Retaliation was expected from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) for or a number of reasons, the most important being the death of Baitullah Mehsud; thus preventive and protective measure were in place. TTP has struck in Peshawar, Kohat, and Bannu, accompanied by assassinations of tribal leaders supporting the government backed militias, the lashkars.

The timing of the weekend attacks is noteworthy, as they occurred against the backdrop of the passage of the Kerry-Lugar bill and the meeting of President Zardari and the Friends of Democratic Pakistan, which he co-chaired with President Obama and Prime Minister Gordon Brown. The meeting was intended to demonstrate global support for Pakistan’s campaign against extremists. The purpose of the TTP’s attack, on the other hand, was to show that it is alive and kicking.

For the extremists to be able to once again penetrate the peripheries of the most secure areas of Peshawar tells volumes about the incapacity of the civilian security apparatus of NWFP/Pukhtunkhwa in particular and Pakistan in general. Like the earlier attack on the PC hotel in Peshawar, this incident could and should have been prevented. After all, three previous attacks have been attempted at the same location.

Here we examine the history of high-profile attacks on Saddar Bazaar in Peshawar and also propose some common sense countermeasures, much needed during times of heightened and unprecedented threat levels. Although these measures relate largely to Peshawar, they can also be successfully employed in other cities. We also look at the volatile geopolitics of the region, especially in light of the US decision to overhaul its missile defense system, to the delight of Russia.

Analysis

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Taliban Targeting Pattern

Saddar Bazaar on the whole presents a valuable target area. Saddar and Qissa Khawani Bazaar are the two most well-known shopping centers of Peshawar.  If Saddar is the shopping area of choice for the middle and upper-classes, Qissa Khawani is a ‘go to’ for working people and much less secure. Both were frequently attacked during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; the attacks were blamed on the Afghan Intelligence Service, KHAD. Over the years, the government has repeatedly failed to ensure the security of the Bazaar. Past incidents included the bombing of a general store, Wadud Sons, which resulted in the deaths of more than 40 people. In the 80s, a bombing destroyed the nearby office of the Pakistan International Airlines.

The exact location of the present attacks included a wedding hall, a popular upscale carpet shop often frequented by foreigners and a military-affiliated civilian bank, the Askari.  It is worth noting that the exact location had already been subject to attack, albeit with less tragic consequences.  The sorry performance of the civilian security apparatus is inexcusable.

Based on this anecdotal information PoliTact can confidently predict that due to the limited number of high value targets in Peshawar City, Saddar Bazaar will be the scene of more attacks if appropriate countermeasures are not taken immediately.

The TTP has the following targeting pattern:

• Pakistan military-affiliated businesses or in general, locations frequented by present or past military officials or their families (such as Askari Bank, Welfare Shops, etc.).
• Places frequented by foreigners, e.g., Aid and diplomatic officials (such as carpet shops and hotels).
• Clergymen outspokenly critical of Taliban teachings, tactics and strategies.
• Locations connected with Pakistan’s intelligence and security personal, including suspected locations of foreign security and intelligence officials (many of these are located in the Cantonment area and are often accessible from the Khyber Road).
• As in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Police.

Based on the above analysis, it’s not difficult to discover potential Taliban targets in a small city like Peshawar. The next target could easily be the shopping plazas that surround the suburb of University Town, where many foreign officials reside. Another one could be the residences of high-level government officials or the International Airport of Peshawar.

Counter Measures

It’s not enough to simply identify potential threats – one must suggest countermeasures. The following is a list of some simple and commonsensical counter-terrorism measures that can go a long way towards protecting the lives and property of citizens. All emphasize the involvement of the community in civil defense duties.

• Have best trained counter-terrorism experts and security personnel monitor the lower ranks of the police. These individuals often belong to the military. This will ensure that proper security procedures and protocols are being followed, especially during times of national and religious holidays, meals, prayers, night and shift rotation, etc. If this not already taking place, it should be given priority.
• Medium and large-size trucks should never be allowed access to sensitive facilities, so these facilities must not have adjacent parking lots in order to avoid falling victim to VBIEDs.  This should be adopted as a standard security procedure.
• Peshawar’s Saddar Bazaar and many other shopping centers in the country are situated in extremely congested locations. Due to the country’s extraordinary security problems, vehicular traffic in these bazaars should be disallowed. The provision of parking lots that are a 10 to 15 minutes walk from the bazaars can go a long way towards removing the most dangerous threats. Most people will understand the need to exchange a measure of convenience for safety.
• Induct the private guards of the business and shops located in these bazaars into the government-sponsored Civil Security Awareness and Training Program. The objective of these short orientations should be to train these individuals in identifying potential trouble- makers (especially during the stage when extremists carry out surveying and target selection), in addition to providing a better understanding of countermeasures and reporting procedures.
• Use civilian transport system drivers, especially of buses, taxis and rickshaws, as informants to report suspicious activities in the city. Day laborers can also be very useful for monitoring purposes. Some of these techniques have been employed very successfully in Saudi Arabia.
• The Government should develop and sponsor a Community Security Awareness Program using media campaigns. The main goal of these campaigns should be to enhance public awareness of the fact that life cannot be expected to continue normally under the present security conditions; every citizen has an obligation to act as a security guard in his/her neighborhood, as is in countries like Israel, where college students are recruited into highly responsible civil defense and security duties. Pakistan can draw on the experience of the NCC (National Cadet Corps) for this purpose.
• Promote the use of Ring Road as a detour and alternative to the use of Khyber Road and possibly Jamrud Road as well. The use of Khyber Road for commercial traffic, or minimally to trucks and buses, should immediately stop during the emergency period. (If this measure was in place, the suicide attack on the PC Hotel could have been averted.)

