In efforts to provide targeted and timely insights on evolving issues, PoliTact has started a special series. This series is carefully designed for policy and decision makers, analysts, academics, media anchors, columnists, journalists, and students attempting to make sense of the increasingly chaotic and complex world.

This particular brief covers Pakistan’s efforts to fight extremists and the regional and global dynamics. Pakistan’s decision to conduct surgical operations against Taliban has come at a critical time and will have an impact on the Afghan reconciliation as well as the upcoming US-Pakistan strategic dialogue.

See below a list of in-depth action oriented analyses that go a long way towards understanding the multidimensional situation and developing a holistic perspective.

Entropy Alert

Pakistan’s Counter Terrorism Strategy And Emerging Threats
Transformation of Al Qaeda And Implications

Global Security Studies

Why Pakistan Needs To Manage Its National Strategic Narrative
Pakistan’s National Security Policy: What Can Be Done?
The Stumbling Blocks Towards Afghan Reconciliation
The Correlation Between Pakistan’s Threat Perception And Regional Economics
Pakistan’s Other Foreign Policy Challenge; Managing Ties Between Iran, Gulf States

Vantage Point Analysis

Post 2014 Afghanistan, Reconciliation And Central Asia
Russian Strategy For The Islamic World And Pakistan
China, US And The Balancing Act In South Asia
The AfPak Vision And North Waziristan Operation
Afghan Reconciliation And The Perilous Outlook For TTP

Analysis of Perception and Perspective

Karzai’s Strategic Intent And Bilateral Security Agreement
The Mysterious Killings Of Hakimullah Mehsud And Nasiruddin Haqqani
Nawaz Sharif’s US Mission And Death Of Hakimullah Mehsud
The Dilemma Of Afghan Representation And Reconciliation
The Security, Economic Calculus Of Pakistan’s New Government
Sino, Indian Role In Afghanistan; Implications For Pakistan
Afghan Reconciliation, War On Terror And Future Politics of Pakistan

PoliTact’s Forecasts

The Context To Understand The Emerging World – 2014 Forecast, Part I
Discerning Change Produced By The War Against Extremists – 2014 Forecast, Part II
The Western Vantage Point And War On Terror 2.0 – 2014 Forecast, Part II

Analysis

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The post Understanding Pakistan’s War on Terror; What Can Be Done? appeared first on Politact.

Context
Drone attacks in Pakistan have increased dramatically during the month of September. According to the Long War
Journal, 35 such strikes took place in 2008, 53 in 2009 and so far 67 have occurred in 2010. The Prime Minister of Pakistan commented on Tuesday that even if US fails to deliver the drone technology, the country will soon have locally produced ones. This analysis lays out the significance of the recent surge in drone strikes.

Analysis

As noted by PoliTact in its August 10th forecast, senior US officials now also admit the focus of Pakistan’s military has shifted to providing flood relief and that counter insurgency and terrorism operations have been impacted. The US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently commented that due to the floods, Pakistan’s North Waziristan operation is expected to be delayed.

One reason for the hike in drone strikes could simply be that Pakistani military is preoccupied with providing rescue and relief efforts, while the US does not want the extremists to have the breathing space to plan and conduct terrorist attacks in Pakistan and elsewhere. With political unrest worsening in Kashmir, extremists might try to aggravate the situation further by striking a target in India.

According to media reports and based on the above assessment, US has stopped pushing Pakistan to do more, as this might be counterproductive. However, this does not mean that US would not act on its own at this crucial junction of the Afghan war. The major emphasis of the strategy is to weaken the extremists and bring them to the negotiation table from a position of weakness. Furthermore, there is a growing realization that the situation in Afghanistan cannot be controlled without eliminating the extremist sanctuaries in the tribal areas of Pakistan, a claim supported by both India and Afghanistan. The French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner also conveyed this sentiment on Tuesday when he said, “It’s not a secret for anyone, everyone knows that Mullah Omar is in Quetta, if he’s not now in Karachi.”

