PoliTact’s Global Security Study

With inputs from Naade Ali and Arif Ansar

Context

Negotiations on the Trump’s 20-point Gaza Peace Package has been ongoing in Egypt since Monday, and the deal on the first phase between Hamas and Israel was announced on October 8th. At first glance, the focus appears to be on tactical choices, such as cease-fires, hostage exchanges, the future of Gaza, the fate of Hamas, and whether the Abraham Accords survive the region’s new trauma. Trump’s plan is pragmatic: a phased cease-fire, hostage-prisoner swaps, an interim technocratic authority to oversee Gaza reconstruction and demilitarization. However, it’s much vaguer where the politics bite: long-term political status, refugee questions, and Palestinian statehood.

The leaders of eight Muslim-majority states: Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Türkiye, Indonesia, Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan, who met Trump on the sidelines of the 80th UN General Assembly in New York, had expressed support for the plan in a joint statement, praising his “sincere efforts to end the war in Gaza” and expressing confidence in his ability to achieve peace. However, the text of the plan released subsequently has raised concerns among Arab countries and drawn significant domestic criticism, as it deviates from the proposals of the foreign ministers of the eight Muslim states. Reports indicate that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu secured “the last word,” persuading Washington to make additional changes at a stage when it was harder for the Muslim countries to intervene.

How the Gaza question is resolved — whether as a primarily security-led stabilization by disarming, re-building, and technocratic governance or as a political settlement that recognizes Palestinian political rights in a durable way — is yet to be seen. An Israeli-U.S. approach that produces security and normalization without a credible, enforceable pathway to Palestinian political rights and without addressing refugee claims, settlements or permanent borders risks locking in a durable, managed status quo that advantageously cements Israeli gains and rewards Arab normalization while leaving Palestinian grievances unresolved.

For critics and many Palestinians, the plan’s biggest flaw is that it recapitulates the old “deal by omission” problem — postpone the hard political questions and hope that security fixes suffice. Robert Malley’s long reflection on the failure of past peace processes is a timely reminder that postponing core issues almost guarantees revival of conflict rather than durable peace.

Shift in the Middle East Balance of Power

Since Trump’s first term in power led to Abraham Accords in September 2020, the Middle East is undergoing tumultuous shift in the balance of power. This shift is away from Iran’s axis of resistance and towards those that signed the Abraham Accords – and others that were moving towards accepting it. Highlighting plans to expand the signatories to the Abraham Accord and emphasizing the strategic and economic benefits of cooperating with Israel, Trump recently stated:

“History has shown us that those who establish relations with Israel have thrived, while those who devote resources and attention toward the destruction — even the annihilation — of Israel have languished. Israel is not going anywhere. They are going to coexist with other peoples and countries in the region. The Abraham Accords demonstrate that nations are better off when they communicate, work together, and embrace new opportunities.”

The last five years have seen aggressive Israeli campaigns and intelligence operations directed at damaging — sometimes decisively — Iran’s regional network: kinetic blows, targeted assassinations of key operatives in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, and continued pressure on Iran’s enlistment of militias. Another focus has been the degrading of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, whether by eliminating key scientists, or by cyberattacks on its nuclear facility. In June, US also carried out bombing of the Iran’s nuclear facilities in Fordow, Isfahan, and Nanatz sites.

The net effect has been to cripple Iran’s reach: Hezbollah was weakened on the battlefield during the 2023–24 rounds of fighting; Iran’s Quds Force lost its most iconic commander in Qasem Soleimani in January 2020. Recently, Isreal shifted its focus to the political leadership, which lead to the assassination of Ismael Haniyeh on Iranian soil in July 2024, followed by elimination of Hassan Nasrullah in Lebanon in September 2024. However, it was the Israeli attack on Hamas negotiators in Doha last month that many experts believe may have broken the camel’s back. It blurred the line of who is Israel after – and what does it want to achieve with all the mayhem that followed Oct 7, 2023, tragic Hamas attack on Israel. The campaign against Iran has demonstrated that Israel can play with international rules at will and without any consequences. This will have grave long-term consequences for global order.

But degradation does not mean elimination — proxies adapt, civilian costs grow, and local politics evolve in unpredictable ways. Alongside coercion and violence, normalization diplomacy has quietly reshaped the balance. The Abraham Accords proved that several Arab states were prepared to prioritize trade, technology, and counter-Iran cooperation, over the old formula that required Palestinian statehood before normalization. This bargain created an “outside-in” model of Israeli influence — Israel’s security and economic ties extend into the Arab world even as its control over Palestinian territories and the facts on the ground become more entrenched.

