Context

In the previous articles, we have been examining the various dimensions of the Arab-Israeli rapprochement that got underway as a consequence of the Abraham Accords, signed during the Trump administration in 2020. As a result, UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco officially recognized Israel.

Progressively alarmed by the growing Chinese involvement in the region, demonstrated by the Chinese facilitated Saudi-Iran Détente reached in March, Biden administration had fasten its efforts to normalize ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel as well. Another factor of concern has been the changing politics of Israel – as Netanyahu seemed to have lost interest with the two-state solution.

During his visit to the US to attend the UN General Assembly meetings in September, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman indicated that the normalization process was moving along well, a sentiment shared at the time by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. However, since the signing of Abraham Accords, the paranoia on the Palestinian side had been mounting. All along, it was not clear what the Accords would mean for the Palestinians. Will it include a statehood for Palestinians and cessation of settlements?

While the first Saudi envoy for Palestinian Authority Nayef al-Sudairi did visit West Bank in September – it proved to be a little late in taming Palestinian concerns, especially Hamas. From a purely Israeli point of view, if the Arab states that have traditionally supported the Palestinian cause, agree to recognize Israel – the leverage of Palestinians in any negotiations is greatly reduced.

Things finally blew up on October 7 when Hamas members stormed into Israel killing almost 1400 and taking about 200 hostages. In reprisal, close to 7,000 Palestinians have been killed to date by Israeli bombardments – and the ground operation is imminent. Fears are growing the Israeli ground operation into Gaza will likely result in Hezbollah also becoming fully entangled, and thus widening the war. Moreover, the street pressure in Sunni Arab capitals is likely to push the respective governments to respond – especially if Iran holds true to its statements of not holding back if Israeli military actions continue.

Since the attack, President Biden has offered full support to Israel towards its aim to  eliminate Hamas, and at the same time he clarified that all Palestinians are not Hamas: “The vast majority of Palestinians are not Hamas. Hamas does not represent the Palestinian people.”

In his October 19 Speech, Biden stated: “History has taught us that when terrorists don’t pay a price for their terror, when dictators don’t pay a price for their aggression, they cause more chaos and death and more destruction.”

“As hard as it is, we cannot give up on peace. We cannot give up on a two-state solution,” Biden added.

Response from BRICS

As opposed to the US, China and Russia have stopped short of blaming Hamas while demanding cease fire and offering to mediate. Both have also affirmed that they’ll coordinate their policy for the Middle East. In essence, their position is close to those adopted by the Arab nations. According to media reports, China’s Middle East envoy Zhai Jun told his Russian counterpart, Mikhail Bogdanov, during his current trip to the region: “The fundamental reason the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has reached its current state is that the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people have not been protected.”

On the other hand, South Africa has adopted a more nuanced approach and has stated that its backing for Palestine cause does not mean it supports Hamas. It generally equates its own experience under apartheid as the same as being experienced by the Palestinians. South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) commented that its Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor got a request to speak with Ismail Haniyeh – and that the call was in line with nations policy to “engage will all parties in facilitating dialogue.”

On the other hand, India seems to have reversed its position of backing the Palestinians and has stood squarely with Israel. One of the reasons for that could be because ruling Bahartiya Janata Party (BJP) has given up any hope of receiving Muslim vote in the election next year. This seems similar to the United States where because of the policies adopted by Democratic Party in the Middle East and South Asia, Democratic American Muslims are thinking to shift in mass to the Republican Party. The dilemma being the Republican Party is even more hard-line when it comes to Iran and the Palestinian Issue. It was during the Trump administration in 2018 that the US decided to transfer its embassy to Jerusalem and withdraw from Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA). The agreement was painstakingly reached during Obama’s tenure. However, Trump did develop good relations with Saudi Arabia and Imran Khan in Pakistan.

India may also be evaluating the postures of the Arab world against Hamas vis a vis the Kashmir situation – and what it terms as cross-border terrorism from Pakistan.

Changing Middle East and South Asia

The recognition of Israel by Saudi Arabia would have represented a titanic event in the Islamic world – especially as it relates to the Core versus the Peripheral Islamic world. As a result of Abraham Accords, Pakistan’s other Arab and GCC allies were moving closer to Israel as well. It would have brought tremendous pressure on the peripheral Islamic nations, especially Pakistan, which takes clues from Saudi Arabia when it comes to the maters of Palestinians. On the one hand, Pakistan is China’s closest strategic partner, which is also expanding ties with Iran.

