Context

By Arif Ansar and Claude Rakisits

What a difference two years can make. At the last NATO summit meeting in Chicago the world looked pretty good, Afghanistan appeared to be on track, jihadism was in retreat and Russia was behaving. Now NATO is unexpectedly confronted with some unique challenges. The security organization had thought it had move passed the Cold War era. That thinking has abruptly come to end. Europe is under Russian threat once more.

Then there are matters related to the war on terror. After the death of Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda (AQ) head honchos, NATO and the US wanted to move on, and pivot more towards the strategic threats that emanate from the Pacific. The new strategy to deal with the extremists was premised on the assumption that with the use of Special Forces and smart technologies, the remnants of AQ could be managed. NATO and the US required regional allies to lead the fight against extremists as they build the capacity of these partners. The thinking was that this would allow the room to conserve and redirect resources towards strategic adversaries.

The reality on the ground, however, has unfolded differently and has put this assessment to the test. Disturbingly, the war on terror is covering an ever-wider span, to include South and Central Asia and North Africa. The original Al Qaeda has over the years morphed into a phenomenon called Al Qaeda and Associates, and the emergence of groups such as Islamic State (IS). While the debate whether AQ has been weakened continues, it announced the opening of a new ‘Indian subcontinent’ branch recently. This is indeed an ominous development. While AQ and IS may be presently competing, the risk of them cooperating in the future remains a distinct possibility.

What had originally started as the war against extremists is now truly a battle between non-state actors and ever-feeble Western-backed regional states. And the direct threat posed to the US and Europe by AQ has now been supplemented by IS.

As NATO and the US decide their future strategy to tackle IS and put together a coalition, lessons learned so far in the war against extremists would have to be looked at realistically. The alliance would have to seriously think what would come after IS if things do not go as planned.

To avert the potential collapse of the entire nation-state structure in the Middle East, leading to a protracted and bloody sectarian civil war, a radical rethink is now required. This review involves examining the phenomenon of non-state actors afresh, understanding the societal transformation, and focusing more on economics. Without a revisit of the existing policy, the present global order risks further destabilization and loss of American influence. At this juncture it’s equally essential to not be fixated on the present reality alone and on preventing what may happen. Making strategy is as much about envisioning and preparing for an alternative reality.

Classification of Non-State Actors

Up to this point the non-state actors have been classified on the basis of whether they pose a regional risk or a global one. On the other hand, the cross pollination of jihadists has made this definition mute; the majority of the groups aspire to a vision larger than their capability. Then there is the question of Shia and Sunni non-state actors. While AQ and IS are Sunni non-state actors, Hezbollah represents the Shia one. Another way of looking at these groups is from the prism of purpose specificity, which is demonstrated by groups such as the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistan Taliban and Lashkar-e-Toyba. These differences provide opportunities to look at the phenomenon of non-state actors in a different manner.

Engagement with Iran related to its nuclear ambitions provides one such alternative in dealing with non-state actors. If there is willingness to talk with Iran despite its support for Hezbollah, then this suggests that while state support of the extremist groups is part of the present challenge, it could also be a part of the solution. The real danger is from those extremists that don’t listen to anyone, such as IS and AQ.

The on-going nuclear negotiations have not only helped engage Iran but also created leverage. Now, Iran has to prioritize its interests. It has to evaluate if it’s more important to achieve a permanent nuclear deal and normalization of ties with the West or continue with its activities in Syria and its support of Hezbollah. Clearly, Hezbollah’s restraint during the recent Gaza flare-up was no accident. Iran’s cooperation and constructive role in these areas, including in Iraq, could be highly conducive in ultimately achieving that ever-elusive peace between Israel and Palestine.

For this approach to fully yield results, the anxieties of Israel and Sunni Arab nations, especially Saudi Arabia, would have to be carefully managed. Behind the scenes the debate continues whether a ‘full spectrum’ approach should be adopted towards talks with Iran. Complicating the picture is that Israel equates Hezbollah and Hamas with other non-state actors, such as IS and AQ.

