By Arif Ansar

Context

In the aftermath of the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021—formalized through the Doha Accords of 2020—South Asia has entered an entirely new and volatile phase. The Taliban’s return to power, their continued lack of international recognition, and the deepening conflict along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border have collectively reshaped the region’s geopolitical contours. What once was envisaged as an American “peace deal” has since evolved into a crucible of power rivalries, ideological contestations, and security dilemmas extending far beyond Kabul.

Amid this changing landscape, Washington finds itself confronting an old question in a new era: What strategic interests does the United States still have at stake in Afghanistan? This question gained renewed urgency after the tragic shooting near the White House on the eve of Thanksgiving in 2025, when Rahmanullah Lakanwal—a former Afghan supporter of U.S. forces who immigrated under the Protect America Operation—opened fire, killing two National Guard members. The attack, still under investigation, reignited the debate about the consequences of U.S. disengagement from Afghanistan and the enduring ripple effects of America’s two-decade military presence.

To assess these evolving dynamics, The Middle East Institute (MEI) collaborated with PoliTact to host a Webinar in November last year to explore these aspects centered around the evolving situation of Afghanistan and if merits a fresh policy and approach. Earlier in May, soon after the four-day conflict between Pakistan and India, MEI also conducted a discussion with regional experts to assess President Trump’s policy towards Taliban. Both discussions were moderated by Dr. Marvin Weibnbaum, the Director of Afghanistan-Pakistan Center.

Through these deliberations, a sobering consensus emerged: the U.S. has abandoned its nation-building ambition, replacing it with a strictly transactional and selective engagement guided by short-term counterterrorism and strategic interests. This shift marks a watershed in South Asian geopolitics—one in which regional powers like Pakistan, India, China, and Russia are recalibrating alliances, while the Taliban’s regime struggles to define its sovereignty amid growing internal fractures and international isolation.

Counterterrorism and Pragmatism

According to panelists such as Joshua White and David Sedney, Washington’s current strategy toward South Asia is driven not by ideology or doctrine but by political expediency. The United States, still wary of being drawn into another endless conflict, now prefers “quick interventions that can be framed as political wins” without the burden of prolonged commitments. At the heart of this approach lies counterterrorism (CT)—the only enduring U.S. interest in Afghanistan. The Taliban, Washington, and Pakistan paradoxically, share a common adversary: the Islamic State–Khorasan Province (ISKP). While formal cooperation remains limited, intelligence coordination to prevent ISKP attacks has emerged as a rare channel of pragmatic engagement. Adjunct Professor at George Town University, Doug London, underscored this convergence, observing that neither Washington nor the Taliban can afford an al-Qaeda-style attack “with fingerprints all over Afghanistan.” Thus, even hostile actors find themselves bound by mutual survival instincts.

Another dimension of U.S. engagement is transactional diplomacy—a pragmatic mechanism aimed at resolving targeted issues such as hostage recovery and retrieval of left-behind military assets. As former Afghan ambassador Javid Ahmad explained, these dealings often blur ethical lines; American captives have been freed in exchange for concessions, including the removal of Haqqani Network bounties. Similarly, billions of dollars’ worth of infrastructure and equipment left during the withdrawal remain part of simmering behind-the-scenes negotiations—either to buy back through intermediaries like Pakistan or to ensure their destruction to prevent exploitation.

Pakistan’s position in this matrix is particularly complex. While the U.S. remains a visible interlocutor, Islamabad’s deepest strategic alignment continues to be with China. Pakistan leverages Washington’s engagement as a counterbalance against overreliance on Beijing. According to the panelists, efforts to “reset” U.S.-Pakistan relations on the basis of trade, minerals, and counterterrorism cooperation may refresh dialogue but are unlikely to override hard security realities.

Human Rights and the Counterterrorism Dilemma

The Taliban’s domestic policies, particularly toward women and civil society, continue to complicate U.S. engagement. As Lisa Curtis observed, the regime has demonstrated “no change in policies” from its 1990s practices—the repression of women and stifling of dissent remain total. This poses a moral and strategic crisis for Washington: how to cooperate on counterterrorism while refusing to legitimize a regime that flagrantly violates human rights.

Curtis argued that sacrificing principles for intelligence access risks undermining long-term stability, as repression fuels extremism by creating ungoverned spaces ripe for recruitment. Yet London countered that, in practice, the U.S. often cooperates with regimes that commit abuses when it aligns with national interests, effectively separating human rights advocacy from realpolitik.

