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	<title>Strategic Stability and Asymmetric Warfare Archives - Politact</title>
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	<description>Futurist Advisory Firm - Developing multidimensional strategic insights 2 increasingly asymmetric global political, security, and economic realities</description>
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	<title>Strategic Stability and Asymmetric Warfare Archives - Politact</title>
	<link>https://politact.com/strategic-stabilityfuture-warfare/strategic-stability-and-asymmetric-warfare/</link>
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	<item>
		<title>The Pulwama Incident And Imran Khan’s War On Terror</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/the-pulwama-incident-and-imran-khans-war-on-terror/</link>
					<comments>https://politact.com/the-pulwama-incident-and-imran-khans-war-on-terror/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 17 Mar 2019 23:59:16 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Afghan Reconciliation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Campaign Against Extremism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Issue Brief]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Non-State Actors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South and Central Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Stability and Asymmetric Warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Campaign against extremists]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CENTOM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emerging Geopolitics of South Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[General Votel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indian military and Kashmir]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indian role in Afghanistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[JF 17 Thunder]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[JuD LeT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kashmir issue]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[non state actors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Palwama and Security Council]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Palwama Attack]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.politact.com/?p=8641</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="240" height="210" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Modi-and-Ghani.jpeg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" fetchpriority="high" />Context While the Pakistan-India tensions are known to flare up occasionally, the present one over the February 14 Pulwama incident has calmed down for the time being &#8211; but is likely to have a next episode. Most assessments of the incident have examined the conflagration from a bilateral prism, and less emphasis has been directed [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-pulwama-incident-and-imran-khans-war-on-terror/">The Pulwama Incident And Imran Khan’s War On Terror</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="240" height="210" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Modi-and-Ghani.jpeg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" />
<figure class="wp-block-image is-resized"><img decoding="async" src="https://www.politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/JF-17-Thunder-1.jpeg" alt="" class="wp-image-8655" width="563" height="365"/><figcaption>Pakistan&#8217;s JF-17 Thunder fighter jet</figcaption></figure>



<p><strong>Context</strong></p>



<p>While the Pakistan-India tensions are known to flare up occasionally, the present one over the February 14 Pulwama incident has calmed down for the time being &#8211; but is likely to have a next episode. Most assessments of the incident have examined the conflagration from a bilateral prism, and less emphasis has been directed on scanning the domestic and regional context under which the present tensions have taken shape.</p>



<p><strong>Domestic
Politics</strong></p>



<p>Palwana attack triggered a dangerous crisis between the two
nuclear-armed neighbors; it represented a first foreign policy test for
Pakistan’s new economically strangled PTI led government. It was perhaps meant
to test the fresh political setup. On the other hand, corruption cases are
proceeding against prominent political leaders, with the nations former three
times prime minster, Nawaz Sharif, already serving a jail term. So there is the
domestic politics of Pakistan to consider.</p>



<p><strong>Afghan
Reconciliation and India</strong></p>



<p>Then there is the regional context where Afghan
reconciliation is swiftly moving forward with emphasis on four key segments:
intra-Afghan dialogue, troop withdrawal, counter terrorism assurances, and a
complete ceasefire. &nbsp;However, it’s
unclear what the role of India, if any, would be in the Afghan settlement. </p>



<p><strong>Related Interviews</strong>: <br>1. <a href="https://youtu.be/QIgURNyDIuw">Pakistan’s Crackdown Against Banned Groups And Pakistan-India Tensions </a><br>2. <a href="http://Pulwama Attack: Political or Military Solution to Pakistan-India Tensions ">Pulwama Attack:  Political or Military Solution to Pakistan-India Tensions </a><br>3. Afghan Peace Process: Can Pakistan, Afghanistan, and US Trust Each Other</p>



<figure class="wp-block-embed-youtube wp-block-embed is-type-video is-provider-youtube wp-embed-aspect-16-9 wp-has-aspect-ratio"><div class="wp-block-embed__wrapper">
<iframe width="696" height="392" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/BaTgSNfoQM0?feature=oembed&#038;enablejsapi=1" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen></iframe>
</div><figcaption>PoliTact&#8217;s Chief Analyst Arif Ansar on Voice of America (Pashto Service) discussing the Afghan Peace Process</figcaption></figure>



<p>Speaking at the Senate Armed Services hearing recently, CENTCOM Commander General Votel commented US desires to ensure “Pakistan’s equities are acknowledged and addressed in any future agreement in Afghanistan.“ </p>



<p>If Pakistan plays a positive role in achieving a settlement
to the conflict in Afghanistan, the US will have opportunity and motive to help
Pakistan fulfill that role, as peace in the region is the most important mutual
priority for the US and Pakistan,” he added.</p>



<p>However, India cannot let Pakistan and China emerge as the chief beneficiaries of peace in Afghanistan, or to allow a return to the pre 9/11 geopolitical environment. The Pulwama incident once again raises Indian concerns and its attempts to place Pakistan at the center of cross border terrorism. Meanwhile, Pakistan tries to clear its culpability as the proceedings of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the United Nations Security Council take place. </p>



<p><strong>Pakistan’s
Crackdown Against Banned Outfits</strong></p>



<p>The post Palwama crackdown on banned India oriented outfits in Pakistan, such as JuD, has the potential to make matters difficult for Imran Khan. He won the election apposing the kinetic approaches adopted in the campaign against extremism, and supported political route to settle the Afghan quagmire. Imran’s method ultimately received the American buy-in and has resulted in the present on-going direct talks between the US and Afghan Taliban.</p>



<p>The Pulwama attack, and the subsequent crack down, could add a new dimension to Pakistan’s campaign against extremism. Can Imran Khan also convince India that the causes of mutual animosity can be settled by dealing with the simmering Kashmir issue politically? India, under Modi, appears hell-bent on taking a military approach, but the world can hardly afford an irrational strategy in a nuclear environment. </p>



