. China and Iran are entering a $400 billion 25 year economic [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/bidens-middle-east-policy-china-iran-ties-and-cpec/">Biden’s Middle East Policy, China-Iran Ties, and CPEC</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="696" height="392" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-1024x576.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-1024x576.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-300x169.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-768x432.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-696x392.jpg 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-1068x601.jpg 1068w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-747x420.jpg 747w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-600x338.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault.jpg 1280w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" /><p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-9439 alignleft" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/First_Peace_Treaty_between_Israel_and_an_Arab_State-300x200.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="200" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/First_Peace_Treaty_between_Israel_and_an_Arab_State-300x200.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/First_Peace_Treaty_between_Israel_and_an_Arab_State-630x420.jpg 630w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/First_Peace_Treaty_between_Israel_and_an_Arab_State-600x400.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/First_Peace_Treaty_between_Israel_and_an_Arab_State.jpg 632w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" />Guest Analyst Muhammad Siraj ul Huda Khan assisted in researching and developing this article.</p>
<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>PoliTact periodically invites leading regional and global experts to understand the changing geopolitical situations and significant emerging themes. One such theme is the budding China-Iran economic and security partnership.</p>
<p>China and Iran are entering a $400 billion 25 year economic and security deal that would lead to enhanced military and trade relations. The agreement ensures Chinese investment in Iranian telecommunication, transportation, and military fields. The military cooperation includes exercises, intelligence sharing, and joint research and development of weapons. China will also procure its energy needs from Iran on discounted price for over next 25 years.</p>
<p>On July 28, 2020, PoliTact held a webinar to discuss the potential China-Iran economic deal and its impact on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The panelists analyzed the major developments taking place in the South Asia and Middle East regions and provided perspectives on the evolving situation. The theme has taken on added significance in the aftermath of US elections and with additional Muslim states, such as UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco officially recognizing the state of Israel.</p>
<p>CEO and Chief Analyst of PoliTact, Arif Ansar, moderated the panel discussion. The opening remarks were made by Ikram Sehgal, who is a Chairman of the Karachi Council on Foreign Relations, CEO of Pathfinder Group, and member of the East West Institute’s Board of Directors.</p>
<p>The panel included:</p>
<ul>
<li>Ambassador Mustafa Kamal Kazi – Senior Vice Chairman at the Karachi Council on Foreign Relations, former Foreign Secretary and Ambassador of Pakistan to the Russian Federation, the Kingdom of Netherlands, Republic of Indonesia and Republic of Iraq.</li>
<li>Khaled Almaeena – Former Editor-in-Chief of Arab News and Saudi Gazette, CEO of a PR Firm, and Saudi Television news anchor.</li>
<li>Claude Rakisits – Honorary Professor at the Asia Pacific College of Diplomacy at the Australian National University. He is also a Director at PoliTact and covers the South Asia and Middle East region.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>The Webinar explored the following key questions:</strong></p>
<ol>
<li>What are the implications of the China-Iran economic and security deal on the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)?</li>
<li>Assessing Chinese influence in the Middle East region and does the China-Iran deal represent a Chinese pivot to the Middle East? Moreover, how does Chinese sway play out against that of India, Israeli, and the US in the region?</li>
<li>How the does the China-Iran treaty correlates with the Quad and Indo-Pacific strategy?</li>
<li>Will China use the Iran deal as a leverage in its dealing with the US, just as Russia has done?</li>
<li>History informs that Muslim nations or empires have often sided with one or the other global power – and then fought directly with each other. What can be done to prevent such an outcome in the framework of the present regional and global geopolitics?</li>
</ol>
<p><iframe loading="lazy" width="375" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/4EkxkeAk6uU" title="YouTube video player" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen></iframe></p>
<p><strong>Implications of the potential China-Iran Deal on China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)</strong></p>
<p>There are multiple angles to review this connection; that of Pakistan and Iran, and one cannot ignore the positions of China and the US.</p>
<p>Pakistan sees no negative impact of the potential China-Iran deal on CPEC. Former foreign minister Sartaj Aziz once stated that the Chabahar Port was not competing with the Gwadar port, in fact they were seen as complimentary. Media reports have also indicated that a road was to connect the two closely located ports at some point.</p>