The delicate balance between moral credibility and strategic necessity defines Washington’s Afghan dilemma—where human rights concerns, while loudly voiced, often take a back seat to the imperatives of terrorism prevention.

The TTP Factor

When U.S. troops exited Afghanistan, many in Pakistan assumed the Taliban’s ascension would enhance Islamabad’s regional leverage. Instead, the opposite has occurred. The enduring ties between the Afghan Taliban and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have emerged as the central source of cross-border friction, destabilizing Pakistan more than any external actor.

Since the short but intense four-day war between Pakistan and India in May 2025, border skirmishes between the Taliban and Pakistani forces have intensified, reflecting a broader regional unraveling. Analysts such as Sedney describe these clashes as a subtext of the larger India-Pakistan rivalry, with each side using Afghan soil as a pressure valve for strategic signaling. Yet a full-scale Taliban-Pakistan war remains improbable. Pakistan’s military, with its overwhelming technological and nuclear superiority, could decimate Taliban forces—but at the risk of provoking a drawn-out insurgency it cannot control. The Taliban, aware of this asymmetry, prefer hybrid tactics, allowing the TTP to wage low-intensity proxy warfare inside Pakistan.

The Taliban dismiss Islamabad’s demands to curb the TTP, calling it a “domestic problem”. This refusal underscores their ideological kinship and the shared ambition to see Pakistan’s border tribal belt revert to Taliban-style Sharia governance. Ahmad warned that this dynamic is perilous: the TTP’s suicide battalions possess the capacity to incite urban terror within Pakistan, amplifying the country’s internal vulnerabilities.

Behind these clashes lies a larger ideological project—the Taliban’s belief, shared by TTP hardliners, that regional power is shifting back to the “Islamic Emirate” model. Sedney noted that radical circles envision a future, within a generation, where Pakistan and even India could see Taliban-like movements ascend. Whether delusional or strategic, this belief animates the persistence of militancy and shapes Islamabad’s deepening anxiety.

US Leverages and Pakistan’s Regime Change Dilemma

The question of whether the U.S. or Pakistan can leverage internal Taliban factionalism looms large. Within the movement, a pragmatic Haqqani network faction favors economic engagement and limited U.S. cooperation, while the isolationist Kandahar faction, led by Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada, rejects dependency and seeks autonomy. Although tensions exist, Akhundzada maintains ultimate control, preventing visible fragmentation that might invite civil war. For Pakistan, frustration with the Taliban’s defiance has sparked talk of supporting Afghan resistance groups. Yet Ahmad warns this path is fraught: funding insurgency would demand resources, while the disunited Afghan opposition lacks both cohesion and stamina.

Consequently, Islamabad’s strategy has shifted from influence to contingency—exploiting Taliban divisions when advantageous, but no longer betting on a “friendly” Kabul. As White put it, the myth of a compliant, pro-Pakistan “Pashtun leadership” in Afghanistan has always been just that—a myth. This reality has spurred a profound shift in mindset within Pakistan’s government. No longer divided between the “good Taliban” and “bad Taliban,” Islamabad increasingly sees a spectrum of “bad and worse Taliban.”

At an event held at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in February, 2022, the Special Representative for Afghanistan at the time, Tom West, had discussed the economic leverages US still holds and commented that Afghan Taliban has shown the least interest in future cooperation with the US in fulling the terms of their side of the Doha Accord. At the same time, West noted that US is not supporting any opposition to Afghan Taliban and is advising other nations to refrain from that, but some will do that sooner or later if Taliban does not show urgency. Answering a question, he commented that many players are realizing that not having US engagement in Afghanistan is not in their interest.

Regional Rivalries and Great Power Calculus

Beyond the Pakistan-Taliban binary, regional power competition has turned Afghanistan into a geopolitical chessboard once again. None of the major powers—China, Russia, India, or the U.S.—wants a total state collapse, yet each pursues a distinct agenda. India, for its part, has pivoted sharply. As Curtis noted, New Delhi is now actively courting elements within the Taliban to undermine Pakistan’s influence. The May 2025 conflict with Pakistan demonstrated India’s willingness to strike deep into Pakistani territory, signaling a readiness to rewrite the traditional escalation playbook.

