By Arif Ansar

Context

As the alliances associated with the global balance of power remain in the heightened state of flux, the organizations through which these tectonic shifts are being manifested, such as the United Nations, BRICS, NATO and SCO, are critical to observe. An inquiry that goes along with this examination is to understand the purposes of these multinational entities.

Analysis

NATO and Europe

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came into being in 1949 in the aftermath of World War II. The first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay, famously stated the organization’s goal was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” With the end of the Cold War and the Warsaw Pact, one of the main premises upon which the NATO military alliance was formulated was gone. The alliance began to look for a new purpose and identity that would keep it united against the emerging threats. The war against terror has proven to be one such unifying factor, as has dealing with rogue dictators and nations that threaten western interests, such as Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qaddafi and recently Iran.

However, these motives have proven to be short lived in the present multi-polar world and with the return of great power politics and the Cold War like dynamics. The established powers are now directly challenging the emerging power players, even at the extent of undoing the existing political, security, and economic systems that the established powers had themselves helped to set up at the end of World War II. It can be contended that the overwhelming emphasis on fighting the extremists has weakened and distracted the western alliance.

Moreover, the abuses of the very capitalist system that was a source of strength for the western nations, are proving to be its Achilles heels. The multinational corporations while generated enormous profits have also weakened the Middle Class, the backbone of any vibrant democratic society. Additionally, the technological edge the West and the US enjoyed is being eaten away by the emerging powers such as China.

None of these changes are as fundamental as the present transformation of Europe and its identity. Since the end of World War II, Europe has represented the pillar of American power projection around the globe. With Brexit and emergence of nationalist tendencies – this reliance can no longer be taken as given. Moreover, the change in what Europe reflected in the American strategic calculus has been adversely impacted by the America First doctrine. The doctrine has created skepticism in the minds of the European powers and that the US can no longer be trusted as provider of its security. This has resulted in Europe increasingly caught between its traditional ally US, and the pull of the emerging powers such as China and Russia. Meanwhile, the traditional European power tussles between France, Germany and UK also appears to be resurging.

What is the Evolving Role of SCO?

On the other hand, the Chinese have given more importance to the economic and trade leverages in its foreign policy as opposed to military means, which seems to be the preferable US choice in recent conflicts. Chinese One Belt One Road (OBOR) is an example of this. It is only under Trump that the focus has shifted to using American economic tools against adversaries, but that has resulted in the prospects of trade wars, which in return also impacts American economy.

The emerging powers are now represented by organizations such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). Additionally the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) reflects the interests of the Central Asian states, and is thought of as the security arm of BRICS.

The SCO was formed in 2001 mainly as a security forum. The member governments have common security concerns, with emphasis on tackling terrorism, religious extremism, and ethnic separatism. In 2017, the organizing reached a milestone when India and Pakistan joined the organization as full members. Other members include China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Afghanistan and Iran have an observer status while Turkey is a dialogue partner of SCO.

It is especially interesting to study the connection between BRICS and SCO, and their reaction to events in countries impacted by the Arab Spring – and their position on the developments of the AfPak region. In matters related to Libya, Syria, and Iran, the positions of BRICS and SCO nations were in stark contrast to those adopted by the western powers – and Russia and China have both used their veto powers in the UN in this regard.

This is particularly at display as it relates to the present crisis over Iran and the US decision to withdraw from JCPOA. The European powers had advised the US to stay within the agreement to influence Iran, and even after the American withdrawal, the European powers have tried to salvage the agreement.

BRICS, SCO and Evolution of its Role in Afghanistan

PoliTact has been keenly observing the evolution of these budding organizations. To explore the role of BRICS and SCO towards the AfPak region further, we examined the views expressed at a conference held at the Woodrow Wilson Center in June 2011, titled, BRICS: Shaping the New Global Architecture. We especially focused on the comments of Da Wei, who was at the time the Director of the Presidents Office, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR); Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor in Chief of Russia in Global Affairs; and Inderjit Singh, a Professor of National Strategy at the National War College, US National Defense University.

In expressing his views, Da Wei distinguished the role of BRICS countries and the SCO, and avoided making any comparison of the SCO with NATO, or to comment on the role of the SCO in Afghanistan. He clarified that the BRICS are focused on global economic and political affairs while the SCO is more concerned with security issues. He added that BRICS membership is open to other countries and is a forum for emerging powers to dialogue amongst member countries and with other institutions like the SCO. He clarified further that both BRICS and the SCO are not very “strict-tight” organizations.

On the other hand, Fyodor Lukyanov emphasized saw the role of SCO in Afghanistan and stated that, “The SCO now is primarily about Afghanistan because this [is] a matter of huge concern for all countries of Central Euro Asia [because of the question of] what will happen in Afghanistan after American and NATO exit, and nobody can answer it.” He added that NATO should be very much interested and should encourage the SCO to take over the settlement of this issue and that it’s the only organization that is very well-placed to take on this responsibility.

In contrast, while speaking to PoliTact, Dr Inderjist Singh stressed a regional solution to Afghanistan that includes the interests of India, Russia, China, and Iran. He had noted at the time that Afghan interest to join SCO did not carry much significance, as the country cannot yet ensure its own security – and that’s why the role of Pakistan is important. He commented that Pakistan should not attempt to marginalize the interests of the Northern Alliance and India through the Haqqani network because a stable solution for Afghanistan would have to involve regional powers and the route of negotiations would be better than the use of force.

Future Role of SCO

The Chinese have clearly adopted a more cautious posture on the role of SCO as opposed to the more aggressive Russian stance. The differences in their respective approach is directly connected with their threat perceptions vis-à-vis the United States and Europe. The tense US ties with both Russian and China have pushed both strategically closer.

Moreover, the Chinese have given more credence to the economic and trade leverages in its foreign policy as opposed to military means. Chinese One Belt One Road (OBOR) is an example of this.

Since its inception, SCO has held a number of military exercises. However, at this stage it is not in a position to match the interoperability prowess of NATO.

