Context

The saga of the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline project is a stark illustration of how geopolitical complexities can impede critical infrastructure development, even when the need is dire. For Pakistan, a country grappling with chronic energy shortages, this pipeline has long represented a beacon of hope for economic stability and growth. Yet, for decades, it has remained tantalizing out of reach, a victim of international pressures, regional rivalries, and economic challenges.

The story begins in 2010 when Pakistan, facing an escalating energy crisis, signed a landmark deal with Iran to construct a 2,750-kilometer pipeline. Initially valued at $7.5 billion, the project promised to be a game-changer for Pakistan’s energy sector. The potential impact was significant: according to a USIP report, Pakistan’s persistent power crisis was trimming off about 2 percent of the country’s annual domestic product[1]. Furthermore, a World Bank study estimated that power shortages in developing countries like Pakistan could reduce business profitability by up to 40 percent[2]. These figures underscored the critical nature of the project for Pakistan’s economic well-being and future growth prospects.

Economic and Geopolitical Realities

From its inception, the project has been shadowed by the looming threat of U.S. sanctions. Unlike India, which received exemptions for its involvement in Iran’s Chabahar port, or Afghanistan, which was granted allowances for trade through Iran, Pakistan has consistently faced stern warnings from Washington about the consequences of proceeding with the pipeline. This disparity in treatment reflects the complex web of U.S. strategic interests in the region. India is viewed as a potential counterweight to China’s growing influence, while for Afghanistan Chabahar represents and alternative for its dependence on Pakistan. Pakistan, with its complex relationship with the U.S. and close ties to China, finds itself in a less favorable position.

The US policy towards Pakistan, Iran, and India have different ambitions. The situation demonstrates the complexity of international relations, where strict policy adherence often gives way to strategic exceptions based on broader geopolitical goals. The American approach has been criticized for its inconsistency, but from the U.S. perspective, it reflects a nuanced balancing of various strategic interests in the region. Using exceptions and restrictions as tools allows U.S, to influence foreign policy choices of regional players.

The geopolitical landscape has further complicated Pakistan’s position. Historically, tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran meant that Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations were hesitant to support a project that could increase Iran’s influence and decrease Pakistan’s financial dependence on them. Especially because Iran’s influence in the Middle East has consistently been increasing. China and Iran also signed $400 billion-dollar strategic economic agreement in 2021.

While the Chinese facilitated Saudi-Iran détente reached in 2023 offered a glimmer of hope, it has not significantly altered the dynamics surrounding the pipeline project. This hesitation from traditional allies has left Pakistan in a precarious position, caught between its energy needs and its diplomatic relationships. Moreover, the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel has further hardened positions against Iran.

Pakistan’s economic instability has added another layer of difficulty. The country’s frequent need for IMF bailouts and its struggle to finance large-scale infrastructure projects have made the pipeline’s completion seem increasingly elusive. As years passed, the project’s costs escalated, and the global political and security environment became even more convoluted, making it more challenging for Pakistan to move forward. In August 2023, Pakistan announced the suspension of the project due to the threat of U.S. sanctions, highlighting the ongoing pressures and uncertainties surrounding the initiative.

The failure of alternative energy projects has exacerbated Pakistan’s predicament. Initiatives like TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline) and CASA 1000 (Central Asia-South Asia power project) have stalled, often citing security concerns in Afghanistan and Baluchistan. Consequently, Pakistan remains heavily reliant on expensive Independent Power Producers (IPPs), a situation that undermines the competitiveness of its exports in the global market. This dependence on costly energy sources creates a vicious cycle, hampering economic growth and making it even more difficult for Pakistan to invest in long-term energy solutions.

Meanwhile, regional dynamics have shifted dramatically. India has made significant strides in enhancing its connectivity to Central Asia through the Chabahar port, effectively bypassing Pakistan. In May 2024, India signed a 10-year agreement to develop and operate Iran’s strategic Chabahar Port, committing $120 million, along with an additional $250 million loan credit facility for related projects. This development not only provides India with strategic advantages but also highlights the opportunities Pakistan is missing due to its inability to complete the pipeline project. The Chabahar port offers India an opportunity to reestablish its presence in Afghanistan and enhance its access to Central Asian markets, areas where Pakistan could have played a pivotal role had the pipeline project moved forward.

