By Arif Ansar

Context

In the aftermath of the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021—formalized through the Doha Accords of 2020—South Asia has entered an entirely new and volatile phase. The Taliban’s return to power, their continued lack of international recognition, and the deepening conflict along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border have collectively reshaped the region’s geopolitical contours. What once was envisaged as an American “peace deal” has since evolved into a crucible of power rivalries, ideological contestations, and security dilemmas extending far beyond Kabul.

Amid this changing landscape, Washington finds itself confronting an old question in a new era: What strategic interests does the United States still have at stake in Afghanistan? This question gained renewed urgency after the tragic shooting near the White House on the eve of Thanksgiving in 2025, when Rahmanullah Lakanwal—a former Afghan supporter of U.S. forces who immigrated under the Protect America Operation—opened fire, killing two National Guard members. The attack, still under investigation, reignited the debate about the consequences of U.S. disengagement from Afghanistan and the enduring ripple effects of America’s two-decade military presence.

To assess these evolving dynamics, The Middle East Institute (MEI) collaborated with PoliTact to host a Webinar in November last year to explore these aspects centered around the evolving situation of Afghanistan and if merits a fresh policy and approach. Earlier in May, soon after the four-day conflict between Pakistan and India, MEI also conducted a discussion with regional experts to assess President Trump’s policy towards Taliban. Both discussions were moderated by Dr. Marvin Weibnbaum, the Director of Afghanistan-Pakistan Center.

Through these deliberations, a sobering consensus emerged: the U.S. has abandoned its nation-building ambition, replacing it with a strictly transactional and selective engagement guided by short-term counterterrorism and strategic interests. This shift marks a watershed in South Asian geopolitics—one in which regional powers like Pakistan, India, China, and Russia are recalibrating alliances, while the Taliban’s regime struggles to define its sovereignty amid growing internal fractures and international isolation.

Counterterrorism and Pragmatism

According to panelists such as Joshua White and David Sedney, Washington’s current strategy toward South Asia is driven not by ideology or doctrine but by political expediency. The United States, still wary of being drawn into another endless conflict, now prefers “quick interventions that can be framed as political wins” without the burden of prolonged commitments. At the heart of this approach lies counterterrorism (CT)—the only enduring U.S. interest in Afghanistan. The Taliban, Washington, and Pakistan paradoxically, share a common adversary: the Islamic State–Khorasan Province (ISKP). While formal cooperation remains limited, intelligence coordination to prevent ISKP attacks has emerged as a rare channel of pragmatic engagement. Adjunct Professor at George Town University, Doug London, underscored this convergence, observing that neither Washington nor the Taliban can afford an al-Qaeda-style attack “with fingerprints all over Afghanistan.” Thus, even hostile actors find themselves bound by mutual survival instincts.

Another dimension of U.S. engagement is transactional diplomacy—a pragmatic mechanism aimed at resolving targeted issues such as hostage recovery and retrieval of left-behind military assets. As former Afghan ambassador Javid Ahmad explained, these dealings often blur ethical lines; American captives have been freed in exchange for concessions, including the removal of Haqqani Network bounties. Similarly, billions of dollars’ worth of infrastructure and equipment left during the withdrawal remain part of simmering behind-the-scenes negotiations—either to buy back through intermediaries like Pakistan or to ensure their destruction to prevent exploitation.

Pakistan’s position in this matrix is particularly complex. While the U.S. remains a visible interlocutor, Islamabad’s deepest strategic alignment continues to be with China. Pakistan leverages Washington’s engagement as a counterbalance against overreliance on Beijing. According to the panelists, efforts to “reset” U.S.-Pakistan relations on the basis of trade, minerals, and counterterrorism cooperation may refresh dialogue but are unlikely to override hard security realities.

Human Rights and the Counterterrorism Dilemma

The Taliban’s domestic policies, particularly toward women and civil society, continue to complicate U.S. engagement. As Lisa Curtis observed, the regime has demonstrated “no change in policies” from its 1990s practices—the repression of women and stifling of dissent remain total. This poses a moral and strategic crisis for Washington: how to cooperate on counterterrorism while refusing to legitimize a regime that flagrantly violates human rights.

Curtis argued that sacrificing principles for intelligence access risks undermining long-term stability, as repression fuels extremism by creating ungoverned spaces ripe for recruitment. Yet London countered that, in practice, the U.S. often cooperates with regimes that commit abuses when it aligns with national interests, effectively separating human rights advocacy from realpolitik.

The delicate balance between moral credibility and strategic necessity defines Washington’s Afghan dilemma—where human rights concerns, while loudly voiced, often take a back seat to the imperatives of terrorism prevention.

The TTP Factor

When U.S. troops exited Afghanistan, many in Pakistan assumed the Taliban’s ascension would enhance Islamabad’s regional leverage. Instead, the opposite has occurred. The enduring ties between the Afghan Taliban and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have emerged as the central source of cross-border friction, destabilizing Pakistan more than any external actor.

Since the short but intense four-day war between Pakistan and India in May 2025, border skirmishes between the Taliban and Pakistani forces have intensified, reflecting a broader regional unraveling. Analysts such as Sedney describe these clashes as a subtext of the larger India-Pakistan rivalry, with each side using Afghan soil as a pressure valve for strategic signaling. Yet a full-scale Taliban-Pakistan war remains improbable. Pakistan’s military, with its overwhelming technological and nuclear superiority, could decimate Taliban forces—but at the risk of provoking a drawn-out insurgency it cannot control. The Taliban, aware of this asymmetry, prefer hybrid tactics, allowing the TTP to wage low-intensity proxy warfare inside Pakistan.