As NATO leaders strategize and Washington attempts to put together a coalition to deal with IS and their fellow ideological travellers, the critical difference between non-state actors that can be controlled by state actors, and those that can’t be, should be kept in mind. This differentiation may well be more useful than the standard classification of extremists with regional agenda and those with global aims, which evolved after 9/11.
This has the risk of conveying the wrong signal to the states that have influence over non-state actors and use them to achieve political ends. At the same time, it has the benefit of attaching responsibility for the conduct of such non-state actors. The best way to fight extremism at this juncture is to isolate AQ and IS from potential associates, and jump-start the search for political solution in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Societal Transformation

In addition to the role of non-state actors, it is critical to understand the fundamental transformation that Islamic regions and societies are going through. Regardless of the reasons why this is occurring, the balance is shifting towards religious conservatism. This is making Western powers edgy. Especially, if it leads to Islamists gaining power, like they did in Egypt and Tunisia.

But instead of preventing moderate Islamists from gaining power, they should be supported if they win free and fair elections. Moderate Islamists present the last hope to change the tide against the extremists. It’s better to allow them to fail, if that happens to be the case, rather than forcibly removing them. Premature removal of such regimes provides further fuel to the non-state actors that don’t listen and adopt violent means to achieve their aims.

In this context too, the engagement with Iran takes on added emphasis. If a deal over its nuclear program is reached in the near future, it conveys that, if properly engaged, even theocracies can act rationally.

As NATO and the US deliberate on a new strategy, it is clear success against extremists will not be achieved by kinetic means alone, but more so by making them irrelevant. One way to achieve this is to bring moderate Islamists into the fold, despite fears and apprehensions, and then help shift the total societal balance to the center later. There should be no illusions, adjusting this balance will require many years, as it did to get to the present unstable state.

The regional governments’ association with the West adds to the attraction of non-state actors. The war will be won by moving the masses away from the pull of non-state actors and making the state actors govern responsibly and deliver on their citizens’ socio-economic needs, which can hardly be done by focusing primarily on security affairs.

With events occurring so quickly and the possibility of black swans high, it’s not certain this strategy would be enough to change the tide at this late stage. The regional allies are proving incapable or unwilling of standing up to the challenge, and airpower alone will not do the job. Therefore, at this juncture it’s equally essential to not be fixated on the present reality alone and in preventing what may happen. Making strategy is as much about envisioning and preparing for an alternative reality.

Arif Ansar is a Chief Analyst at PoliTact and Claude Rakisits is a Director at PoliTact and Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council.

The post A Successful Strategy To Defeat Islamic State, Non State Actors appeared first on Politact.

As the concentration of Pakistan and the world was focused on the Karachi airport attack, alarming questions were raised once again. Some of these are concerning the next phase of the campaign against extremists. In essence the query relates to the future direction of the campaign against terror, now that its tentacles are spread all over the landscape without respect of the nation-state confines.

Tragically, whenever the subject of extremism is discussed in Pakistan, it’s in the context of Afghanistan and India. However, the issue of extremism has a wider context. Just look at what took place in northern and western Iraq this week when a number of cities were lost to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (or ISIL), an offshoot of AQ. To deal with extremism in Pakistan obviously the local and regional dynamics and lessons would have to be kept in mind. Equally important is to keep in perspective the emerging Western strategies.

When dealing with any complicated issue, it’s critical to look at the emerging patterns and trends first, not the outcomes, and then develop their strategic implications. The current atmosphere of fast moving change and the breaking news and elections cycles, forces institutions and individuals to deal with the short-term, and extra efforts have to be devoted to the long-term thinking about what is taking shape.

Three particular interrelated sequential phenomenons have combined to create a highly combustible situation in the Middle East and beyond. One of them is obviously the wider campaign against extremism, which has now morphed with the Arab Spring related uprisings. The third tangent is the growing tensions between US and Russia, and China and US, which has created circumstances resembling the global power tussles of the past.

Analysis

The Campaign Against Terror

PoliTact has previously presented the debate on the various causes that produced each of these variables. The reasons and the future direction of these factors are up for much discussion, and are interpreted differently in various regions of the world. Similarly, international media sources and various centers of intellectual thinking, often present a checkered understanding of the progress of the war against terror. It is by no means over and actually appears to be just to take off right now. It is now truly taking the form of non-state actors versus state actors frame.

