By Naade Ali
South Asia and Middle East Fellow, PoliTact

Context

The recent brief yet intense escalation between India and Pakistan has further exposed the fragile nature of South Asia’s security landscape. The four-day-long tit-for-tat cross-border military confrontation between the two nuclear-armed rivals has significantly undermined prospects for normalization, redefining the rules of engagement and signaling a shift in how both countries may manage their relationship moving forward. What began as a terrorist attack on Indian tourists in the Pahalgam region of the disputed India-administered Kashmir last month, resulting in the deaths of 26 people, quickly escalated into a significant diplomatic and military crisis.

India’s Strategic Shift: Operation Sindoor and the ‘New Normal

India hastily accused Pakistan of orchestrating the terror attacks and used the incident as justification to revise its military doctrine through the launch of Operation Sindoor.

In a public speech highlighting the goals of Operation Sindoor, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced what he described as reaching a ‘new normal,’ signaling a decisive departure from India’s earlier posture of restraint, long shaped by the perceived threat of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent. He emphasized that the new approach centered on firm and unyielding retaliation against terrorist attacks, including cross-border military operations and a deliberate refusal to distinguish between militant groups and their state sponsors—effectively placing direct responsibility on Pakistan for any acts of terrorism on Indian soil. Modi also stated that India would no longer be deterred by the threat of nuclear escalation, signaling a willingness to pursue bold and proactive actions despite potential risks. Having absorbed the initial Indian strikes, Pakistan, in response to the damage inflicted from Operation Sindoor, initiated its own military campaign named Banyan-Marsoos, targeting key Indian military targets to restore deterrence.

A Pause in Hostilities: U.S. Intervention and the Ceasefire

As the two countries climbed the escalation ladder, a surprise ceasefire announcement by U.S. President Trump on social media temporarily halted the hostilities. While the truce continues to hold, prospects for lasting peace remain uncertain. Inflammatory national rhetoric and the unresolved diplomatic deadlock continue to fuel tensions. At the core of the post-ceasefire period is a significant divide between India and Pakistan, each celebrating their military campaigns as a victory and viewing the outcome of their confrontation through a zero-sum lens. This has made the aftermath more complex and contentious than the conflict itself, while also revealing how both sides intend to manage their ongoing disputes moving forward. In this context, key questions have emerged: what does the temporary truce mean for the India-Pakistan rivalry, and what are its implications for the long-term stability of South Asia?

Experts Respond

On May 12, PoliTact hosted a panel discussion under the auspices of recently formed US-Pakistan Policy Forum titled: “India-Pakistan Tensions and the Way Forward,” moderated by its Chief Analyst, Arif Ansar. The session featured a distinguished panel, including Dr. Hassan Abbas, Chair of the Department of Regional and Analytical Studies at the U.S. National Defense University; Dr. Qamar ul Huda, Michael E. Paul Chair in International Affairs and Distinguished Visiting Professor at the U.S. Naval Academy; and Mr. Khaled Al Maeena, former Editor-in-Chief of Arab News and Saudi Gazette. The discussion centered on the implications of the recent ceasefire between India and Pakistan, the roles of international actors, and the significant obstacles to achieving long-term peace.

Will the Ceasefire Hold?

One of the key questions examined was whether the current ceasefire between India and Pakistan is likely to hold.

A cautious optimism emerged from Dr. Hassan Abbas, who expressed confidence that the ceasefire between India and Pakistan would likely hold — at least in the short term. He argued that both nations had achieved what they needed politically and militarily to step back from the brink. India could claim it had struck militant targets, while Pakistan could point to a successful air defense response. He emphasized that U.S. mediation had played a key role in facilitating the agreement and that both governments were likely committed to preventing further military action. However, he warned that unless deeper structural issues — particularly the Kashmir dispute and proxy militancy — were addressed diplomatically, this ceasefire would remain fragile.

Dr. Qamar ul Huda shared a more skeptical view. While not dismissing the ceasefire outright, he questioned its substance, noting the absence of a transparent or structured diplomatic process. The ceasefire, in his view, seemed to have emerged from informal channels — tweets and backchannel phone calls — rather than serious, trackable negotiations. He was concerned that such an approach lacked durability and legitimacy. Dr. Huda stressed that a real ceasefire requires more than silence on the battlefield; it demands diplomatic engagement on the root causes of conflict: Kashmir, water disputes, and terrorism. He also noted the potential influence of third-party actors, from China to Gulf states, and expressed concern over the lack of clarity in the U.S. position. In his view, the region wasn’t yet “ripe” for lasting peace, and without a comprehensive approach, this ceasefire might only be a pause rather than a turning point.

From a media and public sentiment angle, Mr. Khaled Al Maeena brought a grounded and people-centered perspective. He voiced deep concern over the role of Indian media, which he accused of fomenting hate and spreading misinformation that inflamed public opinion and made diplomacy politically costly. Drawing on conversations with people across religious and national lines, he asserted that the majority of Indians and Pakistanis want peace, not war. Mr. Al Maeena emphasized that the region’s pressing need was not military confrontation but economic development and political stability. He also highlighted the proactive role of Gulf states — especially Saudi Arabia — in de-escalating tensions. With ties to both India and Pakistan, and a vested interest in regional peace due to economic interdependence, Mr. Al Maeena saw the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia, as a credible mediator. While hopeful about the ceasefire’s potential, he underscored the importance of media responsibility, regional diplomacy, and leadership that prioritizes stability over nationalist bravado.

The panel discussed the evolving role of the Gulf states—particularly Saudi Arabia—as key international mediator. The panelists agreed that Saudi Arabia, with significant interests in both India and Pakistan, could play a constructive role in easing tensions. Mr. Khaled Al Maeena stressed that Saudi Arabia seeks regional stability, including in South Asia, and could facilitate dialogue, if requested, between the two rivals by encouraging both sides to come to the table and accept international mediation.

The panelists agreed that India and Pakistan must move beyond tactical ceasefires and pursue a comprehensive, long-term peace process—ideally supported by third-party mediation. The speakers emphasized that unless the two countries address their domestic challenges and regional rivalries, their aspirations will remain unmet.

What Role should US Play?

Throughout the discussion, the panelists recognized the United States as a pivotal external actor with the capacity to influence the trajectory of the India-Pakistan ceasefire. However, their assessments revealed a shared caution about the limitations and inconsistencies in the U.S. approach.

Dr. Abbas emphasized that U.S. involvement was instrumental in brokering the initial ceasefire, with both India and Pakistan reaching out to Washington behind the scenes. He argued that this reflected the high-level trust and strategic alignment both countries maintain with the U.S., albeit for different reasons. India is a key partner in the Indo-Pacific strategy and a counterbalance to China, while Pakistan has long-standing security and geopolitical ties to the U.S., particularly in the context of Afghanistan. However, Abbas cautioned that the U.S. influence alone cannot guarantee lasting peace. He urged Washington to move beyond tactical mediation and instead support long-term conflict resolution mechanisms, including structured dialogue on Kashmir and militancy. He also noted that U.S. credibility depends on maintaining a balanced posture, especially when public narratives in India resist outside interference.

