Context

Historical parallels are important in developing perspectives on present-day conundrums. They provide an illustration of where matters were and what were the important events and considerations at the time. Deciphering this helps to ascertain where matters stand and navigate the future.

The November article last year had examined the division of British subcontinent in 1947 and compared the US August 2021 withdrawal to that. Since then, two other significant events have unfolded on the global scene. The invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February and the removal of Imran Khan’s government in April through a no confidence motion. And the two events seem to be interlinked as well. Apparently, Imran Khan’s decision to visit Russia and meet Putin had angered Western powers including the US.

Analysis

Pre-Partition Dynamics

How does the arrival of new Cold War with Russia and removal of Imran’s government fit with the earlier balance of power tussles that led the British to leave the Sub-Continent – and the birth of India and Pakistan in 1947? Moreover, how does Imran’s stance differ from those adopted by previous leadership including Mohammad Ali Jinnah.

Clearly, both, Jinnah in the past, and Imran in the present, are dealing with a different set of circumstances. Jinnah was attempting to carve out a new nation and had to work with the colonial power. And the best chance for him to achieve success was by not being a revisionist. Moreover, he realized that the time of empires had passed, and the nation-state trend was the one he needed to conform to – not Pan-Islamism.

Another important consideration is an assessment of alternative political thoughts that existed at the time to deal with the challenges. Acuteness of obstacles, especially economic, often cause strong divergent views – where it is difficult to bring consensus.

For example, Jinnah’s attitude was in stark contrast to that of Mowlana Azad, Mowdudi, Mohammad Ali and Showkat Ali, Ghaffar Khan, and other Pan-Islamists of the time. He was against the ‘Khilafat Movement’ (which was formed against the breakup of the Ottoman Empire) and considered it a religious exaggeration; Gandhi, ironically, had supported this movement. Some Pan-Islamists later resisted the formation of Pakistan, as it would divide the Muslims of the subcontinent, and inadvertently became Gandhi’s staunch supporters.

The critical point in Jinnah’s position was his differentiation between the importance of local and regional interests vis-a-vis global ones. The local and regional interests translated into nationalistic interests, in the post-World War II nation-state environment. In Jinnah’s assessment, more importance was given to what was attainable; he complied with the nation-state trend in opposition to Pan-Islamism — the time for empires had passed. Not to forget, the transformation of Turkey to a State at the end of Ottoman Empire. And, it was not just Turkey. Virtually all the European empires had converted to nation-states toward the end of World War II.

Post-Independence Alignments

After gaining independence from Great Britain, Pakistan solidly remained in the Western block. The final battle of the previous Cold War was fought and won with Pakistan assistance in Afghanistan. It was, therefore, more than ironic that as the new Cold War got underway, and Russia invaded Ukraine in February, leader of Pakistan Imran Khan was seen standing next to Putin in Russia. And as Imran proclaimed his desire to establish and maintain independent foreign policy – his stances are perceived as Pan-Islamic and nationalist, with the undertones of revisionism.

When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the then ruler and chief martial law administrator, Gen Zia-ul-Haq, squarely sided with the US in organizing jihad against the godless Soviets. Subsequently, after 9/11 when US launched the War against Extremism, the then military ruler of Pakistan Gen Musharraf also decided to side with the US in carrying out the Campaign against Extremism. In both instances, the nation gained US economic and military support – despite the fact that both leaders had unceremoniously removed elected civilian governments, of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif respectively.

Irrespective, as the new Cold War gets underway Imran Khan appeared to be a misfit. To conform with the past trajectory would have meant for him to quickly fall in line – and avail the opportunity presented by the change in global political landscape for the betterment of the country – as had occurred during the Zia and Musharraf’s time. Alternatively, even if that was not possible, then Jinnah presents an ideal depiction of how to operate as a pragmatist with a weak hand. While Jinnah had to carve out an Muslim nation state, the present political, economic and security imperatives translate into no-less than existential threat.

Imran’s idealism is requiring him to alter the very conditions that are taking the nation to brink of extinction again and again – namely corruption and an opportunism. Whenever matters have taken a turn for the worse, the country has waited things out for the global context to change, and surely time never stays the same. This, by any definition, can hardly be called a policy or a strategy.

Societal Outlook

When we look at the past for examples, a question is also raised: did Jinnah align with the West because he believed the Allied powers were winning. Or – was it that he felt their values matched closely with his and what he was trying to achieve. After all, he spent a lot of time in Britain, like Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Imran Khan.

And this question remains relevant today. As Pakistan has remained an ally of the West and the US since Independence, naturally its people are also connected to the West when it comes to people-to-people contacts and commercial ties.

While the nation claim’s strategic friendship with China, the social contacts are no way near like what Pakistan has with the US. But which segment of the society are we talking about is also pertinent; the upper middle class, business elites, and top brass of the military have always been tied to the West, as can be said for many other nations.

More importantly, and otherwise less talked about, is how close are Pakistan’s value system to that of the West – at least in aspiring democratic form of government and sharing customized version of liberal world view. While its true that the West and the US have been losing their soft power – still Russia and China are no match when it comes to the cultural appeal.

When Imran Khan gives an example of what systems inspires him, other than ‘Riyasat-e-Medina’- he usually quotes the British system – not the Russian or Chinese. Although he has praised Chinese successes in poverty alleviation.

The fact of the matter is that Pakistan is politically, socially, and economically still connected to and dependent on the West and the US. However, this connection is deeper the higher one goes in the class system. This poses serious implications. Moreover, the disoriented youth have been galvanized and empowered by Imran’s narrative – which rhymes with their world view. Additionally, this world view inadvertently has been facilitated by the West: by supporting political leadership that falls short of its own standards and is seen as corrupt – and by not living up to the moral high ground in recent conflicts.

The non-revisionist class and leadership, in whose hands the British left the power, has lost credibility over time. Although that system is still attempting to maintain status quo – it would be increasingly difficult to do so.

The post New Cold War; Leadership Challenges For Middle Powers And Societal Imbalance appeared first on Politact.

By Dr. Syed Mohammad Ali

Context

While longstanding, relations between the US and Pakistan have experienced much turbulence especially since 9/11. It looks like the unceremonious American exit after two decades of intervention in Afghanistan is going to become another source of contention for this troubled bilateral relationship. Yet, some opportunities still exist for the US and Pakistan to cooperate, especially with regards to ensuring long-term stabilization in Afghanistan.

The story of Pakistan working with Saudi Arabia and the US to help wage a holy war against the Soviets in the 80s is well known. But Pakistan’s security cooperation with US goes back much earlier. Pakistan joined Cold War alliances like the Baghdad Pact in 1955 and the Central Treaty Alliance in 1959. In 1958, Dwight D. Eisenhower even requested Pakistan’s Prime Minister Feroze Khan Noon for a secret facility, to fly reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union. This arrangement was only uncovered when an American U2 spy plane which flew from Peshawar was shot down in May 1960 by Soviet forces.

In the Global War Against Terror (GWOT), Pakistan was pressured to become a ‘frontline’ state, and to help the US fight the same hardliners it helped create in Afghanistan during the 1980s. Pakistan has repeatedly complained of being embroiled in GWOT and not being adequately appreciated for its cooperation and sacrifices. On the other hand, the US has long suspected Pakistan of being duplicitous and not doing enough to ensure stabilization in Afghanistan.

It took the US almost twenty years to realize that there is no military solution to the Afghan crisis. While American talks with the Taliban have produced lackluster results, these ‘peace’ talks did allow President Trump an opportunity to announce a US military withdrawal. Once the withdrawal decision was made, it has proven very difficult for the incoming Biden administration to reverse course, despite his claims of wanting a ‘responsible exit’.

The US and other NATO allies will probably continue proving financial assistance to Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, including funds to the national army that they created. While the US is withdrawing militarily, the budget request for the next fiscal year is still asking Congress for $3.3bn to support and sustain the Afghan Security Forces, a jump of 9.2 percent from 2021. In addition, the US intends to keep ‘over the horizon’ counter terrorism capabilities in neighboring countries to ensure that ISIS and Al Qaeda are not able to gain enough ground in Afghanistan that they become an international threat again.

Pakistan would logistically have been an ideal base for US counter-terrorism operations, but the Pakistani government has categorically rejected the possibility of such cooperation. Pakistan’s refusal to give the US military bases to undertake operations in Afghanistan is understandable. Such a move would be deeply unpopular given the controversy surrounding tacit Pakistani endorsement of US drone strikes despite the collateral damage caused by them. It may risk fueling extremist attacks within Pakistan, and it may irk the Taliban who have warned neighboring countries of hosting an American military presence.

Media reports reflect that under the Biden administration budget request for fiscal year 2022, some military training and economic assistance for Pakistan is forthcoming, but the overall suspension of military aid that came about in May 2018 remains intact. What will be the actual size of US aid to Pakistan next year, especially if it does not succumb to American pressure to provide it military bases to operate in Afghanistan remains to be seen. Pakistan could be pressured by the US via lending agencies like the IMF. Threatening to blacklist Pakistan using the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) if it refuses to allow the US to operate military bases on its soil would not be fair. But in the realpolitik world, states can often resort to such tactics to try and get what they need.

Emerging Complications and Compulsions

While Pakistan keeps insisting that it is open to any permutation of power sharing which are acceptable to the Afghans, the nation is widely suspected of preferring a hardline Afghan state which would rebuff Indian attempts to encircle Pakistan. The latest Congressional Research Service Report’s assessment of Islamabad’s motives are not too rosy. It concludes that Pakistan will prefer a weak and destabilized Afghanistan, instead of a strong Pashtun-dominated government (which would continue to resist the status of the Durand Line and appeal to Pakistan’s own restive Pashtun minority). Such suspicions are questionable, however, given that destabilization in Afghanistan would incur the hefty cost of another large wave of Afghan refugees pouring into Pakistan. Unfortunately, there are no easy solutions when it comes to ensuring a semblance of order and stability in Afghanistan. The Tajiks will probably continue to resist the Taliban’s attempt to gain complete power over the country, and they will again look towards different regional backers to challenge the Taliban. Turkey’s recent offer to take a lead role in ensuring the security of Kabul airport after the American departure is an interesting twist in this regard, hinting at an expanded Turkish role in Afghanistan in the foreseeable future.