Many of the western supported governments are at the front end of this assault by the non-state actors. What took place in Iraq this week is a prime example of the predicament. In the aftermath of US withdrawal, Iraq has remained mired in escalating sectarian tensions and the wider tensions between Iran and Sunni Arab states.

In case of Syria, a new differentiation has emerged; moderates and extremists. Moderates in Syria are those Sunni liberal fighters that want Assad government to go and have the backing of key Gulf States, including the West. Extremists in Syria are of two types; Sunni extremists are the AQ inspired groups while Shiite extremists constitute Hezbollah, which has the backing of Iran and Syria.

One of the most important lessons of Syria is that Assad regime would not have survived without the urban warfare skills of Hezbollah and technical advice from Iranian Quds Force. Furthermore, Russian influence in the Security Council also played a key part in holding off foreign military intervention in Syria.

Good and Bad Extremists

In the South Asian region, Sunni non-state actors (Afghan Taliban and Pakistan based Taliban) are also on the assault in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. In the aftermath of the US/NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014, the country is the most vulnerable of the three. With all the differences, Afghanistan’s situation is peculiarly similar to that of Iraq, where Iraqi US trained forces either abandoned or were overrun by ISIS. This has raised the prospect of US air strikes or direct Iranian involvement in Iraq to stop the advance of Sunni extremist forces.

The critical differentiating factor in Iraq has now come to be the air power, and future Afghan resistance to Taliban will also have to rely heavily on this. A point also emphasized by the Afghan presidential candidate Ashraf Ghani at a talk recently hosted by the Atlantic Council via Skype.

In a similar discussion organized by the Atlantic Council and the Center for American Progress with Afghan presidential candidate Dr Abdullah Abdullah on June 12, PoliTact raised a comparison between the present situation of Iraq and the future of Afghanistan. Dr. Abdullah stated that Afghanistan is different than Iraq because the people have rejected Taliban and their ideology. Moreover, he added the lesson of Iraq is that sectarian policies will not work in any place. Lastly, he made an important point that to prevent an Iraq like dilemma, the legitimacy of the government and its policies, rule of law, and provision of services to the masses, are equally important.

The lack of governance and corruption are perhaps the main causes behind what triggered the Arab Awakening. These symptoms are amply visible in Pakistan as well. While the majority does not agree with the agenda of extremists, the secular governments of these regions have failed to deliver benefits to the people, and now stand at the precipice of either collapse or vying for status quo.

This is occurring at a time when the West is looking for partners to continue to fight against extremists, as it retrenches to deal with more strategic state adversaries, such as China and Russia. Meanwhile, as the economies of these terror inflicted states crumble, they need western support to fight, as they aspire for stabilization that is not attainable.

This has created a highly tumultuous environment for the states in question.
They can hardly gain credibility when they continue to fail to deliver to the masses and appear to be western lackeys. This in turn reinforces the message of the extremists and thus creates a vicious cycle. Just as the West is ‘moving on’ in the campaign against terror, the Associates of AQ are ressurging. This does not bode well for the weak states that are balancing western pressure to tackle extremism and provide services for the masses at the same time. Economic prosperity only follows peace, while war and peace do not exist simultaneously.

The post Campaign Against Terror; The Confrontation Between State, Non-State Actors appeared first on Politact.

Context

With the carnage of Quetta and Swat in perspective, a question to ponder over is: at a time when the US is withdrawing from Afghanistan, why is Pakistan setting off? At a juncture, when elections are just around the corner, why has Tahirul Qadri decided to launch a long march? Most importantly, what has caused Pakistan’s military to change its threat perception after more than a decade fighting the war on terror?

There are two prevalent views on what will happen in Pakistan once the US withdraws from Afghanistan. These two differing outlooks complicate the politics of the nation and will very well define its future course.

Analysis

Two Schools Of Thought

One of these schools proclaims that once NATO forces pull out, the motivation for Afghan Taliban will wither away, and things will move back to normal. The same holds true for the Pakistani and Punjabi Taliban residing in FATA and other parts of Pakistan. This has been a key position of nationalists and conservative elements (Salafi and Deobandi) in Pakistan. Political parties such as the Pakistan’s Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) has consistently favored a political solution to the Afghan quagmire that has spilled over into the country. This approach and conceptualization to Pakistan’s present political, economic and security challenges also a hold that the threat Pakistan faces is primarily external that desires to trigger a civil war with in the country.