<p>On the other hand, Iran is likely to see the Chinese deal as a blessing in disguise. Fearing US sanctions, Pakistan has been dragging its feet on the Iran Gas pipeline project for years, and India has also been slow in developing the Chabahar Port. In all likelihood, once the deal is finalized, Chinese investments will start flowing in quickly and provide immense relief to the much-penalized Iran. More importantly, the China-Iran deal would provide the strategic counterbalance to the American, Israeli, and Arab pressure.</p>
<p>According to Ambassador Kazi, the US withdrawal from the Iranian deal of 2015, and mismanagement of the multipolar world, is one of the reasons China-Iran economic and security partnership is coming to fruition.</p>
<p>However, for China, the treaty with Iran diversifies the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) providing it with another tributary. This is especially true if the CPEC route runs into trouble, or if the work slows down considerably due to the American, Indian, and Arab pressure on Pakistan.</p>
<p><strong>Chinese Pivot to the Middle East and American, Israeli and Indian Coalition</strong></p>
<p>China has been building strategic ties with the Middle East for some time now – in addition to the Asia Pacific, Middle East represents its other flank. Khaled Almaeena pointed out that the Saudi ties with China got underway in the 90s, as the Gulf region started to balance ties between China and the US. On the other hand, Dr. Claude Rakisits noted that the Chinese push westward is not necessarily a pivot, irrespective, the Iran deal will be seen negatively in both Saudi Arabia and the US.</p>
<p>Speaking at the Saudi embassy in China in July on the occasion of the 30 anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties, Saudi Ambassador Turki M. A. Almadi commented: “our relations are all-round, multi-field, not only about bilateral trade and mutual investment, but also extended to cooperation in the fields of culture, science and technology, and health.”</p>
<p>Zhai Jun, China’s special envoy on Middle East affairs indicated at the occasion that the bilateral trade volume between the two nations stood at $78.04 billion at the end of 2019. He added Saudi Arabia was the largest supplier of crude oil to China, and also the Arab nations largest trading partner.</p>
<p>Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has become an active player in the Middle East with strategic ties with a number of regional players, to include Saudi Arabia. As its influence increases gradually, it could become an active interlocutor between Israel and the Palestinians, and other conflicts of the Middle East. However, it is not clear if China aspires to get involved in the security affairs of the region, like Russia has in Syria.</p>
<p>Chinese analysts present a case that the nation wants to be more active in providing economic support than engaging in security affairs of the Middle East. Nonetheless, China has amicable political and military relations with both Iran and Israel. As part of BRI, China has been extending its trade relations with Israel and lately US has objected strongly to some of them citing security concerns – such as the Chinese company Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) running a container terminal at the Port of Haifa – near an Israeli naval base that is frequently visited by the US Sixth Fleet.</p>
<p>If the China-Israeli economic ties continue to strengthen uninhibited, overtime China will be able to build leverages that can potentially undercut US primacy in the affairs of the Middle East. The Israelis disagree on this possibility, stating that the nature of its ties with China and the US are of totally different nature. Nonetheless, the push under President Trump to normalize ties between Israel and the Arab nations can be seen as an attempt to counter China becoming an influential Middle Eastern player in the future.</p>
<p>When it comes to the Indian alignment with Israel and its growing ties with the Gulf nations, a different question is raised. How do these relations undercut the traditional support Pakistan has generated from the Gulf region?  In November 2018, PoliTact collaborated with the <a href="http://www.mei.edu/">Middle East Institute</a> to examine the <a href="https://politact.com/examining-saudi-iran-tensions-and-its-impact-on-south-asia-china/">political, security, and economic interconnections between South Asia and the Gulf States</a>, and one of the subsets, Pakistan and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The report pointed out to how India was strategically undermining Pakistan, a risk that has matured now.</p>
<p><iframe loading="lazy" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Wq7cWEsaqcs" width="350" height="250" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen"><span style="display: inline-block; width: 0px; overflow: hidden; line-height: 0;" data-mce-type="bookmark" class="mce_SELRES_start">﻿</span></iframe></p>
<p>Commenting on this during the webinar, Khaled Almaaena stated that Pakistan’s position has been undermined by the negative economic and security news consistently emanating from the country. And this has been occurring at a time when India has positioned itself as an information technology and economic powerhouse, and by investing in Saudi Arabia that brought jobs to the Kingdom. He further added, the younger leadership of KSA do not hold the same kind of affinity towards Pakistan as past leaders had.</p>
<p>Irrespective, we can see an attempt to undermine both the Chinese and <a href="https://politact.com/examining-saudi-iran-tensions-and-its-impact-on-south-asia-china/">Pakistan connections in the Middle east</a> as they compete with the American, Israeli and Indian interests.</p>
<p><strong>China-Iran Deal and Quad Strategy</strong></p>
<p>Answering the moderator, and as noted above, Dr. Claude Rakisits noted that the Chinese push westward does not represent its pivot to the Middle East &#8211; and how this relates to the Quad strategy is a different angle.</p>