<p>Nonetheless, if Afghan reconciliation does take place, it does give Pakistan the space to address India oriented groups. Moreover, with Kashmir already hot, now mainly due to the Indian mishandling and harsh military tactics, any connection to groups like JuD serves to harm the otherwise legitimately accepted global issue.</p>



<p></p>



<p></p>



<p></p>



<p></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-pulwama-incident-and-imran-khans-war-on-terror/">The Pulwama Incident And Imran Khan’s War On Terror</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
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			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Review of Iran Nuclear Deal And Pakistan, US, Afghanistan Relations</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/us-iran-policy-pakistan-us-afghanistan-relations/</link>
					<comments>https://politact.com/us-iran-policy-pakistan-us-afghanistan-relations/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 16 Oct 2017 02:17:55 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Afghan Reconciliation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Campaign Against Extremism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emerging, Established Power Ties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Issue Brief]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Iran Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South and Central Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Stability and Asymmetric Warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Pakistan Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US-Islamic World Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America First doctrine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of Afghanistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran nuclear deal]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Afghanistan relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trumps South Asia Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Pakistan relations]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.politact.com/?p=8413</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="696" height="390" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Iran-Nuclear-Deal3.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Iran-Nuclear-Deal3.jpg 1000w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Iran-Nuclear-Deal3-600x337.jpg 600w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" />A media discussion on a VOA Urdu Program Jahan Rang hosted by Behjat Gilani on October 14, 2017. Topics included: Trump’s US Iran policy and world reaction. Situation of Myanmar Rohingyas. Pakistan, US, and Afghanistan Relations. Pakistan&#8217;s Civil Military Confrontation. The analysts participating in the discussion were: Lord. Nazir Ahmad &#8211; Permanent British Parliament Member, [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/us-iran-policy-pakistan-us-afghanistan-relations/">Review of Iran Nuclear Deal And Pakistan, US, Afghanistan Relations</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="696" height="390" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Iran-Nuclear-Deal3.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Iran-Nuclear-Deal3.jpg 1000w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Iran-Nuclear-Deal3-600x337.jpg 600w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" /><p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-8427 alignleft" src="https://www.politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Iran-Nuclear-Deal3.jpg" alt="iran-nuclear-deal3" width="1000" height="561" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Iran-Nuclear-Deal3.jpg 1000w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Iran-Nuclear-Deal3-600x337.jpg 600w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px" />A media discussion on a VOA Urdu Program Jahan Rang hosted by Behjat Gilani on October 14, 2017. Topics included:</p>
<p>Trump’s US Iran policy and world reaction.<br />
Situation of Myanmar Rohingyas.<br />
Pakistan, US, and Afghanistan Relations.<br />
Pakistan&#8217;s Civil Military Confrontation.</p>
<p>The analysts participating in the discussion were:</p>
<p>Lord. Nazir Ahmad &#8211; Permanent British Parliament Member, London<br />
Arif Ansar &#8211; CEO, “POLITACT” Washington, DC<br />
Brigadier (R) Imran Malik &#8211; Defense Analyst &amp; Columnist<br />
Mir Waise Afghan &#8211; London based Analyst, ‘Khabrial’<br />
Prof. A. Z. Hilali &#8211; Political Analyst, Peshawar University</p>
<p><strong>Sound Bites From<br />
</strong>Syed Khursheed Shah, Leader of Opposition, National Assembly Pakistan<br />
Major General Asif Ghafoor, Director General ISPR Pakistan</p>
<p><strong>Strategic Insight</strong></p>
<p><iframe loading="lazy" src="https://www.urduvoa.com/embed/player/0/4050682.html?type=audio" width="100%" height="113" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen"></iframe></p>
<p>While it is customary to point to issues related to Afghanistan, and more recently India, for the cause of mistrust between US and Pakistan, it is actually the differing strategic visions. Approaching the future of the region in a zero-sum manner is the basis for recurring tensions between US and Pakistan. There is a need to craft win-win scenarios amongst the various stakeholders and dealing with extremism of different colors.</p>
<p>On the other hand, scrutiny of the Iran nuclear deal is part of the wider US foreign policy review being carried out under President Trump’s America First Doctrine. A number of international economic and security treaties have already been revoked, and others are being appraised on how they benefit the US. What would be critical is how the foreign policy evolves after the initial bluster that has marked President Trump&#8217;s style.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/us-iran-policy-pakistan-us-afghanistan-relations/">Review of Iran Nuclear Deal And Pakistan, US, Afghanistan Relations</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
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			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Political, Security, And Nuclear Dimensions Of Pakistan, India Tensions</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/political-security-and-nuclear-dimensions-of-pakistan-india-tensions/</link>
					<comments>https://politact.com/political-security-and-nuclear-dimensions-of-pakistan-india-tensions/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 26 Sep 2016 14:52:38 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Campaign Against Extremism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan India Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South and Central Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Stability and Asymmetric Warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Stability and Future Warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Pakistan Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vantage Point Analysis]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://beta.politact.com/?p=8055</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="288" height="248" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Pak-India-Nuclear-Weapons.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" />A media discussion on Voice of America (Urdu Service) on September 26, 2016. The program covered the political and security implications of the India-Pakistan tensions, resulting from the Uri attack and unrest in Kashmir. A particular focus is on the security implications as both nations are nuclear powers with well-developed nuclear weapon programs. The panel included: [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/political-security-and-nuclear-dimensions-of-pakistan-india-tensions/">Political, Security, And Nuclear Dimensions Of Pakistan, India Tensions</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="288" height="248" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Pak-India-Nuclear-Weapons.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" /><p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-8056 alignleft" src="https://beta.politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Pak-India-Nuclear-Weapons.jpg" alt="pak-india-nuclear-weapons" width="288" height="248" />A <a href="http://www.urduvoa.com/a/3503005.html">media discussion</a> on Voice of America (Urdu Service) on September 26, 2016. The program covered the political and security implications of the India-Pakistan tensions, resulting from the Uri attack and unrest in Kashmir. A particular focus is on the security implications as both nations are nuclear powers with well-developed nuclear weapon programs.</p>