On the other hand, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has claimed responsibility for most of the recent terror attacks in Pakistan. TTP has linked the terrorist attacks to US drone strikes that have been conducted against them, which it claims have also caused civilian causalities. Additionally, the TTP spokesman Azam Tariq has accused the Pakistan army and the government of complicity in these attacks. By making these statements, Taliban have in fact accepted that the drone strikes are causing significant damage and this could also be the basis for the increase in UAV strikes in the tribal areas. While Prime Minister Gillani’s statement on the drone technology was probably meant to show disagreement between US and Pakistan on this matter, and to challenge the perception created by Taliban that the government is complicit in these strikes.

Drone strikes remain deeply unpopular in the country and are viewed as a violation of its sovereignty.  However, US humanitarian flood relief counters the negative perceptions created by the strikes. US is delicately but aggressively approaching both these goals; going after the extremists and providing flood relief. By adopting this tactics, US is attempting to prove that the drone strikes take out the very people that are known to kill Pakistani civilians, and thus to manage and offset the negative sentiment created by the drone strikes.

The post The Significance of the Surge in Drone Strikes in Pakistan appeared first on Politact.

Context
The drone attacks by the United States in the tribal areas (FATA) have become increasingly controversial in Pakistan. The U.S. argues that these attacks have been instrumental in targeting key Al-Qaeda leaders hidden in the tribal areas, as well as other terrorist groups using this area as a safe heaven to launch attacks on NATO forces across the border in Afghanistan. The U.S. further maintains that these drone attacks present the best possible alternative to ground-based (boots on the ground) incursions. Moreover, both unofficially and via media reports, the U.S. maintains that the attacks are carried out under a secret tacit agreement with the government of Pakistan. Senator Diane Feinstein(D-California) went so far as to claim that the drones are actually based in Pakistan and are launched from there against their targets; recent media reports suggest that the Pakistan conducts the groundwork for selection of the targets and then pass it on to the U.S.

Analysis

Pakistan has denied – publicly and vehemently – the existence of any such agreement with the U.S. The country’s official position is that the drone attacks are counterproductive and do not achieve the coalition’s goal of winning the hearts and minds of the local people; that in fact they encourage the recruitment of more extremists. Recently, the Pakistani Taliban, based in South and North Waziristan, have begun assailing civilian and military targets, threatening that these will continue until the drone attacks cease. The Pakistani Taliban believes it likely that their government is implicated in planning and conducting the attacks is some way and thus view it as collaborating with the enemy. So in order to change the perception that its national sovereignty is being compromised, the government of Pakistan has requested the U.S. to transfer its drone technology to Pakistan instead.

American and Pakistani intelligence agencies are increasingly at odds over how to approach this thorny situation. Pakistan desires more intelligence collaboration with the Unites States, which in turn alleges that on those occasions where it shared intelligence with the Pakistan, it was leaked to the people being targeted.

At the end of the day, the issues are the lack of trust and clarity of intentions of the parties involved; the difficulties in distinguishing friend from foe. In the past, Pakistan has entered into peace agreements with the Taliban and other radical groups with alleged involvement in cross border activities. According to the terms of these agreements, the radicals will desist from attacking the Pakistan Army or civilian targets. These agreements, however, usually didn’t address the issue of cross border activities, so that in the eyes of the U.S. and the West, they provide the respite the radical elements need to gather strength and launch attacks against NATO and the coalition forces in Afghanistan. Thus, America and the West have the following questions:

• Why does Pakistan enter into agreements with these radicals?Why does the country fail to follow through with forceful actions that substantiate its claim that these extremists are their enemies as well?
• Could Pakistan in fact be using these militants as proxies, as India and Afghanistan claim?
• Which elements in Pakistan are sympathetic to radical groups? How can this be changed?
• What is the real nature of public opinion in Pakistan regarding these Islamic radicals and militants?

