By Naade Ali

Context

Afghanistan is once again at the dead center of great power rivalries. The then Soviet Union departed Afghanistan in 1989 abandoning the quest for access to warm waters and subsequently losing the Cold War, and then US left in 2021 after claiming to have achieved the primary goals of War Against Extremism.

The departure of U.S. from Afghanistan did not mean that it did no longer had any interests left in the country. It made sure to maintain over the horizon counter-terror capabilities. While the government of Pakistan at the time facilitated the peace talks between the US and Afghanistan and the withdrawal that followed – it was reluctant to offer further assistance as it related to fighting terrorists in Afghanistan. Many believe, this led to the fall of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government in Pakistan.

As the balance of power tussles escalate, with the US on the one side, and Russia and China on the other, the significance of Afghanistan is fast changing. The UN General Assembly recently adopted a resolution despite US objections, and abstentions of China, Russia, India and Iran, and with 116 nations including Pakistan voting in favor. The resolution calls on Taliban to reverse their growing oppression of women and girls and eliminate all terrorist organizations operating from its soil.

On the other hand, Russia that emerged from the ashes of Soviet Union, became the first country in the world to officially recognize Afghanistan on July 3rd, as US removed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which now is in power in Syria, from its list of terrorist organizations. This was after quick Western legitimation of Islamic authorities in Syria led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, a former al Qaeda member. Meanwhile, China congratulated Russia for recognizing Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan with it foreign ministry commenting, Afghanistan “should not be excluded from the international community”. Earlier in January 2024, China had recognized Bilal Karimi, as an official envoy to Beijing out of security concerns and economic interests.

The international configuration formulated in the aftermath of 9/11 to fight the Global War on Terror (GWOT) appears to be dismantling with the potential reemergence of traditional game play of ‘proxy wars.’ While US stance towards Afghan Islamic Emirate appears to be easing since the withdrawal, it does not look any closer to bestow recognition.

Where Does US Stand on Afghanistan?

Although the U.S. removed a $10 million bounty on Sirajuddin Haqqani, State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce clarified recently that many Taliban leaders remain designated terrorists and that this position remains unchanged. This statement came in the wake of a U.S. delegation’s visit to Kabul in March, where they secured the release of American hostages and held important meetings with Taliban leadership. During the meetings, the Taliban expressed their interest in re-engaging with the U.S. and resetting bilateral ties. They offered to reopen the U.S. embassy in Kabul in exchange for the transfer of control of the Afghan Embassy in Washington to the Taliban government.

Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi has repeatedly called on Washington to engage with the Taliban administration—a message he reiterated during trips to Saudi Arabia and Qatar in April. Muttaqi, explaining his interaction with American counterparts, said that during their discussions, he dismissed concerns about instability and the Taliban’s perceived lack of public support. He asserted, “No power can control Afghanistan without the support of its people. This truth must be acknowledged, and engagement with this government must take place.” He further argued that Taliban rule has brought enhanced internal stability and cautioned that any effort to weaken their government could lead to renewed instability in Afghanistan, threatening broader regional peace and security.

Despite the Taliban’s diplomatic overtures, the Trump administration has so far ruled out the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul or the formal recognition of the interim Taliban government. State Department spokesperson Bruce stated , “The United States does not recognize any entity as the government of Afghanistan and therefore has no plans to allow for the reopening of its embassy.” National Security Council spokesperson James Hewitt reinforced this stance, saying, “We have made no commitments regarding the Afghan Embassy in Washington, and there are no discussions underway concerning the status of the U.S. Embassy compound in Kabul.”

Pakistan-U.S. Pressure on Taliban

Washington’s continued refusal to recognize the Taliban regime is also widely seen as part of a coordinated counterterrorism understanding with Pakistan, aimed at pressuring the Taliban to break its ties with the internationally designated terrorist groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Pakistan has raised concerns about the U.S.-weapons left behind during the American withdrawal falling into the hands of terrorist organizations. A Washington Post report revealed that the perpetrators of the March Jaffar Express train attack in Balochistan used these abandoned U.S. weapons. Although President Trump had previously threatened to permanently suspend U.S. aid to Afghanistan unless the Taliban returned the military equipment, the Taliban flatly rejected the demand, declaring that the remaining American weapons “now belong to the Taliban and will not be returned.”

