By Arif Ansar

Context

In the aftermath of the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021—formalized through the Doha Accords of 2020—South Asia has entered an entirely new and volatile phase. The Taliban’s return to power, their continued lack of international recognition, and the deepening conflict along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border have collectively reshaped the region’s geopolitical contours. What once was envisaged as an American “peace deal” has since evolved into a crucible of power rivalries, ideological contestations, and security dilemmas extending far beyond Kabul.

Amid this changing landscape, Washington finds itself confronting an old question in a new era: What strategic interests does the United States still have at stake in Afghanistan? This question gained renewed urgency after the tragic shooting near the White House on the eve of Thanksgiving in 2025, when Rahmanullah Lakanwal—a former Afghan supporter of U.S. forces who immigrated under the Protect America Operation—opened fire, killing two National Guard members. The attack, still under investigation, reignited the debate about the consequences of U.S. disengagement from Afghanistan and the enduring ripple effects of America’s two-decade military presence.

To assess these evolving dynamics, The Middle East Institute (MEI) collaborated with PoliTact to host a Webinar in November last year to explore these aspects centered around the evolving situation of Afghanistan and if merits a fresh policy and approach. Earlier in May, soon after the four-day conflict between Pakistan and India, MEI also conducted a discussion with regional experts to assess President Trump’s policy towards Taliban. Both discussions were moderated by Dr. Marvin Weibnbaum, the Director of Afghanistan-Pakistan Center.

Through these deliberations, a sobering consensus emerged: the U.S. has abandoned its nation-building ambition, replacing it with a strictly transactional and selective engagement guided by short-term counterterrorism and strategic interests. This shift marks a watershed in South Asian geopolitics—one in which regional powers like Pakistan, India, China, and Russia are recalibrating alliances, while the Taliban’s regime struggles to define its sovereignty amid growing internal fractures and international isolation.

Counterterrorism and Pragmatism

According to panelists such as Joshua White and David Sedney, Washington’s current strategy toward South Asia is driven not by ideology or doctrine but by political expediency. The United States, still wary of being drawn into another endless conflict, now prefers “quick interventions that can be framed as political wins” without the burden of prolonged commitments. At the heart of this approach lies counterterrorism (CT)—the only enduring U.S. interest in Afghanistan. The Taliban, Washington, and Pakistan paradoxically, share a common adversary: the Islamic State–Khorasan Province (ISKP). While formal cooperation remains limited, intelligence coordination to prevent ISKP attacks has emerged as a rare channel of pragmatic engagement. Adjunct Professor at George Town University, Doug London, underscored this convergence, observing that neither Washington nor the Taliban can afford an al-Qaeda-style attack “with fingerprints all over Afghanistan.” Thus, even hostile actors find themselves bound by mutual survival instincts.

Another dimension of U.S. engagement is transactional diplomacy—a pragmatic mechanism aimed at resolving targeted issues such as hostage recovery and retrieval of left-behind military assets. As former Afghan ambassador Javid Ahmad explained, these dealings often blur ethical lines; American captives have been freed in exchange for concessions, including the removal of Haqqani Network bounties. Similarly, billions of dollars’ worth of infrastructure and equipment left during the withdrawal remain part of simmering behind-the-scenes negotiations—either to buy back through intermediaries like Pakistan or to ensure their destruction to prevent exploitation.

Pakistan’s position in this matrix is particularly complex. While the U.S. remains a visible interlocutor, Islamabad’s deepest strategic alignment continues to be with China. Pakistan leverages Washington’s engagement as a counterbalance against overreliance on Beijing. According to the panelists, efforts to “reset” U.S.-Pakistan relations on the basis of trade, minerals, and counterterrorism cooperation may refresh dialogue but are unlikely to override hard security realities.

Human Rights and the Counterterrorism Dilemma

The Taliban’s domestic policies, particularly toward women and civil society, continue to complicate U.S. engagement. As Lisa Curtis observed, the regime has demonstrated “no change in policies” from its 1990s practices—the repression of women and stifling of dissent remain total. This poses a moral and strategic crisis for Washington: how to cooperate on counterterrorism while refusing to legitimize a regime that flagrantly violates human rights.

Curtis argued that sacrificing principles for intelligence access risks undermining long-term stability, as repression fuels extremism by creating ungoverned spaces ripe for recruitment. Yet London countered that, in practice, the U.S. often cooperates with regimes that commit abuses when it aligns with national interests, effectively separating human rights advocacy from realpolitik.

The delicate balance between moral credibility and strategic necessity defines Washington’s Afghan dilemma—where human rights concerns, while loudly voiced, often take a back seat to the imperatives of terrorism prevention.