Dr. Huda took a more critical and analytical stance on the U.S. role. He noted that while President Trump’s tweet announcing the ceasefire was widely reported, it lacked substantive follow-through or diplomatic backing. From his view in Washington, the ceasefire appeared to be the result of sporadic political gestures rather than coordinated U.S. policy. Huda questioned whether the U.S. is truly committed to sustained mediation or simply reacting to crises. He highlighted the ambiguity in U.S. policy—initially appearing indifferent, then suddenly claiming credit—and argued that this inconsistency undermines its ability to lead serious peace efforts. To sustain negotiations, the U.S. would need to invest diplomatically and involve multilateral partners, such as the EU, China, and Gulf states, in creating a legitimate and lasting peace framework.

Mr. Khaled Almaeena provided a regional and Gulf-centered perspective, acknowledging the U.S. role but emphasizing that regional actors—particularly Saudi Arabia—are just as important. He noted that while the U.S. has diplomatic leverage, it should not attempt to dominate the process unilaterally. Instead, he advocated for a collaborative approach, where the U.S. works in concert with Gulf countries and other stakeholders who maintain strong ties with both India and Pakistan. Mr. Al Maeena viewed President Trump’s announcement of the ceasefire with skepticism, suggesting it may have been more performative than strategic. He argued that the U.S. can help facilitate talks, but its influence must be exercised carefully and in support of locally driven, regionally endorsed initiatives.

In summary, the panelists suggested that while the U.S. remains a necessary actor for de-escalation, its role must evolve from crisis management to sustained diplomacy, ideally in partnership with regional powers who have both legitimacy and proximity to the conflict.

Great Power Rivalry and Peace Talks

In the discussion of whether the ceasefire between India and Pakistan could evolve into lasting peace, all three panelists acknowledged that great power dynamics—particularly involving China—play a critical role in shaping the strategic landscape of South Asia.

Dr. Qamar-ul Huda emphasized the geopolitical complexity introduced by China’s growing influence and the competing interests of major powers. He noted that China, along with the Gulf states, the EU, and the U.S., has shown interest in being involved in conflict resolution efforts between India and Pakistan. However, this multiplicity of actors creates a crowded diplomatic space, making coherent mediation more difficult. Dr. Huda pointed out that China’s strategic alignment with Pakistan and its rivalry with India complicate peace efforts. He also raised a broader concern: if India aspires to be a global leader, as envisioned through its role in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategy and the Quad alliance, it must demonstrate stability and responsible leadership in its own region. Repeated border skirmishes and crises with Pakistan, he argued, undermine India’s credibility as a reliable partner in the great power competition with China.

Dr. Hassan Abbas echoed these concerns, observing that China’s influence is an integral part of South Asia’s strategic fabric, particularly through its economic and military ties with Pakistan. He highlighted how Chinese military technology—especially fighter jets used by Pakistan—played a significant role in the recent skirmishes, which helped Pakistan demonstrate parity in air power despite India’s numerical advantage. Dr. Abbas saw China’s indirect support as a factor that emboldens Pakistan to resist Indian pressure and sustain its strategic posture. However, he also noted that the escalation ladder is becoming dangerously steep due to technological advancements and information warfare, increasing the risk of miscalculation in a region already shaped by great power rivalries.

Mr. Khaled Al Maeena took a broader, more diplomatic view, situating China within a network of powerful states — including the U.S. and Gulf nations — that have vested interests in regional stability. While not delving deeply into China’s military role, Mr. Al Maeena acknowledged that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are increasingly aware of China’s regional footprint, particularly through its economic initiatives like the Belt and Road. He suggested that China, like the U.S., could play a constructive role in diffusing tensions if it acts as a responsible stakeholder. However, he warned that foreign involvement, including by great powers, must be invited and balanced, as unilateral or self-interested interventions could backfire.

Collectively, the panelists agreed that China’s strategic position and the broader great power rivalry intensify the stakes in South Asia. While this rivalry may deter full-scale war, it also raises the risk of prolonged instability unless managed through inclusive and multilateral diplomacy.

Nuclear Environment and the Escalation Ladder

In examining how the India-Pakistan conflict unfolds within a nuclear framework, the panelists offered nuanced perspectives on the risks and realities of escalation.

Dr. Hassan Abbas presented a cautiously optimistic view, asserting that while both nations had indeed tested the boundaries of military engagement—through strikes, counterstrikes, and air skirmishes—they ultimately pulled back due to the overarching presence of nuclear deterrence. He emphasized that both sides were able to claim symbolic victories: India asserted it had targeted militant-linked sites, while Pakistan showcased its military preparedness and air defense capabilities, including the successful use of advanced Chinese aircraft. For Dr. Abbas, this demonstration of strength on both sides created the space for de-escalation, as neither nation was willing to push the conflict into full-scale war, knowing the devastating consequences of nuclear engagement. He remained confident that, despite heightened tensions, both countries were rational actors who understood the mutual destruction that a nuclear exchange would bring.

Dr. Qamar-ul Huda, meanwhile, offered a more cautious and critical interpretation. He characterized the pattern of India-Pakistan escalation as a dangerous cycle—an unending loop of skirmishes, retaliations, and brief periods of calm that lacked any strategic architecture. According to him, this repetitive behavior pointed to a fundamental weakness in regional diplomacy and governance. Despite the presence of nuclear weapons acting as a deterrent, he argued that the failure to address root causes—such as the Kashmir dispute, water-sharing tensions, and cross-border terrorism—meant that both countries continued to climb the escalation ladder in an ad hoc and reactive manner. Without institutional reforms or sustained international engagement, he warned, the region remained vulnerable to miscalculations that could spiral beyond control, even in a nuclear context.

Mr. Khaled Almaeena approached the issue from a societal and media perspective, underscoring how misinformation, media sensationalism, and hyper-nationalist rhetoric often play a more dangerous role in escalation than military strategy itself. Drawing comparisons to the “phony war” period of World War II, Mr. Al Maeena argued that the most recent flare-up between India and Pakistan resembled more of a media-fueled standoff than a genuine military confrontation. He criticized the Indian mainstream media in particular for manufacturing a climate of hostility, which in turn pressured political leaders to take aggressive stances to appease domestic audiences. In this environment, the escalation ladder becomes more volatile—not because of formal military decisions, but because public sentiment, stoked by inflammatory media narratives, compels leaders to act out of fear of appearing weak.

In essence, the three panelists painted a complex picture of escalation in South Asia. While they all agreed that nuclear deterrence plays a restraining role in preventing all-out war, they also highlighted different drivers of danger—be it military miscalculation, diplomatic failure, or media manipulation. The consensus was clear: the region may be protected by the logic of mutual destruction, but without responsible leadership, institutional dialogue, and media accountability, the rungs of the escalation ladder remain all too easy to climb.

Domestic Politics and Sustained Political Dialogue

As the conversation shifted from immediate military de-escalation to the prospect of sustained political dialogue, all three panelists highlighted domestic political dynamics in both India and Pakistan as central to whether the ceasefire could evolve into meaningful negotiations.

