PoliTact’s Analysis of Perceptions and Perspectives

With inputs from Naade Ali and Arif Ansar

Context

Since the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan in August 2021, there was a perception the installation of Afghan Taliban in Kabul will make Pakistan’s regional influence grow. However, Afghan Taliban-TTP nexus continues to bedevil the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) remains the central source of friction and a key driver of the persistent cross-border violence. There is no indication that the group has endorsed the ceasefire reached in Istanbul; its ongoing attacks suggest that it remains active despite the interstate truce. The next round of talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan are scheduled for November 6 in Istanbul.

Islamabad accuses the Afghan Taliban of providing support and sanctuary to the TTP, designated as a terror group by both UN and the U.S., while Kabul dismisses these allegations. Qatar and Turkey are closely observing the ceasefire, marking their first substantive involvement in mediating between Islamabad and Kabul after previous efforts—including those led by China—failed to achieve meaningful results. While the agreement commits Pakistan to refrain from launching strikes inside Afghanistan, it does not neutralize the TTP threat. Under the deal, Pakistan is expected to avoid cross-border operations but retains the right to target TTP militants attempting to infiltrate its territory.

For the Afghan Taliban, the ceasefire offers a degree of peace and reduces the risk of cross-border strikes. However, relinquishing support for the TTP is not a decision that rests with any single Taliban leader, not even the defense minister. The authority to determine the Taliban’s stance toward the TTP lies solely with their Supreme Leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada. There have been no reports to date indicating that he has issued any directive against the group. Although the ceasefire may temporarily pause the infiltration of TTP militants from Afghanistan into Pakistan, it could simultaneously prompt the group’s factions within Pakistan to become more active, fighting independently in the absence of reinforcement from their Afghan counterparts.

Why do Afghan Taliban Support TTP?

The Afghan Taliban’s support for the TTP stems from their shared combat experience, religious ideology, and tribal ties. The TTP’s leadership has sworn allegiance to the Taliban’s Supreme Leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, granting the group significant autonomy to operate without interference from the Kabul-based Taliban faction.

This arrangement allows the TTP to pursue strategic and geopolitical objectives on behalf of the Taliban, such as challenging Pakistan’s control over territories beyond the Durand Line, which the Taliban considers part of Afghanistan. The Durand Line, a colonial-era border, remains a contentious issue, as the Afghan Taliban rejects its legitimacy, fueling tensions with Pakistan. Despite the recent Afghanistan-Pakistan agreement emphasizing mutual respect for territorial integrity, ambiguity persists regarding both sides’ interpretations of their sovereign boundaries.

Afghanistan’s Defense Minister, Mullah Yaqoob Mujahid, recently described the Durand line as an “imaginary border”, reinforcing the impression that the Afghan Taliban do not consider it a legitimate border. Similarly, the Deputy Interior Minister Nabi Omari expressed hopes of reclaiming “Afghanistan’s old lands” currently under Pakistani control, stating, “By Allah’s will, this land will return to us.”

It is important to note that, unlike the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP), which directly challenges Taliban rule, the TTP does not pose an immediate threat. Instead, it contributes to the Taliban-led Afghan economy by purchasing weapons and sharing profits from smuggling, extortion, and other illicit activities, making the TTP a significant stakeholder in Afghanistan’s economy. In fact, TTP also acts as a Taliban ally against ISKP.

While Al Qaeda (AQ) presence in Afghanistan has significantly diminished, the most significant evidence of continued ties with the Taliban was the U.S. drone strike that killed Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahri in July 2022 in a safe house in Kabul. In the February 2020 Doha Agreement with the U.S., the Taliban pledged to prevent international terrorist groups, including AQ, from using Afghan territory to threaten the U.S. and its allies. However, evidence strongly suggests the Taliban leadership has violated this pledge.

Disarming these battle-hardened TTP militants, who lack alternative livelihoods due to their combat-focused skill set, appears to be a costly and complex endeavor for the Afghan Taliban. Fully integrating them into Afghan security forces could also undermine the Taliban’s public denials of supporting the TTP and risk internal discord.