Meanwhile, China and Russia tread cautiously. For Beijing, the overriding concern is protecting multibillion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) investments from militant spillover. Russia, despite its history of confrontation with Islamist movements, maintains unpublicized CT cooperation with the Taliban to prevent ISKP’s expansion into Central Asia. Trump’s renewed engagement with Central Asian leaders under the “C5+1 initiative”—focused on strategic minerals—has further rattled Moscow and Beijing, who view it as U.S. encroachment upon their regional sphere of influence.

Panelists such as White and Karp noted that China now holds more extensive economic leverage in both Pakistan and Afghanistan than any other actor. Despite attempts to mediate between them, Beijing’s balancing efforts have faltered. Nonetheless, economic interdependence has rendered China an unwilling stakeholder in both states’ stability.

For the Taliban, the Great Power rivalry offers an opportunity. In an assessment, PoliTact noted last year: “As Afghan Taliban celebrate 4^th year in power, the nation now finds itself at a crossroads of competing currents. The net effect is a cautious, multi-prong stance: keep Iranian channels open for trade and energy, nurture Indian economic alternatives through Chabahar, avoid burning bridges with Pakistan as it courts Washington, and remain pragmatically receptive to Chinese infrastructure where it serves Afghan interests.”

Javid Ahmad observed, the regime seeks “economic neutrality,” extracting benefits from all sides while avoiding puppeteering by any. Pragmatic factions engage Russia and China for investment; hardliners in Kandahar, wary of foreign intentions, prefer cautious distance. This balancing act defines Kabul’s foreign policy—a tactical survival strategy that keeps all powers interested, but none dominant.

Containment Over Resolution: The U.S. Strategic Dilemma

Dr. Weinbaum summarized the prevailing expert view succinctly: “There is no military solution to the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict—only conflict management.” After decades of direct engagement, the U.S. now acts as a remote balancer, occasionally intervening diplomatically but avoiding deep entanglement. Washington’s immediate goal is not victory, but containment: preventing Afghanistan’s collapse while denying extremist sanctuaries the freedom to orchestrate global terror. This means sustaining aid and limited engagement but conditioning every form of support on verifiable security behavior.

Panelists urged regional coordination involving China, Turkey, and Qatar, whose economic leverage could pressure the Taliban to restrain the TTP. However, as Karp pointed out, both Turkey and Qatar’s favoritism toward Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated movements complicates their credibility as neutral mediators.

Ahmad cautioned that the U.S. must abandon the pursuit of ideological “unicorns” and embrace pragmatic realpolitik—dealing with actors as they are, not as Washington wishes them to be. The mantra, he argued, should be “leverage first, ideals later.” Delayed engagement only increases risks of ungoverned chaos, but overreaction could trap the U.S. in another open-ended quagmire.

The Perpetual Balancing Act

As of 2025, U.S. policy in South Asia has evolved into a delicate balancing act—a calculated choreography between engagement and restraint. America’s current presence is limited but consequential: intelligence links, sporadic negotiations, and cautious cooperation with regional allies. Yet looming questions remain. If Afghanistan once again becomes a safe haven for transnational terrorist networks, what tools does Washington have to respond? Under Trump’s renewed mandate, analysts predict the U.S. would double down on counterterrorism partnerships—especially with Pakistan and India—to prevent another 9/11-style surprise.

However, as India’s outreach to the Taliban deepens, it risks entrenching the very militant alignments that destabilize Pakistan and jeopardize U.S.-Pakistan rapprochement. Such dynamics may inadvertently revive the ideological monster once defeated by the War on Terror. Moreover, the Taliban’s tacit encouragement of TTP demands—such as reversing Pakistan’s merger of tribal areas and enforcing Sharia law—threatens to seed an insurgent domino effect. This could erode Islamabad’s internal cohesion and ripple across borders, complicating U.S. peace efforts from Gaza to Central Asia. Trump’s Taliban policy would require broader public ownership of Pakistan’s CT strategy and preventing the budding India-Afghan ties from destabilizing Pakistan and the rejuvenated US-Pakistan ties.