Geopolitics

The Pakistani Army has every reason to launch the much-awaited ground operation against TTP in Waziristan, but it has to walk a sensitive line of non-interference with respect to the Afghan Taliban, who have remained friendly towards Pakistan. After the Swat Operation, the United States is once again ratcheting up the pressure. With the US and NATO increasingly caught up in a sticky position in Afghanistan, where the insurgency is fast getting out of control, Pakistan cannot escape some of the blame for the worsening situation there.

After the US decisions to revamp their missile defense system, Russia is courting Iran. How firm Russian and Chinese support of stronger sanctions against Iranian nuclear belligerence will be remains to be seen. Meanwhile China is gradually coming out more strongly against the growing US presence in Pakistan and Afghanistan. While there is again much talk in the media of US drone attacks and special forces raids in Quetta and other places, the goal appears more to pressure Pakistan into action in Waziristan than anything else.

From Pakistan’s point of view, the US will sooner or later have to realize that without talks with the Afghan Taliban, the situation in Afghanistan is not going to improve. By changing its stance on the missile defense system in regard to Russia, the US has probably convinced the Taliban that victory is just around the corner. The US needs the help of its ally, Pakistan, more than ever in order to deal with Afghanistan and understands that Pakistan’s willingness to act is predicated on considerations of its security interest vis-a-vis India, as well as the civilian and military aid promised to Pakistan under the Kerry-Lugar bill.

Although President Obama is now approaching a decision regarding a new strategy for Afghanistan, we believe that it will be difficult to reverse or alter the institutional momentum built up over the last eight years. Any change will most likely be incremental.

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A female suicide attacker attacked a police checkpoint with a handcart bomb in Peshawar on Thursday morning. This was part of a three separate assaults that left at least seven persons dead and wounded 42 others. One of the incident occurred in the Lahori Gate area while the other took place on City Circular Road. The Tehreek-e- Taliban Pakistan (TTP) took responsibility for the attacks.

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Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan on Sunday rejected blame for twin bomb explosions that tore through a packed market in Peshawar on Saturday night, killing at least 39 persons and wounding dozens. The bombings, one of the most devastating in the country following the US raid that killed Bin Laden on May 2, hit the Khyber Super Market area which is home to student accommodation and shops. The Taliban denied their role in the attack, saying they only target the military and government and blamed foreign secret agencies which, according to them, carried out the attack to “malign” the Taliban.

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Two separate bombings in northwestern Pakistan killed 24 persons on Sunday. The first explosion ripped through a passenger van at a bus station near Peshawar, the provincial capital of the Khyber Pukhtunkhawa province, at around 9 am, leaving six people dead. Another 18 people were killed around 12 hours later when a second explosion occurred at a crowded bakery in the city of Nowshehra, approximately 50 km east of Peshawar. The Pakistani Taliban took responsibility for the second attack. The attacks came just a day after a US drone attack in South Waziristan on Friday reportedly killed Ilyas Kashmiri, a key operational leader of Al-Qaeda.

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A Taliban suicide attacker flattened a police station in the northwestern Pakistani city of Peshawar on Wednesday, leaving six people dead in the latest of a series of attacks in the wake of Bin Laden’s assassination by US troops. The early morning truck bombing toppled the three-storey compound in the city’s military zone. The Pakistan Taliban have taken responsibility for the explosion, calling it their fourth reprisal for the killing of Bin Laden on May 2^nd.

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Context
Introduction

In a series of articles, PoliTact is examining the status of Taliban insurgency in each one of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Any realistic assessment of this region has to rely on independent and first hand access to the facts on the ground, to draw any meaningful conclusions or projections. In our previous study, we have examined the dynamics of Orakzai Agency and this article looks at Kurram Agency.

Kurram Agency is one of the most strategic located Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. As with other parts of FATA, it has also been severely affected by the Pakistani Taliban and Al Qaeda insurgency during the last decade. Since the rise of Pakistani Taliban groups in the country’s Pakhtoon tribal belt in 2004, and as a result of gradual relocation of Al Qaeda leadership and rank and file from Afghanistan, Kurram Agency has seen numerous clashes.

