PoliTact’s Analysis of Perception and Perspective

Context

President Donald Trump’s second term has ushered in a foreign policy that departs sharply from the liberal internationalist consensus of the post–Cold War era. Instead of multilateralism and institution-building, the Trump administration has embraced transactional diplomacy, tariff-based leverage, and a CEO-style approach to global power. The guiding logic is less about sustaining a rules-based order than about extracting concessions in a world Trump views as fundamentally zero-sum.

This orientation—the so-called Trump Doctrine—is reshaping the United States’ posture toward rivals and allies alike. He frames his foreign policy as an extension of his populist domestic agenda: “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) through trade realignment, industrial re-shoring, and hard bargaining. Yet while tariffs and deal-making remain his preferred tools, Trump also harbors ambitions for statesmanship, including a quixotic pursuit of a Nobel Peace Prize. His attempts to mediate conflicts from Ukraine to South Asia illustrate both the promise and the peril of his approach. The result is a high-risk strategy that could redefine America’s global role—and shape the political landscape of the next U.S. elections.

Tariffs as Tools of Statecraft

During his first term, as Robert Blackwill of the Council on Foreign Relations had noted, Trump consistently makes major foreign policy decisions against the advice of seasoned advisors, amid unprecedented turnover in senior defense and diplomatic posts. A 2020 Senate Democratic report accused him of transforming U.S. foreign policy into a tool of personal and business interests, undermining alliances and institutions alike.

At the heart of Trump’s foreign policy is the use of tariffs and trade leverage. Where previous presidents relied on sanctions or diplomatic pressure, Trump employs tariffs as his signature instrument—against adversaries and allies alike.

During his first term, tariffs targeted China, the EU, and even Canada and Mexico. His second term has expanded this logic into a global bargaining strategy: tariffs are cast not merely as economic tools but as instruments of national security. Trump argues that tariffs protect American workers, pressure foreign governments into concessions, and restore industrial self-sufficiency.

The long-term effects remain uncertain. Economists warn that trade wars increase consumer costs and disrupt supply chains. Yet Trump has succeeded in re-framing tariffs as patriotic policy, appealing to swing-state voters who see globalization as a betrayal. Going into the next election cycle, this rhetoric will be central to his pitch: only a tariff-wielding America, he claims, can reclaim greatness.

French observer of American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville, once warned that democracies risk losing their moral compass when governed solely for material gain. Trump’s America First agenda, rooted in tariffs and short-term bargaining, embodies this danger. For him, alliances and norms are not ends in themselves but bargaining chips.

Trump as Peace and Deal Maker

The Ukraine-Russia Stalemate

Trump’s most high-profile attempt at statesmanship came with the August 2025 Alaska Summit, where he hosted Vladimir Putin on U.S. soil—the first such visit since 2007. Styled as CEO-style deal-making, the summit bypassed traditional diplomats. Analysts at Chatham House concluded that the meeting emboldened Putin, who intensified his war aims rather than compromising. The Council on Foreign Relations reported that Putin’s demands remained maximalist: Ukrainian neutrality, demilitarization, and recognition of annexed territories.

Far from resolving the conflict, Trump’s intervention muddled U.S. messaging while alienating allies and NATO. Reuters called the summit a tilt toward Moscow, while AP noted it granted Putin undeserved legitimacy. European leaders have since moved to fill the vacuum, training Ukrainian forces and planning “reassurance forces” with limited U.S. backing. The Ukraine episode illustrates Trump’s foreign policy paradox: eager for dramatic breakthroughs, he often undercuts long-term credibility in pursuit of short-term optics.

Iran and the Quest for a Nobel Prize

Trump has repeatedly hinted that he seeks a Nobel Peace Prize, viewing it as the ultimate validation of his leadership. His prior efforts—such as the Abraham Accords in the Middle East—bolstered his claim but fell short of Nobel recognition.

Looking ahead, Trump is likely to focus on Iran’s nuclear program as the most dramatic arena for a potential peace deal. He has oscillated between threats of military action and promises of “the best deal ever.” His critics note that scrapping the 2015 JCPOA nuclear accord in his first term weakened U.S. leverage and pushed Iran closer to enrichment thresholds. Yet Trump now suggests he alone can broker a new accord, one tougher than his predecessors achieved.

Israel, Palestine, and the Limits of Transactionalism

Trump’s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains deeply shaped by his earlier recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and the Abraham Accords. In his second term, he presents himself as uniquely capable of brokering a “grand bargain” between Israel and Arab states.

Yet Palestinians remain sidelined, and violence in Gaza and the West Bank has escalated. European analysts argue that Trump’s transactional diplomacy—focused on Arab-Israeli normalization—ignores the structural roots of Palestinian grievances. Without addressing Palestinian claims to sovereignty, however, any settlement risks being cosmetic.

The recent Israeli attack on Hamas negotiators in Doha has threatened the entire architecture of U.S. strategy in the Middle East. GCC now confronts the reality that Washington either could not—or would not—prevent Israel from striking within their borders. The strike risks driving Gulf nations to reconsider their reliance on U.S. guarantees and to explore alternative security alignments, as Saudi Arabia demonstrated by concluding a defense treaty with Pakistan.

Not only that, on the domestic front, the incident has reinforced the MAGA-Israeli rift. Many America First voters have started to question Trump’s policy of prioritizing Israeli support over American interests. How this plays out will be utterly consequential for the future of American politics.

India and Pakistan Tensions

Trump has also cited his efforts to mediate between India and Pakistan, two nuclear-armed rivals, as evidence of his unique statesmanship. After the recent four-day conflict, he offered to broker talks over Kashmir, even claiming that Prime Minister Narendra Modi requested U.S. intervention. While India denied such overtures, Trump continued to highlight his role in lowering tensions during border skirmishes. Irrespective, Trump revives this narrative, portraying himself as the only leader willing to bring two nuclear powers to the table.

For domestic audiences, the image of Trump as peacemaker between two nuclear states reinforces his argument that he alone can prevent catastrophic wars—an argument likely to feature prominently in his re-election campaign.

No More Soft Power

Traditional presidents—including many of the Founders—understood that America’s influence lay in both persuasion and force. George Washington counseled avoiding entangling alliances, but also promoting republican values. Trump’s policy inverts this balance: U.S. soft power—the tools of USAID, VOA—is slashed, replaced by tariffs, threats, and military posturing.

Removing soft power tools weakens long-term credibility. A legislative report warned Trump’s instincts make U.S. a “bystander in international efforts,” undermining democracy promotion and global cooperation. Institutions like WHO, climate accords, and multilateral forums are dismissed, even as authoritarian players fill the void.

Trump’s defense of using military power against Iran’s nuclear program—despite ongoing talks—underscores reliance on hard tools over diplomacy. His use of economic coercion—tariffs on allies and adversaries alike—challenges norms of trade reciprocity.

At home, this approach reflects his populist stance: reclaiming leverage against countries like India by imposing tariffs and stricter oversight of H1B Visa Program, while demanding Europe meet NATO obligations. While Trump distances U.S. from multilateralism, countries like China and Russia are deepening cooperation via BRICS, SCO, and other forums. Meanwhile, U.S. has alienated NATO and EU—evident in the diplomatic backlash after Alaska.

On the other hand, European efforts to assure Ukraine’s security—a potential buffer zone, peacekeepers—are gaining momentum and autonomy, though still needing U.S. support. Emerging countries view Trump’s U.S. as transactional and surveys by the European Council on Foreign Relations indicated that global responses to his second term reflect hedging, not alliance-building.

Trump’s foreign policy represents a break with the post-1991 liberal order, which emphasized collective security, open markets, and democratic values. Instead, his worldview echoes 19th-century great-power politics, in which spheres of influence and economic coercion dominate.

Trump’s posture harks back to classic great-power thinking. Scholars have noted that U.S. resistance to Russian or Chinese spheres of influence is a post–Cold War construct. Historically, the U.S. itself wielded Monroe Doctrine-style influence and accepted postwar spheres such as Eastern Europe under Soviet control. He appears to embrace that tradition—viewing global competition through the lens of zero-sum regional hierarchies, especially across Eurasia. He prioritizes a strategy of wedge-driving between Russia and China, rather than accepting a multi-polar order.

The conventional wisdom in think-tank literature—a world moving towards multi-polarity, with diplomatic messiness but strategic balance—is largely ignored. Some argue multipolarity may be more hazardous than bipolarity. However, Trump avoids such debates: instead, he seems to seek a revival of bilateral leverage, playing off great powers to U.S. advantage where possible.

Election Implications: Tariffs and Populism at Home

Trump’s foreign policy represents a radical experiment in realpolitik. It replaces liberal order with transactional bargaining, elevates tariffs to tools of statecraft, and prizes symbolic breakthroughs—especially peace deals that might burnish Trump’s legacy.