<p>The panel included:</p>
<p>Nuclear Scientist Dr. Samar Mubarakmand<br />
Nuclear Analyst Commodore (R) Uday Bhaskar<br />
Chief Analyst PoliTact &#8211; Arif Ansar</p>
<p>For discussion of the political dynamic participants included:</p>
<p>Dr. Asma Khawaja from the National Defense University, Islamabad<br />
Dr. Ravni Thakur from Delhi University, and<br />
Strategic Analyst Shama Junejo</p>
<p><a href="http://www.urduvoa.com/a/3503005.html">http://www.urduvoa.com/a/3503005.html</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/political-security-and-nuclear-dimensions-of-pakistan-india-tensions/">Political, Security, And Nuclear Dimensions Of Pakistan, India Tensions</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>Understanding Cyber Threats And Extremism</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/understanding-cyber-threats-and-extremism/</link>
					<comments>https://politact.com/understanding-cyber-threats-and-extremism/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Aug 2016 19:23:36 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Cyber Security and Information Warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Issue Brief]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South and Central Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Stability and Asymmetric Warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cyber attacks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cyber Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cyber threats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cyberspace]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Social Media and extremism]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://beta.politact.com/?p=8087</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="696" height="497" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Cyber-Security.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Cyber-Security.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Cyber-Security-600x428.jpg 600w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" />A media discussion on Voice of America (Urdu Service) on August 29, 2016. The focus of the program was on increasing awareness of Cyber threats and the use of social media by extremists. Morover to understand privacy and legal dimensions of Cyberspace. The increasing focus on Cybersecurity is to protect the Cyberspace from the threats posed by [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/understanding-cyber-threats-and-extremism/">Understanding Cyber Threats And Extremism</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="696" height="497" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Cyber-Security.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Cyber-Security.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Cyber-Security-600x428.jpg 600w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" /><p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-8088 alignleft" src="https://beta.politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Cyber-Security.jpg" alt="cyber-security" width="1024" height="731" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Cyber-Security.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Cyber-Security-600x428.jpg 600w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" />A <a href="http://www.urduvoa.com/a/3464345.html">media discussion</a> on Voice of America (Urdu Service) on August 29, 2016. The focus of the program was on increasing awareness of Cyber threats and the use of social media by extremists. Morover to understand privacy and legal dimensions of Cyberspace.</p>
<p>The increasing focus on Cybersecurity is to protect the Cyberspace from the threats posed by State and Non-State Actors to infrastructure, computer data and networks, and financial institutions etc.</p>
<p>The panel included:</p>
<p>Arif Ansar – Chief Analyst, PoliTact<br />
Farhan Hussein – Founder of ‘Bites for All’<br />
Tariq J Qureshi – Meena Group Global<br />
Sangeen Shah – Kings College London<br />
Amjad Malik – Barrister</p>
<p><a href="http://www.urduvoa.com/a/3464345.html">http://www.urduvoa.com/a/3464345.html</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/understanding-cyber-threats-and-extremism/">Understanding Cyber Threats And Extremism</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>The Future Of Asymmetric Warfare In Middle East</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/6093-2/</link>
					<comments>https://politact.com/6093-2/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 15 May 2016 10:28:49 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Analysis of Perception and Perspective]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Campaign Against Extremism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Core vs Peripheral Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Arab Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Iran Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South and Central Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Stability and Asymmetric Warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Asymmetric Warfare and Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[future of warfare in Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future order of Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran Saudi tensions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Situation of Yemen]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syrian conflict]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://beta.politact.com/?p=6093</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="250" height="300" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/04-06-2011_PoliTact-Graphics-2.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" />By Justin McCauley As the power contest between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran intensifies, an important factor is Iran’s advantage in the area of asymmetric warfare, particularly with regard to Yemen and Syria. A major driver in the rise of the so-called “Shi’ite Crescent” has been Iran’s ability to [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/6093-2/">The Future Of Asymmetric Warfare In Middle East</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="250" height="300" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/04-06-2011_PoliTact-Graphics-2.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" /><p>By Justin Mc<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://politact.com/images/stories/04-06-2011_PoliTact%20Graphics%202.jpg" alt="" width="250" height="300" align="left" />Cauley</p>
<p>As the power contest between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran intensifies, an important factor is Iran’s advantage in the area of asymmetric warfare, particularly with regard to Yemen and Syria. A major driver in the rise of the so-called “Shi’ite Crescent” has been Iran’s ability to spread its influence through a combination of well-placed and robustly supported proxies (both state and non-state), as well as a nuanced capacity to leverage parochial ethnic and sectarian conflicts to Tehran’s strategic benefit. Saudi Arabia has not even sought to acquire this skill set.</p>