The present circumstances suggest that the Taliban have chosen to continue supporting the TTP, enabling them to focus on external rather than internal operations. Moreover, by continuing this backing, raises serious questions about the Taliban motivations and world view. Irrespective, this risky strategy jeopardizes the Taliban’s pursuit of international recognition and complicates their relations with Pakistan.

The Key Demands of TTP

While the TTP’s focus has tactically shifted over the years (for instance, limiting attacks on civilians after 2018), their fundamental goal remains the enforcement of their interpretation of Sharia and the withdrawal of the state’s writ from Pakistan’s merged tribal areas. Based on their stated objectives presented during past negotiations, the key demands of the TTP include:

1. Implementation of Sharia

The TTP’s long-term goal is the establishment of a state based on its own strict interpretation of Islamic law (Sharia), mirroring the system of the Afghan Taliban.

2. Restoring Autonomy and Demilitarization

The TTP demands the reversal of the 2018 constitutional amendment that merged the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) into Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. The TTP seeks to restore the semi-autonomous or independent status of these tribal regions.

A frequent demand is the complete withdrawal of the Pakistani military and security forces from the tribal belt (the former FATA and surrounding regions), allowing the TTP to establish control and implement its own governance system.

3. Prisoner and Amnesty Demands

The TTP consistently demands the release of all its imprisoned members and commanders held by Pakistani authorities. This has often been a precondition for engaging in ceasefires or peace talks. The group demands full amnesty for its fighters who have committed acts of terror against the Pakistani state and its citizens.

Pakistan’s Evolving Policy Towards Afghan Taliban and TTP

Pakistan has long tried to convince Afghan Taliban to act against the TTP. While Afghan Taliban offered to facilitate talks between TTP and Pakistan and relocate it from the border regions – it has restrained from taking any serious actions against it. Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) led government had sought Afghan Taliban assistance in pacifying TTP, resulting in a ceasefire that fell apart in November 2022 – and resumption of TTP attacks against Pakistan. The TTP demands related to release of prisoners were also met to some extent. On the other hand, their requirements of decreasing the number of security forces in FATA – and rescinding of FATA merger are more complicated.

The situation now seems different. By conducting military strikes in Afghanistan and killing dozens of Taliban fighters, Islamabad has set a new precedent, signaling that the Afghans must face consequences for supporting its enemies. Though, Pakistan’s carrot-and-stick strategy was designed to change the Taliban cost-benefit calculus, forcing them to choose between Pakistan or TTP. To date, the Afghan Taliban have chosen the latter, a course they may continue to follow, as tensions with Islamabad neither threaten their domestic control nor hinder their growing engagement with other regional actors, including India.

The Taliban has yet to craft an effective framework to regulate the TTP, restrict its autonomy, or halt its cross-border operations. Instead, growing friction with Pakistan has only deepened the alignment between the two. Afghan Deputy Minister of Interior Affairs, Mawlawi Muhammad Nabi Omari, was reported to have issued a stark warning to Pakistan, stating that if Afghan tribes and the nation declare Pakistan an invader by religious decree, “by God, you will not find safety even up to the Indian border.”

These anti-Pakistan sentiments cast doubts about the Afghan Taliban intentions. The combined pride of the Afghan Taliban and TTP in their perceived triumphs over major powers like the U.S. and NATO, and in reclaiming Afghanistan after decades of war, reinforces their determination and stubbornness.

Afghan Taliban support alone does not fully explain the TTP’s survival and expansion. A significant portion of its fighters are disenfranchised and radicalized youth from Pakistan’s impoverished regions, particularly Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. In a security briefing to KP lawmakers, the provincial police chief once revealed that around 4,000 militants, including 35% Afghan nationals, were operating in the province, often blending in with civilians by day and carrying out attacks at night.

A belief reportedly exists within the TTP that, with support from local tribes, it can seize Pakistani territory by force and eventually transform from a non-state actor into a legitimate state actor, like their Afghan counterpart. This perception boosts the morale of its fighters and encourages the group’s continued expansion. These characteristics truly indicate that TTP aspires for a space from where Afghan Taliban can extend their reach.