US attempts to support the Afghan national army from being overrun by the Taliban may compel the Taliban to increasingly rely on Al Qaeda’s support. The CIA has also built-up counter-terrorism militias over these past several years, which have problematic human rights records, and these militias may now back varied factions motivated by personal gains. The presence of major illicit arms and drug trade cartels operating in the region could add to the threat of worsening violence.

While Pakistan can play an important role in helping create stability and economic prosperity in Afghanistan, the US continues to view Pakistan from the narrow lens of achieving its own counter-terrorism goals. Pakistan has not done much either to provide alternative pathways to working with the US which could help improve the lives of ordinary people in Afghanistan.

The Way Forward

Recent Pakistani attempts to reboot relations with the US are perhaps too ambitious given US suspicion of China, and the Biden administration’s decision to continue working with India to contain Chinese influence. Instead, Pakistan now needs to focus on more pragmatic and mutually beneficial opportunities for collaboration, such as the need to enable much needed stabilization in Afghanistan.

One possibility in this regard is the activation of the much discussed but still not operationalized reconstruction opportunity zone (ROZ) on both sides of the Durand Line, via which jointly produced Afghan and Pakistani products could be given preferential access to US markets. A well-functioning ROZ could create a strong incentive for Pakistan and Afghanistan to cooperate and it could provide the means for boosting economic sustainability within Afghanistan.

There is ample room for the US and Pakistan to work together to avert escalating chaos in Afghanistan. In his June 21 article in the Washington Post, Prime Minister Khan reiterated his desire to be a willing partner for ensuring peace in conflict-ridden Afghanistan, even though his government is unwilling to host US military bases. He also significantly asserted that Pakistan would reject attempts to impose a government in Kabul though the use of force.

The need for promoting economic connectivity and regional trade to promote lasting peace and security in Afghanistan is well recognized. Within this context, an ROZ between Pakistan and Afghanistan is an idea whose time has come. There is need to show pro-activeness in articulating parameters of such an ROZ, so that needed incentives are in place for boosting economic cooperation between the neighboring states as soon as a power-sharing formula emerges in post-withdrawal Afghanistan.

The post Recalibrating The US-Pakistan Partnership In Afghanistan appeared first on Politact.

Context

As Biden administration formulates its Pakistan policy, and reviews the Afghan peace deal reached in February last year – a debate is raging in both US and Pakistan based think tanks on the future of US-Pakistan relations. It is like a new season of an exciting Netflix drama serial, only that this one has been continuing for about two decades. For all intents and purposes Biden administration represents Season 4 of the US-Pakistan serial which has seen many twists and turns. During this period, several terms were used to represent the ties, such as ‘frenemies’ or a troubled marriage heading towards a divorce.

If we use this analogy, the serial started right after the 9/11 attack – represented by season 1 under Bush, followed by Obama’s season 2, and Trump’s season 3 just concluded on January 20^th.

What may happen in season 4 requires an understanding of the plot. And the great debate ranging in the think tank world represent this assessment. One of the assertions is that although the nation has maintained an important position during the previous administrations, its likely to be low on Biden’s priority list. This emphasis is not much different than the approach adopted under Trump where military aid was cut to Pakistan. A greater emphasis was towards global adversaries than on countering extremism or promoting human rights. The analysts are thus suggesting areas around which convergences can be built.

Some have mentioned that Pakistan can help build bridges between US and China, just as it can between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Others have emphasized trade as the focus, and cooperation in dealing with the pandemic and climate change. As the balance of power in the Muslim world is shifting away from the Arab world and towards the peripheral nations of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, the country can play an active balancing role vis a vis the global powers.

On the other hand, Pakistan is stressing it has moved away from geopolitics to geoeconomics, as witnessed by CPEC like initiatives. This has been a consistent message from Pakistan’s National Security Advisor, Moeed Yusuf, who recently spoke at the Karachi council on Foreign Relations and Woodrow Wilson Center.

Under the Coronavirus induced circumstances, this could be interpreted to mean that the nations focus is on economics and less on engaging in another kinetic phase in Afghanistan – which has devastated Pakistan’s social fabric and economy. And this mantra goes along with the policy the present Prime Minister Imran Khan adopted when he came to power in 2018 – that it can help in making peace but not in the continuation of war. Just about the same time, US also shifted its position, which resulted in direct talks with the Afghan Taliban. Previously, Taliban had consistently refused to negotiate with the Afghan government, calling it a puppet.

In essence, as opposed to the thrust on military solutions that had remained the hallmark of Bush and Obama administrations, under Imran Khan, Pakistan’s assistance was focused on facilitating the peace talks with Afghan Taliban. The concentrated efforts, and cooperation from China, Russia, and Iran, resulted in an agreement between the US and Afghan Taliban in February 2020.

The peace deal was not arrived at easily and there were obstacles at each step of the way, consistently from the same sets of players. The very first challenge perhaps came from President Karzai when Taliban were allowed to open an office in Doha in 2013, carrying the sign and flag of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. He argued that peace talks should be Afghan led.

In September 2019, the talks between the US and Taliban were abruptly broken off by President Trump – when peace deal was nearly at hand. Reportedly, he called-off talks due to an attack carried out by Afghan Taliban in Kabul that killed an American soldier. The confusion remained for some time if Trump had permanently abandoned the talks or if it was a temporary suspension. Moreover, he faced severe push back from Ashraf Ghani’s government. Senior former US officials with experience in Afghan affairs recommended US should not pullout before a real peace agreement, or in other words a responsible withdrawal.

Even when the deal was signed, everybody knew that the next step of intra-Afghan talks will be even more difficult, especially because of the role of spoilers, especially India. Heating global power tussles between US and China during the Trump administration added another dimension of worries. Up to now, global powers have cooperated when it comes to Afghanistan. Can it stay that way is not guaranteed.

As Biden administration evaluates its Afghan options, it is important to keep perspective of how we arrived at this juncture, what has already been tried. More importantly, to not get distracted under different pressures, especially when domestic challenges are mounting for the US. Keeping in view the historical context, about what can be achieved in Afghanistan at present – may not be possible six months from now.

How Did We Get Here?

Season 1 – 9/11 Attack (2001-2008)

Bush administration had been in power for about nine months when September 11 attacks struck the US. America launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) on October 7, 2001 with military strikes against Al Qaeda (AQ) and Afghan Taliban. The Taliban government crumbled quickly. While there were confrontations like the Battle of Tora Bora in December 2001, Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters mostly retreated to fight another day.

Early on US pressured Pakistan to join what later became known as the Global War on Terrorism. The nation had been one of the few, including UAE and Saudi Arabia, that recognized the Taliban government. The military ruler General Pervez Musharraf decided to support the US and to go after former allies, the Afghan Taliban.

In the aftermath of the 1999 short and bloody Kargil conflict, then the army chief Pervez Musharraf had overthrown the civilian government in October 1999, removing Nawaz Sharif from power. For this US had slapped sanctions on his government, which were in addition to the ones imposed on Pakistan and India in the aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests. For Musharraf’s support in Afghanistan, Bush lifted all sanctions on Pakistan in October 2001.

The 9/11 attacks presented an opportunity for Musharraf to gain international credibility. It was only later the realization dawned that AQ and Taliban had mostly slipped away from Afghanistan into the ungoverned Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

While US got distracted by going into Iraq in 2003, Bush administration increased pressure on Pakistan to launch military operations in FATA to eliminate what it termed as safe havens. Pakistan moved nearly hundred thousand troops from the Indian border towards Afghanistan to tackle the issue. US also conducted thousands of drone strikes in FATA between 2004 and 2018 to go after the extremist leaders hiding there. But Pakistan’s military operations in FATA, including the Lal Masjid operation in July 2007, accompanied by drone strikes, started to create an ominous backlash internally. It was unclear if the US drone strikes were occurring with Pakistan’s acquiescence – but it would publicly protest the strikes vehemently as violation of its sovereignty.

Many high value targets and facilities were hit in Pakistan as extremist reprisal spread, with thousands of civilian and soldiers killed and maimed. According to Dawn newspaper, Pakistan’s economic loss in the war against terror was a figure around $126.79 billion. The security and political turmoil, including the civil-military divide, was reflected by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007.

By this time, the internal politics of Pakistan had gotten fully intertwined with the support it was providing US in the war against extremism and at what cost. While Musharraf had become increasingly unpopular, and US grievances with him grew, the death of Benazir Bhutto demonstrated that this was a battle for Pakistan’s survival too.

The Mumbai Attack in November 2008, just about a month and a half before Obama was inaugurated on Jan 2009, created fresh headaches for Pakistan on how it was dealing with good and bad extremists.

Season 2 – Obama’s AfPak

On assuming power, President Obama initiated an exhausting evaluation of the US Afghan policy, which later adopted the acronym of AfPak. The late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke was appointed to lead the office, whose mandate was to originally include India, but that part was dropped due to heavy lobbying from the country. This may have been a critical mistake, as India remains opposed to any negotiated settlement with Afghan Taliban.

At the time it was assumed that the new policy would break from the Bush era focus on kinetic approach, and tilt more towards a diplomatic surge and a search for political solutions based on a regional emphasis. Obama’s assessment went through a metamorphosis of sorts and ended up being an evaluation of the entire US foreign policy. Reappraisal of policy involved the critical questions of what is at stake for America in Afghanistan? Dealing satisfactorily with this inquiry required evaluating US interests globally, understanding how they are related and then prioritizing in terms of the prevailing economic recession at the time.

The strategy that finally emerged represented the competing institutional influences that shape American foreign policy. Obama had to balance domestic economic realities with the perception of appearing weak on national security threats, a leverage he did not want to offer to the Republican Party. Additionally, he also wanted to fulfill his campaign promises of pulling troops out of Iraq and focusing on Afghanistan. Specifically, the new strategy opted for sending 30,000 more troops while setting a timeline for an exit to begin by July 2011.