The future of the US presence in the South and Central Asia, and increasingly Middle East region, have remained the focus of SCO. In June 2011 Medvedev had commented that the future of Afghanistan was directly relational to security and stability in all SCO countries and most observer countries, and that the SCO must endeavor to increase cooperation and involvement in Afghanistan to try and ensure stability in a post-US scenario.

At a UN Security Council meeting in September 2011, Russia insisted Afghanistan must stay neutral after troops withdraw from the region. Moreover, Russian deputy ambassador to the UN at the time, Alexander Pankin had stated, “if Kabul sets a goal of restoring neutrality as early as now, this can ease the reconciliation dialogue with the opposition.” The diplomat told UN members that military means were not enough to stabilize Afghanistan. Pankin criticized NATO’s ineffectiveness in controlling the situation and warned militancy networks could spread to bordering countries. Russia and China both fear the situation in Afghanistan could destabilize the Central Asian states.

On the other hand, India has warned against any hasty withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. India has maintained the stability of the region can only be achieved once terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and Taliban are rooted out of Afghanistan.

India, Pakistan, and SCO

US and Indian interests are no doubt convergent when it comes to the AfPak region, however, India has consistently taken a position against foreign intervention, in places like Libya and Syria, just as China, Russia, and Pakistan. India is also aligned with the Indo-Pacific strategy and that is what complicates its role in both the SCO and BRICS. It simply cannot be a member of both the emerging power club, and established powers, at the same time, and sooner or later it would have to choose. This is the same predicament the European powers are finding themselves in, especially as it relates to the affairs of Iran, while the UK remains entangled in the on-going Brexit saga.

This is also true to Indian role in SCO. The SAARC organization become dysfunctional because of the Pakistan-India tensions, and the Chinese do not desire a similar fate for the SCO platform. However, without taking on a larger security role and diplomatic posture in mediating long-standing conflicts, whether it is Kashmir or Palestine, SCO cannot rise to a truly respected organization – in par with NATO.

The post The Evolving Power Shift; Multilateral Organization, Conflicts And Role of SCO appeared first on Politact.

By Arif Ansar

Context

In an endeavor to decipher the emerging geopolitical realities, PoliTact occasionally partners with leading thought centers to understand the multi faceted tangents of a particular theme. On November 16, 2018 PoliTact collaborated with the Middle East Institute to examine the political, security, and economic interconnections between South Asia and the Gulf States, and one of the subsets, Pakistan and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). While this interrelationship is not new, it is likely to become more pronounced in the future.

Dr. Marvin Weinbaum, Director for Pakistan, Afghanistan Studies Center at the Middle East Institute, moderated the panel discussion. The panel included:

– Ambassador Gerald Feierstein – Director for government relations, policy and programs, at the Middle East Institute and US ambassador to Yemen from 2010-2013.

– Ambassador Richard Olson – The former US ambassador to Pakistan and Special Representative for Afghanistan, Pakistan. Former ambassador to UAE (2008-2011).

– Shamila Chaudhary – Senior South Asia fellow at the New America Foundation and former director for Pakistan and Afghanistan at the National Security Council, White House (2010-2011).

– Shehryar Fazli is a Political Analyst and Consultant at the World Bank.

This discussion explored the following key questions:

– Can Pakistan play a Mediating role in Yemen and other Middle East conflicts?

– Is Saudi Arabia joining China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and what are the        implications?

– How is Pakistan managing the Saudi-Iran tensions and what is the future of this delicate balancing role?

– How is the GCC influence likely to play out in Pakistan’s policies?

– Do China and Pakistan have a common approach towards the Middle East?

– What is the role of India in this changing dynamics?

– What are the implications for the US policy in the region – and how are US policies impacting Pakistan’s posture?

– How are the policies of PTI led government in Pakistan shaping up towards GCC?

Analysis

The Connection of South Asia and Gulf States

As mentioned above, PoliTact has been analyzing the connection between the political dynamics of the Middle East and South Asia. As the situation of Middle East has been deteriorating gradually, we have contended that sooner or later it is likely to intersect and influence conflicts such as Afghanistan and Kashmir that have been boiling in the South and Central Asian theater.

The key question is what is the direction of this impact – meaning do the affairs of South Asia influence the Middle East more or vice versa? PoliTact has contended that this trajectory flows and is influenced more from the Middle East towards South Asia.

The panelists however had a varied view on the connection between the two regions. Ambassador Olson noted that this interconnectivity is not new but the Imran Khan led government is a new factor in this dynamics. However, Shamila Chaudhary took a slightly different angle to examine the geopolitical significance of this relation, and pointed out that the right questions were not being posed when it comes to this linkage. For example, how does Pakistan look at the Middle East and the role of Non-State-Actors?

But what about the other part of the equation, the influence of Gulf region on Pakistan and India – especially if Iran and Saudi rivalry becomes more intense.

Chaudhary stressed that Gulf region has been very involved in the Afghan issue and to some extent Pakistan desires this. Moreover, she emphasized the role of Pakistan’s Shiite population as a balancing act when it comes to Pakistan’s ties with Iran.

Ambassador Fierestein, however, added that there is no question if tensions continue to grow between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the Saudis would look to Pakistan to protect their interests, and it would become very difficult for Pakistan to balance its domestic pressures and foreign policy. Sheryar Fazli added that Iran Pakistan Pipeline is already one of the causality of this tension. If something major happens between Iran and Saudi Arabia, there are no good options for Pakistan.

Ambassador Olson observed that the recent security changes pose existential threats for the Gulf region and the stakes are much higher, and this will lead to greater pressure on Pakistan to make unpleasant choices. To which Ambassador Feierstein posed a hypothetical question: what could be the situation when Gulf States decide to call on allies like Pakistan. He assumed that it could be when Gulf States think that they cannot handle the circumstances on their own, or with US help.

What is the Role of India? 