That model has a dual consequence: it strengthens Israel’s regional legitimacy and deterred coalitions, but it also delegitimizes the Palestinian cause in some Arab capitals. Unless meaningful political concessions accompany normalization under the current rounds of peace accords – the situation may plan in the hands of hardliners in the longer run.

Reshaping the New Middle East

The 20-point Trump plan thus revolve around two linked wagers.

First: can an externally led, security-first approach end immediate bloodshed and create a stable environment for reconstruction? Second: can that short-term security compact be turned into a politically legitimate, durable settlement that includes Palestinian rights and prevents radicalization? If the answer to the second question is “no,” then any tactical success will be ephemeral — the security gains will ossify into new grievances and a renewed cycle of violence.

If the American-Israeli tack succeeds in producing a stable Gaza that is demilitarized, internationally managed and economically rebuilt — but without a credible pathway to Palestinian statehood, refugee resolution, or substantive political participation — the regional consequence is likely to be twofold:

(a) the anti-Abraham Accord camp will consolidate, and (b) the Palestinian national cause shifts from mainstream diplomacy back to asymmetric forms of resistance and transnational advocacy. That benefits actors that can exploit grievances — whether non-state actors in the region or international rivals that seek influence by presenting themselves as alternatives to the U.S. model.

Middle East and the Global Balance of Power

Potential failure of the U.S.-Israeli approach does not automatically favor China and Russia — but it creates openings. China and Russia are playing a long game: both have expanded political and economic ties in the Middle East, offering infrastructure, arms, and diplomatic cover without the political conditionalities the West often attaches. Beijing’s economic footprint, growing role in regional institutions, including BRICS partners, and willingness to court Gulf states for energy and investment means it can offer attractive alternatives to American dependency.

Moscow, for its part, remains an arms supplier and a diplomatic interlocutor (especially in Syria), and it relishes opportunities to undercut U.S. influence. If Washington’s approach produces stability without justice, public sentiment may turn away from the U.S. narrative and look to non-Western partners who promise investments or political balance-as as has already started to occur. That said, China and Russia do not currently possess the same depth of security integration with Israel or the same network of alliances that would let them ‘replace’ American influence overnight — what they can do is exploit U.S. credibility gaps to gain economic and political footholds.

The Way Forward

Three practical conclusions emerge from a realistic appraisal of Trump’s 20-point plan:

1. Security outcomes are necessary but not sufficient. Short-term stabilization that includes hostage releases, ceasefires, and reconstruction, is important and politically urgent — but by itself it will not end the conflict’s structural drivers. The old lesson of Oslo remains: postponing core grievances breeds future crises.
2. Normalization without a political track is a strategic accelerant for some actors and a strategic liability for others. States that prioritize economic and security ties with Israel will gain leverage; however, the Arab and Muslim Street will judge outcomes by whether justice is achieved for Palestinians.
3. Geopolitically, every gap left by U.S. leadership, or perceived U.S. indifference to justice, creates space for China and Russia to expand influence — primarily through diplomacy and investment, and secondarily through arms and political support. But neither Beijing nor Moscow offers a ready-made substitute for U.S. regional security guarantees; rather, they offer alternative hedges that regional states will use in pursuit of their own short-term interests.

If Cairo deal and the Trump package are to avoid merely delaying the next crisis they must do three things simultaneously:

Secure an immediate end to mass killing and human suffering; create an inclusive, accountable reconstruction process that gives Palestinians meaningful agency; and set out an enforceable, internationally backed political roadmap that addresses, not postpones, refugee claims, borders and sovereignty – as was done in the Oslo Accords. Without that tripod, any “victory” will be tactical, not strategic — and the balance of power will keep shifting unpredictably, with winners among states and non-state actors who are best at exploiting unresolved grievances.

Related Articles:

Israel Airstrike Targets Hamas Negotiators In Doha, Threatening Gaza Ceasefire Talks – Sep 15, 2025
Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions – April 26, 2025
Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran – February 25, 2025
Assad’s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East – Dec 26, 2024
The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump – Dec 5, 2024
Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences – Aug 30, 2024
The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities – Sep 27, 2024
What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply? – Aug 4, 2022

The post From Oslo To Trump’s Abraham Accords And 20-Point Peace Plan For Gaza appeared first on Politact.