The new US policy was followed-up with a process of strategic dialogue with Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. What transpired from this dialogue with India was a civil nuclear deal, the groundwork for which was laid during the Clinton administration. On the other hand, Kerry-Lugar-Berman aid package ran into controversy because of provisions that many in Pakistan thought compromised its sovereignty. The Raymond Davis incident in January 2011 further validated Pakistan’s apprehensions. At the same time, Mumbai attacks and dealings associated with David Hadley, increased cooperation between US and India against groups such as LeT based in Pakistan.

Thus, the feeling of mistrust between US and Pakistan continued to increase, with both actors blaming each other for playing a double game. The Operation Geronimo gave further evidence of how deeply each party distrusts the other, while claiming to be strategic partners. The subsequent Memogate Affair, followed by the Salala Incident on November 26, 2011 further dented the relationship. A perception grew that the Civil-Military divide in Pakistan was being exploited.

During Obama’s tenure, war against extremism had expanded quite wide and included Yemen, Syria, and Libya. Moreover, by 2011 and onward the extremist threat had transformed as many new groups came in to being, such as Daesh (also known as ISIS and ISIL). Moreover, the Arab Spring related upheaval was further destabilizing many regimes in the MENA theater, to be exploited by extremists and other global adversaries.

As US was over-consumed by the war against extremism, China and Russia were resurging. China launched the Belt and Road global infrastructure initiative in 2013, with CPEC being one of its main arteries. At the cost $62 billion China plans to upgrade Pakistan’s infrastructure, build modern transportation networks, numerous energy projects and special economic zones.

While US remained busy with the war against extremism, the economy was impacted. The 2008 recession had a significant impact on the American middle class and a thought was taking shape that China, and even American allies, were exploiting Globalization – and US was paying. These sentiments were galvanized and channeled by Trumps ‘America First’ mantra.

Season 3 – Making American Great Again and ‘America First’

While July 15, 2015 Iran nuclear agreement (JCPOA) was a significant step in the direction of negotiated settlement to conflicts, only a year and a half later President Trump reversed the deal. On the Middle East Peace Process, he went ahead to make the controversial decision of accepting Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

Trump also stepped out of the Paris Agreement and annulled the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that Obama had pushed and was signed in 2016. In essence, Trump was against multilateralism and multilateral institutions and preferred bilateral approach to issues. Trump stated in his speech at the 74^th UN session:

“Globalization exerted a religious pull over past leaders, causing them to ignore their own national interests. Those days are over.” He went on to add, “Around the world our message is clear, America’s goal is lasting, America’s goal is harmony, and America’s goal is not to go with these endless wars, wars that never end.”

While on the political and economic front he declared: “If you want freedom, hold on to your sovereignty, and if you want peace, love your nation. The future does not belong to Globalists. The future belongs to patriots. The future belongs to strong, independent nations.”

Following this principle, Trump supported direct talks with Afghan Taliban leading to the peace agreement. If it had not been for the Coronavirus, Trump would have likely won the election.

The storming of the Capitol Hill on January 6, and the events associated with the recent concluded US elections are reflective of the tremendous stress US is under to chart out its future direction; whether it be the globalized one or based on America First. The coronavirus has added to the woes – where many have lost jobs and the lifestyle of others acutely impacted – adding to the public anger and stress.

Irrespective of who is to blame for what transpired on January 6th, Biden administration would have to focus on how to bring the disillusioned, and the Trump supporters, back into the system. This is the best approach to prevent matters being further exploited. This implies Biden would have to address the concerns reflecting by the America First mantra – to provide jobs and to improve the economic well being of the Americans.

Season 4 – ‘America is Back’

Delivering a speech virtually at the Munich Security Conference on February 19, President Biden stated unequivocally that America is back. “I’m sending a clear message to the world,” Biden addressed the security conference. “America is back. The transatlantic alliance is back. And we are not looking backward.”

On the other hand, soon after his acquittal from his impeachment trial in the Senate, Trump stated: “Our historic, patriotic and beautiful movement to Make America Great Again has only just begun”. His acquittal from Senate trial means Trump can run for office again in the election of 2024, which is likely to be the most consequential in American history.

The domestic politics is becoming increasingly polarized and that is directly linked to the state of the economy, which has been seriously dented by mishandling of the coronavirus pandemic. In such conditions, it would become increasingly challenging for the US to concentrate on foreign affairs, especially on the ‘unending wars’.

And it is in this domestic and global context the US-Pakistan relations, and the associated Afghan conflict, will unfold. There is no appetite left in Pakistan, and perhaps amongst European allies as well, for the continuation of the war other than supporting a reasonable exit. Whatever could be done, has been done, and now the responsibility lies squarely on Afghans. This message needs to be delivered – accompanied by reduction in violence on the Afghan Taliban side – associated by agreed withdrawal of troops on the part of the alliance.

The mantra of Trade not Aid is more prevalent as far as Pakistan is concerned. While China, Russia, Iran, and Turkey, have all supported the resolution of the Afghan conflict and have not linked it to their other frictions with the US, this cannot be assured in the future.

In other words, if US would make things difficult for China and Russia in other places and matters, they will now likely reciprocate in Afghanistan. While re-engaging with Iran on nuclear talks, and suspension of sanctions, may buy some favors with Iran – coming in and out international agreements have casted a long-term impact on US credibility. There was a time when American word was taken as ironclad, and leadership changes did not matter. Now US is telling the world to accommodate its dysfunction and confusion.

One of the fundamental question at this point is, to what extent will Afghanistan become a theater where global power tussles are going to play out. And thus – how critical is Afghanistan to undercut China and Pakistan’s influence in the region – and this is where the role of India, the Indo-Pacific, and the related Quad strategy fits in. The answer to this question makes the decision for US and NATO easier – if they should leave now and fight somewhere else – or stay. In other words, will Afghanistan remain an area of cooperation amongst global powers – or will competition ensue.

The post US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden appeared first on Politact.

Guest Analyst Muhammad Siraj ul Huda Khan assisted in researching and developing this article.

Context

PoliTact periodically invites leading regional and global experts to understand the changing geopolitical situations and significant emerging themes. One such theme is the budding China-Iran economic and security partnership.

China and Iran are entering a $400 billion 25 year economic and security deal that would lead to enhanced military and trade relations. The agreement ensures Chinese investment in Iranian telecommunication, transportation, and military fields. The military cooperation includes exercises, intelligence sharing, and joint research and development of weapons. China will also procure its energy needs from Iran on discounted price for over next 25 years.

On July 28, 2020, PoliTact held a webinar to discuss the potential China-Iran economic deal and its impact on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The panelists analyzed the major developments taking place in the South Asia and Middle East regions and provided perspectives on the evolving situation. The theme has taken on added significance in the aftermath of US elections and with additional Muslim states, such as UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco officially recognizing the state of Israel.

CEO and Chief Analyst of PoliTact, Arif Ansar, moderated the panel discussion. The opening remarks were made by Ikram Sehgal, who is a Chairman of the Karachi Council on Foreign Relations, CEO of Pathfinder Group, and member of the East West Institute’s Board of Directors.

The panel included:

• Ambassador Mustafa Kamal Kazi – Senior Vice Chairman at the Karachi Council on Foreign Relations, former Foreign Secretary and Ambassador of Pakistan to the Russian Federation, the Kingdom of Netherlands, Republic of Indonesia and Republic of Iraq.
• Khaled Almaeena – Former Editor-in-Chief of Arab News and Saudi Gazette, CEO of a PR Firm, and Saudi Television news anchor.
• Claude Rakisits – Honorary Professor at the Asia Pacific College of Diplomacy at the Australian National University. He is also a Director at PoliTact and covers the South Asia and Middle East region.

The Webinar explored the following key questions:

1. What are the implications of the China-Iran economic and security deal on the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)?
2. Assessing Chinese influence in the Middle East region and does the China-Iran deal represent a Chinese pivot to the Middle East? Moreover, how does Chinese sway play out against that of India, Israeli, and the US in the region?
3. How the does the China-Iran treaty correlates with the Quad and Indo-Pacific strategy?
4. Will China use the Iran deal as a leverage in its dealing with the US, just as Russia has done?
5. History informs that Muslim nations or empires have often sided with one or the other global power – and then fought directly with each other. What can be done to prevent such an outcome in the framework of the present regional and global geopolitics?

Implications of the potential China-Iran Deal on China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

There are multiple angles to review this connection; that of Pakistan and Iran, and one cannot ignore the positions of China and the US.

Pakistan sees no negative impact of the potential China-Iran deal on CPEC. Former foreign minister Sartaj Aziz once stated that the Chabahar Port was not competing with the Gwadar port, in fact they were seen as complimentary. Media reports have also indicated that a road was to connect the two closely located ports at some point.

On the other hand, Iran is likely to see the Chinese deal as a blessing in disguise. Fearing US sanctions, Pakistan has been dragging its feet on the Iran Gas pipeline project for years, and India has also been slow in developing the Chabahar Port. In all likelihood, once the deal is finalized, Chinese investments will start flowing in quickly and provide immense relief to the much-penalized Iran. More importantly, the China-Iran deal would provide the strategic counterbalance to the American, Israeli, and Arab pressure.

According to Ambassador Kazi, the US withdrawal from the Iranian deal of 2015, and mismanagement of the multipolar world, is one of the reasons China-Iran economic and security partnership is coming to fruition.

However, for China, the treaty with Iran diversifies the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) providing it with another tributary. This is especially true if the CPEC route runs into trouble, or if the work slows down considerably due to the American, Indian, and Arab pressure on Pakistan.

Chinese Pivot to the Middle East and American, Israeli and Indian Coalition

China has been building strategic ties with the Middle East for some time now – in addition to the Asia Pacific, Middle East represents its other flank. Khaled Almaeena pointed out that the Saudi ties with China got underway in the 90s, as the Gulf region started to balance ties between China and the US. On the other hand, Dr. Claude Rakisits noted that the Chinese push westward is not necessarily a pivot, irrespective, the Iran deal will be seen negatively in both Saudi Arabia and the US.

Speaking at the Saudi embassy in China in July on the occasion of the 30 anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties, Saudi Ambassador Turki M. A. Almadi commented: “our relations are all-round, multi-field, not only about bilateral trade and mutual investment, but also extended to cooperation in the fields of culture, science and technology, and health.”

