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		<title>China-India Border Skirmishes; BRICS Versus Quad</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/china-india-border-skirmishes-brics-versus-quad/</link>
		
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		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Jun 2020 03:56:09 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Asia Pacific]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="300" height="168" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ModiXi.jpeg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" fetchpriority="high" />What Is Pushing India to Extreme Policies? Context In the COVID-19 environment, the Asia Pacific is increasingly an active theater. A number of inquiries are being contemplated on the role and policy of China as the world grapples on how to deal with the pandemic. Then there is the angle of how China was able [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/china-india-border-skirmishes-brics-versus-quad/">China-India Border Skirmishes; BRICS Versus Quad</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="300" height="168" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ModiXi.jpeg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" /><p><img decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-9273" src="https://www.politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/putinmodijinping-300x169.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="169" /></p>
<figure id="attachment_9276" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-9276" style="width: 300px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-9276" src="https://www.politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Xi-and-Modi-300x184.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="184" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Xi-and-Modi-300x184.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Xi-and-Modi-356x220.jpg 356w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Xi-and-Modi-600x368.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Xi-and-Modi.jpg 640w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-9276" class="wp-caption-text">GOA, INDIA OCTOBER 16, 2016: Russia&#8217;s President Vladimir Putin, India&#8217;s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and China&#8217;s President Xi Jinping (L-R) at a meeting of the BRICS leaders with BRICS Business Council members. Mikhail Metzel/TASS (Photo by Mikhail MetzelTASS via Getty Images)</figcaption></figure>
<p>What Is Pushing India to Extreme Policies?<br />
<strong>Context</strong><br />
In the COVID-19 environment, the Asia Pacific is increasingly an active theater. A number of inquiries are being contemplated on the role and policy of China as the world grapples on how to deal with the pandemic. Then there is the angle of how China was able to tackle the virus quickly while others are faltering? And thus perhaps indicating Beijing is the net beneficiary so far &#8211; as others are being economically weakened.<br />
The focus had shifted to the Pacific long before the arrival of Coronavirus. With a pre COVID-19 annual growth rate of more than 6%, China has been on the trajectory to challenge the US for a while now. And that is the reason substantial intellectual capital has been committed to devise approaches to counter its rise. These discussions have revolved around coexistence to competition, and containment.<br />
During the Obama administration the emphasis was on economic collaboration with allies through trade deals like TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) and emphasis on the military Pivot to Asia. Under the American First doctrine, Trump quickly annulled TPP and increased economic pressure on China. On the other hand, <a href="https://www.politact.com/the-impact-of-trumps-victory-on-us-australia-alliance-pivot-to-asia/">Pivot to Asia</a> has morphed into the Indo-Pacific strategy.<br />
And then there is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that China has launched to reconfigure the world based on its vision – and is perceived as highly threatening by the West. The scientific and technological advancement is another dimension of the risk, such as the next generation 5G technologies. US is vehement in impressing upon its allies to avoid these Chinese technologies as that would create vulnerabilities for the western economic and security alliances.<br />
<strong>Weakened America</strong><br />
The increasing tension in the Asia Pacific is a reflection of the COVID-19 related defense and security reassessments that different players are conducting. The perception that China was able to deal with the Coronavirus early on &#8211; has reinforced the impression that it has emerged a little unblemished under the changing geopolitical and geostrategic context. On the other hand, the inept handling of the pandemic, followed by <a href="https://www.politact.com/coronavirus-race-relations-and-upcoming-elections-in-the-us/">inter-racial riots</a>, has created an image that US is imploding and losing its global preeminence. And thus the American allies are recalibrating on how to position and place their bets, while other powers consider what a weakened and inward-focused America would mean for the world.<br />