<p>Dr. Claude added that Quad is meant to “keep China within its borders”. And as a counter, China is pushing US away from the first island chain by building artificial islands in the South China Sea. Moreover, China-Iran deal counteracts Quad and the Indo-Pacific strategy by providing China with a key footprint in the Indian Ocean, which together with Gwadar and Djibouti, enhances Chinese naval potential.</p>
<p>While Quad would desire to box-in China, conversely China wants to limit the Indian role in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, by keeping it busy within its borders. This dynamics can be witnessed by the present tensions and <a href="https://politact.com/china-india-border-skirmishes-brics-versus-quad/">skirmishes on the Line of Actual control (LAC) and the Ladakh region</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Biden’s Middle East Policy, Iranian Sanctions, and Chinese Leverage</strong></p>
<p>A related inquiry has to do with sanctions on Iran and how will China navigate them? Previous European attempts to build trade relations with the nation hit numerous roadblocks. As soon as Trump administration took oath in January 2017, within almost a year and a half of signing the Iran nuclear deal (July 2015), US started to build pressure on western companies attempting to build trade relations with Iran. As a result, even the $20 billion aircraft deal Boeing had signed with Iran had to be scrapped.</p>
<p>Under President Elect Biden’s Iran Policy, will these sanctions be eased if US rejoins the treaty? This will all depend on how the Biden administration re-engages Iran. Recently Biden has indicated that it will want to renegotiate the Iran deal to include its missile program, and wider behavior in the region; these were widely seen as major weaknesses of the 2015 deal.</p>
<p>This, however, will likely be a non-starter for Iran. The country has expressed it would not enter fresh negotiations with the US when even the terms and guarantees of the 2015 agreement were not kept.</p>
<p>A parallel concern is, with the ‘Outside In’ approach to the Middle East Peace Process so far along resulting in the Abraham Accords, will President Elect Biden be able to reverse it and thus jeopardize the present Arab-Israeli normalizing process? A more likely approach would be that the normalization process would have to incorporate the two-state solution under Biden – including a more transparent give and take by the Israelis – of the type that is frequently hinted by the Saudi leadership.</p>
<p><iframe loading="lazy" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/KJzuPWM960g" width="350" height="250" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen"></iframe></p>
<p>Irrespective, Dr. Claude was of the opinion that China will continue its dealings with Iran, despite the sanctions, and will push back on any efforts to restrict the ties between Iran and China. It is also possible that China will use the Iran deal as a leverage in its dealing with the US, just as Russia has done in the past. On several occasions when Russian ties stumbled with the West, it threatened to supply Iran with modern weaponry that could help it withstand any attack on its nuclear program.</p>
<p>The US Iran policy has circled around two approaches recently: the negotiated settlement was adopted by President Obama by signing the JCPOA in 2015, which sidelined the aggressive route against Iran propagated by Israel and Saudi Arabia. Trump took on the more militaristic alternative – moving away from the two-state solution, with wider recognition of Israel from the GCC and Arab States. The assassination of two top Iranian officials recently, Major General Qassim Soleimani and nuclear scientist Mohsin Fakhrizadeh, are linked to this approach.</p>
<p>The challenge is that a military solution towards Iran would be unacceptable for both China and Russia. Similarly, the reenactment of the JCPOA, along with potential China-Iran deal, will make China a stronger player in the Middle East. It could possibly utilize its clout to bring about Israeli-Palestinian agreement, which US has not been able to do alone.</p>
<p>On the one hand this cooperation between China and the US would be an immensely positive development that can bring about peace in the Middle East. However, this directly contradicts with what is transpiring in the Asia Pacific and resulting Indo-Pacific and the Quad strategy. And this also does not factor in Russian role in the whole scenario – and the <a href="https://politact.com/whats-next-in-the-growing-saudi-uae-power-tussles-with-turkey-iran/">interplay of the Muslim Middle powers</a>, such as Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.</p>
<p><strong>Islamic World and Global Power Tussles</strong></p>
<p>In the past Muslim nations or empires have often <a href="https://politact.com/understanding-jinnahs-position-on-world-war-i-and-ii-lessons-to-be-learned/">sided with one or the other global power</a> – and then fought directly with each other. And the question becomes what can be done to avert such an outcome in the framework of the present regional and global geopolitics.</p>
<p>Replying to the moderator, Khaled Almaeena pointed out that the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) is unable to fulfill this role. He added this requires strong Islamic leadership to prevent being exploited, commitment to their citizens, and rule of law. Moreover, he stated that ‘if Iran suffers, the Arabs will suffer too’. In his opinion CPEC can play a constructive role by being a bridge, ‘good economics makes good politics,’ he stated.</p>