Related Articles:

The Unbroken Alliance: Why the Afghan Taliban-TTP Nexus Is Dooming Peace with Pakistan – Nov 4, 2025
The Fragile Truce Between Pakistan And Afghanistan And The War Of Narratives – Nov 2, 2025
Afghanistan’s Strategic Outlook And New Geopolitical Realities – Aug 18, 2025
Afghanistan, Pakistan Relations and Great Power Rivalry – Jul 21, 2025
Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions, Trump, And Wakhan Corridor – Feb 3, 2025
Political Or Military Solution; Pakistan’s New Counter-Terrorism Operation Azm-e-Istehkam – Aug 1, 2024
Convergences in US Pakistan Ties and Afghanistan – Jan 1, 2024
Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP – Feb 22, 2023
Post Withdrawal Campaign Against Extremism In Afghanistan And US-Pakistan Relations – Sep 7, 2022
Emerging US Policy Towards Afghanistan After Withdrawal – March 2, 2022
Recalibrating The US-Pakistan Partnership In Afghanistan – Jun 22, 2021
US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden – Mar 2, 2021

The post The Future Of Afghan Taliban-Pakistan Conflict: Implications For Regional Stability And US Interests appeared first on Politact.

PoliTact’s Issue Brief

By Naade Ali

Context

After several rounds of intensive negotiations mediated by Qatar and Türkiye, Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to extend their ceasefire despite failing to achieve a major breakthrough. The decision followed a series of fierce cross-border clashes that caused heavy casualties on both sides. According to Türkiye’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, both countries also consented to establish a monitoring and verification mechanism to ensure the ceasefire’s implementation and to penalize any violations.

The latest round of talks in Istanbul followed the initial negotiations held in Doha, where Islamabad and Kabul first agreed to an immediate ceasefire and the creation of frameworks to consolidate peace and stability. During the Doha meeting, Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif and Afghanistan’s Acting Defense Minister Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob Mujahid signed a bilateral agreement prohibiting either country’s forces from targeting the other’s military, civilians, or critical infrastructure, while pledging mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Analysis

Throughout the negotiation process, several details have surfaced that expose the deep-seated fault lines underpinning the conflict between the two neighbors. Although cross-border hostilities have paused, a “war of narratives” has emerged in the aftermath of the Istanbul talks, with both Kabul and Islamabad accusing each other of distorting facts. Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid accused Pakistan’s military of fueling instability to pave the way for a U.S. return to Bagram Air Base, claiming Islamabad’s actions aim to create chaos. He said the Taliban do not trust Pakistan’s assurances of peaceful relations, adding that Pakistan’s demand for the Taliban to prevent militant attacks inside its territory was unrealistic. Mujahid also criticized Pakistan’s defense minister for making “threatening remarks” during the Istanbul talks, warning that “Afghans should never be spoken to in the language of threats.”

The principal point of contention remains the two sides’ differing perceptions of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which Islamabad designates as a terrorist organization and refers to as Fitna al-Khawarij—“deviant rebels sowing chaos.” Mujahid denied the presence of TTP leaders in Afghanistan, asserting that those identified by Pakistan were merely “Pakistani refugees” returning home. The Afghan side even offered to facilitate their repatriation, a claim Pakistan dismissed as deliberately distorted. Pakistan’s Information Ministry clarified that Islamabad had demanded action against militants operating from Afghan soil and, when Kabul insisted those individuals were Pakistani nationals, proposed that they be handed over via designated border posts.

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s Foreign Office stated that the Taliban regime had effectively admitted the presence of TTP and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan, offering various justifications for not taking action against them. In a separate statement, Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif accused the Taliban regime of “treacherous and barbaric patronization of India-sponsored terrorism,” asserting that Pakistan harbored “no illusions” about Kabul’s intentions. Asif described the Taliban government as non-representative, deeply divided, and repressive toward Afghanistan’s ethnic minorities, women, and civil society. Amid these tensions, Pakistan is seeking a binding written agreement conditioning its cooperation on the Taliban’s commitment to prevent TTP from using Afghan territory for attacks. Asif stated that lasting peace would require the Taliban to end its support for the TTP, enforce a long-term ceasefire, and facilitate the repatriation of Afghan refugees.

The Taliban, however, rejected Asif’s characterization, insisting that the TTP issue is an internal matter for Pakistan. Doubts persist over the durability of the ceasefire and its ability to address the entrenched mistrust between the two countries. Anti-Pakistan and anti-Afghanistan sentiment has increasingly become part of national discourse on both sides, rapidly translating into broader social polarization. The growing hostility suggests that the prospects for durable peace or a return to normalcy between Islamabad and Kabul remain distant.