Then there are the growing ties between India and the Gulf States and how this might impact Pakistan. Ambassador Olson stated that similar to the approach adopted by the US towards Pakistan-India ties, the Gulf States have also embraced a de-hyphenated approach towards the two nuclear South Asian states. The Gulf States are building economic ties with India – but this is not at the cost of Pakistan.

Shamila Chaudhary laid out how Indian analysts view policy towards the Gulf States, which is based on the principles of being “Non-Intrusive, Non-judgmental, and Not-taking sides”. She went on to add that Pakistan does need to pay attention to the growing nexus between India and the Gulf States, especially when its transitioning from purely economic and in to security and defense domains. Moreover, unlike Pakistan, India has no interventionist or mediatory interests in the Middle East.

Nonetheless, India wants to be a member of any reformed UN Security Council, and that may be one of the reasons for its enhanced ties with the Gulf States. It also assists in building leverage against Pakistan’s good ties with the Gulf States. The panelists overlooked that like India, the ties of Gulf States are also maturing with Israel. This dynamics will push Pakistan to review the nature of its ties with Israel, and long standing point of contentions with India.

Balancing the Saudi-Iran Ties 

Now coming to the issues that represent the fault lines between Iran and Saudi Arabia, primarily Yemen and the extending arc of Iranian influence in the Middle East, accompanied by the threat posed by the Non-State-Actors.

Shamila Chaudhary thought that Yemen was not that big of a deal between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, but Ambassador Feierstein disagreed with this assertion. He complemented Pakistan that it has performed the balancing act between Saudi Arabia and Iran very nicely up to this point.

According to Ambassador Olson, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sarif was vetoed for getting military involved in the Yemen conflict, despite Saudi insistence. Moreover, Pakistan’s military is acutely aware of the sensitivities of its Shite-Sunni composition. So Pakistan would not want to get involved in any conflict with Iran, nor will it want to get in the position of choosing.

However, Chaudhary opined that many of the Non-State-Actors have the support of private networks and are now operating beyond state influence, and their actions have policy implications.

On the other hand, Ambassador Feierstein stated that UAE and the Saudis are taking a more assertive stance and asking its allies to choose sides. In this environment, Pakistan will be forced to choose but it will not want to. And this explains why the new PTI led government in Pakistan wants to mediate in Yemen, and to prevent the eventuality where it will have to choose between Iran and Saudi Arabia. However, Ambassador Feierstein was vehement that Pakistan will not, and neither will be asked, to mediate in Yemen or beyond, because it is seen to have a client status with Saudi Arabia.

Obviously, the interrelated question is how will Iran respond if Pakistan was to completely side with the Saudis. According to Fazli, Iran withdrew its support from Baluchistan based proxies in the past but some level of Iranian support does exist in the Kurram tribal area. Additionally, Pakistan considers its Shiite population getting involved in the Iraq and Syria conflict as a potential threat.

Role of China and Saudi Involvement in CPEC

The South Asia and Gulf connection cannot be fully understood without also considering how these regions fit in the tussles of the emerging and established powers. In this regard while US seems to be withdrawing, China, in addition to its economic partnerships, is also increasing its security role.

However, Ambassador Olson considers Saudi interest in Pakistan and CPEC two distinct matters, and that Chinese Belt and Road Initiative is more about exporting Chinese excess capacity. He commented the US had tried to connect American companies with CPEC during his time as Pakistan’s Ambassador, but the attempts were not fruitful ‘just because of the way CPEC works.’ While the Saudis have decided to help Pakistan financially, it may not want to get involved in opportunities related to CPEC. He added US was unlikely to lend its traditional support for the IMF assistance to Pakistan.

On the contrary, Shamila Chaudhary considered it to be strategic for everyone to be aligning with China. The discussion about the Saudis interest in CPEC was taking place just about the time when Pakistan was considering seeking assistance from IMF. Chaudhary added that US has helped in building regional connectivity in South and Central Asia, and now it is getting less involved in the region, and is watching the developments from outside ‘a little grudgingly.’

However, Ambassador Feierstein thought Pakistan and China ties couldn’t be understood in isolation. China’s security role is increasing in the wider region and Pakistan may facilitate ties between the Gulf States and the Chinese. The Saudi king also visited China in 2017 and efforts are underway to link the Saudi Vision 2030 with the Chinese BRI.

At the same time, China has also been growing its security presence and may develop an airbase in Pakistan, in addition to its support for Gwadar and military facilities in Djibouti. China wants to protect the sea lines of access and routes for the Saudi oil, and the BRI path also passes through the Red Sea.

Meanwhile Sheryar Fazli pointed out to the risks if Saudis were to put the oil refineries close to the border with Iran where Baluch insurgency, Lashkare Jhangvi, and Jundullah could threaten Saudi interests.

The Impact of US Policies on Pakistan’s Approach 

The other important question to examine is how are the policies of the US government impacting Pakistan’s outlook for the Middle East.

According to Ambassador Feierstein, diminishing US role in the Middle East is pushing other global powers to fill the vacuum and has encouraged an enhanced engagement by the Russians and the Chinese. Moreover, this is also acting as a catalyst for more aggressive actions by the Saudis and the UAE, which has been demanded by previous US administrations to counter extremists. And this is where Pakistan’s security engagement with the Saudis fits in. However, the US approach towards Iran, creates a challenge for Pakistan’s balancing role in the Middle East.

On the other hand, Ambassador Olson pointed out that it would be important to watch how US frames its policy towards IMF assistance to Pakistan and address the Chinese influence. And this may be a test case for how US will respond to BRI related indebtedness generally.

He further opined that US’s hard line approach towards Pakistan has peaked and is now probably has to recede – especially when US needs the country to bring about a political settlement in Afghanistan, and that is also a geographic reality.

The moderator, Dr. Weinbaum commented that another scenario to look out for is if the attempts towards Afghan reconciliation fail and how that may play out in the region.

New Government in Pakistan and its Foreign Policy 

Another interesting aspect to consider is what difference will PTI led Pakistan government will make. Will there be continuity in Pakistan’s policies and its posture towards the Gulf region or will there be disruption.