Pakistan’s security establishment accuses India of using Afghanistan as a base for launching terror operations against Pakistan – and the availability of modern weapons in Afghanistan has enhanced militants’ capabilities. At the same time, the military recognizes that Pakistan’s terrorism problem is not purely external but also internally facilitated. In his recent remarks, Pakistan Army Chief urged Kabul to prioritize mutual security over ongoing violence, calling on the Afghan Taliban regime to “rein in the proxies who have sanctuaries in Afghanistan.”

An Alliance of Ideology vs. State Necessity

The current crisis surrounding the ceasefire reveals a fundamental and seemingly unresolvable conflict: while Pakistan demands the Afghan Taliban choose state necessity (diplomatic recognition and regional trade) over ideological loyalty, the leadership in Kabul has consistently chosen the latter.

The TTP is more than just an operational proxy; it is a vital ideological ally and an economic stakeholder that reinforces the Afghan Taliban’s own anti-state identity and vision for a borderless Islamic Emirate. Pakistan’s previous posture of limited intervention in Afghanistan, coupled with the TTP’s growing recruitment base among disenfranchised Pakistani youth, means that Islamabad’s carrot-and-stick strategy has failed to alter the Taliban’s calculus.

While the Pakistani government has previously pursued political solutions, the TTP’s extremist demands and uncompromising approach have rendered sustained negotiations nearly impossible. The current strategic pivot toward a military approach—which carries the inherent risk of seeking regime change in Afghanistan—is equally unlikely to yield a long-term roadmap. For any military pressure to be effective, it must be integrated with political steps that foster public ownership and address long-held local grievances. This sophisticated, multi-pronged strategy offers the best chance to definitively dismantle the Taliban-TTP nexus.

Any attempt at regime change is heavily contingent upon securing the explicit support of key regional players, most notably China. A full-scale war directly jeopardizes substantial Chinese investments, particularly those under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and risks creating a dangerous new front amid Pakistan’s ongoing tensions with India. Furthermore, escalating border conflicts are likely to severely complicate the recent reset in U.S.-Pakistan relations, which is premised on cooperation in trade, strategic minerals, and technology.

Internationally, being mired in internal and border conflicts would significantly erode Pakistan’s capacity to play a credible regional role, hindering its ability to support allies like Saudi Arabia or contribute to broader stability efforts, such as a Gaza peace plan. Even with powerful backing from both China and the U.S., attempting to alter the ethnic balance of power within Afghanistan remains an extremely high-risk gamble that could easily spiral into a prolonged, devastating civil war.

In the absence of a truly sophisticated methodology—one that moves beyond binary military or political options—Pakistan risks becoming entangled in a protracted proxy guerrilla warfare within an era of escalating great power rivalry. The recent Istanbul ceasefire, therefore, provides only a temporary and fragile pause. This strategic impasse casts a long, enduring shadow over the future of South Asian security.

Related Articles:

The Fragile Truce Between Pakistan And Afghanistan And The War Of Narratives – Nov 2, 2025
Afghanistan’s Strategic Outlook And New Geopolitical Realities – Aug 18, 2025
Afghanistan, Pakistan Relations and Great Power Rivalry – Jul 21, 2025
Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions, Trump, And Wakhan Corridor – Feb 3, 2025
Political Or Military Solution; Pakistan’s New Counter-Terrorism Operation Azm-e-Istehkam – Aug 1, 2024
Convergences in US Pakistan Ties and Afghanistan – Jan 1, 2024
Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP – Feb 22, 2023
Post Withdrawal Campaign Against Extremism In Afghanistan And US-Pakistan Relations – Sep 7, 2022
Emerging US Policy Towards Afghanistan After Withdrawal – March 2, 2022
Recalibrating The US-Pakistan Partnership In Afghanistan – Jun 22, 2021
US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden – Mar 2, 2021

The post The Unbroken Alliance: Why the Afghan Taliban-TTP Nexus Is Dooming Peace with Pakistan appeared first on Politact.

PoliTact’s Issue Brief

By Naade Ali

Context

After several rounds of intensive negotiations mediated by Qatar and Türkiye, Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to extend their ceasefire despite failing to achieve a major breakthrough. The decision followed a series of fierce cross-border clashes that caused heavy casualties on both sides. According to Türkiye’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, both countries also consented to establish a monitoring and verification mechanism to ensure the ceasefire’s implementation and to penalize any violations.