The Taliban dismiss Islamabad’s demands to curb the TTP, calling it a “domestic problem”. This refusal underscores their ideological kinship and the shared ambition to see Pakistan’s border tribal belt revert to Taliban-style Sharia governance. Ahmad warned that this dynamic is perilous: the TTP’s suicide battalions possess the capacity to incite urban terror within Pakistan, amplifying the country’s internal vulnerabilities.

Behind these clashes lies a larger ideological project—the Taliban’s belief, shared by TTP hardliners, that regional power is shifting back to the “Islamic Emirate” model. Sedney noted that radical circles envision a future, within a generation, where Pakistan and even India could see Taliban-like movements ascend. Whether delusional or strategic, this belief animates the persistence of militancy and shapes Islamabad’s deepening anxiety.

US Leverages and Pakistan’s Regime Change Dilemma

The question of whether the U.S. or Pakistan can leverage internal Taliban factionalism looms large. Within the movement, a pragmatic Haqqani network faction favors economic engagement and limited U.S. cooperation, while the isolationist Kandahar faction, led by Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada, rejects dependency and seeks autonomy. Although tensions exist, Akhundzada maintains ultimate control, preventing visible fragmentation that might invite civil war. For Pakistan, frustration with the Taliban’s defiance has sparked talk of supporting Afghan resistance groups. Yet Ahmad warns this path is fraught: funding insurgency would demand resources, while the disunited Afghan opposition lacks both cohesion and stamina.

Consequently, Islamabad’s strategy has shifted from influence to contingency—exploiting Taliban divisions when advantageous, but no longer betting on a “friendly” Kabul. As White put it, the myth of a compliant, pro-Pakistan “Pashtun leadership” in Afghanistan has always been just that—a myth. This reality has spurred a profound shift in mindset within Pakistan’s government. No longer divided between the “good Taliban” and “bad Taliban,” Islamabad increasingly sees a spectrum of “bad and worse Taliban.”

At an event held at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in February, 2022, the Special Representative for Afghanistan at the time, Tom West, had discussed the economic leverages US still holds and commented that Afghan Taliban has shown the least interest in future cooperation with the US in fulling the terms of their side of the Doha Accord. At the same time, West noted that US is not supporting any opposition to Afghan Taliban and is advising other nations to refrain from that, but some will do that sooner or later if Taliban does not show urgency. Answering a question, he commented that many players are realizing that not having US engagement in Afghanistan is not in their interest.

Regional Rivalries and Great Power Calculus

Beyond the Pakistan-Taliban binary, regional power competition has turned Afghanistan into a geopolitical chessboard once again. None of the major powers—China, Russia, India, or the U.S.—wants a total state collapse, yet each pursues a distinct agenda. India, for its part, has pivoted sharply. As Curtis noted, New Delhi is now actively courting elements within the Taliban to undermine Pakistan’s influence. The May 2025 conflict with Pakistan demonstrated India’s willingness to strike deep into Pakistani territory, signaling a readiness to rewrite the traditional escalation playbook.

Meanwhile, China and Russia tread cautiously. For Beijing, the overriding concern is protecting multibillion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) investments from militant spillover. Russia, despite its history of confrontation with Islamist movements, maintains unpublicized CT cooperation with the Taliban to prevent ISKP’s expansion into Central Asia. Trump’s renewed engagement with Central Asian leaders under the “C5+1 initiative”—focused on strategic minerals—has further rattled Moscow and Beijing, who view it as U.S. encroachment upon their regional sphere of influence.

Panelists such as White and Karp noted that China now holds more extensive economic leverage in both Pakistan and Afghanistan than any other actor. Despite attempts to mediate between them, Beijing’s balancing efforts have faltered. Nonetheless, economic interdependence has rendered China an unwilling stakeholder in both states’ stability.

For the Taliban, the Great Power rivalry offers an opportunity. In an assessment, PoliTact noted last year: “As Afghan Taliban celebrate 4^th year in power, the nation now finds itself at a crossroads of competing currents. The net effect is a cautious, multi-prong stance: keep Iranian channels open for trade and energy, nurture Indian economic alternatives through Chabahar, avoid burning bridges with Pakistan as it courts Washington, and remain pragmatically receptive to Chinese infrastructure where it serves Afghan interests.”

Javid Ahmad observed, the regime seeks “economic neutrality,” extracting benefits from all sides while avoiding puppeteering by any. Pragmatic factions engage Russia and China for investment; hardliners in Kandahar, wary of foreign intentions, prefer cautious distance. This balancing act defines Kabul’s foreign policy—a tactical survival strategy that keeps all powers interested, but none dominant.

Containment Over Resolution: The U.S. Strategic Dilemma

Dr. Weinbaum summarized the prevailing expert view succinctly: “There is no military solution to the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict—only conflict management.” After decades of direct engagement, the U.S. now acts as a remote balancer, occasionally intervening diplomatically but avoiding deep entanglement. Washington’s immediate goal is not victory, but containment: preventing Afghanistan’s collapse while denying extremist sanctuaries the freedom to orchestrate global terror. This means sustaining aid and limited engagement but conditioning every form of support on verifiable security behavior.

Panelists urged regional coordination involving China, Turkey, and Qatar, whose economic leverage could pressure the Taliban to restrain the TTP. However, as Karp pointed out, both Turkey and Qatar’s favoritism toward Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated movements complicates their credibility as neutral mediators.

Ahmad cautioned that the U.S. must abandon the pursuit of ideological “unicorns” and embrace pragmatic realpolitik—dealing with actors as they are, not as Washington wishes them to be. The mantra, he argued, should be “leverage first, ideals later.” Delayed engagement only increases risks of ungoverned chaos, but overreaction could trap the U.S. in another open-ended quagmire.