The other school believes that once NATO troops depart from Afghanistan, Islamist forces will get stronger, and this will reinforce similar elements on the Pakistan side of the border. These groups include TTP and other loosely affiliated sectarian militants, including Indian-focused jihadists. This stance is popular among the liberal elements and ethnic minorities of Pakistan that have repeatedly felt the brunt of deadly and brutal extremist onslaught. Just like the US, India, and Afghanistan, this construct stipulates the threat Pakistan is facing mostly internal not external.

Afghan Reconciliation And Pakistan’s Threat Perception

While Afghanistan reconciliation is in the works, NATO efforts are also underway to counter the risk posed by Pakistan-based extremists to the region and beyond. For these efforts to work, however, has required the acquiescence of Pakistan’s military. In this regard, US has carried out a long campaign convincing the nation the danger it faces is not from outside, but from elements within the country that also targeting NATO forces in Afghanistan. The unrelenting lobbying has now produced results, with Pakistan assured of its role in the Afghan reconciliation, and Pakistan-India ties normalizing, its military announced a change in its threat perception. Barely a week later, however, Pakistan-India tensions are on the rise due to incidents on the LOC.

Coincidentally, shift in Pakistan’s threat perception is accompanied by an increase in drone strikes in FATA against both good and bad Taliban. Another evidence of the policy shift was the elimination of Mullah Nazir for which, other than the customary, there was no strong reaction from the Pakistan’s side. During his meeting with Karzai in Washington, President Obama stated that there is growing recognition of the risk posed by the extremists in Pakistan. Obviously, the extremists sense this transformation and will attempt to preempt it. The upsurge of deadly attacks across Pakistan, especially in Peshawar, Swat and Quetta, appear to be a part of this. Far from public awareness and media attention, a dangerous stage in Pakistan’s history may have commenced.

Pakistan’s Politics And Role In The War On Terror

With the war on terror transitioning to a smarter and economical phase, President Obama also declared recently the Afghan dilemma could not be resolved without Pakistan’s cooperation. One cannot overlook the link between the next phase in Afghanistan and who comes to power in Pakistan.

The design of Tahirul Qadri’s long march may be to circumvent the nationalists from significantly impacting the politics of Pakistan after the elections. In PoliTact’s assessment, a coalition of nationalist and conservative Islamic elements, otherwise, is highly probable in the coming elections. These forces are strongly opposed to Pakistan’s involvement in the war against terror and drone strikes. Qadri’s long march could change this scenario and move the election results towards an alliance of liberal and moderate Islamists (Sufi-Barelvi) as the country takes on the groups posing the internal threat.

The thrust of this maneuver may have been to prevent an Egypt like scenario playing out in nuclear-armed Pakistan. In Egypt, and in other Arab Spring impacted countries, it is feared that the extreme Islamists will eventually outmaneuver the moderate Islamists to take on the helms of power, the ultimate nightmare for the security perception of Israel. The lesson from Egypt is once such elements get a hold of power, it is extremely difficult to dislodge them. The Gulf States are also weary of Muslim Brotherhood’s attempt to export Arab Spring to their countries. The risk of such a scenario playing out in Pakistan is too high to be ignored.

Consider, for example, the leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) traveled to Egypt in June 2011 for a four-day visit at the invitation of the chief of Ikhwannul Muslimoon, Dr. Muhammad Badei. According to media reports, both sides agreed to closer cooperation between Islamic movements in different parts of the world. Such linkages and contacts are probably being closely watched.

For a long-time, Western policies have been driven by the threat of Islamists taking over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Moreover, if Pakistan was to distance itself from the war on terror, NATO’s emerging strategy would be endangered at a delicate stage; when the alliance is eager to exit Afghanistan. In a nutshell, as NATO withdraws, it wants Pakistan to take on the fight against extremist and militant elements with in the country. Without political and public consensus, however, this scenario can lead to increased polarization and towards a dreadful and deadly prospect of a civil war.

The post Afghan Reconciliation, War On Terror And Future Politics of Pakistan appeared first on Politact.

