Trump had criticized NATO even in his first term, and the prospect of him getting re-elected is making the European allies worried. Trump has consistently questioned NATO’s relevance, criticized member countries for not meeting defense spending commitments, and pushed for a more transactional approach to alliances.

This strategy could lead to several significant outcomes in terms of U.S. influence, its global standing, and its ability to manage rising geopolitical tensions, especially in the context of great power rivalry with China and Russia.

1. Erosion of U.S. Influence in Europe

Trump’s skeptical view of NATO could weaken transatlantic relations, leading to a reduced U.S. leadership role in Europe, think tanks such as Brooking Institutions and Council on Foreign Relations have written extensively on this. NATO is a cornerstone of American power projection in the region and beyond since the end of World War II. It has served not only as a military alliance but also as a vehicle for maintaining U.S. influence over European affairs. Trump’s criticism of the alliance as “obsolete” or overly reliant on American funding creates uncertainty within NATO and potentially undermines the unity and strategic coherence of the organization.

If Trump undermines NATO further, European countries may begin to pursue more independent security policies, potentially seeking alternative alliances or focus more on strengthening European Union defense capabilities. Such responses could diminish U.S. leverage in European geopolitical affairs, leading to greater fragmentation within the West and provide opportunities for Russia to exploit these divisions. Russia, already seeking to weaken NATO’s eastern flank, would likely see this as a strategic opportunity to reassert its influence over former Soviet states and weaken Western deterrence.

The erosion of U.S. influence in Europe would also undermine its ability to project power into regions like the Baltics, Eastern Europe, and even the Middle East and North Africa, where NATO missions have played a role in stabilizing conflict zones and countering terrorism.

2. Reduced Deterrence Against Russia

NATO serves as the primary bulwark against Russian aggression in Europe, particularly in Eastern Europe and the Baltics, where countries like Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania depend on the alliance for security guarantees. Trump made a statement in February 2024, that if NATO countries do not raise their defense spending, he will allow Russia to ‘whatever the hell they want’. A farewell visit from President Biden to Europe did little to calm European anxiety regarding upcoming US Elections and what Trump might do if he is elected.

Trump’s reduction of focus on NATO could embolden Russia, as Moscow would see a weakened NATO as an opportunity to further destabilize Eastern Europe, whether through direct military action (as seen in Ukraine) or hybrid warfare tactics like cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and energy manipulation.

Russia has long viewed NATO expansion and U.S. military presence in Eastern Europe as a threat to its sphere of influence. If Trump were to further pull back from NATO or question the U.S. commitment to Article 5, the collective defense clause, it could undermine deterrence against Russian aggression. Eastern European countries, feeling less secure under the U.S. security umbrella, might either seek new alliances or pursue policies of appeasement towards Russia to safeguard their own security.

A weaker NATO would allow Russia to challenge U.S. influence more aggressively in Europe, possibly leading to increased Russian intervention in places like Ukraine, Georgia, and even the Balkans, where Russian-backed forces or political parties have significant influence.

3. Shift of U.S. Focus to Bilateral and Transactional Alliances

Under Trump, the U.S. could shift away from multilateral alliances like NATO and focus more on bilateral or ad-hoc agreements that are more transactional in nature. Trump has long favored a more “America First” approach, expecting allies to pay more for U.S. protection and to contribute more to shared defense goals. This approach could lead to a recalibration of U.S. alliances, with Washington seeking more cost-effective, flexible partnerships in regions it deems strategically important.

This shift would likely see the U.S. working more closely with countries like Poland, the U.K., or other European states that are willing to increase defense spending or pursue joint military projects on more favorable terms to the U.S. However, these ad-hoc alliances would lack the collective strength and unity that NATO provides, making U.S. power projection less consistent and reliable.

Moreover, Trump’s skepticism towards NATO could push European countries to seek greater autonomy, leading to the development of EU-led defense initiatives, which could dilute U.S. influence further. France has made a case for European defense force in the past as well. While European nations might still value U.S. support, they may increasingly turn towards France or Germany for leadership within Europe, weakening U.S. dominance over transatlantic security matters.

France has been one of the uneasy members of the alliance that had initially left NATO in 1958, on quarrels related to its unequal status vis-a-vis the special relationship of United States and the United Kingdom. Then president of France Charles De Gaulle sought to establish a tripartite commission which would put France on equal footing with United States and United Kingdom. It had also wanted to extend the geographic reach of NATO to include Algeria, where France needed NATO’s help in fighting an insurgency. Furthermore, France wanted maneuvering room to negotiate its own peace with communist Eastern European nations, independent of NATO-Warsaw rivalries. (Under Nicholas Sarkozy, France has returned as a member of NATO since April 2009.)

4. Impact on Power Projection in Asia and the Middle East

While Trump has largely focused his criticisms on NATO, any weakening of U.S. multilateral commitments could have ripple effects in other regions where American alliances are critical for power projection. In Asia, where the U.S. relies on a network of alliances to counter China’s growing influence, Trump’s de-emphasis on collective security arrangements could raise questions about the U.S. commitment to alliances like those with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines. China could exploit any perception that the U.S. is retreating from multilateral alliances to assert more control over the South China Sea, expand its Belt and Road Initiative, and influence other Asian nations to align with Beijing.

Similarly, in the Middle East, U.S. power projection has often relied on partnerships with countries like Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the Gulf states, but these relationships have also been supported by broader international coalitions. Trump’s focus on more transactional, bilateral deals, such as a possible NATO-style nuclear security pact with Saudi Arabia, could strain multilateral efforts to address issues like Iranian influence, terrorism, or stability in the region.

5. China and Russia Taking Advantage of a U.S. Retreat

China and Russia would likely see Trump’s de-emphasis on NATO and broader multilateral commitments as a strategic opportunity to fill the vacuum left by a less engaged U.S. In Europe, Russia would see a weakened NATO as a chance to reassert its influence over its Near Abroad. In Asia, China would push to expand its influence in the South China Sea, assert more control over Taiwan, and strengthen its economic and military ties with Southeast Asian countries that might question U.S. reliability.

Both powers could also collaborate more closely to undermine U.S. influence in key regions, as seen through China and Russia’s growing cooperation in military, energy, and diplomatic matters. If the U.S. under Trump pulls back from its global commitments, China and Russia could further position themselves as alternative global powers, offering security and economic deals to countries wary of relying on a less predictable U.S. ally. Such as through BRICS conference, being held in Kazan, China and Russia will demonstrate the alternative to Western model exists, and also in the form of SCO.

6. Weakened U.S. Global Leadership and Soft Power

NATO is not just a military alliance but also a symbol of U.S. leadership in the post-World War II liberal order. A retreat from NATO and multilateralism could weaken U.S. soft power globally, as countries increasingly view the U.S. as an unreliable partner. This would reduce America’s ability to lead on global issues, whether in addressing climate change, global health crises, or humanitarian interventions.

Weaker alliances would also mean that the U.S. has less diplomatic leverage in shaping the policies of its allies, making it harder to forge consensus on global challenges like counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, and non-proliferation. Meanwhile, China’s influence through initiatives like the Belt and Road, and Russia’s use of hybrid warfare, could rise, with both powers offering alternatives to a U.S.-led international order.

The post What Would Trump 2.0 Mean For The Future Of NATO? appeared first on Politact.

Naad-e-Ali Sulehria – South Asia Fellow, PoliTact

As the conflict between Ukraine and Russia continues, statement has set in. In recent negotiations, both sides rejected each other’s terms thus suggesting that finding a resolution remains elusive.

Despite previous indications of openness to a ceasefire, Russia, in a Security Council meeting this Monday, criticized and rejected Ukraine’s peace proposal. Russia denounced President Zelensky’s plans, which include the withdrawal of Russian troops from all Ukrainian territory and the prosecution of Russian officials for war crimes. Russia asserted its readiness to negotiate for peace but not on compromising terms while declaring the present plan a guise to continue Ukraine’s war ambitions while obtaining more western funds.

Zelensky, in turn, has rejected Russia’s offer for a ceasefire, expressing concerns that any frozen conflict would likely reignite. By exploiting Ukraine’s vulnerabilities, Russia can launch a new aggression that could expand to other countries. Zelensky believes that accepting a ceasefire at the current positions, where Russia has already annexed four Ukrainian regions, would provide Russia with a claim to victory. Meanwhile, Ukraine will lose the gains it has made or could make in its offensive against Russia.

Last week at the World Economic Forum, Zelensky voiced his fear that any shortage of military equipment and ammunition will result in strengthening Putin, especially as the EU and the US, have shown reluctance to fulfill their commitments.

In response, the US and EU have affirmed their support for Ukraine, with promises from US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. However, despite renewed commitments, Zelensky’s hopes for a significant breakthrough may be dashed as attention has been diverted by the Gaza-Israel conflict and upcoming US elections.