<strong>China-India Border Tensions</strong><br />
If it is assessed that US has indeed been weakened by the Coronavirus, it represents an opportunity for other players to exert and test new scenarios. And this may be what has transpired on the China, India border as it relates to the broader disputed region of Kashmir. However, it was India that triggered the recent action-reaction cycle.<br />
In August 2019, India had revoked the special status of Jammu and Kashmir, granted under article 370 and 35A of the constitution, and divided it into union territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh. Following the move, India sent additional troops and placed Jammu and Kashmir in a complete lockdown, cut-off telecommunications and Internet, and jailed political leaders. India removed the ‘permanent status’ clause demonstrating it wanted to change the facts on the ground to bring about the desired outcome.<br />
Since revoking the special status of Kashmir, Indian officials repeatedly made claims regarding the Pakistan administered Kashmir, suggesting it was ready to tackle it head on. The neighbors of India wearily looked on these aggressive Indian actions, especially China. To them the message was clear; under the garb of Quad and its strategic alliance with the US, India was trying to change the status of these border disputes in violation of previous treaties and historical understandings.<br />
<strong>Why is India Provoking its Neighbors?</strong><br />
The question becomes why is India acting rashly? The nation has recently suffered a series of humiliating setbacks to economically and militarily punish Pakistan for its role in Kashmir.<br />
In February 2019, India claimed to have carried out a preemptive attack inside Pakistan while destroying the terrorist training camp located there. This was after it blamed Pakistan for the <a href="https://www.politact.com/pulwana-attack-and-the-indian-strategic-calculus-against-pakistan-from-cold-start-to-surgical-strikes/">Pulwama attack</a>. International media widely discrediting the Indian claims that any such camp was hit in Balakot. Subsequently, Modi government continued the jingoism even in the face of a dogfight with Pakistani jets that resulted in two of Indian fighter planes crashing &#8211; and a pilot being captured.<br />
Before this escalation, in 2016 India asserted to have carried out surgical strikes, a term usually reserved for the US in its campaign against extremism, on Pakistan’s side of the Kashmir. These claims were mostly unverifiable. India attempts to link instability on its side of Kashmir with Pakistan supported terrorism, while Pakistan claims it to be a locally supported insurgency against Indian brutality – and recognized by UN as the unsettled business of the 1947 partition.<br />
New Delhi has also been unable to globally isolate and economically marginalize Pakistan, though it made inroads to put distance between Pakistan and its traditional support emanating from the <a href="https://www.politact.com/core-versus-peripheral-islamic-world-and-covid-19-pandemic/">Gulf States</a>. However, Pakistan was mostly able to counter that via China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a major tributary of the BRI. Moreover, despite considerable efforts India was unsuccessful in diminishing the centrality of Pakistan in the Afghan peace process.<br />
All of this is pushing India towards riskier steps and behavior– example being the disastrous step of revoking the special status of Jammu and Kashmir- that possibly led to the deadly June 15<sup>th</sup> skirmishes in Galwan Valley with China.<br />
<strong>Indian Strategic Narrative and China</strong><br />
As the events unfold, Indian strategic narrative is revealing. It portrays the border skirmishes with China as a consequence of its brazen regional and global policy, which includes Hong Kong and Taiwan. India attempts to link the cause of the clashes with China with the raison d’être for the Indo-Pacific strategy and Quad alliance, which includes US, Japan, and Australia. While this may benefit the full stake membership of India to the Quad, it will make Indian economic outlook less diversified – while firmly pegging its dependence.<br />
For China it is hard to understand why India would continue to undermine its interests while they have considerable convergences. India and China have significant economic stakes with bilateral trade expected to cross $100 billion in 2020. More importantly, they both are members of the club of emerging nations known as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). India, like Pakistan, is also now a full member of the China and Russia dominated SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization).<br />
Despite the convergences, India rattled China by toying with the idea of supporting Taiwan for an observer status in the World Health Organization (WHO) in May. New Delhi has also been contemplating linking Chinese support for Kashmir in the Security Council &#8211; to lending more support for Taiwan and challenging the ‘One-China’ policy. Moreover, India has backed calls for WHO to investigate Chinese role in the spread of Coronavirus.<br />