The Opportunity Cost

The opportunity cost for Pakistan is substantial and multifaceted. Economically, the completion of the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline could have significantly reduced Pakistan’s energy import bill. Conservative estimates suggest that access to Iranian natural gas could have saved Pakistan billions of dollars annually in energy costs[3]. This reduction in energy expenses would have had a cascading positive effect on the economy, potentially boosting GDP growth by 1-2% per annum[4].

Moreover, the availability of reliable and affordable energy would have been a boon for Pakistan’s industrial sector. Many industries, particularly textiles – a key export sector for Pakistan – have suffered due to inconsistent power supply. With a steady supply of natural gas, these industries could have operated at full capacity, potentially increasing export revenues by 15-20% annually[5].

The pipeline could have also played a crucial role in reducing Pakistan’s dependence on the IMF. By stabilizing energy costs and boosting industrial output, Pakistan could have improved its foreign exchange reserves and reduced its current account deficit. Economic projections suggest that over a 10-year period, the pipeline could have contributed to reducing Pakistan’s external debt by 20-25%, significantly altering its financial landscape and reducing the need for frequent IMF interventions[6].

Furthermore, the project had the potential to transform Pakistan into an energy corridor, linking Iran to the vast markets of South Asia. This role could have brought in significant transit fees and positioned Pakistan as a key player in regional energy dynamics. Conservative estimates put potential transit fee earnings at $500 million to $1 billion annually, a substantial boost to Pakistan’s foreign exchange earnings[7].

The environmental impact is another overlooked aspect. Natural gas, being a cleaner fuel compared to oil and coal, could have helped Pakistan meet its climate change commitments more effectively. The shift to gas could have reduced carbon emissions by 15-20% in the power sector alone, contributing to global climate goals while also improving local air quality[8].

Navigating the Future

As Pakistan grapples with these lost opportunities and ongoing challenges, it finds itself at a critical juncture. The country must navigate the escalating great power rivalry between the United States and China while addressing its pressing energy needs. In this context, Pakistan could consider a multi-faceted approach to move forward.

Firstly, Pakistan should intensify its diplomatic efforts with the United States, emphasizing the project’s importance for regional stability and economic development. Framing the pipeline as a crucial element for broader international goals in the region might help in securing exemptions or finding a middle ground. This approach could involve highlighting how energy security in Pakistan contributes to overall regional stability, a key U.S. foreign policy objective. A more economically stable Pakistan could be a more effective partner in fighting extremism and promoting regional security.

Engaging with Iran through economic projects could provide more diplomatic leverage for the international community in negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program. While the pipeline would benefit Iran, it would also make Iran more dependent on its neighbors for economic stability, potentially increasing leverage in nuclear negotiations.

Secondly, Pakistan could leverage the improved Saudi-Iran relations to garner support from GCC countries. This diplomatic outreach should be coupled with a renewed focus on diversifying energy sources, including accelerating the development of domestic resources and exploring alternative gas import options. The recent geopolitical shifts in the Middle East offer a unique opportunity for Pakistan to reposition itself in regional energy dynamics.

Thirdly, Pakistan should consider a phased implementation of the pipeline project, starting with sections less likely to trigger immediate sanctions. This approach could be complemented by exploring technical solutions that might mitigate sanctions risks, such as processing Iranian gas at the border. By breaking the project into smaller, more manageable phases, Pakistan might be able to demonstrate progress and build momentum while navigating complex international regulations.

Furthermore, Pakistan needs to reduce political polarization and strengthen its economic foundations through structural reforms. Improving the investment climate to attract foreign investment in the energy sector and reducing dependence on external financial support would put Pakistan in a stronger position to pursue its energy security goals. These reforms could include streamlining bureaucratic processes, enhancing transparency in the energy sector, and developing a clear, long-term energy policy that prioritizes sustainable and affordable energy sources.

In the broader context of great power rivalry, Pakistan should maintain a balanced approach between the U.S. and China. Leveraging relationships with both nations, while also exploring multilateral forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and potentially BRICS, could open new avenues for support and cooperation on energy projects. This balanced approach could involve positioning the pipeline project as part of a broader regional connectivity initiative that benefits multiple stakeholders, potentially making it more palatable to international partners.