However, recent developments suggest a significant shift in the Taliban’s stance as U.S. and Pakistani pressure intensifies. In a phone call between U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar reported in April, both leaders underscored the urgency of neutralizing the threat posed by these weapons. Shortly after, Pakistan’s special envoy for Afghanistan, Muhammad Sadiq Khan, issued a stern warning that “all deals with Afghanistan are off” if the Taliban failed to address Islamabad’s terrorism concerns. He then traveled to Kabul to participate in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Joint Coordination Committee (JCC), aimed at restarting dialogue and addressing key security issues, particularly the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) threat.

According to media reports, the Taliban leadership has, for the first time, shown signs of flexibility suggesting a potential policy shift in response to Pakistan’s demands. Analysts point to mounting pressure from both Washington and Islamabad, including U.S. aid suspension and Pakistan’s mass expulsion of Afghan refugees, as key factors forcing the Taliban to reconsider their approach. With limited capacity to manage a large influx of returning refugees, the Taliban government now face the risk of a deepening humanitarian crisis. On the other hand, with the on-going tensions between Iran and Israel in the Middle East, Iran has also started deporting undocumented Afghan immigrants.

Afghanistan-India and U.S.

At the same time, growing Indian engagement in Afghanistan warrants equal attention. As a key U.S. strategic partner, India—owing to its improving ties with the Taliban regime—is well positioned to tap into Afghanistan’s vast mineral reserves, including rare earth elements vital for semiconductor manufacturing. With India striving to become a global semiconductor hub in collaboration with the U.S., Afghanistan could serve as a crucial resource partner. India’s trade with Afghanistan has already hit a record $642.29 million in 2023–24, according to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

If India succeeds in establishing a firm strategic and economic presence in Afghanistan, the U.S. could advance its goal of curbing China’s growing influence in Central Asia—without reintroducing a military footprint. Washington is well placed to leverage its bilateral relationships with both India and Pakistan in this context. While continuing to support Pakistan in counter-terrorism operations, the U.S. may once again delegate regional security responsibilities to Islamabad.

At the same time, it could enable India to expand its geo-economic role in Afghanistan, effectively advancing U.S. interests. This dual-track strategy—outsourcing security to Pakistan and economic engagement to India—offers a cost-effective, high-return approach for the U.S., especially when Trump prefers limited, transactional relations with South Asia. With larger foreign policy priorities elsewhere, this model allows Washington to remain influential in the region without committing significant resources.

U.S.-China and Afghanistan

The House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Authorization and Oversight Plan for the 119th Congress explicitly identified China as its top oversight priority and aligns with the central foreign policy objective of the Trump administration, underscoring countering Chinese influence while offering alternative development paths.

Part of the challenge from the American perspective is that Pakistan is strategically aligned with China, which is actively engaged to reconfigure the region around its interests, and the recent inclusion to this vision is Bangladesh. Pakistan’s Foreign Office Spokesperson Shafqat Ali Khan commented earlier this month on the topic that the cooperation between China, Bangladesh, and Pakistan is part of Beijing’s development agenda.

China holds significant geo-strategic stakes in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. As a key ally to Pakistan, China would face substantial setbacks if relations between the two neighbors further deteriorate. Beijing has sought to leverage its Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Global Development Initiative (GDI) as frameworks to promote peace, counter-terrorism cooperation, and economic development in the region. Chinese Ambassador to Afghanistan Zhao Xing, in a recent interaction with Taliban leaders, proposed key strategies to enhance collaboration with Afghanistan, which could potentially restore its strained relations with Pakistan.