And thus, just like in the US Coronavirus related vilifying of China has impacted the Wall Street and started a larger debate about reorienting the supply chains – India may be heading in the same direction &#8211; leading to internal polarization regarding its future outlook.<br />
In changing the status of Ladakh, India miscalculated and seriously provoked Beijing. While India has played macho on border disputes with smaller neighbors like Pakistan and Nepal, China is a different ball game altogether. The Israeli style annexations only work when there is no big party with direct involvement in the conflict. Through its unilateral action on August 2019, India has linked LOC with LAC like never before, and for this it has no one else to blame.<br />
In the aftermath of the present border skirmishes, India may question the efficacy of the Quad alliance and the significance of Russia is likely to be escalated, which Putin will surely leverage against the US. According to the media reports, President Trump is likely to invite Russia, including India, Australia, and South Korea, to the expanded G7 meeting in September. Trump has proposed extending the grouping to G10 or G11 &#8211; for dealing with China. President Trump revealed his intentions to invite Russia after Angela Merkel had declined to attend the G7 meeting mentioning Coronavirus concerns. Canada and UK have also resisted the inclusion of Russia. It’s also questionable if Russia would want to play any role to counter China &#8211; when it’s one of its closest strategic ally.<br />
Also read:<br />
<a href="https://www.politact.com/examining-saudi-iran-tensions-and-its-impact-on-south-asia-china/">Examining Saudi-Iran Tensions And Its Impact On South Asia, China</a><br />
Watch video: PoliTact&#8217;s Collaboraion with the Middle East Instutute &#8211; Pakistan&#8217;s Deepening Involvement in the Gulf</p>
<p><iframe loading="lazy" width="696" height="392" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Wq7cWEsaqcs?feature=oembed" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen></iframe></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/china-india-border-skirmishes-brics-versus-quad/">China-India Border Skirmishes; BRICS Versus Quad</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>Sino, Indian Role In Afghanistan; Implications For Pakistan</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/sino-indian-role-in-afghanistan-implications-for-pakistan/</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 27 May 2013 02:46:54 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Afghan Reconciliation]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="303" height="235" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/28-05-2013_Li-And-Nawaz.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/28-05-2013_Li-And-Nawaz.jpg 303w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/28-05-2013_Li-And-Nawaz-300x233.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 303px) 100vw, 303px" />Context The new Chinese Premier Li Kegiang made his first official visit to India and Pakistan last week. The trip was watched closely around the globe for what it represented. Pakistan and China have a strategic relation going back decades, and many believe it has taken on an additional significance for the purpose of countering [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/sino-indian-role-in-afghanistan-implications-for-pakistan/">Sino, Indian Role In Afghanistan; Implications For Pakistan</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="303" height="235" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/28-05-2013_Li-And-Nawaz.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/28-05-2013_Li-And-Nawaz.jpg 303w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/28-05-2013_Li-And-Nawaz-300x233.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 303px) 100vw, 303px" /><p><strong>Context</strong><br />
<span style="font-size: 10px;"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignleft" src="https://www.politact.com/images/stories/28-05-2013_Li%20And%20Nawaz.jpg" alt="" width="250" height="194" align="left" /></span></span>The new Chinese Premier Li Kegiang made his first official visit to India and Pakistan last week. The trip was watched closely around the globe for what it represented. Pakistan and China have a strategic relation going back decades, and many believe it has taken on an additional significance for the purpose of countering the growing clout of India.</p>
<p>The global politics, and even the weather patterns, are changing so quickly that the ‘all weather’ friendship cannot remain the same either. New factors are constantly causing the equation to evolve.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;">For one, Sino-Indian trade is growing steadily, and is projected to reach $100 billion in the next two to three years. On the other hand, Pakistan’s trade with India is expected to reach $15 billion. Secondly, irrespective of the security situation of Afghanistan, both China and India are investing heavily in its mineral resources. The Chinese trade activities are taking place despite ongoing border tensions with India and NATO’s presence in Afghanistan. India and China are also the integral members of BRICS, a body many believe is an emerging platform to counter western influence, especially economics, in different parts of the world.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;"><span id="more-1741"></span></p>