By Naade Ali
South Asia and Middle East Fellow

Context

In the post October 7, 2023, Hamas led attack on Israel, the geopolitics of Middle East is fast evolving. This has been accompanied by the loss of Hezbollah leadership in Lebanon and the fall of Assad regime in Syria in December 2024. The inauguration of President Trump on January 20, 2025, has presented unique threats and opportunities regarding the future of two-state solution and Iran.

The likelihood of a broader conflict between Iran and Israel hangs in balance as President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have forged a strong strategic alignment. Meeting with Trump on Feb 4, Netanyahu tried to ensure that U.S. policy remained closely aligned with Israel’s objective of weakening Iran’s defense capabilities, particularly preventing it from ever acquiring nuclear missile power. On the other hand, Iran had hoped that Trump would adopt a pragmatic approach and revive nuclear talks leading to easing of economic pressure. To Iran’s disappointment, Trump pursued the reinstatement of “maximum pressure” policy on Tehran.

However, difference of opinion exists where Netanyahu, sensing an opportunity, is lobbying for a military solution towards Iran. Conversely, Trump is vying for a negotiated settlement while keeping hopes alive for a two-state solution. This he is doing by raising the stakes for the Gulf and Arab nations, who met in Riyadh on February 21 to discuss the future of Gaza. A follow-up emergency meeting of the Arab League is planned on March 4th in Egypt, to present a counter plan to what Trump has proposed.

Trump’s Carrot-and-Stick Approach

The “maximum pressure” doctrine portrays Iran as a destabilizing force and a significant threat to U.S. national interests, centered on three key objectives:

First, it seeks to cripple Iran’s nuclear program through harsh diplomatic and economic sanctions. Second, it aims to weaken Iran’s regional influence by dismantling its network of “proxies” and axis of resistance. This objective has taken on additional significance with the on-going Gaza crisis, elimination of Hezbollah leadership, and the fall Assad regime in Syria. Third, it strives to isolate Iran on the global stage, a move Iran’s president condemned as an attempt to “bring Iran to its knees.”

Justifying his approach, Trump claimed the timing was ideal, stating, “Iran, terrified after losing almost all its air defenses, would love to make a deal with the United States.” Confident that relentless pressure would force Iran into submission, he remains committed to a strategy of economic and diplomatic coercion.

Despite his tough rhetoric, Trump ruled out military intervention, dismissing reports of a potential U.S.-Israel strike as “greatly exaggerated.” While acknowledging Iran’s military ambitions—describing it as “very militant”—he firmly rejected the idea of bombing Iran, stating, “I would much prefer a Verified Nuclear Peace Agreement, which will let Iran peacefully grow and prosper.”

Meanwhile, key Republican leaders, including U.S. Rep. Mike Turner, have stated that Trump’s strategy is designed to “secure a long-term solution that guarantees Israel’s security by preventing Iran and its proxies from ever threatening its sovereignty.” Likewise, Rep. Joe Wilson has praised the maximum pressure campaign, asserting that it would ultimately weaken Iran and dismantle its network of terror proxies.

Israeli Plans

While U.S. President Donald Trump has shown reluctance to engage in direct military action against Iran, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has taken a more assertive approach. According to multiple credible reports, with Iran’s air defense systems significantly weakened and its regional proxies under strain, Netanyahu sees a strategic window to target Iran’s nuclear facilities—whether or not the U.S. supports the move. The American intelligence assessments indicate that Israel is actively considering large-scale strikes on Iranian nuclear sites in the latter half of the year, with Israeli officials expected to urge the Trump administration and key Republican leaders to endorse their plans.

The recent approval by the U.S. State Department of a $7.4 billion arms sale to Israel—including thousands of bombs and missiles set for delivery this year—suggests a broader effort to reinforce Israel’s military capabilities against potential regional threats. Israel already possesses U.S.-made bunker-busting munitions capable of striking Iran’s underground nuclear sites, particularly those concealed within the mountainous terrain of Fordow near Qom. This growing military buildup highlights Israel’s preparedness to neutralize Iran’s security infrastructure if necessary.

Israeli officials have repeatedly affirmed that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are fully prepared to launch strikes on Iranian nuclear sites. Defense Minister Israel Katz has hinted at the possibility of an attack in the coming months. In a letter to incoming U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, Katz wrote:

“The months ahead present both challenges that demand military readiness and opportunities to advance our strategic objectives.” He has previously stated that “Iran’s nuclear facilities are more vulnerable than ever,” suggesting that this moment may offer the best chance to neutralize what Israel perceives as an existential threat.