Dr. Abbas offered a deep dive into the Pakistani domestic landscape, emphasizing that the ceasefire had inadvertently strengthened the military establishment’s standing at a time when it was under intense public and political criticism—especially over its handling of the Imran Khan-led Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) movement. He noted that the military’s effective management of the immediate crisis had boosted its credibility and given the current coalition government some breathing room. However, he warned that without broader political consensus and constitutional legitimacy, Pakistan could not sustain a serious peace process. He stressed that internal unity, political stability, and inclusiveness—particularly reconciling with PTI’s large support base—would be necessary if Pakistan hoped to engage in long-term diplomacy with India.

Dr. Huda placed domestic politics within a broader governance and institutional context, particularly in Pakistan. He saw the moment as an opportunity for political re-examination, noting that recurring conflict cycles had revealed the deep fractures in the country’s political system. He emphasized the need for Pakistan’s political institutions to commit to constitutionalism and inclusivity, warning that sidelining popular political parties (such as PTI) or suppressing dissent only deepens instability. For Dr. Huda, sustainable negotiations—whether about the ceasefire or Kashmir—would require a bipartisan or multiparty consensus. In his view, the absence of such internal coherence would make Pakistan an unreliable negotiating partner, especially in the eyes of international actors.

Mr. Khaled Al Maeena focused more broadly on the popular mood and societal divide within both India and Pakistan. He warned that rising hate rhetoric, media manipulation, and political polarization—particularly in India—create an environment where leaders are constrained by nationalist pressures. In both countries, he argued, the public appetite for peace exists, but political elites often exploit nationalist sentiment for short-term gain. He called for leadership that could rise above partisanship and media-driven hysteria, emphasizing that economic development and social stability should be the common goals uniting political factions. Mr. Al Maeena also stressed that peace efforts cannot be externally imposed; they must be grounded in domestic political will and legitimacy.

The panelists agreed that no ceasefire or peace process can succeed without strong, credible, and inclusive domestic political foundations. While foreign mediation may help broker talks, lasting peace must come from within, supported by political leadership that reflects the will and aspirations of their people.

Related Research

Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States August 4, 2023
Examining Saudi-Iran Tensions And Its Impact On South Asia, China Jan 4, 2019

The post India-Pakistan Ceasefire And The Way Forward appeared first on Politact.

Arab-Israel Normalization of Ties and US Middle East Policy

Context

With the normalization of ties between UAE, Bahrain and Israel, the so-called ‘Outside-In Approach’ to the Middle East Peace Process is now in full swing. Most GCC and Arab nations are on the way to normalizing of ties with Israel. This was predicted as regional situation dramatically shifted during the war against extremism, and as a consequence of Arab Spring. During this time, the threat perceptions of the Arabs have also gradually shifted away from Israel and towards Iran. What was the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, transformed in to an Arab-Israeli conflict, and now appears to have become Arab-Israeli versus Iran conflict.

At an event hosted by Atlantic Council on May 7, 2015, PoliTact’s Chief Analyst Arif Ansar asked the former US special envoy for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations Martin Indyk, about how the Iranian nuclear deal and the US-Gulf partnership can help or hinder the Middle East Peace Process.

Martine Indyk replied that the prospects of a solution emerging from an ‘Inside Out’ approach i.e., from within Israel and Palestine, and independent of whatever else is going on in the Middle East, are not good. However, the potential for an ‘Outside In’ solution which has emerged because of the possible Iran nuclear deal and Israeli and Arab countries being on the same side, might emerge with positive response because of the new strategic alignment in the region.

The regional and global shift in the balance of power have also played a key role in this evolution – and caries critical implications for the South and Central Asia – and the strategic ties of India and Pakistan with the Gulf region – and for Afghan reconciliation and Kashmir quagmire by association. While there is a time during which the balance of power is in transition, obviously, there comes a time when the power shifts decisively and a new alignment starts to manifest. This is exactly what has transpired.

While PoliTact has been writing about the waning American influence in the non-Arab Islamic world, it had continued to maintain its sway in the Middle East and GCC. PoliTact has also recently contemplated and examined a scenario that explores why US would even want to maintain its presence in the Middle East – as it is now self-sufficient when it comes to energy needs. Moreover, if the region was left to implode, the global adversaries of China and Russia are likely to be more impacted.

And as such there is no direct threat from the region to the US, whether it be in the form of extremism or WMD. While no such weapons were discovered in Iraq, any such threat from Iran was curtailed as a result of Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) reached in 2015 but later scuttled by President Trump. An argument can be made that the US policy towards Middle East now is mainly driven by protecting its regional ally Israel – and in turn its present and future allies. These new Arab allies will now likely take the frontal role in protecting Israel and could also become the main battlefield.

Future of War Against Extremism

The most used term during the Bush and Obama administrations that is no longer as popular is the War against Extremism. Several questions can be raised on why that is the case. Was the campaign won, the extremist ideologies that led to 9/11 eliminated, or were the organizations such as Al Qaeda (AQ) and Daesh (ISIS) dismantled. Moreover, what happened to the allies that were leading the fight against terrorists? The examination of these inquiries reveals clues about the emerging scenarios.

While the war against extremism has transformed, the risks to the Israel’s Arab allies are only quadrupling. The threats posed by the global extremists, such as AQ and ISIS and their associates, are only going to magnify after normalizing of their ties with Israel. After all the very premise these groups have used to inspire is their lack of action on the causes such as Palestine – along with allowing western military presence.

In addition, the dynamics of Arab Spring have been further aggravated by circumstances created by the Coronavirus pandemic and has limited the maneuvering space for many Arab states. Decreasing reliance on US for energy resources have left them further vulnerable and amenable to external pressures.

Nearly two decades of war against extremism has transformed societies and galvanized them towards nationalistic and conservative leaderships, such as Tayyab Erdogan in Turkey and Imran Khan in Pakistan. The political leaders close to the West, or needing their support, are no longer considered viable.

Global Power Dynamics

While the extending regional threat from Iran has been playing out in places like Yemen, Lebanon and Syria, the prospective China-Iran economic and security deal is a different ball game altogether. It has indicated that like Russia backed the Syrian regime, China appears willing to do that for Iran. And this is occurring at a time when Trump administration has completely reversed course on the Iran nuclear deal. It has exerted maximum pressure on the country to renegotiate the deal; now to encompass its missile program, accompanied by stricter monitoring, and wider behavior in the region.

The potential $400 billion China–Iran treaty must have been an ominous development from the perspective of the Arabs and the US. However, the talks have been proceeding for a while, and as has been the ‘Outside-In Approach’ to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has become an active player in the Middle East with strategic ties with a number of regional players, to include Saudi Arabia. As its influence increases gradually, it could become an active interlocutor between Israel and the Palestinians, and other conflicts of the Middle East. However, it’s not clear if China desires to get involved in the security affairs of the region, like Russia has in Syria.

Speaking at the Saudi embassy in China in July on the occasion of the 30 anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties, Saudi Ambassador Turki M. A. Almadi commented: “our relations are all-round, multi-field, not only about bilateral trade and mutual investment, but also extended to cooperation in the fields of culture, science and technology, and health.”

Zhai Jun, China’s special envoy on Middle East affairs indicated at the occasion that the bilateral trade volume between the two nations stood at $78.04 billion at the end of 2019. He added Saudi Arabia was the largest supplier of crude oil to China, and also the Arab nations largest trading partner.