Zhai Jun, China’s special envoy on Middle East affairs indicated at the occasion that the bilateral trade volume between the two nations stood at $78.04 billion at the end of 2019. He added Saudi Arabia was the largest supplier of crude oil to China, and also the Arab nations largest trading partner.

Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has become an active player in the Middle East with strategic ties with a number of regional players, to include Saudi Arabia. As its influence increases gradually, it could become an active interlocutor between Israel and the Palestinians, and other conflicts of the Middle East. However, it is not clear if China aspires to get involved in the security affairs of the region, like Russia has in Syria.

Chinese analysts present a case that the nation wants to be more active in providing economic support than engaging in security affairs of the Middle East. Nonetheless, China has amicable political and military relations with both Iran and Israel. As part of BRI, China has been extending its trade relations with Israel and lately US has objected strongly to some of them citing security concerns – such as the Chinese company Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) running a container terminal at the Port of Haifa – near an Israeli naval base that is frequently visited by the US Sixth Fleet.

If the China-Israeli economic ties continue to strengthen uninhibited, overtime China will be able to build leverages that can potentially undercut US primacy in the affairs of the Middle East. The Israelis disagree on this possibility, stating that the nature of its ties with China and the US are of totally different nature. Nonetheless, the push under President Trump to normalize ties between Israel and the Arab nations can be seen as an attempt to counter China becoming an influential Middle Eastern player in the future.

When it comes to the Indian alignment with Israel and its growing ties with the Gulf nations, a different question is raised. How do these relations undercut the traditional support Pakistan has generated from the Gulf region?  In November 2018, PoliTact collaborated with the Middle East Institute to examine the political, security, and economic interconnections between South Asia and the Gulf States, and one of the subsets, Pakistan and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The report pointed out to how India was strategically undermining Pakistan, a risk that has matured now.

Commenting on this during the webinar, Khaled Almaaena stated that Pakistan’s position has been undermined by the negative economic and security news consistently emanating from the country. And this has been occurring at a time when India has positioned itself as an information technology and economic powerhouse, and by investing in Saudi Arabia that brought jobs to the Kingdom. He further added, the younger leadership of KSA do not hold the same kind of affinity towards Pakistan as past leaders had.

Irrespective, we can see an attempt to undermine both the Chinese and Pakistan connections in the Middle east as they compete with the American, Israeli and Indian interests.

China-Iran Deal and Quad Strategy

Answering the moderator, and as noted above, Dr. Claude Rakisits noted that the Chinese push westward does not represent its pivot to the Middle East – and how this relates to the Quad strategy is a different angle.

Dr. Claude added that Quad is meant to “keep China within its borders”. And as a counter, China is pushing US away from the first island chain by building artificial islands in the South China Sea. Moreover, China-Iran deal counteracts Quad and the Indo-Pacific strategy by providing China with a key footprint in the Indian Ocean, which together with Gwadar and Djibouti, enhances Chinese naval potential.

While Quad would desire to box-in China, conversely China wants to limit the Indian role in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, by keeping it busy within its borders. This dynamics can be witnessed by the present tensions and skirmishes on the Line of Actual control (LAC) and the Ladakh region.

Biden’s Middle East Policy, Iranian Sanctions, and Chinese Leverage

A related inquiry has to do with sanctions on Iran and how will China navigate them? Previous European attempts to build trade relations with the nation hit numerous roadblocks. As soon as Trump administration took oath in January 2017, within almost a year and a half of signing the Iran nuclear deal (July 2015), US started to build pressure on western companies attempting to build trade relations with Iran. As a result, even the $20 billion aircraft deal Boeing had signed with Iran had to be scrapped.

Under President Elect Biden’s Iran Policy, will these sanctions be eased if US rejoins the treaty? This will all depend on how the Biden administration re-engages Iran. Recently Biden has indicated that it will want to renegotiate the Iran deal to include its missile program, and wider behavior in the region; these were widely seen as major weaknesses of the 2015 deal.

This, however, will likely be a non-starter for Iran. The country has expressed it would not enter fresh negotiations with the US when even the terms and guarantees of the 2015 agreement were not kept.

A parallel concern is, with the ‘Outside In’ approach to the Middle East Peace Process so far along resulting in the Abraham Accords, will President Elect Biden be able to reverse it and thus jeopardize the present Arab-Israeli normalizing process? A more likely approach would be that the normalization process would have to incorporate the two-state solution under Biden – including a more transparent give and take by the Israelis – of the type that is frequently hinted by the Saudi leadership.

Irrespective, Dr. Claude was of the opinion that China will continue its dealings with Iran, despite the sanctions, and will push back on any efforts to restrict the ties between Iran and China. It is also possible that China will use the Iran deal as a leverage in its dealing with the US, just as Russia has done in the past. On several occasions when Russian ties stumbled with the West, it threatened to supply Iran with modern weaponry that could help it withstand any attack on its nuclear program.

The US Iran policy has circled around two approaches recently: the negotiated settlement was adopted by President Obama by signing the JCPOA in 2015, which sidelined the aggressive route against Iran propagated by Israel and Saudi Arabia. Trump took on the more militaristic alternative – moving away from the two-state solution, with wider recognition of Israel from the GCC and Arab States. The assassination of two top Iranian officials recently, Major General Qassim Soleimani and nuclear scientist Mohsin Fakhrizadeh, are linked to this approach.

The challenge is that a military solution towards Iran would be unacceptable for both China and Russia. Similarly, the reenactment of the JCPOA, along with potential China-Iran deal, will make China a stronger player in the Middle East. It could possibly utilize its clout to bring about Israeli-Palestinian agreement, which US has not been able to do alone.

On the one hand this cooperation between China and the US would be an immensely positive development that can bring about peace in the Middle East. However, this directly contradicts with what is transpiring in the Asia Pacific and resulting Indo-Pacific and the Quad strategy. And this also does not factor in Russian role in the whole scenario – and the interplay of the Muslim Middle powers, such as Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.

Islamic World and Global Power Tussles

In the past Muslim nations or empires have often sided with one or the other global power – and then fought directly with each other. And the question becomes what can be done to avert such an outcome in the framework of the present regional and global geopolitics.

Replying to the moderator, Khaled Almaeena pointed out that the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) is unable to fulfill this role. He added this requires strong Islamic leadership to prevent being exploited, commitment to their citizens, and rule of law. Moreover, he stated that ‘if Iran suffers, the Arabs will suffer too’. In his opinion CPEC can play a constructive role by being a bridge, ‘good economics makes good politics,’ he stated.

On the other hand, Ambassador Kazi was critical of the role the GCC nations have played in this regard and pointed to the infighting between the Arab nations. He noted that ‘what happens in the Arab world, impacts the Islamic world’.

Meanwhile, Ikram Sehgal added the role of Turkey is important, and one should not forget the Regional Cooperation for Development Organization (RCD) formed between Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey in 1964, and replaced by Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in 1979. He emphasized that Russia and China have good ties with Pakistan, Turkey and Iran, and that ‘constructive engagement can be a harbinger of peace’.

Conclusion

While Saudi Arabia has delayed recognizing the statehood of Israel, and while Qatar remains closer to Turkey, the shifting alliance of most GCC and Arab nations towards Israel and the US, represents a decisive shift in the balance of power. Adopting the threat perception that centers on Iran, and without any clear give and take from Israel in the context of Abraham Accords, is likely to revitalize the message of non-state actors.

While China has made an economic entry in the Middle East, it has not decided to influence the security affairs – other than under the umbrella of UN and for maritime security purposes. In Syria too, it has adopted a non-interventionist approach and has supported the Assad regime.

However, economic leverages will eventually lead to influences in other areas. And China would have to utilize its sway – especially when it has the most to lose if a conflict breaks out in the region. One measure of if matters are heading in that direction would be the establishment of military bases, like the one in Djibouti, and potential militarization of Gawadar and Chabahar port. And in this context, the China-Iran economic and security deal takes on an added emphasis.

In the long run, US would want to create a wedge between China and Russia. Since attaining self-sufficiency in its energy needs, the US interests in Middle East is primarily to prevent nuclear weapons from falling in the hands of rogue states, or non-state actors, and this this a goal it shares with Israel. At the same time, US would not want to lose its primacy in the Middle East, but to exploit the existing fault lines to further extend its reach – to the detriment of China and Russia.

At the same time, under President Elect Biden, there is an opportunity to move away from the zero-sum approach to world affairs – by reaching out to China for a wider détente and cooperation – and the geopolitics resulting from the Coronavirus related pandemic especially necessitates this. Reaching that stage, however, would require first a smooth transition of power in the US.

The post Biden’s Middle East Policy, China-Iran Ties, and CPEC appeared first on Politact.

A Ten-Year Assessment of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009

By Waleed Hashmi

Background

Many observers describe U.S-Pakistan affairs as torturous, mercurial, and enigmatic. Some view the two nations as “frenemies on the brink”.[i] Until recently, it had become increasingly difficult to find streams of optimism in Islamabad and Washington D.C. to suggest that positive days are ahead. While the U.S. is pursuing a political endgame in the Afghanistan War, Pakistan is burdened with domestic economic problems, a complex pandemic, and security concerns with its arch-rival India. To complicate matters further, both Pakistan and the U.S. have quarreled over the (mis)management of militant threats and sanctuaries around Pakistan’s borders. Indeed, the “trust deficit”[ii] that impedes both nations from greater cooperation does not appear too different from the wariness that existed in prior decades.

U.S. lawmakers have made attempts to reset relations with their South Asian ally, as well as provide considerable aid. Between independence and 2001, Pakistan received over $70 billion[iii] in American aid (military and non-military). Between 2002 and 2009, the majority of aid was related to defense, counter terrorism, and military support. However, a major shift in U.S. foreign policy and development occurred by way of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, commonly known as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill (KLB). The legislation was promoted by Senator John Kerry as a critical step in improving long-term strategic commitment and bilateral trust:

“The heart of this bill gives the people of Pakistan $7.5 billion (Rs. 62,500 crore) over five years (2010-2014) in nonmilitary aid. This bill should be seen for what it is — a true sign of U.S. friendship to the people of Pakistan.”[iv]

Since the KLB was introduced to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a decade ago, it has largely struggled to meet its original objectives and broader diplomatic goals. The trust deficit seems to have expanded, and Pakistan’s development indicators remain low.[v] Why was the KLB unsuccessful in achieving its targets, and does its collapse provide a larger commentary on the nature of U.S.-Pakistan relations? While the KLB was well-intentioned, its ostensible failure could be due to miscalculations in development, erratic U.S. foreign policy, and a problematic civil-military divide in Pakistan. Moreover, the KLB experience suggests that attempts to foster bilateral relations in recent history appear, on the one hand, to be promises but in fact are premonitions. The initial euphoria surrounding new legislation, in the case of U.S.-Pakistan ties, largely produces inadequate results and disgruntled actors.