These clashes have been between the Shia majority population of Kurram tribal district and the extremely anti-Shia, Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters backed by local Sunnis. The biggest tribe in the Kurram Agency, Turi, is predominantly Shia while there is also a sizable population of Sunnis living in the area. The Sunni tribes include Zazi, Chamkani and some clans of Bangash; most of the clans of Bangash tribe of Upper Kurram are Shia. According to one estimate the Shias of Kurram Agency represents 20% of the total Shia population of Pakistan.

Analysis

Background

The ongoing wave of violence in the tribal agency began in April 2007 and after a brief lull, resurged in November of that year. According to South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), in 2010 a total of 219 peoples have died in FATA due to suicide attacks. A total of 313 have died as a result of bomb blasts, of which 26 were related to Kurram Agency. A total of 28 people have fallen victim to sectarian violence in Kurram this year. The residents of the area have suffered a lot due to road closures. Violence in particular has made the road which connects the agency to Peshawar, through Hangu, Kohat and Darra Adam Khel, totally unusable.

A large number of Kurram dwellers have relocated to other areas to avoid harm while those still living there are deeply stressed due to the security situation. The violence in Kurram Agency has also caused material losses estimated to be in billions of rupees. This is the longest period of ongoing bloodshed the tribal agency has seen, lasting for more than a year; it was usual for spats of violence to subside within days.

In light of discussions with several inhabitants from Kurram, PoliTact has learned the following. According to public perception, majority of the clashes in Kurram Agency are not actually sectarian but given such a spin by Pakistani establishment. This is in stark contrast to opinions held in other parts of Pakistan that hold India, Afghanistan and the NATO coalition responsible for destabilizing FATA.

The violence in Kurram is triggered and sustained by the Taliban from the neighboring North Waziristan Agency. Importantly, the current Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) head, Hakimullah Mehsud, was previously the commander of Kurram along with Orakzai and Khyber tribal districts of FATA. Hakimullah succeeded TTP founder Baitullah Mehsud after he was killed in a 2009 US drone attack.

The reason for Taliban to move to Kurram Agency is to dislocate the Shia population from the strategically located border with Afghanistan, which the Taliban wanted to use. However, historically people of Kurram Agency have always resisted the attempts to use their territory. In order to marginalize Shias and stop them from preventing militants crossing into Afghanistan or providing NATO-US or Afghan government information about militants activities, Taliban-Al Qaeda nexus devised a strategy to kill and terrorize Shias in the region.

The ongoing violence in Kurram Agency and the subsequent closure of the road has left the Shias living in Upper Kurram, towards the border, facing an extreme situation and with feelings of abandonment and resentment. They are cut off from the rest of Pakistan and there is no real attempt by the authorities to reopen the vital roadway. According to former chief secretary of NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), Khalid Aziz, Shias of Kurram Agency on one occasion petitioned the Afghan government and NATO forces to enter their territory, as there was no writ of Pakistan in these areas while they they have been left at the mercy of Taliban. According to data collected by the Long War Journal, a total of 3 drone strikes have occurred in Kurram Agency from 2004 to 2010.

Strategic Distinction of Kurram Agency

The religious profile of Kurram Agency sets it apart from other tribal districts of FATA. Along with Orakzai, the districts are the only two places where there is a large Shia population. However, it is only in Kurram where Shias are in majority. The Pakistani Taliban and their Al Qaeda guest fighters have tried to stir up sectarian sentiments is Kurram resulting in violence against Shias. In this respect the local Sunni militants have been greatly supported by Pakistani Taliban militants from other areas of FATA, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province and the so-called Punjabi Taliban.

An important reason why the Pakistani Taliban and Al Qaeda have concentrated so specially on Kurram Agency has been its immense geo-strategic importance from the insurgent’s standpoint. The tribal district is located on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and is just 100 kilometers from the Afghan capital of Kabul, and is also know by the name of ‘Parrots Beak’. On the southwest of Kurram is located the North Waziristan tribal agency, which is more or less ruled by Pakistani Taliban groups led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur. The base of the Afghan militant Haqqani Network is also located in North Waziristan. Presently the largest hub of TTP is in Orakzai Agency and is located to the Southeast of Kurram. Kurram Agency also provides easy strategic access to an important region of Afghanistan comprising Nangarhar and Kabul provinces. The Afghan and NATO forces have faced the stiffest resistance in the adjacent areas of Gardez and Khost. The insurgents can easily attack Coalition and Afghan forces in Afghanistan and also readily withdraw, making full use of the territory of the Kurram Agency and the strategic advantages it affords them.