Chinese analysts close to the government present a case the nation wants to be more involved in providing economic support than to get involved in security affairs of the Middle East. Nonetheless, it has good political and military relations with both Iran and Israel. As part of BRI, China has been extending its trade relations with Israel and lately US has objected strongly to some of them citing security concerns – such as the Chinese company Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) running a container terminal at the Port of Haifa – near an Israeli naval base that is frequently visited by the US Sixth Fleet.

If the China-Israeli economic ties are allowed to strengthen uninhibited, overtime China will be able to build leverages that potentially can undercut US primacy in the affairs of the Middle East. The Israelis disagree on this, stating that the nature of its ties with China and the US are of totally different nature.

Conclusion

While Saudi Arabia has delayed recognizing the statehood of Israel, and Qatar remaining closer to Turkey, the shifting alliance of most GCC and Arab nations towards Israel and the US represents a decisive shift in the balance of power – that has serious costs associated with it. Adopting the threat perception that centers on Iran, and without any clear give and take on the Middle East Peace Process yet, is likely to revitalize the non-state actors.

While China has made an economic entry in the Middle East, it has not decided to influence the security affairs – other than under the umbrella of UN and for maritime security purposes. In Syria too, it has adopted a non-interventionist approach and has supported the Assad regime.

However, economic leverages will eventually lead to influences in other areas. And China would have to use its sway especially when it has the most to lose if a conflict breaks out in the region. One measure of if it’s heading in that direction would be the establishment of military bases, like the one in Djibouti, and potential militarization of Gwadar port. And in this context, the Iran-China economic and security deal takes on an added emphasis.

The post The Future Of Middle East Peace Process, Extremism, And China-Iran Deal appeared first on Politact.

Context

Never before have there been so many conflicts been brewing at the same time, in particular in the regions of Middle East – and the adjoining areas of South Asia and North Africa. There is a tendency to view these conflicts as separate with their individual dynamics. However, they are intertwined and there is a need to understand their intersections and trajectory. In this, it’s also essential to grasp the mega trends and how they are linking these otherwise desperate conflicts.

History obviously is the most important determinant, playing out over time, as different empires and nations rise and crumble. Old grudges reappear in different form as attempts are made to settle scores. Many of the present day inter-regional conflicts can be associated with the following:

1. Left over business of World War II, falling empires, and end of colonialism that led to the creation of present day nation-states.
2. Shifting balance of religious dominance, such as that between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. And there are tussles with in religions for example between Shiite and Sunni Islam – spearheaded by Iran and Saudi Arabia, and joined by Turkey recently. And then there is the Eastern Orthodox Church, which Putin energizes. And more importantly, how these trend correlates with the role of religion in politics.
3. War Against Extremism
4. Rise and fall of different political and economic systems: from communism to capitalism – and from authoritarianism to democracy etc.
5. Struggle for the balance of power and resources between the regional and global powers, which is now taking place in a setting of climate change and Coronavirus pandemic.

The Corona Factor

While most of the characteristics laid out above represent a consistent part of the cycle of change and conflict as the world knows them. However, it is the climate change, and now the Coronavirus, that have seriously altered the dynamics and the struggle for the balance of power and resources.

Balance between Liberals and Conservatives and Nationalists

In many parts of the Islamic world, economies had already been suffering under the corrupt rulers, often supported by the West. These governments have focused most of their efforts on self-preservation than on the uplift of the masses. In the war against extremism with extraordinary focus on security, the fiscal systems have been further destabilized. This has lead to increased internal polarization, in which the space for liberals has been continually shrinking while the conservatives and nationalists are consistently on the rise, which also translates in to a growing role for religion in politics and governance.

Public versus Private Government Stances

In their efforts to promote their reign and retain western support, the leadership of these nations often went against the very fabric of public sentiment. This caused them to keep their political dealings private – away from the scrutiny of the public. This was the case during the Musharraf era and subsequent political set-ups in Pakistan that privately supported the drone strikes in the tribal areas – but publicly criticized them.

It is also true when it comes to the positions of Gulf States on sensitive matters such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Kashmir. On one hand, these states have grown closer to Israel and India – while mostly remaining silent on Indian and Israeli brutalities against Kashmiri and Palestinian Muslims. While this may have gained them temporary allocates in the West – the long-term implications of such policies are serious, and the gap between their public and private stances have grown wider and in some cases becoming unsustainable.

This divergence is even visible in the treatment of Uighur Muslims in China or when it came to Russian activities in Chechnya and Dagestan. Muslim states have kept quite on these maters because their national interests often converge with Russia and China on other important issues. Moreover, in the aftermath of 9/11 many movements and abuses of human rights have been conveniently lumped in to the category of extremism.

Political Governance

Added to this maze is the dynamics of Coronavirus. The dysfunctional systems in many of these nations were hardly able to deliver during normal times – let alone during the uncertain present. Moreover, the elongated war against extremism and prevalent corruption have eaten up and eroded the moral compass of these societies. With declining economies, the liberal and the ruling class are likely to be increasingly in the eye of the storm – as they are unable to deliver on the most basic services and provide security and opportunities for their citizens. This will push government to take on even more nationalistic and conservative stances.

In the long run, this will likely lead to more protests and upheavals, as the voices and messages of the extreme factions are gaining traction. We saw a glimpse of this even in the developing world, where the death of George Floyd at the hands of the police in the US led to the unleashing of long pent-up grievances.

Conclusion

As the economies crumble under the weight of COVID-19, many nations are unlikely to survive the Coronavirus induced struggles for the balance of power. Moreover, the fiscal pressures are likely to promote fissures along racial and religious lines. These outcomes will aggravate the tussles of new winners and losers – that will emerge as the tentacles of the virus spread wider and deeper.

This is amply at display in places like Lebanon and Jordan, with large refugee populations. According to World Bank estimate the tourism has dropped by almost 50 percent in Jordan, which constitutes almost 14 percent of its GDP. Moreover, with the return of many expatriates employed in the Gulf region, it has seriously impacted the inflow of foreign remittances. With the drop in oil revenues, it’s unclear if the oil rich Arab nations will be able to continue funding the geopolitical games in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Libya.

Moreover, it would be difficult for these governments to maintain their previous private stances, especially if India and Israel were to move forward with unilateral moves – like India displayed last year by abolishing the special status of Kashmir, and through possible West Bank annexation by Israel. And in this context, as the Coronavirus induced economic vows become more transparent; the political and governance challenges will manifold posing grave risks to the internal stability and state viability.

The post Coronavirus And Arab Spring 2.0 appeared first on Politact.

Context

The three-day visit of Prime Minister Imran Khan to the US was a significant ice breaking moment for the otherwise downward spiraling US-Pakistan ties. Aside from the positive optics, the broader implications remain vague. The Afghan peace process was supposed to be the focus of the meetings, however, President Trump’s comment on Kashmir has opened a Pandora box; a recognition that the solution to Kashmir is perhaps inexplicably linked to the Afghan peace process and security of the wider region.

Nonetheless, the question remains if the Iran tensions boil into full blown conflict – what would that mean for the Afghan peace process?