The Perpetual Balancing Act

As of 2025, U.S. policy in South Asia has evolved into a delicate balancing act—a calculated choreography between engagement and restraint. America’s current presence is limited but consequential: intelligence links, sporadic negotiations, and cautious cooperation with regional allies. Yet looming questions remain. If Afghanistan once again becomes a safe haven for transnational terrorist networks, what tools does Washington have to respond? Under Trump’s renewed mandate, analysts predict the U.S. would double down on counterterrorism partnerships—especially with Pakistan and India—to prevent another 9/11-style surprise.

However, as India’s outreach to the Taliban deepens, it risks entrenching the very militant alignments that destabilize Pakistan and jeopardize U.S.-Pakistan rapprochement. Such dynamics may inadvertently revive the ideological monster once defeated by the War on Terror. Moreover, the Taliban’s tacit encouragement of TTP demands—such as reversing Pakistan’s merger of tribal areas and enforcing Sharia law—threatens to seed an insurgent domino effect. This could erode Islamabad’s internal cohesion and ripple across borders, complicating U.S. peace efforts from Gaza to Central Asia. Trump’s Taliban policy would require broader public ownership of Pakistan’s CT strategy and preventing the budding India-Afghan ties from destabilizing Pakistan and the rejuvenated US-Pakistan ties.

Related Articles:

The Unbroken Alliance: Why the Afghan Taliban-TTP Nexus Is Dooming Peace with Pakistan – Nov 4, 2025
The Fragile Truce Between Pakistan And Afghanistan And The War Of Narratives – Nov 2, 2025
Afghanistan’s Strategic Outlook And New Geopolitical Realities – Aug 18, 2025
Afghanistan, Pakistan Relations and Great Power Rivalry – Jul 21, 2025
Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions, Trump, And Wakhan Corridor – Feb 3, 2025
Political Or Military Solution; Pakistan’s New Counter-Terrorism Operation Azm-e-Istehkam – Aug 1, 2024
Convergences in US Pakistan Ties and Afghanistan – Jan 1, 2024
Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP – Feb 22, 2023
Post Withdrawal Campaign Against Extremism In Afghanistan And US-Pakistan Relations – Sep 7, 2022
Emerging US Policy Towards Afghanistan After Withdrawal – March 2, 2022
Recalibrating The US-Pakistan Partnership In Afghanistan – Jun 22, 2021
US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden – Mar 2, 2021

The post The Future Of Afghan Taliban-Pakistan Conflict: Implications For Regional Stability And US Interests appeared first on Politact.

PoliTact’s Analysis of Perceptions and Perspectives

With inputs from Naade Ali and Arif Ansar

Context

Since the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan in August 2021, there was a perception the installation of Afghan Taliban in Kabul will make Pakistan’s regional influence grow. However, Afghan Taliban-TTP nexus continues to bedevil the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) remains the central source of friction and a key driver of the persistent cross-border violence. There is no indication that the group has endorsed the ceasefire reached in Istanbul; its ongoing attacks suggest that it remains active despite the interstate truce. The next round of talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan are scheduled for November 6 in Istanbul.

Islamabad accuses the Afghan Taliban of providing support and sanctuary to the TTP, designated as a terror group by both UN and the U.S., while Kabul dismisses these allegations. Qatar and Turkey are closely observing the ceasefire, marking their first substantive involvement in mediating between Islamabad and Kabul after previous efforts—including those led by China—failed to achieve meaningful results. While the agreement commits Pakistan to refrain from launching strikes inside Afghanistan, it does not neutralize the TTP threat. Under the deal, Pakistan is expected to avoid cross-border operations but retains the right to target TTP militants attempting to infiltrate its territory.

For the Afghan Taliban, the ceasefire offers a degree of peace and reduces the risk of cross-border strikes. However, relinquishing support for the TTP is not a decision that rests with any single Taliban leader, not even the defense minister. The authority to determine the Taliban’s stance toward the TTP lies solely with their Supreme Leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada. There have been no reports to date indicating that he has issued any directive against the group. Although the ceasefire may temporarily pause the infiltration of TTP militants from Afghanistan into Pakistan, it could simultaneously prompt the group’s factions within Pakistan to become more active, fighting independently in the absence of reinforcement from their Afghan counterparts.

Why do Afghan Taliban Support TTP?

The Afghan Taliban’s support for the TTP stems from their shared combat experience, religious ideology, and tribal ties. The TTP’s leadership has sworn allegiance to the Taliban’s Supreme Leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, granting the group significant autonomy to operate without interference from the Kabul-based Taliban faction.

This arrangement allows the TTP to pursue strategic and geopolitical objectives on behalf of the Taliban, such as challenging Pakistan’s control over territories beyond the Durand Line, which the Taliban considers part of Afghanistan. The Durand Line, a colonial-era border, remains a contentious issue, as the Afghan Taliban rejects its legitimacy, fueling tensions with Pakistan. Despite the recent Afghanistan-Pakistan agreement emphasizing mutual respect for territorial integrity, ambiguity persists regarding both sides’ interpretations of their sovereign boundaries.

Afghanistan’s Defense Minister, Mullah Yaqoob Mujahid, recently described the Durand line as an “imaginary border”, reinforcing the impression that the Afghan Taliban do not consider it a legitimate border. Similarly, the Deputy Interior Minister Nabi Omari expressed hopes of reclaiming “Afghanistan’s old lands” currently under Pakistani control, stating, “By Allah’s will, this land will return to us.”

It is important to note that, unlike the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP), which directly challenges Taliban rule, the TTP does not pose an immediate threat. Instead, it contributes to the Taliban-led Afghan economy by purchasing weapons and sharing profits from smuggling, extortion, and other illicit activities, making the TTP a significant stakeholder in Afghanistan’s economy. In fact, TTP also acts as a Taliban ally against ISKP.