The latest round of talks in Istanbul followed the initial negotiations held in Doha, where Islamabad and Kabul first agreed to an immediate ceasefire and the creation of frameworks to consolidate peace and stability. During the Doha meeting, Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif and Afghanistan’s Acting Defense Minister Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob Mujahid signed a bilateral agreement prohibiting either country’s forces from targeting the other’s military, civilians, or critical infrastructure, while pledging mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Analysis

Throughout the negotiation process, several details have surfaced that expose the deep-seated fault lines underpinning the conflict between the two neighbors. Although cross-border hostilities have paused, a “war of narratives” has emerged in the aftermath of the Istanbul talks, with both Kabul and Islamabad accusing each other of distorting facts. Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid accused Pakistan’s military of fueling instability to pave the way for a U.S. return to Bagram Air Base, claiming Islamabad’s actions aim to create chaos. He said the Taliban do not trust Pakistan’s assurances of peaceful relations, adding that Pakistan’s demand for the Taliban to prevent militant attacks inside its territory was unrealistic. Mujahid also criticized Pakistan’s defense minister for making “threatening remarks” during the Istanbul talks, warning that “Afghans should never be spoken to in the language of threats.”

The principal point of contention remains the two sides’ differing perceptions of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which Islamabad designates as a terrorist organization and refers to as Fitna al-Khawarij—“deviant rebels sowing chaos.” Mujahid denied the presence of TTP leaders in Afghanistan, asserting that those identified by Pakistan were merely “Pakistani refugees” returning home. The Afghan side even offered to facilitate their repatriation, a claim Pakistan dismissed as deliberately distorted. Pakistan’s Information Ministry clarified that Islamabad had demanded action against militants operating from Afghan soil and, when Kabul insisted those individuals were Pakistani nationals, proposed that they be handed over via designated border posts.

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s Foreign Office stated that the Taliban regime had effectively admitted the presence of TTP and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan, offering various justifications for not taking action against them. In a separate statement, Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif accused the Taliban regime of “treacherous and barbaric patronization of India-sponsored terrorism,” asserting that Pakistan harbored “no illusions” about Kabul’s intentions. Asif described the Taliban government as non-representative, deeply divided, and repressive toward Afghanistan’s ethnic minorities, women, and civil society. Amid these tensions, Pakistan is seeking a binding written agreement conditioning its cooperation on the Taliban’s commitment to prevent TTP from using Afghan territory for attacks. Asif stated that lasting peace would require the Taliban to end its support for the TTP, enforce a long-term ceasefire, and facilitate the repatriation of Afghan refugees.

The Taliban, however, rejected Asif’s characterization, insisting that the TTP issue is an internal matter for Pakistan. Doubts persist over the durability of the ceasefire and its ability to address the entrenched mistrust between the two countries. Anti-Pakistan and anti-Afghanistan sentiment has increasingly become part of national discourse on both sides, rapidly translating into broader social polarization. The growing hostility suggests that the prospects for durable peace or a return to normalcy between Islamabad and Kabul remain distant.

The Future of Ceasefire

Highlighting the fragility of the deal, Khawaja Asif cautioned that its success depends on the Taliban’s capacity to restrain militants targeting Pakistan. “Anything coming from Afghanistan will be a violation of this agreement,” he said, defending Pakistan’s right to carry out cross-border strikes. “They are in Kabul. They are everywhere. Wherever they are, we will attack them. Kabul is not a no-go area.” Asif emphasized that the ceasefire applies only to the Afghan Taliban and does not extend to the TTP, reaffirming that Islamabad will not negotiate with the group.