The TTP Factor

When U.S. troops exited Afghanistan, many in Pakistan assumed the Taliban’s ascension would enhance Islamabad’s regional leverage. Instead, the opposite has occurred. The enduring ties between the Afghan Taliban and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have emerged as the central source of cross-border friction, destabilizing Pakistan more than any external actor.

Since the short but intense four-day war between Pakistan and India in May 2025, border skirmishes between the Taliban and Pakistani forces have intensified, reflecting a broader regional unraveling. Analysts such as Sedney describe these clashes as a subtext of the larger India-Pakistan rivalry, with each side using Afghan soil as a pressure valve for strategic signaling. Yet a full-scale Taliban-Pakistan war remains improbable. Pakistan’s military, with its overwhelming technological and nuclear superiority, could decimate Taliban forces—but at the risk of provoking a drawn-out insurgency it cannot control. The Taliban, aware of this asymmetry, prefer hybrid tactics, allowing the TTP to wage low-intensity proxy warfare inside Pakistan.

The Taliban dismiss Islamabad’s demands to curb the TTP, calling it a “domestic problem”. This refusal underscores their ideological kinship and the shared ambition to see Pakistan’s border tribal belt revert to Taliban-style Sharia governance. Ahmad warned that this dynamic is perilous: the TTP’s suicide battalions possess the capacity to incite urban terror within Pakistan, amplifying the country’s internal vulnerabilities.

Behind these clashes lies a larger ideological project—the Taliban’s belief, shared by TTP hardliners, that regional power is shifting back to the “Islamic Emirate” model. Sedney noted that radical circles envision a future, within a generation, where Pakistan and even India could see Taliban-like movements ascend. Whether delusional or strategic, this belief animates the persistence of militancy and shapes Islamabad’s deepening anxiety.

US Leverages and Pakistan’s Regime Change Dilemma

The question of whether the U.S. or Pakistan can leverage internal Taliban factionalism looms large. Within the movement, a pragmatic Haqqani network faction favors economic engagement and limited U.S. cooperation, while the isolationist Kandahar faction, led by Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada, rejects dependency and seeks autonomy. Although tensions exist, Akhundzada maintains ultimate control, preventing visible fragmentation that might invite civil war. For Pakistan, frustration with the Taliban’s defiance has sparked talk of supporting Afghan resistance groups. Yet Ahmad warns this path is fraught: funding insurgency would demand resources, while the disunited Afghan opposition lacks both cohesion and stamina.

Consequently, Islamabad’s strategy has shifted from influence to contingency—exploiting Taliban divisions when advantageous, but no longer betting on a “friendly” Kabul. As White put it, the myth of a compliant, pro-Pakistan “Pashtun leadership” in Afghanistan has always been just that—a myth. This reality has spurred a profound shift in mindset within Pakistan’s government. No longer divided between the “good Taliban” and “bad Taliban,” Islamabad increasingly sees a spectrum of “bad and worse Taliban.”

At an event held at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in February, 2022, the Special Representative for Afghanistan at the time, Tom West, had discussed the economic leverages US still holds and commented that Afghan Taliban has shown the least interest in future cooperation with the US in fulling the terms of their side of the Doha Accord. At the same time, West noted that US is not supporting any opposition to Afghan Taliban and is advising other nations to refrain from that, but some will do that sooner or later if Taliban does not show urgency. Answering a question, he commented that many players are realizing that not having US engagement in Afghanistan is not in their interest.

Regional Rivalries and Great Power Calculus

Beyond the Pakistan-Taliban binary, regional power competition has turned Afghanistan into a geopolitical chessboard once again. None of the major powers—China, Russia, India, or the U.S.—wants a total state collapse, yet each pursues a distinct agenda. India, for its part, has pivoted sharply. As Curtis noted, New Delhi is now actively courting elements within the Taliban to undermine Pakistan’s influence. The May 2025 conflict with Pakistan demonstrated India’s willingness to strike deep into Pakistani territory, signaling a readiness to rewrite the traditional escalation playbook.

Meanwhile, China and Russia tread cautiously. For Beijing, the overriding concern is protecting multibillion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) investments from militant spillover. Russia, despite its history of confrontation with Islamist movements, maintains unpublicized CT cooperation with the Taliban to prevent ISKP’s expansion into Central Asia. Trump’s renewed engagement with Central Asian leaders under the “C5+1 initiative”—focused on strategic minerals—has further rattled Moscow and Beijing, who view it as U.S. encroachment upon their regional sphere of influence.

Panelists such as White and Karp noted that China now holds more extensive economic leverage in both Pakistan and Afghanistan than any other actor. Despite attempts to mediate between them, Beijing’s balancing efforts have faltered. Nonetheless, economic interdependence has rendered China an unwilling stakeholder in both states’ stability.