Support for Ukraine is contingent upon the outcome of the US presidential elections. European allies, including NATO, are also anxious about the result of these elections. Zelensky has expressed concern over Donald Trump’s suggestion that he could swiftly end the Russia-Ukraine war if he returns to the White House. Apprehensive about the past ties between Putin and Trump, Zelensky insists that any unilateral decisions by Trump would undermine Ukraine’s genuine demands and would weaken Ukraine’s position.

The post Ukraine-Russia: Stalemate Ensues, Concerns Multiply appeared first on Politact.

Context

From time to time there is a need to ascertain the status of global Balance of Power, is it in equilibrium or moving in the favor of one or the other power. While the global Balance of Power and the associated Spheres of Influence are not the only construct to assess power dynamics – they are the most prevalent presently.

In this conceptualization, usually empires or states are either emerging – challenging the established powers or coalescing with them – and deemed to be either ascending or descending in ranking. It is primarily based on a zero-sum world view i.e., the gain of one is at the expense of the other. It visualizes the world as having limited resources which need to be competed for, controlled, and leveraged.

Cold War and War Against Terror

The Cold War got triggered soon after the end of World War II, between US dominated Western alliance and the USSR, and is an illustration of how the balance of power tussles usually playout. The Western alliance came out victorious as USSR collapsed in the aftermath of the Afghan debacle of the 80s. This was followed by a period of calm – or as some would call the emergence of Unipolar world led by the US.

However, this relative tranquility did not last for long. 9/11 disturbed the calm that prevailed since the collapse of USSR. It appeared that the Islamic extremists were planning to upend the global order and the nation-state system – which according to them was unjust and established on the ashes of Ottoman Empire.

As the Global War Against Terrorists (GWOT) progressed, it bifurcated along extremists with global ambitions such as Al Qaeda (AQ) and ISSI (Daesh) – and others with local and regional grievances, like the Afghan Taliban, Baloch Liberation Front and Baloch Liberation Army, Kurds, or Al Shabab. The Kurds go by different names depending in which state they exist: YPG in Syria, and PKK in Turkey. Turkey accuses the West of supporting PKK and YPG.

While the GWOT is by no way over, with the passage of time it became apparent that balance of power tussles had infiltrated and became intertwined with the GWOT, especially when it came to extremists with local or regional grievances. Alarmingly, some of these regional groups also assist AQ and ISIS – and are also known as ‘AQ and Associates’ or ‘ISIS and Associate’.

For example, the deal between Afghan Taliban and US in the form of Doha Agreement – was only sealed after guarantees that they will delink from AQ. Moreover, Afghan Taliban will not support groups like TTP (Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan) – or allow for the use of Afghan territory to launch attacks against other countries, like Pakistan and India. The discovery of Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul, and resurging TTP activities in Pakistan, suggest Afghan Taliban have renegaded on both terms.

Globalization, COVID-19, and Emerging Powers

While US was paying in blood and treasure in GWOT, emerging powers like China and Russia, had no such stakes, even though they cooperated in the Campaign against Extremism. Moreover, globalization was further strengthening the economic wherewithal of the emerging powers, with Western multinationals facilitating this transfer of wealth. This became the fuel for populist rhetoric spewed by leaders like Donald Trump under the mantra of Making America Great Again (MAGA), which was later adopted with modification by President Biden and naming it ‘Made in America’. Under Biden’s approach, the centrality of Europe was revitalized, which previously faced neglect and acrimony under Trump.

In the wake of GWOT, the crux of American concerns stem from a sense of exploitation at the hands of allies, and thus confusing the ability to clearly define strategic enemies. That was rectified in the subsequent National Defense Strategies, declaring that global adversaries, such as China and Russia, need to be confronted and contained in different spheres of influence. In consideration of the above context, the economic order that is making the adversarial emerging powers stronger also needs to re-engineered.

With many other unfavorable affects, COVID-19 aided the disruption of supply chains related with globalization. The tense ties between US and China, tit for tat sanctions, and tariff battles, have taken a toll on American business and consumers. Nonetheless, there is an attempt to reorient global economic and security order to make it more beneficial for the US and its allies – and detrimental for those showing inclination towards adversarial rising powers.

European Spheres of Influence, Ukraine, and China

Europe is one of the most important spheres of influence for the US and critical to its global power projection. However, the dependence of Europe on Russian energy resources, accompanied by economic penetration from China, was gradually eroding American sway and jeopardizing the raison d’etre for NATO.

Alarmingly, China overtook US as EU’s biggest trading partner in 2020. While US and UK were the largest export market, the trade volume has been consistently dropping. US witnessed a drop in imports of 13.2% and export of 8.2%. In 2019, EU trade volume with US stood at $746bn and decreasing to $671bn in 2020.

In addition, after seven years of negotiations, China and EU agreed on an investment deal that came to be known as the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment. Because of Chinese support for Russian position on Ukraine, tensions between EU and China continued mounting, and as a consequence the deal could not be ratified. Not only that EU imposed sanctions on China, which were reciprocated, for human right abuses in Xinjiang.

European powers are caught in a dilemma; they do not want to economically distance themselves from China – or appear to be working at cross-interests to the US. While aligning with US on Ukraine, they are paying heavily for shortage of energy resources due to dependence on Russia. On the other hand, US realizes that in order to have maximum impact on China and Russia, Europe would have to act in parallel.

According to a CNN article: “The COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and tit-for-tat sanctions between China and EU lawmakers have strained relations since. The United States, which imposed controls on exports of semiconductors to China in October, is reportedly exerting pressure on Europe to adopt a similarly hard line.”

The same article quotes Ricardo Borges de Castro, associate director at the European Policy Center, as stating.

“I don’t see [the EU’s strategy] as a decoupling strategy. I think the EU strategy, for the moment, is a diversification strategy… the lesson [from Russia] is that you cannot have a single provider.”

Two leading European powers, Germany and France, seem to illustrate this strategy. UK on the other hand, since Brexit, has acted most aggressively on decoupling from China and restricting access to Chinese businesses and technology.

The German Chancellor Olaf Scholz visited China in November, the symbolism suggests they want to continue doing business, what is known as ‘Business First’ approach, despite pressure from the US. He was the first leader of G7 nations to visit and the critics point out to lack of cohesion within EU. Chinese and German economies are broadly connected, and China is a key market for German machinery and automobiles. Olaf also agreed to Chinese investment in its leading terminal, Hamburg Port.

The French leader is expected to visit China in January but before that Macron visited US where he had extensive talk with his American counterparts in November. While France shares US concerns on Ukraine and China’s aggressive positioning in the Indo-Pacific, Biden’s Inflation reduction Act (IRA) has sent alarm bells ringing in Europe and France. Europeans, including France, consider the Act which was signed by Biden on August 16, as protectionism.

The law provides $370bn of green subsidies towards manufacturing of wind turbines, solar panels, microprocessors and electronic vehicles. Moreover, the most controversial part of the bill is that it offers tax credit of $7,500 to American buyers of cars manufactured in the US and locally built batteries. Reportedly Macron stated: “I think that this is not in line with the rules of the World Trade Organization and that it is not in line with friendship.” Biden and Macron agreed to continue discussions and minimize the negative impact of the IRA.

Conclusion

Europe represents the epicenter for the tussles of the balance of power, which then transfuses into other regions of the world, to be examined in future articles. COVID-19 has facilitated the upending of the existing supply chains – and provide an opportunity to reorient them and prevent them from benefiting global adversaries such as China and Russia. Moreover, climate change has become another factor to be used as a leverage – in terms of resources and technologies needed to address its negative consequences.

Just as in Europe, existing spheres of influence are also in friction in other nations – and its likely be tough going for their respective citizens economically. While the developed nations strive to protect their economic and financial interests – it’s going to be a particularly rough ride for the developing and underdeveloped nations. This will result in deteriorating social order and mounting political polarization – as power and political alignments change at the local level. Sadly, many may not be able to adapt to the economic and security flux – and tugs and pulls of the shift in the global balance of power – in a timely fashion.

The post Ukraine Conflict And Global Balance Of Power Tussles In Europe appeared first on Politact.

Great Power Rivalry in the Middle East – What it means for South Asia?

Context

The New Cold War paradigm and great power rivalry framework is settling in and beginning to define international affairs. After Europe and Pacific, Middle East is emerging as another hotly contested theater between the global powers. While Ukraine has been consuming most of the media bandwidth, matters related to Iran’s nuclear program and Israeli-Palestinian conflict had taken more of a back seat. Nonetheless, after the War Against Terror, Ukraine has become the new pivot increasingly defining geopolitics, and meanwhile galvanizing NATO and EU.