<p>Over the years Riyadh has consistently invested in the kingdom’s military capabilities, but such efforts have focused on building a well-equipped conventional force – one geared largely toward territorial defense. While Saudi Arabia has prepared itself well for an interstate conflict, it has failed to establish the kind of asymmetric capabilities that Iran has used so effectively to build geostrategic alliances and influence battlefields and political systems alike.</p>
<p>These capabilities could prove to be a strategic game-changer as the Saudi-Iranian rivalry further intensifies. Why has Tehran been so successful? Why has Riyadh faltered?</p>
<p><span id="more-6093"></span></p>
<p><strong>Analysis</strong></p>
<p><strong>The Iranian Advantage</strong></p>
<p>Iran has excelled at asymmetric warfare since the inception of the Islamic Republic. The foundation of the Sepa-e-Pasdaran – the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) – and within it the Quds Force, alongside its regular armed forces, created in 1979 a military formation dedicated to nontraditional warfare and strategically indispensable expeditionary operations. The Quds Force specializes in what the U.S. military calls ‘Unconventional Warfare’ (UW), ‘Foreign Internal Defense’ (FID), and ‘Information Operations,’ i.e. organizing and leading guerrilla groups, assisting allied governments against insurgencies and revolutionary movements, engaging in psychological warfare, and carrying out “hearts and minds” operations.</p>
<p>The best example of the Pasdaran’s strategic efficacy is of course Hezbollah. The Iranian hand in the creation of Lebanon’s Party of God is well-known. A few dozen Quds Force officers infiltrated Lebanon, commandeered a barracks in the Beka’a Valley, recruited top-notch talent such as the infamous Imad Mughniyah (a.k.a. Hajj Radwan), and produced the inchoate Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO).</p>
<p>In a few short years the IJO, before its metamorphosis into Hezbollah in 1985, drove the U.S. from Lebanon and forced the Israelis into what became an 18-year quagmire. Now, as the most powerful force in Lebanon’s political arena, with an armed wing larger than the entire Lebanese Army, Hezbollah remains beholden to Tehran. The Quds Force currently runs blended UW-FID operations in Iraq and Syria. IRGC battalions augment government forces and Pasdaran officers direct Shi’ite militias such as the Hashd al-Shaabi and Asa&#8217;ib Ahl al-Haq on the battlefields of both countries.</p>
<p>In Iraq, deep ties with powerful Shi’ite leaders, including Hadi al-Amiri (head of the Badr Organization) now pay major dividends for Tehran. These relationships are the fruit of the Quds Force’s dedicated covert support for both Shi’ite and Kurdish opposition groups throughout the Saddam era. &#8220;In Iraq, deep ties with powerful Shi’ite leaders, including Hadi al-Amiri (head of the Badr Organization) now pay major dividends for Tehran. These relationships are the fruit of the Quds Force’s dedicated covert support for both Shi’ite and Kurdish opposition groups throughout the Saddam era&#8221;<br />
The Pasdaran is on the ground in Yemen with significant numbers of operatives involved in training and arming the Houthi rebels. It is likely that the Iranians want to draw Riyadh into an open-ended conflict that they can neither decisively win nor lose, but which will be sure to sap money, manpower, and prestige from the kingdom.</p>
<p>The Iranian model’s success stems partly from the advantageous structure and discipline of Shi’ite jihadist groups writ large. Unlike the apocalyptic and divisive takfiri extremism, that to varying degrees characterizes almost all consequential Sunni militant groups (except for some Palestinian groups), Shi’ite extremist organizations, while doubtless violent, are also observably disciplined, exercising strategic restraint and pragmatic foresight. The Pasdaran both instills and<br />
capitalizes on this characteristic.</p>
<p>In practical terms, this rationality has made the components of the “Shi’ite Crescent” somewhat more manageable in terms of Iran’s grand strategy. It has allowed for a coherent and consistent regional strategy, as well as the creation of an axis aligning Tehran, Baghdad, Damascus, and Beirut. Moreover, Hamas, a Sunni Islamist group, is one of Iran’s benefactors. This cross-sectarian alliance is in stark contrast to Daesh (“Islamic State”), Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda and other major takfiri groups, who would not only be loath to ally with Shi’ite actors, but who also seem to be detrimentally preoccupied with slaughtering their co-religionist rivals.</p>
<p>Part of this formula is self-evident in Shi’ism, which, relative to Sunnism, has a hierarchical structure and a respect for codified religious authority (as evidenced in the Iranian ideology of Wilayat al-Faqih). But it also derives heavily from Iran’s revolutionary positioning as, first and foremost, a bulwark of “Islamic resistance”.</p>
<p>While the Wahhabi-Salafi arc has grown increasingly nihilistic, messianic, and apocalyptic, Shi’ite extremist groups remain steeped in the language of “resistance”, nomenclature borrowed from Cold Warera Leftism, which also carries a powerful implicit link to the Palestinian cause, a key Arab unifier.</p>
<p>By invoking Third-Worldism, Iran has successfully positioned its ‘brand’ as a regional liberation movement, not as an irrational sectarian cult. Hezbollah’s military successes against Israel and Iran’s rhetorical and operational support for the Palestinians have also garnered immense goodwill on the Arab street, where the Israel-Palestine conflict remains a pan-Arab political issue. It is also crucial to understand that the Quds Force’s long-standing relationships with Palestinian and Kurdish groups – both stateless Sunni Muslims – seem to confirm Iran’s status as primarily a resister of colonialism and imperialism (as opposed to a narrowly Shi’ite fundamentalist force).</p>
<p><strong>The Saudi Deficit</strong></p>
<p>Saudi Arabia has no counterpart to the Quds Force. The kingdom’s military is geared almost entirely toward national defense and conventional warfare. Saudi special operations units focus on tactical counterterrorism, but have no UW or FID capability to speak of. Unlike the Iranians, the Saudis have spent the last 35 years looking largely inward.</p>
<p>After the 1979 revolution in Iran, major Sunni powers like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan engaged in “Islamization” – efforts to reinvigorate Sunnism in the face of fundamentalist Shi’ite expansionism. This did result is some increased foreign activity. The Saudis matched the financial commitment of the U.S. to the Afghan mujahideen during the 1980s. For many years Riyadh officials have been intentionally lax in combating terrorist financing from within the kingdom’s borders.</p>
<p>Also, the Saudis have allowed convicts and other undesirables to leave the country to wage jihad across the Middle East and Central Asia. But unlike the Quds Force, Saudi forces are not on the ground with allies, building rapport and offering tutelage. Compared to the committed patronage of Pasdaran efforts in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, the Saudis apply a “fire and forget” policy that leaves them little if any strategic control and opens them (and the region) up to unintended secondary and tertiary consequences.</p>
<p>The most crucial difference between Iran and its Shi’ite reservoir and the Saudi kingdom’s relationship with its potential proxies is credibility.</p>