In response to Pakistan’s repeated threats of cross-border action, the Taliban have issued a strong warning through Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, asserting that Afghanistan would not tolerate any violation of its sovereignty. Haqqani cautioned that any aggression or incursion by Pakistan would be met with firm resistance, declaring, “If anyone attacks or invades our country, we will defend it. Our history speaks volumes about how Afghanistan has dealt with aggressors.” His remarks reflected the Taliban’s growing frustration over Islamabad’s rhetoric and underscored Kabul’s resolve to respond militarily if Pakistan carries out further strikes inside Afghan territory

Against this backdrop, it is unlikely that the agreement will substantially resolve Pakistan’s growing terrorism challenge. While ongoing tensions between the two countries offer no clear advantage to either side, they continue to hinder development and progress. Before the escalation, there were hopes that Afghanistan might participate in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Such economic interdependence, following the Chinese model, could have created a win-win scenario, reducing the likelihood of conflict and fostering regional collaboration. However, that prospect now appears increasingly remote.

As Pakistan enters Phase Two of CPEC and the U.S. begins investing in its critical minerals sector, Islamabad cannot afford to let terrorism persist. The Pakistani military faces mounting pressure from China, whose personnel and infrastructure have already come under attack. If any such incident were to occur with American ventures, it would have severe repercussions for Pakistan’s security apparatus and its relations with Washington. Hence, countering terrorism has become a top priority for the Pakistani military, which aims to ensure a secure environment for foreign investors in the country’s vast mineral resources.

The current ceasefire with Afghanistan is viewed as Pakistan’s last opportunity to compel the Afghan Taliban to reconsider their stance toward the TTP. However, if the Taliban fail to act, the situation could deteriorate further. The prospect of a wider Pakistan-Afghanistan confrontation cannot be ruled out, particularly as Kabul and New Delhi draw closer. India has recently upgraded its technical mission in Kabul to a full embassy, and last year, Indian Minister of External Affairs J.P. Singh held a landmark meeting with Taliban Defense Minister Mullah Yaqoob, who expressed hopes for enhanced defense ties with India.

Islamabad is concerned that the warming diplomatic relations between India and Afghanistan could evolve into security cooperation, extending Pakistan’s threat landscape. Pakistan has accused India of waging a low-intensity proxy war through Afghanistan, alleging that New Delhi aims to keep Islamabad preoccupied on both its eastern and western fronts.

Nonetheless, these developments reflect Islamabad’s deepening insecurity and impatience toward Kabul and raise the possibility that any India-Afghanistan defense cooperation could be perceived by Islamabad as a direct threat to its own security, potentially drawing the two countries into a broader conflict. Without addressing these core issues, any ceasefire will remain fragile, and true peace between the two neighbors, crucial to regional stability, will remain out of reach.

Related Articles:

Afghanistan’s Strategic Outlook And New Geopolitical Realities – Aug 18, 2025
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Political Or Military Solution; Pakistan’s New Counter-Terrorism Operation Azm-e-Istehkam – Aug 1, 2024
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Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP – Feb 22, 2023
Post Withdrawal Campaign Against Extremism In Afghanistan And US-Pakistan Relations – Sep 7, 2022
Emerging US Policy Towards Afghanistan After Withdrawal – March 2, 2022
Recalibrating The US-Pakistan Partnership In Afghanistan – Jun 22, 2021
US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden – Mar 2, 2021

The post The Fragile Truce Between Pakistan And Afghanistan And The War Of Narratives appeared first on Politact.

The case of Raymond Davis is shrouded by complexity, no matter which angle one pursues. The incident has not only impacted the US-Pakistan relations but has also raised many questions related to diplomatic immunity and international law. Furthermore, the outcome of the event is likely to push US to evaluate its policy of using contractors to conduct government business. Nonetheless, at this crucial juncture of the Afghan war, both governments are searching for a face-saving exit.

The main pressure for US is to prevent another ‘Faisal Shahzad’ type attack in US, or Mumbai style incident in India, both of which had roots in Pakistan. In the aftermath of the devastating floods last year, the nations economic, social and political challenges are escalating. These difficulties are distracting it from taking on the extremists based on the American timeline. Additionally, there are questions regarding Pakistan’s strategic intent.

Meanwhile, mistrust between the two allies and their intelligence organizations, CIA and ISI, continue to grow. This article examines the evolution of overt and covert part of the war against terror in the region.