Fazli claimed that Imran has continued the policies of the past, and some of this is dictated by the dire fiscal condition of the country. There was no surprise that Imran’s first official visit was to Saudi Arabia. In his fiscal approach, he wants to lessen the dependence on the West and IMF.

However, a critical point to watch out would be PTI’s relation with the opposition, and political stability in Pakistan, when it has a very narrow majority. Chaudhary added, that what we are realizing is that many of Pakistan’s challenges are systemic and are not going to be solved by one person. When it comes to foreign policy and Middle East, Imran has the least influence.

Ambassador Olson also commented the Prime Minister in Pakistan has more authority in the domain of economic, education, health and social programs, and the least in the arena of foreign policy, where the military dominates. So he contended, and countered Fazli that it’s not the relation with the opposition, but PTI’s relation with the military, or the civilian-military relations, that will be crucial. Because of Imran’s personality, a clash could eventually develop, especially if he asserts independence from the military. As it relates to UAE, the nations was closer to the Bhutto’s, while Nawaz Sharif was nearer to the Saudis, and Imran is an unknown entity. 

Conclusion

One of the significant considerations as it relates to the connection between the Gulf States and Pakistan is the rapid pace of change in the variables that were once considered to be the constants. Now we are seeing diminishing US involvement in the region, independent government in Pakistan, and unpredictable young leadership in Saudi Arabia.

In this environment, the Pakistan’s security connection with the Middle East is likely to take on added significance. The offering of economic aid by Saudi Arabia and UAE to Pakistan is part of the emerging circumstances, where their leverage is growing over Pakistan. And this most likely is also out of concern to mitigate any Pakistani tilt towards Iran.

Recent events indicate that Afghan peace talks now involve UAE and Saudi Arabia, which previously centered around the Qataris. Moreover, the closeness of the Gulf States to the US also creates a unique twist for Pakistan. It was in this context that the author asked the panel about the significance of the potential Arab NATO alliance, seemingly with US support, and how this correlates with the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC). The IMCTC was formed by Saudi Arabia and is headed by Pakistan’s retired military chief. This potentially is a point of convergence between the Gulf States, US, and Pakistan.

The post Examining Saudi-Iran Tensions And Its Impact On South Asia, China appeared first on Politact.

Does The Road To Peace In Afghanistan Originate In Kashmir?

By Arif Ansar

Context

The conflict in Afghanistan has been continuing for the last 30 years or so. The present phase got underway after the tragic incident of 9/11. US launched a campaign against the perpetrators of the attack, Al Qaeda, and those that provided them refuge, the Afghan Taliban.

While the Al Qaeda menace has been controlled for the most part in the region, the Taliban have remained a lethal force even after billions of dollars were spent to counter them. Under the Obama administration’s troop surge, more than 100,000 soldiers were deployed in Afghanistan.

The question though remains, why have Taliban not been managed even after spending so much in blood and treasure. An inaccurate answer to this question can and have caused many new complications, while prolonging the war.

The causes for this not only lie inside Afghanistan but also relate to the India-Pakistan rivalry, including the impact of Iran-Saudi tussles in the Middle East. In addition, the global power tensions between US, China, and Russia have escalated the tugs of the global balance of power. There is also a need to understand the transformation of the extremism phenomenon that has lead the emergence of Daesh to replace Al Qaeda.

In this complicated dynamics, the Indian motives in Afghanistan are the least understood, and perhaps hold the key to make progress on lasting Afghan peace.

Lack of Afghan Purpose

If we look at the reasons internal to Afghanistan, there are factors connected to the Afghan political, economic, and security capacity to continue to fight this seemingly endless war. In January, President Ashraf Ghani himself admitted that without US support, Afghan Army couldn’t be sustained for six months.

Any army needs to have clear-cut goals and purpose in order to put up a decisive fight; this is especially true when the Afghans are fighting their fellow countrymen. The Afghan Army is fighting Taliban, including extremists like Al Qaeda and Daesh, with limited military capability, and has to rely on air and advisory support to conduct operations.

On the other hand, Afghan Taliban have a transparent message that they are conducting a jihad against foreign occupiers, historically an honorable Afghan occupation. Their most apparent demands for peace talks include complete withdrawal of foreign troops, and to negotiate directly with the Americans, and not its ‘puppet’ Afghan government.

As opposed to this, the coalition demands from Taliban a clear break with global jihadists like Al Qaeda. Furthermore, to renounce violence and accept the present Afghan constitution and government. On the surface, all major external stakeholders have demanded that peace process should be Afghan owned and Afghan led, a noble aim indeed.

Who Can Bring About Afghan Reconciliation?

Many talk about the Afghan Reconciliation in simplistic terms. Since the kinetic approaches have not worked, it is automatically assumed the next step should be the peace process. There are many limitations to that. At this point, Afghan Taliban have splintered into many groups and it’s not clear who can politically represent them, and has the sway over all groups.

Another premise that accompanies the above argument is that while there are many stakeholders to the conflict, the peace process should be Afghan owned and Afghan led. Put it more succinctly, the Western backed Afghan government should be spearheading the peace initiative. With the interests of many regional and global stakeholders at stake, to expect the weakest partner to perform this job is hoping for the impossible.

The Afghan reconciliation is an auxiliary to Afghan Peace Process. Meaning that the Afghan reconciliation by itself will not bring peace to Afghanistan – in absence of settlement between the regional and global stakeholders, particularly India and Pakistan, and the US and China.

A successful approach to Afghan peace should first involve careful scrutiny of the interests of the key stakeholders, starting from the Afghan government and different factions of Afghan Taliban. The motives of the fragile Afghan government are not clear on why it would want to share power with Afghan Taliban. They lack credibility and are corrupt. The political leadership benefits the most from the continuing infighting in Afghanistan as it attracts millions of dollars of military and economic support, which provides opportunities for more corruption.

The turmoil that resulted from the 2014 Afghan election was only settled after former US Secretary of State John Kerry assembled a Unity Government and developed a power sharing formula between the CEO and the President. This provides one example of how a facilitated wider power-sharing model, which includes the Afghan Taliban, could work.