<p>Unlike the Islamic Republic, which remains popular with Shi’ite Islamists of varying stripes as well as with some Sunnis in the wider Middle East, the Al Saud are viewed by many on the Arab Street as decadent and corrupt. In the eyes of many Salafists, the Saudi rulers are apostates allied with the West and unfit to serve as the guardians of Mecca and Medina.</p>
<p>Hence, while most Shi’ite (and some Sunni) organizations view the Islamic Republic as the father of the anti-Western and anti-Zionist resistance, the spawns of Wahhabism view the House of Saud as occupants of the Dar al-Harb, or territory outside Muslim rule. From the Saudi perspective, it is an issue of reliability.</p>
<p>As stated above, in spite of the kingdom’s state-promoted brand of Wahhabism, Sunni takfiri groups do not feel beholden to Riyadh, nor do they view the kingdom as a paternalistic, ideological big brother. This translates into limited prospects for dependable allies who will obey the House of Saud’s strategic guidance. The result has been Saudi Arabia having to manage support for conservative Wahhabis within the kingdom for over 35 years, while attempting to deflect the worst elements who demand the House of Saud’s overthrow.</p>
<p>Maintaining this delicate balance has somewhat tied Riyadh’s hands with regard to entrepreneurial operations abroad vis-à-vis Iran. Perhaps a more fundamental point lies at the heart of Riyadh’s lack of asymmetric adventurism. Saudi Arabia, as an illiberal and undemocratic dynastic monarchy, is by definition a reactionary and anti-revolutionary state. To venture abroad and actively foment insurgency and the overthrow of governments would be to incite exactly what Riyadh most fears for itself.</p>
<p>While the Saudis have proven willing at times to meddle in the internal affairs of weak states, they will not enact a systematic policy against a foe that can respond in kind. The sanctity of the state is inseparable from the Saudi political leadership’s survival.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion </strong></p>
<p>The military parity of Iran and Saudi Arabia is such that it will likely preclude a direct confrontation. While Saudi Arabia’s armed forces are much better equipped than Iran’s (the Saudi military budget is roughly eight times that of Tehran), the Islamic Republic compensates by possessing a much larger force in terms of manpower and by maintaining an ability to take a defensively asymmetric posture.</p>
<p>The geostrategic reality is that Iran has the ability to attack major centers of oil production in Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern Province (EP) in response to any Saudi and/ or Western aggression. A single effective rocket strike on Saudi Aramco’s Abqaiq facility, for instance, would send the international oil trade into complete disarray. The power of this Iranian deterrent is likely not lost on Saudi strategic thinking.</p>
<p>Mohammed bin Salman’s aggressive – some would say impetuous – war policy in Yemen will continue to be met with Iranian asymmetric efforts. The same will be true in the case of Syria if Riyadh takes a more direct role there, as has been suggested. The Saudi war in Yemen already has significant potential to become an open-ended quagmire, which would ultimately benefit Iran. The kingdom’s best weapon against Iran at the moment is the economic strategy of keeping oil prices low to retard Iranian growth as sanctions lift. Riyadh’s status as a swing producer gives it immense power in this regard, but with major powers like Russia and China looking to invest long-term in Iran’s energy sector, Saudi market manipulation will only delay the inevitable.</p>
<p>The Iranians have honed their skills in asymmetric conflicts. Their influence in Iraq is largely attributable to Tehran’s investment in groups such as Badr, Dawa, and SCIRI over the span of decades. Iran’s premier proxy, Hezbollah, twice humiliated Israel on the battlefield – in 2000 and 2006. Given the Israeli military’s extremely high levels of experience and effectiveness, Hezbollah’s achievements were significant.</p>
<p>If the Houthis can achieve a similar result against the Saudis in Yemen, Iran’s strategic position in the Gulf will grow exponentially. Although Ansar Allah (the dominant Houthi militia in Yemen) is not Hezbollah, the Saudi military is not the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) either. In spite of its robust defense budget, the Saudi military’s lack of experience has led to embarrassing operational struggles in Yemen.</p>
<p>Many view the emergence of Iran as a hegemon to be inevitable. History, geography, and Iran’s status as a reemerging petro-state support this prediction. Over the last 35 years, Iran’s asymmetric warfare capabilities have allowed it to rapidly expand its geopolitical influence and strategic position in the Middle East. It remains to be seen the extent to which Iran’s efforts will further transform the region’s strategic landscape. However, Saudi Arabia is unlikely to fight fire with fire. Asymmetric warfare is often not only the tool of the weak, but also a means of affecting transformational change, which the nascent Iranian hegemon seeks. As a status quo power, that is the last thing which the Al Saud rulers want in the Gulf or anywhere else.</p>
<p><em>Justin McCauley is an independent analyst based in Dubai specializing in terrorism, geopolitics and security affairs in the greater Middle East and the post-Soviet space</em></p>
<p>A version of this article also appeared in Gulf State Analytics, an affiliate of POLITACT.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/6093-2/">The Future Of Asymmetric Warfare In Middle East</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>Israel Preparing Spring Attack, Iran Doubles Defense Spending While Khamemei Threatens Retaliation</title>
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		<pubDate>Thu, 04 Feb 2016 12:02:16 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Issue Brief]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Context US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has said that Western allies are cautioning Israel against attack on Iran. Panetta strongly believes that Israel has already made the decision to strike Iran this spring. He said the US is leading the persuasion initiative, though it believes outside argument will not have any effect on Israeli [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/israel-preparing-spring-attack-iran-doubles-defense-spending-while-khamemei-threatens-retaliation/">Israel Preparing Spring Attack, Iran Doubles Defense Spending While Khamemei Threatens Retaliation</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has said that Western allies are cautioning Israel against attack on Iran. Panetta strongly believes that Israel has already made the decision to strike Iran this spring. He said the US is leading the persuasion initiative, though it believes outside argument will not have any effect on Israeli decision-making. US is presenting the argument that Iranian regime will be considerably weakened after imploding its ally, Syria, but the attack on Iran will have the opposite impact.</p>
<p>Israel fears Iran will soon reach the zone of immunity, where limited military strike will not deter it from launching its nuclear bomb. Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak said on Thursday that if sanctions do not prevent Iran from making nuclear bomb, then there is worldwide understanding to launch a military strike.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, President Ahmedinejad predicted on Wednesday that Iran’s economy would grow eight percent over the next 12 months despite Western sanctions. He added that the budget was developed taking into account the price of oil and increased the defense spending by 127 percent under the new budget.</p>