President Biden’s visit to Israel and Palestinian territories in July, and then to Saudi Arabia, signaled that US aspires to reinvigorate its traditional ties with the Arab world – as it attempts to harness their support against Russia and China. And this was stated by none other than the President himself while speaking to the GCC during his visit to Saudi Arabia,

“We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia or Iran … We will seek to build on this moment with active, principled, American leadership.”

US withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, and from Afghanistan in 2021, gave the impression that America was no longer interested in the Middle East – a perception that was reinforced by mantras such as ‘Pivot to Asia’ used during the Obama administration (2009-2017). Moreover, Iran nuclear deal (also known as JCPOA) reached in July 2015 had greatly unnerved the Israelis and the Gulf States regarding the balance of power in the region and US intent.

After coming to power, one of the first nation visited by former president Trump in 2017 was Saudi Arabia. However, he withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018. During his tenure, US once again established cordial ties with Israel that have been damaged during the Obama presidency. One of the common themes that brought the Arabs and Israel closer has been the expanding influence of Iran in the region. Trump also applied maximum pressure on Iran. In a drone strike in January 2020, Iranian intelligence chief Qasem Soleimani was eliminated in Baghdad. On the other hand, Israel also kept the pressure on the country to stall its nuclear ambitions. The chief of Iran’s nuclear program, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, was assassinated in November 2020.

In parallel and on the diplomatic front, Trump administration worked towards improving ties between the Arabs and Israel, which culminated in Abraham Accords in August 2020. As a result, UAE, Bahrain, and subsequently Sudan and Morocco, also normalized ties with Israel. It was believed that Saudi Arabia will also soon follow, and according to some analysts, other key non-Arab nations, like Pakistan, are also being pressured towards this reorientation of the regional threat perception. The other key Muslim state, Turkey, already has normal ties with Israel.

Revitalized NATO

While Trump was exerting pressure on Iran, pulling out of the nuclear deal also alienated American European allies who had strived greatly to secure the deal. Moreover, not contributing enough towards NATO has also been a persistent source of tension between the US and its European allies. The Ukraine crisis has helped reverse this while attracting new aspirants, like Sweden and Finland, for NATO membership. Just before travelling to the Middle East, Biden was in Europe attending the NATO and G7 gatherings. One of the top-most agenda during the NATO meetings was to come up with a new concept that unites and define the NATO alliance for the future. NATO’s updated mission statement for the first time mentions Russia as the greatest threat and China-Russian alliance as a counter to its values.

While NATO looks to thwart Russia in Ukraine, Middle East represents the other flank. There is less consensus on how much time and resources it will take to achieve the goals in Ukraine and elsewhere. Disruption of supply chains and rising energy costs are some of the direct consequences of the conflict, including inflation, when nations were just beginning to come out of Covid-19 induced economic woes.

China- Russia and Middle East

China and Russia both have been extending their influence in the Middle East. The $400 billion China–Iran treaty signed in March 2021 must have been an ominous development from the perspective of the Gulf Arabs and the US. However, the talks have been proceeding for a while, as has been the ‘Outside-In Approach’ to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has become an active player in the Middle East with strategic ties with a number of regional players, to include Saudi Arabia. As its influence increases gradually, it could become an active interlocutor between Israel and the Palestinians, and other conflicts of the Middle East. However, it’s not clear if China desires to get involved in the security affairs of the region, like Russia has in Syria – as far as the Middle East is concerned. Soon after Biden’s visit to the Middle East, Putin and Erdogan visited Iran and discussed the evolving situation in Syria, and allowing shipment of Ukrainian grain through the Black Sea. According to media reports, Khamenei called for long-term cooperation between Russia and Iran and to guard against ‘Western deception’.

Chinese analysts present a case the nation wants to be more involved in providing economic support than engaging in the security affairs of the Middle East. Nonetheless, it has good political and military relations with both Iran and Israel. As part of BRI, China has been extending its trade relations with Israel and lately US has objected strongly to some of them citing security concerns – such as the Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) running a container terminal at the Port of Haifa – near an Israeli naval base that is frequently visited by the US Sixth Fleet. The Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had warned Israel in 2019 to reduce its economic and security ties with China or risk reduced security cooperation from US.

If the China-Israeli economic ties are allowed to strengthen uninhibited, overtime China will be able to build leverages that can potentially undercut US primacy in the affairs of the Middle East. The Israelis disagree on this, stating the nature of its ties with China and the US are of totally different nature.

Conclusion

Thus, Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia represents a push to counter China and Russia and meanwhile providing continuity to the policy undertaken by Trump, which resulted in Abraham Accords. At the same time, engaging and supporting the Palestinian authorities, and reiterating that two-state solution remains the best way forward to resolving the conflict.

The fresh engagement also envisions a new security architecture for the region that some have called the Arab NATO. During the G7 meeting held in the Bavarian Alps, the leaders also announced the $600 billion Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment program, seen as an alternative to Chinese BRI.

With their energy resources UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, have also come to play an increasingly critical role when it comes to the affairs South Asia, most recently exhibited in Afghanistan. Then there are the expanding Indian ties with the Gulf nations that have overshadowed the traditional Pakistan’s influence. And this change has undercut the financial support from the region Pakistan had relied upon in the past. PoliTact had covered this shift in a joint event with the Middle East Institute in November 2018.

The reoriented US engagement with the Arab world will also have a profound impact on the affairs of South Asia – and the present political and economic turbulence in Pakistan could be the direct result of this flux in Middle East – and surge of great power tussles there.

The post What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply? appeared first on Politact.

The Return of ‘Spheres of Influence’ Politics

Context

While there are different angles to interpret the fast-moving flux in the global political, economic and security situation, the great power rivalry perspective is clearly ascendant.

There is usually a period of calm when one power dominates or when there is stability in the balance of power equation. The rapid economic rise of China and infringement into the traditional American spheres of Influence, like Europe, has clearly been a cause of alarm. Moreover, Trump administration took certain actions that were seen as weakening the Western alliance – deemed essential to deal with emerging global rivals, to include Russia. Europe is critical to American power projection, and it was becoming progressively tied to Russia and China via trade. The present European energy dependence is a case point. Trumps admiration for Putin, and other authoritarian rulers, was seen as a vulnerability. Accompanied by his threats to NATO members to increase defense spending confused the Europeans on American reliability.

Under Biden, US is actively countering the expanding influence of China and Russia – and to reverse the Sino-Russian penetration in different regions. And one of the casualty of this reversal will be the phenomena known as globalization. Security concerns arising from aggressive Chinese posturing in the Indo-Pacific, events unfolding in Ukraine, and COVID-19 related supply chain disruptions have further weakened the case for globalization.

Additionally, these factors have helped eliminate American ambiguity on who is benefiting most from free trade presently. Going against laissez-faire principle is not an easy undertaking when the capitalist system is anchored around the very premise and has tremendously benefited the multinational corporations.

This context begs the question of what future security and trade system is the world shifting towards – and what phase of this transfer the present circumstances represent. It was WWI and II that moved the world to the nation-state system and the creation of United Nations. The answers are not readily available.

Analysis

New Cold War and Spheres of Influence

As these global rivalries escalate, they are being classified as related to the new Cold War. The previous one being between US dominated Western Sphere of Influence – with USSR mostly influencing Eastern Europe. China at that time was not as close of an ally of Russia as it is now.

The Sino-Soviet ties have had their ups and down historically. For example, during the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 Chinese Beiyang government had supported the Whites, like the West, and sent in forces to fight the Reds. Conversely, in 1923 Soviets provided support to groups opposing the Beiyang government. In 1949, with Soviet backed communists won the Chinese civil war leading to the creation of People’s Republic of China. Soviets and Chinese were even involved in a brief border conflict in 1969.

Irrespective, as the new Cold War gets underway, and no near-term Ukraine solution on the horizon, what will this emerging Cold War look like?

The first thing is obvious, the Spheres of Influence was the key character of the old Cold War – dividing the world into communist USSR and capitalist America. The Soviet system was associated with autocratic closed security states, with strict regulations controlling the lives of the citizens. On the contrary, the hallmark of Western democratic states was freedom of expression and trade that led to creativity, innovation, and greater economic prosperity. And these attributes ultimately became the reasons for the success of West against the closed Soviet system.

The new Cold War would likely create similar spheres of influence between US and China-Russia aligned states. While some would argue that this new Cold War is only between US and China. To understand these alignments – how the spheres of influence evolved after the Soviet Union collapsed need to be understood.

NATO’s Evolution

As Soviet Union dissolved during the period of 1988-1991, 15 Soviet republics opted for independence with the Baltic states leading. The former Eastern European states applied and became members of Western security alliance, NATO. A trajectory that has continued to this day – and one of the reasons for Ukraine conflict to erupt, which is also causing Finland and Sweden to move towards NATO.