The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline project remains a symbol of unfulfilled potential in regional cooperation and energy security. Its completion could catalyze a transformation in Pakistan’s economic landscape, potentially adding 2-3% to annual GDP growth, creating hundreds of thousands of jobs, and significantly reducing the country’s carbon footprint. The ripple effects would extend beyond Pakistan’s borders, fostering regional integration and potentially contributing to stability in a volatile region.

As Pakistan continues to navigate the complex interplay of domestic needs and international pressures, the path forward requires astute diplomacy, economic resilience, and strategic foresight. By addressing these challenges head-on and adapting to the evolving geopolitical landscape, Pakistan may yet find a way to turn this long-delayed project into a reality. The stakes are high – not just for Pakistan’s energy security, but for its economic future and its role in an increasingly interconnected region.

The coming years will be crucial in determining whether Pakistan can overcome the hurdles that have long delayed this project. Success would not only secure a more stable energy future for its people but could also redefine Pakistan’s position in the regional and global economic order. The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline, therefore, represents more than just an energy project; it is a test of Pakistan’s ability to navigate complex geopolitical waters and emerge as a key player in the changing dynamics of South and Central Asia.

References:

[1] United States Institute of Peace (USIP) report on Pakistan’s energy crisis (2023)

[2] World Bank study on power shortages in developing countries (2022)

[3] Asian Development Bank (ADB) report on South Asian energy trade (2021)

[4] International Monetary Fund (IMF) country report on Pakistan (2023)

[5] Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Annual Export Data (2023)

[6] Economic projections by Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) (2022)

[7] Estimates from Pakistan’s Ministry of Energy (Petroleum Division) (2021)

[8] Pakistan’s Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to the Paris Agreement (2021)

Related Links:

Iran-Pakistan Cross-Border Clashes And Deep-Rooted Challenges

Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States

The Future and Politics of Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project

The post The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities appeared first on Politact.

In the COVID-19 geopolitical context, this zoom webinar, held on on July 28, explores the ramifications of the likely China, Iran economic and security pact for the Gulf region and its ties with Pakistan and India. Another important query examined is how will the pact correlate with the Saudi-Iran tensions and US-Saudi ties. Moreover, the panelists examined the impact of the deal for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

The panel included:
1. Khaled Almaeena – Former Editor-in-Chief of Arab News and Saudi Gazette.
2. Ambassador (R) Mustafa Kamal Kazi – Senior Vice Chairman and Senior Diplomat Emarituis, Karachi Council on Foreign Relations.
3. Dr. Claude Rakisits – Honorary Associate Professor, Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy, Australian National University.

This zoom webinar is part of a series PoliTact has organized to examine the economic and security interconnections between South Asia and the Middle East. In November 2018, PoliTact collaborated with the Middle East Institute to study this relation in detail (link: https://youtu.be/Wq7cWEsaqcs).

The post What Does The Potential China, Iran Economic and Security Deal Mean? appeared first on Politact.

Context

Since 911, and even before, the world affairs are often linked to significant events that force upon a change from routine, while moving them towards a different direction. The often-quoted assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 is a case in point that directly led to World War I. Then there are natural catastrophes that can have dramatic results on the conduct of human affairs. The dinosaurs are believed to have been made extinct 65 millions years ago by either an asteroid impact or a comet shower. Our universe itself was created as a result of an accumulation of reactions that caused the big bang 13.8 billion years ago.

While the natural catastrophes are beyond human control, human beings can plan events to have certain impacts and outcomes. The risk is that sometimes such instances have the desired outcomes with known side effects, but at other times, there can be unintended consequences. The killing of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani was just such an event. The question becomes that while Qasem Soleimani, a state actor, had been conducting the activities he is known for a while, why take him out now?

While there are different angles to assess this, PoliTact has attempted to grasp it from the perspective of Core versus Peripheral Islamic world theory. What risks did Qasem Soleimani particularly, and Iran generally, posed at this juncture as it relates to the affairs of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. May be it was not what he had done up to this point that mattered, but what he could have potentially assembled as an experienced player – to challenge the newly unveiled Trump’s Middle East Peace Process.