Analysis

Situation in Afghanistan, Pakistan Based Extremists And Mumbai Attack

The tactics and strategies related to fighting the war on terror evolved over time. It’s essential to consider the constant atmosphere of mistrust between US and Pakistan over each other’s intent in Afghanistan. Pakistan has remained concerned over not only Indian interference in Afghanistan, FATA and Baluchistan, but also with American attempt to build a strong strategic relationship with India. On the other hand, US continues to be wary of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), and the nation’s alliance with China.

It should be pointed out that former President Musharraf had for quite a while denied that extremists from Pakistan were involved in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s position at the time was that even if there was cross-border support, it was coming from Afghan Taliban and Afghan refugees based in the country, and not from its intelligence organization. On the other hand, Indian, Afghan, and Western officials widely blamed ISI for the worsening situation in Afghanistan, and contended that without out the elimination of extremist safe havens in FATA, situation in Afghanistan could not improve.

It was only in 2007 that Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) came in to being, representing an alliance of several other organizations. After the Red Mosque incident in late 2007, events took a turn for the worse and terrorist events spread across Pakistan, severely impacting its economy and the law and order situation of the country. The argument shifted from ‘there are no Pakistani’s involved in Afghanistan’ to if the country can on its own, and without foreign assistance, control the extremists responsible for the wave of terror in Pakistan.

Being a nuclear state, Pakistan could ill afford the negative publicity and the perception that extremists could take over its nuclear assets. Thus, it had to accept the offer of external assistance to manage American anxieties. However, all of this happened far from public knowledge or scrutiny of political leaders.

In late 2008, Mumbai attack definitively changed which groups had to be controlled by Pakistan. Subsequently, Kashmir related jihadi groups like Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) also got lumped in to the broader definition of extremist groups, posing threats not only to India, but increasingly to Europe and North America. Furthermore, other neighbors of Pakistan, Iran and China, have also periodically raised concerns, regarding extremist groups operating from Pakistan that have threatened the stability of these respective countries.

Boots On The Ground And Drones

Drone attacks were US response to Pakistan’s slow pace of action in FATA. US had contended that Pakistan’s military either did not have the will or the capability to act against the extremists based there. On the other hand, Pakistan claimed it lacked capablity to take on countrer-insurgency operations and seeked US military assistance.

Although drone attacks started during the rule of Mushharraf, he was emphatic about Pakistan’s policy of ‘no boots on the ground’. Most observers believe this to mean that no NATO or US troops were allowed to cross border from Afghanistan in to the Pakistani tribal areas, in hot pursuit kind of scenario. Questions related to violating the sovereignty of Pakistan were often quoted in this regard. Additionally, coalition forces do not have the UN mandate to operate outside of Afghanistan.

In the case of drone attacks, they are widely believed to be flying from inside of Pakistan and therefore the questions about ‘violation of sovereignty’ are minimized. At this point, the government of Pakistan is widely believed to be complicit in the drone attacks while it publicly criticizes it.

Once Musharraf departed and Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) led civilian government came in to power, and the typical approach to ‘boots on the ground’ changed. Instead, different tactics unfolded; if these ‘boots’ were already with in the country, then they do not have to come from across the border. They could be in the form of trainers or civilian contractors and thus eliminating the chances of public and political outcry, which could arise from the presence of American boots.

This method could not have been implemented without the approval of Pakistan’s government. However, the views of nations civilian, military, and bureaucratic leadership were likely divergent on how many people were allowed on the ground in Pakistan, and about the red lines. This eventually led to many of the visa problems that US personnel confronted and were widely discussed in the Pakistani media. Nonetheless, like the drone attacks, the public remained in the dark on the details.

Every time US crossed Pakistan’s red lines, the country reacted strongly. The most recent incident occurred on September 30th, 2010, when a NATO helicopter attacked a Pakistani check post in Kurram. The attack took place only a few days after rumors had surfaced regarding peace talks between warring factions in Kurram Agency. That helicopter attack eventually led to the temporary closure of the key supply lines for NATO forces in Afghanistan.

The Raymond Davis Incident And The Future

After careful deliberation, the Obama administration unveiled its new Afghan policy in early 2009, known by its controversial name, AfPak. The most noteworthy aspect of this review was the shift of US policy from military approach to a search for a political solution, with the emphasis on regionalism. There was recognition of the fact that the extremists were operating across borders and without regard to the nation-state classification, which the governments had to abide by.