It’s due to these interests that a trilateral summit between China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan was held on May 21 in Beijing soon after the four-day conflict between India and Pakistan. Some of the major outcomes of the meeting was the restoration of diplomatic ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan leading to the exchange of ambassadors. Moreover, the Chinese foreign ministry announced that China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) would now also be extended to Afghanistan.

The trilateral meeting occurred after Afghan side has progressively adjusted its position regarding the criticism emanating from Pakistan on providing support to TTP. The Afghan Taliban government has publicly denied accusations of supporting the TTP and allowing them to operate from Afghan soil. They have reiterated their commitment to preventing any group from using Afghanistan to threaten other countries. In a recent move, Afghan officials announced, “Sheikh Hibatullah’s diktats bind all groups pledging allegiance to him, and his diktat is that attacking Pakistan is haram.”

The Afghan Game Plan

In the evolving great power rivalry Afghanistan appears to be courting both US and China to get involved in Afghanistan, especially to address the security concerns emanating from the country – and using that as a leverage to gain international recognition. This approach seems to have worked in the case of Russia. Moreover, it’s also exploiting the vulnerabilities of Pakistan and China from India – possibly suggesting its potential utility to the U.S.

On the other hand, the Chinese strategy involves getting more involved in trade and connectivity of Afghanistan, through its partnership with Pakistan, pushing Afghans to change their behavior. However, U.S. appears to be employing the same approach towards Afghanistan, utilizing its partnership with India, to change Pakistan’s calculations.

Related Articles:

Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions, Trump, And Wakhan Corridor – Feb 3, 2025
Political Or Military Solution; Pakistan’s New Counter-Terrorism Operation Azm-e-Istehkam – Aug 1, 2024
Convergences in US Pakistan Ties and Afghanistan – Jan 1, 2024
Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP – Feb 22, 2023
Post Withdrawal Campaign Against Extremism In Afghanistan And US-Pakistan Relations – Sep 7, 2022
Emerging US Policy Towards Afghanistan After Withdrawal – March 2, 2022
Recalibrating The US-Pakistan Partnership In Afghanistan – Jun 22, 2021
US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden – Mar 2, 2021

The post Afghanistan, Pakistan Relations and Great Power Rivalry appeared first on Politact.

By Naade Ali
South Asia and Middle East Fellow, PoliTact

Context

The recent brief yet intense escalation between India and Pakistan has further exposed the fragile nature of South Asia’s security landscape. The four-day-long tit-for-tat cross-border military confrontation between the two nuclear-armed rivals has significantly undermined prospects for normalization, redefining the rules of engagement and signaling a shift in how both countries may manage their relationship moving forward. What began as a terrorist attack on Indian tourists in the Pahalgam region of the disputed India-administered Kashmir last month, resulting in the deaths of 26 people, quickly escalated into a significant diplomatic and military crisis.

India’s Strategic Shift: Operation Sindoor and the ‘New Normal

India hastily accused Pakistan of orchestrating the terror attacks and used the incident as justification to revise its military doctrine through the launch of Operation Sindoor.

In a public speech highlighting the goals of Operation Sindoor, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced what he described as reaching a ‘new normal,’ signaling a decisive departure from India’s earlier posture of restraint, long shaped by the perceived threat of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent. He emphasized that the new approach centered on firm and unyielding retaliation against terrorist attacks, including cross-border military operations and a deliberate refusal to distinguish between militant groups and their state sponsors—effectively placing direct responsibility on Pakistan for any acts of terrorism on Indian soil. Modi also stated that India would no longer be deterred by the threat of nuclear escalation, signaling a willingness to pursue bold and proactive actions despite potential risks. Having absorbed the initial Indian strikes, Pakistan, in response to the damage inflicted from Operation Sindoor, initiated its own military campaign named Banyan-Marsoos, targeting key Indian military targets to restore deterrence.