<p>On the other hand, Ambassador Kazi was critical of the role the GCC nations have played in this regard and pointed to the infighting between the Arab nations. He noted that ‘what happens in the Arab world, impacts the Islamic world’.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Ikram Sehgal added the role of Turkey is important, and one should not forget the Regional Cooperation for Development Organization (RCD) formed between Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey in 1964, and replaced by Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in 1979. He emphasized that Russia and China have good ties with Pakistan, Turkey and Iran, and that ‘constructive engagement can be a harbinger of peace’.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>While Saudi Arabia has delayed recognizing the statehood of Israel, and while Qatar remains closer to Turkey, the shifting alliance of most GCC and Arab nations towards Israel and the US, represents a decisive shift in the balance of power. Adopting the threat perception that centers on Iran, and without any clear give and take from Israel in the context of Abraham Accords, is likely to revitalize the message of non-state actors.</p>
<p>While China has made an economic entry in the Middle East, it has not decided to influence the security affairs – other than under the umbrella of UN and for maritime security purposes. In Syria too, it has adopted a non-interventionist approach and has supported the Assad regime.</p>
<p>However, economic leverages will eventually lead to influences in other areas. And China would have to utilize its sway &#8211; especially when it has the most to lose if a conflict breaks out in the region. One measure of if matters are heading in that direction would be the establishment of military bases, like the one in Djibouti, and potential militarization of Gawadar and Chabahar port. And in this context, the China-Iran economic and security deal takes on an added emphasis.</p>
<p>In the long run, US would want to create a wedge between China and Russia. Since attaining self-sufficiency in its energy needs, the US interests in Middle East is primarily to prevent nuclear weapons from falling in the hands of rogue states, or non-state actors, and this this a goal it shares with Israel. At the same time, US would not want to lose its primacy in the Middle East, but to exploit the existing fault lines to further extend its reach &#8211; to the detriment of China and Russia.</p>
<p>At the same time, under President Elect Biden, there is an opportunity to move away from the zero-sum approach to world affairs &#8211; by reaching out to China for a wider détente and cooperation – and the geopolitics resulting from the Coronavirus related pandemic especially necessitates this. Reaching that stage, however, would require first a smooth transition of power in the US.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/bidens-middle-east-policy-china-iran-ties-and-cpec/">Biden’s Middle East Policy, China-Iran Ties, and CPEC</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Future Of Middle East Peace Process, Extremism, And China-Iran Deal</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/the-future-of-middle-east-peace-process-extremism-and-china-iran-deal/</link>
		
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		<pubDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2020 00:19:02 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Campaign Against Extremism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global Power Tussles and Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South and Central Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US-Islamic World Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vantage Point Analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Afghan Peace process]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Al Qaeda]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arab Israeli relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arab Israelu conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arab Spring]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Atlantic Council]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bahrain Israeli ties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[BRI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chabahar]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China Saudi Arabia Ties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China-Iran Economic Deal]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chinese Middle Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Daesh]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics of Midde East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gulf States and Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gwadar Port]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Haifa Port]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran nuclear deal]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ISIS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel UAE normalization of ties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israeli Palestinian relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[JCPOA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kashmir issue]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Martin Indyk]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Outside In Strategy Middle East Peace Process]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Arab ties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Iran Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Threat perception of Arab world]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Middle East Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War against extremism]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.politact.com/?p=9311</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="696" height="904" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Middle-East-Map-2.