Analysis

As previously noted that the continuing war against terror, plus the situation of Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Libya, have played havoc in the regions of South and Central Asia, Middle East, and Islamic Maghreb. This has led to ever escalating political, security and economic flux and instability. In this, the multidimensional relations of Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have taken on an added significance. As the chart demonstrates, the following four segments of this diagram need to be further examined, and juxtaposed vis-à-vis the influences of other global powers.

1. Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia

These three Sunni states have much in common. However, there views diverge when it comes to important matters of the region and beyond, to include Kashmir and Palestinian issue.

In fact, Saudi Arabia, including UAE, is competing with Turkish interests in Syria and Libya. As it relates to the Middle East Peace Process, Turkey, Iran, and Qatar have opposed the Israeli blockade of Gaza and provided economic support to the Palestinians. On the other hand, Egypt, backed by Saudi Arabia, facilitated the blockade by closing the crossing points for the Palestinians.

Turkey, in addition to Malaysia, has spoken out against the Indian decision to impose emergency and unilaterally revoking the special status of Kashmir on August 5, 2019. On the contrary, Saudi Arabia and UAE have not taken such a stance and have in fact increased their investments in India.

Reportedly, the Saudis exerted tremendous pressure on Pakistan to keep the nation away from the Islamic Summit held in Malaysia last December. Saudi Arabia feared that the conference of Islamic nations was an attempt by Malaysia and Turkey to develop an alternative body to the Saudi dominated OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference). The Islamic Summit organized by Malaysia, and backed by Qatar, Turkey and Iran, indicated a preliminary attempt to present an alternative forum. This endeavor was opposed by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt.

“We are attempting to start small, and if these ideas, proposals and solutions are acceptable and prove workable, then we hope to take them up to the larger platform for consideration,” Malaysian Prime Minister Dr Mahathir stated. He added, I have suggested that we re-visit the idea of trading using the gold dinar and barter trade among us.

While US ties with Pakistan have improved recently because of its active facilitation of Afghan reconciliation; US-India alignment continues to be a source of tension, to which now Saudi Arabia and UAE have also been added. Turkish-US ties are also not well despite it being a NATO member. This is mainly because of US support of Kurdish forces in Syria, which Turkey considers as terrorists. Moreover, acquiring defense equipment from Russia (S-400 anti aircraft defense system) has further aggravated the ties with the US.

Turkey’s relations with China and Russia can best be described as need based. China and Russia have both supported the Assad regime in Syria while Turkey had initially wanted to remove him power. Turkey has also been critical of the Chinese treatment of Uighurs, however, it looks favorably towards Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the One Belt and One Road (OBOR) Initiative. Pakistan is a full member of SCO and one of the critical tributaries of OBOR, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passes through Pakistan. Media reports indicate Pakistan has attempted to get the Saudis and Turkey involved in the CPEC related projects, while Iran has already indicated its interest on joining.

Comparatively the Saudi-US ties are at the best level, especially why when the Saudis and UAE have complete alignment of interests, to include their recent shift towards Israel.

2. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran

On the other hand, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have had very close and mutually beneficial relationship, especially in the post Iranian revolution era. Economically weak Pakistan has relied on Saudi Arabia to bail it on a number of occasions. On its part, Pakistan has provided security assistance to the Kingdom and presently is heading the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC), founded by the Saudis.

However, the direction of influence is more towards Pakistan. Saudis have used their economic wherewithal, and increasing closeness to the US, to keep Pakistan away from Iran, and now from Turkey. Moreover, it appears that Saudi Arabia and UAE and are now acting in coherence when it comes to the matters of Pakistan, which involves a growing tilt toward India. In all likelihood, the CPEC project, and the development of Gwadar port, will decrease Pakistan’s dependence on the Gulf State and this is likely perceived as a threat. However, the Gulf States will benefit indirectly from the Gwadar port since it would ensure the uninterrupted energy supplies from these states to China – incase of tensions in the Indo-Pacific theater.

Any conflict involving Iran will put Pakistan in highly vulnerable position, and force it to choose sides, and therefore it’s actively pursuing to avert war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. This picture, however, cannot be fully grasped without understanding what is at play in the greater Middle East.

3. Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia – The Middle East

Managing tensions over Iran, and preventing a conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran, entails matter more than just Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Both Iran and Turkey are nations born out of former empires, while the Gulf States were the outcome of opportunist positioning during the World Wars. Nonetheless, the competition between the Persians and the Arabs is nothing new. The Ottoman’s took the brunt of what transpired during the World Wars, and now Erdogan is attempting to reclaim its lost status.

Then there are the left over issues of the Kurds and the fate of Palestine that are complicating the situation. Kurds are divided between Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria and are the very center of the present conflict brewing in Syria and Iraq. According to some estimates, 12 million Kurds are living in Turkey, 6 million in Iran, about 6 million in Iraq, and close to 2 million in Syria. All of these states, especially Turkey, are worried about the future of Kurds and their own national integrity, especially because of the US support they have enjoyed.

Then there is growing influence of Iran across the region to include Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria. Irrespective of the Shia-Sunni divide, the Iranians have provided support to both the Shia Hezbollah and Sunni-Hamas. At the same time, Iran has also assisted in the fight against ISIS.

Thus, there is an overlay of pressures and tensions in the Middle East that are being exploited by the global powers. In this the Gulf Arabs, to include Egypt – and minus Qatar, have been worried about losing face when it comes to sensitive issues of the Middle East Peace Process. They are also concerned about the growing influence of Iran and Erdogan’s Ottomanist ambition that now extends to Africa. In Libya, UAE and Saudi Arabia are supporting Khalifa Haftar while Turkey is backing the UN backed Government of National Accord (GNA).

4. Pakistan, Turkey and Iran

This is the segment with the most interoperability with in the nations that compose it. Pakistan and Iran are both close to China, while Turkey is increasingly developing cordial ties with it. Pakistan has been a strong ally of the US during the Cold War and in the War against Terror, while Turkey is a NATO member. And one would suppose that this would make US, Turkey, and Pakistan natural allies – but that is hardly the case.

Ironically, during the early days of Cold War, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Iraq were all part of CENTO (Central Treaty Organization), also known as Baghdad Pact, created in 1955 and dissolved in 1979. Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran are also part of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), founded in 1985 to promote trade and investment opportunities. ECO was preceded by the Regional Cooperation and Development Organization (RCD) – founded in 1965. To deal with the energy crisis, Pakistan-Iran Gas Pipeline was supposed to alleviate some of the energy shortages, but due to sanctions from the US on Iran and pressure from the Gulf nations, the project has hit numerous obstacles and is held in abeyance presently.

While Iran has tense ties with the US and Saudi Arabia, it does not have such issues with Pakistan and Turkey. However, the ties between Turkey and Iran are not ideal, but they are better than Iran has with any Arab nation. Turkey has continued to receive its energy supplies from Iran – and if the Syrian conflict can be managed, this would significantly decrease their divergences. 

Conclusion

It is clear from the above discussion that the contiguous Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey segment of the chart has the most potential, and they are increasingly aligned with China. Iran is the lynchpin of this alignment, and other than its nuclear program, that is perhaps the reason for the consistent focus on Iran.

The removal of Qasem Soleimani is likely associated with this apprehension. Iran has developed a network of proxies throughout the region and has supported them across the Sunni Shiite-Sunni divide. Recent media reports indicate that there may have even been attempts to build bridges with the Muslim Brotherhood. And this would have been ominous for the freshly unveiled Middle East Peace Plan. Iran is likely to pose the most serious challenge to the new plan.

Ironically, the Gulf States of Saudi Arabia and UAE now represent the other side that are opposing any convergences to develop in the Islamic world along the above lines, while failing to take a balanced position on the Middle East Peace Process or Kashmir. Increasingly the nations have to mitigate the tussles between Saudi Arabia/UAE and Iran on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia/UAE and Turkey on the other.

The post What’s Next In The Growing Saudi, UAE Power Tussles With Turkey, Iran appeared first on Politact.

Context 

For many President Trump’s decision to move the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem came as a surprise. However, the changes in the political, economic and security landscape of the Middle East have been pointing in this direction for a number of years now. PoliTact had noted this trajectory in July 2015 as the emerging ‘Outside In Approach’ to the Middle East peace process and Kashmir. The variables influencing this move involve the dynamics associated with War against Extremism, Arab Spring, Iran-Saudi tussles, and the ongoing Syrian conflict.