Context and Construction of the Bill

2009 was, in many ways, a watershed year for Pakistan. While it was supporting U.S. efforts to defeat terrorism in Afghanistan, the internal political dynamics of the country were in flux. Democracy had seemingly been restored, as General Pervez Musharraf resigned in August of the previous year due to prospects of impeachment. The nation was recovering from Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, and struggling to contain repetitive cycles of violence in the form of suicides, bombings, and surprise attacks. The period spanning 2006-2009 was one of the bloodiest, as the number of those killed and injured soared into the thousands. Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani and President Zardari were leading Pakistan at a time when the economy suffered from stagflation, state institutions clashed with armed forces, and judicial bodies had not fully been reinstated. The nation was in dire need of stability, direction, and assistance.

The KLB sought to provide some semblance of relief for the important South Asian ally. Proposed by Democratic Senator John Kerry and Republican Senator Richard Lugar, the bill was a bipartisan push for Congress to provide $1.5 billion yearly in non-military aid to Pakistan for five years. The bill was comfortably passed through Congress, and less than 30 days after being introduced, it was signed into law by President Obama. Zardari and the PPP endorsed the legislation, as the KLB was an ambitious commitment which had several developmental goals. These included emergency humanitarian relief, civilian assistance, private sector growth, regional border stabilization, and programs designed to support vital sectors like energy and health. It also targeted infrastructure, in the form of laying hundreds of kilometers of roads. The popular Fulbright Scholar Program, which allows students to study in the U.S., was also expanded by the bill.

Pakistan’s army leadership, as well as the media, were particularly critical of the KLB. The army was concerned by the language drafted in the bill, claiming it was written in a way that undermined the military. The frustration shown by Pakistan’s armed forces would only continue in years to come, placing a huge burden on U.S. diplomatic personnel at the State Department, officials at the Department of Defense, and policy makers on Capitol Hill. Many media outlets in Pakistan were skeptical of the bill. It was not uncommon to hear conspiracies and falsehoods in their programming. Some believed that the KLB was designed by a Zionist lobby, in which the Indians were involved, to bribe Pakistan and compromise its nuclear program. Media personalities feared that the bill would make Pakistan internally weak, and that it was a disingenuous attempt by the U.S. to control Pakistan because ground operations in Afghanistan were failing.

Knowing that initial reactions to the bill would be mixed, John Kerry published press releases to provide clarity for skeptics. In his statements, he argued that the bill does not impinge on Pakistan’s sovereignty; it does not expand the Predator drone program; it does not come with strings attached; and it does not require U.S. oversight on Pakistan’s military or internal affairs.

Miscalculations in Development

Since 1947, U.S. aid to Pakistan can be categorized in terms of economic assistance and military assistance. Prior to 2001, Congress obligated the highest number of funds to Islamabad in the early 1960s (mostly economic-related). Since then, U.S. aid fluctuated due to competing priorities at home and major events in the subcontinent. The Center for Global Development collected data on the history of U.S. outlays to Pakistan, as seen below. The lowest amount of aid was provided during the 1990s, partly because of Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation. Military aid understandably spiked after 9/11 and, for the first time, overtook economic assistance as the primary mode of support. The U.S. curtailed military assistance for nearly 20 years between the time period of the Indo-Pakistan War in 1965 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the early 1980s. Economic assistance during that time was provided, though it was oscillating.

[vi]

Historically, aid to Pakistan can be described as inconsistent and case-dependent. In many ways, the constant shifting of aid also tells the story of U.S-Pak relations. It has been a contentious ‘alliance’ due to opposing world-views and unpredictable behavior. Moments of harmony have often been followed by discord and silence. Ultimately, “this pattern has rendered the United States a far cry from a reliable and unwavering partner to Pakistan over the years.”[vii] Thus, the KLB’s implementation was destined for a path of doubt and disapproval. This is where the crafters of the bill may have miscalculated its efficacy and promise. Perhaps there should have been greater awareness about the historical success rate of aid to Pakistan.

It is also worth asking how the figure of $7.5 billion was determined. What calculations were made to confirm that number? Even though the KLB tripled economic assistance from prior aid, the yearly obligations of $1.5 billion seem capricious and low. Compared to Pakistan’s total GDP at the time (roughly $170 billion)[viii], the KLB’s assistance package was diminutive. Even if every program of the KLB produced its desired results, the overarching impact to Pakistan’s economy would have been insignificant. Another miscalculation that hampered the KLB was the decision to pass the legislation rather quickly. Any aid package that is as large as $7.5 billion would require ample time for bureaucratic bodies to convene and prudently decide all stipulations. Since the KLB had a massive portfolio of programs, the relevant stakeholders could be USAID, State, Commerce, Treasury, Energy, and more. However, since the bill was passed in less than one month, there may have been a higher likelihood of miscalculations in the development approach.

The five-year commitment of the bill seems to be another miscalculation by policy makers. Many would argue that development assistance should be a long-term endeavor, especially in the case of U.S. aid to Pakistan, which has been sporadic. The KLB could have seen greater success if Congress and President Obama extended it for a period longer than five years. Congressional and presidential turnover was another obstacle because it was unknown whether incoming officials would carry the same motivation and political will to support the KLB. In 2013, CGD’s Alexis Sowa advocated the idea of a no-cost extension of the KLB with the following rationale:

“By extending KLB’s time frame from five to ten years, the US government would signal its interest in a long-term partnership with Pakistan’s civilian government to tackle fundamental issues of economic development and growth. Even if the Congress did not approve a formal reauthorization it could signal its support for continued engagement with Pakistan on economic and social development, perhaps in the form of a Congressional Resolution.”[ix]

Policy leaders in Washington could have used several bureaucratic mechanisms to prolong the KLB’s lifeline. The fact that funding for the bill was cut off in 2013/2014 signaled low confidence and distrust. In retrospect, that may have been key miscalculation because relations only soured thereafter, and some in Pakistan perceived the U.S. to be repeating a history of economic abandonment.

Erratic Foreign Policy

Following the end of the Cold War, the U.S no longer needed to rely on its Truman Doctrine or any strategy of containment. Some have argued that the nature of U.S. foreign policy after 1990 morphed into a type of reactive pragmatism.[x] That is, conducting global affairs on a practical case-by-case basis, and reacting to events. While President Bush’s foreign policy was predicated on a global war on terror, there was no clear doctrine or ideology that was laid out. Two major foreign policy actions in Pakistan severely undermined the KLB’s work. The first was America’s nascent drone program, and the second was the perplexing capture of Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad.  In addition to these events, one can point to the Raymond Davis incident, the ‘Memogate’ scandal, and the Salala attack as further irritants to the bilateral relationship.

Drone strikes in Pakistan have earned a dreadful reputation by the public, even though several operations were backed by Pakistani intelligence[xi]. Despite successfully targeting and executing high-level insurgents, many viewed the strikes unfavorably because of collateral damage to civilians. There was also a common perception that drones were violating national sovereignty and endangering human rights. The extreme unpopularity of U.S. aerial tactics not only damaged credibility, but also would have made development programs like the KLB seem suspicious and contradictory. The overlap in timing between the KLB and America’s drone program may have indicated mixed intentions to Pakistan’s government and the public, further driving conspiracies within media programming and perpetuating the people’s disapproval of the Western superpower.

The mysterious capture and killing of Osama bin Laden complicated U.S.-Pak affairs at a time when mutual distrust was already peaking. It is claimed by some that the original phone number that ultimately led to tracking bin Laden may have been provided by Pakistan – as a direct result of intelligence sharing. Nevertheless, the incident may have single-handedly cemented the idea of Pakistan being synonymous with safe havens/sanctuaries for extremists. Bin Laden’s capture in Abbottabad could have further persuaded U.S lawmakers to limit, and eventually abandon, the KLB. Akbar Zaidi notes that the “barrage of writing and analysis that has appeared since the killing of bin Laden in Pakistan has underscored this point, with such words as “duplicity” and “double game” being used extensively by U.S. analysts and policymakers alike.”[xii] These descriptions of America’s mercurial South Asian ally are still being used today. They also point to a desperate need for reconciliation and trust-building for both countries.

Given the present reality of U.S.-Pak affairs, it would be surprising to see an aid package like the KLB in the near future. Ten years ago, Congress and the President quickly obligated billions of taxpayer dollars to Pakistan’s development. The same cannot be promised today, indicating just how low the level of trust and alliance may have reached.

Civil-Military Divide

The KLB was a clear admission by the Americans that previous ways to deal with Pakistan had failed. Lawmakers saw Pakistan’s democratic restoration of 2009 as a fortuitous opportunity to support the country with development funds, and provide a gesture of goodwill. The PPP welcomed the financial support, but perhaps more so the idea of the U.S. working with civilian counterparts instead of the military when it came to Pakistan’s internal development. Unfortunately, the civil-military divisions at the time had reached a point where members of the armed forces were highly skeptical of the bill and its confidence toward Pakistan’s civilian government. The army appeared to be offended by the KLB, and believed it was an attempt to prevent the army from conducting another coup.

Though the army was no longer in power, its rhetoric gave the impression that it could still regulate and run the country. The KLB was strictly a non-military initiative, yet the army was harshly critical of the bill’s language and motives. The civil-military division was not merely on a political level. Pakistan’s armed establishment has had a disproportionate control over key sectors and industries in the country. The army naturally came to view the KLB as an external attempt to modify sectors over which it had exercised great control. If the KLB’s language was not in accordance with how the military preferred it to be, then it would certainly vocalize its opposition to the bill. Despite efforts by Senator Kerry and U.S. government officials to lobby for the bill, it became apparent that the army’s intransigence would be a massive obstacle to the KLB’s goals.