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Map of Middle East" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Middle-East-Map-2.jpg 788w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Middle-East-Map-2-600x780.jpg 600w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" />Arab-Israel Normalization of Ties and US Middle East Policy Context With the normalization of ties between UAE, Bahrain and Israel, the so-called ‘Outside-In Approach’ to the Middle East Peace Process is now in full swing. Most GCC and Arab nations are on the way to normalizing of ties with Israel. This was predicted as regional [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-future-of-middle-east-peace-process-extremism-and-china-iran-deal/">The Future Of Middle East Peace Process, Extremism, And China-Iran Deal</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="696" height="904" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Middle-East-Map-2.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Map of Middle East" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Middle-East-Map-2.jpg 788w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Middle-East-Map-2-600x780.jpg 600w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" /><p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone size-full wp-image-8581" src="https://www.politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Middle-East-Map-2.jpg" alt="" width="788" height="1024" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Middle-East-Map-2.jpg 788w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Middle-East-Map-2-600x780.jpg 600w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 788px) 100vw, 788px" />Arab-Israel Normalization of Ties and US Middle East Policy</p>
<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>With the normalization of ties between UAE, Bahrain and Israel, the so-called <a href="https://www.politact.com/the-emerging-outside-in-approach-to-israeli-palestinian-conflict-afghan-reconciliation-and-kashmir-issue/">‘Outside-In Approach’ to the Middle East Peace Process</a> is now in full swing. Most GCC and Arab nations are on the way to normalizing of ties with Israel. This was predicted as regional situation dramatically shifted during the war against extremism, and as a consequence of Arab Spring. During this time, the threat perceptions of the Arabs have also gradually shifted away from Israel and towards Iran. What was the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, transformed in to an Arab-Israeli conflict, and now appears to have become Arab-Israeli versus Iran conflict.</p>
<p>At an event hosted by <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/with-an-eye-on-iran-gulf-countries-seek-us-security-guarantee/">Atlantic Council on May 7, 2015</a>, PoliTact’s Chief Analyst Arif Ansar asked the former US special envoy for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations Martin Indyk, about how the Iranian nuclear deal and the US-Gulf partnership can help or hinder the Middle East Peace Process.</p>
<p><iframe loading="lazy" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/KJzuPWM960g" width="500" height="315" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen"><span style="display: inline-block; width: 0px; overflow: hidden; line-height: 0;" data-mce-type="bookmark" class="mce_SELRES_start">﻿</span></iframe></p>
<p>Martine Indyk replied that the prospects of a solution emerging from an ‘Inside Out’ approach i.e., from within Israel and Palestine, and independent of whatever else is going on in the Middle East, are not good. However, the potential for an ‘Outside In’ solution which has emerged because of the possible Iran nuclear deal and Israeli and Arab countries being on the same side, might emerge with positive response because of the new strategic alignment in the region.</p>
<p>The regional and global shift in the balance of power have also played a key role in this evolution – and caries critical implications for the South and Central Asia – and the strategic ties of India and Pakistan with the Gulf region – and for Afghan reconciliation and Kashmir quagmire by association. While there is a time during which the balance of power is in transition, obviously, there comes a time when the power shifts decisively and a new alignment starts to manifest. This is exactly what has transpired.</p>
<p>While PoliTact has been writing about the waning American influence in the non-Arab Islamic world, it had continued to maintain its sway in the Middle East and GCC. PoliTact has also recently contemplated and examined a scenario that explores why US would even want to maintain its presence in the Middle East – as it is now self-sufficient when it comes to energy needs. Moreover, if the region was left to implode, the global adversaries of China and Russia are likely to be more impacted.</p>
<p>And as such there is no direct threat from the region to the US, whether it be in the form of extremism or WMD. While no such weapons were discovered in Iraq, any such threat from Iran was curtailed as a result of Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) reached in 2015 but later scuttled by President Trump. An argument can be made that the US policy towards Middle East now is mainly driven by protecting its regional ally Israel – and in turn its present and future allies. These new Arab allies will now likely take the frontal role in protecting Israel and could also become the main battlefield.</p>
<p><strong>Future of War Against Extremism </strong></p>
<p>The most used term during the Bush and Obama administrations that is no longer as popular is the War against Extremism. Several questions can be raised on why that is the case. Was the campaign won, the extremist ideologies that led to 9/11 eliminated, or were the organizations such as Al Qaeda (AQ) and Daesh (ISIS) dismantled. Moreover, what happened to the allies that were leading the fight against terrorists? The examination of these inquiries reveals clues about the emerging scenarios.</p>