However, unlike other tribal districts the local Shia population has greatly resisted the extremists, including using armed defiance. As a result the Pakistani Taliban and Al Qaeda have not been able to maintain a hold over Kurram. In order to pressurize the Shia population to give up resistance, Taliban insurgents have blocked the main road that connects Upper Kurram with Peshawar, and thus exert economic strain on the local population.

Peshawar, the provincial capital, has been the health, education and business hub for most of FATA. Most of the province including FATA have traditionally been dependent on the city for the supplies of essential items and staples. The Taliban and Al Qaeda have successfully managed to keep the road between Kurram and Peshawar shut for almost three years. Although Pakistani authorities opened up the road after several military offensives in the recent past, Shia travelers have constantly come under attack from Taliban operatives.

Parties Involved in the Violence

The local Taliban are fighting the Shia under the name Mahdi Militia while the opposing Shia force goes by the name of Hizbullah, though without connection to the Iranian-backed group of the same name in Lebanon. However, to view the situation in the region in isolation from the larger Shia-Sunni tensions of the Middle East would be naive.

The second major element responsible for violence in Kurram Agency has been confrontation between Mangal and Tori tribes living near the Pak-Afghan border. Both the tribes often indulge in skirmishes with each other on petty issues like water, cattle-heads, wood-cutting and others. These kinds of disputes are often given a sectarian color but these are enmities and disputes which often result in violence . The non-sectarian nature of the Tori-Mangal disputes prompted the four main tribes of central Kurram — Para Chamkani, Ali Sherzai, Masoozai and Zeahmusht — to refuse to take part in the clashes, stating that they would not be a party to domestic-type issues between the Tori and Mangal tribes. However, there has been local suspicion that Pakistani intelligence agencies have been fanning the flames of sectarianism between the two tribes.

Peace Initiative

A peace initiative by the civilian political administration was started by the then Political Agent of Kurram Agency, Zahir-ul-Islam, which culminated in an agreement in January 2008 between warring factions in Kurram Agency. Under this agreement:

• Tal-Parachanar highway leading towards Peshawar and other roads would be opened.
• Both parties would come out of their trenches and the bunkers would be handed over to security forces.
• If any party violated the agreement, a fine of Rupees 40 million would be received from the faction.

The peace deal was finalized through a 50-member jirga of council of elders by the political administration. However the Taliban and two other militias have kept on carrying out activities in violation of that accord. Therefore, when there have been naked violations of the peace terms the government convened the same jirga in Peshawar to try and affix responsibility. The jirga included 25 elders each from the Shia and Sunni sects of Kurram Agency. However, the two sides could not reach a final decision after several rounds of government-sponsored deliberations.

There has been no improvement in the security situation of Kurram with the conditions going from bad to worse. According to various experts, Pakistani authorities have almost lost control and credibility in the area, making it very challenging to implement the existing peace agreement or attempt a new treaty.

Media reports indicate today that a fresh attempt towards bringing peace to Kurrum is being made. PoliTact will continue to monitor the dynamics of this key tribal agency of FATA, Pakistan.

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Context

US-Japan relations are strained this month as Japanese Prime Minister Yujio Hatoyama tries to make good on an election promise to move the US Okinawa military base off the Island. While it is now very unlikely that Hatoyama will be able to keep his promise, the situation brings into focus the US’s reliance on her allies in the region for providing operational bases and supply lines, as well as the increasing awareness of China’s naval reach and aspirations. Turmoil in Kyrgyzstan has similarly brought the fate of the vital US air base in the country into question, with Russia moving in to secure its eviction.

Analysis

A pre-election promise made by Japan’s Prime Minister Yujio Hatoyama is turning out to be a bone of contention between the US and Japan, but has ultimately served to highlight the two countries’ mutually dependent status-especially when it comes to China.

The US base on Okinawa Island has long been an issue for local residence who complain of the noise and pollution from the base. The previous government had promised to move the base within Okinawa, but Hatoyama went one step further and said he would move the base off the island altogether. Negotiations were tense, but Hatoyama has finally conceded that the base will have to stay on Okinawa, as previously agreed with the former government.

Japan is constrained by several factors in regards to the US bases and US military activity on its sovereign soil:

Japan is reliant on the US in military matters as far as defense is concerned. Japan is feeling the squeeze of increasing Chinese naval activity. The only real counterweight for growing Chinese might lies in building cooperative relationships, especially with the US.

On the other hand, the US is reliant on Japan for giving it a strategic foothold in the area, and Japan has conceded that the US presence in the region is more important than an election promise, even if it is a bitter pill to swallow.

The Hatoyama government was surely influenced in its decision by the recent spout of Chinese long-reach naval operations in its waters, which took the Japanese government totally by surprise. Two naval exercises within Japanese waters took place on March 18 and April 10, on the back of the US-China standoff in the South China Sea in mid-march. Chinese naval activities are showing the world, and clearly showing its neighbors just how far the Chinese naval capacity has come, with improved command and control, flexibility and technology. With China flexing its naval muscle, Japan is in no real position to be bickering with its major defense ally.