While Al Qaeda (AQ) presence in Afghanistan has significantly diminished, the most significant evidence of continued ties with the Taliban was the U.S. drone strike that killed Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahri in July 2022 in a safe house in Kabul. In the February 2020 Doha Agreement with the U.S., the Taliban pledged to prevent international terrorist groups, including AQ, from using Afghan territory to threaten the U.S. and its allies. However, evidence strongly suggests the Taliban leadership has violated this pledge.

Disarming these battle-hardened TTP militants, who lack alternative livelihoods due to their combat-focused skill set, appears to be a costly and complex endeavor for the Afghan Taliban. Fully integrating them into Afghan security forces could also undermine the Taliban’s public denials of supporting the TTP and risk internal discord.

The present circumstances suggest that the Taliban have chosen to continue supporting the TTP, enabling them to focus on external rather than internal operations. Moreover, by continuing this backing, raises serious questions about the Taliban motivations and world view. Irrespective, this risky strategy jeopardizes the Taliban’s pursuit of international recognition and complicates their relations with Pakistan.

The Key Demands of TTP

While the TTP’s focus has tactically shifted over the years (for instance, limiting attacks on civilians after 2018), their fundamental goal remains the enforcement of their interpretation of Sharia and the withdrawal of the state’s writ from Pakistan’s merged tribal areas. Based on their stated objectives presented during past negotiations, the key demands of the TTP include:

1. Implementation of Sharia

The TTP’s long-term goal is the establishment of a state based on its own strict interpretation of Islamic law (Sharia), mirroring the system of the Afghan Taliban.

2. Restoring Autonomy and Demilitarization

The TTP demands the reversal of the 2018 constitutional amendment that merged the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) into Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. The TTP seeks to restore the semi-autonomous or independent status of these tribal regions.

A frequent demand is the complete withdrawal of the Pakistani military and security forces from the tribal belt (the former FATA and surrounding regions), allowing the TTP to establish control and implement its own governance system.

3. Prisoner and Amnesty Demands

The TTP consistently demands the release of all its imprisoned members and commanders held by Pakistani authorities. This has often been a precondition for engaging in ceasefires or peace talks. The group demands full amnesty for its fighters who have committed acts of terror against the Pakistani state and its citizens.

Pakistan’s Evolving Policy Towards Afghan Taliban and TTP

Pakistan has long tried to convince Afghan Taliban to act against the TTP. While Afghan Taliban offered to facilitate talks between TTP and Pakistan and relocate it from the border regions – it has restrained from taking any serious actions against it. Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) led government had sought Afghan Taliban assistance in pacifying TTP, resulting in a ceasefire that fell apart in November 2022 – and resumption of TTP attacks against Pakistan. The TTP demands related to release of prisoners were also met to some extent. On the other hand, their requirements of decreasing the number of security forces in FATA – and rescinding of FATA merger are more complicated.

The situation now seems different. By conducting military strikes in Afghanistan and killing dozens of Taliban fighters, Islamabad has set a new precedent, signaling that the Afghans must face consequences for supporting its enemies. Though, Pakistan’s carrot-and-stick strategy was designed to change the Taliban cost-benefit calculus, forcing them to choose between Pakistan or TTP. To date, the Afghan Taliban have chosen the latter, a course they may continue to follow, as tensions with Islamabad neither threaten their domestic control nor hinder their growing engagement with other regional actors, including India.

The Taliban has yet to craft an effective framework to regulate the TTP, restrict its autonomy, or halt its cross-border operations. Instead, growing friction with Pakistan has only deepened the alignment between the two. Afghan Deputy Minister of Interior Affairs, Mawlawi Muhammad Nabi Omari, was reported to have issued a stark warning to Pakistan, stating that if Afghan tribes and the nation declare Pakistan an invader by religious decree, “by God, you will not find safety even up to the Indian border.”

These anti-Pakistan sentiments cast doubts about the Afghan Taliban intentions. The combined pride of the Afghan Taliban and TTP in their perceived triumphs over major powers like the U.S. and NATO, and in reclaiming Afghanistan after decades of war, reinforces their determination and stubbornness.

Afghan Taliban support alone does not fully explain the TTP’s survival and expansion. A significant portion of its fighters are disenfranchised and radicalized youth from Pakistan’s impoverished regions, particularly Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. In a security briefing to KP lawmakers, the provincial police chief once revealed that around 4,000 militants, including 35% Afghan nationals, were operating in the province, often blending in with civilians by day and carrying out attacks at night.

A belief reportedly exists within the TTP that, with support from local tribes, it can seize Pakistani territory by force and eventually transform from a non-state actor into a legitimate state actor, like their Afghan counterpart. This perception boosts the morale of its fighters and encourages the group’s continued expansion. These characteristics truly indicate that TTP aspires for a space from where Afghan Taliban can extend their reach.

Pakistan’s security establishment accuses India of using Afghanistan as a base for launching terror operations against Pakistan – and the availability of modern weapons in Afghanistan has enhanced militants’ capabilities. At the same time, the military recognizes that Pakistan’s terrorism problem is not purely external but also internally facilitated. In his recent remarks, Pakistan Army Chief urged Kabul to prioritize mutual security over ongoing violence, calling on the Afghan Taliban regime to “rein in the proxies who have sanctuaries in Afghanistan.”

An Alliance of Ideology vs. State Necessity

The current crisis surrounding the ceasefire reveals a fundamental and seemingly unresolvable conflict: while Pakistan demands the Afghan Taliban choose state necessity (diplomatic recognition and regional trade) over ideological loyalty, the leadership in Kabul has consistently chosen the latter.

The TTP is more than just an operational proxy; it is a vital ideological ally and an economic stakeholder that reinforces the Afghan Taliban’s own anti-state identity and vision for a borderless Islamic Emirate. Pakistan’s previous posture of limited intervention in Afghanistan, coupled with the TTP’s growing recruitment base among disenfranchised Pakistani youth, means that Islamabad’s carrot-and-stick strategy has failed to alter the Taliban’s calculus.