To deal with the menace of extremism a two prong has been in works, one overt and the other covert. President Obama authorized to significantly increase the covert operations in Pakistan. Additionally, the New York Times disclosed in May 2010 that General Petraeus signed a secret order in late 2009, increasing secret operations to counter militants and other threats across the region. The order authorized Special Operations forces to operate in both allied and hostile nations in the Mideast, Central Asia and the Horn of Africa.

Although the Afghan policy remained a combination of both covert and overt operations, the Pakistan element has been largely covert. The public narrative of  some segments in Pakistan has consistently maintained that the larger goal of American boots in the country is to undermine it and ultimately neutralize the nuclear capability of the nation. As the country becomes consumed in self-survival, it would no longer be able to concentrate on Afghanistan. To counter this perception US approved $7.5 dollar under the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act.  However, it  has failed to make significant headway due mainly to the security situation in Pakistan and the continued mistrust between the two countries. Many of the USAID workers were delayed from arriving in Pakistan, as the ISI would not give Pakistan embassy in Washington the speedy clearances for issuing the visas. Ultimately, the civilian government in Pakistan found a work around to this issue, which by passed the stringent procedures.

From the point of view of the US, use of contractors offers the buffer of plausible deniability but does not protect the assets in the long-term. The incident would inevitable lead to increase scrutiny of American personnel all over the world and risks denting the integrity of American diplomats. At the same time, US would want to avoid the results of this event to serve as a negative precedence. Furthermore, it would not like to jeopardize its pivotal relations with Pakistan on the issue of Raymond alone.

From Pakistan’s perspective, activities of Raymond Davis have validated the reasons for the hesitation of the country in accepting foreign support. Pakistan, on the other hand, is caught between its economic dependence on US and extreme anti-Americanism in the country. Economically strangled Pakistan can barely afford hurting US-Pakistan relations, which results in billions of dollars in civilian and military aid. However, the Pakistani media has elevated the issue to such a extent that the political government cannot hope to survive, if it lets Raymond Davis go with a slap on the wrist.

It is the above context that has led to the Raymond Davis incident and the complications that have followed regarding his status and role. From the posturing of both US and Pakistan, it seems that some red lines and the provisions of the secret agreements between the countries have been violated.

Although, the full details of the Raymond incident are not publicly available, the momentous question for Pakistan’s army would be if there is evidence suggesting US is actually trying to contain Pakistan and its influence in Afghanistan, once the US withdraws. Addtionally, if there is active ground level operational cooperation and intelligence sharing, between India and US, against Kashmir related jihadist groups in Pakistan. A recent Stuxnet operation against Iran’s nuclear program revealed there was such collaboration between Israel, UK, and US.

As the public outrage and rebellion against their governments spreads in Middle East, Pakistan’s government cannot risk treading too far from public opinion, while it supports the secret war against terrorism. From all indications, the country intends to perform some course correction in its relations with the US. In all likelihood, and after initial posturing is over, new red lines would result from the Raymond incident in the conduct of war against terror.

The post The Case of Raymond Davis And US-Pakistan Relations – The Evolution Of Political And Tactical Strategies Related To The War On Terror appeared first on Politact.

Context
The controversial tactics of unmanned drones, hot pursuit, and boots on the ground have continued to bedevil the relations of US, Pakistan and Afghanistan. These tactics used by the coalition forces have not only acted as leverages in getting better cooperation from the Pakistan Army, but are also examples of how to counter the asymmetric warfare being waged by the extremists. Over the weekend, Apache helicopters crossed over in to upper Kurram twice to carry out raids against insurgents, who had earlier conducted an attack on an outpost near Khost. A similar helicopter raid was reported on Sunday against Al Shabab in Somalia. This article studies the politics and complications around these new tactics, which have evolved to deal with extremists that operate across borders.

Analysis

politics Unmanned Drones

PoliTact has recently examined the resurge of drone attacks in Pakistan, and earlier the politics surrounding these highly contentious military actions. From all accounts, there exists a tacit agreement between the US and Pakistan which allows these attacks in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) attacks at this point have become more or less point joint operations, although, they were quite unilateral initially.