A Pause in Hostilities: U.S. Intervention and the Ceasefire

As the two countries climbed the escalation ladder, a surprise ceasefire announcement by U.S. President Trump on social media temporarily halted the hostilities. While the truce continues to hold, prospects for lasting peace remain uncertain. Inflammatory national rhetoric and the unresolved diplomatic deadlock continue to fuel tensions. At the core of the post-ceasefire period is a significant divide between India and Pakistan, each celebrating their military campaigns as a victory and viewing the outcome of their confrontation through a zero-sum lens. This has made the aftermath more complex and contentious than the conflict itself, while also revealing how both sides intend to manage their ongoing disputes moving forward. In this context, key questions have emerged: what does the temporary truce mean for the India-Pakistan rivalry, and what are its implications for the long-term stability of South Asia?

Experts Respond

On May 12, PoliTact hosted a panel discussion under the auspices of recently formed US-Pakistan Policy Forum titled: “India-Pakistan Tensions and the Way Forward,” moderated by its Chief Analyst, Arif Ansar. The session featured a distinguished panel, including Dr. Hassan Abbas, Chair of the Department of Regional and Analytical Studies at the U.S. National Defense University; Dr. Qamar ul Huda, Michael E. Paul Chair in International Affairs and Distinguished Visiting Professor at the U.S. Naval Academy; and Mr. Khaled Al Maeena, former Editor-in-Chief of Arab News and Saudi Gazette. The discussion centered on the implications of the recent ceasefire between India and Pakistan, the roles of international actors, and the significant obstacles to achieving long-term peace.

Will the Ceasefire Hold?

One of the key questions examined was whether the current ceasefire between India and Pakistan is likely to hold.

A cautious optimism emerged from Dr. Hassan Abbas, who expressed confidence that the ceasefire between India and Pakistan would likely hold — at least in the short term. He argued that both nations had achieved what they needed politically and militarily to step back from the brink. India could claim it had struck militant targets, while Pakistan could point to a successful air defense response. He emphasized that U.S. mediation had played a key role in facilitating the agreement and that both governments were likely committed to preventing further military action. However, he warned that unless deeper structural issues — particularly the Kashmir dispute and proxy militancy — were addressed diplomatically, this ceasefire would remain fragile.

Dr. Qamar ul Huda shared a more skeptical view. While not dismissing the ceasefire outright, he questioned its substance, noting the absence of a transparent or structured diplomatic process. The ceasefire, in his view, seemed to have emerged from informal channels — tweets and backchannel phone calls — rather than serious, trackable negotiations. He was concerned that such an approach lacked durability and legitimacy. Dr. Huda stressed that a real ceasefire requires more than silence on the battlefield; it demands diplomatic engagement on the root causes of conflict: Kashmir, water disputes, and terrorism. He also noted the potential influence of third-party actors, from China to Gulf states, and expressed concern over the lack of clarity in the U.S. position. In his view, the region wasn’t yet “ripe” for lasting peace, and without a comprehensive approach, this ceasefire might only be a pause rather than a turning point.

From a media and public sentiment angle, Mr. Khaled Al Maeena brought a grounded and people-centered perspective. He voiced deep concern over the role of Indian media, which he accused of fomenting hate and spreading misinformation that inflamed public opinion and made diplomacy politically costly. Drawing on conversations with people across religious and national lines, he asserted that the majority of Indians and Pakistanis want peace, not war. Mr. Al Maeena emphasized that the region’s pressing need was not military confrontation but economic development and political stability. He also highlighted the proactive role of Gulf states — especially Saudi Arabia — in de-escalating tensions. With ties to both India and Pakistan, and a vested interest in regional peace due to economic interdependence, Mr. Al Maeena saw the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia, as a credible mediator. While hopeful about the ceasefire’s potential, he underscored the importance of media responsibility, regional diplomacy, and leadership that prioritizes stability over nationalist bravado.

The panel discussed the evolving role of the Gulf states—particularly Saudi Arabia—as key international mediator. The panelists agreed that Saudi Arabia, with significant interests in both India and Pakistan, could play a constructive role in easing tensions. Mr. Khaled Al Maeena stressed that Saudi Arabia seeks regional stability, including in South Asia, and could facilitate dialogue, if requested, between the two rivals by encouraging both sides to come to the table and accept international mediation.