Context

US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton headed a powerful delegation to Pakistan for a two-day visit. The trip to Islamabad was preceded by a stop-over in Afghanistan, and afterward Clinton was headed to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to conclude her Central Asia tour. The high-profile delegation was clearly on a fence-mending mission, with Clinton all smiles during her stay in Pakistan. The friendly overtone belies a struggling US-Pakistan relationship, with the future of Afghanistan at the core.

Analysis

Clinton’s visit was a busy one, with public audiences given to a carefully selected group of business leaders and students, as well as peer-to-peer government meetings and closed-door sessions with Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari.

The message, by and large, is the same: deal with safe havens along the Afghan border, or we will deal with them for you. However, there was a notable tone of conciliation coming from Clinton, particularly in the public audience sessions.

It appears that one aspect of the trip was to make amends for the comments made by Admiral Mike Mullen about the ISI’s relationship with the Haqqani network. Clinton clearly stated when the question arose that there was ‘no evidence’ to support Mullen’s claims. However, it has been suggested that the issue about the ISI and the Haqqani network is being pursued behind closed doors, to minimize public outcry on both sides about the relationship.

Public and media perceptions were big topics on the agenda in the public audience sessions. Many audience members pointed out that the anti-Americanism witnessed in the Pakistani media and public opinions was being mirrored by a ‘demonize Pakistan’ campaign in the US media, which has hugely affected the public perception in the US of Pakistan’s role in the war on terror and the NATO efforts in Afghanistan.

Clinton was keen to keep the talks focused on ways Pakistan and the US can build their relationship constructively, citing economic cooperation and a “trade not aid” policy as two avenues to pursue going forward. She also expressed admiration for the progress being made regarding normalizing relations with India vis-à-vis Pakistan giving India a Most Favored Nation status and increased talks between the trade and finance ministries of both countries.

Clinton didn’t mention, however, the strategic deal between India and Afghanistan, one which many are calling “US staged,” as the strategic partnership has put Pakistan on edge. The perception of a containment policy towards Pakistan is high, and Clinton did well to navigate away from this subject.

The complex Indo-Pak relations are rapidly taking on a kind of double life, which above all exposes the different visions of Pakistan’s civilian government and it’s military. On the one hand, Pakistan’s military iterate again and again that their one eye is always on India, and on the other hand the government is charging ahead with economic cooperation initiatives, and the tit-for-tat friendship votes at the UN. Last year Pakistan voted for India to receive a seat on the Security Council, Friday, India returns the favor with a vote for Pakistan as a non-permanent member of the Security Council.

However genial the tone of the public audiences, Clinton was still in Islamabad to bang out a message to her Pakistani counterparts: do more about your border region. The three options that seemed to come from the US delegation were either, a) deal with the Haqqani network aggressively, b) we’ll deal with the Haqqani network aggressively for you, whether you like it or not, or c) bring them to negotiations.

The mention of negotiations with the Haqqanis was a surprise to many because the group has been at the center of such contention. However it may be more like lip-service to the Pakistani All Parties Conference message of “give peace a chance” than an actual belief in the Haqqani network being willing to negotiate, or Pakistan being able to bring them into negotiations.

Another party unsure about Pakistan’s ability to get negotiations underway with militant networks came from the so-called “Radio Mullah” Maulana Fazlullah. Fazlullah took the opportunity of the US delegation in Pakistan to declare ‘war’ on Pakistan. The Afghan-based Taliban leader was previously entrenched in the Swat region of northern Pakistan before fleeing in 2009 after a military offensive. He vowed to return to his former stronghold to “get Sharia implemented in the Malakand region and rest of Pakistan.”
What the Talks Accomplished

Press conferences after the high-level talks were held were full of meaningless phrases like “broadened understanding,” which signifies for all intents and purposes no real solutions were agreed upon or problems solved in the meetings. This is more or less expected, given that both sides are quite clear in stating their differences of opinion, and neither seems willing or able to change stance. Pakistan is still averse to enter into military engagement in North Waziristan, and the US still feels adamantly that they should.