In essence, the emphasis of the approach is twofold: Israel exerting military pressure while the U.S. working on the economic squeeze. The outcome of the two would either result in a regime change led by the Iranian people – or push the Iranian government to strike a deal with Trump. According to some media reports, if Tehran does not reach an agreement with the U.S. by October, Israel is likely to initiate a military action.

How is Iran Preparing?

President Masoud Pezeshkian has warned that while Israel or its allies “may succeed in damaging Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, they will not be able to strip the country of its ability to rebuild.” His statement came after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected negotiations with the Trump administration, asserting that past talks had neither been rational nor honorable. “Negotiations with America do not solve any of our problems,” Khamenei declared.

President Pezeshkian has accused Trump of engaging in deceptive diplomacy while simultaneously working to undermine his government. While reaffirming that Iran does not seek war, he warned that “Iran will never bow to foreign pressure.” Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi echoed this sentiment, stating that negotiating with Trump would amount to surrender. He further cautioned that any military action by Israel or the U.S. against Iran’s nuclear facilities would trigger an “all-out war,” calling it one of the greatest strategic miscalculations Washington could make.

Last year, Iran announced plans to triple its military budget. Western think tanks estimate that Iran was the fourth-largest military spender in the Middle East in 2023, with a defense budget of approximately $10.3 billion.

On the other hand, Iran has deepened its military and economic cooperation with China and Russia. Despite crippling U.S. sanctions, Iran has found alternative economic mechanisms to sustain itself and remains a key player in the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS.

Some reports suggest that Iran is ramping up its missile program, with a vessel carrying 1,000 tons of Chinese-made chemicals—potentially crucial for missile fuel—recently arriving at an Iranian port. Furthermore, Iranian military has launched its first drone carrier ship, capable of launching stealth attacks, and has acquired Russian Sukhoi-35 fighter jets to modernize its aging air force. A strategic cooperation agreement signed with Moscow in January has further reinforced Tehran’s defense ties. Despite Israel’s escalating rhetoric, Iranian military officials insist that the country’s air defense remains intact and more resilient than ever.

Conclusion

For years, Israel and Iran have been engaged in a shadow conflict, carefully calibrating their actions to avoid all-out war. Recently, Iran has adopted a strategic paradigm described as ‘strategic patience’—a calculated approach that has shielded it from large-scale destruction while reinforcing its self-sufficiency. Iranian Vice President Javad Zarif has dismissed speculation that Iran might resort to nuclear weapons as a last-ditch effort for survival or deterrence. Instead, he emphasized that the nation’s self-reliant defense strategy ensures resilience against external pressure.

However, The New York Times has reported that Iran may be discreetly exploring the possibility of developing nuclear weapons should its leadership decide to take that path. According to the report, since resuming fuel production, Iran has accumulated enough enriched uranium to construct at least four nuclear bombs. While Iran has the technical expertise to develop a basic nuclear device relatively quickly, it currently lacks the capability to integrate such a weapon into a ballistic missile system. Nonetheless, a successful nuclear test could allow Iran to declare itself a nuclear-armed state, significantly altering the strategic balance in the region.

While Iran’s conventional military strength does not match that of Israel or the U.S., it retains the capability to inflict serious damage on both adversaries. As the main supporter of Hamas and Hezbollah, the question of Iran is directly linked to the present Gaza crisis and what comes next. While many Gulf and Arab nations have privately loathed Hamas for the Oct 7, 2023, attack on Israel and for disrupting the progress achieved through Abraham Accords, the Trump plan to take over Gaza, has forced them to back up their sentiments with action. It also represents the final step in the full culmination of the Outside-In approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Related Articles:

Assad’s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East – Dec 26, 2024
The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump – Dec 5, 2024
Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences – Aug 30, 2024
The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities – Sep 27, 2024

The post Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran appeared first on Politact.

Context

By Dr Claude Rakisits

Washington’s management of its wobbly and contested Middle East policy has just become whole lot more difficult and complicated with the worsening of tensions between Riyadh and Tehran following the recent Saudi execution of an elderly Shiite cleric on dubious terrorism charges.

On the one hand, there’s Saudi Arabia, the uncontested leader of the Arab world and a long-lasting ally of the US; and on the other hand, Iran, the leader of the Shiite community and a country with which the US wants to develop a more constructive relationship. But more importantly, Washington needs both countries to be on board with the Vienna process if the Obama administration is to make any progress in finding a political solution to the never-ending Syrian crisis. And although Saudi Arabia and Iran were both at the initial meeting endorsing the process, their continued participation down the road looks increasingly like a pipe dream.