The panelists agreed that India and Pakistan must move beyond tactical ceasefires and pursue a comprehensive, long-term peace process—ideally supported by third-party mediation. The speakers emphasized that unless the two countries address their domestic challenges and regional rivalries, their aspirations will remain unmet.

What Role should US Play?

Throughout the discussion, the panelists recognized the United States as a pivotal external actor with the capacity to influence the trajectory of the India-Pakistan ceasefire. However, their assessments revealed a shared caution about the limitations and inconsistencies in the U.S. approach.

Dr. Abbas emphasized that U.S. involvement was instrumental in brokering the initial ceasefire, with both India and Pakistan reaching out to Washington behind the scenes. He argued that this reflected the high-level trust and strategic alignment both countries maintain with the U.S., albeit for different reasons. India is a key partner in the Indo-Pacific strategy and a counterbalance to China, while Pakistan has long-standing security and geopolitical ties to the U.S., particularly in the context of Afghanistan. However, Abbas cautioned that the U.S. influence alone cannot guarantee lasting peace. He urged Washington to move beyond tactical mediation and instead support long-term conflict resolution mechanisms, including structured dialogue on Kashmir and militancy. He also noted that U.S. credibility depends on maintaining a balanced posture, especially when public narratives in India resist outside interference.

Dr. Huda took a more critical and analytical stance on the U.S. role. He noted that while President Trump’s tweet announcing the ceasefire was widely reported, it lacked substantive follow-through or diplomatic backing. From his view in Washington, the ceasefire appeared to be the result of sporadic political gestures rather than coordinated U.S. policy. Huda questioned whether the U.S. is truly committed to sustained mediation or simply reacting to crises. He highlighted the ambiguity in U.S. policy—initially appearing indifferent, then suddenly claiming credit—and argued that this inconsistency undermines its ability to lead serious peace efforts. To sustain negotiations, the U.S. would need to invest diplomatically and involve multilateral partners, such as the EU, China, and Gulf states, in creating a legitimate and lasting peace framework.

Mr. Khaled Almaeena provided a regional and Gulf-centered perspective, acknowledging the U.S. role but emphasizing that regional actors—particularly Saudi Arabia—are just as important. He noted that while the U.S. has diplomatic leverage, it should not attempt to dominate the process unilaterally. Instead, he advocated for a collaborative approach, where the U.S. works in concert with Gulf countries and other stakeholders who maintain strong ties with both India and Pakistan. Mr. Al Maeena viewed President Trump’s announcement of the ceasefire with skepticism, suggesting it may have been more performative than strategic. He argued that the U.S. can help facilitate talks, but its influence must be exercised carefully and in support of locally driven, regionally endorsed initiatives.

In summary, the panelists suggested that while the U.S. remains a necessary actor for de-escalation, its role must evolve from crisis management to sustained diplomacy, ideally in partnership with regional powers who have both legitimacy and proximity to the conflict.

Great Power Rivalry and Peace Talks

In the discussion of whether the ceasefire between India and Pakistan could evolve into lasting peace, all three panelists acknowledged that great power dynamics—particularly involving China—play a critical role in shaping the strategic landscape of South Asia.

Dr. Qamar-ul Huda emphasized the geopolitical complexity introduced by China’s growing influence and the competing interests of major powers. He noted that China, along with the Gulf states, the EU, and the U.S., has shown interest in being involved in conflict resolution efforts between India and Pakistan. However, this multiplicity of actors creates a crowded diplomatic space, making coherent mediation more difficult. Dr. Huda pointed out that China’s strategic alignment with Pakistan and its rivalry with India complicate peace efforts. He also raised a broader concern: if India aspires to be a global leader, as envisioned through its role in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategy and the Quad alliance, it must demonstrate stability and responsible leadership in its own region. Repeated border skirmishes and crises with Pakistan, he argued, undermine India’s credibility as a reliable partner in the great power competition with China.