The uncertainty regarding the much-delayed parliamentary elections has continued. Many of the election reforms are still not in place and there is little time left to do that. The presidential elections scheduled for mid-2019 could very well result in another phase of political chaos while the security situation of the country dwindles further. This is one more reason to quicken the pace of finding a peace formula for Afghanistan.

Understanding the Indian Position on Afghan Reconciliation

The media attention is usually fixated on the American interests and that of Pakistan as they are linked with the Afghan reconciliation. However, this debate lacks assessment of those players that do not want Afghan peace process to be successful, for example India. How does it benefit or lose from peace in Afghanistan? To talk about reconciliation in Afghanistan in the absence of this analysis will not be doing justice with the objective of achieving peace.

The country is perhaps the least interested in Afghan reconciliation. And we only need to look at the pre 9/11 Afghanistan to understand the reasons for that.

This was the time when militants and extremists with regional and global ambitions were cross-pollinating in Afghanistan after they had fought the jihad against the Soviets in the 80s, and this resulted in several attacks inside India, and ultimately leading to 9/11.

For India the nightmare scenario would be the return of the Afghan Taliban and other religious zealots, which would be the outcome of any kind of Afghan reconciliation. It fears this will have a direct impact on the insurgency in Kashmir. While India provides economic aid to Afghanistan and supports development projects to improve its soft image, the main aim of India would be to prevent any kind of Afghan patch-up that puts the Afghan Taliban back in the government. Instead, it has focused all its efforts to malign the image of Pakistan as a supporter of extremists in Kashmir and Afghanistan.

Indian objective would be to weaken Pakistan to such an extent that it abandons any claim on Kashmir, or accept a resolution of the conflict based on Indian terms. This is not much different than what just transpired in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The politics of the Middle East has changed to such an extent, that the traditional supporters of the Palestinian cause like Saudi Arabia and Egypt have moved their position closer to that of Israel. This changing political landscape recently resulted in the Trump administration’s decision to move the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

Based on this assumption, Indian strategy has been to use its increasing clout to sideline Pakistan in the international arena, and to short-circuit channels through which Pakistan has traditionally garnered support, such as the GCC and the US. And in this endeavor, it has allied with Israel. In this context, the emerging Indian Middle East posture is interesting to watch and quite risky for Pakistan.

India’s Emerging Middle East Posture

Pakistan-India tensions are tied to the Kashmir issue and the associated skirmishes on the LOC. This rivalry has now fully engulfed the Afghan conflict, where Pakistan blames India for using the turmoil in Afghanistan as a stepping-stone to destabilize and weaken Pakistan. It does this by carrying out terrorist activities within Pakistan, and by supporting Baloch separatist. On the other hand, India blames Pakistan for supporting the Kashmiri militants and Afghan Taliban.

Despite years of dialogue between US and Pakistan, US has gradually given more credence to the argument presented by India. Moreover, the maturing US-India strategic ties are a source of great concern for Pakistan.

In addition to the US, Pakistan has also enjoyed strong support from the Middle East nations, especially from the GCC. In times of emergencies and political crises, Pakistan has always been able to harness political and financial support from its oil rich Islamic brethren.

However, due to the tremendous change being brought upon by the campaign against extremism, the Iran-Saudi tensions, and the transformation in the energy industry, the geopolitics of the Middle East is changing dramatically. India is positioning itself to exploit the opportunities being created to undermine the customary support Pakistan has enjoyed in the region.

This was recently at display when Prime Minister of Israel visited India in January for six days, followed by Modi’s trip to Palestine in February. In his meeting with the Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas, he ironically backed the cause of independent Palestine. India has historically supported the Palestinians but its extra-ordinary close ties to Israel makes a mockery of this claim. And these trips have taken place in the aftermath of highly controversial US decision to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. During his trip, he also visited UAE, Oman, and three nations of West Africa.

The Indian analysts projected the nations Middle East diplomacy as an attempt to balance its ties with the Arab states that employ a large number of Indian workers. However, this is hardly digestible when other Arab nations such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt have themselves moved closer to the position of Israel. Reportedly, it was due to their private consent that emboldened President Trump to take the decision of moving the embassy to Jerusalem.

Needless to say, during this timeframe Pakistan was itself busy with hosting President Abdullah II of Jordan. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s Army Chief visited Saudi Arabia in early February and met with Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman. On February 20^th came the decision to post a contingent of Pakistani troops to the Kingdom for training and advisory mission.

The reasons for aggressive Indian Middle East diplomacy are multidimensional. With large Muslim population, India desires to project its suitability for the seat on the reformed UN Security Council, and as a credible future arbiter in the almost dead Middle East Peace Process. Moreover, to undercut the customary support for Pakistan in the Arab world for the Kashmir cause and matters related to Afghanistan.

Conclusion

The above assessment provides several clues on how to approach the Afghan peace process. Firstly, the motives of the Afghan government need to be looked at closely. The reason Obama administration gave a timeline for the American withdrawal was not to alert the enemy but recognizing history. Without Afghan’s taking responsibility for their country, the nation will remain dependent on the West and billions will continue to be wasted. And as soon as the aid dries up, the infighting will start.

Second, the missing component on Afghan reconciliation has to do with India. India should be expected to clearly lay out a minimal acceptable formula for Afghanistan. And it cannot be that it wouldn’t accept Afghan Taliban in any potential power sharing formula. Moreover, without entering into a dialogue with Pakistan on the resolution of Kashmir, it risks a wider conflagration.

Thirdly, to achieve Afghan Peace, will require Western facilitation like the power sharing model crafted in 2014 with the active US support.

On the flip side, Afghan Taliban would have to accept any power sharing formula that results from the negotiations, and that their religious aspirations would have to be attained through a consultative mechanism. Moreover, they would have to break ties with global extremists. They should recognize the leverage of being a bulwark against the aims of Deash in the region.

The post Afghan Peace Process And Kashmir appeared first on Politact.