The Future of Ceasefire

Highlighting the fragility of the deal, Khawaja Asif cautioned that its success depends on the Taliban’s capacity to restrain militants targeting Pakistan. “Anything coming from Afghanistan will be a violation of this agreement,” he said, defending Pakistan’s right to carry out cross-border strikes. “They are in Kabul. They are everywhere. Wherever they are, we will attack them. Kabul is not a no-go area.” Asif emphasized that the ceasefire applies only to the Afghan Taliban and does not extend to the TTP, reaffirming that Islamabad will not negotiate with the group.

In response to Pakistan’s repeated threats of cross-border action, the Taliban have issued a strong warning through Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, asserting that Afghanistan would not tolerate any violation of its sovereignty. Haqqani cautioned that any aggression or incursion by Pakistan would be met with firm resistance, declaring, “If anyone attacks or invades our country, we will defend it. Our history speaks volumes about how Afghanistan has dealt with aggressors.” His remarks reflected the Taliban’s growing frustration over Islamabad’s rhetoric and underscored Kabul’s resolve to respond militarily if Pakistan carries out further strikes inside Afghan territory

Against this backdrop, it is unlikely that the agreement will substantially resolve Pakistan’s growing terrorism challenge. While ongoing tensions between the two countries offer no clear advantage to either side, they continue to hinder development and progress. Before the escalation, there were hopes that Afghanistan might participate in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Such economic interdependence, following the Chinese model, could have created a win-win scenario, reducing the likelihood of conflict and fostering regional collaboration. However, that prospect now appears increasingly remote.

As Pakistan enters Phase Two of CPEC and the U.S. begins investing in its critical minerals sector, Islamabad cannot afford to let terrorism persist. The Pakistani military faces mounting pressure from China, whose personnel and infrastructure have already come under attack. If any such incident were to occur with American ventures, it would have severe repercussions for Pakistan’s security apparatus and its relations with Washington. Hence, countering terrorism has become a top priority for the Pakistani military, which aims to ensure a secure environment for foreign investors in the country’s vast mineral resources.

The current ceasefire with Afghanistan is viewed as Pakistan’s last opportunity to compel the Afghan Taliban to reconsider their stance toward the TTP. However, if the Taliban fail to act, the situation could deteriorate further. The prospect of a wider Pakistan-Afghanistan confrontation cannot be ruled out, particularly as Kabul and New Delhi draw closer. India has recently upgraded its technical mission in Kabul to a full embassy, and last year, Indian Minister of External Affairs J.P. Singh held a landmark meeting with Taliban Defense Minister Mullah Yaqoob, who expressed hopes for enhanced defense ties with India.

Islamabad is concerned that the warming diplomatic relations between India and Afghanistan could evolve into security cooperation, extending Pakistan’s threat landscape. Pakistan has accused India of waging a low-intensity proxy war through Afghanistan, alleging that New Delhi aims to keep Islamabad preoccupied on both its eastern and western fronts.

Nonetheless, these developments reflect Islamabad’s deepening insecurity and impatience toward Kabul and raise the possibility that any India-Afghanistan defense cooperation could be perceived by Islamabad as a direct threat to its own security, potentially drawing the two countries into a broader conflict. Without addressing these core issues, any ceasefire will remain fragile, and true peace between the two neighbors, crucial to regional stability, will remain out of reach.

Related Articles:

Afghanistan’s Strategic Outlook And New Geopolitical Realities – Aug 18, 2025
Afghanistan, Pakistan Relations and Great Power Rivalry – Jul 21, 2025
Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions, Trump, And Wakhan Corridor – Feb 3, 2025
Political Or Military Solution; Pakistan’s New Counter-Terrorism Operation Azm-e-Istehkam – Aug 1, 2024
Convergences in US Pakistan Ties and Afghanistan – Jan 1, 2024
Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP – Feb 22, 2023
Post Withdrawal Campaign Against Extremism In Afghanistan And US-Pakistan Relations – Sep 7, 2022
Emerging US Policy Towards Afghanistan After Withdrawal – March 2, 2022
Recalibrating The US-Pakistan Partnership In Afghanistan – Jun 22, 2021
US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden – Mar 2, 2021

The post The Fragile Truce Between Pakistan And Afghanistan And The War Of Narratives appeared first on Politact.