Another element of this post-Soviet period was that Russia and China both adopted policies that has made Western system stronger, for example allowing foreign investments and free trade. But they did not embrace the democratic political system. So, while China and Russia benefited from free trade, their respective restricting political governance models remained in place. This has been a cause of continuous friction when it comes to for example, state controlling the currency values, protecting minorities and human rights etc.

Conclusion

Moving forward, the roles seem to be reversing. The US and West are shifting away from globalization and altering the supply chains that were created for maximum profitability. On the other hand, China is championing globalization. In May, Chinese Xi Jinping had urged the organization of emerging nations BRICS to, “reject Cold War mentality and bloc confrontation, and work together to build a global community of security for all”.

Two properties of the new supply chains are: they have to be from friendly nations and pose no economic and security implications for the dominant power of the alliance. In other words, the concept that evolved after WWII that economic interdependence can resolve security issues – is being put to rest.

While China has been attracting states through Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and associated large infrastructure projects, the US, EU, and Japan have begun to counter with their own infrastructure projects. At the recently held G7 conference in Germany, President Biden announced US will help finance $200 billion from public and private sectors to counter Chinese projects.

The question then is how will the emerging respective spheres of influence be monitored and policed. The energy supply lines provide one example where sanctions are playing a critical role. In this, US using its influence in moving Europeans away from Russian energy dependence and building trade relations with China. Meanwhile, it is allowing India flexibility to acquire cheap energy from Russia, however, coercing weaker nations to stay away.

US is also resetting its ties with Saudi Arabia to use the enhance its energy leverage and to keep energy dependent states in-line. President Biden is scheduled to visit Saudi Arabia in July and ask for increase in oil production to compensate for Russian oil shortfall. He will also be attending the meeting of Gulf Cooperation Council. Meanwhile King Abdullah of Jordan has supported the idea of Middle East version of NATO. It’s not clear though what threat perception would the NATO of Middle East counter, Iran, Russia or China? Clearly, it cannot be Israel.

In other words, the balance of power tussles now involve use of economic influence to attract and discipline states. During the previous Cold War, USSR did not have the type of economic prowess that the US and West enjoyed, but in the emerging Cold War the case of China is different.

Thus, there will likely be a China-Russia dominated supply lines and economic zone and the US-Europe controlled one. Ultimately, China and Russia will likely use tactics similar to the West i.e., if the new Cold War persists and matures. The Domino Theory and the associated dynamics that were the underpinning of the old Cold War, will become relevant once more. This will fundamentally alter the way present global trade is conducted, and this will significantly impact the working of the UN Security Council.

The post Emerging Great-Power Rivalry; How Will The New Cold War Unfold As Ukraine Simmers? appeared first on Politact.

Context

Historical parallels are important in developing perspectives on present-day conundrums. They provide an illustration of where matters were and what were the important events and considerations at the time. Deciphering this helps to ascertain where matters stand and navigate the future.

The November article last year had examined the division of British subcontinent in 1947 and compared the US August 2021 withdrawal to that. Since then, two other significant events have unfolded on the global scene. The invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February and the removal of Imran Khan’s government in April through a no confidence motion. And the two events seem to be interlinked as well. Apparently, Imran Khan’s decision to visit Russia and meet Putin had angered Western powers including the US.

Analysis

Pre-Partition Dynamics

How does the arrival of new Cold War with Russia and removal of Imran’s government fit with the earlier balance of power tussles that led the British to leave the Sub-Continent – and the birth of India and Pakistan in 1947? Moreover, how does Imran’s stance differ from those adopted by previous leadership including Mohammad Ali Jinnah.

Clearly, both, Jinnah in the past, and Imran in the present, are dealing with a different set of circumstances. Jinnah was attempting to carve out a new nation and had to work with the colonial power. And the best chance for him to achieve success was by not being a revisionist. Moreover, he realized that the time of empires had passed, and the nation-state trend was the one he needed to conform to – not Pan-Islamism.

Another important consideration is an assessment of alternative political thoughts that existed at the time to deal with the challenges. Acuteness of obstacles, especially economic, often cause strong divergent views – where it is difficult to bring consensus.

For example, Jinnah’s attitude was in stark contrast to that of Mowlana Azad, Mowdudi, Mohammad Ali and Showkat Ali, Ghaffar Khan, and other Pan-Islamists of the time. He was against the ‘Khilafat Movement’ (which was formed against the breakup of the Ottoman Empire) and considered it a religious exaggeration; Gandhi, ironically, had supported this movement. Some Pan-Islamists later resisted the formation of Pakistan, as it would divide the Muslims of the subcontinent, and inadvertently became Gandhi’s staunch supporters.

The critical point in Jinnah’s position was his differentiation between the importance of local and regional interests vis-a-vis global ones. The local and regional interests translated into nationalistic interests, in the post-World War II nation-state environment. In Jinnah’s assessment, more importance was given to what was attainable; he complied with the nation-state trend in opposition to Pan-Islamism — the time for empires had passed. Not to forget, the transformation of Turkey to a State at the end of Ottoman Empire. And, it was not just Turkey. Virtually all the European empires had converted to nation-states toward the end of World War II.

Post-Independence Alignments

After gaining independence from Great Britain, Pakistan solidly remained in the Western block. The final battle of the previous Cold War was fought and won with Pakistan assistance in Afghanistan. It was, therefore, more than ironic that as the new Cold War got underway, and Russia invaded Ukraine in February, leader of Pakistan Imran Khan was seen standing next to Putin in Russia. And as Imran proclaimed his desire to establish and maintain independent foreign policy – his stances are perceived as Pan-Islamic and nationalist, with the undertones of revisionism.

When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the then ruler and chief martial law administrator, Gen Zia-ul-Haq, squarely sided with the US in organizing jihad against the godless Soviets. Subsequently, after 9/11 when US launched the War against Extremism, the then military ruler of Pakistan Gen Musharraf also decided to side with the US in carrying out the Campaign against Extremism. In both instances, the nation gained US economic and military support – despite the fact that both leaders had unceremoniously removed elected civilian governments, of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif respectively.

Irrespective, as the new Cold War gets underway Imran Khan appeared to be a misfit. To conform with the past trajectory would have meant for him to quickly fall in line – and avail the opportunity presented by the change in global political landscape for the betterment of the country – as had occurred during the Zia and Musharraf’s time. Alternatively, even if that was not possible, then Jinnah presents an ideal depiction of how to operate as a pragmatist with a weak hand. While Jinnah had to carve out an Muslim nation state, the present political, economic and security imperatives translate into no-less than existential threat.

Imran’s idealism is requiring him to alter the very conditions that are taking the nation to brink of extinction again and again – namely corruption and an opportunism. Whenever matters have taken a turn for the worse, the country has waited things out for the global context to change, and surely time never stays the same. This, by any definition, can hardly be called a policy or a strategy.

Societal Outlook

When we look at the past for examples, a question is also raised: did Jinnah align with the West because he believed the Allied powers were winning. Or – was it that he felt their values matched closely with his and what he was trying to achieve. After all, he spent a lot of time in Britain, like Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Imran Khan.

And this question remains relevant today. As Pakistan has remained an ally of the West and the US since Independence, naturally its people are also connected to the West when it comes to people-to-people contacts and commercial ties.

While the nation claim’s strategic friendship with China, the social contacts are no way near like what Pakistan has with the US. But which segment of the society are we talking about is also pertinent; the upper middle class, business elites, and top brass of the military have always been tied to the West, as can be said for many other nations.

More importantly, and otherwise less talked about, is how close are Pakistan’s value system to that of the West – at least in aspiring democratic form of government and sharing customized version of liberal world view. While its true that the West and the US have been losing their soft power – still Russia and China are no match when it comes to the cultural appeal.

When Imran Khan gives an example of what systems inspires him, other than ‘Riyasat-e-Medina’- he usually quotes the British system – not the Russian or Chinese. Although he has praised Chinese successes in poverty alleviation.

The fact of the matter is that Pakistan is politically, socially, and economically still connected to and dependent on the West and the US. However, this connection is deeper the higher one goes in the class system. This poses serious implications. Moreover, the disoriented youth have been galvanized and empowered by Imran’s narrative – which rhymes with their world view. Additionally, this world view inadvertently has been facilitated by the West: by supporting political leadership that falls short of its own standards and is seen as corrupt – and by not living up to the moral high ground in recent conflicts.

The non-revisionist class and leadership, in whose hands the British left the power, has lost credibility over time. Although that system is still attempting to maintain status quo – it would be increasingly difficult to do so.

The post New Cold War; Leadership Challenges For Middle Powers And Societal Imbalance appeared first on Politact.

Context

Why did Putin Invade Ukraine?