<p style="text-align: left;"><strong>Analysis</strong></p>
<p><strong>China, Indian Investments in Afghanistan</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: left;">Over the years, China has increased its economic interests in Afghanistan and has invested heavily in exploiting its mineral resources. According to the United States Geological Survey, Afghan mineral reserves are worth $1 trillion dollars. While Afghan sources present this estimate to be around $3 trillion. Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC) and Jiangxi Copper Corporation (JCCL) won the tender in 2008 to develop the copper deposits located in Logar, and is putting in $4.4 billion for this purpose.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;">In contrast, India is investing up to $11 billion dollars in Afghanistan to mine the Hajigak iron ore. The project involves a consortium of 7 states and many private firms. Reports indicate the Hajigak deposits contain about 1.8 billion tons of ore, with an exceptionally high iron concentration ranging from 61 percent to 64 percent.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;">However, unlike China, India does not share a border with Afghanistan and the sea route can be expensive. This is why India has been exploring the Pakistani land route for transport of iron ore.</p>
<p>As compared to using the longer Iranian route via Chahbhar, India prefers Pakistan for transporting the ore out and for building a slurry pipeline. While Pakistan approved the trade and transit treaty that allows Afghanistan to send goods to India, it has remained concerned about losing influence in Afghanistan as Indian economic clout increases there.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;">Mining work is expected to begin in 2014 as the Afghan forces take over the security responsibility of the country. However, there are concerns whether Afghans will be able to provide the needed security.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;"><strong>American Posture</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: left;">On the other hand, American officials have welcomed these investments in Afghanistan.<br />
&#8220;We appreciate very much the significant role that India is playing in Afghanistan. In fact, we see India as kind of the economic linchpin for future,&#8221; US Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake informed lawmakers in February during a hearing of Asia and the Pacific Sub-committee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;">&#8220;As our troops (and) their spending draws down, it&#8217;s going to be much more important now to establish a private-sector basis for the Afghan economy and to make a trade-based economy and not an aid-based economy. India is such an important role to play in that,” added Blake.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;">Meanwhile, US has wanted to keep Iran out of this regional trade, and has preferred the TAPI gas pipeline as oppose to the Iran-Pakistan.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;"><strong>Trade Not Aid and its Implications for Pakistan, Afghanistan</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: left;">‘Trade not Aid’ has been one of the main demands of Pakistan from US, and now Nawaz Sharif also presented it to the new Chinese Premier. The challenge is while India and China are investing in Afghanistan, they both see Pakistan from a security perspective, and not necessarily as an economic opportunity. With Chinese economic interests growing in Afghanistan, like India, it would also want Pakistan to use its influence in ensuring the security and stability of Afghanistan. This is the same as US and NATO that are depending on Pakistan for withdrawal of its equipment from Afghanistan and to rein in the extremists. The growing dilemma for Pakistan is that while it is being expected to ensure regional security, it is coming at a huge economic cost to the nation.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;">At the same time, despite insistence from Afghanistan, India and China both have refrained from getting involved directly in the military affairs of the country.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;">As far as India is concerned, it is not clear if it would continue this posture. Surprisingly, President Hamid Karzai and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang ended up in India at about the same time. Majority of the media sources reported on them as separate visits and did not point to the significance of this coincidence. While Pakistan’s ties have improved with India, but not to the extent to make it oblivious to the occurrence.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;">The visit of President Karzai to India was meant to solicit more defense equipment and military training from India. The training of Afghan army by India has been a cause of grave concern and a red line for Pakistan. Moreover, Karzai&#8217;s trip has taken place in the aftermath of increased tensions on the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;">By visiting India first, and while Karzai was there, China is conveying to Pakistan, India and Afghanistan, it gives more importance to the economic and trade relations as oppose to security concerns. The implied message will obviously have a positive influence on their ties with each other. At the same time, the Chinese message is likely to be only valid as long as India does not play a countering role in the American pivot to the Pacific, which ultimately will also determine the fate of BRICS, and the full membership of India and Afghanistan to SCO.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/sino-indian-role-in-afghanistan-implications-for-pakistan/">Sino, Indian Role In Afghanistan; Implications For Pakistan</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>Sino-Indian Border Tensions In Ladakh</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/sino-indian-border-tensions-in-ladakh/</link>
		