The drone attacks are a result of the inability and frustration of US and NATO forces to act in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), due to challenges of international law and US image in the Islamic world.  At the same time, the tactics are also a consequence of Pakistan failing to control the tribal areas and the extremists that have operated from these sanctuaries.

The drones also reveal the underlying premise of the US strategy that unless and until extremist sanctuaries are eliminated with in FATA, insurgency in Afghanistan could not be brought under control. This assumption is the same as the one propagated by Karzai government and India. However, this is in contrast to Pakistan’s original view, which stresses that as long as Afghanistan remains unstable, it would be extremely difficult for Pakistan to control the militants on its territory.

Troops on the Ground

This option is considered more dangerous than the drones by both Pakistan and the US because of the consequences involved. Drones are unmanned so even if a mishap occurs, the potential risks are minimal. However, ‘boots on the ground’ carry significant penalty for Pakistan. It reinforces the weakness of the Pakistan government and the perception that it’s being used against its own people, and not for defending them against foreign intruders. This negative impression could be  extremely useful for the extremists when they conduct their recruitment drives.

Ever since Pakistan joined the war against terror its decision appears to be based on the logic of, ‘if you cannot stop them then might as well join them’. The minds of Pakistan’s American trained generals understand particularly well the enormous practical disequilibrium between the military prowess of US and Pakistan. However, it also demonstrates an approach based on an inherent weakness, and is quite unacceptable to the bravado of average unsophisticated Pakistani citizen.

Hot Pursuit

Both ‘drones’ and ‘boots on the ground’ are thus techniques to deal with the inability of Pakistan, Afghan, and the coalition forces to stop the insurgents from crossing over in to Afghanistan, to launch attacks there, and then retreat to their sanctuaries in tribal areas.

This presents a twofold problem for the security forces in Afghanistan. First, what to do once they are attacked in Afghan territory? Usually when coalition forces initiate a hot pursuit, the extremists slip over in to FATA. Moreover, a difference of opinion has existed between US and NATO/ISAF forces on how they consider their mandate in Afghanistan. NATO and ISAF forces have wanted to restrict their activities to Afghanistan alone, as per UN mandate, while US has taken the lead on most of the overt and covert activities in Pakistan.

According to media reports, U.S. rules of engagement permit ground forces to go a little over six miles into Pakistan territory when in hot pursuit, and when forces are targeted or fired on by the enemy. Additionally, U.S. rules allow aircraft to go 10 miles into Pakistan air space.

The second question is how to deal with the planners and strategists working from FATA where the writ of Pakistani government is minimal.

The New York Times had reported in May that General Petraeus signed a secret order in late 2009, increasing covert operations to counter militants and other threats across the region. The order authorizes Special Operations forces to operate in both allied and hostile nations in the Mideast, Central Asia and the Horn of Africa. This order, in fact, represents modified ‘boots on the ground’ option.

US has worked with both Pakistan and Afghanistan to beef up the training and capabilities of their counter-terrorism commandos, reducing the need for direct intervention and use of its own troops. As reported in Bob Woodward’s new book ‘Obama’s Wars,’ CIA has operated a 3,000 strong Afghan counter-terrorist pursuit teams for long-range reconnaissance and surveillance missions since 2002, and which operates in the border areas of Pakistan as well.

These tactics in short represent a workaround to the challenges posed by the international law and the nation state system. Islamic extremists neither believe in the present world order nor abides by its rules. Therefore countering the extremist required unconventional means. However, these unconventional means also appear to weaken the nations-state system.

An additional factor that complicates these tactics is the idiom that ‘all is fair in love and war’. In the age of Internet, people have come to believe the stated intents and positions of international players to be true. The real intent and policies of global players are the most highly guarded secrets and are not meant for public consumption. Publicly disclosing the nations real intent, strength and vulnerabilities would be tantamount to surrendering. Nonetheless, when the statements and actions of stakeholders repeatedly don’t match, it creates many conspiracy theories as well as mistrust amongst allies.

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