For the next election, Trump’s tariff-driven populism may prove a potent political weapon at home. His campaign will emphasize tariffs, industrial re-shoring, and economic nationalism as proof of “America First” success. Swing-state voters, especially in the Midwest, may respond favorably to tariff-driven protection of steel, autos, and manufacturing. Yet suburban and business constituencies could rebel against higher consumer prices and global instability.

But internationally, America risks being seen less as a reliable leader than as a transactional actor chasing deals and prestige. Allies face uncertainty about whether U.S. commitments will endure. The credibility gap—created by Trump’s personalized, ad-hoc decision-making—risks long-term erosion of American leadership, regardless of who wins in the next election.

Equally, it’s critical to keep in perspective the sense of exploitation which resulted in the America First Mantra, using which President Trump came into power for the second time. If America First policy does not produce economic dividends for common Americans in the short and long term, it will further complicate the domestic politics and confusion regarding its global role and future direction. In this, how Trump balances his foreign policy regarding Israel will be critical.

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Israel Airstrike Targets Hamas Negotiators In Doha, Threatening Gaza Ceasefire Talks – Sep 15, 2025
Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions – Apr 26, 2025
Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran – Feb 25, 2025
The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump – Dec 25, 2024
What Would Trump 2.0 Mean For The Future Of NATO? – Oct 29, 2024
Ukraine-Russia: Stalemate Ensues, Concerns Multiply – Jan 27, 2024
Ukraine Conflict And Global Balance Of Power Tussles In Europe – Jan 5, 2023
‘America First’ And Future Of Globalization – Nov 12, 2019
Understanding Trump’s America First Doctrine And Its Implications – Sep 17, 2017
Understanding The Change in America – How To Make America Great Again? – Mar 20, 2017
Deciphering Obama’s UN Speech; Non-State Actors, State Sovereignty, And Future Of UN – Sep 30, 2013

The post The End of Liberal Internationalism? Trump’s Foreign Policy Revolution and Its Electoral Implications appeared first on Politact.

Trump had criticized NATO even in his first term, and the prospect of him getting re-elected is making the European allies worried. Trump has consistently questioned NATO’s relevance, criticized member countries for not meeting defense spending commitments, and pushed for a more transactional approach to alliances.

This strategy could lead to several significant outcomes in terms of U.S. influence, its global standing, and its ability to manage rising geopolitical tensions, especially in the context of great power rivalry with China and Russia.

1. Erosion of U.S. Influence in Europe

Trump’s skeptical view of NATO could weaken transatlantic relations, leading to a reduced U.S. leadership role in Europe, think tanks such as Brooking Institutions and Council on Foreign Relations have written extensively on this. NATO is a cornerstone of American power projection in the region and beyond since the end of World War II. It has served not only as a military alliance but also as a vehicle for maintaining U.S. influence over European affairs. Trump’s criticism of the alliance as “obsolete” or overly reliant on American funding creates uncertainty within NATO and potentially undermines the unity and strategic coherence of the organization.

If Trump undermines NATO further, European countries may begin to pursue more independent security policies, potentially seeking alternative alliances or focus more on strengthening European Union defense capabilities. Such responses could diminish U.S. leverage in European geopolitical affairs, leading to greater fragmentation within the West and provide opportunities for Russia to exploit these divisions. Russia, already seeking to weaken NATO’s eastern flank, would likely see this as a strategic opportunity to reassert its influence over former Soviet states and weaken Western deterrence.

The erosion of U.S. influence in Europe would also undermine its ability to project power into regions like the Baltics, Eastern Europe, and even the Middle East and North Africa, where NATO missions have played a role in stabilizing conflict zones and countering terrorism.

2. Reduced Deterrence Against Russia

NATO serves as the primary bulwark against Russian aggression in Europe, particularly in Eastern Europe and the Baltics, where countries like Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania depend on the alliance for security guarantees. Trump made a statement in February 2024, that if NATO countries do not raise their defense spending, he will allow Russia to ‘whatever the hell they want’. A farewell visit from President Biden to Europe did little to calm European anxiety regarding upcoming US Elections and what Trump might do if he is elected.

Trump’s reduction of focus on NATO could embolden Russia, as Moscow would see a weakened NATO as an opportunity to further destabilize Eastern Europe, whether through direct military action (as seen in Ukraine) or hybrid warfare tactics like cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and energy manipulation.

Russia has long viewed NATO expansion and U.S. military presence in Eastern Europe as a threat to its sphere of influence. If Trump were to further pull back from NATO or question the U.S. commitment to Article 5, the collective defense clause, it could undermine deterrence against Russian aggression. Eastern European countries, feeling less secure under the U.S. security umbrella, might either seek new alliances or pursue policies of appeasement towards Russia to safeguard their own security.

A weaker NATO would allow Russia to challenge U.S. influence more aggressively in Europe, possibly leading to increased Russian intervention in places like Ukraine, Georgia, and even the Balkans, where Russian-backed forces or political parties have significant influence.

3. Shift of U.S. Focus to Bilateral and Transactional Alliances

Under Trump, the U.S. could shift away from multilateral alliances like NATO and focus more on bilateral or ad-hoc agreements that are more transactional in nature. Trump has long favored a more “America First” approach, expecting allies to pay more for U.S. protection and to contribute more to shared defense goals. This approach could lead to a recalibration of U.S. alliances, with Washington seeking more cost-effective, flexible partnerships in regions it deems strategically important.

This shift would likely see the U.S. working more closely with countries like Poland, the U.K., or other European states that are willing to increase defense spending or pursue joint military projects on more favorable terms to the U.S. However, these ad-hoc alliances would lack the collective strength and unity that NATO provides, making U.S. power projection less consistent and reliable.

Moreover, Trump’s skepticism towards NATO could push European countries to seek greater autonomy, leading to the development of EU-led defense initiatives, which could dilute U.S. influence further. France has made a case for European defense force in the past as well. While European nations might still value U.S. support, they may increasingly turn towards France or Germany for leadership within Europe, weakening U.S. dominance over transatlantic security matters.

France has been one of the uneasy members of the alliance that had initially left NATO in 1958, on quarrels related to its unequal status vis-a-vis the special relationship of United States and the United Kingdom. Then president of France Charles De Gaulle sought to establish a tripartite commission which would put France on equal footing with United States and United Kingdom. It had also wanted to extend the geographic reach of NATO to include Algeria, where France needed NATO’s help in fighting an insurgency. Furthermore, France wanted maneuvering room to negotiate its own peace with communist Eastern European nations, independent of NATO-Warsaw rivalries. (Under Nicholas Sarkozy, France has returned as a member of NATO since April 2009.)

4. Impact on Power Projection in Asia and the Middle East

While Trump has largely focused his criticisms on NATO, any weakening of U.S. multilateral commitments could have ripple effects in other regions where American alliances are critical for power projection. In Asia, where the U.S. relies on a network of alliances to counter China’s growing influence, Trump’s de-emphasis on collective security arrangements could raise questions about the U.S. commitment to alliances like those with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines. China could exploit any perception that the U.S. is retreating from multilateral alliances to assert more control over the South China Sea, expand its Belt and Road Initiative, and influence other Asian nations to align with Beijing.

Similarly, in the Middle East, U.S. power projection has often relied on partnerships with countries like Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the Gulf states, but these relationships have also been supported by broader international coalitions. Trump’s focus on more transactional, bilateral deals, such as a possible NATO-style nuclear security pact with Saudi Arabia, could strain multilateral efforts to address issues like Iranian influence, terrorism, or stability in the region.

5. China and Russia Taking Advantage of a U.S. Retreat

China and Russia would likely see Trump’s de-emphasis on NATO and broader multilateral commitments as a strategic opportunity to fill the vacuum left by a less engaged U.S. In Europe, Russia would see a weakened NATO as a chance to reassert its influence over its Near Abroad. In Asia, China would push to expand its influence in the South China Sea, assert more control over Taiwan, and strengthen its economic and military ties with Southeast Asian countries that might question U.S. reliability.

Both powers could also collaborate more closely to undermine U.S. influence in key regions, as seen through China and Russia’s growing cooperation in military, energy, and diplomatic matters. If the U.S. under Trump pulls back from its global commitments, China and Russia could further position themselves as alternative global powers, offering security and economic deals to countries wary of relying on a less predictable U.S. ally. Such as through BRICS conference, being held in Kazan, China and Russia will demonstrate the alternative to Western model exists, and also in the form of SCO.

6. Weakened U.S. Global Leadership and Soft Power

NATO is not just a military alliance but also a symbol of U.S. leadership in the post-World War II liberal order. A retreat from NATO and multilateralism could weaken U.S. soft power globally, as countries increasingly view the U.S. as an unreliable partner. This would reduce America’s ability to lead on global issues, whether in addressing climate change, global health crises, or humanitarian interventions.