Arif Ansar

Context

Analysts and scholars from a variety of origins and backgrounds have described the present state of global affairs as going through a transition. The bilateral and multilateral ties during this interlude have remained anchored around the principles of globalization and laissez faire economic policies, which necessitate more economic cooperation.

However, the election of Donald Trump signifies the start of a new phase, which is a marked departure from the trajectory that was set forth since World War II, premised on economic interdependence as representing the best hope for safeguard humanity and preserving peace. Now, free trade is shifting towards protectionism – and the noble ideals such as promoting democracy and upholding human rights are taking the back seat. This was quite apparent in the recently laid out Trump’s Afghan policy and earlier during his visit to Saudi Arabia.

As this reversal takes shape, and contrary to what is popularly proclaimed, foreseeing the future is becoming more predictable. The history provides sufficient examples of how the commotion between the emerging and established powers usually plays out. This raises a related inquiry of why the US is seemingly ditching such high aspirations at this juncture?

A Sense of being Exploited

Whether stated or not, perhaps the most important reason is the perceived sense of being exploited by the emerging global powers that are getting ahead economically. And they are doing so by not being necessarily democratic or upholding human rights. In fact, a case can be made that in these times of chaos and polarization, democratic systems are reflecting mounting paralysis – whereas centralized and hierarchical systems are being able to better navigate the present turbulence.

Moreover, as the sources of Western economic wherewithal dwindle, they have started to challenge the very basis of their strength, such as multiculturalism and diversity. And again, historical precedence would suggest similar outcomes in such circumstances. When the going gets tough, immigrants and minorities are usually the first to be blamed for the predicament.

The prolonged war against extremism has played a pivotal role towards this dilemma. On the other hand, Europe that has acted as the bedrock of American global power projection is more and more looking unable or unwilling to play this role, as the seismic events in the form of Brexit play out. Additionally, the emerging powers of Russian and China are also acting as centrifugal forces when it comes to the future of Europe.

Thus, because of this imbalance of global power, and due to the apparent unwillingness of the US to maintain the present order, we are entering the most dangerous phase. The era of cooperation that marked the transition phase has now entered the confrontation stage. The key challenge for the other state actors has now become how to manage and maintain tranquility as the present order crumbles, while the shape of emerging system remains unclear.

On the other hand, one of the key challenges for the West, and the US, is that after an era of complete economic and military dominance, will they be able to adjust to the new global realities and multipolarity. Understanding the ‘America First’ principle is critical to grasping the emerging US posture.

Interpreting America First Doctrine

Since 9/11 US has found itself at the forefront of many theaters of the campaign against extremism. In addition to Iraq and Afghanistan, its involvement includes the GCC, Libya, Syria, Horn of Africa, and nations of Islamic Maghrib. While it has the support of Western and regional Muslim allies, however, most of the financial and security heavy lifting for this campaign has been undertaken by the US. Even NATO partners have been reluctant to increase their defense contributions to the organization. And this is despite the fact that American role brings security benefits for its regional and Western allies.

And because of this line of reasoning, resentment has gradually been building, which ultimately led to the election of Donald Trump and the mantra of ‘America First’. The full contours of this principle have not yet been laid out, and thus it is hard to comprehend it fully within the US and abroad. International actors are nervously trying to gauge what it means for the international order and for them.

From the American perspective, it has gone out of its way and at the cost of tremendous resources for the preservation and sustenance of the present system. The US has often acted for the common good and the mutual benefit of its allies. When it comes to global crises, other powers seldom act in the absence of American leadership. Obviously, American allies have their own perspective on the evolving American role and the narrative laid out above.

This sentiment has also crept over into the economic realm, and led to the quick dissolution of trade agreements such as the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) that America had itself crafted with tremendous efforts, while questioning how North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is benefiting the US. At the core of this belief is a feeling that US is being unfairly treated within the very system it helped create, and that Paris agreement on climate change will likely further strangulate American economic growth under the burden of strenuous regulations.

And if this is the case, with its emerging policies under Trump, US is telling the world that they need the present system more than it does. Moreover, it can help in maintaining the present order – but the allies would have to take the lead and the responsibility wherever applicable. This is not all, the US also seems to be saying that its interests supersede all others – and thus there is less and less room for diplomacy.

While there is an element of truth to how other nations have exploited the US, but one cannot underestimate the role played by American corporations. These companies have benefited tremendously from globalization by outsourcing work to other nations to maximize their profits while the American job markets and industrial capabilities suffered. The argument that technology and robotics are to blame for this is only a part of the explanation. And even if it is due to these reasons, it should have been a cause for alarm. A large unemployed workforce is in itself cause for instability, ethnic tensions, and hike in crimes.

Surprisingly, even the political representatives have failed to take notice of this combustible mixture, while overlooking the interests of their constituents. In one way, they are not to blame because globalization conflicts with the concept of nation-state, and often puts the citizen of their own country in second place. Globalization works best when there are minimal hindrances in the way of cross border trade, and the free market dynamics are allowed to play out.

America First and Allies

As this reversal takes shape, what will be the political, security and economic implications of the America First policy? In all practicality, America First mantra is likely to put it in confrontational mode with many of its allies, including other emerging powers. While President Trump has not repeated his earlier criticism of NATO, there is no hiding the fact that US wants NATO members to increase their defense spending if they in the long run want continued American security commitment. The America First policy was also at display in the unfolding North Korean crisis, where Trump criticized the trade dealings with South Korea at an ill-conceived time.

Moreover, the new sanctions imposed on Russia could also indirectly penalize EU, especially in the energy sector, and Germany and France have come out strongly against them.

There are five western firms that are partnering with Russia’s Gazprom to construct Nordstream 2 pipeline meant to carry gas from Russia to Germany. These include Germany’s Wintershall and Uniper, the Anglo-Dutch company Royal Dutch Shell, Austria’s OMV, and France’s Engie.