The December 6th US declaration to transfer its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, under the influence of its America First Doctrine, has marked a new phase for the shift in the balance of power from the Core to the Peripheral Islamic world, a theory that has been discussed in detail in this space. It has reinforced the path that is bringing the peripheral Muslim nations represented by Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, closer. These states have harshly criticized the American move.

This may have been one of the reasons why Pakistan’s military and security assistance is now in jeopardy. President Trump had threatened to penalize those countries that opposed the American decision to recognize Jerusalem as the Israeli capital in the December 21st UN General Assembly vote. The US ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, had commented that Washington will not forget the countries which “disrespected” America by voting against its unilateral recognition.

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s ambassador to the UN, Lodhi, had stated that the American move was a serious violation of international law and had gravely dented the Middle East peace process. She went on to add the US should refrain from using undiplomatic and threatening moves to garner support for its decision. On the other hand, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan had warned before the US decision that Jerusalem is the red line for Muslims. He clarified that considering Jerusalem as belonging only to Israel will result in Turkey ending ties with Israel.

The Sunni Arab nations, with the focus on GCC, reflect the other side of the equation. These Arab nations are steadfastly holding on to the western powers whose support is critical for their survival. Media reports indicate that Saudi Arabia and Egypt may have privately consented to the American move.

The key question now is how the dramatic changes in the political dynamics of the Core Islamic world, represented by Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Yemen, Syria etc., will now impact the fate of the Peripheral. Our previous assessment had noted how the predicament Middle East finds itself in would impact South and Central Asia, including Afghanistan conflict. We are now entering a stage where that distinction will be harder to maintain, as it will represent one wide theater of operations, one on the West of Iran (South and Central Asia), and the other to the East (Middle East).

Analysis

Implications of the Jerusalem Decision

The Core versus Periphery theory also stipulated that under threat the Core Muslim nations, which carry exclusive religious significance, will likely reach out to the Peripheral nations for support and protection. This has now manifested in the form of Saudi Arabia seeking Pakistan’s assistance for the alliance formulated to counter Daesh. The former chief of Pakistan’s Army, General Raheel Sharif, now heads the Saudi led military alliance called Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC).

While the liberal global order is itself going through modification, Pakistan appears to be on a gradual slide out, and so is NATO member Turkey, while Iran departed a long time ago. Ironically, Saudi Arabia has reaffirmed it membership to the liberal order. But what does the America First Doctrine, mean for the Core versus Peripheral Muslim world theory? Following is a list of some key implications of the American decision to move its embassy to Jerusalem.

Countering the Ideological Narrative

With the recent US decision to move its embassy, and now deteriorating relations with Pakistan, the perception is taking hold that the US, and the War against Terror, is against Islam. Previous US administrations have gone to great length to avoid strategies that convey or strengthen the perception that War against Extremism is against Islam. On the other hand, the extremists have used this narrative to convert the war against extremism in to a religious war.

To recruit and motivate, extremists have claimed that Muslim governments for the most are not credible as they achieve power with Western support, are corrupt, and serve there interests at the cost of their citizens. This lack of credibility was what sparked the Arab Spring which resulted in the removal of many of the authoritarian rulers in the Middle East.

The Jerusalem decision will pose acute challenges in the way of countering the ideological narrative being used by the extremists. The extremist groups will utilize this against the role of UN and its failure to peacefully resolve long simmering Palestinian issue. While Daesh has been physically defeated in Iraq and Syria, reports indicate they are strengthening in Afghanistan, posing an emerging threat to the reconciliation efforts, and to the wider South and Central Asia region. Deash and Associates are also likely to exploit Muslim resentments related to Kashmir and Rohingya genocide. On the other hand, AQ in the India Subcontinent (AQIS) is making in roads in Kashmir. This scenario was explored in PoliTact’s April 2015 assessment: Can IS Jeopardize Afghan Peace Process and Pakistan India ties?

Decreasing Private Space for American Allies to Cooperate

As indicated above, the US relations are already under stress with other major Islamic nations, such as Turkey and Iran. Now worsening ties with Pakistan will further decrease American leverage in the Islamic world, which will be, and is being exploited by China and Russia. Thus the liberal order will be further weakened.