Weaker alliances would also mean that the U.S. has less diplomatic leverage in shaping the policies of its allies, making it harder to forge consensus on global challenges like counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, and non-proliferation. Meanwhile, China’s influence through initiatives like the Belt and Road, and Russia’s use of hybrid warfare, could rise, with both powers offering alternatives to a U.S.-led international order.

The post What Would Trump 2.0 Mean For The Future Of NATO? appeared first on Politact.

Naad-e-Ali Sulehria – South Asia Fellow, PoliTact

As the conflict between Ukraine and Russia continues, statement has set in. In recent negotiations, both sides rejected each other’s terms thus suggesting that finding a resolution remains elusive.

Despite previous indications of openness to a ceasefire, Russia, in a Security Council meeting this Monday, criticized and rejected Ukraine’s peace proposal. Russia denounced President Zelensky’s plans, which include the withdrawal of Russian troops from all Ukrainian territory and the prosecution of Russian officials for war crimes. Russia asserted its readiness to negotiate for peace but not on compromising terms while declaring the present plan a guise to continue Ukraine’s war ambitions while obtaining more western funds.

Zelensky, in turn, has rejected Russia’s offer for a ceasefire, expressing concerns that any frozen conflict would likely reignite. By exploiting Ukraine’s vulnerabilities, Russia can launch a new aggression that could expand to other countries. Zelensky believes that accepting a ceasefire at the current positions, where Russia has already annexed four Ukrainian regions, would provide Russia with a claim to victory. Meanwhile, Ukraine will lose the gains it has made or could make in its offensive against Russia.

Last week at the World Economic Forum, Zelensky voiced his fear that any shortage of military equipment and ammunition will result in strengthening Putin, especially as the EU and the US, have shown reluctance to fulfill their commitments.

In response, the US and EU have affirmed their support for Ukraine, with promises from US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. However, despite renewed commitments, Zelensky’s hopes for a significant breakthrough may be dashed as attention has been diverted by the Gaza-Israel conflict and upcoming US elections.

Support for Ukraine is contingent upon the outcome of the US presidential elections. European allies, including NATO, are also anxious about the result of these elections. Zelensky has expressed concern over Donald Trump’s suggestion that he could swiftly end the Russia-Ukraine war if he returns to the White House. Apprehensive about the past ties between Putin and Trump, Zelensky insists that any unilateral decisions by Trump would undermine Ukraine’s genuine demands and would weaken Ukraine’s position.

The post Ukraine-Russia: Stalemate Ensues, Concerns Multiply appeared first on Politact.

Context

From time to time there is a need to ascertain the status of global Balance of Power, is it in equilibrium or moving in the favor of one or the other power. While the global Balance of Power and the associated Spheres of Influence are not the only construct to assess power dynamics – they are the most prevalent presently.

In this conceptualization, usually empires or states are either emerging – challenging the established powers or coalescing with them – and deemed to be either ascending or descending in ranking. It is primarily based on a zero-sum world view i.e., the gain of one is at the expense of the other. It visualizes the world as having limited resources which need to be competed for, controlled, and leveraged.

Cold War and War Against Terror

The Cold War got triggered soon after the end of World War II, between US dominated Western alliance and the USSR, and is an illustration of how the balance of power tussles usually playout. The Western alliance came out victorious as USSR collapsed in the aftermath of the Afghan debacle of the 80s. This was followed by a period of calm – or as some would call the emergence of Unipolar world led by the US.

However, this relative tranquility did not last for long. 9/11 disturbed the calm that prevailed since the collapse of USSR. It appeared that the Islamic extremists were planning to upend the global order and the nation-state system – which according to them was unjust and established on the ashes of Ottoman Empire.

As the Global War Against Terrorists (GWOT) progressed, it bifurcated along extremists with global ambitions such as Al Qaeda (AQ) and ISSI (Daesh) – and others with local and regional grievances, like the Afghan Taliban, Baloch Liberation Front and Baloch Liberation Army, Kurds, or Al Shabab. The Kurds go by different names depending in which state they exist: YPG in Syria, and PKK in Turkey. Turkey accuses the West of supporting PKK and YPG.

While the GWOT is by no way over, with the passage of time it became apparent that balance of power tussles had infiltrated and became intertwined with the GWOT, especially when it came to extremists with local or regional grievances. Alarmingly, some of these regional groups also assist AQ and ISIS – and are also known as ‘AQ and Associates’ or ‘ISIS and Associate’.

For example, the deal between Afghan Taliban and US in the form of Doha Agreement – was only sealed after guarantees that they will delink from AQ. Moreover, Afghan Taliban will not support groups like TTP (Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan) – or allow for the use of Afghan territory to launch attacks against other countries, like Pakistan and India. The discovery of Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul, and resurging TTP activities in Pakistan, suggest Afghan Taliban have renegaded on both terms.

Globalization, COVID-19, and Emerging Powers

While US was paying in blood and treasure in GWOT, emerging powers like China and Russia, had no such stakes, even though they cooperated in the Campaign against Extremism. Moreover, globalization was further strengthening the economic wherewithal of the emerging powers, with Western multinationals facilitating this transfer of wealth. This became the fuel for populist rhetoric spewed by leaders like Donald Trump under the mantra of Making America Great Again (MAGA), which was later adopted with modification by President Biden and naming it ‘Made in America’. Under Biden’s approach, the centrality of Europe was revitalized, which previously faced neglect and acrimony under Trump.

In the wake of GWOT, the crux of American concerns stem from a sense of exploitation at the hands of allies, and thus confusing the ability to clearly define strategic enemies. That was rectified in the subsequent National Defense Strategies, declaring that global adversaries, such as China and Russia, need to be confronted and contained in different spheres of influence. In consideration of the above context, the economic order that is making the adversarial emerging powers stronger also needs to re-engineered.

With many other unfavorable affects, COVID-19 aided the disruption of supply chains related with globalization. The tense ties between US and China, tit for tat sanctions, and tariff battles, have taken a toll on American business and consumers. Nonetheless, there is an attempt to reorient global economic and security order to make it more beneficial for the US and its allies – and detrimental for those showing inclination towards adversarial rising powers.

European Spheres of Influence, Ukraine, and China

Europe is one of the most important spheres of influence for the US and critical to its global power projection. However, the dependence of Europe on Russian energy resources, accompanied by economic penetration from China, was gradually eroding American sway and jeopardizing the raison d’etre for NATO.

Alarmingly, China overtook US as EU’s biggest trading partner in 2020. While US and UK were the largest export market, the trade volume has been consistently dropping. US witnessed a drop in imports of 13.2% and export of 8.2%. In 2019, EU trade volume with US stood at $746bn and decreasing to $671bn in 2020.

In addition, after seven years of negotiations, China and EU agreed on an investment deal that came to be known as the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment. Because of Chinese support for Russian position on Ukraine, tensions between EU and China continued mounting, and as a consequence the deal could not be ratified. Not only that EU imposed sanctions on China, which were reciprocated, for human right abuses in Xinjiang.

European powers are caught in a dilemma; they do not want to economically distance themselves from China – or appear to be working at cross-interests to the US. While aligning with US on Ukraine, they are paying heavily for shortage of energy resources due to dependence on Russia. On the other hand, US realizes that in order to have maximum impact on China and Russia, Europe would have to act in parallel.

According to a CNN article: “The COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and tit-for-tat sanctions between China and EU lawmakers have strained relations since. The United States, which imposed controls on exports of semiconductors to China in October, is reportedly exerting pressure on Europe to adopt a similarly hard line.”

The same article quotes Ricardo Borges de Castro, associate director at the European Policy Center, as stating.

“I don’t see [the EU’s strategy] as a decoupling strategy. I think the EU strategy, for the moment, is a diversification strategy… the lesson [from Russia] is that you cannot have a single provider.”

Two leading European powers, Germany and France, seem to illustrate this strategy. UK on the other hand, since Brexit, has acted most aggressively on decoupling from China and restricting access to Chinese businesses and technology.

The German Chancellor Olaf Scholz visited China in November, the symbolism suggests they want to continue doing business, what is known as ‘Business First’ approach, despite pressure from the US. He was the first leader of G7 nations to visit and the critics point out to lack of cohesion within EU. Chinese and German economies are broadly connected, and China is a key market for German machinery and automobiles. Olaf also agreed to Chinese investment in its leading terminal, Hamburg Port.

The French leader is expected to visit China in January but before that Macron visited US where he had extensive talk with his American counterparts in November. While France shares US concerns on Ukraine and China’s aggressive positioning in the Indo-Pacific, Biden’s Inflation reduction Act (IRA) has sent alarm bells ringing in Europe and France. Europeans, including France, consider the Act which was signed by Biden on August 16, as protectionism.

The law provides $370bn of green subsidies towards manufacturing of wind turbines, solar panels, microprocessors and electronic vehicles. Moreover, the most controversial part of the bill is that it offers tax credit of $7,500 to American buyers of cars manufactured in the US and locally built batteries. Reportedly Macron stated: “I think that this is not in line with the rules of the World Trade Organization and that it is not in line with friendship.” Biden and Macron agreed to continue discussions and minimize the negative impact of the IRA.