For the Taliban, the Great Power rivalry offers an opportunity. In an assessment, PoliTact noted last year: “As Afghan Taliban celebrate 4^th year in power, the nation now finds itself at a crossroads of competing currents. The net effect is a cautious, multi-prong stance: keep Iranian channels open for trade and energy, nurture Indian economic alternatives through Chabahar, avoid burning bridges with Pakistan as it courts Washington, and remain pragmatically receptive to Chinese infrastructure where it serves Afghan interests.”

Javid Ahmad observed, the regime seeks “economic neutrality,” extracting benefits from all sides while avoiding puppeteering by any. Pragmatic factions engage Russia and China for investment; hardliners in Kandahar, wary of foreign intentions, prefer cautious distance. This balancing act defines Kabul’s foreign policy—a tactical survival strategy that keeps all powers interested, but none dominant.

Containment Over Resolution: The U.S. Strategic Dilemma

Dr. Weinbaum summarized the prevailing expert view succinctly: “There is no military solution to the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict—only conflict management.” After decades of direct engagement, the U.S. now acts as a remote balancer, occasionally intervening diplomatically but avoiding deep entanglement. Washington’s immediate goal is not victory, but containment: preventing Afghanistan’s collapse while denying extremist sanctuaries the freedom to orchestrate global terror. This means sustaining aid and limited engagement but conditioning every form of support on verifiable security behavior.

Panelists urged regional coordination involving China, Turkey, and Qatar, whose economic leverage could pressure the Taliban to restrain the TTP. However, as Karp pointed out, both Turkey and Qatar’s favoritism toward Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated movements complicates their credibility as neutral mediators.

Ahmad cautioned that the U.S. must abandon the pursuit of ideological “unicorns” and embrace pragmatic realpolitik—dealing with actors as they are, not as Washington wishes them to be. The mantra, he argued, should be “leverage first, ideals later.” Delayed engagement only increases risks of ungoverned chaos, but overreaction could trap the U.S. in another open-ended quagmire.

The Perpetual Balancing Act

As of 2025, U.S. policy in South Asia has evolved into a delicate balancing act—a calculated choreography between engagement and restraint. America’s current presence is limited but consequential: intelligence links, sporadic negotiations, and cautious cooperation with regional allies. Yet looming questions remain. If Afghanistan once again becomes a safe haven for transnational terrorist networks, what tools does Washington have to respond? Under Trump’s renewed mandate, analysts predict the U.S. would double down on counterterrorism partnerships—especially with Pakistan and India—to prevent another 9/11-style surprise.

However, as India’s outreach to the Taliban deepens, it risks entrenching the very militant alignments that destabilize Pakistan and jeopardize U.S.-Pakistan rapprochement. Such dynamics may inadvertently revive the ideological monster once defeated by the War on Terror. Moreover, the Taliban’s tacit encouragement of TTP demands—such as reversing Pakistan’s merger of tribal areas and enforcing Sharia law—threatens to seed an insurgent domino effect. This could erode Islamabad’s internal cohesion and ripple across borders, complicating U.S. peace efforts from Gaza to Central Asia. Trump’s Taliban policy would require broader public ownership of Pakistan’s CT strategy and preventing the budding India-Afghan ties from destabilizing Pakistan and the rejuvenated US-Pakistan ties.

Related Articles:

The Unbroken Alliance: Why the Afghan Taliban-TTP Nexus Is Dooming Peace with Pakistan – Nov 4, 2025
The Fragile Truce Between Pakistan And Afghanistan And The War Of Narratives – Nov 2, 2025
Afghanistan’s Strategic Outlook And New Geopolitical Realities – Aug 18, 2025
Afghanistan, Pakistan Relations and Great Power Rivalry – Jul 21, 2025
Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions, Trump, And Wakhan Corridor – Feb 3, 2025
Political Or Military Solution; Pakistan’s New Counter-Terrorism Operation Azm-e-Istehkam – Aug 1, 2024
Convergences in US Pakistan Ties and Afghanistan – Jan 1, 2024
Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP – Feb 22, 2023
Post Withdrawal Campaign Against Extremism In Afghanistan And US-Pakistan Relations – Sep 7, 2022
Emerging US Policy Towards Afghanistan After Withdrawal – March 2, 2022
Recalibrating The US-Pakistan Partnership In Afghanistan – Jun 22, 2021
US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden – Mar 2, 2021

The post The Future Of Afghan Taliban-Pakistan Conflict: Implications For Regional Stability And US Interests appeared first on Politact.

As the direct peace talks between the US and Afghan Taliban move along – and the sixth round takes place in Doha, questions are being raised regarding the prospects of success. Any negotiations have to incorporate the positions of various stakeholders. More importantly, first the stakeholders have to agree to talk and then continue the process until a reasonable accommodation has been achieved. Then there are spoilers that do not want the conflict to be resolved – as that would jeopardize their perceived interests.