Dr. Hassan Abbas echoed these concerns, observing that China’s influence is an integral part of South Asia’s strategic fabric, particularly through its economic and military ties with Pakistan. He highlighted how Chinese military technology—especially fighter jets used by Pakistan—played a significant role in the recent skirmishes, which helped Pakistan demonstrate parity in air power despite India’s numerical advantage. Dr. Abbas saw China’s indirect support as a factor that emboldens Pakistan to resist Indian pressure and sustain its strategic posture. However, he also noted that the escalation ladder is becoming dangerously steep due to technological advancements and information warfare, increasing the risk of miscalculation in a region already shaped by great power rivalries.

Mr. Khaled Al Maeena took a broader, more diplomatic view, situating China within a network of powerful states — including the U.S. and Gulf nations — that have vested interests in regional stability. While not delving deeply into China’s military role, Mr. Al Maeena acknowledged that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are increasingly aware of China’s regional footprint, particularly through its economic initiatives like the Belt and Road. He suggested that China, like the U.S., could play a constructive role in diffusing tensions if it acts as a responsible stakeholder. However, he warned that foreign involvement, including by great powers, must be invited and balanced, as unilateral or self-interested interventions could backfire.

Collectively, the panelists agreed that China’s strategic position and the broader great power rivalry intensify the stakes in South Asia. While this rivalry may deter full-scale war, it also raises the risk of prolonged instability unless managed through inclusive and multilateral diplomacy.

Nuclear Environment and the Escalation Ladder

In examining how the India-Pakistan conflict unfolds within a nuclear framework, the panelists offered nuanced perspectives on the risks and realities of escalation.

Dr. Hassan Abbas presented a cautiously optimistic view, asserting that while both nations had indeed tested the boundaries of military engagement—through strikes, counterstrikes, and air skirmishes—they ultimately pulled back due to the overarching presence of nuclear deterrence. He emphasized that both sides were able to claim symbolic victories: India asserted it had targeted militant-linked sites, while Pakistan showcased its military preparedness and air defense capabilities, including the successful use of advanced Chinese aircraft. For Dr. Abbas, this demonstration of strength on both sides created the space for de-escalation, as neither nation was willing to push the conflict into full-scale war, knowing the devastating consequences of nuclear engagement. He remained confident that, despite heightened tensions, both countries were rational actors who understood the mutual destruction that a nuclear exchange would bring.

Dr. Qamar-ul Huda, meanwhile, offered a more cautious and critical interpretation. He characterized the pattern of India-Pakistan escalation as a dangerous cycle—an unending loop of skirmishes, retaliations, and brief periods of calm that lacked any strategic architecture. According to him, this repetitive behavior pointed to a fundamental weakness in regional diplomacy and governance. Despite the presence of nuclear weapons acting as a deterrent, he argued that the failure to address root causes—such as the Kashmir dispute, water-sharing tensions, and cross-border terrorism—meant that both countries continued to climb the escalation ladder in an ad hoc and reactive manner. Without institutional reforms or sustained international engagement, he warned, the region remained vulnerable to miscalculations that could spiral beyond control, even in a nuclear context.

Mr. Khaled Almaeena approached the issue from a societal and media perspective, underscoring how misinformation, media sensationalism, and hyper-nationalist rhetoric often play a more dangerous role in escalation than military strategy itself. Drawing comparisons to the “phony war” period of World War II, Mr. Al Maeena argued that the most recent flare-up between India and Pakistan resembled more of a media-fueled standoff than a genuine military confrontation. He criticized the Indian mainstream media in particular for manufacturing a climate of hostility, which in turn pressured political leaders to take aggressive stances to appease domestic audiences. In this environment, the escalation ladder becomes more volatile—not because of formal military decisions, but because public sentiment, stoked by inflammatory media narratives, compels leaders to act out of fear of appearing weak.