Another US military base, this time in the Central Asian country of Kyrgyzstan, is also under question as the country recovers from an internal uprising in April. The US Manas air base in the north of the country is central to the US’s Afghan war, especially as an alternative supply route from much-used Pakistan. The interim government in Kyrgyzstan says that the fate of the US base is ‘undecided’, but in all likelihood similar constraints that made Japan reconsider its move on the US base in Okinawa will pressure the Kyrgyz government to keep the base as-is.

The only card-yet-played is in the Russian quarter, and this may well see the base evicted yet. Russia has long since eyed the US base with distrust, and sentiments boiled over in 2008 when a senior Russian official told reporters that “In Kyrgyzstan there should only be one base-Russian” while at an interview in Prague.

If the interim government is plied with enough pressure and/or inducements form Moscow, the US base could be in jeopardy, which would make its other bases in the region even more important.

China has stayed silent on the Kyrgyz issue, which indicates that, as PoliTact has previously noted, the US and China have a prickly but valuable relationship-one which China will not lay on the line to interfere with the US bases in either one of its neighbors, Japan or Kyrgyzstan.

While the end-game remains to be seen, it is more than likely that the two US bases in question will remain. This will probably come at a higher rental cost for the US, but the bases are more than strategically valuable enough to be worth the extra cost.

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Any sober analysis of the military operations in Pakistan reveals that the menace of terrorism is spreading, with ever more dangerous consequences. Each operation is followed by a temporary respite followed by even more devastating terrorist attacks and increasing lawlessness. The writ of the state is gaining traction in the tribal areas but appears to be dissolving in urban centers, especially in Peshawar. Politicians are living in a bubble, increasingly unresponsive to public sentiment and thus are finding it more difficult to establish the national consensus required to govern effectively. Law enforcement authorities clearly lack the training and tools required to competently implement preventive measures.

As previously noted by PoliTact, in this situation extremists appear to be sophisticated and cutting-edge, while in reality they are merely exploiting the glaring vulnerabilities of Pakistan’s law enforcement agencies, both civilian and military. Meanwhile the government is losing the confidence of the public and its prestige internationally. The foot soldiers cannot be blamed for the shortcomings of the law enforcement agencies.

This analysis will focus on the implications of the attack on the Inter-Services Intelligence Office in Peshawar on November 13th. This followed an attack on Army General Headquarters on October 12th and one on the ISI Office in Lahore on May 27th. We also examine terrorist tactics and government security procedures in order to highlight apparent shortcomings. Lastly, we explore the future of terrorism in Pakistan vis-a-vis the situation in Afghanistan and the lessons of history.

Analysis

Extremist Tactics

Below are listed the different types of terrorist attacks, each adapted to its target:

Individual suicide attacks in which a person wearing a suicide belt blows himself up in a bazaar or in settings where support services for military and security personnel are present. Those utilizing Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED), the most lethal and destructive, and perhaps the hardest to pull off successfully. Cars and mid-size trucks have been used in most cases, but as demonstrated by the Marriott hotel bombing in Islamabad, big trucks have been used selectively. Ambushes in which a small team of assailants launch a surprise attack on a law enforcement or military facility in an attempt to kill its personnel and take hostages, thus prolonging the siege.

Extremist Targeting

The terrorists have attacked civilians, police and civil and military intelligence personnel; even players on the Sri Lankan Cricket team haven’t been spared. It must be noted, however, that responsibility for the attacks on civilians, such as the one which occurred in the Peshawar Meena Bazaar on October 28, (resulting in the deaths of more than 100 people and wounding many more), was not claimed by either the TTP or Al Qaeda. Instead, the extremists blamed American defense contractors operating in the country.

Oddly enough, political leaders are the only group that has been spared thus far. Possible explanations for this include:

The politicians receive better protection and are thus more difficult to attack;The terrorists believe that the politicians are proving so ineffective at governing that they are best left alone; that their ineptitude actually assists the extremists prevent the development of an effective counter-terrorism strategy;That politicians can be targeted later on when the escalation mounts;Leaving the politicians unharmed exacerbates tensions between the nation’s civilian and military;The terrorists are hoping that public discontent with the worsening situation will result in a violent revolution.

PoliTact’s analysis of September 29, 2009 identified some of the future potential targets. We also recommended closing of the Khyber Road to traffic, as it passes through areas housing sensitive government’s installations. If this measure were adopted, it would almost certainly eliminate the possibility of VBIED attacks, such as the ones launched against the ISI office and the Pearl Continental Hotel in Peshawar. Both facilities were located about a mile from each other on the Khyber Road in Peshawar.