While the Pakistani government has previously pursued political solutions, the TTP’s extremist demands and uncompromising approach have rendered sustained negotiations nearly impossible. The current strategic pivot toward a military approach—which carries the inherent risk of seeking regime change in Afghanistan—is equally unlikely to yield a long-term roadmap. For any military pressure to be effective, it must be integrated with political steps that foster public ownership and address long-held local grievances. This sophisticated, multi-pronged strategy offers the best chance to definitively dismantle the Taliban-TTP nexus.

Any attempt at regime change is heavily contingent upon securing the explicit support of key regional players, most notably China. A full-scale war directly jeopardizes substantial Chinese investments, particularly those under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and risks creating a dangerous new front amid Pakistan’s ongoing tensions with India. Furthermore, escalating border conflicts are likely to severely complicate the recent reset in U.S.-Pakistan relations, which is premised on cooperation in trade, strategic minerals, and technology.

Internationally, being mired in internal and border conflicts would significantly erode Pakistan’s capacity to play a credible regional role, hindering its ability to support allies like Saudi Arabia or contribute to broader stability efforts, such as a Gaza peace plan. Even with powerful backing from both China and the U.S., attempting to alter the ethnic balance of power within Afghanistan remains an extremely high-risk gamble that could easily spiral into a prolonged, devastating civil war.

In the absence of a truly sophisticated methodology—one that moves beyond binary military or political options—Pakistan risks becoming entangled in a protracted proxy guerrilla warfare within an era of escalating great power rivalry. The recent Istanbul ceasefire, therefore, provides only a temporary and fragile pause. This strategic impasse casts a long, enduring shadow over the future of South Asian security.

Related Articles:

The Fragile Truce Between Pakistan And Afghanistan And The War Of Narratives – Nov 2, 2025
Afghanistan’s Strategic Outlook And New Geopolitical Realities – Aug 18, 2025
Afghanistan, Pakistan Relations and Great Power Rivalry – Jul 21, 2025
Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions, Trump, And Wakhan Corridor – Feb 3, 2025
Political Or Military Solution; Pakistan’s New Counter-Terrorism Operation Azm-e-Istehkam – Aug 1, 2024
Convergences in US Pakistan Ties and Afghanistan – Jan 1, 2024
Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP – Feb 22, 2023
Post Withdrawal Campaign Against Extremism In Afghanistan And US-Pakistan Relations – Sep 7, 2022
Emerging US Policy Towards Afghanistan After Withdrawal – March 2, 2022
Recalibrating The US-Pakistan Partnership In Afghanistan – Jun 22, 2021
US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden – Mar 2, 2021

The post The Unbroken Alliance: Why the Afghan Taliban-TTP Nexus Is Dooming Peace with Pakistan appeared first on Politact.

By Naade Ali
South Asia and Middle East Analyst

Context

Since the withdrawal of US and NATO troops from Afghanistan in the aftermath of 2020 Doha Agreement, tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan have frequently escalated. The differences reached their peak last year when the Pakistani military conducted targeted airstrikes in Afghanistan’s Barmal district, located in eastern Paktika province. The aim of the strike was to neutralize key Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) commanders and dismantle a media facility. In retaliation, the Afghan Taliban launched attacks on multiple targets, including military posts, beyond the Durand Line. In its messaging, the Afghan Defense Ministry further dismissed Pakistan’s claim over the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), now integrated into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP).

Adding to the strain, the Afghan Taliban collaborated with TTP forces in joint border offensives, resulting in prolonged skirmishes that significantly deteriorated bilateral relations. This year, clashes between the two militaries resumed in Khost province. On January 11, Taliban spokesperson Zabiullah Mujahid accused Pakistani forces of targeting civilian infrastructure in eastern Kunar province which resulted in casualties, and urged them to cease such actions. While border clashes became the new normal, Pakistan maintains that despite the tensions, it seeks friendly relations with Afghanistan.

What is clear is that the security situation in Pakistan has worsened by an acute increase in terrorist violence, with an estimated 4,000 TTP militants reportedly taking refuge in KP. These militants operate secretly, launching attacks on security forces at night and blending into civilian areas during the day. Recent reports from the KP police indicate that these militants often use civilians as shields, making counter terror operations particularly complex.

The opposition from certain local groups to military operations has further exacerbated these challenges. Political groups like the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI)-led government in KP have publicly criticized the military’s actions, even demanding its withdrawal from the region.

Pakistan’s policy on how to deal with TTP has swung between achieving a political solution to using force. The core of the issue is how to engage with the Afghan Taliban who have provided refuge to TTP, reciprocating the support TTP previously provided to Afghan Taliban that resulted in US and NATO withdrawal.

Political versus Military Solution

Recent reports indicate that Afghan Taliban government privately acknowledged the TTP as a problem but objected to Pakistan’s hardline approach in addressing the threat. Instead, the Afghan Taliban proposed dialogue as a solution, but Pakistan dismissed the TTP’s demands as unacceptable, ruling out negotiations. This development starkly contrasts with the Afghan Taliban’s official stance, which denies the presence of the TTP in Afghanistan and frames the issue as an internal matter for Pakistan. Taliban spokesperson Zabiullah Mujahid was observed saying, “The issue of the TTP or the war within Pakistan is a matter that pertains to that country. We are working to find a solution to this issue; however, it is not our matter. We will not allow Afghanistan’s soil to be used against any country, including Pakistan.”

The Afghan Taliban have consistently portrayed terrorism in Pakistan as an internal matter, and continued refusal to recognize the Durand Line as an international border. By fostering Pashtun nationalist sentiments in KP, the Taliban have undermined Pakistan’s territorial integrity and bolstered support for the TTP’s broader agenda.