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		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Apr 2013 12:07:21 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Issue Brief]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="469" height="299" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/25-04-2013_Ladakh.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/25-04-2013_Ladakh.jpg 469w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/25-04-2013_Ladakh-450x287.jpg 450w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/25-04-2013_Ladakh-300x191.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 469px) 100vw, 469px" />Context While border tensions have surged from time to time between Indian and Chinese forces situated along the poorly demarcated border, the Indian media has created an unusual hype around recent incidents. The first intrusion allegedly had occurred on April 20th. The Indian authorities have accused Chinese forces and helicopters of straying far in to [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/sino-indian-border-tensions-in-ladakh/">Sino-Indian Border Tensions In Ladakh</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="469" height="299" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/25-04-2013_Ladakh.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/25-04-2013_Ladakh.jpg 469w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/25-04-2013_Ladakh-450x287.jpg 450w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/25-04-2013_Ladakh-300x191.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 469px) 100vw, 469px" /><p><strong>Context</strong><br />
<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-6152 alignleft" src="https://beta.politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/25-04-2013_Ladakh-300x191.jpg" alt="25-04-2013_Ladakh" width="300" height="191" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/25-04-2013_Ladakh-300x191.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/25-04-2013_Ladakh-450x287.jpg 450w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/25-04-2013_Ladakh.jpg 469w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" />While border tensions have surged from time to time between Indian and Chinese forces situated along the poorly demarcated border, the Indian media has created an unusual hype around recent incidents. The first intrusion allegedly had occurred on April 20th. The Indian authorities have accused Chinese forces and helicopters of straying far in to the Depsang Valley of Ladakh region. In efforts to diffuse the matter, Indian foreign minister Salman Khurshid is slated to visit China on May 9th. There are also unconfirmed reports that Chinese Premier Li Keqiang&#8217;s is likely to visit India and Pakistan around May 20th.</p>
<p>On the other hand, Chinese authorities have wanted to calm things down. Foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying stated, &#8220;We hope relevant media can keep patience and create favorable conditions for the two countries to solve this issue through friendly consultations,&#8221; she commented.</p>
<p>The question to ponder is if some action taken by China or India provoked the tensions, or is it related to the broader regional tectonic shifts. The present escalation is taking place as the security situation in the Pacific region continues to worsen. Especially, as it relates to the events of South China Sea, North Korean threats, and the American pivot towards the region.<br />
The handing over of the Gwadar port by Pakistan to a Chinese firm has also unnerved India. Moreover, President Karzai recently has been stressing on the role of China in the resolution of Afghan conflict.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/sino-indian-border-tensions-in-ladakh/">Sino-Indian Border Tensions In Ladakh</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>US-India Strategic Dialogue – Why Is India Reluctant?</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/us-india-strategic-dialogue-why-is-india-reluctant/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 17 Jun 2012 20:35:14 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Afghan Reconciliation]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Analysis of Perception and Perspective]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[China and Islamic World]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[FATA situation]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics of South Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India Afghanistan ties]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="448" height="295" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/17-06-2012_Hillary-and-India.