Law Enforcement’s Weak Spots

It should also be pointed out that the extremists appear to have developed both a short and long- term strategy. Law enforcement agencies don’t seem to have anticipated the target surveying and selection activities of the extremists. One would hope that after each attack, the law enforcement agencies would tweak their countermeasures. Sadly, this doesn’t appear to be happening; it is the extremists who are more likely to adapt themselves to new contingencies.

For example, after careful scrutiny of the attack on the ISI Office in Peshawar and other similar ones, one feels compelled to ask the following questions:How did the truck used by the terrorists to attack the facility bypass numerous check posts located along each access point?The security measures in place at the facility appear to be more suited to countering an ambush than a VBIED-style attack. Why the oversight and what steps will be taken to deal with it?What does this dismal performance by security personnel tell us about the security of nuclear installations?

The following are possible answers:

The extremists had accomplices who helped the truck elude the check posts.The extremists know the area very well and arranged for the truck to move from a location situated between a given check post and the targeted facility, so that the truck never had to pass any check post.The fact that proper steps weren’t taken to protect the facility for VBIED attacks points to inadequate training and a failure to anticipate the worst-case scenario. A number of options suggest themselves. First, all traffic on Khyber Road should have been stopped and diverted. If this proved impossible due to public inconvenience, then the facility should have been moved to a more secure premise (inside a military base, for example), where its existence would not be common knowledge. If this was found to be untenable, blast-proof walls should have been constructed.

The extremists have shown themselves to be more astute than security personnel. The pattern underlying terrorist attacks point towards multiple groups with support within the country as well as outside it. The attacks on civilians and ethnic groups could have a different source than the ones on law enforcement and military facilities but they share the same motive; to destabilize Pakistan. Since the findings of government investigations of these attacks are never made public, it is hard to build a convincing case one way or the other.

Interpreting the Terrorist Message

By demonstrating their reach, the extremists send the message that the operations against them have failed to make a dent in their capabilities and that they can still freely attack the nation’s most secure facilities with impunity. This is worrisome to the Western powers, which are anxious about the safety of the country’s nuclear facilities. On its part, Pakistan is extremely sensitive about its nuclear status and thus these terrorist attacks play upon the government’s fears, as well as destabilizing the government itself. A nuclear power cannot afford the latter, which raises questions about terrorist motivation.

One explanation: by demonstrating their capabilities and reach, the extremists want to convince the country’s government and military to end support for the US-backed war in Afghanistan, in addition to military operations in the tribal areas of Pakistan. From the terrorist perspective, if the government fails to cease and desist, then it is not being true to Islam. Therefore, in the best interests of Islam, they feel justified in taking over the control of nukes.

The Future of Terrorism in Pakistan

In the absence of a political strategy accompanying the military one, Pakistan is fast sliding into the abyss. In the meantime, the United States is engaged in an extensive and realistic review of its strategy in Afghanistan; attempting to cope with a global recession, it will most likely leave more of the fighting to Pakistani and Afghan forces. According to some in Pakistan, the situation looks like a revival of the colonial model, where the native foot soldiers were led by British Army officers. When the British finally left, it wasn’t because they had won or that they had tamed the tribal areas, but simply because of the results of the two World Wars. The lessons of World War I and II educated the global powers to avoid direct confrontations, which could have disastrous consequences (for example, Mutually Assured Destruction, or MAD). Instead, “proxy powers” and “client states” emerged.

When government policies increasingly appear to be developed in response to foreign pressure and not to public opinion, it is the military where one usually detects the first signs of revolt. After all, this has been the case in other parts of the Islamic world, notably Egypt and Iraq. The Urabi Revolt of (1879-82) and the subsequent Free Officers Movement of 1952 in Egypt both provide historic antecedents and parallels to the current situation in Pakistan, as does The Iraqi Army Revolt of 1958. There is one significant difference, however: the above mentioned Arab revolts were mostly nationalistic in origin but today the reaction against pervasive corruption and perceived foreign meddling has both national and religious origins – a potentially explosive combination – one would think.

As the gap between a common citizen’s perception of reality and the elite increases, the chances of dangerous consequences escalate. The government is widely seen as corrupt and, in the public view, following foreign dictates and interests while compromising national interests. Additionally, the government and senior military officials seem to be working together with US under a tacit agreement, to conduct drone attacks on its own soil while launching military operations against its own people. Meanwhile, however, citizens are suffering under rising food prices and businesses are trying to deal with electricity shortages and price hikes resulting from IMF (International Monetary Fund) loan terms. Under these circumstances, the real question becomes, “How can a mutiny or a revolution in Pakistan be avoided?” The Western powers are bracing themselves for such an eventuality.