Conclusion

Europe represents the epicenter for the tussles of the balance of power, which then transfuses into other regions of the world, to be examined in future articles. COVID-19 has facilitated the upending of the existing supply chains – and provide an opportunity to reorient them and prevent them from benefiting global adversaries such as China and Russia. Moreover, climate change has become another factor to be used as a leverage – in terms of resources and technologies needed to address its negative consequences.

Just as in Europe, existing spheres of influence are also in friction in other nations – and its likely be tough going for their respective citizens economically. While the developed nations strive to protect their economic and financial interests – it’s going to be a particularly rough ride for the developing and underdeveloped nations. This will result in deteriorating social order and mounting political polarization – as power and political alignments change at the local level. Sadly, many may not be able to adapt to the economic and security flux – and tugs and pulls of the shift in the global balance of power – in a timely fashion.

The post Ukraine Conflict And Global Balance Of Power Tussles In Europe appeared first on Politact.

The Return of ‘Spheres of Influence’ Politics

Context

While there are different angles to interpret the fast-moving flux in the global political, economic and security situation, the great power rivalry perspective is clearly ascendant.

There is usually a period of calm when one power dominates or when there is stability in the balance of power equation. The rapid economic rise of China and infringement into the traditional American spheres of Influence, like Europe, has clearly been a cause of alarm. Moreover, Trump administration took certain actions that were seen as weakening the Western alliance – deemed essential to deal with emerging global rivals, to include Russia. Europe is critical to American power projection, and it was becoming progressively tied to Russia and China via trade. The present European energy dependence is a case point. Trumps admiration for Putin, and other authoritarian rulers, was seen as a vulnerability. Accompanied by his threats to NATO members to increase defense spending confused the Europeans on American reliability.

Under Biden, US is actively countering the expanding influence of China and Russia – and to reverse the Sino-Russian penetration in different regions. And one of the casualty of this reversal will be the phenomena known as globalization. Security concerns arising from aggressive Chinese posturing in the Indo-Pacific, events unfolding in Ukraine, and COVID-19 related supply chain disruptions have further weakened the case for globalization.

Additionally, these factors have helped eliminate American ambiguity on who is benefiting most from free trade presently. Going against laissez-faire principle is not an easy undertaking when the capitalist system is anchored around the very premise and has tremendously benefited the multinational corporations.

This context begs the question of what future security and trade system is the world shifting towards – and what phase of this transfer the present circumstances represent. It was WWI and II that moved the world to the nation-state system and the creation of United Nations. The answers are not readily available.

Analysis

New Cold War and Spheres of Influence

As these global rivalries escalate, they are being classified as related to the new Cold War. The previous one being between US dominated Western Sphere of Influence – with USSR mostly influencing Eastern Europe. China at that time was not as close of an ally of Russia as it is now.

The Sino-Soviet ties have had their ups and down historically. For example, during the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 Chinese Beiyang government had supported the Whites, like the West, and sent in forces to fight the Reds. Conversely, in 1923 Soviets provided support to groups opposing the Beiyang government. In 1949, with Soviet backed communists won the Chinese civil war leading to the creation of People’s Republic of China. Soviets and Chinese were even involved in a brief border conflict in 1969.

Irrespective, as the new Cold War gets underway, and no near-term Ukraine solution on the horizon, what will this emerging Cold War look like?

The first thing is obvious, the Spheres of Influence was the key character of the old Cold War – dividing the world into communist USSR and capitalist America. The Soviet system was associated with autocratic closed security states, with strict regulations controlling the lives of the citizens. On the contrary, the hallmark of Western democratic states was freedom of expression and trade that led to creativity, innovation, and greater economic prosperity. And these attributes ultimately became the reasons for the success of West against the closed Soviet system.

The new Cold War would likely create similar spheres of influence between US and China-Russia aligned states. While some would argue that this new Cold War is only between US and China. To understand these alignments – how the spheres of influence evolved after the Soviet Union collapsed need to be understood.

NATO’s Evolution

As Soviet Union dissolved during the period of 1988-1991, 15 Soviet republics opted for independence with the Baltic states leading. The former Eastern European states applied and became members of Western security alliance, NATO. A trajectory that has continued to this day – and one of the reasons for Ukraine conflict to erupt, which is also causing Finland and Sweden to move towards NATO.

Another element of this post-Soviet period was that Russia and China both adopted policies that has made Western system stronger, for example allowing foreign investments and free trade. But they did not embrace the democratic political system. So, while China and Russia benefited from free trade, their respective restricting political governance models remained in place. This has been a cause of continuous friction when it comes to for example, state controlling the currency values, protecting minorities and human rights etc.

Conclusion

Moving forward, the roles seem to be reversing. The US and West are shifting away from globalization and altering the supply chains that were created for maximum profitability. On the other hand, China is championing globalization. In May, Chinese Xi Jinping had urged the organization of emerging nations BRICS to, “reject Cold War mentality and bloc confrontation, and work together to build a global community of security for all”.

Two properties of the new supply chains are: they have to be from friendly nations and pose no economic and security implications for the dominant power of the alliance. In other words, the concept that evolved after WWII that economic interdependence can resolve security issues – is being put to rest.

While China has been attracting states through Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and associated large infrastructure projects, the US, EU, and Japan have begun to counter with their own infrastructure projects. At the recently held G7 conference in Germany, President Biden announced US will help finance $200 billion from public and private sectors to counter Chinese projects.

The question then is how will the emerging respective spheres of influence be monitored and policed. The energy supply lines provide one example where sanctions are playing a critical role. In this, US using its influence in moving Europeans away from Russian energy dependence and building trade relations with China. Meanwhile, it is allowing India flexibility to acquire cheap energy from Russia, however, coercing weaker nations to stay away.

US is also resetting its ties with Saudi Arabia to use the enhance its energy leverage and to keep energy dependent states in-line. President Biden is scheduled to visit Saudi Arabia in July and ask for increase in oil production to compensate for Russian oil shortfall. He will also be attending the meeting of Gulf Cooperation Council. Meanwhile King Abdullah of Jordan has supported the idea of Middle East version of NATO. It’s not clear though what threat perception would the NATO of Middle East counter, Iran, Russia or China? Clearly, it cannot be Israel.

In other words, the balance of power tussles now involve use of economic influence to attract and discipline states. During the previous Cold War, USSR did not have the type of economic prowess that the US and West enjoyed, but in the emerging Cold War the case of China is different.

Thus, there will likely be a China-Russia dominated supply lines and economic zone and the US-Europe controlled one. Ultimately, China and Russia will likely use tactics similar to the West i.e., if the new Cold War persists and matures. The Domino Theory and the associated dynamics that were the underpinning of the old Cold War, will become relevant once more. This will fundamentally alter the way present global trade is conducted, and this will significantly impact the working of the UN Security Council.

The post Emerging Great-Power Rivalry; How Will The New Cold War Unfold As Ukraine Simmers? appeared first on Politact.

Context

Why did Putin Invade Ukraine?

Many interpretations have come to the fore on why Putin invaded Ukraine on February 22. One of the recurring one is the ever-expanding NATO presence in Eastern Europe, which was now about to include Ukraine itself, right on the Russian border. Russia has often cited the unwritten understanding that came about at the time when Soviet Union was getting dissolved from 1989-1991 – suggesting NATO will not expand further. The cessation of Soviet Union eliminated the reason for NATO to expand in what Russia considers it to be its traditional sphere of influence, also known as its ‘Near Abroad’. US has denied that any such understanding existed.

On the other hand, Western scholars have long maintained that Putin aspires to revive the union of former Soviet republics – and the invasion of Ukraine may be another step along that path. Previously, he occupied Georgian states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russo-Georgian War of 2008. Had it not been due to the intervention of France to negotiate the truce, and subsequent US financial support in which then Senator Joe Biden played a key role, Georgia may very well had lost its sovereignty. Many believe that what happened in 2008, and the lame Western response, emboldened Putin.

Then came Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. It occurred soon after President Victor Yanukovych fled to Russia and the new acting Ukrainian president pledged to move closer to Europe by signing the association agreement of European Union. At the time Putin claimed Russia wants to ensure proper conditions for the people of Crimea, 60 percent of which were of Russian ethnicity, to freely express their views.

Whatever the reason for the present offensive on Ukraine i.e., NATO’s expansion in Russian Near Abroad or Putin’s desire to revive the Soviet Union, the timing of his move is deliberate.

His decision to move into Ukraine is likely based on a sense of Western weakness. The manner in which US withdrew from Afghanistan, economic situation resulting from Corona pandemic, and the status of European cohesion, are all likely playing a part in his decision. Perhaps the most critical aspect of his calculation is the future of American domestic politics and the Trump phenomenon. US has accused Russia of meddling in American elections through social media and by launching cyber-attacks.