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/17-06-2012_Hillary-and-India.jpg 448w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/17-06-2012_Hillary-and-India-300x198.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 448px) 100vw, 448px" />Context Soon after President Obama came to office, an exhaustive review of the US Afghan policy was initiated. The policy that evolved represented continuity and was adjusted for the lessons learned and economic realities. Troops surge was implemented in Afghanistan as they were withdrawn from Iraq, drone attacks escalated in Pakistan, and US maintained its [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/us-india-strategic-dialogue-why-is-india-reluctant/">US-India Strategic Dialogue – Why Is India Reluctant?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="448" height="295" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/17-06-2012_Hillary-and-India.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/17-06-2012_Hillary-and-India.jpg 448w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/17-06-2012_Hillary-and-India-300x198.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 448px) 100vw, 448px" /><p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignleft" src="https://www.politact.com/images/stories/17-06-2012_Hillary%20and%20India.jpg" alt="" width="275" height="181" align="left" /></p>
<p>Soon after President Obama came to office, an exhaustive review of the US Afghan policy was initiated. The policy that evolved represented continuity and was adjusted for the lessons learned and economic realities. Troops surge was implemented in Afghanistan as they were withdrawn from Iraq, drone attacks escalated in Pakistan, and US maintained its focus on Iran’s nuclear program.</p>
<p>Similarly, the emphasis on building a strategic relationship with India, which had been laid earlier during Bill Clinton’s era, was also sustained. The centrality of India in the emerging US foreign policy has only increased. However, the dilemma is that the country is not gung-ho on playing the role envisioned for it in the Asia-Pacific and South and Central Asia.<span id="more-1725"></span></p>
<p><strong>Analysis</strong></p>
<p><strong>Obama’s AfPak Policy</strong></p>
<p>Learning from the mistakes of Bush era kinetic policies, Obama’s AfPak policy was big on a regional approach and political reconciliation. As part of the new direction, strategic dialogues were launched with Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Since then, talks with Pakistan have faltered to such an extent that the country was almost not invited to the Chicago conference on the future of Afghanistan.</p>
<p>Both India and Afghanistan meanwhile have continued with their respective talks. The terms and details of the strategic agreement signed recently between US and Afghanistan have remained vague and have caused confusion in the region, especially for Iran and Pakistan. For example, while US has claimed it will not keep long-term military bases in Afghanistan, its neighbors are not convinced. Furthermore, while US has stated Afghanistan will not be used as a staging ground for attacks, the drone strikes are continuing against Pakistan. This uncertainty regarding the long-term intent of different stakeholders continues to complicate the reconciliation process. This is why Karzai has reiterated once again that the strategic pact with US is not meant against any other country.</p>
<p>On the other hand, the dialogue between US and India has moved quite swiftly since the Mumbai incident. Five US cabinet officials visited India only this year, with Leon Panetta being the latest one. The third Strategic Dialogue was held on June 13 and was led by SM Krishna and Hillary Clinton. Nonetheless, there are growing concerns that India-US partnership has not lived up to its expectations and potential.</p>
<p><strong>India’s Defense, Security Needs</strong></p>
<p>Although India wants US arms and technology, the nation does not want to be used against China. There is a rising sentiment that India does not seek an alliance with the US as it has with Japan and other Asian powers. Meanwhile, US has refuted the relationship with India has been oversold, while emphasizing its importance in regional dynamics of East Asia and Afghanistan.</p>
<p>According to the report of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India has emerged as the worlds top importer of arms and accounts for 10 percent of the global arms sales. India’s imports of major weapons surged by 38 percent in 2007-11, closely followed by China and Pakistan. According to SIPRI, India will spend more than $100 billion on weapons and systems in the next 15 years.</p>
<p>This has triggered a competition to provide for India’s defense needs, and friction with some western nations. For example, Britain is concluding its aid program to India. UK’s International Development Secretary Andrew Mitchell stated recently that the aid program to India was being questioned, and its withdrawal came after a series of perceived snubs from India over weapons deals. New Delhi struck an agreement with France for Rafale fighter jets while UK was also competing for the contract.</p>