Many interpretations have come to the fore on why Putin invaded Ukraine on February 22. One of the recurring one is the ever-expanding NATO presence in Eastern Europe, which was now about to include Ukraine itself, right on the Russian border. Russia has often cited the unwritten understanding that came about at the time when Soviet Union was getting dissolved from 1989-1991 – suggesting NATO will not expand further. The cessation of Soviet Union eliminated the reason for NATO to expand in what Russia considers it to be its traditional sphere of influence, also known as its ‘Near Abroad’. US has denied that any such understanding existed.

On the other hand, Western scholars have long maintained that Putin aspires to revive the union of former Soviet republics – and the invasion of Ukraine may be another step along that path. Previously, he occupied Georgian states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russo-Georgian War of 2008. Had it not been due to the intervention of France to negotiate the truce, and subsequent US financial support in which then Senator Joe Biden played a key role, Georgia may very well had lost its sovereignty. Many believe that what happened in 2008, and the lame Western response, emboldened Putin.

Then came Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. It occurred soon after President Victor Yanukovych fled to Russia and the new acting Ukrainian president pledged to move closer to Europe by signing the association agreement of European Union. At the time Putin claimed Russia wants to ensure proper conditions for the people of Crimea, 60 percent of which were of Russian ethnicity, to freely express their views.

Whatever the reason for the present offensive on Ukraine i.e., NATO’s expansion in Russian Near Abroad or Putin’s desire to revive the Soviet Union, the timing of his move is deliberate.

His decision to move into Ukraine is likely based on a sense of Western weakness. The manner in which US withdrew from Afghanistan, economic situation resulting from Corona pandemic, and the status of European cohesion, are all likely playing a part in his decision. Perhaps the most critical aspect of his calculation is the future of American domestic politics and the Trump phenomenon. US has accused Russia of meddling in American elections through social media and by launching cyber-attacks.

Why the West has to React?

From an American perspective, while there may have been reasons to not counter Russia aggressively previously, in the case of Ukraine that is not the case. Short of sending troops to Ukraine, all other options are being evaluated.

While Russia and China alone do not pose a serious threat to the US and the Western political system, put together they are formidable adversaries. Since 9/11 US has been engaged in one conflict after the other, and this has provided an opportunity for Russia and China to grow their military and economic wherewithal. US simply cannot allow them to build a stronger military alliance.

Moreover, US depends on Europe for its global power projection. A growing concern recently has been the dependability on NATO and other allies to counter threats emanating from global adversaries – such as China and Russia. European nations and other allies have increasingly been seen dealing with both – building trade and military relations with China and Russia at the expense of US. For example:

• Under US pressure, UK banned Huawei from developing the 5G networks in 2020 due to security concerns, resulting in strong criticism from Chinese officials. Huawei had been operation in UK for at least 20 years and was an integral part of its 4G network.
• In 2015, France backed away from selling two high tech Mistral warships to Russia, a deal worth $1.6 billion, reportedly due to Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. The deal was highly criticized by US since France is a NATO member and supplying of the ship would have augmented Russian military capabilities.
• Then there is the controversial Nord Stream 2 Gas Pipeline that goes from Russia to Germany. Merkel government averted sanctions and reached a deal with the Biden Administration in July last year. The agreement involved investing more than 200 million euros in energy security of Ukraine and sustainable energy across Europe. US-Germany ties were strained considerably when Trump administration decided to pull out 9,500 US troops based in Germany.
• NATO member, Turkey, bought S-400 missile defense system from Russia in 2017. This resulted in Countering American Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAASTA) kicking in, claiming the deal would threaten NATO alliance and F-35 fighter jets in Turkish fleet. Enacted in 2017, CAASTA urged American allies and partners to not engage in transactions with Russia, Iran, and North Korea or risk sanctions. This has also prevented Pakistan from moving forward with Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project.
• Another American ally, India, has also acquired the S-400 air defense system at the cost of $5 billion but so far US has not been highly critical.
• In December 2019, US gave a waiver to India to jointly develop the Chabahar Port with Iran, which is seen as a counter to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port – being erected with Chinese investment. While the US strategic partnership with India has been evolving, the nation has remained reluctant in talking stronger role against China. Not only that, India is also ironically a full member of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). And thus, serious questions continue to be raised about the efficacy of QUAD alliance in which India is a member as well.
• As part of BRI, China has been extending its trade relations with Israel and US objected strongly to some of them citing security concerns – such as the Chinese company Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) running a container terminal at the Port of Haifa. The terminal is located near an Israeli naval base that is frequently visited by the US Sixth Fleet.

China, Russia Alliance – Sanctions and Soft Power

Due to events related to the War against Extremism, American perception and Soft Power has suffered in different parts of the world, which has also been exploited by China and Russia. China has projected its Belt and Road initiative as a win-win as it takes on large infrastructure projects in many nations.

For example, in addition to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China and Iran have signed a $400 billion 25 year economic and security deal that would lead to enhanced military and trade relations. The agreement ensures Chinese investment in Iranian telecommunication, transportation, and military fields. The military cooperation includes exercises, intelligence sharing, and joint research and development of weapons. China will also procure its energy needs from Iran on discounted price for over next 25 years.

The questioned has remained how will China implement the deal while sanctions on Iran remain – which have also delayed the much-needed Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project (IPI). In addition to CAASTA, the new sanctions on Russia will further complicate the China-Russia strategic cooperation.

As negotiations continue on the revived Iran nuclear deal, China could emerge as the big beneficiary if the Iran nuclear deal is reached, which US had left in 2015 during the Trump administration. But then, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed that he has received ‘written guarantees’ from US that Ukraine sanctions will not restrict Russian participation in nuclear projects and trade under the revised nuclear agreement with Iran. It was only after this assurance that Russia dropped its last-minute objections to the deal.

Russian invasion of Ukraine has provided an opportunity to the US to recover the Soft Power reserves, reinvigorate the NATO alliance, and by using sanctions undercut the growing strategic China-Russia alliance.

Emerging Scenarios

As the Ukrainian situation evolves a couple of possibilities are emerging. One of them is for negotiations between Ukrainian and Russian officials to succeed, with Ukraine declaring neutrality and forgoing its aspirations to join NATO. Afterall there are several other nations that have been in the neutral status – just to avoid the type of situation Ukraine now finds itself in. These nations include Austria, Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, and Ireland.

The second scenario is more dreadful and involves Russia getting bog down in Ukraine. As NATO nations supply sophisticated weaponry to Ukraine – leading to increasing loses for Russia. In this scenario, as Russia faces the brunt of sanctions, it reaches out to its strategic partner China for economic and military assistance. According to media reports Russia may have already done this. Talking to a news conference on March 23, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg stated, “China has provided Russia with political support, including by spreading blatant lies and misinformation.” He added there is concern that this could shift to material support. Earlier, US officials threatened China that there will consequences for any Chinese military and economic support to Russia.

One of the benefits of Ukraine crisis for China has been the shift of US focus away from the Pacific. However, if Russian is weakened in the crisis, it represents a strategic loss for China in the long run. In the grand scheme of affairs, Russia could keep Europe busy, if the things take a turn for the worse in the Pacific. But then, why should China face sanctions for what Russia has done. After all, China believes in non-intervention and respect for state sovereignty.

The post NATO, Sino-Russian Strategic Alliance, And Future Of Ukraine appeared first on Politact.

Context

Now that the Biden administration has definitively announced plans to withdraw militarily from Afghanistan by September 11, the focus has shifted to the post withdrawal scenarios – and what that would look like for the US and other key stakeholders. The most important determinant of that is the status of Afghan reconciliation – and US-China ties.

Moreover, like has been the precedence, each major shift and decision is followed by a period of lull – as the other parties interpret what the changed circumstances mean. For many the question remains if US is fully intent on the military withdrawal. After all, the departure of coalition forces does not mean the end of political and security engagement.
As the Biden administration announced that US may not be able to keep the previously agreed May withdrawal deadline, Afghan Taliban has signaled it considers the delay a breach of the treaty signed last year. While they attended the meeting held under the auspices of Russia in March, Afghan Taliban did not show up at the Washington backed peace conference scheduled for April in Istanbul – and thus it had to be postponed. Notably, India was also invited to the Istanbul moot.

Subsequent to the announced delay, US has actively engaged Pakistan to help convince Afghan Taliban that slight delay in military withdrawal should not short circuit the overall plan. The country has already played a major role in facilitating talks with the Taliban. In this regard, the security advisors of Pakistan and US met in Geneva recently, and other direct communications have also taken place between the senior security leadership of both nations.

Media reports indicated that these contacts were geared towards securing the air and ground lines of access (ALOC and GLOC) during and after the US withdrawal. The controversy is already brewing if US has requested bases in Pakistan. And reports also reflect that under the Biden administration budget request for fiscal year 2022, some military training and economic assistance for Pakistan is forthcoming – but the overall suspension of military aid that came about in May 2018 remains intact. While the US is withdrawing militarily, the budget still asks for $3.3bn to support and sustain the Afghan Security Forces, a jump of 9.2 percent from 2021.