The TTP’s ultimate aim of transforming KP into a province of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan aligns with the Taliban’s ideological goals, posing a long-term threat to Pakistan’s sovereignty. In response, Pakistan’s military leadership has labelled the TTP as Fitna Al Khawarij (anarchist infidels), using religious nationalism to delegitimize the group. However, this narrative has struggled to gain widespread public support and political ownership.

Adding to the diplomatic rhetoric, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, the deputy political minister of foreign affairs, stated that the Islamic Emirate would not permit external interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. He also urged neighboring countries, especially Pakistan, to reciprocate by avoiding interference in Afghanistan’s internal matters. His remarks highlighted Afghan Taliban’s resistance to Pakistan’s pressure for dismantling the TTP and relocating fighters from border regions. Despite terse diplomatic exchanges and rising hostilities, Pakistan acknowledged its “multilayered engagement” with the Afghan Taliban reflects the involvement of multiple actors working to de-escalate tensions.

Pakistan’s Shifting Afghan Policy

For Pakistan’s military, however, ceasing counter-terrorism operations would effectively allow the TTP to regroup and further destabilize the region. This sentiment was reiterated by the army chief during meetings with political factions in KP, where he urged unity against terrorism, stating, “The existence of the state ensures the existence of politics; God forbid, if there is no state, there is nothing. We must all stand united against terrorism, without any discrimination or prejudice.” He further emphasized, “Creating disorder is a grave sin, and without the state, nothing else matters.”

During a recent provincial-level security meeting in Peshawar, Pakistan’s army chief, General Asim Munir, described Afghanistan as a “brotherly neighbor” and an “Islamic country” with which Pakistan has always sought better relations. However, he emphasized, “The only difference with Afghanistan is the presence of Fitna al-Khawarij in Afghanistan and the spread of terrorism in Pakistan from across the border.”

General Munir expressed regret over the Afghan Taliban’s refusal to dismantle the TTP, stating that Pakistan had “exhausted all options” to persuade Afghanistan to curb cross-border militant attacks. He further remarked, “Our only policy is Pakistan,” signaling that national security remains paramount and that military operations against TTP-led terrorism would continue, even at the expense of heightened tensions with the Afghan Interim Government (AIG). His statements highlighted the culmination of months of unsuccessful diplomatic efforts and signaled a shift toward a more assertive stance against the TTP and its Afghan supporters.

Meanwhile, commenting on the current state of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, Foreign Office spokesperson Shafqat Ali Khan reiterated Islamabad’s call for the Kabul government to act against terrorist groups operating from sanctuaries across the border. FO spokesperson also dismissed reports of any Pakistani annexation of the Wakhan Corridor, affirming it as an inseparable part of Afghanistan and emphasizing Pakistan’s commitment to respecting Afghanistan’s territorial integrity. Some articles have recently indicated that Pakistan wants to disrupt Afghan Taliban plans to connect directly with China through the Wakhan Corridor, bypassing Pakistan.

China and Pak-Afghan Tensions

China holds significant geo-strategic stakes in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. As a key ally to Pakistan, China would face substantial setbacks if relations between the two neighbors further deteriorate. Beijing has sought to leverage its Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Global Development Initiative (GDI) as frameworks to promote peace, counter-terrorism cooperation, and economic development in the region. Chinese Ambassador to Afghanistan Zhao Xing, in a recent interaction with Taliban leaders, proposed key strategies to enhance collaboration with Afghanistan, which could potentially restore its strained relations with Pakistan.

Speaking at an event commemorating 70 years of diplomatic ties between China and Afghanistan, Zhao emphasized the need for mutual respect, trust-building, and expanded cooperation. He commented, “In today’s complex international environment, China and Afghanistan must respect each other’s core interests, build mutual trust, and expand cooperation in all areas. We must work toward a shared future.” Beijing’s proposals align with the broader goals of the GSI, which emphasizes collective security and regional stability, and the GDI, which focuses on infrastructure development and economic connectivity.

Whether these overtures offered by China will influence AIG to reassess their approach towards Pakistan remains to be seen. So far, their guarantees of not allowing their territory to be used against Pakistan have proven ineffective, raising questions about the extent of their willingness to cooperate. At the same time, China’s growing engagement with Afghanistan underscores its desire to mediate tensions between Islamabad and Kabul while protecting its own strategic interests in the region.

Strategic and Regional Implications

Pakistan’s shifting stance toward AIG reflects its growing mistrust and a potential re-calibration of its approach. This is occurring in the backdrop of emerging reports indicating internal power struggles between the Kandhari and Kabuli factions within the Afghan Taliban. A notable meeting between Pakistan’s DG ISI and Tajikistan’s President recently hinted at Islamabad’s interest in engaging with regional actors to achieve its security objectives. Tajikistan holds a pivotal position in Afghanistan’s internal dynamics, serving as a base for the leadership of the National Resistance Front (NRF). Actively resisting the Taliban since 2021, the NRF has welcomed Pakistan’s expanding security ties with Tajikistan and its call for an inclusive and legitimate Afghan government.

The return of the Trump administration is expected to strain Taliban-U.S. relations further while potentially boosting support for the NRF. The Afghan Taliban, despite attempts to restore ties with the Trump administration, face strong criticism. Trump has signaled continued pressure through sanctions, withholding recognition, and linking financial aid to the return of U.S. military equipment. Trump’s remarks, including his emphasis on recovering military assets left behind in Afghanistan, underscore his administration’s tough stance towards the Taliban regime, particularly as they relate to human rights abuses.