Why the West has to React?

From an American perspective, while there may have been reasons to not counter Russia aggressively previously, in the case of Ukraine that is not the case. Short of sending troops to Ukraine, all other options are being evaluated.

While Russia and China alone do not pose a serious threat to the US and the Western political system, put together they are formidable adversaries. Since 9/11 US has been engaged in one conflict after the other, and this has provided an opportunity for Russia and China to grow their military and economic wherewithal. US simply cannot allow them to build a stronger military alliance.

Moreover, US depends on Europe for its global power projection. A growing concern recently has been the dependability on NATO and other allies to counter threats emanating from global adversaries – such as China and Russia. European nations and other allies have increasingly been seen dealing with both – building trade and military relations with China and Russia at the expense of US. For example:

• Under US pressure, UK banned Huawei from developing the 5G networks in 2020 due to security concerns, resulting in strong criticism from Chinese officials. Huawei had been operation in UK for at least 20 years and was an integral part of its 4G network.
• In 2015, France backed away from selling two high tech Mistral warships to Russia, a deal worth $1.6 billion, reportedly due to Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. The deal was highly criticized by US since France is a NATO member and supplying of the ship would have augmented Russian military capabilities.
• Then there is the controversial Nord Stream 2 Gas Pipeline that goes from Russia to Germany. Merkel government averted sanctions and reached a deal with the Biden Administration in July last year. The agreement involved investing more than 200 million euros in energy security of Ukraine and sustainable energy across Europe. US-Germany ties were strained considerably when Trump administration decided to pull out 9,500 US troops based in Germany.
• NATO member, Turkey, bought S-400 missile defense system from Russia in 2017. This resulted in Countering American Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAASTA) kicking in, claiming the deal would threaten NATO alliance and F-35 fighter jets in Turkish fleet. Enacted in 2017, CAASTA urged American allies and partners to not engage in transactions with Russia, Iran, and North Korea or risk sanctions. This has also prevented Pakistan from moving forward with Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project.
• Another American ally, India, has also acquired the S-400 air defense system at the cost of $5 billion but so far US has not been highly critical.
• In December 2019, US gave a waiver to India to jointly develop the Chabahar Port with Iran, which is seen as a counter to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port – being erected with Chinese investment. While the US strategic partnership with India has been evolving, the nation has remained reluctant in talking stronger role against China. Not only that, India is also ironically a full member of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). And thus, serious questions continue to be raised about the efficacy of QUAD alliance in which India is a member as well.
• As part of BRI, China has been extending its trade relations with Israel and US objected strongly to some of them citing security concerns – such as the Chinese company Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) running a container terminal at the Port of Haifa. The terminal is located near an Israeli naval base that is frequently visited by the US Sixth Fleet.

China, Russia Alliance – Sanctions and Soft Power

Due to events related to the War against Extremism, American perception and Soft Power has suffered in different parts of the world, which has also been exploited by China and Russia. China has projected its Belt and Road initiative as a win-win as it takes on large infrastructure projects in many nations.

For example, in addition to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China and Iran have signed a $400 billion 25 year economic and security deal that would lead to enhanced military and trade relations. The agreement ensures Chinese investment in Iranian telecommunication, transportation, and military fields. The military cooperation includes exercises, intelligence sharing, and joint research and development of weapons. China will also procure its energy needs from Iran on discounted price for over next 25 years.

The questioned has remained how will China implement the deal while sanctions on Iran remain – which have also delayed the much-needed Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project (IPI). In addition to CAASTA, the new sanctions on Russia will further complicate the China-Russia strategic cooperation.

As negotiations continue on the revived Iran nuclear deal, China could emerge as the big beneficiary if the Iran nuclear deal is reached, which US had left in 2015 during the Trump administration. But then, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed that he has received ‘written guarantees’ from US that Ukraine sanctions will not restrict Russian participation in nuclear projects and trade under the revised nuclear agreement with Iran. It was only after this assurance that Russia dropped its last-minute objections to the deal.

Russian invasion of Ukraine has provided an opportunity to the US to recover the Soft Power reserves, reinvigorate the NATO alliance, and by using sanctions undercut the growing strategic China-Russia alliance.

Emerging Scenarios

As the Ukrainian situation evolves a couple of possibilities are emerging. One of them is for negotiations between Ukrainian and Russian officials to succeed, with Ukraine declaring neutrality and forgoing its aspirations to join NATO. Afterall there are several other nations that have been in the neutral status – just to avoid the type of situation Ukraine now finds itself in. These nations include Austria, Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, and Ireland.

The second scenario is more dreadful and involves Russia getting bog down in Ukraine. As NATO nations supply sophisticated weaponry to Ukraine – leading to increasing loses for Russia. In this scenario, as Russia faces the brunt of sanctions, it reaches out to its strategic partner China for economic and military assistance. According to media reports Russia may have already done this. Talking to a news conference on March 23, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg stated, “China has provided Russia with political support, including by spreading blatant lies and misinformation.” He added there is concern that this could shift to material support. Earlier, US officials threatened China that there will consequences for any Chinese military and economic support to Russia.

One of the benefits of Ukraine crisis for China has been the shift of US focus away from the Pacific. However, if Russian is weakened in the crisis, it represents a strategic loss for China in the long run. In the grand scheme of affairs, Russia could keep Europe busy, if the things take a turn for the worse in the Pacific. But then, why should China face sanctions for what Russia has done. After all, China believes in non-intervention and respect for state sovereignty.

The post NATO, Sino-Russian Strategic Alliance, And Future Of Ukraine appeared first on Politact.

Context

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) held its head of state summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan on September 17. The conference took place in the backdrop of the collapse of Ashraf Ghani government in Afghanistan as Taliban took over. This was accompanied by the complete withdrawal of US and coalition troops – that has raised alarmed bells across the region and beyond.

The future of the US presence in the South and Central Asia, and increasingly Middle East region, have remained the focus of SCO. As early as June 2010, the then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev had commented that the future of Afghanistan was directly relational to security and stability in all SCO countries and most observer countries, and that the SCO must endeavor to increase cooperation and involvement in Afghanistan to try and ensure stability in a post-US scenario.

The withdrawal of US troops and NATO from Afghanistan represents a significant shift in the regional and global balance of power – and while Taliban are in the process of establishing their government – they have not formally been recognized by any other nation yet. This is reflective of the wait and see approach. As Taliban get established and their domestic and foreign policies become more apparent – that is likely when the recognition process and financial support starts.

As SCO matures, other questions regarding its vision and capabilities also come in to play. The Dushanbe Declaration stated, it aspires:

“a more representative, democratic, just and multi-polar world order based on universally recognized principles of international law, cultural and civilizational diversity, mutually beneficial and equal cooperation of states under the central coordinating role of the UN.”

While the US has insisted that it will continue ‘over the horizon’ operations in Afghanistan as needed – the withdrawal from Afghanistan represents an attempt towards obtaining strategic clarity – and re-prioritizing its national interests. While US has been striving to Pivot towards Asia for a while, other global distractions have come in the way, and continue to pull US towards the War and Terror related hot-spots.

As the War Against Extremism was being waged, American sway in the Islamic world has been considerably reduced, and other than the Gulf Arab nations, its ties with Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan remain tense. It is interesting to note that Pakistan and India are already full members of SCO. Interestingly, Iran attained full membership, while Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Egypt also achieved the observer status during the SCO 20^th anniversary convention.

Nonetheless, US and NATO withdrawal increases pressures on SCO, and the member states, to maintain stability in Afghanistan. If it not managed well, it could escalate the regional tussles.

NATO, QUAD, and AUKUS

While SCO contemplates with how it can safeguard its interest in other parts of the world where it carries significant stakes, like Afghanistan or the Pacific, a growing concern for the US is how much it can depend on NATO and other allies to counter threats emanating from global adversaries – such as China and Russia.

European nations have increasingly been seen dealing with both – building trade relations with China and Russia at the expense of US. Moreover, the European allies are increasingly acting as go-betweens – to mitigate ties with those nations with which US has less than amicable relations. For example:

• Under US pressure, UK banned Huawei from developing the 5G networks in 2020 due to security concerns, resulting in strong criticism from Chinese officials. Huawei had been operation in UK for at least 20 years and was an integral part of its 4G network.
• In 2015, France backed away from selling two high tech Mistral warships to Russia, a deal worth $1.6 billion, reportedly due to Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. The deal was highly criticized by US since France is a NATO member and supplying of the ship would have augmented Russian military capabilities.
• Then there is the controversial Nord Stream 2 Gas Pipeline that goes from Russia to Germany. Merkel government averted sanctions and reached a deal with the Biden Administration in July. The agreement involved investing more than 200 million euros in energy security in Ukraine and sustainable energy across Europe. US-Germany ties were strained considerably when Trump administration decided to pull out 9,500 US troops based in Germany.