To prevent such a calamity, the government will have to prove to the public that it has the ability to discharge the minimal obligations of government: to safeguard human life and property. If the only security available is that provided by the extremists -that is, those occasions when they choose to initiate or conclude attacks – then why bother with a government? The need for credible leadership with the capacity to build a consensus on how to address critical issues has never been more pressing. Leadership means not only taking the initiative, but the ability to craft and then make a convincing case to the pubic on the suitable course for the future. In the interdependent world of the future the most daunting task is the ability to anticipate and cope with change as the status quo will not prevail. The institution most likely to initiate reform at this juncture, bringing a level of credibility to the system and help avoid extreme outcomes, is the Supreme Court of Pakistan and not the Parliament or the Executive.

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The post The Attack on the ISI Office in Peshawar, the Evolution of Terrorist Tactics and the Implications for Pakistan’s Future appeared first on Politact.

Any sober analysis of the military operations in Pakistan reveals that the menace of terrorism is spreading, with ever more dangerous consequences. Each operation is followed by a temporary respite followed by even more devastating terrorist attacks and increasing lawlessness. The writ of the state is gaining traction in the tribal areas but appears to be dissolving in urban centers, especially in Peshawar. Politicians are living in a bubble, increasingly unresponsive to public sentiment and thus are finding it more difficult to establish the national consensus required to govern effectively. Law enforcement authorities clearly lack the training and tools required to competently implement preventive measures.

As previously noted by PoliTact, in this situation extremists appear to be sophisticated and cutting-edge, while in reality they are merely exploiting the glaring vulnerabilities of Pakistan’s law enforcement agencies, both civilian and military. Meanwhile the government is losing the confidence of the public and its prestige internationally. The foot soldiers cannot be blamed for the shortcomings of the law enforcement agencies.

This analysis will focus on the implications of the attack on the Inter-Services Intelligence Office in Peshawar on November 13th. This followed an attack on Army General Headquarters on October 12th and one on the ISI Office in Lahore on May 27th. We also examine terrorist tactics and government security procedures in order to highlight apparent shortcomings. Lastly, we explore the future of terrorism in Pakistan vis-a-vis the situation in Afghanistan and the lessons of history.

Analysis

Extremist Tactics

Below are listed the different types of terrorist attacks, each adapted to its target:

•   Individual suicide attacks in which a person wearing a suicide belt blows himself up in a bazaar or in settings where support services for military and security personnel are present;
• Those utilizing Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED), the most lethal and destructive, and perhaps the hardest to pull off successfully. Cars and mid-size trucks have been used in most cases, but as demonstrated by the Marriott hotel bombing in Islamabad, big trucks have been used selectively;
• Ambushes in which a small team of assailants launch a surprise attack on a law enforcement or military facility in an attempt to kill its personnel and take hostages, thus prolonging the siege.

Extremist Targeting

The terrorists have attacked civilians, police and civil and military intelligence personnel; even players on the Sri Lankan Cricket team haven’t been spared. It must be noted, however, that responsibility for the attacks on civilians, such as the one which occurred in the Peshawar Meena Bazaar on October 28, (resulting in the deaths of more than 100 people and wounding many more), was not claimed by either the TTP or Al Qaeda. Instead, the extremists blamed American defense contractors operating in the country.

Oddly enough, political leaders are the only group that has been spared thus far. Possible explanations for this include:

• The politicians receive better protection and are thus more difficult to attack;
• The terrorists believe that the politicians are proving so ineffective at governing that they are best left alone; that their ineptitude actually assists the extremists prevent the development of an effective counter-terrorism strategy;
• That politicians can be targeted later on when the escalation mounts;
• Leaving the politicians unharmed exacerbates tensions between the nation’s civilian and military;
• The terrorists are hoping that public discontent with the worsening situation will result in a violent revolution.

PoliTact’s analysis of September 29, 2009 identified some of the future potential targets. We also recommended closing of the Khyber Road to traffic, as it passes through areas housing sensitive government’s installations. If this measure were adopted, it would almost certainly eliminate the possibility of VBIED attacks, such as the ones launched against the ISI office and the Pearl Continental Hotel in Peshawar. Both facilities were located about a mile from each other on the Khyber Road in Peshawar.

Law Enforcement’s Weak Spots

It should also be pointed out that the extremists appear to have developed both a short and long- term strategy. Law enforcement agencies don’t seem to have anticipated the target surveying and selection activities of the extremists. One would hope that after each attack, the law enforcement agencies would tweak their countermeasures. Sadly, this doesn’t appear to be happening; it is the extremists who are more likely to adapt themselves to new contingencies.

For example, after careful scrutiny of the attack on the ISI Office in Peshawar and other similar ones, one feels compelled to ask the following questions:

1. How did the truck used by the terrorists to attack the facility bypass numerous check posts located along each access point?
2. The security measures in place at the facility appear to be more suited to countering an ambush than a VBIED-style attack. Why the oversight and what steps will be taken to deal with it?
3. What does this dismal performance by security personnel tell us about the security of nuclear installations?