At the same time, violence has increased in Afghanistan and there are no signs of permanent cease fire that was being hoped for – as US agrees to leave albeit with a slight delay. But what can a few months accomplish which was not achieved in almost two decades?

The Spring Offensive

Seemingly, a delay of a few months should not matter, but when world events are moving with lightning speed, and added to that the Coronavirus related dynamics, postponements could create a new set of calculations. Perhaps the most important consideration would be the pace of fighting. Summer and Spring are usually the heaviest fighting season, with Afghan Taliban and coalition forces both launching operations.

Based on the agreement reached on Feb 29, 2020, Taliban are not targeting the coalition and American troops but that does not include the Afghan government forces. Therefore, one of the key assumptions that is likely to be tested is that if the Afghan forces can hold on their own – and thus indicate with some level of certainty what can transpire in the future. As US continues to close bases, Afghan Taliban are gaining in the vacuum that’s generated. Commenting on the situation, Foreign Minister of Pakistan showed concern that Afghan forces may not be able to hold on, and without political settlement, the country is heading towards a civil war.

This drastic prospect is not what Pakistan would hope for and has supported the concept of responsible withdrawal. Pakistan will likely increase pressure on Afghan Taliban to get on with the new reality – provided it get some concessions from the US. Pakistan wants US to take a broader view of its ties with Pakistan – and not just from the security prism of Afghanistan. Thus one of the key element at stake is the nature of US-Pakistan ties in the aftermath of US withdrawal – and what role Pakistan can offer while it takes place.

Blinken’s Proposal and Afghan Peace Process

Second causality to be tested by the delay is how the US withdrawal influences the Afghan Peace Process. One would assume that the momentous decision would have created a sense of urgency, as Secretary Blinken’s letter to Ashraf Ghani had specifically conveyed. And if the talks had progressed, perhaps a ceasefire could have been established before the full US departure.

According to Secretary Blinken’s proposal, the postponed April conference UN was going to convene in Istanbul, was to be followed by a 90-day reduction in violence. Moreover, the envisioned concept of interim government appears to have landed flatly in Afghanistan, with President Ashraf Ghani strongly resisting. The Ghani government prefers a new election to decide the fate of existing set-up – not a transitional government that includes power sharing with Afghan Taliban.

Thus, the delay in talks, and speedy US withdrawal, adds to the pressure on the Ghani government. The option it is utilizing is to blame Pakistan for what ails Afghanistan, and let the situation worsen dramatically – so as to cause a rethink on the part of the US and coalition forces.

Pakistan-India Ties

Another key dimension of the Afghan quagmire is the continued Indian intransigence towards the budding peace process. According to the Indian strategic thinking, Afghan Taliban gaining the upper hand would not bode well for the Kashmir conflict – and the insurgency there could likely gain more momentum. And thus, India would like Pakistan to remain distracted with Afghanistan while continuing to support groups such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other Baloch insurgents, and prevent CPEC related projects from maturing.

While India has also been working to distance Pakistan from its traditional Arab allies, for the first time, India has to consider tensions on its northern border with China – and this is where the India-US strategic ties and the Quad alliance comes in to play.

The External Minister of India, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, met with the US officials and Secretary Blinken on May 28 to emphasize its case. Clearly, a quandary for the US would be to balance withdrawal from Afghanistan with securing Indian interests, calming Pakistan’s security concerns, while obtaining more cooperation from India as it relates to the Quad strategy.

China-Iran and JCPOA

The sixth round of Iran nuclear talks are scheduled in Vienna this week. As the likelihood of US lifting sanctions on Iran increase, what role can Iran play in the post US Afghan withdrawal scenario, and will the results of Iranian elections make a difference?

It remains doubtful how much Iran can act as a calming force in Afghanistan. Iran’s trust with US and India is quite low. And that prospect has been made if even more remote due to its strategic closeness to China and Russia; the recent $400 billion China-Iran deal is a case in point. With this far-reaching treaty, Iran is likely to become more a conduit in extending Chinese influence in the Middle East.

If the Iran nuclear talks with Biden administration prove to be successful, it would likely play out of its of its own historical aspirations, in Afghanistan and the wider Middle East. But that also means relegation of the Sunni Arabs and Turks – and more importantly, this will require Israeli acquiescence.

Conclusion

The crux of the matter remains, will the US withdrawal from Afghanistan result in China-Russia dominated region, or the one under US-India. Remaining engage with the Afghanistan and Pakistan will provide some room to maneuver.

As alluded to by PoliTact in previous assessments, the window for Chinese and Russian cooperation on Afghanistan is narrowing quickly – and depends a lot on the cross leverages US, China, and Russia have on each other in other regions and matters. In this, the sequencing of events is of crucial significance. While Secretary Blinken’s meeting in March with Chinese counterparts held in Anchorage had a stark tone – the one with Foreign Minister Lavrov in May seemed more amenable, leading to the waiving of sanctions on Nord-Stream 2 pipeline.

The Biden-Putin summit, coming after the G7, EU, and NATO meetings, will demonstrate the state of play between US and Russia. The G7 agenda is expected to cover areas such as strategic stability, Ukraine, Belarus, Cyberattacks and cooperation in the areas of Coronavirus and climate change.

On the other hand, NATO’s website indicates the June 14 NATO leadership Summit will discuss Afghanistan. Speaking at an Atlantic Council event on June 7, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated the organization will continue to support and train Afghan military, while clarifying that most of this will be taking place ‘outside Afghanistan’. He went on to add: “at some stage Afghans had to take responsibility for their own future, and that’s what they’re doing with continued support from NATO allies.”

Stoltenberg commented that China is not an adversary, rhyming with the opinion piece President Biden wrote in the Washington Post on June 5th. He further added that they are looking at the possibility of re-initiating the otherwise defunct NATO-Russia Council.

Biden wrote in his price, “we want a stable and predictable relationship with Russia on issues like strategic stability and arms control. When he meets Putin, he will be taking a holistic approach – gauging how much is Russia willing to play ball on a whole gamut of matters dear to Russia – and then see how Russia can assist towards Afghan withdrawal. How China perceives any give and take, is part of the ongoing great power rivalry.

The post US Afghan Withdrawal, Regional Geopolitics, And Biden-Putin Summit appeared first on Politact.

Context

PoliTact has consistently maintained that the longer the Afghan imbroglio continues it is bound to intersect with the other regional and global flashpoints – and the larger balance of power tussles. Not that it had not been in the past, but to a lesser degree.
Since 9/11, and the subsequent war against extremism, the global politics has been primarily shaped by cooperation in dealing with extremism. So much so that even legitimate struggles against oppression conveniently got linked with terrorism, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Kashmir.

As mentioned above, it would be wrong to assume that global power games, and the linked regional dimensions, had gone dormant as the campaign against extremism was being waged. It just had taken a different form. Consider the example of Arab Spring. As the uprising spread through the Arab world, it soon became apparent that the regime change that accompanied the popular revolts were risking the interests of Russia and China more.
And thus, the Spring came to a stop in the case of Syria, where Russia intervened militarily to save Bashar al-Assad, and by default its naval facility in Tartus. Syrian example also illustrated that different groups of extremists were being backed by array of state players, and thus it become a full fledge proxy war.

In the case of Egypt, the then General Fatah el-Sisi ousted democratically elected Islamist Mohammed Morsi in 2013. Morsi had arrived at the helm after the removal of Hosni Mubarak, as a result of the Egyptian revolution in 2011.

Libya provided another case where a different configuration of regional and global players emerged in the aftermath of the removal of Muammar Qaddafi, attempting to restore a semblance of order. Russia got involved militarily in Libya through its version of Black Water type mercenaries.

In most cases, China has remained on the sidelines. Instead, it has focused on economic route and developing strategic deals with both the Shia and Sunni states. It spoke in favor of state sovereignty and against foreign interventions.

In the emerging environment, the extremists with global aspirations, such as Al Qaeda (AQ) and Deash (ISIS), remained in the pariah status. However, the same could not be claimed for groups that came to be known as the associates of AQ and Daesh. These factions often had regional ambitions, grievances, and causes, which were either beneficial or detrimental to the interests of the regional and global stakeholders. In essence, the new reality was reflective of the political and security dynamics that existed before 9/11. And as the Cold War like situation returns, these local grievances and ambitions are likely to play a pivotal role.