Analysis

Saudi, Iran Tensions And Syria

The Obama administration is indeed worried that this sudden rise in tension between the two key countries in the region will undermine its efforts to stop the horrendous bloodshed in Syria and the consequent human displacement and misery that it generates. Accordingly, Secretary of State John Kerry has been busy working the phones talking to the Saudi and Iranian leaders and officials in an attempt to de-escalate the situation. However, his efforts don’t seem to have had much impact.

Not only has Saudi Arabia broken all diplomatic relations with Iran and stopped all commercial flights between the two countries following the storming of its embassy in Tehran, but most of Riyadh’s Sunni allies in the region have joined it, in various degrees, in severing their ties with Iran. That will further harden the Sunni-Shiite sectarian divide and may well have far-reaching implications for the long-term stability of Saudi Arabia, where 10% of the population is Shiite. Importantly, most of the minority Saudi Shiite population lives in the eastern part of the kingdom where the oil fields and refineries are located. Reportedly, the Obama administration was privately critical of the Saudi Government’s decision to execute the Shiite cleric, fearing that it would create a vigorous Iranian reaction—which, in the end, happened regardless.

The tensions between the two big actors in the region are nothing new. However, the last time diplomatic relations were severed was in the 1980s during the Iran–Iraq war, when Saudi Arabia and its Arab Gulf allies actively financially supported Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in his conflict with Iran. But what’s worrisome today is how quickly tension has risen between the two sectarian rivals, with Iran accusing Saudi Arabia of conducting airstrikes on its embassy in Yemen. (A Saudi-led coalition has been battling Iranian-backed rebels since March 2015 in an attempt to restore the legitimate national government of Yemen.) And although Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (son of King Salman) has stated that Saudi Arabia doesn’t want war with Iran, this latest development doesn’t augur well for the future of bilateral relations.

But as everyone knows, a proxy war has already been taking place between the two rivals for the better part of four years, with Tehran supporting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, head of a minority Shiite sect, and Saudi Arabia backing the anti-Syrian government armed groups. However, the present scrap between Iran and Saudi Arabia underscores the more troubling differences: those between Riyadh and Washington.

Obama’s Middle East Policy

During most of Obama’s tenure, there have been deep differences between Riyadh and Washington on how to deal with Middle Eastern issues. The Saudi monarchy has been particularly critical of the US’ willingness to cut Egyptian President Mubarak loose during the Arab Spring; its early refusal to support the moderate opposition against President al-Assad and its failure to act on the famous ‘red line’ in Syria; and, most importantly, its nuclear deal with Iran last year. As seen from Riyadh, this American approach deeply worries the House of Saud, sensing that Washington is gradually loosening its ties with the Kingdom and beginning to lean towards Iran.

In light of the underlying US–Saudi tension, it isn’t too surprising to read (although generally only stated privately) that the Saudi Deputy Crown Prince reportedly said ’the US must realise that they’re ‘the number one’ in the world and they have to act like it’. Such public statements won’t help move matters forward.

In reaction to the perceived lack of US leadership in the Middle East or in response to Washington’s criticism of Saudi Arabia’s failure to pull its weight in fighting the Islamic State, Saudi Arabia unexpectedly launched an ‘Islamic military alliance’ in mid-December 2015. And although it was welcomed by the US administration, it’s unclear how this motley group of 35 Muslim countries—many of which hadn’t even been consulted prior to their inclusion—is supposed to achieve its stated aim of ‘coordinating mutual anti-terrorism assistance all over the Islamic world’.

What is clear, however, is that, though that alliance is more symbolic than anything else, as seen from Tehran, this grouping very much looks like an anti-Shiite alliance. Only three Muslim countries—Iran, Iraq and Syria, all majority Shiite or Shiite-dominated states—aren’t included. No wonder then that Iran reacted to the Saudi execution of the Shiite cleric as it did.

It’ll be critical for the Obama administration to diffuse this ever-growing tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran as quickly as possible. And although it’s unlikely that tensions will eventually lead to direct armed conflict between the two Gulf countries, it’ll probably lead to an increase in military support for each other’s regional, non-state proxies. So let’s hope Washington is up to the task of hosing down this latest Iranian–Saudi scrap because it’s those living in this already unstable and war-torn region who would suffer as a result of increased tensions.