The following are possible answers:

1. The extremists had accomplices who helped the truck elude the check posts.
2. The extremists know the area very well and arranged for the truck to move from a location situated between a given check post and the targeted facility, so that the truck never had to pass any check post.
3. The fact that proper steps weren’t taken to protect the facility for VBIED attacks points to inadequate training and a failure to anticipate the worst-case scenario. A number of options suggest themselves. First, all traffic on Khyber Road should have been stopped and diverted. If this proved impossible due to public inconvenience, then the facility should have been moved to a more secure premise (inside a military base, for example), where its existence would not be common knowledge. If this was found to be untenable, blast-proof walls should have been constructed.
4. The extremists have shown themselves to be more astute than security personnel. The pattern underlying terrorist attacks point towards multiple groups with support within the country as well as outside it. The attacks on civilians and ethnic groups could have a different source than the ones on law enforcement and military facilities but they share the same motive; to destabilize Pakistan. Since the findings of government investigations of these attacks are never made public, it is hard to build a convincing case one way or the other.

Interpreting the Terrorist Message

By demonstrating their reach, the extremists send the message that the operations against them have failed to make a dent in their capabilities and that they can still freely attack the nation’s most secure facilities with impunity. This is worrisome to the Western powers, which are anxious about the safety of the country’s nuclear facilities. On its part, Pakistan is extremely sensitive about its nuclear status and thus these terrorist attacks play upon the government’s fears, as well as destabilizing the government itself. A nuclear power cannot afford the latter, which raises questions about terrorist motivation.

One explanation: by demonstrating their capabilities and reach, the extremists want to convince the country’s government and military to end support for the US-backed war in Afghanistan, in addition to military operations in the tribal areas of Pakistan. From the terrorist perspective, if the government fails to cease and desist, then it is not being true to Islam. Therefore, in the best interests of Islam, they feel justified in taking over the control of nukes.

The Future of Terrorism in Pakistan

In the absence of a political strategy accompanying the military one, Pakistan is fast sliding into the abyss. In the meantime, the United States is engaged in an extensive and realistic review of its strategy in Afghanistan; attempting to cope with a global recession, it will most likely leave more of the fighting to Pakistani and Afghan forces. According to some in Pakistan, the situation looks like a revival of the colonial model, where the native foot soldiers were led by British Army officers. When the British finally left, it wasn’t because they had won or that they had tamed the tribal areas, but simply because of the results of the two World Wars. The lessons of World War I and II educated the global powers to avoid direct confrontations, which could have disastrous consequences (for example, Mutually Assured Destruction, or MAD). Instead, “proxy powers” and “client states” emerged.

When government policies increasingly appear to be developed in response to foreign pressure and not to public opinion, it is the military where one usually detects the first signs of revolt. After all, this has been the case in other parts of the Islamic world, notably Egypt and Iraq. The Urabi Revolt of (1879-82) and the subsequent Free Officers Movement of 1952 in Egypt both provide historic antecedents and parallels to the current situation in Pakistan, as does The Iraqi Army Revolt of 1958. There is one significant difference, however: the above mentioned Arab revolts were mostly nationalistic in origin but today the reaction against pervasive corruption and perceived foreign meddling has both national and religious origins – a potentially explosive combination – one would think.

As the gap between a common citizen’s perception of reality and the elite increases, the chances of dangerous consequences escalate. The government is widely seen as corrupt and, in the public view, following foreign dictates and interests while compromising national interests. Additionally, the government and senior military officials seem to be working together with US under a tacit agreement, to conduct drone attacks on its own soil while launching military operations against its own people. Meanwhile, however, citizens are suffering under rising food prices and businesses are trying to deal with electricity shortages and price hikes resulting from IMF (International Monetary Fund) loan terms. Under these circumstances, the real question becomes, “How can a mutiny or a revolution in Pakistan be avoided?” The Western powers are bracing themselves for such an eventuality.

To prevent such a calamity, the government will have to prove to the public that it has the ability to discharge the minimal obligations of government: to safeguard human life and property. If the only security available is that provided by the extremists -that is, those occasions when they choose to initiate or conclude attacks – then why bother with a government? The need for credible leadership with the capacity to build a consensus on how to address critical issues has never been more pressing. Leadership means not only taking the initiative, but the ability to craft and then make a convincing case to the pubic on the suitable course for the future. In the interdependent world of the future the most daunting task is the ability to anticipate and cope with change as the status quo will not prevail. The institution most likely to initiate reform at this juncture, bringing a level of credibility to the system and help avoid extreme outcomes, is the Supreme Court of Pakistan and not the Parliament or the Executive.

Tell Us What You Think

Feedback@politact.com

The post The Attack on the ISI Office in Peshawar, the Evolution of Terrorist Tactics and the Implications for Pakistan’s Future appeared first on Politact.