The Jerusalem decision will shrink the private space for Muslim nations and their civilian and military leadership, including Pakistan, to continue their cooperation with the US in the war against extremists. The loss of credibility is likely to trigger Arab Spring 2.0 in the Middle East, especially if the two-state solution is eroded any further. If the variance in the Public and Private stances of the Muslim leaders widens too much, naturally it will become untenable to the point where the narrative of the extremists will look more realistic.

In case of Pakistan, tensions are likely to mount. There is a difference of opinion between US and Pakistan on how to approach the Afghan peace process. At this juncture, US wants to pressure the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network with the assistance of Pakistan, before attempting the peace process.

On the other hand Pakistan thinks the military tactics and strategies have not worked up to this point, and thus it’s time to put more emphasis on reconciliation. Moreover, Russian, China, and Iran consider Afghan Taliban to be the bulwark against the spreading influence of groups like Daesh with global ambitions. The Jerusalem decision implies that America is not interested in negotiated settlement of long simmering conflicts, to include Afghanistan and Kashmir.

With the deteriorating US-Pakistan ties and sanctions, the American position is likely to be weakened. Especially when China is also attempting to pull Afghanistan in to its One Belt One Road economic vision. In this, the significance of Saudi Arabia will increase, and it will attempt to create divisions between the Peripheral nations, and to keep Pakistan from drifting too far from the liberal order.

The Role of Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is increasingly caught in a quandary. It needs the support of Peripheral nations, especially Pakistan, to counter the spreading forces of extremism. However, as pointed out earlier, these Peripheral nations are in the process of moving out of the liberal world order. This poses unique challenges for the Kingdom.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia is entangled in a bitter regional rivalry with another Peripheral nation, Shiite Iran. The Saudis are also not on the same page with Turkey when it comes to the matters of Palestine, Iran, Lebanon, Libya, and to some extent Syria. These reasons resulted in rupturing of its relations with Qatar. Furthermore, these factors have pushed Saudis closer to Israel and the US, and inadvertently to India, at the cost of its ties with Core and Peripheral Muslim nations.

Convergences and Risk Mitigation

While there are differences along the lines pointed to above, there are also areas where convergences exist and which can be exploited if there is a will. At the same time, if these common interests are not built upon they also pose serious risks. At this stage of the War against Extremism, if these threats are not mitigated, they can now cause interstate conflicts.

Now that the US has taken the decision on moving its embassy to Jerusalem, there is an urgency to understand the wider peace plan being envisioned by the Trump Administration and for preserving the two-state solution. Delaying the unveiling of this plan can cause extremists to exploit the circumstances, especially against the Muslim allies of the US. This will make it impossible for them to cooperate in the campaign against extremists.

There is consensus amongst all players that extremist groups with global ambitions, like AQ and Daesh, need to be countered. The disparity exists on the next level of non-state actors that are known as Associates of AQ and Daesh. The variance also persists when it comes to the third kind of non-state actors, such as Kurds that have nationalist aspirations.

No one wants the extremist groups with local ambitions to become fully integrated with groups with global agenda and transform into a much bigger and lethal threat. Dealing with the grievances of these associates with local aspirations can deliver the biggest blow to groups like AQ and Daesh. This remains the best strategy to win the war against extremists. Furthermore, the strategy has the capacity to bring the global powers, including the Core and the Peripheral Muslim nations, on the same page. However, this would have to be on a case by case basis. The first step remains to eliminate the reasons which motivate these groups.

The post Jerusalem Declaration And The Future Of US Islamic World Ties appeared first on Politact.

These are interesting times indeed. Many of the international relations global norms and systems that have come to be accepted as the bedrock of stability, are in flux. Consider this for example; the Security Council (UNSC) in particular is being blamed for its inability to deal with the existing and emerging conflicts. President Obama himself criticized the body for its paralysis in tackling contemporary challenges, which are mostly intrastate, not interstate, and involve non-state actors.

On the other hand, the principle of state sovereignty and integrity are increasingly in the limelight, especially as they relate to the war on terror. Pakistan itself has taken the matter of drone strikes to the United Nations, and the issue was discussed in the recent meeting between Nawaz Sharif and Obama. Annoyed at the sudden turn of events in Syria, and the surprising US-Iran thaw, Saudi Arabia has blamed the UNSC for being dysfunctional and practicing double standards, citing principally the issue of Palestine.