A version of this article also appeared in The Strategist, a blog for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)

The post America’s Middle East Policy; Mitigating Iran, Saudi Arabia Tensions appeared first on Politact.

The process of transformation in the Middle East appears to be speeding up. If the western powers do reach an accord with Iran, it will come with tremendous risks and opportunities for both the region and the West. An agreement will represent a turning point in the West’s relations with the Islamic world, and perhaps in the long term, a move away from the Arab centric to Turkish and Iran oriented policies.

The traditional balance of power of the Middle East first got disturbed in Iraq. The environment of the Arab world has also been altering as a result of the war against extremists and Arab Spring; both have played havoc with the equilibrium of secular, conservative and religious forces of the region. How will the normalization of ties between Iran and the West impact these forces is a critical consideration. However, the first step is to understand what may have forced the West to engage with Iran.

Middle East Peace Process

The last attempt to push through a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict failed during the Clinton era. Subsequently, the death of Arafat, now thought to have been poisoned, was followed by a period of stalemate. During the Bush term, no serious effort was made to revive the Middle East peace process, and besides, US got busy with Al Qaeda after 9/11.

There was a growing realization in the West that a fresh approach was needed towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict if the two-state solution was to ever materialize. The new approach likely assessed the role played by the Arab autocrats during the previous peace efforts. And it must have quickly become clear that the monarchies were now more of a liability than an asset.

Due to challenges of credibility, they usually clung to the West and US for support. However, to remain relevant on the Arab street, they also had to take a strong position on the issue of Palestine. The arrival of the war on terror further complicated the dilemma of Arab authoritarian rulers. It increased their dependency on the West for survival while they compromised further on their traditional stances against Israel.

This was most evident when the Gaza Blockade started in 2007; Hosni Mubarak supported the Israeli moves while the Gulf States remained oblivious. The Arabs, especially the Gulf States, did not recognize at the time their inertness was causing Iran and Turkey to gain. The first visible sign of this shift came during the Mavi Marma incident in 2010. The Turks was seen as standing up to the Israeli injustices, while the Arab states came across as accomplices.

While the Arabs were mostly engaged in rhetoric, it was Iran doing the heavy lifting in Iraq, and for the Palestinian cause, using Hezbollah and even assisting Sunni Hamas in Gaza. The Arab States interpreted Turkish, Iranian, and Qatar’s support for Hamas in Gaza as attempts to sabotage the two-state solution.

Nonetheless, this dynamics further proved that in order to have a lasting solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran and Turkey were the key, and less so the Arab states. Ironically, as these developments were transpiring, the issue was identified less and less as a matter between the Arabs and Israelis and more and more as Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

How to Deal with Iran?

This led to the next question of how then to deal with Iran: through a military solution or a political one. As this argument was taking place, pretty much the same debate was occurring on how to tackle Taliban in the AfPak region. In 2009, President Obama presented a new strategy for Afghanistan. Engaging Iran politically was not only beneficial for the western policy in the Middle East but also for dealing with Afghanistan and Al Qaeda.

Throughout George W. Bush’s two terms, and especially after the invasion of Iraq, the debate on the best course for Iran came up for consideration on several occasions. Each time the route of negotiations was pushed back due to strong resistance from within the American system and from Israel. From the Israeli perspective, once Iran’s nuclear program matured enough to produce a nuclear weapon, it would be too late and therefore it persistently threatened a unilateral strike. On the other hand, every time a military option was explored its limitation also came to the fore, and even the American military advised against it due to the risk of a wider regional conflagration.

The Syrian Opportunity

Then another opportunity presented itself about three years ago with the arrival of Arab Spring in Syria, a strong ally of Iran. If Assad’s regime could be removed, and in addition to economic sanctions, Iran could be pressured to change course on its nuclear ambition. The Saudis and Qataris went full fledge in supporting the rebels in Syria.

This option ran into trouble when Russia, and China, resisted strongly against any Libya style military intervention. The West was not about to start a world war over Syria, and a political opportunity was presented when Assad offered to dismantle the chemical weapons. In addition, Iran’s new regime took a more moderate stance resulting in the restart of the negotiations on it nuclear programs.

The question now is if a nuclear deal with Iran is reached, how will the Arab world, particularly the Gulf States, respond to this sea change? Egypt and Saudi Arabia are already probing Russia, which seems willing to reciprocate. War on terror has caused tremendous damage to the repute of US and NATO in the Islamic world and China and Russia are well positioned to gain from this. On the other hand, Pakistan has been drifting ever closer to China. Even Turkey, a member of NATO, is flirting with the prospect of joining SCO.