Since the KLB was not written on the army’s terms, U.S. lawmakers had the initial challenge to convince Pakistan’s security establishment that the bill was a genuine attempt to foster bilateral friendship and support the country’s economic growth. Senator Kerry used candid and honest language to persuade opponents: “even when Americans are going through a deep recession and tough economic times, the United States is pledging $7.5 billion (Rs. 62,500 crore) as a long-term commitment to Pakistan”.[xiii] The army did not seem convinced, and continued viewing the bill “as a deliberate strategic attempt by United States to weaken the Pakistani army and intelligence agency, which they believe are the last bulwarks with the ability to prevent U.S. expansion plans in the region.”[xiv] The budding U.S.-India strategic partnership, which is outside the scope of this article, was another significant source of mistrust between Washington and Islamabad.The KLB experience depicts US-Pak relations in a low-spirited light. Ten years after its formation, many of the same problems that the bill sought to alleviate are persisting. The economy is suffering from inflation, low growth, and inadequate foreign investment. China’s influence in Pakistan has multiplied, and the alleged support for extremist groups remains an issue. While the U.S. seeks reliable caretakers in the region after its departure from Afghanistan, it will have to work closely with Pakistani counterparts on cross-border affairs. The deficits in trust and bilateral cooperation may not be intractable, but certainly are problematic. Recently, New Delhi’s significant cooperation with the U.S. on security, economic, and human capital affairs could further complicate Islamabad’s geopolitical calculus.

The KLB was a noble effort to create, administer, and promote an aid package. It ultimately struggled, but it offered lessons for future engagement. Foreign assistance alone cannot lead to desired results. A nation’s foreign policy actions should, in a perfect world, complement the development work it is undertaking. It is also worth pursuing a long-term foreign assistance plan that can withstand criticisms that the KLB often received. Any successful international partnership is one that is institutionally resilient, supported by both constituencies, and impervious to turnover or change in government. Given the U.S-Pakistan history, these conditions simply cannot be achieved in 5 year increments.

The China Factor

As the KLB all but halted in 2014, Beijing’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) looked toward Pakistan, and established the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Considered by many as the largest infrastructure initiative in history, BRI seeks to expand China’s economic diplomacy through extensive development projects and inter-regional connectivity. Pakistan had received relatively little development support from China before 2000, but found itself well-positioned to receive Chinese aid especially since domestic infrastructure networks were under-developed. Thus, CPEC focused heavily on road expansions, mass transit, energy growth, and special economic zones.

CPEC, and the broader BRI framework, has received ample criticism related to opaque business practices, debt-trap diplomacy, environmental harm, and corruption. The U.S. has perhaps led the most vocal campaign against CPEC and BRI, remarking that “Beijing is not a member of the Paris Club, and has never supported globally-recognized, transparent lending practices…China does not publish, or even report, overall figures on its official lending. So neither rating agencies, nor the Paris Club, nor IMF are able to monitor those financial transactions.”[xv] Though Beijing has regularly denied claims related to debt-traps and illegitimate development tactics, some observers have noted a change of tone in major speeches pertaining to the BRI. During the 2019 Belt and Road Forum, President Xi pledged a “debt-sustainability framework” and noted that “everything should be done in a transparent way, and we should have a zero tolerance for corruption.”[xvi] The granular impact of Xi’s statements remains unclear, but it seems that pressure from the U.S. and like-minded countries has been effective.

So what does this imply for Pakistan, which has enjoyed ongoing relations with Beijing, as well as improved ties with Washington D.C? Great power competition could have a positive impact for Islamabad, as both the U.S. and China are competing for influence and partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region. Prime Minister Khan’s National Security Advisor Moeed Yusuf noted in August that economic diplomacy, trade, and investment are priorities for the Khan administration[xvii]. According to Yusuf, Pakistan is not selective when it comes to assistance or economic engagement from China or the U.S., suggesting it is a win-win situation for Pakistan.

It is unlikely the U.S. will repeat the KLB formula for development aid. Instead, the focus on trade and investment will be key, as suggested by President Trump during the Khan visit in 2019. It may also be unlikely for CPEC to continue operations and project management in the same manner that it did during its early years, due to increased pressure from critics. Thus, Pakistan sits in a unique position as both the U.S. and China might re-examine their development models. It could be in Pakistan’s best interest to promote a positive investment climate and business reforms that encourage foreign countries to invest in its growing domestic markets. However, many observers have low confidence in the Pakistan government to implement serious changes that it needs to match its economic diplomacy goals.

Great power competition between the U.S. and China is expected to continue, despite the outcome of American elections. It will ultimately depend on Pakistan whether it pursues policies that are favorable not only for its own growth, but also to attract commercial investment and development from global powers.

Guest Analyst Waleed Hashmi received his Master’s Degree in Public Policy from George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government. He resides in the Washington D.C. Metro Area.

[i] Mansoor, Peter. The United States and Pakistan: Frenemies on the Brink. Hoover Institution, April 26 2018. https://www.hoover.org/research/united-states-and-pakistan-frenemies-brink

[ii] Yusuf, Moeed. Trust Deficit. Dawn, January 30 2018. https://www.dawn.com/news/1386022

[iii] Zaidi, Akbar. Who Benefits from U.S. Aid to Pakistan? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. September 21, 2011. Page 3.

[iv] Press Release. “Separating Myth from Fact on the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009. October 8, 2009. https://web.archive.org/web/20120406114831/http:/kerry.senate.gov/press/release/?id=623931a0-151c-4cac-8eb2-7d9ddbd96df8

[v] Pakistan, Journey to Self-Reliance: FY2019 Country Roadmap. Data presented by USAID. https://selfreliance.usaid.gov/country/pakistan

[vi] “Aid to Pakistan by the Numbers”. Center for Global Development. September, 2013
https://www.cgdev.org/page/aid-pakistan-numbers

[vii] Ibid.

[viii] Data of annual GDP growth provided by The World Bank. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=PK

[ix] Sowa, Alexis. 2013.

[x] Kaine, Tim. “A New Truman Doctrine: Grand Strategy in a Hyperconnected World”. Foreign Affairs. July/August 2017 Issue. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-06-13/new-truman-doctrine

[xi] Mir, Asfandyar. The U.S. Drone War in Pakistan Revisted. Lawfare, 2018. https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-drone-war-pakistan-revisited

[xii] Zaidi, Akbar. 2011

[xiii] Press Release. “Separating Myth from Fact on the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009. October 8, 2009. https://web.archive.org/web/20120406114831/http:/kerry.senate.gov/press/release/?id=623931a0-151c-4cac-8eb2-7d9ddbd96df8

[xiv] Hippel, Karin von and Shahid, Shiza. “The Politics of Aid: Controversy Asurrounds the Pakistan Aid Bill.” Center for Strategic & International Studies. October 19, 2009.

[xv] Wilson Center remarks by Ambassador Alice Wells; November 21, 2019.
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/conversation-ambassador-alice-wells-the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor

[xvi] Chun Han Wong & James Areddy, “China’s Xi Vows New Direction for ‘Belt and Road’ After Criticism”. April 26, 2019. https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-xi-vows-new-direction-for-belt-and-road-after-criticism-11556249652

[xvii] Atlantic Council remarks by NSA Moeed Yusuf. “Navigating Pakistan’s National Security Challenges; August 10, 2020. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/navigating-pakistans-national-security-challenges/

The post Promise And Premonition; Historical Context Of The US-Pakistan Relations And Emerging China Factor appeared first on Politact.

Obama administration has proposed a total of $8.2 billion for Overseas Contingency Operations to support the civilian led programs and missions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan. According to the State Department, from the annual budget of $3.8 trillion, US has proposed financial aid worth $2.4 billion to Pakistan for the fiscal year 2012-13. Of this aid, $2.2 billion is for strengthening democratic institutions of the country, including $800 million for the Counter-Insurgency Capability Fund (PCCF).

US Officials have maintained that the aid is “conditional”. The Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will have to provide ‘Presslar Amendment’ style certification to various Congressional committees on the following:

• Pakistan is “cooperating” against the Quetta Shura, Haqqani Network, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Al Qaeda and other domestic and foreign terrorist organizations.
• Pakistan is not “supporting terrorist activities against the US.”
• “Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies are not intervening extra-judicially into political and judicial processes in Pakistan”.
• Speedy issuance of visas for US personel involved in counterterrorism efforts and assistance programs in Pakistan.
• Pakistan is taking action against networks that facilitate building of IEDs used against American forces in Afghanistan.
• Pakistan must take steps to prevent nuclear proliferation.

The Secretary of State not only has the authority to suspend aid to Pakistan if the country does not demonstrate progress in meeting these conditions, she can also waive the certification requirements using the ‘national interest’ clause.

The post US Attaches Stringent Conditions To The Proposed $2.4 Billion Pakistan Aid For 2012-13 appeared first on Politact.

Context

The settling in of the Modi government in India, and installation of a unity set up in Afghanistan, represents the beginning of a new phase of politics for Pakistan and the region. However, this is just one dimension of the dramatic change that presently engulfs the region and beyond.

Despite what is commonly believed, the future of US-Pakistan relations will be determined by the direction of not only the US-China ties, but also by the degree of US-India security cooperation related to Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Iran is another significant factor of this regional flux. The P5+1 negotiations with the nation are continuing and are likely to be extended beyond the November deadline. The delay in securing a permanent deal is not necessarily bad; it gives western powers the time to leverage Iran’s nuclear ambition and secure enhanced cooperation from the Sunni Arab states against extremists.

On the other hand, as the pivot strategy gains momentum and India increases its economic and security cooperation with the pacific powers of Japan, South Korea and Australia, US-China ties are likely to get tense. Then there is the matter of American-Russian ties that have been greatly impacted by the events of Ukraine. If the Russians will continue to play ball over Syria, Iran, and confronting the extremists, is likely to be conditioned on the treatment they get over the affairs of Europe.