In earlier assessment, PoliTact had noted: “While most of the GCC nations are autocratic – a broken democracy still exists in Pakistan. Irrespective, under the present circumstances, Saudi recognition of Israel anytime soon, will gravely unsettle the political and security situation of the country, particularly if it were to be accompanied by economic and political pressure from Saudi Arabia, and other GCC nations, to follow suit. As for the timeline, President Biden would want an agreement before the US elections next year.

These high-stake decisions need public debate and political ownership – that are presently missing in Pakistan. In fact, the crackdown against PTI hardly creates a conducive environment to build consensus on these fast moving regional and global changes.”

Since the October 7 attack, the scenario has switched, and the Saudi-Israel normalization has all but collapsed. A whole lot will now depend on if Israel launches a ground operation in Gaza. If the war theater expands, the following pressures are likely to play out for Pakistan:

• Most likely the country will have to side with the Arab world and that will make it stand at odds with US and Israel. Pakistan’s caretaker foreign minister Jalil Abbas Jilani had stated on October 8, “We stand in solidarity with Palestinians and call for an immediate end to the violence and oppression by Israeli occupation forces. A viable and sovereign state of Palestine must be established on the basis of pre-1967 borders and UN resolutions.”
• If Pakistan sides with US and Israel – it will put it at odds with its other ally China, its neighbor Iran, and its own public opinion. A lot will depend on If Iran directly or indirectly intervenes in the conflict – and what position Arab states take at that point. China and Russia will likely both support Iran.
• Moreover, if Pakistan stays idle it would greatly dent its stance on Kashmir. And if in the future India takes a similar approach towards Kashmir – as Israel has now on Gaza – it will gravely complicate options for Pakistan.

The future of Abraham Accords and Saudi-Israel normalization now hangs on if Israel will launch a ground operation in Gaza. Reportedly, President Biden is doing his utmost to restrain Israel – and that was one of the aims of his visit. And if that can be accomplished – then the Palestinians would have to be at the dead center of any future negotiations. In other words, there can be no Arab-Israel normalization without first settling the Palestinian issue.

The post Hamas Attack On Israel, Abraham Accords, And South Asia appeared first on Politact.

Context

The emergent world has become increasingly multi-polar in nature, represented in the form of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). Additionally the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) signifies the interests of Central Asian states, and is thought of as the BRICS security arm. India, Pakistan and Iran maintain an observer status on the SCO and are keen to become its full member. PoliTact has been especially interested in studying the connection between BRICS and the SCO, and their reaction to events in countries impacted by the Arab Spring and their position on the developments of the AfPak region. This article explores these linkages by incorporating the views of Chinese, Russian and Indian scholars and officials.

Understanding the positions of the emerging powers has become paramount, as they will play an increasingly important role in determining the fate of existing and future conflicts.

Analysis

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came into being in 1949 in the aftermath of World War II. The first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay, famously stated the organization’s goal was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” With the end of Cold War and the Warsaw Pact, one of the main premises upon which the NATO military alliance was formulated was gone. The alliance began to look for a new purpose and identity that would keep it united against emerging threats. The war against terror has proven to be one such unifying factor, as has dealing with rogue dictators that threaten western interests, such as Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qaddafi.

The emergent world, however, has become increasingly multi-polar in nature, represented in the form of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). Additionally the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) represents the interests of Central Asian states, and is thought of as the BRICS security arm. India, Pakistan and Iran maintain an observer status on the SCO. PoliTact has been especially interested in studying the connection between BRICS and the SCO, and their reaction to events in countries impacted by the Arab Spring and their position on the developments of the AfPak region.

The cooperation and competition between established and emerging powers is now playing out in key strategic regions of the world, most recently in Libya and Syria. In both cases the positions of BRICS nations were in stark contrast to western powers. In the case of Libya, these nations — including Germany — abstained from voting on the Security Council resolution 1973.

In the recent vote on Syria, Russia and China both vetoed the resolution meant for punishing Syria. The resolution received 9 votes in favor, while India, Brazil, South Africa and Lebanon abstained. Germany this time opted to vote for imposing sanctions on Syria. The role of Turkey, a NATO member, has also been noteworthy. Although it has maintained an aggressive posture towards Israel recently, in the case of Libya and Syria its position has shifted more in line with NATO. This is in contrast to Turkey’s stance towards Iraq war in 2003.