Analysis  

Military versus Political Solution

The conflict of Afghanistan has been continuing for the last 19 years with array of military strategies being applied, including the operations conducted by Pakistan across FATA. The Afghan quagmire has finally reached a point that the three major stakeholders i.e., Pakistan, US, and Afghanistan are a point of convergence that there is no military solution to the conflict.

This has long been the stance and a political slogan of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and its leader Imran Khan. In the past, he faced significant criticism and was often labeled ‘Taliban Khan’ – but now his position stands vindicated. However, it’s interesting to note that the change in US policy was taking place at the same time as PTI was coming into power and settling down.

In addition the emphasis on a political solution, Pakistan has long maintained the reason the country could not devote all its energies on eliminating the spectrum of extremists groups, especially those oriented towards India, is because of the threat emanating from its arch rival India. Moreover, because of the superior conventional forces of India, Pakistan had no choice but to maintain good ties with the Afghan Taliban. In other words, the Afghan peace process has to be accompanied by a start of negotiation process geared towards the simmering Kashmir issue, the main point of contention between India and Pakistan.

Kashmir Solution

Apparently now there is a shift and a comprehension of Pakistan’s position that the road to Afghan peaces passes through Kashmir. If true, additional factors may have caused Prime Minister Modi to request Trump’s mediation. The situation of Kashmir has been worsening on its own – but with the introduction of ISIS to Afghanistan, there is a risk that such groups with global agenda could transfuse the otherwise localized Kashmir crisis. This phenomenon has previously replicated in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Libya. Not to forget, it was the refuge AQ got in Afghanistan, and the cross-pollination of jihadi groups there, that led to the 9/11 attacks.

In post Palwama security situation of the region, the risk of a nuclear exchange is greater than ever, especially if there is another significant attack on an India target. In fact, had it not been for the cool headed handling of the matter by Imran Khan, the circumstances were dangerously escalating. In a recent video message, Ayman al-Zawahiri has called on Kashmiri militants to wage attacks “to bleed the Indian economy and make India suffer sustained losses in manpower and equipment”.

”Moreover, as pointed out in previous assessments in this space, India has been the last hold out to political reconciliation with the Taliban in Afghanistan. The country has maintained that with the Taliban back in power, the Kashmiri militants are likely to once again garner hinterland support, as was the case before 9/11. With the Afghan peace talks spearheaded by US special representative Zalmay Khalilzad well on their way, India has to come up with an alternate approach to its strategy of isolating Pakistan globally. If President Trump’s claim regarding Modi requesting Kashmir mediation are correct – then the aforementioned logic provides the context for it. It’s better for India to attempt to shape the new reality then being sidelined and continuing with its failed policy. Besides, Khalilzad has been regularly visiting India and apprising the counterparts on the progress being made in the talks. 

Implications of the New Reality

While there is an initial euphoria with the improved US-Pakistan relations, strategically US is very much still tied to India, a policy move that was initiated during Clinton’s tenure, and continued subsequently by both the Republican and Democratic administrations. Similarly, Pakistan has also made it strategic bets on China; demonstrated by becoming a member of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and joining One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative via China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This has been accompanied by opening up of political and military ties with Russia and reports of Chinese plans to establish military bases in Pakistan.

The improving of US-Pakistan ties is occurring in the background of the arrest of Lashkar-e- Taiba (LeT) leader Hafez Saeed and intent to mainstream religious schools (Madrasas). Both have been the key long standing demands of the US and India. How the PTI government responds to the criticism – and any attempts by the opposition to politicize and exploit these developments would be critical, as it goes all out against corruption. In the post 9/11 environment, the chumminess in US-Pakistan relations has usually been accompanied by a reaction from the religious quarters and deterioration in the security environment of the country.

The ability of the PTI government to sell the above actions will depend on quick dividends from the Afghan peace process and progress on Pakistan-India talks on Kashmir.

The Middle East Inferno  

During his trip to the US, Imran Khan was asked about the Iran situation at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). He reflected on the seriousness of the matter if there was a full-blown conflict, and how damaging the outcomes would be for Pakistan and the region. At the same time, he also pointed out to the indebtedness of his nation to UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, for pulling his government out of its economic woes. With Pakistan’s involvement in the Saudi led military alliance IMCTC (Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Cooperation), it would be difficult to maintain a position of neutrality. In partnership with the Middle East Institute, PoliTact examined this scenario (https://www.politact.com/examining-saudi-iran-tensions-and-its-impact-on-south-asia-china/) in detail in November 2018.

The sequencing of these events now has added significance and poses some related inquiries. Will this move towards politically settling with the Afghan Taliban, and possibly Kashmir, also applicable towards Iran and other flash points in the Middle East. If not, is it an attempt to pacify the South Asian Sunni flank if the matters do take a turn for the worse in the Middle East? As the conflicts in the wider Middle East and North Africa have demonstrated, the non-state actors are a very lethal component of the present day asymmetric warfare.

The post Imran-Trump Meeting; US-Pakistan Relations, Afghan Peace, and Kashmir appeared first on Politact.

By Arif Ansar

Context

While the Pakistan-India tensions are known to flare up occasionally, the present one over the February 14 Pulwama incident has calmed down for the time being. However, in the absence of any political dialogue related to Kashmir, there is likely to be a next episode. Most assessments of the incident have examined the conflagration from a bilateral prism, and less emphasis has been directed on scanning the domestic and regional context under which the present tensions have taken shape.

In the aftermath of the Pulwama incident, on February 26 India claimed to have carried out air strikes against militant training camps in Balakot, inside Pakistan. The attack indicated the evolution of Indian strategic thinking that border towards irrationality, and is more worrisome on what could come next. To the contrary, during the whole affair Pakistan exhibited mature escalation control in a nuclear environment. However, connections to groups like Jaishe-e-Mohammad (JeM), which accepted responsibility for the Pulwama attack, are adding to the costs for Pakistan.

Domestic Politics, Afghan Reconciliation and India

Palwama attack triggered a dangerous crisis between the two nuclear-armed neighbors; it represented a first foreign policy test for the Pakistan’s new economically strangled PTI led government, and was perhaps was meant to.

Then there is the regional context to consider where Afghan reconciliation is swiftly moving forward with emphasis on four key segments: intra-Afghan dialogue, foreign troop withdrawal, counter terrorism assurances, and a ceasefire. However, it’s unclear what the role of India, if any, would be in the Afghan settlement.

Speaking at the Senate Armed Services hearing recently, CENTCOM Commander General Votel commented US desires to ensure “Pakistan’s equities are acknowledged and addressed in any future agreement in Afghanistan.“

If Pakistan plays a positive role in achieving a settlement to the conflict in Afghanistan, the US will have opportunity and motive to help Pakistan fulfill that role, as peace in the region is the most important mutual priority for the US and Pakistan,” he added.

However, India cannot let Pakistan and China emerge as the chief beneficiaries of peace in Afghanistan, or to allow a return to the pre 9/11 geostrategic environment. The Pulwama incident once again raises Indian concerns and its attempts to place Pakistan at the center of cross border terrorism. Meanwhile, Pakistan tries to clear its culpability as the proceedings of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the United Nations Security Council take place.