Then there are ties between Islamic states themselves. With the easing of sanctions on Iran, the South and Central Asia can benefit tremendously economically. However, Pakistan ties with Gulf region are likely to be tested in case of normalization of Iran’s relations with the West. The gravest challenge, however, would be to prevent a confrontation between the resurgent Sunni extremist forces with Shia groups, which are likely to be energized by Iran’s emerging regional and global stature.

The post Iranian Deal And Transformation Of Middle East appeared first on Politact.

China and Russia vetoed the UN Security Council resolution that condemns Assad’s crackdown and backs Arab League plan calling for Bashar Assad to step aside. Both reiterated their opposition to the use of force to resolve the Syrian crisis, where escalating violence has killed thousands of civilians as the regime has cracked down on dissidents. The other 13 members that include US, UK, France, India and Pakistan, voted in favor of the resolution. Arab League Secretary General Nabil al-Araby was pressing the Council to take swift and decisive action. On the other hand, Syrian UN ambassador dismissed the criticism against the regime, calling it the dream of western powers to return to colonialism and hegemony.

Analysis

Russian envoy to the EU had objected to the language of the Western-Arab UN Security Council resolution, calling for ‘unspecified measures’, if President Bashar does not cede power. Russia wanted a clear clause that rules out the possibility of external military intervention.

Russia had further stated that it will not support any action that is imposed on Syria; moreover, it will not take sides as had happened in the case of Libya. Sergei Lavrov had earlier commented that armed extremists disrupting the civic life are equally condemnable as the use of violence by the government. Additionally, Lavrov had warned that the regime change will not be restricted to Syria only, and it would spread.

China had also resisted Western push for the Security Council resolution, calling the forced regime change a violation of the United Nations Charter and the basic norms guiding the practice of international relations.

Meanwhile, Washington has maintained that the fall of Assad’s regime is inevitable, and it’s only a question of time. The opposition Syrian National Council has deplored the ‘lack of swift’ action by the international community and to protect the Syrian citizens ‘by all necessary means’. The rebel Free Syrian Army has claimed fifty percent of territory is no longer under the control of the regime, while CIA director David Petraeus has said that Assad now faced challenges in Damascus and Aleppo, two cities that had been insulated from the unrest.

The post Russia And China Veto UNSC Resolution On Syria appeared first on Politact.

Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Liu Weimin stated, “China is opposed to one country imposing unilateral sanctions on another country in accordance with domestic law, let alone imposing sanctions on a third country.”

Washington had announced that the seven emerging economies that are heavily dependent on Iranian export would not be penalized, if these countries make some amount of reduction. The countries exempted from sanctions are India, Malaysia, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Turkey and Taiwan. Japan and some European Union countries were also added to the list in March.

Quoting unnamed US officials, media reports in Pakistan indicate that the countries’ import of oil from Iran is too low to be considered for sanctions. However, the Iran Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline project will be subject to sanctions.

The post US To Penalize China, Pakistan For Iran Energy Dealings appeared first on Politact.

Israeli Prime Minster Benjamin Netanyahu commented that Iran was behind both incidents and the country is world’s largest terror exporter. He also charged Iran of plotting against Israeli targets in Thailand and Azerbaijan. According to Israeli media sources, any serious attack against Israelis abroad could trigger a full-scale response against Iran.

Meanwhile, Iran’s foreign ministry spokesman has rejected the accusations calling them untrue and sheer lies, and part of a psychological warfare against Iran.

The post Israel Accuses Iran For Delhi, Tblisi Attacks, Threatens Retaliation appeared first on Politact.

Context

Iran and India are at an interesting point in their relationship. The US sanctions against Iranian oil imports has forced countries to take sides, and at present, it looks like India may be deciding to side with Iran, or more to the point, with its oil-hungry economy. This is a complication for the development of India’s relationship with the US and Israel, who want to bring India closer to them as a counterbalance to China, Pakistan and ultimately Iran as well.

Analysis

The aftermath of the new round of US sanctions on Iran is taking its toll on many countries, but is being particularly felt in Asia. While China was clear from the start that it would continue to purchase oil from Iran, most countries in the region including Japan, South Korea and India, were largely expected to fall in line with the US demands and end their oil trade with Iran. India has surprised many onlookers by not only seeming to ignore the new sanctions, but to press ahead and increase its purchases from Iran. India has also reportedly reached an agreement over long-standing payment issues with Iran, with 45 percent of payments to be made in Indian Rupees.