The just concluded European Union summit raised serious concerns and resentment on US spying on its leaders. France and Germany have gone as far as to comment that the special EU-US ties are at stake as a result. The two countries, including Brazil, are hinting at taking the matter to the UN in efforts to establish new laws on spying and intelligence sharing.

As a result of the recent understanding between Russia and the US, the risk of a wider war over Syria has been averted for the time being, and direct contact between the Iranian and American leadership was also established during the recent UN General Assembly session. As the voices for reforming the Security Council grow, the shift of balance of power in favor of Iran has presented its own unique risks and opportunities for the Middle East and South and Central Asia.

Changing Middle East

While it’s too early to tell if Iran will join the Genève II peace talks, slated to take place in late November, and in efforts to find a political solution for the civil war in Syria. Nonetheless, John Kerry has stated that if Iran did, it would have to accept a transitional government in Syria. Or in other words, Iran would have to agree that Assad has to go. The US-Iran thaw, and the prospect of Iran joining the political talks over Syria, has greatly unnerved the Gulf States, so much so that the Saudis refused to accept the coveted non-permanent rotating seat on the Security Council. The Saudis are now posturing to take the hard line and using its leverages, including oil, to protect its interests.

What It Means for AfPak?

In this respect, Pakistan stands at an interesting crossroad. The country has played a delicate balancing act in managing the Iranian and Saudi tussles playing out in the wider region. In light of the recent shift in positions, the scenarios to ponder over are how will the US-Iran thaw impact Pakistan’s approach towards Afghanistan, India, and Central Asia. Will Pakistan’s react similarly to the Saudis, at the prospect of Iran getting involved in the Afghan reconciliation? The US has usually objected the most on Iran getting involved in Afghanistan.

Moreover, what will the betterment in US-Iran relations do to the Pakistan-Saudi ties? While one hopes Saudi Arabia does not take the shift in US position in a zero-sum context, early indications do not look positive. To them, the change in US position confirms its worse kept fears. The scare was first triggered when US pulled its support from Hosni Mubarak and then backed the Morsi government, albeit reluctantly. The Saudis now seemed to have confirmed the broad western strategy is actually about removing autocratic rulers in the Arab world.

While it’s early to say how quickly and how far US-Iran détente progresses, the Saudis could pressure Pakistan, and others, to choose a side. They can always use the religious card, which supersedes any political inclinations anyone may have. Saudis could push for its own nuclear program with the assistance of Pakistan, a matter of concern in the West. Moreover, Saudis could speed up the process of Gulf unification and defense cooperation. Pakistan has previously helped Bahrain in putting down the uprising there.

The Opportunities

For Pakistan, such a situation would present several opportunities. The nation may actually exploit tension in the American ties with Saudi Arabia and Turkey, to prevent Iranian involvement in Afghanistan, if it so desire. Turkey’s decision to buy the Chinese long-range air and defense missile system has raised alarm bells from NATO and US, with both registering their protests at the move. Using its good offices, Nawaz Sharif can play an intermediary role to ease Saudi concerns, in the very same fashion Saudis did when the US-Pakistan ties had nose-dived. Fearing adverse consequence, Egypt has already offered to conduct this role between GCC and Iran.

On the other hand, and contrary to what many may think, improvement in US-Iran ties could prove to be economically productive for Pakistan. Firstly, once the matter of rates are tackled, the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline could finally be completed. With Iran onboard, we could see a much more stable Afghanistan emerge, which in turn would have a positive impact on regional trade. Additionally, Iran could help the rapprochement of India and Pakistan. This, however, assumes delinking the region from what transpires in the Middle East, and reverting to pre-Iranian revolution and pre-Soviet occupation of Afghanistan kind of environment. This practically is not possible now.

Some rumors suggest that the ultimate aim of Saudi raucous on the Security Council performance has to do more with securing a permanent position for OIC on the reformed body. The Security Council coming under criticism from such influential voices suggests the process of reform may be about to speed up. And in this Pakistan could readily assist Saudi Arabia, worried itself about Indian efforts to secure a Security Council seat. However, for this to happen, the Shiite-Sunni tussles would have to be settled first, and this is no easy task.

The post Resurgent Iran; Implications for Middle East, AfPak, And Security Council appeared first on Politact.