Timeline of Major Events

Since India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998, there have been a series of major events risking full fledge war between the two nuclear neighbors, each times raising the stakes tremendously.

– The Kargil War of 1999 was one such event. It was only after reports emerged that India was planning to open other fronts, and that Pakistan had started to move its nuclear weapons, was the conflict defused with the active US mediation.

– The alleged Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and JeM planned attacks against the Indian Parliament in December 2001, led to an extended stand off as both nations deployed conventional forces along the border. This confrontation also resulted in the Indian Cold Start Doctrine, which Pakistan countered overtime by developing tactical short-range nuclear weapons.

– This was followed up by Mumbai attacks in 2008, for which LeT was once again blamed. The attack caused the deaths of more than 150 people, to include citizens of Israel and the US. Once again, India was prepared to launch a full fledge onslaught, which was only stemmed by active US diplomacy, and pressure on Pakistan to act against such groups and by conducting a transparent investigation. In the post 9/11 environment, Mumbai incident inflicted acute damage to Pakistan’s global image.

– The killing of popular Kashmiri militant Burhan Wani by Indian security forces worsened the security situation in Indian Occupied Kashmir. In 2016 an alleged JeM planned attacks on the brigade headquarter in Uri, lead to the death of about 19 soldiers, followed by claims of surgical strikes by India targeting training camps in Azad Kashmir. Pakistan denied any such strikes tool place. The Uri attacks were preceded by similar incidents in Gurdaspur and attack on Pathankot Airbase.

Indian Approach Towards Kashmir and Pakistan

In the conventional arena, India has attempted to address the issue of Kashmir, and countering Pakistan, by strengthening its military presence in the Indian Occupied Kashmir, and escalating its kinetic tactics there. It has targeted four of Pakistan’s sensitivities dealing with maintaining territorial integrity, military parity, economic viability (includes water resources), and political harmony.

According to Times of India, in 2018 Indian defense budget stood at $58.6 billion, compared to $26.6 billion in 2008/09. On the other hand, Pakistan defense budget for 2018 was around $11 billion, compared to $4.2 billion in 2009 (Source: Defense Industry Daily). For 2018, Indian defense expenditure reflected 2.1% of the GDP, while that of Pakistan represented 3.6% of the total GDP (Source: Times of India). Quoting Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 2018 data, India has remained the largest importer of major arms, making up 13% of the global sales.

Secondly, using its newfound economic prowess and strategic ties to the US, India has attempted to isolate Pakistan in different global forums while maligning Pakistan’s military as rogue – and thus building a case of international sanctions. Moreover, it has threatened to curtail water flows to Pakistan, agreed under the Indus Basin Treaty.

Thirdly, India has been working to curtail sources of Pakistan’s traditional support, such as from the Gulf States, and has been attempting to tilt these ties in its favor. This was recently exhibited when Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) for the first time invited the Indian foreign minister to its meeting.

Fourthly, India has attempted to deepen the civil-military, ethnic, and liberal-conservative fissures in the country, and ceased all sports and cultural ties.

In the domain of unconventional warfare, Pakistan has accused India of using proxies from Afghan territory to launch terror attacks inside Pakistan, which have caused thousands of causalities. India has also been supporting militants to destabilize Balochistan province and to cause friction with Iran. The Indian role in transforming the former East Pakistan in to a new state of Bangladesh has been accepted by Prime Minister Modi himself.

Related Interviews

Pakistan’s Crackdown Against Banned Groups And Pakistan-India Tensions

Pulwama Attack: Political or Military Solution to Pakistan-India Tensions

The strategists in India have hopped that through the above mechanics, it would be able to strangulate Pakistan and change its traditional support for Kashmir.

In essence, India has presented its interests as aligned with the US and the West, especially as they relate to extremism. This has been further reflected in the Indian thinking by the use of phrases like ‘surgical strikes’ etc., of the sort US has used in its campaign against terrorism. Moreover, Indian approach towards Kashmir presents similarities with the Israeli strategy towards Palestine.

Conclusion

In the broader geopolitical context, what strategic calculus is India attempting to address and alter by building a narrative of a surgical strike inside Pakistan, and how is this different from its past posture – or anything else India has attempted previously?

Moreover, with retaliatory action by Pakistan and repeated messaging from Prime Minister Khan, the nation made it unequivocal that the matters could easily escalate in to a nightmarish nuclear exchange. As Pakistan employs the first use doctrine, it would have no choice if matters had escalated beyond a certain point. At the same time, it was practicing a ‘graduated response’ to the evolving situation, and exhibited ‘escalation control’ when it unilaterally released the captured Indian pilot, Abhinandan Varthaman.

Through the use of surgical strikes, India most likely meant to test Pakistan’s first use threshold. India would prefer to utilize its superior conventional advantage rather than resorting to mutual annihilation approach. This is why it is important for India to test Pakistan’s nuclear first use threshold. Through the surgical strike claim in 2016, and now in the case of Pulwama, India has been checking Pakistan’s limits, and the International response to any serious crisis.

The perceptions become critical when nuclear weapons are involved, the ramifications of a nuclear exchange go much beyond the geographic confines of South Asia. While the claims of Indian surgical strikes in 2016 could not be independently verified, and were carried out in Pakistan side of Kashmir, therefore the country did not feel a need to respond.

There was no such ambiguity when Indian jets crossed over and claimed attacking militant camps inside Pakistan in Balakot. The country not only acknowledged but also responded. Irrespective of if Indian strikes caused any damage, it carried a more serious symbolic implication. And this was also the reason that Pakistan had to retaliate to demonstrate its strategic will and capability.     

Indian experimenting with Pakistan’s first use threshold suggests that when the next attack in Kashmir or India occurs, it would want to have the space to launch punitive strikes without worrying about nuclear repercussions. Pakistan, on the other hand, would like to convey in no uncertain terms, that there are no grey areas – if such an eventuality took place.

The drone strikes that US carried out in the FATA region under Bush and Obama, whether with Pakistan’s acquiesce or not, may have conveyed the wrong message to India. There are huge discrepancies between the military prowess of US and India, demonstrated by the downing of Indian fighter jet, and a number of other technical mistakes that went along. In its desire to be seen as a global player, India has inadvertently exposed its conventional vulnerabilities and international repute. 

Moreover, simply labeling every incident in Kashmir to have been supported by Pakistan does not absolve India from acting rationally. Even at the height of Cold War, US and former Soviet Union avoided direct confrontation. Meanwhile, whatever Pakistan may have done in the past, the present requires a course correction; the Kashmir cause is much damaged when groups like JeM accept responsibility for carrying out attacks in India, or Indian held Kashmir.

The post Pulwama Attack And The Indian Strategic Calculus Against Pakistan – From Cold Start To Surgical Strikes appeared first on Politact.

Context

While the Pakistan-India tensions are known to flare up occasionally, the present one over the February 14 Pulwama incident has calmed down for the time being – but is likely to have a next episode. Most assessments of the incident have examined the conflagration from a bilateral prism, and less emphasis has been directed on scanning the domestic and regional context under which the present tensions have taken shape.