This is an interesting move by India, given that they have been playing to the US for the past couple of years and it looked as though they were falling squarely into the US camp. This was perfect for US interests, as India provided a bulwark against China, Pakistan and to some extent Iran in the region.
US interests also suffered another setback as India decided to buy 126-French-made Rafale combat aircraft. The French aviation company Dassault snapped up the $11 billion deal. India has dropped the airplanes deals with Boeing Co. and Lockheed Martin of the United States, and from Russian and Swedish makers, due to technical reasons.

Israel has publicly pleaded for India to heed to the sanctions, which it says are crucial to crippling Iran’s nuclear program. However the refusal of some of Iran’s largest oil trading partners to comply with the sanctions may have pushed Israel into commenting that “unlike in the past, there is widespread global understanding that if the sanctions don’t achieve their goal of halting Iran’s nuclear weapons program, there will arise the need of weighing an operation.” Israel’s Defense minister, Ehud Barak told said in an address to the annual Herzliya Conference at the Interdisciplinary Center academic campus just north of Tel Aviv.

This comes as Israeli Military’s intelligence head Maj. Gen. Aviv Kochavi stated that “Iran has over four tones of enriched materials and nearly 100 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium that’s enough for four bombs. It [nuclear bomb] will be done… within one year.”

Reports also surfaced in the US that US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta had warned that Israel is getting reading to strike Iranian nuclear facilities, before they enter a so-called “immunity zone” where nuclear material and facilities are transferred to secret locations. That India has decided to buck the sanctions and continue to trade with Iran at this time, is very upsetting for the US and Israel.

India has found itself in the same position as many countries, balancing the wishes of the US against its own national interest. This balancing act is an uncomfortable one and quite an unnatural one at that, because a nation state’s first priorities must be to pursue its national interest. For India, fueling growth and keeping the economy powered has superseded the need to bandwagon with the superpower.
It is this dynamics that is also causing China and Russia to refuse to comply with the unilateral sanctions. Japan and South Korea are also unhappy about the sanctions, but are trying to work with the US to secure a waiver without having to significantly reduce oil import from Iran.

India’s position, as well as that of Pakistan’s, is looking increasingly closer to that of China and Russia, as it also tries to maintain a non-interference status on issues like Syria and the unrest in the wider Middle East. Although India and Pakistan supported the latest UN Security Council resolution condemning President Bashar al-Assad’s crackdown in Syria, it does not reflect a change in their stated position. Chinese media has picked up on the possibility of support between these countries in trying to secure their energy needs. A senior editor for the China Daily published a scathing review of the US and Western dealings with Iran, and noted that in order for countries to secure their oil imports from Iran, it would take cooperation. “China and India (and hopefully, Japan and South Korea) have to join hands and send out a clear signal to the West that they don’t want another war in the Middle East. And they can count on Russia’s support for that,” the article concluded. This illustrates a clear hope that more countries will join together, not so much to support Iran, but to support their collective national interests of ready supplies of fuel. It also highlights that China (or at least some elements in China) fully expect a US or Israeli strike on Iran if the situation deteriorates.

In all likelihood Japan and South Korea will take pains to secure an agreement or a waiver with the US over the sanctions. However even without these countries, the absence of China, Russian and now India may be enough to curtail the sanction’s effect, and may be enough to make a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities by the US or Israel that much closer.

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According to Israeli media the country could launch an attack on Iran’s nuclear site without much prior notice to its closest ally, US. These reports indicate that Israel’s Defense Minister Ehud Barak has told US Gen Martin Dempsey that Israel will give US no more than 12 hours notice before striking Iran.

Israel PM Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated the message saying that an early warning on Israel’s intentions will not be provided to the US. Israel is training its elite 35th Paratroopers Brigade for a long-range operation against Iran.

US has cancelled a joint antimissile exercise with Israel for its non-cooperation, which was scheduled to be held in April.

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Iran expressed its consent on Thursday towards holding nuclear talks in Turkey. Speaker of Iran’s Majiles, Ali Larijini, stated in Ankara, “Our Turkish brothers think that negotiations should take place in Turkey, and of course we are positive for holding these talks in Turkey,” adding that Iran wants negotiations to be serious this time.

This came when the Western powers are pressing sanctions on Iran to force it to abandon its nuclear ambition. Turkey also hosted an unsuccessful round of nuclear talks in January 2011 between Iran and G5+1 countries.

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