To explore the role of BRICS and SCO towards the AfPak region further, we examined the views expressed at a conference held at the Woodrow Wilson Center in June, titled, BRICS: Shaping the New Global Architecture. We especially focused on the comments of Da Wei, who is the Director of the Presidents Office, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR); Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor in Chief of Russia in Global Affairs; and Inderjit Singh, Professor of National Strategy at the National War College, US National Defense University.

In expressing his views, Da Wei distinguished the role of BRICS countries and the SCO, and avoided making any comparison of the SCO with NATO, or any comment on the role of the SCO in Afghanistan. He clarified that the BRICS are focused on global economic and political affairs while the SCO is more concerned with security issues. He added that BRICS membership is open to other countries and is a forum for emerging powers to dialogue amongst member countries and with other institutions like the SCO. He clarified further that both BRICS and the SCO are not very “strict-tight” organizations.

On the other hand, Fyodor Lukyanov emphasized the role of the SCO in Afghanistan and stated that, “The SCO now is primarily about Afghanistan because this [is] a matter of huge concern for all countries of Central Euro Asia [because of the question of] what will happen in Afghanistan after American and NATO exit, and no body can answer it.” He added that NATO should be very much interested and should encourage the SCO to take over the settlement of this issue and that it’s the only organization that is very well placed to take on this responsibility.

In contrast, while speaking to PoliTact, Dr. Inderjist Singh stressed a regional solution to Afghanistan that includes the interests of India, Russia, China, and Iran. He noted that the invitation recently from Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to Afghan President Hamid Karzai to join the SCO does not carry much significance, as the country cannot yet ensure its own security — and that’s why the role of Pakistan is important. He commented that Pakistan should not attempt to marginalize the interests of the Northern Alliance and India through the Haqqani network because a stable solution for Afghanistan would have to involve regional powers and the route of negotiations would be better than the use of force.

The Chinese are clearly adopting a cautious posture as oppose to the more aggressive Russian stance. These differences in approach are obviously the result of their respective threat perceptions vis-à-vis the United States and Europe.

The future of the US presence in the region was also a central theme on the agenda of the SCO meeting held in mid June in Kazakhstan. At the meeting, President Medvedev commented that the future of Afghanistan was directly relational to security and stability in all SCO countries and most observer countries, and that the SCO must endeavor to increase cooperation and involvement in Afghanistan to try and ensure stability in a post-US scenario.

In a UN Security Council meeting on September 29th, Russia insisted Afghanistan must stay neutral after troops withdraw from the region. Russian deputy ambassador to the UN, Alexander Pankin said, “if Kabul sets a goal of restoring neutrality as early as now, this can ease the reconciliation dialogue with the opposition.” The diplomat told UN members that military means were not enough to stabilize Afghanistan. Pankin criticized NATO’s ineffectiveness in controlling the situation and warned militancy networks could spread to bordering countries. Russia and China both fear the situation in Afghanistan could destabilize the Central Asian states.

On the other hand, India warned on September 30th against hasty withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. India’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Hardeep Singh Puri stated the stability in the region can only be achieved once terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and Taliban are rooted out of Afghanistan. US and Indian interests are no doubt convergent when it comes to the AfPak region, however, India has consistently taken a position against foreign intervention in both Libya and Syria. It is unlikely; the country would maintain the same position when it comes to threats to its security that emanate from the AfPak region.

The resurgence of Germany and Russia including financial constraints have complicated NATO’s future. NATO is facing a serious identity crisis as member nations contemplate how much the often-popular and long war in Afghanistan and the latest air operations in Libya justify national interests- when many nations’ financial systems are under strain. In a rare blunt parting address on Friday, departing US Defense Secretary Robert urged NATO allies of the US to do and pay more to overcome the coalition’s military weaknesses- raising questions over NATO’s position today and its future. The allies need to do some soul-searching in days to come, with Bin Laden killed, many European nations facing slow economic growth, America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan set to begin and tough questions over how long the aerial campaign in Libya can last.

(A variation of this article also appeared in Pakistan Today.)

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In a recent statement, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has said the BRICS nations which comprise of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa will prevent Syria from following down the path of Libya. He called for the UN Security Council to demand for an end to violence in the country. Lavrov said that BRICS members opposed EU moves to impose sanctions on Syria calling them harmful and ineffective.

The EU, which buys 95 percent of Syrian oil, has imposed an oil embargo against Syria, and has threatened further sanctions, in a move to force President Assad’s regime to give up power.

The post Russia: BRICS To Prevent Syria From Going Down Libya’s Path appeared first on Politact.