In this context how then we evaluate the on-going talks keeping the perspectives of various parties in mind.

There are three main interlocutors to these talks: Afghan Taliban, the Afghan Government, and the US, leading an alliance of foreign troops in Afghanistan. Meanwhile Pakistan is facilitating at this point and is not directly participating.

For US and Afghan Taliban to hold direct talks was a first step that indicated the willingness of the both interlocutors to engage. The US and Afghan Taliban have also held direct talks in the past, but they have been very subject specific. For example, when US and Taliban negotiated on the release of POWs, and Bowe Bergdhal.

The US has now change its position and decide to take a holistic approach to talks with the Taliban. According to Zalmay Khalilzad, there will be no agreement until everything is agreed on. The primary focus areas include a complete ceasefire, foreign troops withdrawal, Counter Terrorism assurances, and Intra Afghan dialogue. However the sequencing of these agreements is proving to be challenging.

On the other hand, Afghan Taliban had always wanted to hold direct talks with the US and complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. This is critical to understand even before we get the specific demands of each party. 

Then there are the secondary stakeholders of Afghan peace talks, which involve Iran, Russia, and China. In the face of unilateral US withdrawal from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) last year and re-imposition of sanctions, on May 8 Iran decided to incrementally withdraw from the agreement too, unless the other signatories (UK, France, Germany, China and Russia) ease restrictions placed on its banking and oil sectors in sixty days. 

These developments, including any military escalation, are bound to complicate the Afghan peace process. China and Russia are cooperating on the Afghan peace process, and a number of related meetings have taken place in Russia. However, China and Russia are also close to Iran, with China being the largest crude oil customer for Iran, and India the second. Iran is a vital pillar of Russian Middle East strategy, to include Syria.

The post Prospects For Afghan Peace; Loya Jirga And Sixth Round Of US-Taliban Doha Talks appeared first on Politact.

By Arif Ansar

Context

The North Korean crisis has emerged as another serious foreign policy challenge for the Trump administration. And this is happening at a time when his presidency is confronted with a number of difficult issues at the domestic and international front. Normally the American president has considerable discretion when it comes to the foreign affairs front, and they often leverage it when they find themselves on the back foot domestically – to reassert authority.

In this context, President Trump has had to face repeated setbacks in his efforts to repeal the Obamacare health care system, and this happened despite Republicans controlling the House and the Senate. His presidency also continues to be bedeviled by the investigation related the Russian interference in the American election, and the contacts between a number of his close associates with people close to Putin. The appointment of Robert Mueller as a special counsel to oversee the probe looks further ominous.

Reset with Russia was one of the pivots around which Trump’s policy was anchored. However, Trump has been unable to make progress towards this goal. Soon after the July meetings with Putin during the G20 Summit held in Hamburg, Germany, Congress imposed more sanctions against Russia. Putin reciprocated by evicting close to 750 American diplomats from Russia.

On the other hand, review of the Afghan policy is also ongoing but much delayed and there is considerable anxiety in the policy-making circles about this. This has led Senator McCain to announce his own Afghan strategy. The Trump administration also appears to be moving towards nullifying the Iran nuclear deal.

And as if this was not enough, the North Korean crisis has taken a turn for the worst and is impacting US-China affairs. Increasingly, China is being asked to use its influence, if it has any, to control the belligerence of North Korea. Meanwhile, the country has continued its ballistic missile tests. After imposition of additional sanctions against it, North Korea raised the stakes by threatening to launch missiles towards the American territory of Guam.

China, North Korea, and Russia

As these matters unfold, a thinking is developing in the US that if China cannot stop North Korea, then it should suffer the consequences of any military escalation. Meanwhile, as Trump delivered his dramatic ‘fire and fury’ comments, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford travelled to China to convey that military solution will only be implemented if political and economic routes to prevent the North Korean regime from developing nuclear tipped ballistic missiles have been exhausted. The crisis seems to have deescalated for now and Kim Jong Un also appears to have put his plans to fire missiles towards Guam on hold.

The collapse of North Korean regime poses a serious challenge for China. It would cause floods of refugees to cross over to China. Moreover, the fall of an ally in the Pacific would be the last thing China would want to see. At the same time, there is the question of what purpose does North Korea serve for China. Could it be that through Kim Jong Un’s rash behavior China is testing the response and will of the US, realizing that the Americans have been military involved for more than a decade in Afghanistan and the Middle East.

The element of ‘testing the US response’ could also have played a role when Russia acted more assertively in Syria and in Europe, especially relating to the affairs of Ukraine and taking over of Crimea. On the other hand, China has up to this point escaped any direct external military involvement, but this may change in the future.