In essence, the three panelists painted a complex picture of escalation in South Asia. While they all agreed that nuclear deterrence plays a restraining role in preventing all-out war, they also highlighted different drivers of danger—be it military miscalculation, diplomatic failure, or media manipulation. The consensus was clear: the region may be protected by the logic of mutual destruction, but without responsible leadership, institutional dialogue, and media accountability, the rungs of the escalation ladder remain all too easy to climb.

Domestic Politics and Sustained Political Dialogue

As the conversation shifted from immediate military de-escalation to the prospect of sustained political dialogue, all three panelists highlighted domestic political dynamics in both India and Pakistan as central to whether the ceasefire could evolve into meaningful negotiations.

Dr. Abbas offered a deep dive into the Pakistani domestic landscape, emphasizing that the ceasefire had inadvertently strengthened the military establishment’s standing at a time when it was under intense public and political criticism—especially over its handling of the Imran Khan-led Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) movement. He noted that the military’s effective management of the immediate crisis had boosted its credibility and given the current coalition government some breathing room. However, he warned that without broader political consensus and constitutional legitimacy, Pakistan could not sustain a serious peace process. He stressed that internal unity, political stability, and inclusiveness—particularly reconciling with PTI’s large support base—would be necessary if Pakistan hoped to engage in long-term diplomacy with India.

Dr. Huda placed domestic politics within a broader governance and institutional context, particularly in Pakistan. He saw the moment as an opportunity for political re-examination, noting that recurring conflict cycles had revealed the deep fractures in the country’s political system. He emphasized the need for Pakistan’s political institutions to commit to constitutionalism and inclusivity, warning that sidelining popular political parties (such as PTI) or suppressing dissent only deepens instability. For Dr. Huda, sustainable negotiations—whether about the ceasefire or Kashmir—would require a bipartisan or multiparty consensus. In his view, the absence of such internal coherence would make Pakistan an unreliable negotiating partner, especially in the eyes of international actors.

Mr. Khaled Al Maeena focused more broadly on the popular mood and societal divide within both India and Pakistan. He warned that rising hate rhetoric, media manipulation, and political polarization—particularly in India—create an environment where leaders are constrained by nationalist pressures. In both countries, he argued, the public appetite for peace exists, but political elites often exploit nationalist sentiment for short-term gain. He called for leadership that could rise above partisanship and media-driven hysteria, emphasizing that economic development and social stability should be the common goals uniting political factions. Mr. Al Maeena also stressed that peace efforts cannot be externally imposed; they must be grounded in domestic political will and legitimacy.

The panelists agreed that no ceasefire or peace process can succeed without strong, credible, and inclusive domestic political foundations. While foreign mediation may help broker talks, lasting peace must come from within, supported by political leadership that reflects the will and aspirations of their people.

Related Research

Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States August 4, 2023
Examining Saudi-Iran Tensions And Its Impact On South Asia, China Jan 4, 2019

The post India-Pakistan Ceasefire And The Way Forward appeared first on Politact.

Iran claims to have brought down a state-of-the-art US surveillance drone near its border with Afghanistan. RQ-170 Sentinel, also known as the Beast of Kandahar, is one of the most sophisticated high altitude stealth jet drone in US possession and it also flies over Pakistan.

A number of questions have arisen as a result, did the Beast of Kandahar came from Afghanistan or Pakistan? Additionally, how do the people of Afghanistan feel about their country becoming the covert-central in the region?

Analysis

PoliTact discerns the implications of this event for the region in a discussion with:

• Brigadier (R) Mahmood Shah – Defense and Security Analyst
• Dr. Asad Khan – Secretary Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) USA
• Gul Bacha Majidi – Member of Parliament in Afghanistan
• Dr. Alam Payind – Director Middle East Studies Center at Ohio State University

Part 1

Part – 2

The post Regional Implications: Fall Of The Kandaharian Beast (RQ-170 Sentinel) In Iran appeared first on Politact.