European Union President Jean-Claude Juncker was quoted as stating in July,

“If our concerns are not taken into account sufficiently, we stand ready to act appropriately within a matter of days. ‘America First’ cannot mean that Europe’s interests come last.”

In his South Asia policy President Trump also asked India to assist US in Afghanistan and payback for the benefits it derives from trade with the US.

America First approach is also accompanied by less and less emphasis on finding political solutions to international crises, whether it be in Afghanistan or the Middle East, or the emerging confrontation with North Korea.

The new doctrine thus require international actors, and even the allies, to prove how they are going to reciprocate the advantages received as a result of trade with, and security assurances provided by the US. As alluded to above, this message has already been conveyed to allies such as NATO, EU, South Korea, Pakistan, and India. Some nations, such as Saudi Arabia, have quickly jumped on the bandwagon by signing huge defense deals with the US.

At the heart of this misalignment between the US and the allies is a concern that who benefits more. In any relationship when matters sink to this level, it’s an indication that all is not well. In absence of partners, the combination of America First doctrine and American Exceptionalism, will likely produce dangerous consequences and hasten new global and regional realignments.

If American First policy does not produce economic dividends for common Americans in the short and long term, it will further complicate its domestic politics and confusion regarding its global role and future direction, and this in turn will further aggravate the present order.

The post Understanding Trump’s America First Doctrine And Its Implications appeared first on Politact.

The Balance of Power is swinging back in favor of Sunni’s and Saudi, Egypt, Jordan, and Israeli Alliance. Particularly when these Sunni Arab countries are gesturing that Iranian pursuit of Nuclear weapons is a bigger issue than the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Moreover, Initial American diplomatic posturing towards Iran have not brought any easing of relations between Iran and US relations thus far. Meanwhile US formally ask Saudi Arabia to play its influence with the religious elements and Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The post appeared first on Politact.

Baloch rebels assailed the security forces on Wednesday night, killing 15 soldiers and injuring another 12. About two-dozen gunmen attacked two security posts in Margut, which is 60 km east of Quetta. The check posts were meant to provide security for the coalmines located there. Reports indicate the assailants belonged to the Baloch militant group led by Harbiar Marri, who is in self-exile in London.

Baloch rebels are seeking greater political autonomy and more share in the natural oil, gas and mineral resources of the province.

The post Baloch Rebels Attack Security Check Posts, Killing 15 appeared first on Politact.

Condemnation and condolences poured in for the Nigerian bombings. The attacks occurred during the Christmas celebrations and killed about 40 people. A militant Islamist group, Boko Haram, has claimed responsibility for the attacks. Boko Haram, which means ‘Western education is haram’ wants the imposition of ‘shraiah’ in Nigeria. One of the blasts took place outside a church near the capital Abuja, while the others occurred in Jos and Damatru. The White House has pledged to bring the perpetrators to justice.

The group had carried out similar attacks last year around Christmas Eve and was involved in bombing the UN headquarters in Abuja, this year in August.

The post Nigerian Bomb Blasts Widely Condemned appeared first on Politact.

To understand the way forward in the AfPak region, one would have to first grasp how the situation got to where it is right now. To deal with the intent of different players and the asymmetric nature of the conflict, the tactics and strategies adopted by US and Pakistan have evolved over time. The focus of these strategies has remained on the military dimension of the war, and has only just begun to move towards a political approach, represented by the Istanbul Regional Conference. The political path is likely to be accompanied by its own sets of challenges that are already beginning to emerge.

The Overt War



When the US got involved in Afghanistan after 9/11, Pakistan had to make quick decisions under pressure from the new US doctrine, “either you are with us or against us”. Musharraf was widely criticized for his abrupt about face in parting with the Taliban, which Pakistan had helped create.

For all intents and purposes, Musharraf saw the turn of events as a strategic opportunity to gain credibility for his regime. In the early years of the Afghan conflict, Musharraf used to vehemently deny there were any cross-border attacks in Afghanistan from Pakistan. Pakistan’s position at the time was that even if there was cross-border support, it was coming from Afghan Taliban and Afghan refugees based in the country, and not from its intelligence organization, as alleged. On the other hand, Indian and Afghan officials generally blamed ISI for the worsening situation in Afghanistan, and contended that without elimination of safe havens in FATA, situation in Afghanistan could not improve. On the other hand, Pakistan blamed the conditions in Afghanistan for the instability in Pakistan. Moreover, Musharraf laid the “Good Taliban” and “Bad Taliban” classification.

From Pakistan’s perspective, Good Taliban were the Afghan groups that did not attack the state and its armed forces and focused their attention across the border. Today these groups are known as Haqqani Network and the Quetta Shura. Bad Taliban were the extremists belonging to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) who attacked Pakistani forces and wanted to implement Sharia.

The status of Kashmir related jihadist groups has remained a bone of contention as well, as they increasingly cross-pollinated with Good and Bad Taliban in the tribal areas. The US viewed the role of these groups, such as LeT, differently as compared to Pakistan, especially after the Mumbai attacks in late 2008. The US defined the threat emanating from these different groups based on if they pose a local threat or a regional and a global one, and how closely they affiliate operationally and ideologically with Al Qaeda.

Pakistan also made a crucial strategic distinction in its cooperation with NATO in the fight against extremists; it was forthcoming against Al Qaeda but not so much against the Good Taliban. Most of the military operations the country carried out were against the Bad Taliban. Meanwhile, it also periodically entered in to peace deals with Taliban that eventually collapsed.

As the situation in Afghanistan slowly deteriorated, the US began to question the intent of its ally, and the focus increasingly shifted to safe havens in the tribal areas. Pakistan countered that by stating that it lacked the capability to fight a non-conventional war and its intent should not be doubted. Pakistan requested bolstering of its capacity with modern gadgets and equipment to take on the militants. For example, night vision gear, attack helicopters and capability for Pakistan air force to conduct night missions. Nonetheless, the US began to lose patience with Pakistan and realized that a different approach was needed to deal with the Taliban and Al Qaeda rest and relaxation, training and command centers in FATA.