<p>On the other hand, in addition to the nuclear deal, Indian and US intelligence cooperation has grown tremendously in the aftermath of Mumbai attacks. American companies and security institutions are well placed to provide the expertise and capabilities related to the homeland security needs of India. The officials of the two countries are carrying out extensive brainstorming to develop a framework for interoperability in this area.</p>
<p><strong>Strategic Costs For A Strategic Partnership</strong></p>
<p>Although there are economic and security benefits for India’s ties with the West, there are also costs. With the imposition of US and EU sanctions on Iranian Central Bank that go in to effect at the end of June, India is expected to reduce its imports of energy from Iran and this will strain its ties with the country. Furthermore, India has had exemplary relations with Russia, but when it comes to matters related to NATO’s missile defense system and affairs of Libya and Syria, India will have to play a delicate balancing act.</p>
<p>On most of these evolving policy challenges, India’s stance of non-intervention and emphasis on a political solution is closer to Russia and China than US and NATO. On the other hand, when it comes to Pakistan and Afghanistan, including Kashmir issue, the Indian position is contradictory to the stance it has adopted in case of Libya and Syria. Moreover, being part of BRICS and an observer on SCO, further complicates India’s role. For example, at the just concluded SCO conference in Beijing, President Hu Jintao made the following comments while referring to the situation in Afghanistan:</p>
<p>&#8220;We will continue to follow the concept that regional affairs should be managed by countries in the region, that we should guard against shocks from turbulence outside the region and that [the SCO] should play a bigger role in Afghanistan&#8217;s peaceful reconstruction.&#8221;</p>
<p>In addition, due to its own large Muslim population, India’s has to be sensitive to the various undercurrents of the Islamic world, such as the Shiite-Sunni divide. With trade relations with GCC countries expected to increase by 34 percent next year, India is adopting a position similar to the US for Gulf States. And as it does, India’s relations with Iran are likely to deteriorate. If it moves closer to the Chinese and Russian stance on Syria, it will be at the cost of its relations with GCC states. This dilemma is not much different for Pakistan and other non-GCC states.</p>
<p>Thus, clearly there are inconsistencies in Indian position towards the Middle East, as compared to its posture towards Afghanistan and Pakistan. At the same time, the country realizes its security cannot be ensured by playing proxy to powers that are far away, while having enmity with neighbors. And, this lesson is not much different for Afghanistan and Pakistan either. These perhaps are some of the reasons that are causing India to hesitate in fully taking on the role envisioned by the US-India strategic dialogue.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/us-india-strategic-dialogue-why-is-india-reluctant/">US-India Strategic Dialogue – Why Is India Reluctant?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>China Launches 2 Satellites For Its Global Navigation System</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/china-launches-2-satellites-for-its-global-navigation-system/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Apr 2012 09:06:54 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Asia Pacific]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Context In the aftermath of the Indian test of Agni V missile and the launch of RISAT-1 satellite, China has successfully lifted two satellites in to space that will support its Beidou global navigation and positioning network. The satellites were sent from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center in the southwestern province of Sichuan. China is [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/china-launches-2-satellites-for-its-global-navigation-system/">China Launches 2 Satellites For Its Global Navigation System</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>In the aftermath of the Indian test of Agni V missile and the launch of RISAT-1 satellite, China has successfully lifted two satellites in to space that will support its Beidou global navigation and positioning network. The satellites were sent from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center in the southwestern province of Sichuan.</p>
<p>China is planning to send three more satellites in to orbit this year as part of Beidou network, and is expecting to complete the system in 2020 with more than 30 orbiters. Presently the system is being used in China and the region.</p>
<p>The Chinese Beidou navigation system will be the equivalent of US Global Positioning System (GPS), Russia’s Glonass, and Europe’s Galileo.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/china-launches-2-satellites-for-its-global-navigation-system/">China Launches 2 Satellites For Its Global Navigation System</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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