<p>While the <a href="https://www.politact.com/global-socio-political-and-economic-change-the-battle-for-alternative-systems/">war against extremism has transformed</a>, the risks to the Israel’s Arab allies are only quadrupling. The threats posed by the global extremists<strong>,</strong> such as AQ and ISIS and their associates, are only going to magnify after normalizing of their ties with Israel. After all the very premise these groups have used to inspire is their lack of action on the causes such as Palestine – along with allowing western military presence.</p>
<p>In addition, the dynamics of Arab Spring have been further aggravated by circumstances created by the <a href="https://www.politact.com/coronavirus-and-arab-spring-2-0/">Coronavirus pandemic</a> and has limited the maneuvering space for many Arab states. Decreasing reliance on US for energy resources have left them further vulnerable and amenable to external pressures.</p>
<p>Nearly two decades of war against extremism has transformed societies and galvanized them towards nationalistic and conservative leaderships, such as Tayyab Erdogan in Turkey and Imran Khan in Pakistan. The political leaders close to the West, or needing their support, are no longer considered viable.</p>
<p><strong>Global Power Dynamics</strong></p>
<p>While the extending regional threat from Iran has been playing out in places like Yemen, Lebanon and Syria, the prospective <a href="https://www.politact.com/what-does-the-china-iran-economic-and-security-deal-mean/">China-Iran economic and security deal</a> is a different ball game altogether. It has indicated that like Russia backed the Syrian regime, China appears willing to do that for Iran. And this is occurring at a time when Trump administration has completely reversed course on the Iran nuclear deal. It has exerted maximum pressure on the country to renegotiate the deal; now to encompass its missile program, accompanied by stricter monitoring, and wider behavior in the region.</p>
<p>The potential $400 billion China–Iran treaty must have been an ominous development from the perspective of the Arabs and the US. However, the talks have been proceeding for a while, and as has been the ‘Outside-In Approach’ to the Arab-Israeli conflict.</p>
<p>Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has become an active player in the Middle East with strategic ties with a number of regional players, to include Saudi Arabia. As its influence increases gradually, it could become an active interlocutor between Israel and the Palestinians, and other conflicts of the Middle East. However, it’s not clear if China desires to get involved in the security affairs of the region, like Russia has in Syria.</p>
<p>Speaking at the Saudi embassy in China in July on the occasion of the 30 anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties, Saudi Ambassador Turki M. A. Almadi commented: “our relations are all-round, multi-field, not only about bilateral trade and mutual investment, but also extended to cooperation in the fields of culture, science and technology, and health.”</p>
<p>Zhai Jun, China’s special envoy on Middle East affairs indicated at the occasion that the bilateral trade volume between the two nations stood at $78.04 billion at the end of 2019. He added Saudi Arabia was the largest supplier of crude oil to China, and also the Arab nations largest trading partner.</p>
<p>Chinese analysts close to the government present a case the nation wants to be more involved in providing economic support than to get involved in security affairs of the Middle East. Nonetheless, it has good political and military relations with both Iran and Israel. As part of BRI, China has been extending its trade relations with Israel and lately US has objected strongly to some of them citing security concerns – such as the Chinese company Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) running a container terminal at the Port of Haifa – near an Israeli naval base that is frequently visited by the US Sixth Fleet.</p>
<p>If the China-Israeli economic ties are allowed to strengthen uninhibited, overtime China will be able to build leverages that potentially can undercut US primacy in the affairs of the Middle East. The Israelis disagree on this, stating that the nature of its ties with China and the US are of totally different nature.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>While Saudi Arabia has delayed recognizing the statehood of Israel, and Qatar remaining closer to Turkey, the shifting alliance of most GCC and Arab nations towards Israel and the US represents a decisive shift in the balance of power – that has serious costs associated with it. Adopting the threat perception that centers on Iran, and without any clear give and take on the Middle East Peace Process yet, is likely to revitalize the non-state actors.</p>
<p>While China has made an economic entry in the Middle East, it has not decided to influence the security affairs – other than under the umbrella of UN and for maritime security purposes. In Syria too, it has adopted a non-interventionist approach and has supported the Assad regime.</p>
<p>However, economic leverages will eventually lead to influences in other areas. And China would have to use its sway especially when it has the most to lose if a conflict breaks out in the region. One measure of if it’s heading in that direction would be the establishment of military bases, like the one in Djibouti, and potential militarization of Gwadar port. And in this context, the Iran-China economic and security deal takes on an added emphasis.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-future-of-middle-east-peace-process-extremism-and-china-iran-deal/">The Future Of Middle East Peace Process, Extremism, And China-Iran Deal</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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