<p>On the other hand, after leading the Friday prayers, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei warned that Iran will retaliate to the western oil embargo or military attack. He said that war with Iran will be detrimental to America, whereas it will not dampen Iran’s determination to continue the nuclear course. Khamenei added that he has no fear to state that Iran will back any nation or group that wants to confront or fight Zionist regime.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/israel-preparing-spring-attack-iran-doubles-defense-spending-while-khamemei-threatens-retaliation/">Israel Preparing Spring Attack, Iran Doubles Defense Spending While Khamemei Threatens Retaliation</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Future Of The War Against Extremists; The Arrival Of Stage III</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/the-future-of-the-war-against-extremists-the-arrival-of-stage-iii/</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2015 14:39:10 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="606" height="385" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/01-06-2015_Arrival-of-Stage-III-of-GWOT.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/01-06-2015_Arrival-of-Stage-III-of-GWOT.jpg 606w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/01-06-2015_Arrival-of-Stage-III-of-GWOT-600x381.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/01-06-2015_Arrival-of-Stage-III-of-GWOT-300x191.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 606px) 100vw, 606px" />Context By Arif Ansar In earlier articles different facets and phases of the ‘war against terror’ since it got underway, have been discussed. The terminology has almost become defunct as the balance of power in Middle East stands at a tipping point. Why that has happened is instrumental towards understanding the present status of the [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-future-of-the-war-against-extremists-the-arrival-of-stage-iii/">The Future Of The War Against Extremists; The Arrival Of Stage III</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="606" height="385" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/01-06-2015_Arrival-of-Stage-III-of-GWOT.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/01-06-2015_Arrival-of-Stage-III-of-GWOT.jpg 606w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/01-06-2015_Arrival-of-Stage-III-of-GWOT-600x381.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/01-06-2015_Arrival-of-Stage-III-of-GWOT-300x191.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 606px) 100vw, 606px" /><p><strong>Context</strong><br />
<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignleft" src="https://beta.politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/01-06-2015_Arrival-of-Stage-III-of-GWOT-300x191.jpg" alt="01-06-2015_Arrival of Stage III of GWOT" width="300" height="191" /></p>
<p>By Arif Ansar</p>
<p>In earlier articles different facets and phases of the ‘war against terror’ since it got underway, have been discussed. The terminology has almost become defunct as the balance of power in Middle East stands at a tipping point. Why that has happened is instrumental towards understanding the present status of the campaign against extremists.</p>
<p>For all intents and purposes, the first phase can be classified as the time frame between 9/11 and the demise of Osama bin Laden. The period between Operation Geronimo to the ignition of Yemen conflict can be termed as the second phase. While Yemen has been in the limelight for a while as a strong seat for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the departure of US Special Forces in March this year represented a turning point. The eruption of Yemen conflict in its current form, and the growing Saudi and Gulf involvement there, marks the beginning of the third phase.</p>
<p>Each period of the campaign was accompanied by its own sets of assumptions and characteristics that have been previously discussed. They are being summarized to recollect and help us understand the Stage III. Obviously, each one these patterns pose unique implications.</p>
<p>Phase III of the campaign against terror may see more direct interstate conflict which risks involving one or the other global power. And this will fundamentally change the nature of the conflict that was initially deemed as the war against Islamic extremists.</p>
<p>Mitigating far-flung security threats is one thing, risks that can imperil influence in the home sphere and economic lifeline of an aspiring or an established global power, is a different matter altogether.</p>
<p><span id="more-1547"></span></p>
<p><strong>Analysis</strong></p>
<p><strong>Character I</strong> – The growth of Non-State Actors of different colors accompanied by Asymmetric Warfare, which the conventional militaries were not trained to engage in.</p>
<p>These include Sunni Islamic State (IS, ISIL, ISIS, Daesh) and AQ that apparently do not listen to anyone. Since 9/11 many affiliates of AQ have also sprung up in the extremism inflicted regions. Some are loosely attached while others are more directly linked with AQ. In some instances, these associates are also perceived to be under the influence of a state entity.</p>
<p>On the other hand, there is the Shia Hezbollah acting as a proxy of Iran.<br />
The third kind of non-state actors are nationalist in character such as the Kurds and Houthis, and moderate forces like Free Syrian Army (FSA) supported by the West, and others, against the extremists.</p>
<p><strong>Character II </strong>– Future of extremism as represented by Fission and Fusion of Sunni extremists and the emergence of IS. The harmonization or divisions have resulted in new alignments amongst extremist posing ominous risks for the nation-states of the region and beyond. For examples the tussles between AQ and Associates against IS and Associates.</p>
<p><strong>Character III</strong> – Societal transformation of extremist inflicted regions with increased polarization, growing religious conservatism, decreasing secular space and respect for minorities, with difficulty in achieving political consensus. The election results are narrow; power sharing formulas and unity governments are the outcome as witnessed in places like Iraq, Afghanistan and Tunisia.</p>
<p>In addition, this transformation has created a fear that religious parties may make it to the helm of power using the system, as occurred in Egypt. Preventing this is requiring constitutional amendments.</p>
<p><strong>Character IV</strong> – The application of military force against extremists appears to have not worked and the political reconciliation is proving to be equally difficult; there are no clear winners or losers. The agenda of the extremists is often too harsh to reach any settlement. On the other hand, there is lack of ingenuity in crafting an alternative approach.</p>
<p><strong>Character V</strong> – The tactics and strategies employed against extremists are mostly event/incident driven. Strategically, the emerging focus is on regional approaches and the onus is shifting towards western allies to take the lead in the fight against extremists and applying kinetic tactics. In many theaters of the war against terror, civil war like scenarios are now ripe, and Urban Warfare the likely outcome</p>
<p><strong>Character VI</strong> – The weakening Nation-State structure is under dual economic and security pressures. The governments of the regions concerned are finding it harder and harder to govern as the multidimensional internal and external security risks intermingle and manifest. Internal divisions make it harder to deal with the external enemies, while those that pose external threats exploit internal risks. This dynamics produces a circular threat perception for the subject.</p>