China remains anxious regarding the emerging US policies in the Pacific region, particularly towards Taiwan and the disputed islands of South China Sea. Additionally, China probably draws a parallel to the situation in the Middle East – and whether a regime changes-type formula might be applied to the rash regime of North Korea. Not surprisingly, China has protested the deployment of the THAAD (anti-missile system) in South Korea. The country has also recently increased its involvement in Afghanistan, which represents the other flank for China.

In addition to skirmishes along the Pakistan, India Line of Control, tensions are also building between China and India over their shared border. The armed forces of both nations are face to face since June in the plateau area known as Donglang and Dokhlam. Quoting Indian sources, Reuters recently reported that Chinese forces tried to enter the Indian territory of Ladakh, Jammu and Kashmir State.

China has also built its first military base in Djibouti, located in the strategic Horn of Africa. While the projected focus of this base is primarily geared towards anti-piracy and humanitarian crises related missions, its strategic location will help China monitor its interests in Africa and the Middle East.

When it comes to South Asia, the success of China’s “One Belt One Road” economic initiative, and one of its tributaries is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project, is heavily dependent on the security situation of Pakistan and Afghanistan. And the associated Gwadar Port provides China an alternative sea access in case the Strait of Malacca was blocked, and there are rumors regarding militarization of this port at some point in the future.

Conclusion

In this perspective, North Korea helps China, and Russia, balance the affairs of the Pacific, and to counter assertive actions being taken by an alliance represented by India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and the US. In the South Asia region, this balancing role is more and more being played by Pakistan, in particular reference to the affairs of Afghanistan and India. The future of Afghanistan will determine the balance of power in South and Central Asia, and in this regard there are three possibilities:

The first one being, the major powers agree to the right mix of representation in the future Afghan government. The second possibility being that one or the other side wins comprehensively – and then decides the shape of future government in its favor. The third likelihood is reflected by the present stalemate in which no one clearly wins, but the situation continues to drain the powers directly involved.

The post North Korean Crisis, US-Pakistan Tensions, and Afghanistan appeared first on Politact.

Context 

By Adam Patterson

Despite the fact that al-Qaeda is responsible for the deadliest attack on U.S. soil, and that dismantling the terror apparatus was Washington’s primary motive for occupying Afghanistan, the burgeoning of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is a development that has eluded much of the American public. Yet, since the Saudi Arabian-led military coalition launched “Operation Decisive Storm” on March 26 of this year, Osama bin Laden’s former cohorts in AQAP have effectively transformed their organization into an occupying militia. This development has largely escaped the U.S. mainstream media’s radar.

Lacking significant oil reserves, Yemen has not experienced an influx of wealth as have neighboring Saudi Arabia and other nearby Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. As a result, it has become increasingly insular. Yemen has long attracted Sunni revivalists and assorted religious purists. The Yemeni strain of Arabic is believed to be the closest to that spoken during the times of the Prophet. Those with an especially austere, fundamentalist vision of Islam have flocked to Yemen believing that the area remains uncorrupted. The world’s most reactionary Sunni Muslims (frequently labeled Wahhabis or Salafists) share a special reverence for their vision of the early Muslim caliphate. Those who migrate to Yemen on these grounds do so to invoke the past and to promote a revival of their absolutist interpretation of Islam.

AQAP’s strong presence in Yemen long predates the country’s 2011 breakdown of civil authority, when the group constituted more of a hostile nuisance than a martial threat. According to reports, the al-Qaeda branch began germinating in the Arabian Peninsula during the 1990s and gradually rose to prominence as a regular instigator of violence following the escalation of Washington’s war on terror during the 2000s.

Analysis

Fertile Land For Global Jihadists

This unique situation drew Anwar al-Awlaki, the influential preacher and al-Qaeda recruiter, to Yemen in 2004. Hardline jihadists view the impoverished country as fertile ground in an ideological sense, while petroleum speculators have long regarded Yemen as barren. American-born Anwar al-Awlaki was a gifted agitator for Sunni jihadism, speaking English fluently in addition to commanding a poetic grasp of Arabic. He ultimately chose Yemen in which to exhibit his disreputable talents, which included the skill of attracting Anglophone recruits.

Al-Awlaki’s relocation to Yemen was part of a greater tide, one that has been met with increasing retaliation from both U.S. intelligence and Yemen’s local authorities. Drone strikes in Yemen became common early in the Obama administration, one of which killed al-Awlaki in 2011. Certain analysts suggested that the al-Qaeda recruiter became a regional commander within AQAP and was instrumental in overseeing the logistics of terror attacks, including the failed explosion aboard Northwest Airlines Flight 253. Despite his ignominious death, al-Awlaki’s presence still lingers in the jihadist psyche.