“Should Russia attempt to use energy as a weapon or commit further aggressive acts against Ukraine, Germany will take action at the national level and press for effective measures at the European level, including sanctions to limit Russian export capabilities to Europe in the energy sector,” a senior State Department official told a CNBC reporter in July.

• Other NATO member, Turkey, bought S-400 missile defense system from Russia in 2017. This resulted in Countering American Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAASTA) kicking in, claiming the deal would threaten NATO alliance and F-35 fighter jets in Turkish fleet. Enacted in 2017, CAASTA urged American allies and partners to not engage in transactions with Russia, Iran, and North Korea or risk sanctions. This has also prevented Pakistan from moving forward with Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project.
• Another American ally, India, is also in the process of acquiring the S-400 air defense system at the cost of $5 billion. According to some reports, India will receive the system by the end of the year.
• In December 2019, US gave a waiver to India to jointly develop the Chabahar Port with Iran, which is seen as a counter to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port – being erected with Chinese investment. It can serve as an alternative supply route for Afghanistan and to help the country diversify its export opportunities. While the US strategic partnership with India has been evolving, it has remained reluctant in talking stronger role against China or getting engaged in the security realm in Afghanistan. Not only that, it is also ironically a full member of SCO. And thus, serious questions continue to be raised about the efficacy of QUAD alliance.

And this is where the trilateral alliance AUKUS, announced on September 15, comes into play. From the American perspective, one can observe what is the use of alliances or strategic partners that have significant divergent interests – as has been demonstrated from the behavior of European allies, that have to be cajoled to contribute more towards their defense spending – and cut down their dealings with adversarial powers. The quality of the alliance is more critical than the quantity of partners.

Managing the Rise of China

For US the question has remained how best to counter China which since its admission to the World Trade Organization in 2001, has gotten fully intertwined in global trade. The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement signed in February 2016, and dumped by Trump in 2017, represented the economic approach to deal with China. The recently formulated AUKUS pact between Australia, UK, and US is a security-oriented alliance.

The best approach would involve more economic dimension – according to Fareed Zakaria’s Washington Post column, titled: To contain China, joining the Pacific trade pact might be more effective than new submarines. But there is another dimension to this debate that was last heard prominently during the Obama administration – and has to do with coexistence. Speaking at the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) event in July, the White House coordinator for Asia Pacific, Kurt Campbell, admitted that coexistence is still possible but expect a period of uncertainty and raised tensions.

Speaking at the inception ceremony of ASPI in 2014, Henry Kissinger had stated while the Russian aggressiveness in Europe is clearly worrisome, it’s China that has the size and the economic wherewithal to challenge US. Moreover, this challenge does not appear to be a military one but perhaps more of an economic one. However, ever since, Chinese military capabilities are increasing by leaps and bounds.

Speaking at the same ASPI event in 2014, then Chinese Ambassador to the US, Cia Tiankai, had insisted they are not against the US presence in the Pacific; after all they have been there for a while. Furthermore, US businesses have large presence within China as well. What they (Chinese) are worried about is the US intent when it is building alliances in the region and conducting military exercises. When asked about what Kissinger’s advice would be for the Chinese and the US in the present circumstances (2014). He stated that he would tell China to not let the military issues overhang in their ties, while he will tell US not to get involved in military provocations, exercises in the region, or develop bases.

The post Status of Global Alliances: US Afghan Withdrawal, Evolution Of SCO, And Creation Of AUKUS appeared first on Politact.

Context

Now that the Biden administration has definitively announced plans to withdraw militarily from Afghanistan by September 11, the focus has shifted to the post withdrawal scenarios – and what that would look like for the US and other key stakeholders. The most important determinant of that is the status of Afghan reconciliation – and US-China ties.

Moreover, like has been the precedence, each major shift and decision is followed by a period of lull – as the other parties interpret what the changed circumstances mean. For many the question remains if US is fully intent on the military withdrawal. After all, the departure of coalition forces does not mean the end of political and security engagement.
As the Biden administration announced that US may not be able to keep the previously agreed May withdrawal deadline, Afghan Taliban has signaled it considers the delay a breach of the treaty signed last year. While they attended the meeting held under the auspices of Russia in March, Afghan Taliban did not show up at the Washington backed peace conference scheduled for April in Istanbul – and thus it had to be postponed. Notably, India was also invited to the Istanbul moot.

Subsequent to the announced delay, US has actively engaged Pakistan to help convince Afghan Taliban that slight delay in military withdrawal should not short circuit the overall plan. The country has already played a major role in facilitating talks with the Taliban. In this regard, the security advisors of Pakistan and US met in Geneva recently, and other direct communications have also taken place between the senior security leadership of both nations.

Media reports indicated that these contacts were geared towards securing the air and ground lines of access (ALOC and GLOC) during and after the US withdrawal. The controversy is already brewing if US has requested bases in Pakistan. And reports also reflect that under the Biden administration budget request for fiscal year 2022, some military training and economic assistance for Pakistan is forthcoming – but the overall suspension of military aid that came about in May 2018 remains intact. While the US is withdrawing militarily, the budget still asks for $3.3bn to support and sustain the Afghan Security Forces, a jump of 9.2 percent from 2021.

At the same time, violence has increased in Afghanistan and there are no signs of permanent cease fire that was being hoped for – as US agrees to leave albeit with a slight delay. But what can a few months accomplish which was not achieved in almost two decades?

The Spring Offensive

Seemingly, a delay of a few months should not matter, but when world events are moving with lightning speed, and added to that the Coronavirus related dynamics, postponements could create a new set of calculations. Perhaps the most important consideration would be the pace of fighting. Summer and Spring are usually the heaviest fighting season, with Afghan Taliban and coalition forces both launching operations.

Based on the agreement reached on Feb 29, 2020, Taliban are not targeting the coalition and American troops but that does not include the Afghan government forces. Therefore, one of the key assumptions that is likely to be tested is that if the Afghan forces can hold on their own – and thus indicate with some level of certainty what can transpire in the future. As US continues to close bases, Afghan Taliban are gaining in the vacuum that’s generated. Commenting on the situation, Foreign Minister of Pakistan showed concern that Afghan forces may not be able to hold on, and without political settlement, the country is heading towards a civil war.

This drastic prospect is not what Pakistan would hope for and has supported the concept of responsible withdrawal. Pakistan will likely increase pressure on Afghan Taliban to get on with the new reality – provided it get some concessions from the US. Pakistan wants US to take a broader view of its ties with Pakistan – and not just from the security prism of Afghanistan. Thus one of the key element at stake is the nature of US-Pakistan ties in the aftermath of US withdrawal – and what role Pakistan can offer while it takes place.

Blinken’s Proposal and Afghan Peace Process

Second causality to be tested by the delay is how the US withdrawal influences the Afghan Peace Process. One would assume that the momentous decision would have created a sense of urgency, as Secretary Blinken’s letter to Ashraf Ghani had specifically conveyed. And if the talks had progressed, perhaps a ceasefire could have been established before the full US departure.

According to Secretary Blinken’s proposal, the postponed April conference UN was going to convene in Istanbul, was to be followed by a 90-day reduction in violence. Moreover, the envisioned concept of interim government appears to have landed flatly in Afghanistan, with President Ashraf Ghani strongly resisting. The Ghani government prefers a new election to decide the fate of existing set-up – not a transitional government that includes power sharing with Afghan Taliban.

Thus, the delay in talks, and speedy US withdrawal, adds to the pressure on the Ghani government. The option it is utilizing is to blame Pakistan for what ails Afghanistan, and let the situation worsen dramatically – so as to cause a rethink on the part of the US and coalition forces.

Pakistan-India Ties

Another key dimension of the Afghan quagmire is the continued Indian intransigence towards the budding peace process. According to the Indian strategic thinking, Afghan Taliban gaining the upper hand would not bode well for the Kashmir conflict – and the insurgency there could likely gain more momentum. And thus, India would like Pakistan to remain distracted with Afghanistan while continuing to support groups such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other Baloch insurgents, and prevent CPEC related projects from maturing.

While India has also been working to distance Pakistan from its traditional Arab allies, for the first time, India has to consider tensions on its northern border with China – and this is where the India-US strategic ties and the Quad alliance comes in to play.

The External Minister of India, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, met with the US officials and Secretary Blinken on May 28 to emphasize its case. Clearly, a quandary for the US would be to balance withdrawal from Afghanistan with securing Indian interests, calming Pakistan’s security concerns, while obtaining more cooperation from India as it relates to the Quad strategy.

China-Iran and JCPOA

The sixth round of Iran nuclear talks are scheduled in Vienna this week. As the likelihood of US lifting sanctions on Iran increase, what role can Iran play in the post US Afghan withdrawal scenario, and will the results of Iranian elections make a difference?