Domestic Politics

Palwana attack triggered a dangerous crisis between the two nuclear-armed neighbors; it represented a first foreign policy test for Pakistan’s new economically strangled PTI led government. It was perhaps meant to test the fresh political setup. On the other hand, corruption cases are proceeding against prominent political leaders, with the nations former three times prime minster, Nawaz Sharif, already serving a jail term. So there is the domestic politics of Pakistan to consider.

Afghan Reconciliation and India

Then there is the regional context where Afghan reconciliation is swiftly moving forward with emphasis on four key segments: intra-Afghan dialogue, troop withdrawal, counter terrorism assurances, and a complete ceasefire.  However, it’s unclear what the role of India, if any, would be in the Afghan settlement.

Related Interviews:
1. Pakistan’s Crackdown Against Banned Groups And Pakistan-India Tensions
2. Pulwama Attack: Political or Military Solution to Pakistan-India Tensions
3. Afghan Peace Process: Can Pakistan, Afghanistan, and US Trust Each Other

Speaking at the Senate Armed Services hearing recently, CENTCOM Commander General Votel commented US desires to ensure “Pakistan’s equities are acknowledged and addressed in any future agreement in Afghanistan.“

If Pakistan plays a positive role in achieving a settlement to the conflict in Afghanistan, the US will have opportunity and motive to help Pakistan fulfill that role, as peace in the region is the most important mutual priority for the US and Pakistan,” he added.

However, India cannot let Pakistan and China emerge as the chief beneficiaries of peace in Afghanistan, or to allow a return to the pre 9/11 geopolitical environment. The Pulwama incident once again raises Indian concerns and its attempts to place Pakistan at the center of cross border terrorism. Meanwhile, Pakistan tries to clear its culpability as the proceedings of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the United Nations Security Council take place.

Pakistan’s Crackdown Against Banned Outfits

The post Palwama crackdown on banned India oriented outfits in Pakistan, such as JuD, has the potential to make matters difficult for Imran Khan. He won the election apposing the kinetic approaches adopted in the campaign against extremism, and supported political route to settle the Afghan quagmire. Imran’s method ultimately received the American buy-in and has resulted in the present on-going direct talks between the US and Afghan Taliban.

The Pulwama attack, and the subsequent crack down, could add a new dimension to Pakistan’s campaign against extremism. Can Imran Khan also convince India that the causes of mutual animosity can be settled by dealing with the simmering Kashmir issue politically? India, under Modi, appears hell-bent on taking a military approach, but the world can hardly afford an irrational strategy in a nuclear environment.

Nonetheless, if Afghan reconciliation does take place, it does give Pakistan the space to address India oriented groups. Moreover, with Kashmir already hot, now mainly due to the Indian mishandling and harsh military tactics, any connection to groups like JuD serves to harm the otherwise legitimately accepted global issue.

The post The Pulwama Incident And Imran Khan’s War On Terror appeared first on Politact.

Context

Since Nawaz Sharif came to power, he has consistently talked about improving ties with India and Pakistan’s other neighbors. However, the otherwise calm situation on the LoC is increasingly getting tense. The good intentions do not seem to be aligned with the ground reality.

Allegedly, Pakistani troops crossed the LoC and attacked Indian Chakanda Bagh check post in the Poonch sector on August 6 and as a result six Indian soldiers were reportedly killed. A similar incident had taken place in January, in which an Indian soldier was decapitated. Pakistan’s military promptly denied carrying out any such assaults. According to reports, in both instances the intruders were wearing Pakistan army’s uniform. The reaction from the Indian political and military leaders to the latest attack has evolved to become quite harsh, with casualties being reported daily on Pakistan’s side of LoC.

The similarities between the two cases have raised the possibility of jihadi elements being involved. Since the latest ambush, India has alleged that Pakistan’s Special Forces have carried out these attacks in conjunction with extremist elements, forming what it calls the Border Action Team (BAT).

On the other hand, Indian Consulate in Jalalabad also came under attack on August 3, which Indian authorities believe was instigated by Pakistan. The occurrence caused nine causalities, mostly ordinary civilians and security guards protecting the outpost. It is difficult to understand why Pakistan would want to harm relations with India at this juncture. The economic and security perils of the nation dictate otherwise. The question though remains: who was responsible?

Analysis

Jihadi Groups

It could be the militant jihadi groups, trying to circumvent the resumption of Pakistan-India talks, aimed at normalizing relations. The dialogue has remained limited since the 2008 Mumbai incident. Equally, it could be the hardliners and nationalist forces on the Indian or Pakistan sides that do not want increased trade between the two nations. It could also be a third hand that benefits from the extension of status quo and tensions in the region. It should be noted that continued wrangling between India and Pakistan benefits the global powers strategically.

Perceived from the Indian angle, a suspicion may linger about the possible connection between Chinese intrusions in the Ladakh region and the LoC attacks. Despite the jingoism and media euphoria displayed at the time of Chinese intrusions in the Ladakh region, India has resorted to diplomatic channels to calm things down. With Pakistan, India cannot afford to appear weak, as it did in the case of China. It should be added that in the aftermath of the Ladakh incidents there is increase traffic of senior US officials to India, including recently US VP Joe Biden. PM Manmohan Singh is also slated to meet President Obama on his upcoming trip to US in September.

Post US Withdrawal Afghanistan

Moreover, both Afghanistan and India share apprehension about how the state of affairs may evolve in the post US Afghan withdrawal regional scenario. India has calculated that if the jihadi network remains intact after the withdrawal, Kashmir may become active once more. On the other hand, Afghanistan fears that Afghan Taliban, with the help of Pakistan based comrades, may try to dominate once more. In essence, it may be a return to the pre 9/11 conditions, which did not bode well for both nations.

Through these border attacks, and strikes against Indian interests in Afghanistan, there may be an attempt to revert the American focus on these jihadi groups. With the US trying the speed up the Afghan reconciliation and withdrawal, India fears US has once more gone lenient on these extremist groups. India may also be looking closely at what is transpiring in Syria.

The Arab Factor in Indo-Pak Politics

The Arab Spring and the War on Terror has produced a new alignment of interests in the Middle East where former adversaries have now become undeclared allies.

The emerging configuration includes Gulf States, Israel, Turkey and the West, aligned on the one side. The other loose arrangement constitutes, China, Russia, Iran, and Syria. It is hard to miss the Shia-Sunni divide in the unfolding alignment of interests. The other undercurrent to keep in perspective is the state versus non-state actors. While the Sunni state actors are aligned with Israel and the West, the Sunni non-state actors are not. This divergence is likely to produce the most volatile turbulence in the region and beyond.

While US appears to be mostly backing Sunni states, Russia and China maintain ties on both sides of the isle. Pakistan shares this strategy with Russia and China, and does not unnecessarily want to make an enemy out of Iran. However, due to its strategic ties with Israel and the US, and fear of China, establishing this balance has become quite difficult for India.

As the relations tense up between Russia and the US on the one hand, and China and US, on the other, militant and religious proxies could once again become important. Some of this is already at display in Syria and to which Russia has repeatedly pointed out. Other than AQ, US is becoming more accommodating to nationalist and religious militant groups, as evident in the case of Afghan Taliban as well. If this outlook continues, it is highly threatening for not only the monarchs of the Gulf, but also for India and Afghanistan.