Yemen’s collapse into civil war was a catalyst for AQAP’s regional ambitions, plans that would have likely remained unrealized had the country not splintered itself into mutually antagonistic pieces. Evidence suggests that hundreds of foreign jihadists have filtered into Yemen since unified rule collapsed in 2011, drawn by the opportunities presented by a fractured central government in a failed state awash with arms caches. In a series of decisive skirmishes, AQAP began rapidly claiming territory outside of major cities and overcoming government forces. As of July 2015, AQAP holds terrain in the northern hinterlands of the Hadramaut Governorate (situated along the Saudi Arabian border) and in much of the Abyan Governorate (situated along Yemen’s southern coast). Al-Qaeda’s growing control in Yemen can be compared to the rise of AQAP’s Syrian counterpart, Jabhat al-Nusra, and of Daesh (“Islamic State”), which followed the rebellion against the Damascus regime in 2011.

One of the interesting components of the jihadists’ shift in priorities is the diminished emphasis on attacking the West. The previous generation of terror organizations have transformed from sleeper cells and shadow elements into openly declared militias. The focus of their aggression has been capturing and occupying contested territories in failed states. As a result, violence against the West is often waived off to copycats and supporters in Europe and North America determined to execute improvised lone wolf attacks. In recent weeks, AQAP has doubled down on this tactic, issuing two proclamations in early August that praised lone-wolf style attacks and exhorted aspiring jihadists to “strike America in its own home and beyond.”

In an extension of this doctrine, the organization has prioritized planned terror attacks in areas they hope to directly influence. AQAP’s bombings appear localized and often symbolic with an August 6 attack obliterating a 700-year old Sufi mosque in the Yemeni province of Lahj. In this case the perceived enemy is close both in terms of geography and religion with the target being a mystical order of Islam that is heretical according to AQAP’s worldview.

In contrast to the more reckless jihadi groups claiming territory in Syria and Iraq, AQAP’s style of operations appears more measured and procedural. They are less prone to the abrupt gains and losses that have characterized Daesh’s campaigns. Keeping in mind that Yemen is a different theater than the Levant, AQAP’s expansion in the area has been one of gradual encroachment. Yet, like Daesh, AQAP is comprised of opportunists, though they seem much more astute at calibrating logistical boundaries. In contrast to the recent blindsiding of Daesh at the hands of Kurdish Peshmerga fighters, AQAP appears less likely to overextend itself.

AQAP’s Prospects in Yemen

The return of a unified civil authority in Yemen would serve as the most effective counter to AQAP’s expansion. Unfortunately, all signs point to this being unlikely in the immediate future. Terror organizations by definition function in the least observable fringes, generally being unable to expose themselves in the face of disciplined martial and policing oversight. AQAP appears to have picked up steam in Yemen because their status as marginal figures has enabled them to bide their time and emerge only when more powerful factions with governmental roots began engaging one another.

Corralling al-Qaeda’s Yemeni branch has become less of a priority for locals now that Sunni and Shi’ite/Zaydi factions have turned their guns upon each other. Saudi Arabia’s military incursion into Yemen bodes poorly for the defeat of AQAP. Riyadh’s aggression breaks down largely along sectarian lines, with their hostility focused primarily on the Houthi rebels. Recent evidence suggests that AQAP has become an ally of convenience for the House of Al Saud, with terrorist militants fighting alongside Saudi-backed militias during open skirmishes. As long as al-Qaeda remains antagonistic toward the local Shi’ite/Zaydi Muslims of Yemen, AQAP will remain well out of Saudi Arabia’s line of fire. Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, the president of Yemen’s ousted government, currently rules in exile from Riyadh. His ongoing protection under the Saudi banner practically guarantees that the Houthis will have to contend with AQAP as a tactical ally of the kingdom.

Unless the Houthis and their Sunni enemies reach a détente, or one side scores a decisive victory on the ground, AQAP is well poised to continue asserting control over portions of territory in Yemeni hinterlands by simple virtue of exploiting the martial chaos. Peace by any means would constitute the clearest threat to AQAP’s power because this would force local Sunnis to contend with pressure from Washington to either suppress or eliminate the al-Qaeda branch. Considering that the crisis in Yemen is escalating by the day, however, al-Qaeda is likely to sustain its position as a major power in the war-torn country, a thorn in the side of Houthi rebels, and a beacon for militant jihadists.

Adam Patterson is a Washington, DC-based analyst of international security topics, with a special focus on insurgency and conflict in Arab states.

This article is being published in affiliation with Gulf State Analytics

The post Al Qaeda And The Interplay Of Extremist Groups In Yemen appeared first on Politact.