On the other hand, the NRF sees an opportunity to align with the U.S., positioning itself as a viable alternative force to counter terrorism in Afghanistan. NRF representatives, including foreign relations head Maisum Nazari, have expressed optimism about American support, highlighting their willingness to combat Al-Qaeda and IS with adequate backing. If the Trump administration extends support to the NRF, it would mark a significant blow to AIG and could enable Pakistan to reassess its regional strategy too. Aligning with the NRF, however, would be a controversial move for Pakistan, potentially antagonizing domestic Pashtun and religio-political factions like Jamiat-e-Islam Fazal and Jamat-e-Islami.

Meanwhile, the AIG, recognizing the shifting regional dynamics, have sought to diversify their alliances by strengthening ties with Pakistan’s adversary, India, and the U.S.’s rival, Russia. Though these partnerships are primarily focused on economic cooperation, the AIG’s interest in expanding them into defense agreements poses a serious challenge to Pakistan. A closer alignment between Afghanistan and India could weaken Islamabad’s efforts to counter India’s influence in the region. Additionally, if Russia transitions from economic cooperation to defense collaboration, it would further complicate Pakistan’s security landscape.

Domestic Challenges

Domestically, Pakistan faces significant hurdles in developing a unified counter-terrorism strategy. Political instability and ethnic divisions have hindered efforts to effectively address the TTP threat. Long-standing grievances among marginalized Pashtun and Baloch communities have been exploited by anti-Pakistan elements, including the Afghan Taliban, to fuel sub-nationalist movements.

To counter this, Pakistan’s military leadership has sought to promote national unity, emphasizing Islam’s role in uniting the country’s diverse ethnic and cultural groups. The army chief has strongly condemned groups threatening Pakistan’s national integrity, branding them as enemies of both Islam and the state. However, this approach has faced criticism for its inconsistency, targeting the TTP while sparing the Afghan Taliban. This selective narrative undermines Pakistan’s counter-terrorism efforts and weakens its credibility.

Conclusion

The on-going tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan has been exacerbated by the mishandling of the TTP issue. The Afghan Taliban’s refusal to sever ties with the TTP, rejection of the Durand Line, and manipulation of ethnic sentiments continue to undermine Pakistan’s national security and territorial integrity. While Pakistan has received international recognition for its stance against the TTP, its inconsistent counter-terrorism narrative and fractured domestic strategy weaken its position. The AIG’s growing ties with India and Russia further complicate Pakistan’s geopolitical calculus, particularly as Islamabad has recently succeeded in re-calibrating its relationships with Bangladesh.

To navigate these challenges, Pakistan must adopt a cohesive strategy that balances military action with diplomatic efforts. However, without political unity and public ownership this approach is unlikely to work. While continued engagement with the Afghan Taliban is a necessity, Pakistan should also explore alternatives. Encouraging China, Russia, Turkey, and Gulf nations to diplomatically pressure the Taliban into forming an inclusive government. At the same time, Pakistan must engage with all political factions in Afghanistan to oppose the TTP.

Related Articles:
Political Or Military Solution; Pakistan’s New Counter-Terrorism Operation Azm-e-Istehkam – Aug 1, 2024
Convergences in US Pakistan Ties and Afghanistan – Jan 1, 2024
Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP – Feb 22, 2023
Post Withdrawal Campaign Against Extremism In Afghanistan And US-Pakistan Relations – Sep 7, 2022
Emerging US Policy Towards Afghanistan After Withdrawal – March 2, 2022
Recalibrating The US-Pakistan Partnership In Afghanistan – Jun 22, 2021
US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden – Mar 2, 2021

A version of this article was also published in Defence Journal Pakistan.

The post Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions, Trump, And Wakhan Corridor appeared first on Politact.

Last minute diplomatic efforts by Washington defused a potentially disastrous situation and helped to resolve the Egyptian-Israeli crisis before their 1979 peace accord was overturned. A compromise was reached when Cairo agreeing not to recall its ambassador from Israel, and the Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak issued a public apology for the deaths of the three Egyptian policemen. Relations soured when three Egyptian policemen were killed in clashes between Israeli troops and Palestinian terrorists on the Eilat road. Israel agreed to a joint investigation with Egypt into the killings and to renegotiate terms on the posting of Egyptian forces in eastern Sinai.

Nonetheless, the prospects of cross border raids have been raised across the region to deal with extremists and nationalistic movements. This trend poses dangerous consequences for the nation-state system.

The post US Defuses Egyptian-Israeli Border Crisis appeared first on Politact.

Context

Turkey began the year already considered a runner for increasing influence in the Middle East and North Africa. With the aftermath of the May 2010 Freedom Flotilla incident positing Turkey in a new, unfriendly dynamic with Israel and increasing cooperation with Iran, Turkey was seen to be positioning itself for undertaking a leadership role in the Arab world with an eye for an anti western-influence approach.

The NATO efforts in Libya were opposed by Turkey at the onset and the nation seemed to be following through on its new Arab-centric route, however, in recent times the tone coming out of Ankara has been markedly different from that of the beginning of the year, especially as affairs in Syria started to deteriorate. Indeed the Turkish perspective appears to have shifted much more to a pro-NATO, Israel-friendly one. This article looks at the evolving role of Turkey and what it means for other regional contenders, Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Analysis

As the US starts to withdraw forces from Iraq and Afghanistan and initiates negotiations on the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) with these countries, the irredentist claims presented by the Kurds, Pastuns and Baluchs are likely to escalate. These claims present an opportunity to keep the regional powers off balance.

(The article includes a map.)

The Syria Factor

The shift invariably came with the onset of trouble in Syria. Syria and Turkey have traditionally been friendly and the border they share relatively peaceful. With Iran and Syria having close ties, the initial Turkish approach would have included warmer ties with these two countries, which necessitates a position away from western influence and good ties with Israel. However, civil unrest and crackdown by the Syrian government against civilians has presented a moral dilemma for Turkey. Assad has continued to ignore requests from Ankara to stop the brutalities against protesters and enter into meaningful reforms, pushing Ankara towards a breaking point in its relationship with Syria.