At the same time, the reach of extremism continues to expand, with fission and fusion amongst various groups of the Middle East and South and Central Asia. This should be especially worrisome for Pakistan, been declared the epicenter of terror. In this context the evolution of western policies in the Middle East provides a sampling of what to expect in the South Asia region.

The question is how will these changes impact the US-Pakistan relations.

Despite what is commonly believed, the future of US-Pakistan relations will be determined by the direction of not only the US-China ties, but also by the degree of US-India security cooperation related to Pakistan and Afghanistan. In this connection, tensions can escalate on the LAC, LOC, and the Durand Line.

While the regional cooperation envisioned under the energy and economic corridors has a lot to offer, the present direction of the Arab world imply it is the security concerns related to the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and its interplay with extremism and non-state actors that are domineering

Analysis

Evolving Policy Towards Middle East

In the Middle East, the Syrian WMDs (chemical weapons) were perceived as the preeminent security threat, as was in the case of Saddam Hussein. The fear was that they could have potentially fallen in the hands of extremists or a rogue leader, who may have decided to use them against Israeli or western targets. The negotiations with Iran are also premised on a similar security threat. In the case of Syria, it was the Russians that facilitated reaching a deal on dismantling its chemical weapons arsenal.

This fear is accompanied by efforts to maintain a moderate order. Speaking at the Washington Institute, US Deputy Secretary of State William Burn stated on September 29 that protecting and shaping a moderate order in the Middle East is also a policy goal. When asked about the role the Russians are playing on P5+1 negotiations with Iran, Secretary Burn commented that Russia has pursued a constructive role in these talks and have conveyed that a nuclear Iran is not in its interest either.

Similarly, he hinted that perhaps the greatest limitation to the leadership change in Syria is from Russia, which continues to see its role in the Middle East in a zero-sum fashion. On the other hand, former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger recently commented that Iran represents a greater threat than IS. And this logic, with the inclusion of China in the calculus, can also be extrapolated on the situation of South Asia.

What this Means for South Asia

While the Middle East policy is geared foremost towards preventing WMDs from falling in the hands of extremists, this urgency is even direr in the context of South Asia, where non-state actors could potentially acquire a WMD and use it against India. A scenario similar to the one that played out in Karachi recently when an Al Qaeda’s linked elements attempted to hijack the warship PNS Zulfiqar.

At this juncture of the war against extremists, attempting to maintain and shape a ‘moderate order’ is fraught with risks. Especially when there is little progress to show on finding political solutions to long simmering hot spots.

As pointed out previously by PoliTact, religious conservatism and political polarization in many of the terror-inflicted societies have been growing over the years and now is at a tipping point. It would be extremely difficult to maintain a moderate order, and the more it is attempted, the chaos is likely to increase. Egypt is a case in point. This emphasis is likely to make the South Asian theater of operation as hot as the Middle East as events unfold.

While Pakistan still has an influential role when it comes to the Afghan reconciliation, Indian concerns and the threat from loose nukes are likely to take precedence. Speaking at the Brooking Institutions on October 7, former Indian national security adviser Shivshankar Menon noted that the West is approaching the problem of IS and extremism primarily militarily, while a political track is also needed. It is yet to be seen if the new Indian government shares this premise towards Afghan reconciliation and especially Kashmir.

On the other hand, failure in reaching a breakthrough with Iran despite its assistance in Iraq and Syria to confront the IS threat, would imply: nationalist (Kurds) and moderate proxies (Free Syrian Army) are preferable over religiously oriented ones (Hezbollah) that are under state influence. And once the Sunni non-state actors that are not under any clear state influence, represented by AQ and IS, are dealt with, the ones under state influence would also be targeted. And this by default will lead to a peace deal between the Israelis and the Arabs.

Alternatively, if a deal is reached with Iran that is acceptable to Israel, it might suggest that non-state actors that are under state influence, whether Shia or Sunni, have a role to play in preserving the world order.

As the emphasis of fighting extremists’ increases, and in absence of any political solution to longstanding conflicts, maintaining and shaping a moderate order will become more and more a tenuous ordeal. And this in turn will only worsen western anxiety regarding loose WMDs falling in the hands of religious zealots. These are the prerogatives that are likely to shape the future direction of US-Pakistan relations more than anything else.

The post What Will Determine The Future Direction Of US-Pakistan Ties? appeared first on Politact.

One rarely pays attention to where the terminology of Middle East, Near East, and Far East come from. To understand their history, helps to grasp the policies that major powers have adopted overtime to deal with these regions. Every great power at its zenith perceives it to be the center of the world, from where it looks outwards and designs strategies to protect its interests.

According to some interpretations, before WWI the term ‘Near East’ referred to the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, ‘Middle East’ was made up of Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asia and Caucus. While ‘Far East’ was a reference to East Asia, which included China, Japan, Koreas and Hong Kong etc.

The word ‘Middle East’ was coined by and represents the British/European world orientation, which was pretty much adopted by the Americans. According to some versions, the terminology may have been coined during the British reign over India and became popular when the most renown American naval geostrategist of the 19th century, Alfred Thayer Mahab, used it to define the space between Arabia and India. The center of this region was the Persian Gulf, and the region adjacent to it, he term as the Middle East.

Mahab wrote in an article published in the British Journal, National review, in 1902:

“The Middle East, if I may adopt a term which I have not seen, will some day need its Malta, as well as its Gibraltar; it does not follow that either will be in the Persian Gulf. Naval force has the quality of mobility which carries with it the privilege of temporary absences; but it needs to find on every scene of operation established bases of refit, of supply, and in case of disaster, of security. The British Navy should have the facility to concentrate in force if occasion arise, about Aden, India, and the Persian Gulf.”

What Mahab stressed was that like Suez Canal, the Persian Gulf was critical to the British to check the Russians from approaching the British India. After all, at that time the Great Game was primarily between the British and the Russians spanning the Central Asia region. In other words, the Persian Gulf presented the other flank for the British to protect its presence in the Indian Sub-Continent.

The European Frame of Reference

The frame of reference for Alfred Mahab was Europe and the regions that lie towards its East. Thus the naming convention paralleled the geospatial arrangement of different regions east of Europe: Near East, Middle East and Far East. Furthermore, the policies and strategies that were formulated to operate in these regions were primarily suited for western interests; be it the flow of oil and trade, preserving different flanks, or preventing access to adversarial powers.

In present times, these worries have persisted. For example, Iran has the potential of choking the Strait of Hormuz. If this was accompanied by disturbances in Egypt, the Suez Canal could become another clog point. These sea passages are key for projecting power and controlling the flow of trade. Whoever controls them has an extraordinary leverage. Egypt getting warm towards the Soviet Union, and its subsequent nationalization of Suez Canal, had led to a crisis in 1956: with France, UK and Israel invading Egypt.

One of the reasons for the present Russian annexation of Crimea could be that it hosts the its Black Fleet, which is key for power projections in other regions, including the Middle East. As seen in the case of Syria, Iran, Iraq and Egypt, the Russians are attempting to grow its influence in these nations once more. While most of the Black Fleet has been aging, Russian military analyst Prokhor Tebin suggested in a recent article: “The Black Sea also provides the closest access for Russia to the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean, which is important for both economic and geopolitical reasons.” Meanwhile, in June 2013, Putin had declared Russia will maintain a permanent naval presence in the area (Middle East). “This is a strategically important region and we have tasks to carry out there to provide for the national security of the Russian Federation,” he had stated.

It should be noted that British centers of intellectual thinking have also been pondering over a ‘Return to East of Suez Policy’. This thinking envisions placing land, sea, and air forces across the region, for touch and go type operations. The fear is that Arab awakening, the situation of Iran and Syria, has made the region highly volatile and Britain has to have options on how to respond, independently or in cooperation with NATO, in case its interests are threatened.

The South Asian Vantage Point

The irony is the Middle East as defined above lies actually to the west of Indo-Pak Sub continent. If we were to instead consider the Subcontinent as the center of the world, the proximity of different regions and their respective value alters. For example, the Middle East would then become ‘Near West’ while Europe will be ‘Middle West’ and North America the ‘Far West’. For all intents and purposes, the East Asia could very well be the true ‘Middle East’ for the Subcontinent.

The question then becomes, how would this difference in terminology help to define the interests of South Asia. First of all, it provides for the true vantage point; meaning it would mean seeing the world from ones own eyes. The Europeans defined the regions based on their proximity, geopolitical significance, security and economic interests. Since the end of World War II, one of the underlying principles of this perspective has been the unity of European powers and keeping the conflicts away from the home sphere of influence.

Applying the same principles to South Asia would also require unity of the home region. Similarly a prosperous South Asia necessitates its adjacent regions of ‘Near West’ (Afghanistan, Persian Gulf and the Middle East) and ‘ Near East and Middle East’ (Myanmar, Vietnam, China, Malaysia, Koreas, Japan, Hong Kong etc.) to stay relatively peaceful in the long run. On the other hand, if China’s Near South West (South Asia) and Middle West (Middle East) were mired in conflict, it would have a significant destabilizing impact on China. Middle East is the largest source of oil imports for China, which constituted about 52% of its total imports in 2013, while Africa provides about 23% of Chinese oil imports. Saudi Arabia and Angola together make up 33% of Chinese oil imports. (Data Source: US Energy Information Administration.)

These scenarios are more applicable if security concerns severely curtail the extension of globalization. However, if the Trans Atlantic and Trans Pacific trade agreements do move forward, the growing interdependence would make nations and regions to act independently, less plausible.

Nonetheless, as European tensions over Ukraine heat up, and transfer to other regions, the interests of Indo-Pak Sub continent lies in stabilizing its adjacent Near East and Near West and establishing unity in the home sphere. The likelihood of this though is minimal as they are likely to select sides, which could aggravate the situation at the home front and the adjacent areas.

The post The Importance of Vantage Point; The South Asian Adjacency appeared first on Politact.

This is a second article as part of the series on preparing for the future. Towards this goal, a challenge identified in the prior article had to do with spoting new patterns. This is followed by attempts to understand the implications, for which it is equally essential to comprehend the causes that produced a new trend. It is only after this, can an entity arrive at the stage of formulating an appropriate response, and begin adapting to the emerging future or attempt to shape it. Merely following the process in such a manner does not guarantee quality results. At each one of these steps, mistakes can be made while polluting the outcome.