Context 
PoliTact’s Arif Ansar was a guest on a VOA Urdu video program ‘Jehan Rang’ on July 27 hosted by Asad Hassan. The program focused on what to expect from the upcoming second meeting (expected on July 30) of the Afghan peace talks that got initiated in Murree, Pakistan on July 8. The panel also included Stratfor’s adviser for Middle East, South Asian affairs Kamran Bokhari and Pakistan’s former ambassador to Afghanistan Rustam Shah Mohmand.

Various angles of the peace talks were covered, including:

– What are the key demands of the Afghan Taliban?
– Which factions of the Afghan Taliban are taking part in the talks and is there unity amongst the groups?
– What is the role of China and Pakistan in the talks?
– What are the major challenges facing the talks?

Watch the Video

The post Pakistan, China Facilitated Afghan Peace Talks; What To Expect? appeared first on Politact.

While the world attention is focused on Gaza and the seemingly slow undoing of Middle East, another crisis is looming on the horizon. This one has to do with Afghanistan. On his visit to Afghanistan in June, US Secretary of State John Kerry had helped reach an interim agreement, stipulating the recount of all votes, and temporarily raised hopes. Now he is back again to keep the momentum going. Just like in Iraq and Palestine, ‘unity government’ and ‘power sharing’ are also the buzzwords in Afghanistan. With so much polarization, such a set up provides the best hope.

Meanwhile, assessments continue if the Afghan army is ready for the difficult task at hand and the nerves are running high in the aftermath of the Iraq debacle. More and more the reviews are turning bleak. The death of Maj. General Harold Greene in a insider attack this week has once again raised questions about US Afghan strategy.

US policy circles continue to debate the strategic goals for the mission in Afghanistan and if that requires a quick draw down or preservation of what has been achieved so far. With the political and security transition at risk in Afghanistan, high-level diplomatic exchanges have also taken place between US and Pakistan. However, it was the appointment of the Chinese special envoy, Sun Yuxi, for Afghanistan, which was especially noteworthy. As China gets more interested in Afghanistan, it will be watching closely how the Pivot to Asia is evolving, and the Indian role in it.

Analysis

The Good and Bad Taliban

The diplomatic exchanges between Pakistan and US had a lot to do with the long awaited North Waziristan operation, and the accompanied policy change related to Good and Bad Taliban. On the US side, there remains a concern that Pakistan’s military operation has not targeted the Haqqani network, and for the most part its members may have escaped unharmed across the border.

From Pakistan’s side, there has been a strong negation of this viewpoint. The country maintains that it is now going after all brands of extremists. To amply convey its perspective, Pakistan sent its Special Assistant to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs, Tariq Fatemi, to Washington.

Without equal pressure from the Afghan side of the border, most extremists were likely to take refuge there, as has occurred in the past when Pakistan has conducted military operations. As they do, they become someone else’s headache, not Pakistan’s. This approach, however, does include the risk of continued cross border raids in to Pakistan from the Afghan side.

From what one can gather, Pakistan’s emerging strategy is premised on reestablishing its writ over FATA. Due to the unfolding situation of Afghanistan and Middle East, Pakistan finally seems to see the dangerous ramifications of the spreading influence of the non-state actors. If it is ready to revise the policy towards Good Taliban, is another mater.

The US Perspective

While Tariq Fatemi was in Washington, the retiring US Special Representative for Afghanistan Pakistan, James Dobbins was making rounds in the region and also met with senior military officials in Pakistan. He was probably gauging how much unity exists between Pakistan’s civilian and military officials on this significant policy change.

Judging from the joint statement that came out during the visit of John Kerry to India while attending the US-India strategic dialogue, Dobbins agenda with Pakistan may have also included a discussion on the nations posture towards Punjabi or India oriented jihadists (LeT).

China and India

As the Afghan situation becomes more uncertain, China and India are also worried; they both have security and economic interests at stake. While China appointed a special representative for the region, India has indicated it will buy arms from Russia to supply to Afghanistan. The country is also involved in training Afghan security forces, a concern for Pakistan. As a result of the crisis in Ukraine, it would be interesting to see how the Russian position evolves towards Afghanistan.

In a recent discussion on a blog linked to the Council on Foreign Relations, the Chinese involvement was portrayed in a positive light. However, it would be naïve to think that Chinese involvement in Afghanistan is singularly focused on extremism. How the Chinese move correlates with the ‘Pivot to Asia’ needs to be factored in as well. While the Pacific is the home sphere of influence, South and Central Asia represent the other flanks for China as it strives to secure its energy and trade routes.

If India were to become active in the pivot strategy, there is no doubt its security footprint in Afghanistan will not be taken lightly by China. In such a case, India will likely come under considerable pressure for acting as a strategic partner to the West, while at the same time remain a member of the BRICS.