The unfolding situation of Syria, and the evolving American position, may push Gulf States and India closer, at the cost of Pakistan. This first became apparent in 2012 when Saudis handed one of the prime suspects of 2008 Mumbai attack, LeT affiliated Sayed Zabiuddin Ansari, to India.

So while Nawaz Sharif and Manmohan Singh wish for good ties, much inertia exists to such a prospect on both sides, and beyond. In Egypt, tables turned on the Islamists with the decisive role of its military. In the coming days and months, the ambiguity about the connection between the state and non-state actors, is likely to be tested in South Asia.

The post What’s Behind Pakistan-India Border Tensions? appeared first on Politact.

Context
While border tensions have surged from time to time between Indian and Chinese forces situated along the poorly demarcated border, the Indian media has created an unusual hype around recent incidents. The first intrusion allegedly had occurred on April 20th. The Indian authorities have accused Chinese forces and helicopters of straying far in to the Depsang Valley of Ladakh region. In efforts to diffuse the matter, Indian foreign minister Salman Khurshid is slated to visit China on May 9th. There are also unconfirmed reports that Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s is likely to visit India and Pakistan around May 20th.

On the other hand, Chinese authorities have wanted to calm things down. Foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying stated, “We hope relevant media can keep patience and create favorable conditions for the two countries to solve this issue through friendly consultations,” she commented.

The question to ponder is if some action taken by China or India provoked the tensions, or is it related to the broader regional tectonic shifts. The present escalation is taking place as the security situation in the Pacific region continues to worsen. Especially, as it relates to the events of South China Sea, North Korean threats, and the American pivot towards the region.
The handing over of the Gwadar port by Pakistan to a Chinese firm has also unnerved India. Moreover, President Karzai recently has been stressing on the role of China in the resolution of Afghan conflict.

The post Sino-Indian Border Tensions In Ladakh appeared first on Politact.

Context

The military preparedness of India and its defense spending have lately been getting a lot of media attention. Obviously, military readiness is connected with defense capabilities. The threat perception of India is first of all shaped by fear of China, second by the extremist threats emanating from Pakistan and thirdly by domestic instability resulting from the activity of groups such as the Maoist.

The perceived weakness in confronting the threats posed to Indian security means the country would have to increase defense spending and develop its security capabilities. The western defense industries are well placed to meet Indian needs in times of global recession. Moreover, the extremist risk helps in keeping India aligned with the West.

Analysis

India’s Decaying Military, China, And Pakistan

The leak of a letter from General V.K Singh, who retired earlier this year, has caused a lot of commotion. He had written this letter to the prime minister describing the shortcomings of the Indian armed forces stating,

“The state of the major (fighting) arms i.e. mechanized forces, artillery, air defense, infantry and Special Forces, as well as the engineers and signals, is indeed alarming.”

According to Singh, there is a shortage of critical ammunition to defeat enemy tanks and the 97% of air defense are obsolete. The infantry is crippled with deficiencies and lacks capabilities such as night fighting equipments.

The letter almost seems like a justification, providing impetus to the argument for why India should dramatically increase its defense spending. Media reports recently indicated India is enhancing its military spending by 17 percent to $40 billion, in a bid to counter China’s military prowess and its traditional rival Pakistan. The increased military spending will be utilized in upgrading the country’s aging military hardware. India is also acquiring new military equipment ranging from combat aircraft to submarines and artillery. It is presently finalizing a deal with France Dassault Aviation worth $12 billion, for 126 Rafale fighter jets.

Early in March, Chinese spokesman for the Fifth Session of the 11th National People’s Congress (NPC), Li Zhaoxing had announced a hike in Chinese defense budget by a double digit of 11.2 percent. This amounts to $106.4 billion as compared to $92 billion in 2011. China also spent $100 billion on internal security last year.

However, according to the report of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India has emerged as the worlds top importer of arms and accounts for 10 percent of the global arms sales. India’s imports of major weapons surged by 38 percent in 2007-11, closely followed by China and Pakistan.

During this period, Pakistan imported 50 JF-17s from China and 30 F-16s from the US. On the other hand, China’s imports dropped due to indigenous production of arms and rising exports. Pakistan is the main buyer of China’s arms exports. According to SIPRI, India will spend more than $100 billion on weapons and systems in the next 15 years.

Friction With Western Nations

This means there is a lot of competition to provide for India’s defense needs, and this is becoming a cause of friction for its ties with the western nations. For example, Britain is concluding its aid program to India. UK’s International Development Secretary Andrew Mitchell stated recently that Britain has spent 1 billion pounds on aid programs to India over the past 6 years and had committed to another 600 million pounds until 2015; however, the aid package had been called off due to India’s economy booms.

Mitchell added that the aid program to India was being questioned, and the aid withdrawal came after a series of perceived snubs from India over weapons deals. New Delhi struck a deal with France for Rafale fighter jets while British government was also competing for the contract.

Homeland Security; Pakistan And Maoist

On the other hand, in addition to the nuclear deal, Indian and US intelligence cooperation has grown tremendously in the aftermath of Mumbai attacks. American companies and security institutions are well placed to provide the expertise and capabilities related to the homeland security needs of India. The officials of the two countries have carried on extensive brainstorming to develop a framework for interoperability in this area.

Homeland security threats to India mainly come from extremists based in Pakistan. US Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Michael Sheehan recently stated that said that Pakistan has an addiction of playing around with militant groups against India. “They have an addiction to playing around with militia groups to achieve certain interests, particularly vis-à-vis India. That gets them in all kinds of trouble.” He said the US has been having a discussion with Pakistan to change this mindset with regard to India, but it has been largely unsuccessful.

In a development today, US has offered a bounty of $10 million for Hafiz Saeed, the alleged perpetrator of the Mumbai attack in 2008. This move will not only be pleasing to India, but at the same time, it serves as a warning to Pakistan that has continued to block NATO supply lines since the Salala attack last November. Pakistan-India relations have been improving recently and both nations have taken steps to bolster regional economic cooperation. India and Pakistan are also on the same wavelength on matters of Iran and Syria. President Zardari of Pakistan is expected to visit India on April 8th.

Another threat to India’s homeland security comes from the Maoist rebels. In an ambush last week, Maoist ambushed a patrol team in central India, killing 13 policemen. The rebels are inspired by Chinese revolutionary leader Mao Zedong and have a presence in 20 Indian states. There are about 10,000 to 20,000 rebels. An Italian man was recently abducted from Orissa and such incidents pose a direct threat to foreign investments and economic activity in the country.

The post India’s Military Preparedness And Risks To Its Homeland Security appeared first on Politact.

Officials from the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) said that the shield locked onto the two incoming nuclear missiles, and destroyed them over the Bay of Bengal. DRDO jointly developed the system’s tracking and fire control radar with Israel and France. India is the fifth state to achieve this missile defense technology.

India’s longest-range nuclear missile, Agni IV, is capable of travelling 3500 kilometers. The country has announced it will soon test a nuclear capable missile that can travel over 5000 kilometers.

The post India Successfully Tests Missile Shied appeared first on Politact.