This is not to say that nothing has changed due to the two-day visit. There was a clear effort to bring Pakistan back into the fold as far as the Afghan situation is concerned. Previously the US had slighted both Pakistan and Afghanistan by pursuing negotiations with the Taliban independent of both nations. While in Kabul on Wednesday, Clinton reaffirmed that the US wanted to reboot peace talks and negotiations including Afghanistan and Pakistan in the mix. She reiterated that Pakistan ‘must be part of the solution’ in Afghanistan.

On a broader level, it was very evident that the coming election year in the US was weighing on Clinton’s mind. A number of times she made reference to US domestic politics tying her hands in many regards toward Pakistan, particularly in regards to trade and emergency aid for this year’s bout of floods.

The looming presidential election may have played into the decision to placate Pakistan with smiles and an amiable demeanor, as President Obama will need as much calm and good news on the Af-Pak front as he can get during the lead up to the presidential race.

Pakistan Unmoved

Interestingly, Pakistan appears to be unmoved by the show of goodwill from the Secretary of State. Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani, reportedly asked the US delegation to respect the sentiments present in the All Party Conference resolution that stressed a peaceful solution to the Afghan conflict, through dialogue.

Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar was even more barefaced in outlining the manifest differences between the two countries. In a joint press conference with Clinton, she rebuffed the US assertion, whether official or not, that Pakistan has been knowingly supporting safe havens in its territory: “There is no question of any support by any Pakistani institutions to safe havens in Pakistan,” she said. “Let me be unequivocal and completely clear about that.”

She further added, in a veiled reference to the high cost of the US strategic partnership, that she takes the threat of terrorism “very, very seriously because we live with this threat on a daily basis; we live with this threat on an hourly basis.”

It appears Pakistan has set out to make it plain to the US that it is, after all a sovereign nation with national interests not always congruent to those of the US, which the US must respect.

The Long Road Ahead

Pakistan and the US know that the region at large is as important as Afghanistan itself for securing a lasting peace in Afghanistan. Most importantly, neighbors Iran and Pakistan.

In this light, Pakistan takes on even greater importance for the US, because there is little if any hope for any sort of help from Iran when the US is involved.

This in turn makes Pakistan more nervous, because they know that the US doesn’t feel it can rely on them to do as asked, so the other card they can play on is India. Already the increased Indian involvement in Afghanistan, as mentioned, has ratcheted up concern in Pakistan, despite ongoing efforts to improve relations between the countries.

It is a knife-edge kind of game for Pakistan, because they are attempting to assert themselves, but at the same time they realize that if the US perception about Pakistan deteriorates further, to the point where they no longer feel the relationship is productive then US support for Indian involvement would likely escalate. However, US very well knows that there can be no permanent solution to Afghanistan minus its two neighbors.

As one audience member at the Clinton talks aptly put it, the “US is like a mother-in-law which is just not satisfied with us.”

Tell us what you think: feedback@politact.com

The post Hillary Clinton’s Visit To Pakistan, Future of Afghanistan And US-Pakistan Relations appeared first on Politact.

Pakistan has urged Afghan and US led forces to take action against the Taliban leader Maulvi Fazlullah. Fazlullah also known as Radio Mullah, is known to use the radio to broadcast fiery rhetoric into the Northern areas of Pakistan. Insurgents loyal to the leader raided villages in Dir, Bajaur and Mohmand earlier this year. Attacks by the Maulana’s men have also caused damage to army and security forces. Islamabad has urged Kabul to take action against militants such as Maulvi Fazlullah in the border areas of Kunar and Nuristan. According to Pakistan Army spokesman Major General Athar Abbas, Fazlullah’s group is trying to enter Swat through Dir. The area had been relatively stable till recently.

The post Pakistan Urges Afghan Action Against Maulvi Fazlullah appeared first on Politact.

A top Taliban leader has threatened to strike nine more major Pakistani installations similar to the attack on PNS Mehran Base in Karachi in order to avenge Osama bin Laden’s death. “The revenge game has already been started from Pakistan. The attack on Mehran Naval Base in Karachi was the first in the line of 10 that Taliban has planned to avenge the death of bin Laden,” said Wali-ur-Rehman, commander of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in South Waziristan, in an interview this week.

The post Taliban Threaten To Strike Nine Key Pakistani Installations appeared first on Politact.