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Context
The new Chinese Premier Li Kegiang made his first official visit to India and Pakistan last week. The trip was watched closely around the globe for what it represented. Pakistan and China have a strategic relation going back decades, and many believe it has taken on an additional significance for the purpose of countering the growing clout of India.

The global politics, and even the weather patterns, are changing so quickly that the ‘all weather’ friendship cannot remain the same either. New factors are constantly causing the equation to evolve.

For one, Sino-Indian trade is growing steadily, and is projected to reach $100 billion in the next two to three years. On the other hand, Pakistan’s trade with India is expected to reach $15 billion. Secondly, irrespective of the security situation of Afghanistan, both China and India are investing heavily in its mineral resources. The Chinese trade activities are taking place despite ongoing border tensions with India and NATO’s presence in Afghanistan. India and China are also the integral members of BRICS, a body many believe is an emerging platform to counter western influence, especially economics, in different parts of the world.

Analysis

China, Indian Investments in Afghanistan

Over the years, China has increased its economic interests in Afghanistan and has invested heavily in exploiting its mineral resources. According to the United States Geological Survey, Afghan mineral reserves are worth $1 trillion dollars. While Afghan sources present this estimate to be around $3 trillion. Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC) and Jiangxi Copper Corporation (JCCL) won the tender in 2008 to develop the copper deposits located in Logar, and is putting in $4.4 billion for this purpose.

In contrast, India is investing up to $11 billion dollars in Afghanistan to mine the Hajigak iron ore. The project involves a consortium of 7 states and many private firms. Reports indicate the Hajigak deposits contain about 1.8 billion tons of ore, with an exceptionally high iron concentration ranging from 61 percent to 64 percent.

However, unlike China, India does not share a border with Afghanistan and the sea route can be expensive. This is why India has been exploring the Pakistani land route for transport of iron ore.

As compared to using the longer Iranian route via Chahbhar, India prefers Pakistan for transporting the ore out and for building a slurry pipeline. While Pakistan approved the trade and transit treaty that allows Afghanistan to send goods to India, it has remained concerned about losing influence in Afghanistan as Indian economic clout increases there.

Mining work is expected to begin in 2014 as the Afghan forces take over the security responsibility of the country. However, there are concerns whether Afghans will be able to provide the needed security.

American Posture

On the other hand, American officials have welcomed these investments in Afghanistan.
“We appreciate very much the significant role that India is playing in Afghanistan. In fact, we see India as kind of the economic linchpin for future,” US Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake informed lawmakers in February during a hearing of Asia and the Pacific Sub-committee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

“As our troops (and) their spending draws down, it’s going to be much more important now to establish a private-sector basis for the Afghan economy and to make a trade-based economy and not an aid-based economy. India is such an important role to play in that,” added Blake.

Meanwhile, US has wanted to keep Iran out of this regional trade, and has preferred the TAPI gas pipeline as oppose to the Iran-Pakistan.

Trade Not Aid and its Implications for Pakistan, Afghanistan

‘Trade not Aid’ has been one of the main demands of Pakistan from US, and now Nawaz Sharif also presented it to the new Chinese Premier. The challenge is while India and China are investing in Afghanistan, they both see Pakistan from a security perspective, and not necessarily as an economic opportunity. With Chinese economic interests growing in Afghanistan, like India, it would also want Pakistan to use its influence in ensuring the security and stability of Afghanistan. This is the same as US and NATO that are depending on Pakistan for withdrawal of its equipment from Afghanistan and to rein in the extremists. The growing dilemma for Pakistan is that while it is being expected to ensure regional security, it is coming at a huge economic cost to the nation.

At the same time, despite insistence from Afghanistan, India and China both have refrained from getting involved directly in the military affairs of the country.

As far as India is concerned, it is not clear if it would continue this posture. Surprisingly, President Hamid Karzai and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang ended up in India at about the same time. Majority of the media sources reported on them as separate visits and did not point to the significance of this coincidence. While Pakistan’s ties have improved with India, but not to the extent to make it oblivious to the occurrence.

The visit of President Karzai to India was meant to solicit more defense equipment and military training from India. The training of Afghan army by India has been a cause of grave concern and a red line for Pakistan. Moreover, Karzai’s trip has taken place in the aftermath of increased tensions on the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

By visiting India first, and while Karzai was there, China is conveying to Pakistan, India and Afghanistan, it gives more importance to the economic and trade relations as oppose to security concerns. The implied message will obviously have a positive influence on their ties with each other. At the same time, the Chinese message is likely to be only valid as long as India does not play a countering role in the American pivot to the Pacific, which ultimately will also determine the fate of BRICS, and the full membership of India and Afghanistan to SCO.

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