It was during this time that Musharraf helped establish a critical red line; coalition forces were not allowed to cross the Durand Line and only a limited range was permissible for the hot pursuit scenarios. The controversial tactics of unmanned drones, hot pursuit, and boots on the ground have continued to bedevil ties between US, Pakistan and Afghanistan. These tactics used by the coalition forces have not only acted as leverages in getting better cooperation from Pakistan Army, they are also examples of how to counter the asymmetric warfare being waged by the extremists across South and Central Asia, Middle East and Africa.

The Covert War


After the Red Mosque incident in late 2007, events took a turn for the worse and terrorist events spread across Pakistan, severely impacting its economy and the law and order. The argument shifted from acting against safe havens to if the country can, on its own, without foreign assistance, control the extremists responsible for the wave of terror in Pakistan. Being a state possessing nuclear weapons, the country could ill afford the negative publicity and the perception that extremists could take over its nuclear assets. Under these pressures and to manage American anxieties, Pakistan accepted the offer of external assistance. However, this happened far from public knowledge or scrutiny of political leaders. It was during this time that rumors about the presence of Blackwater and Special forces personnel in the country became louder.

As President Obama moved into office, he ordered a comprehensive review of the US AfPak strategy. At the time, it was assumed that the new policy would break from the Bush era focus on a primarily kinetic approach, and tilt more toward a diplomatic surge and a search for political solutions, based on a regional emphasis. However, the ground realities and political pressures in Washington did not allow for this shift. What actually transpired from the assessment were a military surge, an exit timeframe and strengthening of the covert strategy against Pakistan. In late 2009 General Petraeus, then the head of CENTOM, signed a secret order, increasing covert operations to counter militants that across borders, and “other” threats across the region. The order authorized Special Operations forces to operate in both allied and hostile nations in the Mideast, Central Asia and the Horn of Africa.

It was this covert unilateral approach that led to the Raymond Davis incident in January and the discovery of and elimination of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in May. The case of Raymond Davis represented a modified ‘boots on ground’ approach, as these operatives were placed inside the country and did not come from across the border. Nonetheless, the red lines defined by Pakistan had been violated. The Raymond incident also exposed that US was trying to establish its own contacts with the Taliban and wanted to bypass Pakistan, as it navigated the political settlement in Afghanistan. Subsequently, Pakistan drastically reduced US covert presence in the country and severely curtailed military cooperation as well.

The elimination of Osama has been followed by an increase in lethal attacks on NATO forces and political personalities in Afghanistan. These strikes have been mainly attributed to the Haqqani network, the Good Taliban. It was the assassination of Afghanistan’s top interlocutor for political reconciliation, Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani that profoundly damaged the mainstream perceptions. These assaults demonstrated that despite the troop surge, the Taliban appeared to have retained the initiative, and both the military and political part of the strategy was in trouble. It was these serious setbacks that led Admiral Mullen to declare Haqqani network a “veritable arm” of the ISI and Karzai signing a strategic agreement with India. Additionally, US dropped the Good and Bad Taliban distinction that Pakistan maintains, targeting both, with the possibility of more unilateral actions looming large if the country does not act against the Haqqanis, and the safe havens in North Waziristan.

The Way Forward



Under this mounting US pressure, Pakistan held an All Parties Conference in October, which adopted a shift in policy by moving towards a political settlement with cessation of military operations on its side of the border. While the US has talked about adopting a political reconciliation, the military approach has clearly dominated. The recent visit of Hillary Clinton to Pakistan in October marked another shift in US strategy, the “fight, talk, build” approach. As opposed to keeping it out, this new approach puts Pakistan and ISI in the driving seat and for bringing warring Taliban to the negotiating table. On the other hand, Karzai has also stipulated that his government would no longer talk to Taliban but would instead negotiate with their supporters.
The move towards a political solution is accompanied by its own set of challenges. For example, one of the emerging challenges appears to be if the regional stakeholders should be involved before or after peace has been achieved in Afghanistan. The answer to this question carries direct implications on the US troop withdrawal, especially as the US is also in the process of retrieving its forces from Iraq, and there is growing unease about Iranian resurgence and its nuclear program.

Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger best described this concern. Speaking at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars on November 1, he told audience, “I have no [objection] in principle of negotiating with the Taliban, but for the purpose of ending the war, it’s the wrong sequence of events. The first negotiation in my view ought to be with surrounding countries.” He also urged the US to reach an agreement before it pulls out it troops from the country. Kissinger also suggested that larger batches of troops should be pulled out at the end of the process, and not the beginning, so as to keep leverage.

Pakistan, on the other hand, maintains that peace and stability in Afghanistan, and the region, is contingent on the reconciliation process within Afghanistan, without which no other effort will bear fruit. From Pakistan’s perspective, there is reason to believe what the US could not get from Pakistan bilaterally, it will try to achieve with a multilateral political process.

Early indications suggest that the road to Bonn and Chicago is not going to be any easier than the military method has been. Although the role of Pakistan remains pivotal, the dynamics resulting from the Arab Spring and the economic woes of the EU and the US are going to play as significant a role. And, it has lately been the BRICS that is imposing its influence on matters of international significance.

The post The Tale of Evolving Strategies in AfPak appeared first on Politact.

WikiLeaks declared on Monday that it will scale back publications to focus on fundraising. The organization which garnered recognition for publishing secret documents said it would “temporarily suspend all publishing operations in order to direct all our resources to fighting the blockade and raising funds.” Wikileaks has witnessed a cut of its revenues after Visa, Mastercard and other firms suspended their donations and transactions to the company.

Julian Assange, founder of Wikileaks sued Visa and Mastercard over the suspension. Assange has called the move by the credit card companies as “politically motivated”. Kristinn Hoffman, spokesperson of Wikileaks said the company’s earnings before the boycott exceeded 100,000 Euros per month. However the sanctions have reduced monthly revenue earnings to between 6000 and 7000 Euros.

The post WikiLeaks Scales Back Publication And Focus On Fundraising appeared first on Politact.