It remains doubtful how much Iran can act as a calming force in Afghanistan. Iran’s trust with US and India is quite low. And that prospect has been made if even more remote due to its strategic closeness to China and Russia; the recent $400 billion China-Iran deal is a case in point. With this far-reaching treaty, Iran is likely to become more a conduit in extending Chinese influence in the Middle East.

If the Iran nuclear talks with Biden administration prove to be successful, it would likely play out of its of its own historical aspirations, in Afghanistan and the wider Middle East. But that also means relegation of the Sunni Arabs and Turks – and more importantly, this will require Israeli acquiescence.

Conclusion

The crux of the matter remains, will the US withdrawal from Afghanistan result in China-Russia dominated region, or the one under US-India. Remaining engage with the Afghanistan and Pakistan will provide some room to maneuver.

As alluded to by PoliTact in previous assessments, the window for Chinese and Russian cooperation on Afghanistan is narrowing quickly – and depends a lot on the cross leverages US, China, and Russia have on each other in other regions and matters. In this, the sequencing of events is of crucial significance. While Secretary Blinken’s meeting in March with Chinese counterparts held in Anchorage had a stark tone – the one with Foreign Minister Lavrov in May seemed more amenable, leading to the waiving of sanctions on Nord-Stream 2 pipeline.

The Biden-Putin summit, coming after the G7, EU, and NATO meetings, will demonstrate the state of play between US and Russia. The G7 agenda is expected to cover areas such as strategic stability, Ukraine, Belarus, Cyberattacks and cooperation in the areas of Coronavirus and climate change.

On the other hand, NATO’s website indicates the June 14 NATO leadership Summit will discuss Afghanistan. Speaking at an Atlantic Council event on June 7, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated the organization will continue to support and train Afghan military, while clarifying that most of this will be taking place ‘outside Afghanistan’. He went on to add: “at some stage Afghans had to take responsibility for their own future, and that’s what they’re doing with continued support from NATO allies.”

Stoltenberg commented that China is not an adversary, rhyming with the opinion piece President Biden wrote in the Washington Post on June 5th. He further added that they are looking at the possibility of re-initiating the otherwise defunct NATO-Russia Council.

Biden wrote in his price, “we want a stable and predictable relationship with Russia on issues like strategic stability and arms control. When he meets Putin, he will be taking a holistic approach – gauging how much is Russia willing to play ball on a whole gamut of matters dear to Russia – and then see how Russia can assist towards Afghan withdrawal. How China perceives any give and take, is part of the ongoing great power rivalry.

The post US Afghan Withdrawal, Regional Geopolitics, And Biden-Putin Summit appeared first on Politact.

By Arif Ansar

Context

As the alliances associated with the global balance of power remain in the heightened state of flux, the organizations through which these tectonic shifts are being manifested, such as the United Nations, BRICS, NATO and SCO, are critical to observe. An inquiry that goes along with this examination is to understand the purposes of these multinational entities.

Analysis

NATO and Europe

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came into being in 1949 in the aftermath of World War II. The first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay, famously stated the organization’s goal was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” With the end of the Cold War and the Warsaw Pact, one of the main premises upon which the NATO military alliance was formulated was gone. The alliance began to look for a new purpose and identity that would keep it united against the emerging threats. The war against terror has proven to be one such unifying factor, as has dealing with rogue dictators and nations that threaten western interests, such as Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qaddafi and recently Iran.

However, these motives have proven to be short lived in the present multi-polar world and with the return of great power politics and the Cold War like dynamics. The established powers are now directly challenging the emerging power players, even at the extent of undoing the existing political, security, and economic systems that the established powers had themselves helped to set up at the end of World War II. It can be contended that the overwhelming emphasis on fighting the extremists has weakened and distracted the western alliance.

Moreover, the abuses of the very capitalist system that was a source of strength for the western nations, are proving to be its Achilles heels. The multinational corporations while generated enormous profits have also weakened the Middle Class, the backbone of any vibrant democratic society. Additionally, the technological edge the West and the US enjoyed is being eaten away by the emerging powers such as China.

None of these changes are as fundamental as the present transformation of Europe and its identity. Since the end of World War II, Europe has represented the pillar of American power projection around the globe. With Brexit and emergence of nationalist tendencies – this reliance can no longer be taken as given. Moreover, the change in what Europe reflected in the American strategic calculus has been adversely impacted by the America First doctrine. The doctrine has created skepticism in the minds of the European powers and that the US can no longer be trusted as provider of its security. This has resulted in Europe increasingly caught between its traditional ally US, and the pull of the emerging powers such as China and Russia. Meanwhile, the traditional European power tussles between France, Germany and UK also appears to be resurging.

What is the Evolving Role of SCO?

On the other hand, the Chinese have given more importance to the economic and trade leverages in its foreign policy as opposed to military means, which seems to be the preferable US choice in recent conflicts. Chinese One Belt One Road (OBOR) is an example of this. It is only under Trump that the focus has shifted to using American economic tools against adversaries, but that has resulted in the prospects of trade wars, which in return also impacts American economy.

The emerging powers are now represented by organizations such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). Additionally the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) reflects the interests of the Central Asian states, and is thought of as the security arm of BRICS.

The SCO was formed in 2001 mainly as a security forum. The member governments have common security concerns, with emphasis on tackling terrorism, religious extremism, and ethnic separatism. In 2017, the organizing reached a milestone when India and Pakistan joined the organization as full members. Other members include China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Afghanistan and Iran have an observer status while Turkey is a dialogue partner of SCO.

It is especially interesting to study the connection between BRICS and SCO, and their reaction to events in countries impacted by the Arab Spring – and their position on the developments of the AfPak region. In matters related to Libya, Syria, and Iran, the positions of BRICS and SCO nations were in stark contrast to those adopted by the western powers – and Russia and China have both used their veto powers in the UN in this regard.

This is particularly at display as it relates to the present crisis over Iran and the US decision to withdraw from JCPOA. The European powers had advised the US to stay within the agreement to influence Iran, and even after the American withdrawal, the European powers have tried to salvage the agreement.

BRICS, SCO and Evolution of its Role in Afghanistan

PoliTact has been keenly observing the evolution of these budding organizations. To explore the role of BRICS and SCO towards the AfPak region further, we examined the views expressed at a conference held at the Woodrow Wilson Center in June 2011, titled, BRICS: Shaping the New Global Architecture. We especially focused on the comments of Da Wei, who was at the time the Director of the Presidents Office, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR); Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor in Chief of Russia in Global Affairs; and Inderjit Singh, a Professor of National Strategy at the National War College, US National Defense University.

In expressing his views, Da Wei distinguished the role of BRICS countries and the SCO, and avoided making any comparison of the SCO with NATO, or to comment on the role of the SCO in Afghanistan. He clarified that the BRICS are focused on global economic and political affairs while the SCO is more concerned with security issues. He added that BRICS membership is open to other countries and is a forum for emerging powers to dialogue amongst member countries and with other institutions like the SCO. He clarified further that both BRICS and the SCO are not very “strict-tight” organizations.

On the other hand, Fyodor Lukyanov emphasized saw the role of SCO in Afghanistan and stated that, “The SCO now is primarily about Afghanistan because this [is] a matter of huge concern for all countries of Central Euro Asia [because of the question of] what will happen in Afghanistan after American and NATO exit, and nobody can answer it.” He added that NATO should be very much interested and should encourage the SCO to take over the settlement of this issue and that it’s the only organization that is very well-placed to take on this responsibility.

In contrast, while speaking to PoliTact, Dr Inderjist Singh stressed a regional solution to Afghanistan that includes the interests of India, Russia, China, and Iran. He had noted at the time that Afghan interest to join SCO did not carry much significance, as the country cannot yet ensure its own security – and that’s why the role of Pakistan is important. He commented that Pakistan should not attempt to marginalize the interests of the Northern Alliance and India through the Haqqani network because a stable solution for Afghanistan would have to involve regional powers and the route of negotiations would be better than the use of force.

Future Role of SCO

The Chinese have clearly adopted a more cautious posture on the role of SCO as opposed to the more aggressive Russian stance. The differences in their respective approach is directly connected with their threat perceptions vis-à-vis the United States and Europe. The tense US ties with both Russian and China have pushed both strategically closer.

Moreover, the Chinese have given more credence to the economic and trade leverages in its foreign policy as opposed to military means. Chinese One Belt One Road (OBOR) is an example of this.

Since its inception, SCO has held a number of military exercises. However, at this stage it is not in a position to match the interoperability prowess of NATO.

The future of the US presence in the South and Central Asia, and increasingly Middle East region, have remained the focus of SCO. In June 2011 Medvedev had commented that the future of Afghanistan was directly relational to security and stability in all SCO countries and most observer countries, and that the SCO must endeavor to increase cooperation and involvement in Afghanistan to try and ensure stability in a post-US scenario.