The New Global Power Calculus

The metamorphosis of the war against extremism also applies to the South Asia region. While US and NATO have been doing the heavy lifting when it comes to the situation of Afghanistan, China and Russia have played a reconciliatory role. In the post 9/11 environment, and even before, China and Russia were threatened by their own brand of Islamic extremists, in Xinjiang, and Dagestan and Chechnya region, respectively. And they have remained worried about their extremists getting hooked up with the global extremists or their associates. In essence, helping in the war against extremism also diminished the domestic threats for these powers.

However, as we enter an era where the global power tussles will define politics once more, the reconciliatory role in Afghanistan is likely to evaporate. This does not bode well for the peace process. At the same time, it does not reflect well for Russia and China either. The theater for the Great Game is likely to get extended where the Pacific, including the Ladakh region, are already active. In short, Afghanistan, could become a quid pro quo on a much larger canvas.

Revitalizing NATO

As history teaches us, one of the critical steps in fighting global rivalries is by solidifying alliances and weakening those of the adversaries. And linked with that is an assessment of the kinds of threats being confronted. The type of alliance needed to fight non-state extremists is markedly different than the one to counter state actors.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came into being in 1949 in the aftermath of World War II. The first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay, had famously stated the organization’s goal was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” With the end of the Cold War and the Warsaw Pact, one of the main premises upon which the NATO military alliance was formulated was gone. The alliance began to look for a new purpose and identity that would keep it united against the emerging threats. The war against terror has proven to be one such unifying factor, as has dealing with rogue dictators and nations that threaten western interests, such as Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qaddafi and recently Iran. However, these motives have proven to be short lived in the present multi-polar world. But the return of great power politics, and Cold War like dynamics, can reinvigorate the alliance.

After the neglect suffered during the Trump’s presidency, the Biden Administration is busy strengthening alliances. To assure allies, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken visited Japan, South Korea, and NATO headquarters in Brussels. On the other hand, Secretary of Defense Loyd Johnson was in India and Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, on March 12 a virtual meeting of the QUAD leaders was held between the leaders of US, India, Japan, and Australia. In the press briefing after the meeting, US affirmed the ‘centrality of the Indo-Pacific in the US national security’. And, this was accompanied by the US-China strategic talks held in Alaska, that set the tone for the ties under Biden.

The Future of BRICS, SCO

On the other hand, an organization representing the emerging powers of Brazil, Russia, China, and India (BRICS) started off in 2011 with much fanfare, promoting commercial, political, and cultural cooperation. Its primary motive was to give voice to the realities of the multipolar world. In 2013, BRICS agreed to create global institutions to rival those of Western controlled IMF and World Bank. However, the economic recession of 2008 and the fluctuating global market has impacted the BRICS disproportionately. While China and India have continued to grow, the economies of Russia and Brazil have had a tougher time. This has obviously impacted the wherewithal of the organization.

More recently, China has been successful in handling the coronavirus pandemic and has been the least impacted economically – as compared to the West. This could also be the reason why the tensions between US and China have escalated.

The Chinese dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was formed in 2001 mainly as a security forum. The member governments have common security concerns, with emphasis on tackling terrorism, religious extremism, and ethnic separatism. In 2017, the organizing reached a milestone when India and Pakistan joined the organization as full members. Other members include China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Afghanistan and Iran have an observer status while Turkey is a dialogue partner of SCO.

As the global focus shifts from the campaign against extremism and towards great power challenges, the nature of BRICS and SCO is likely to morph as well. No other issue is more consequential to the future of these organizations than the role of India. The nation is also aligned with the Indo-Pacific strategy and QUAD. It simply cannot be a member of the emerging power club while supporting the established powers at the same time. Sooner or later, India would have to choose.

A case can be made that the present border tensions between India and China are a direct result of Indian decision to revoke the special status of Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019. Under the garb of US-China rivalry it attempted to settle an internationally recognized dispute unilaterally.

The Great Game of the earlier times was about the dangers of Russian invasion on British India via Afghanistan, the emerging one appears to be about protecting American India against Chinese penetration. While US would want to weaken the Sino-Russian partnership, a successful strategy would likely work by placating one of them, not by alienating both at the same time.

The post The War Against Extremism And The Return Of New Great Game appeared first on Politact.

Context

As Biden administration formulates its Pakistan policy, and reviews the Afghan peace deal reached in February last year – a debate is raging in both US and Pakistan based think tanks on the future of US-Pakistan relations. It is like a new season of an exciting Netflix drama serial, only that this one has been continuing for about two decades. For all intents and purposes Biden administration represents Season 4 of the US-Pakistan serial which has seen many twists and turns. During this period, several terms were used to represent the ties, such as ‘frenemies’ or a troubled marriage heading towards a divorce.

If we use this analogy, the serial started right after the 9/11 attack – represented by season 1 under Bush, followed by Obama’s season 2, and Trump’s season 3 just concluded on January 20^th.

What may happen in season 4 requires an understanding of the plot. And the great debate ranging in the think tank world represent this assessment. One of the assertions is that although the nation has maintained an important position during the previous administrations, its likely to be low on Biden’s priority list. This emphasis is not much different than the approach adopted under Trump where military aid was cut to Pakistan. A greater emphasis was towards global adversaries than on countering extremism or promoting human rights. The analysts are thus suggesting areas around which convergences can be built.

Some have mentioned that Pakistan can help build bridges between US and China, just as it can between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Others have emphasized trade as the focus, and cooperation in dealing with the pandemic and climate change. As the balance of power in the Muslim world is shifting away from the Arab world and towards the peripheral nations of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, the country can play an active balancing role vis a vis the global powers.

On the other hand, Pakistan is stressing it has moved away from geopolitics to geoeconomics, as witnessed by CPEC like initiatives. This has been a consistent message from Pakistan’s National Security Advisor, Moeed Yusuf, who recently spoke at the Karachi council on Foreign Relations and Woodrow Wilson Center.

Under the Coronavirus induced circumstances, this could be interpreted to mean that the nations focus is on economics and less on engaging in another kinetic phase in Afghanistan – which has devastated Pakistan’s social fabric and economy. And this mantra goes along with the policy the present Prime Minister Imran Khan adopted when he came to power in 2018 – that it can help in making peace but not in the continuation of war. Just about the same time, US also shifted its position, which resulted in direct talks with the Afghan Taliban. Previously, Taliban had consistently refused to negotiate with the Afghan government, calling it a puppet.

In essence, as opposed to the thrust on military solutions that had remained the hallmark of Bush and Obama administrations, under Imran Khan, Pakistan’s assistance was focused on facilitating the peace talks with Afghan Taliban. The concentrated efforts, and cooperation from China, Russia, and Iran, resulted in an agreement between the US and Afghan Taliban in February 2020.

The peace deal was not arrived at easily and there were obstacles at each step of the way, consistently from the same sets of players. The very first challenge perhaps came from President Karzai when Taliban were allowed to open an office in Doha in 2013, carrying the sign and flag of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. He argued that peace talks should be Afghan led.

In September 2019, the talks between the US and Taliban were abruptly broken off by President Trump – when peace deal was nearly at hand. Reportedly, he called-off talks due to an attack carried out by Afghan Taliban in Kabul that killed an American soldier. The confusion remained for some time if Trump had permanently abandoned the talks or if it was a temporary suspension. Moreover, he faced severe push back from Ashraf Ghani’s government. Senior former US officials with experience in Afghan affairs recommended US should not pullout before a real peace agreement, or in other words a responsible withdrawal.

Even when the deal was signed, everybody knew that the next step of intra-Afghan talks will be even more difficult, especially because of the role of spoilers, especially India. Heating global power tussles between US and China during the Trump administration added another dimension of worries. Up to now, global powers have cooperated when it comes to Afghanistan. Can it stay that way is not guaranteed.

As Biden administration evaluates its Afghan options, it is important to keep perspective of how we arrived at this juncture, what has already been tried. More importantly, to not get distracted under different pressures, especially when domestic challenges are mounting for the US. Keeping in view the historical context, about what can be achieved in Afghanistan at present – may not be possible six months from now.

How Did We Get Here?

Season 1 – 9/11 Attack (2001-2008)

Bush administration had been in power for about nine months when September 11 attacks struck the US. America launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) on October 7, 2001 with military strikes against Al Qaeda (AQ) and Afghan Taliban. The Taliban government crumbled quickly. While there were confrontations like the Battle of Tora Bora in December 2001, Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters mostly retreated to fight another day.

Early on US pressured Pakistan to join what later became known as the Global War on Terrorism. The nation had been one of the few, including UAE and Saudi Arabia, that recognized the Taliban government. The military ruler General Pervez Musharraf decided to support the US and to go after former allies, the Afghan Taliban.

In the aftermath of the 1999 short and bloody Kargil conflict, then the army chief Pervez Musharraf had overthrown the civilian government in October 1999, removing Nawaz Sharif from power. For this US had slapped sanctions on his government, which were in addition to the ones imposed on Pakistan and India in the aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests. For Musharraf’s support in Afghanistan, Bush lifted all sanctions on Pakistan in October 2001.