Context
Mullah Umar has denied the Taliban’s involvement in attacks on hospitals, schools and other public places. In a statement issued over the weekend, the Taliban leader claimed that the attacks were being carried out by foreign powers to defame the Taliban movement and challenged NATO to provide proof of his comrades’ involvement. Surprisingly, he praised the role of education in developing countries. According to Mullah Umar, the only aim of the Taliban is to drive foreign forces out of Afghanistan.

The post Mullah Umar Denies Attacks on Civilians appeared first on Politact.

According to media reports Colonel Imam who was also known as the father of Taliban has been killed by his captors. On the other hand, some reports have claimed he died of a heart attack while in captivity. Colonel Imam was abducted along with Khalid Khwaja and a British journalist last March, when they were heading to North Waziristan. Khwaja was shot dead last April while the British journalist Asad Qureshi was released after a payment of ransom. A little known group Asian Tigers have claimed responsibility for the initial abduction.

The death of Colonel Imam has raised some important questions regarding who controls North Waziristan, where he and others were abducted. Afghan Taliban carried sympathies for Colonel Imam and had been making efforts for his release.

The event could lead to internal strife between Afghan Taliban, Punjabi Taliban, and Pakistani Taliban (TTP). This would not be a terrible outcome from NATO’s and American point of view. Furthermore, if there is infighting; the need for a North Waziristan operation becomes moot. However, this could also suggest more disarray in FATA, as no one party appears to be in control of the situation there. In the coming days, it would be interesting to see if Al Qaeda linked Ilyas Kashmiri had anything to do with the assassinations of two former ISI officials.

Tell Us What You Think

The post The Death of Colonel Imam appeared first on Politact.

Context

Soon after meeting Vice President Joe Biden, President Zardari is heading to US to take part in the memorial services honoring Richard Holbrooke. This article examines the significance of this visit as Mike Mullen declared Pakistan the epicenter of global terrorism today. Facing dire economic prospects, Pakistan appears all set to pursue a political solution while US demands an operation in North Waziristan to deal with Afghan quagmire.

Analysis

The memorial service for Richard Holbrooke has turned in to a mini conference of sorts. Not only will the service provide an opportunity to honor his diplomatic services and achievements, but also an occasion for international dignitaries to informally take stock of the Afghan situation. Special representatives for Afghanistan, from many different countries, are attending. Reportedly, Holbrooke used to have a monthly consultation with this group on the situation of Afghanistan. He was also a staunch supporter of Zardari government.

From the point of view US, Zaradri’s visit provides a good opportunity to get his first-hand impression on the situation of Pakistan and its relations with India, including FATA and Afghanistan, and compare it to the military leadership of the country. It would also be interesting to hear his side of the story on the brazen assassination of the Governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer. There is considerable concern in US on how far the religious extremism has spread in Pakistan and what it means for the future of the country.

Zardari travels to US as a much-weakened President. Just a few days ago his Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) led coalition government appeared to be falling apart. The only reason it was able to survive was because it made a swift u-turn under political pressure, and reversed the price hikes on fuel it had announced earlier. Furthermore, the fragility of his government means it lacks political clout to muster support for Reformed General Sales Tax (RGST). The IMF, World Bank, and US economic assistance to Pakistan is dependent on the implementation of these provisions. However, these reforms and taxes are highly unpopular in Pakistan. The economy of the country was already reeling from the impact of terrorism, the floods and the energy crisis has nearly crippled the nation’s economy.

In these circumstances, the nations sentiment including that of its military is fast shifting towards a political solution for Afghanistan quagmire and FATA insurgency. A peace initiative supported by Turkey is gaining ground in the region, and as part of this the head of Afghan Peace Committee Burhanuddin Rabbani, recently visited Pakistan. However, US wants Pakistan to take military action in North Waziristan as that would strengthen its position and operations in Afghanistan, and weaken the bargaining leverage of Afghan Taliban.

This difference of premise was also apparent in the media coverage of Joe Biden’s visit to Pakistan. Pakistan’s media bolstered the country has made clear to US that it would no longer accept any Great Game ambitions in Afghanistan, and foreign interference in FATA. Whereas media coverage in US is represented by Mike Mullen’s statement today, stating that Pakistan was the epicenter of global terrorism and that Pakistan Army knows what it has to do to eliminate safe havens.