At a UN Security Council meeting in September 2011, Russia insisted Afghanistan must stay neutral after troops withdraw from the region. Moreover, Russian deputy ambassador to the UN at the time, Alexander Pankin had stated, “if Kabul sets a goal of restoring neutrality as early as now, this can ease the reconciliation dialogue with the opposition.” The diplomat told UN members that military means were not enough to stabilize Afghanistan. Pankin criticized NATO’s ineffectiveness in controlling the situation and warned militancy networks could spread to bordering countries. Russia and China both fear the situation in Afghanistan could destabilize the Central Asian states.

On the other hand, India has warned against any hasty withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. India has maintained the stability of the region can only be achieved once terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and Taliban are rooted out of Afghanistan.

India, Pakistan, and SCO

US and Indian interests are no doubt convergent when it comes to the AfPak region, however, India has consistently taken a position against foreign intervention, in places like Libya and Syria, just as China, Russia, and Pakistan. India is also aligned with the Indo-Pacific strategy and that is what complicates its role in both the SCO and BRICS. It simply cannot be a member of both the emerging power club, and established powers, at the same time, and sooner or later it would have to choose. This is the same predicament the European powers are finding themselves in, especially as it relates to the affairs of Iran, while the UK remains entangled in the on-going Brexit saga.

This is also true to Indian role in SCO. The SAARC organization become dysfunctional because of the Pakistan-India tensions, and the Chinese do not desire a similar fate for the SCO platform. However, without taking on a larger security role and diplomatic posture in mediating long-standing conflicts, whether it is Kashmir or Palestine, SCO cannot rise to a truly respected organization – in par with NATO.

The post The Evolving Power Shift; Multilateral Organization, Conflicts And Role of SCO appeared first on Politact.

By Arif Ansar

Context

The international conferences where leading global thinkers and shapers gather to share insights on the present political, technological, and economic challenges, are crucial to observe. Their thoughts processes help to build a narrative and assist the rest to gauge the future direction.

The Davos World Economic Forum, held every year in late January, is just such a venue where political, intellectual, and corporate leaders share their knowledge. This year, it was reflective of the contradictions that the world presently confronts as it relates to the governance structures, the economic and political models, addressing climate change, and harnessing emerging technological advances in a mutually beneficial manner.

In some respects, these kinds of topics are lately been talked about at many other such conferences, but the irony in Davos could not have been starker this year – when the European Union and Europe itself is in the grips of Brexit related confusion. And when the strong influence behind globalization, represented by the US, is adrift, and under increasing nationalist and isolationist policies.

The hard debates took place at the various Davos forums on the corporate role in the present economic woes, and responsibility towards tacking inequality, fixing the climate, and creating more jobs as Artificial intelligence (AI) and Big Data alter how the business will be conducted in the future. The dilemma remains that under globalization, the nation-state model, and state sovereignty, takes more of a back seat – and this is exactly what has resulted in the populist responses such as ‘American First’ or ‘Brexit’.

1. Globalization and Reforms

Consider the statements of Angela Merkel, one of the Keynote speakers at the Davos this year. She emphasized Germany’s commitment to globalization and multilateralism, and reiterated the risks. “There is a new approach that we see in the world today, an approach that harbors doubts as to the validity of the international system,” she stated.

Indirectly countering Trump’s ‘America First’ mantra she added: “I think (that when it comes to) our national interests — I think we should always understand them in such a way that we always remember that others also have their own vested interests, factor them in, and then shape a win-win situation that will guide us in international politics.”

The Chinese perspective was reflected in one of the discussions titled ‘When Global Order Fails’ by Fang Xinghai, who is the Vice Chairman of China’s Securities Regulatory Commission. Xinghai commented that West should not make China a scapegoat for what is not working in the Western democratic system and that reforms were needed to fix those issues, which have nothing to do with China.

Commenting on why US worries about China, Xinghai replied that the US should be open in accepting polities that operate differently, because if they do not, it would mean excluding China, Russia, and pretty soon India as well. Adam Tooze, who is a historian from Columbia University, further elaborated the response. He pointed out to the evolution of Indian democracy under Prime Minister Modi, which does not resemble democratic norms especially when considering its Muslim population.

2. Emerging Technologies and Digital Consensus

The technological upheaval is another aspect of the global flux. Like globalization, the Internet and Internet of Things (IOT), Big Data and AI, work best when there are no hindrances in the way. However, this has great risks and fears associated with it, when knowledge and technology (automation) is replacing traditional sources of labor. It could become, if not already, a new factor that exasperates global inequality.

Quoting McKinsey’s Global Institute (MGI) report ‘Globalization in Transition’, the Managing Partner Kevin Sneader wrote on the company blog:

“…for the first time, the emerging markets now make 50 percent of the counterparts in global trade. While these markets are perhaps more optimistic about growth than many developed economies are, they face their own challenges as knowledge and technology replace labor as the critical sources of arbitrage in global value chains.”

Therefore, the globalists desire a new form of technological consensus to shape the digital future – that balances the state sovereignty with in the globalized structure. Or as Elizabeth Heineman writes in The Conversation:

“Merkel’s – and Europe’s – quandary is this: how to move forward in the digital age when Europe’s contribution is to seek balance between state power, individual rights and the dynamism of capitalism. Achieving that balance – achieving any balance – means slowing things down. It means philosophizing.” Achieving this equilibrium is what Angela Merkel terms Social Market Economy

The Japanese Prime Minister reflected his sentiments on the subject:

“I call on all of us to rebuild trust toward the system for international trade. That should be a system that is fair, transparent, and effective in protecting IP (intellectual property) and also in such areas as e-commerce and government procurement,” Abe stated in his speech.

While there are many international agreements to address security and trade related matters there are no such agreements when it comes to the digital world especially in the realm of Cyber threats, AI and Big Data etc. This is a cause of enormous concern for nations that are competing in these emerging technologies. 

3. Geopolitics and Economics

The tussles of the global balance of power between the emerging and established powers is obviously not just restricted to security affairs, it also includes trade and technology domains. The ongoing economic tensions between the US and China are having a ripple effect downstream with negative impact on globalization.

The primary concern being that by learning and tweaking the laissez-faire system, China is exploiting it and negatively impacting the American economic outlook, as it relates to protection of Intellectual Property and by forced Technology Transfers. Moreover, there is a pressure on China to address the trade imbalances by opening its market more. Obviously if the Chinese economy continues to strengthen at the cost of others, it will also reflect in its global defense posture and influence. 

The other Asian nations are increasingly concerned as US appears to be withdrawing from international regimes, and this they think would only benefit the Chinese. According to them, the best way for the US to address its apprehensions is by staying in the system and by negotiating. Moreover, the debates also continue on the best way to engage each other and address differences.

Multilateral approaches, as adopted by the US in the past, complicate the negotiations. Conversely, the Chinese have benefited by engaging in bilateral tracts, however, in bilateral negotiations the stronger party usually benefits. Nonetheless, US is increasingly moving towards adopting bilateral talks for engaging and negotiating.

Then there are concerns that a Cold War is developing between China and the US and what that would mean for the international system. Will this result in to a new alignment – with other nations being pushed in to one block or the other. A comparison is also being made with the nature of Cold War between the then Soviet Union and US. That Cold War was primarily in the defense and security realm, and not as much in trade, as is the case between US and China now. And just because of this difference, it may not mature in to a full fledge Cold War.

Many of the above dimensions were discussed in an event titled ‘The Geopolitical Agenda,’ moderated by Vali Nasr. The panel recognized that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is changing the geopolitical landscape and in ten years the results will be obvious.

In this context, the Pathfinder and Dow Martin Groups held discussions related to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, moderated by the Chairman Pathfinder Group, Ikram Sehgal. The speakers, which included the Chief Minister of Baluchistan province Jam Kamal Khan, promoted investment opportunities in the mineral rich, and strategically located Baluchistan province of Pakistan. The province borders Iran and Afghanistan, where not only the Pakistan-India rivalry is playing out, but also the tussles of the global balance of power.

Conclusion

In many of the discussions referred above, the common worry remained how the US-China trade rivalry is going to unfold and how it will impact different businesses and free trade. However, one could see some confusion in grasping the connection between the economic and security domains.

The optimists thought that because the nature of competition is mainly economic, these differences could be managed. But they miss the point that is raising concern for the US: globalization has made China tremendously stronger very quickly, and this would also translate in to defense and technological wherewithal. After all, the nation-state system, and national interests, still exist and cannot be wished away. 

China preaches engagement and negotiations, and stands ready to address the trade imbalances and grievances, while admitting to the benefits of the liberal trade system. Will this be enough to save globalization remains to be seen. After all, trade wars are linked to the change in the global balance of power. What is particularly worrisome is that US no longer sees eye to eye on these matters with its traditional European allies. Moreover, the Europeans do not have consensus amongst themselves either. At no time since World War II, has the division between the globalists and the nationalists, so acute.

The post Davos 2019, EU, And US-China Trade War appeared first on Politact.