<p><strong>Character VII</strong> – Globalization and interconnectivity is being hindered by security apprehensions whether it be Trans Pacific Partnership, Kashgar-Gwadar Economic Corridor, Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project, or New Silk Road.</p>
<p>Economic aspirations now stand face to face with security concerns in many parts of the world, and the individual identity hangs in balance between the national, global, religious, tribal, and ethnic loyalties. The forces of religion and globalization are both acting against the nation-state structure and are often perceived as exploitive.</p>
<p><strong>Character VIII</strong> – The cross-pollination of global power tussles, Arab Spring, and extremism has made the war against terror even more complex and motives confusing. This is amply visible in Syrian conflict. Moreover, weakening Europe and emerging BRICS have created a flux in the international systems, making the balancing act very stressful for international players.</p>
<p><strong>Character IX</strong> – The future role of religion and the crisis of identity is brewing as nation states become weaker. Two key questions are emerging in this context:<br />
one of them is equally applicable to the West and has to do with the settled debate of the separation of church and state. The other question is related to the extremist inflicted regions, in terms of who represents Islam.</p>
<p><strong>Character X</strong> – The emergence of virtual soft weapons of mass destruction: Information and Cyber Warfare. The use of Social Media for radicalization, recruitment, and countering extremist messages and ideologies is an example. While the access to physical WMD’s is limited, these virtual soft weapons are freely available.</p>
<p><strong>Arab and Western Perspectives</strong></p>
<p>In essence, the campaign that was initially directed primarily against the perpetrators of 9/11 and their collaborators, have now spread to the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia. Afghanistan and Iraq, which were the focus of the Phase I and II, have remerged as a threat and have complicated western withdrawal strategies.</p>
<p>In Phase II, we saw other nations such as Syria, Libya and Yemen join the widening ring of instability. The beginning of Phase III is marked by gradual destabilization of the more secure states of the region, to include Egypt, Saudi Arabia and GCC, Jordan, Pakistan, and potentially India.</p>
<p>While the primary threat posed to these states initially came from the Sunni AQ and Associates, over time, the sectarian dimension and nationalist non-state actors (such as Kurds) have joined the fray. While the Western nations have remained supportive in the fight against Sunni extremists, when it comes to the sectarian angle and nationalist forces, their postures are more ambiguous. This has magnified the headaches for the respective states in question.</p>
<p>The present paranoia exhibited by Saudi Arabia and GCC nations is stemming from these contradictions. While the Sunni Arab nations have been fighting the war against Sunni non-state actors, the influence of Iran and Hezbollah has increased in places like Iraq and Syria. In contrast to opposing Hezbollah and Iran, the West entered in to negotiations with the country related to its nuclear program. According to the GCC nations, Iran’s behavior has been rewarded and this will embolden it. Imagine if Saudi Arabia was to do the same; back AQ and IS and then build a nuclear program, while at the same time threaten Israel and the West.</p>
<p>From the Western perspective, Sunni Arab nations have not led a spirited fight against Sunni extremists like Iran, Hezbollah, and Kurds have. Moreover, Western policy is premised first of all on preventing weapons of mass destruction falling in to the hands of extremists, or rogue and autocratic leaders that can threaten Israel or the West. Secondly, to prevent the extremists attacking Western targets again or becoming a proxy for an adversarial power in the future, along the lines of Afghan Jihad of the 80s.</p>
<p>As it stands now, Arab states are left with no leverage other than using the religious card. Even on the sensitive issue of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is Iran, Turkey, and to some extent Qatar, that took the lead. For its role, Qatar faced serious opposition with in the GCC.</p>
<p>In essence, the Iran deal, if finalized, contains its nuclear program, reduces the risk to Israel and the West, and thus strengthens it to become a strong ally in the fight against Sunni extremists. Additionally, it can help in pushing the Middle East Peace Process forward.</p>
<p><strong>The Emerging Approach to the Middle East Peace</strong></p>
<p>At an event hosted by Atlantic Council on May 7, the author asked the former US Special Envoy for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the present Executive Vice President of Brookings Institution, Martin Indyk, about how the Iranian nuclear deal and the US-Gulf partnership can help or hinder the Middle East Peace Process. Martine Indyk commented that the prospects of a solution emerging from an ‘inside out approach’ i.e., from with in Israel and Palestine, and independent of whatever else is going on in the Middle East, are not good. However, the potential for an ‘outside in’ solution which has emerged because of the possible Iran nuclear deal and Israeli and Arab countries being on the same side, might emerge with positive response because of the new strategic alignment in the region.</p>
<p>Speaking at the Heritage Foundation, Israeli envoy to the US, Ron Dermer, recently commented along the same line:</p>
<p>“They used to believe the key to that [a rapprochement with the Arab word] was solving the Palestinian question, and there is no doubt that issue cannot be ignored,” Dermer said.</p>
<p>He continued: “But as the prime minister said a few months ago, I’m not so sure the reverse won’t be true, meaning that I don’t know if Israel and Palestinian peace will unlock wider rapprochement with the Arab world. It might be broader rapprochement with the Arab world will unlock Israeli-Palestinian peace. We should be focusing the next few years on how we can take advantage of this historic aligning of interests between Israel and our Arab neighbors.”</p>
<p>(Note: It’s too early to tell if a similar ‘Outside In’ approach is applicable towards other festering hot spots, such as Afghanistan and Kashmir. However, despite differences, parallels do exist, and PoliTact will be researching this comparison further.)</p>
<p><strong>The US Elections and Middle East</strong></p>
<p>From the Arab and GCC perspective, the shift in the regional balance of power towards Iran is an additional danger to their security, perhaps even bigger than that posed by Sunni extremists. This view is shared by Israel and the Republican Party in the US, which is in control of both the House and the Senate. This is why the next US election is becoming so crucial. On it depends the direction of the Middle East; will the new American president share the threat perception of Israel and Arab allies, is in contention. In addition, the foreign policy hawks in the Republican Party also want US to once again take an aggressive role in the fight against extremists and against Russia and China.</p>
<p><strong>Extremism and Global Players</strong></p>
<p>US, Russia, and China, and other global powers, share the threat from Islamic extremists and have supported the fight against them in one form or the other. While US has been doing the heavy lifting, other powers have facilitated by building capacity of the allies; by giving training and providing military equipment. Moreover, they have also helped by allowing the use of their territories as part of the crucial supply lines for the campaign against extremists.</p>
<p>However, as the regional states become more entangled in this fight, and with their future at stake, the question for these global players is: what does the change in the regional equilibrium of power means for the global balance. Or in other words, what does the extending arc of instability in these regions implies for their security and economic interests.</p>