From the vantage point of South and Central Asia, Middle East, and North Africa, the overarching factor that will define the future of these regions will depend on how they understand the change being produced by the campaign against extremists, what led to it, and then formulating a response to it. At the same time, how the West and other global powers plan their next actions with respect to the present ground conditions, will determine if there is going to be peace or continuation of the conflict.

Resources and Approach

The developed world employs tremendous resources on spotting emerging trends and understanding the repercussions. Studying and understanding the future, whatever the motive, has become a source of great strength for it. On the other hand, there is a dearth of such organizations and expertise in other parts of the globe, especially in South and Central Asia, Middle East, and Africa.

This has resulted in a one-dimensional perspective and standardization of the approaches to identify and deal with many of the global challenges. Often this leads to flawed projections and misinterpretation of the underlying causes, leading to costly policy decisions. Irrespective of the way the world is politically organized presently, the study of nature reveals the fate of human race is inexplicably linked. This realization has served as a unifying factor and has brought the world together in dealing with environmental concerns and tackling threats such as those posed by the weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, there is no shortage of issues and conflicts that are serving to be divisive and destabilizing. Often the differences stem from politicization of various conflicts and how different nations and cultures perceive emerging hazards and prospects.

The Vantage Point and War Against Extremists

From the vantage point of South and Central Asia, Middle East, and North Africa, the overarching factor that will define the future of these regions will depend on how they understand the change being produced by the campaign against extremists, what led to it, and then formulating a response to it. At the same time, how the West and other global powers plan their next actions with respect to the present ground conditions, will determine if there is going to be peace or continuation of the conflict.

The event of 9/11 led to the initiation of the campaign against terror. A coalition was formulated to deal with the menace and the goal of the alliance was to defeat and destroy the perpetrators of the attack. Little attention was paid to what caused the tragic event, and even when it was considered, policy changes have been elusive. At the same time, local allies have exhibited a lack of genuine comprehension on what has transpired ever since the campaign against terror started. A few of the leaders exploited 9/11 to gain credibility they otherwise lacked, some tyrannize political opponents and movements, and in other instances they used it to acquire military and economic assistance.

The Narrative

Moreover, these terror-inflicted nations have failed to develop a genuine narrative for why they are part of the campaign against extremists, which is further polarizing their societies between liberals, conservatives, and nationalists. With the liberals and minorities aligning with the West, the conservatives displaying sympathies for the religious zealous, and the nationalist becoming increasingly xenophobic in character. This schism has made developing consensus on any issue very difficult.

Expansion of War Theater

Since September 11, the campaign against extremism and terrorism has spread to many other parts of Middle East and North Africa and shows no sign of receding. NATO and US have often justified the kinetic approach that is premised on elimination of the Al Qaeda leadership and the irreconcilables, claiming it will cause the affiliates to settle. On the ground, however, the dynamics have been playing out differently; the elimination of the top leadership has not led to the weakening of the extremists and a new set of dangerous patterns have emerged.

Shiite Sunni Tussles, Arab Spring, and the Balance of Emerging and Established Powers

To avoid pressure in one area, extremists have moved from one place to the other. This has caused further cross-pollination of its deadly ideology while bringing in new recruits. Additionally, as the epidemic spread, it incorporated other conflicts that traditionally had other roots. For instance, the Shiite Sunni tussles across the core Islamic world have now also become entangled with the war against terror and the Arab Spring. Not only this, the Arab Spring and the campaign against extremists have also gotten tied up with the tussles of the emerging and established powers.

This was recently demonstrated in the case of Syria where Russian assistance played a key role in developing a deal over its chemical weapons, without which NATO strike appeared imminent. The détente on Syria also helped in crafting an interim deal with Iran over its nuclear program. While NATO has often chosen the route of military intervention, emerging powers, especially Russia and China, have sided against foreign intervention in these conflicts, and this has complicated the operation of the UN Security Council.

Managing Security, Societal, and Economic Concerns

On the other hand, nations under pressure from the West to act against terrorists also became the target for supporting the campaign. Moreover, as the war progressively got worse, the deteriorating law and order situation has meant that the economic situation of these countries has also nose-dived. This has further complicated the social order in these societies, while making these states dependent on foreign aid. This phenomenon is amply evident in nations like Pakistan and Egypt. The dynamics of oil rich regions like Iraq have played out a little differently, where Kurds have chosen to deal directly with Turkey, bypassing the Shiite dominated central government.

What’s Next?

The differing interpretation of the ground situation has meant that many of the western partners in the terrorism inflicted regions now stand socially and ethnically divided; with worsening economic prospects, and a blooming Arab revolt. These associates are loosing the vigor to continue the course while frightened by what the future may entail for them. There are no clear-cut winners or losers to the war against terror at this juncture and this is making any attempts towards political reconciliation even more difficult in places like Afghanistan and Pakistan. At the same time, more than a decade of war has economically drained the West, and the emerging powers, especially China and Russia, stand to gain from this.

The third part of this series will continue to examine the dramatic and unprecedented changes discussed above and shift towards understanding their implications.

The post Discerning Change Produced By The War Against Extremists appeared first on Politact.

Context

Since Nawaz Sharif came to power, he has consistently talked about improving ties with India and Pakistan’s other neighbors. However, the otherwise calm situation on the LoC is increasingly getting tense. The good intentions do not seem to be aligned with the ground reality.

Allegedly, Pakistani troops crossed the LoC and attacked Indian Chakanda Bagh check post in the Poonch sector on August 6 and as a result six Indian soldiers were reportedly killed. A similar incident had taken place in January, in which an Indian soldier was decapitated. Pakistan’s military promptly denied carrying out any such assaults. According to reports, in both instances the intruders were wearing Pakistan army’s uniform. The reaction from the Indian political and military leaders to the latest attack has evolved to become quite harsh, with casualties being reported daily on Pakistan’s side of LoC.

The similarities between the two cases have raised the possibility of jihadi elements being involved. Since the latest ambush, India has alleged that Pakistan’s Special Forces have carried out these attacks in conjunction with extremist elements, forming what it calls the Border Action Team (BAT).

On the other hand, Indian Consulate in Jalalabad also came under attack on August 3, which Indian authorities believe was instigated by Pakistan. The occurrence caused nine causalities, mostly ordinary civilians and security guards protecting the outpost. It is difficult to understand why Pakistan would want to harm relations with India at this juncture. The economic and security perils of the nation dictate otherwise. The question though remains: who was responsible?

Analysis

Jihadi Groups

It could be the militant jihadi groups, trying to circumvent the resumption of Pakistan-India talks, aimed at normalizing relations. The dialogue has remained limited since the 2008 Mumbai incident. Equally, it could be the hardliners and nationalist forces on the Indian or Pakistan sides that do not want increased trade between the two nations. It could also be a third hand that benefits from the extension of status quo and tensions in the region. It should be noted that continued wrangling between India and Pakistan benefits the global powers strategically.

Perceived from the Indian angle, a suspicion may linger about the possible connection between Chinese intrusions in the Ladakh region and the LoC attacks. Despite the jingoism and media euphoria displayed at the time of Chinese intrusions in the Ladakh region, India has resorted to diplomatic channels to calm things down. With Pakistan, India cannot afford to appear weak, as it did in the case of China. It should be added that in the aftermath of the Ladakh incidents there is increase traffic of senior US officials to India, including recently US VP Joe Biden. PM Manmohan Singh is also slated to meet President Obama on his upcoming trip to US in September.

Post US Withdrawal Afghanistan

Moreover, both Afghanistan and India share apprehension about how the state of affairs may evolve in the post US Afghan withdrawal regional scenario. India has calculated that if the jihadi network remains intact after the withdrawal, Kashmir may become active once more. On the other hand, Afghanistan fears that Afghan Taliban, with the help of Pakistan based comrades, may try to dominate once more. In essence, it may be a return to the pre 9/11 conditions, which did not bode well for both nations.

Through these border attacks, and strikes against Indian interests in Afghanistan, there may be an attempt to revert the American focus on these jihadi groups. With the US trying the speed up the Afghan reconciliation and withdrawal, India fears US has once more gone lenient on these extremist groups. India may also be looking closely at what is transpiring in Syria.

The Arab Factor in Indo-Pak Politics

The Arab Spring and the War on Terror has produced a new alignment of interests in the Middle East where former adversaries have now become undeclared allies.

The emerging configuration includes Gulf States, Israel, Turkey and the West, aligned on the one side. The other loose arrangement constitutes, China, Russia, Iran, and Syria. It is hard to miss the Shia-Sunni divide in the unfolding alignment of interests. The other undercurrent to keep in perspective is the state versus non-state actors. While the Sunni state actors are aligned with Israel and the West, the Sunni non-state actors are not. This divergence is likely to produce the most volatile turbulence in the region and beyond.

While US appears to be mostly backing Sunni states, Russia and China maintain ties on both sides of the isle. Pakistan shares this strategy with Russia and China, and does not unnecessarily want to make an enemy out of Iran. However, due to its strategic ties with Israel and the US, and fear of China, establishing this balance has become quite difficult for India.

As the relations tense up between Russia and the US on the one hand, and China and US, on the other, militant and religious proxies could once again become important. Some of this is already at display in Syria and to which Russia has repeatedly pointed out. Other than AQ, US is becoming more accommodating to nationalist and religious militant groups, as evident in the case of Afghan Taliban as well. If this outlook continues, it is highly threatening for not only the monarchs of the Gulf, but also for India and Afghanistan.

The unfolding situation of Syria, and the evolving American position, may push Gulf States and India closer, at the cost of Pakistan. This first became apparent in 2012 when Saudis handed one of the prime suspects of 2008 Mumbai attack, LeT affiliated Sayed Zabiuddin Ansari, to India.

So while Nawaz Sharif and Manmohan Singh wish for good ties, much inertia exists to such a prospect on both sides, and beyond. In Egypt, tables turned on the Islamists with the decisive role of its military. In the coming days and months, the ambiguity about the connection between the state and non-state actors, is likely to be tested in South Asia.

The post What’s Behind Pakistan-India Border Tensions? appeared first on Politact.