Perhaps Turkey has seen that with a change in tone it could now enjoy the backing of the EU, the US and even Russia in its stance as a new regional leader. Its nearest competitor, Iran, would never be able to gain such support, with conceivably the exception of Russia. That being said, Turkey is by no means aiming to blindside Iranian relations. Turkish and Persian relations have been steadily building over the past two or three years, with Turkey maintaining close economic ties with Iran, notably in the energy sector.

Turkey’s role as a mediator in the 2010 nuclear swap deal with Iran was a clear demonstration of Turkey’s ability to play a significant part in affairs of the region and sets a precedent for its inclusion into the stagnant Middle East Peace Process. Turkish prowess in mediatory roles was also showcased in talks between Israel and Syria back in 2008. However, Syria is increasingly becoming a thorn complicating Turkeys relations with Iran and other Arab countries.

Turkey’s Evolving Positions

The other factor pushing Turkey to the fore in the Middle East is the loss of credibility in other Arab nations such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. These countries previously held a strong position in regional affairs, but the Arab Spring, and the reasons that led to it, has taken its toll on their standing. Egypt is still coming to grips with the change in its internal circumstances and Saudi Arabia is trying to balance turmoil on its borders with Yemen as well as unrest in Bahrain with its own civil unrest.

This month’s meeting of the Libyan Transitional National Council (TNC) in Istanbul sends another message of Turkish dominance in Middle Eastern affairs. It also signifies Turkey’s stepping more into line with the NATO alliance and their actions in Libya. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu officially recognized the rebel government in Libya and pledged $200mn in aid during a trip to the rebel stronghold of Benghazi last Sunday. “Gaddafi should leave power and a genuine political change based on the demands and aspirations of the Libyan people should be realized,” Davutoglu said during the trip. “The unity of Libya must be protected.” The recognition comes just one day after the Turkish government announced it is closing down its embassy in the Libyan capital Tripoli.

Compare the above statements to the ones Turkish leaders made towards the start of the Libyan crisis: “Reporters have been asking me whether or not NATO should intervene in Libya. It is such nonsense. What does NATO have to do with Libya? NATO’s intervention in Libya is out of the question. We are against such a thing,” Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had stated while delivering a speech to the Turkish-German Economy Congress in Hanover, Germany.

When the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on Libya in February, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has stated, “Sanctions, an intervention, would force the Libyan people, who are already up against hunger and violence, into a more desperate situation. We call on the international community to act with conscience, justice, laws and universal humane values – not out of oil concerns.”

On Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) intervention in Bahrain Turkish PM Erdogan had said it could not be termed as foreign intrusion since it is a regional task force that is recognized internationally. On the other hand, speaking on the Middle East revolt, Erdogan had earlier stated that the Arab leaders need to realize that they can’t suppress the demand for change through violence or force.

Neo-Ottoman Ambitions

While Ankara is very keen to give off the impression of a benevolent benefactor, its growing presence in the region is not without concern for many Arab countries, suspecting a rise in neo-Ottoman ambitions. It important to note that so far Turkey has sided with the protesters in Egypt, Libya and Syria while it has backed the Saudi led GC intervention in Bahrain. The Iranians would have certainly noted this inconsistency.

In this vein there have been rumors of closed-door talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu just concluded a visit to Saudi Arab followed by a surprise trip to Tehran. Turkey certainly appears to be domineering the affairs of Middle East and North Africa. Three important US Senators John McCain, Lindsey Graham and Joseph Lieberman recently conveyed to the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that only Turkey can persuade the Palestinian group Hamas to participate in peace negotiations with Israel.

On the other hand, Iran appears to be strengthening its role in the affairs of Afghanistan, which must be of great concern to the Saudi’s. President Ahmadinejad of Iran, Zardari of Pakistan and Karzai of Afghanistan shared the stage with Al-Bashir of Sudan, Rahmon of Tajikistan and Talabani of Iraq last month for the “anti terror” conference in Tehran to discuss how they would react when the US and NATO withdraw from Afghanistan. In a trilateral meeting between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan, the leaders of these three countries discussed a number of issues that may arise after the West exits Afghanistan. All three seemed determined to take matters into their own hands and exercise their sovereignty to boost cultural, political and economic cooperation.

As the US starts to withdraw forces from Iraq and Afghanistan and initiates negotiations on the Status of Forces Agreements with these countries, the irredentist claims presented by the Kurds, Pastuns and Baluchs are likely to escalate. These claims present an opportunity to keep the regional powers off balance.

PoliTact intends to closely monitor the Turkish response to the changing situation in the Middle East, especially as it pertains to the conflicts in Libya and Syria, as these two dynamics and Turkish involvement therein will give clues to how the new Middle East balance of power will evolve.

The post The Evolving Role of Turkey in the Middle East and the Arab and Persian Response appeared first on Politact.

Context

Tensions between Kabul and Islamabad flared up Wednesday after Pakistani PM Gillani phoned Afghan President Karzai to express “serious concerns” over cross-border attacks and demand a quick end to such raids. The move comes as hundreds of Afghan militants launched fresh attacks on Wednesday in the Upper Dir area along the Pak-Afghan border. Meanwhile, Afghan officials said at least 78 people were killed on their side of the border on the same day in clashes between security forces and the Taliban in the province of Nuristan. Provincial Governor Jamaludin Badar said that the attackers came from Chitral in Pakistan. Both governments have been blaming one another for not containing the militants. Kabul also accuses Islamabad of launching rockets into its territory.

The post Cross-Border Attacks Raising Tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan appeared first on Politact.