<p>In essence, three main considerations arise from this for the global players:</p>
<p>Firstly, if the states involved in the campaign against extremists, which may be allied with China and Russia, start faltering, what would that mean for their global positioning?</p>
<p>Secondly, how will these powers react to the activities of the competitor in their perceived home spheres of influence?</p>
<p>For example, Russia has cooperated with the West when it comes to Syrian chemical weapons and the Iran nuclear deal, as being part of P5+1, but it is playing a different role when it comes to the affairs of Ukraine. Similarly, China would evaluate its posture in South and Central Asia in comparison to what occurs as part of the ‘Pivot to Asia’ US policy.</p>
<p>Thirdly, what would be their contingency plans if the regions engulfed by extremism sink to full fledge chaos that may impact global energy and trade flows?</p>
<p>The Chinese and Russian energy deals may be the direct result of these assessments. On the other hand, US has also made big gains towards energy independence while Europe is still caught in the bind. Phase III of the campaign against terror may see more direct interstate conflict which risks involving one or the other global power. And this will fundamentally change what was initially deemed as the war against Islamic extremists.</p>
<p>While mitigating far-flung security threats is one thing, risks that can imperil influence in the home sphere and economic lifeline of an aspiring or an established global power, is a different matter all together.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-future-of-the-war-against-extremists-the-arrival-of-stage-iii/">The Future Of The War Against Extremists; The Arrival Of Stage III</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>India Launches A Satellite, Develops Anti-Satellite, Anti Missile Weapons</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/india-launches-a-satellite-develops-anti-satellite-anti-missile-weapons/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 26 Apr 2012 09:12:59 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Final War Frontier Space]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pivot to Asia and South, Central Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South and Central Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Stability and Asymmetric Warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vantage Point Analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ABS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Agni V]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Anti Satellite]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ASAT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Missile Defense Systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Risat 1]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Space arms race in South Asia]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://beta.politact.com/?p=6307</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="693" height="329" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/26-04-2012_ASAT.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/26-04-2012_ASAT.jpg 693w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/26-04-2012_ASAT-600x285.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/26-04-2012_ASAT-300x142.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 693px) 100vw, 693px" />After the test of Agni-V long range Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), India launched the Risat-1 microwave radar imaging satellite on April 26. India has the world’s highest number of remote sensing satellites and is a leader in the remote sensing data market. The country presently has 11 satellites in orbit. Risat-1 will be useful in [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/india-launches-a-satellite-develops-anti-satellite-anti-missile-weapons/">India Launches A Satellite, Develops Anti-Satellite, Anti Missile Weapons</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="693" height="329" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/26-04-2012_ASAT.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/26-04-2012_ASAT.jpg 693w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/26-04-2012_ASAT-600x285.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/26-04-2012_ASAT-300x142.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 693px) 100vw, 693px" /><p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-6308 alignleft" src="https://beta.politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/26-04-2012_ASAT-300x142.jpg" alt="26-04-2012_ASAT" width="300" height="142" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/26-04-2012_ASAT-300x142.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/26-04-2012_ASAT-600x285.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/26-04-2012_ASAT.jpg 693w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" />After the test of Agni-V long range Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), India launched the Risat-1 microwave radar imaging satellite on April 26. India has the world’s highest number of remote sensing satellites and is a leader in the remote sensing data market. The country presently has 11 satellites in orbit.</p>
<p>Risat-1 will be useful in disaster prediction, agriculture forestry and defense purposes. However, China’s media has called it a spy satellite. In 2009, PoliTact had pointed out to an opinion that these satellites can be instrumental in monitoring the moves of unfriendly neighbors such as Pakistan and China. Experts state that such satellites can be used to track militant training camps and incoming hostile ballistic missiles.</p>
<p>India has also show interest in developing Anti Satellite (ASAT) weapons. According to Indian media, this focus developed after China&#8217;s 2007 use of an ASAT weapon to destroy an old satellite. The Director General of Indian Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) VK Saraswat had stated in 2010,</p>
<p>&#8220;India is putting together building blocks of technology that could be used to neutralize enemy satellites. We are working to ensure space security and protect our satellites. At the same time we are also working on how to deny the enemy access to its space assets.&#8221;</p>
<p>Moreover, India performed its latest test for Anti Ballistic Missile System in February. The nation successfully tested the interceptor defense shield, which detects and destroys incoming ballistic missiles. Officials from DRDO had stated that the shield locked onto the two incoming nuclear missiles, and destroyed them over the Bay of Bengal.</p>
<p>DRDO jointly developed the system’s tracking and fire control radar with Israel and France. India is the fifth state to achieve this missile defense technology.</p>
<p>In order to be a player in the space arms race, a nation must develop cutting-edge technologies for its surveillance, through Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and Anti Satellite (ASAT) capabilities. These advanced tools can counter the mechanisms that support the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Systems of adversaries and have the ability to intercept missiles in flight before they can hit their targets.</p>
<p>The recent Indian tests and comments indicate the country has become a competitor in the budding space arms race.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/india-launches-a-satellite-develops-anti-satellite-anti-missile-weapons/">India Launches A Satellite, Develops Anti-Satellite, Anti Missile Weapons</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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