At this crucial junction of the Afghan war, Pakistan’s military may have decided its time for a political solution, as it can no longer sustain the conflict economically. Before sitting down for talks, US wants Pakistan to carryout the North Waziristan operation and is willing to provide the economic and military assistance the country needs. With anti-American sentiment running high in Pakistan, and economic situation worsening by the day, no government would be able to survive for long if it chooses to disregard public opinion.

Tell Us What You Think

Feedback@politact.com

The post President Zardari’s Visit To The US – The Status of Afghan War appeared first on Politact.

Context

In the aftermath of the third round of US-Pakistan strategic talks, held last week in Washington, the likelihood of North Waziristan operation has increased. The promised $2 billion worth of US military assistance for Pakistan and the reported breakdown of peace talks with Taliban have further increased the likelihood of the offensive. Meanwhile, Iran has joined the Afghan Contact Group, which met in Rome, with US acquiescence. This article looks at how Taliban are reacting to these developments in FATA.

The statements coming out of Washington indicate Pakistan Army gave assurances again about conducting a sweep in North Waziristan, however, the country has reiterated that only it will determine the timing of this operation.

In anticipation of the operation statements have emanated from both the Taliban of Pakistan and Afghan origin. If Pakistan was to act, it would raise serious problems for the Afghan Taliban strategy. Local Taliban belonging to the Mujahidin Shura of North Waziristan have stated they would relocate to Afghanistan, in case Pakistan conducts the operation, and threatened to ask Karzai for shelter. The Shura also clarified it would not violate the peace treaty it signed with Pakistan government in 2007, and all incidents would be first investigated.

Analysis

At the same time, the Afghan Haqqani network, which is based in North Waziristan, is trying hard to broker peace in Kurram tribal district. This is occurring after clashes have continued for three years, between local tribes that are for and against Taliban. Kurram borders North Waziristan and is of immense strategic value, as it is located on the Afghan border and quite close to Kabul. The Haqqani network intends to relocate to a new base in Kurram tribal agency before the launch of the offensive.

However, this is not the first time Taliban have attempted to clear out Kurram for their particular use. Pakistani Taliban have for years used ruthless tactics to eradicate the area of forces that have stood in their way, which are mostly Shiites. The Shiites are deeply indignant of Taliban and Al Qaeda and their Wahabi Salafi Islamic doctrine. On their part Al Qaeda and its affiliates, also loath Shiite population, be it in Kurram or Iraq.  According to the religious beliefs of Al Qaeda, Shiites are non-Muslims and traitors and liable to be killed.

Iran has been quite sensitive to the atrocities and mass murders committed by Taliban in Kurram. The Shiites of Kurram Agency, who have religious and cultural affinity with Iran, have been getting consistent flow of weapons and finances from Tehran in its fight against Taliban. This support is believed to be the main reason the anti-Taliban Shiite groups have successfully resisted Taliban taking over the area.

According to PoliTact sources, one of the other objectives of Siraj Haqqani to broker peace in Kurram, is to pacify the influence of Iran. Furthermore, to diminish the possibility and motivation for Iranians to allow the use of its Charbahar port, to supply NATO forces in Afghanistan via Nimroz province. In the aftermath of the closure of Torkham supply route, NATO authorities are trying to organize supplies through other routes, including Iran.

The attempts by the Haqqanis and Taliban to appease Iran, also has another critical reason. Iran continues to overlook the use of its territory, which the potential fighters crossover from Middle East to enter Afghanistan and tribal areas of Pakistan. Taliban want Iran to not produce any impediment in this regard. In the months ahead, this route is going to play a crucial role as US completes its troop surge in Afghanistan.

The above laid out reasons could be why US allowed Iran to join the International Afghan Contact Group meeting in Rome. The group gathers the Afghan government, NATO, the EU, U.N. and other key players to assess progress in Afghanistan. Richard Holbrooke, U.S. special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan commented that it had no problem with Iran joining the group. However, the reaction of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are far from clear.

Tell Us What You think

The post The Status of North Waziristan Operation and Taliban Contingency Plans -Haqqani Network, Kurram Agency and Iran appeared first on Politact.