The 9/11 attacks presented an opportunity for Musharraf to gain international credibility. It was only later the realization dawned that AQ and Taliban had mostly slipped away from Afghanistan into the ungoverned Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

While US got distracted by going into Iraq in 2003, Bush administration increased pressure on Pakistan to launch military operations in FATA to eliminate what it termed as safe havens. Pakistan moved nearly hundred thousand troops from the Indian border towards Afghanistan to tackle the issue. US also conducted thousands of drone strikes in FATA between 2004 and 2018 to go after the extremist leaders hiding there. But Pakistan’s military operations in FATA, including the Lal Masjid operation in July 2007, accompanied by drone strikes, started to create an ominous backlash internally. It was unclear if the US drone strikes were occurring with Pakistan’s acquiescence – but it would publicly protest the strikes vehemently as violation of its sovereignty.

Many high value targets and facilities were hit in Pakistan as extremist reprisal spread, with thousands of civilian and soldiers killed and maimed. According to Dawn newspaper, Pakistan’s economic loss in the war against terror was a figure around $126.79 billion. The security and political turmoil, including the civil-military divide, was reflected by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007.

By this time, the internal politics of Pakistan had gotten fully intertwined with the support it was providing US in the war against extremism and at what cost. While Musharraf had become increasingly unpopular, and US grievances with him grew, the death of Benazir Bhutto demonstrated that this was a battle for Pakistan’s survival too.

The Mumbai Attack in November 2008, just about a month and a half before Obama was inaugurated on Jan 2009, created fresh headaches for Pakistan on how it was dealing with good and bad extremists.

Season 2 – Obama’s AfPak

On assuming power, President Obama initiated an exhausting evaluation of the US Afghan policy, which later adopted the acronym of AfPak. The late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke was appointed to lead the office, whose mandate was to originally include India, but that part was dropped due to heavy lobbying from the country. This may have been a critical mistake, as India remains opposed to any negotiated settlement with Afghan Taliban.

At the time it was assumed that the new policy would break from the Bush era focus on kinetic approach, and tilt more towards a diplomatic surge and a search for political solutions based on a regional emphasis. Obama’s assessment went through a metamorphosis of sorts and ended up being an evaluation of the entire US foreign policy. Reappraisal of policy involved the critical questions of what is at stake for America in Afghanistan? Dealing satisfactorily with this inquiry required evaluating US interests globally, understanding how they are related and then prioritizing in terms of the prevailing economic recession at the time.

The strategy that finally emerged represented the competing institutional influences that shape American foreign policy. Obama had to balance domestic economic realities with the perception of appearing weak on national security threats, a leverage he did not want to offer to the Republican Party. Additionally, he also wanted to fulfill his campaign promises of pulling troops out of Iraq and focusing on Afghanistan. Specifically, the new strategy opted for sending 30,000 more troops while setting a timeline for an exit to begin by July 2011.

The new US policy was followed-up with a process of strategic dialogue with Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. What transpired from this dialogue with India was a civil nuclear deal, the groundwork for which was laid during the Clinton administration. On the other hand, Kerry-Lugar-Berman aid package ran into controversy because of provisions that many in Pakistan thought compromised its sovereignty. The Raymond Davis incident in January 2011 further validated Pakistan’s apprehensions. At the same time, Mumbai attacks and dealings associated with David Hadley, increased cooperation between US and India against groups such as LeT based in Pakistan.

Thus, the feeling of mistrust between US and Pakistan continued to increase, with both actors blaming each other for playing a double game. The Operation Geronimo gave further evidence of how deeply each party distrusts the other, while claiming to be strategic partners. The subsequent Memogate Affair, followed by the Salala Incident on November 26, 2011 further dented the relationship. A perception grew that the Civil-Military divide in Pakistan was being exploited.

During Obama’s tenure, war against extremism had expanded quite wide and included Yemen, Syria, and Libya. Moreover, by 2011 and onward the extremist threat had transformed as many new groups came in to being, such as Daesh (also known as ISIS and ISIL). Moreover, the Arab Spring related upheaval was further destabilizing many regimes in the MENA theater, to be exploited by extremists and other global adversaries.

As US was over-consumed by the war against extremism, China and Russia were resurging. China launched the Belt and Road global infrastructure initiative in 2013, with CPEC being one of its main arteries. At the cost $62 billion China plans to upgrade Pakistan’s infrastructure, build modern transportation networks, numerous energy projects and special economic zones.

While US remained busy with the war against extremism, the economy was impacted. The 2008 recession had a significant impact on the American middle class and a thought was taking shape that China, and even American allies, were exploiting Globalization – and US was paying. These sentiments were galvanized and channeled by Trumps ‘America First’ mantra.

Season 3 – Making American Great Again and ‘America First’

While July 15, 2015 Iran nuclear agreement (JCPOA) was a significant step in the direction of negotiated settlement to conflicts, only a year and a half later President Trump reversed the deal. On the Middle East Peace Process, he went ahead to make the controversial decision of accepting Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

Trump also stepped out of the Paris Agreement and annulled the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that Obama had pushed and was signed in 2016. In essence, Trump was against multilateralism and multilateral institutions and preferred bilateral approach to issues. Trump stated in his speech at the 74^th UN session:

“Globalization exerted a religious pull over past leaders, causing them to ignore their own national interests. Those days are over.” He went on to add, “Around the world our message is clear, America’s goal is lasting, America’s goal is harmony, and America’s goal is not to go with these endless wars, wars that never end.”

While on the political and economic front he declared: “If you want freedom, hold on to your sovereignty, and if you want peace, love your nation. The future does not belong to Globalists. The future belongs to patriots. The future belongs to strong, independent nations.”

Following this principle, Trump supported direct talks with Afghan Taliban leading to the peace agreement. If it had not been for the Coronavirus, Trump would have likely won the election.

The storming of the Capitol Hill on January 6, and the events associated with the recent concluded US elections are reflective of the tremendous stress US is under to chart out its future direction; whether it be the globalized one or based on America First. The coronavirus has added to the woes – where many have lost jobs and the lifestyle of others acutely impacted – adding to the public anger and stress.

Irrespective of who is to blame for what transpired on January 6th, Biden administration would have to focus on how to bring the disillusioned, and the Trump supporters, back into the system. This is the best approach to prevent matters being further exploited. This implies Biden would have to address the concerns reflecting by the America First mantra – to provide jobs and to improve the economic well being of the Americans.

Season 4 – ‘America is Back’

Delivering a speech virtually at the Munich Security Conference on February 19, President Biden stated unequivocally that America is back. “I’m sending a clear message to the world,” Biden addressed the security conference. “America is back. The transatlantic alliance is back. And we are not looking backward.”

On the other hand, soon after his acquittal from his impeachment trial in the Senate, Trump stated: “Our historic, patriotic and beautiful movement to Make America Great Again has only just begun”. His acquittal from Senate trial means Trump can run for office again in the election of 2024, which is likely to be the most consequential in American history.

The domestic politics is becoming increasingly polarized and that is directly linked to the state of the economy, which has been seriously dented by mishandling of the coronavirus pandemic. In such conditions, it would become increasingly challenging for the US to concentrate on foreign affairs, especially on the ‘unending wars’.

And it is in this domestic and global context the US-Pakistan relations, and the associated Afghan conflict, will unfold. There is no appetite left in Pakistan, and perhaps amongst European allies as well, for the continuation of the war other than supporting a reasonable exit. Whatever could be done, has been done, and now the responsibility lies squarely on Afghans. This message needs to be delivered – accompanied by reduction in violence on the Afghan Taliban side – associated by agreed withdrawal of troops on the part of the alliance.

The mantra of Trade not Aid is more prevalent as far as Pakistan is concerned. While China, Russia, Iran, and Turkey, have all supported the resolution of the Afghan conflict and have not linked it to their other frictions with the US, this cannot be assured in the future.

In other words, if US would make things difficult for China and Russia in other places and matters, they will now likely reciprocate in Afghanistan. While re-engaging with Iran on nuclear talks, and suspension of sanctions, may buy some favors with Iran – coming in and out international agreements have casted a long-term impact on US credibility. There was a time when American word was taken as ironclad, and leadership changes did not matter. Now US is telling the world to accommodate its dysfunction and confusion.

One of the fundamental question at this point is, to what extent will Afghanistan become a theater where global power tussles are going to play out. And thus – how critical is Afghanistan to undercut China and Pakistan’s influence in the region – and this is where the role of India, the Indo-Pacific, and the related Quad strategy fits in. The answer to this question makes the decision for US and NATO easier – if they should leave now and fight somewhere else – or stay. In other words, will Afghanistan remain an area of cooperation amongst global powers – or will competition ensue.

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