In attempting to answer these questions, Western observers stress what they perceive as Pakistan’s unwillingness to part with these radical groups, due to both past associations and perceived future strategic utility. They argue that the public and private faces of the Pakistan government are at odds with each other; what the government shares with Americans in private contradicts what it wants to convey to its public and to the extremist elements.

In contrast, Pakistan claims that the problem lies not in any lack of resolve on their country’s part, but in its capacity. There is also a fear of history repeating itself: when as a colonial power, Great Britain arrived on the Sub-Continent, it exploited the Sunni-Shiite Muslim divide in the region. If the British did not have the help of the progressive Nizams of Hyderabad, they would not have been able to defeat Tipu Sultan. Once Tipu was eliminated, the Moguls, weakened by Ahmad Shah Abdali’s relentless attacks from the West, were no match for the British. Other global powers besides Britain have been inclined to leave the region in a rush, once weakened by tussles of other major players in international power struggles, without making any serious attempt to arrange a transition. In short, Pakistan is doubtful about the intentions and stamina of western powers while dealing with problems of the region.

The drone attacks present a number of domestic scenarios for Pakistan.

• First, they could expose the dichotomy of the Pakistan’s official position and force a change in its makeup, particularly in the military.
• Second, they could trigger the rage of radical groups towards Pakistan’s military, which will almost certainly react by doing everything in its power to defend itself.
• Third, they might lead the Pakistani Taliban to switch its focus from Afghanistan to Pakistan. If Pakistani Taliban have to protect their own turf then there chances of supporting Afghan Taliban diminish substantially. Furthermore, this helps to divide the radical forces of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Mullah Omar has recently asserted on all Taliban’s to focus on Afghanistan and wants Pakistani Taliban to stop attacks on the its military, since that distracts from the mission of getting foreign forces out of Afghanistan.
• Fourth, they might force the Pakistan’s public to question the motives and risk/reward calculus of the its Army and associated strategic planning circles, simultaneously weakening the credibility of the present civilian government and heightening the historic tensions between progressives and Islamic revivalists. According to some, stronger Pakistan has traditionally destabilized Afghanistan. By this logic, by weakening Pakistan perhaps Afghanistan can be stabilized.
• Fifth, they might reawaken Pakistan’s old anxieties regarding ethnic strife and civil war, as well fears of Pincer style aggression from India and Afghanistan.

But drone attacks have both regional and global ramifications as well. For Pakistan the fear is that drone attacks can provide precedence for India in how to deal with Kashmiri Jihadis. A prospect which is very much alive in the aftermath of Mumbai attacks. The unmanned drone attacks in the tribal areas of Pakistan are also a signal to Iran, nervous because of the presence of American troops in Iraq, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Furthermore, drone attacks provide a plausible pretext for countries like Israel to launch long distance attacks on adversaries, as it recently is alleged to have done in Sudan. It has been reported that a supply convoy intended for Hamas was targeted there. Realizing the utility of unmanned platforms in last year’s Georgia conflict, Russia recently concluded a $50 Million deal with Israel to purchase drones.

There is another consequence of the drone attacks in Pakistan, perhaps all the more dangerous for being less obvious. It is claimed, the attacks have succeeded in pushing militants away from the border and deeper into the settled and urban areas of Pakistan; as a result, these extremists will almost certainly come into contact with the Kashmiri Jihadis and Punjabi Taliban – if they haven’t already – resulting in a fusion of the radical and Islamic revivalist forces of Pakistan, Afghanistan and India. Regarding India in particular, where Muslim discontent is at an all time high, this prospect is not as far-fetched as it sounds. After all, it should be remembered that adherents of the Taliban believe in the same Deobandi school of thought that originated in India and then spread elsewhere. This joining of forces could intensify Shitte-Sunni tensions in the Middle East and Central and Southern Asia, with Al-Qaeda as the mastermind. This is not a prospect that progressive forces of Pakistan or United Sates look forward to.

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The post The Politics of the Drone Attacks in Pakistan – Its Domestic, Regional and Global Ramifications appeared first on Politact.