By Arif Ansar

Context

In the aftermath of the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021—formalized through the Doha Accords of 2020—South Asia has entered an entirely new and volatile phase. The Taliban’s return to power, their continued lack of international recognition, and the deepening conflict along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border have collectively reshaped the region’s geopolitical contours. What once was envisaged as an American “peace deal” has since evolved into a crucible of power rivalries, ideological contestations, and security dilemmas extending far beyond Kabul.

Amid this changing landscape, Washington finds itself confronting an old question in a new era: What strategic interests does the United States still have at stake in Afghanistan? This question gained renewed urgency after the tragic shooting near the White House on the eve of Thanksgiving in 2025, when Rahmanullah Lakanwal—a former Afghan supporter of U.S. forces who immigrated under the Protect America Operation—opened fire, killing two National Guard members. The attack, still under investigation, reignited the debate about the consequences of U.S. disengagement from Afghanistan and the enduring ripple effects of America’s two-decade military presence.

To assess these evolving dynamics, The Middle East Institute (MEI) collaborated with PoliTact to host a Webinar in November last year to explore these aspects centered around the evolving situation of Afghanistan and if merits a fresh policy and approach. Earlier in May, soon after the four-day conflict between Pakistan and India, MEI also conducted a discussion with regional experts to assess President Trump’s policy towards Taliban. Both discussions were moderated by Dr. Marvin Weibnbaum, the Director of Afghanistan-Pakistan Center.

Through these deliberations, a sobering consensus emerged: the U.S. has abandoned its nation-building ambition, replacing it with a strictly transactional and selective engagement guided by short-term counterterrorism and strategic interests. This shift marks a watershed in South Asian geopolitics—one in which regional powers like Pakistan, India, China, and Russia are recalibrating alliances, while the Taliban’s regime struggles to define its sovereignty amid growing internal fractures and international isolation.

Counterterrorism and Pragmatism

According to panelists such as Joshua White and David Sedney, Washington’s current strategy toward South Asia is driven not by ideology or doctrine but by political expediency. The United States, still wary of being drawn into another endless conflict, now prefers “quick interventions that can be framed as political wins” without the burden of prolonged commitments. At the heart of this approach lies counterterrorism (CT)—the only enduring U.S. interest in Afghanistan. The Taliban, Washington, and Pakistan paradoxically, share a common adversary: the Islamic State–Khorasan Province (ISKP). While formal cooperation remains limited, intelligence coordination to prevent ISKP attacks has emerged as a rare channel of pragmatic engagement. Adjunct Professor at George Town University, Doug London, underscored this convergence, observing that neither Washington nor the Taliban can afford an al-Qaeda-style attack “with fingerprints all over Afghanistan.” Thus, even hostile actors find themselves bound by mutual survival instincts.

Another dimension of U.S. engagement is transactional diplomacy—a pragmatic mechanism aimed at resolving targeted issues such as hostage recovery and retrieval of left-behind military assets. As former Afghan ambassador Javid Ahmad explained, these dealings often blur ethical lines; American captives have been freed in exchange for concessions, including the removal of Haqqani Network bounties. Similarly, billions of dollars’ worth of infrastructure and equipment left during the withdrawal remain part of simmering behind-the-scenes negotiations—either to buy back through intermediaries like Pakistan or to ensure their destruction to prevent exploitation.

Pakistan’s position in this matrix is particularly complex. While the U.S. remains a visible interlocutor, Islamabad’s deepest strategic alignment continues to be with China. Pakistan leverages Washington’s engagement as a counterbalance against overreliance on Beijing. According to the panelists, efforts to “reset” U.S.-Pakistan relations on the basis of trade, minerals, and counterterrorism cooperation may refresh dialogue but are unlikely to override hard security realities.

Human Rights and the Counterterrorism Dilemma

The Taliban’s domestic policies, particularly toward women and civil society, continue to complicate U.S. engagement. As Lisa Curtis observed, the regime has demonstrated “no change in policies” from its 1990s practices—the repression of women and stifling of dissent remain total. This poses a moral and strategic crisis for Washington: how to cooperate on counterterrorism while refusing to legitimize a regime that flagrantly violates human rights.

Curtis argued that sacrificing principles for intelligence access risks undermining long-term stability, as repression fuels extremism by creating ungoverned spaces ripe for recruitment. Yet London countered that, in practice, the U.S. often cooperates with regimes that commit abuses when it aligns with national interests, effectively separating human rights advocacy from realpolitik.

The delicate balance between moral credibility and strategic necessity defines Washington’s Afghan dilemma—where human rights concerns, while loudly voiced, often take a back seat to the imperatives of terrorism prevention.

The TTP Factor

When U.S. troops exited Afghanistan, many in Pakistan assumed the Taliban’s ascension would enhance Islamabad’s regional leverage. Instead, the opposite has occurred. The enduring ties between the Afghan Taliban and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have emerged as the central source of cross-border friction, destabilizing Pakistan more than any external actor.

Since the short but intense four-day war between Pakistan and India in May 2025, border skirmishes between the Taliban and Pakistani forces have intensified, reflecting a broader regional unraveling. Analysts such as Sedney describe these clashes as a subtext of the larger India-Pakistan rivalry, with each side using Afghan soil as a pressure valve for strategic signaling. Yet a full-scale Taliban-Pakistan war remains improbable. Pakistan’s military, with its overwhelming technological and nuclear superiority, could decimate Taliban forces—but at the risk of provoking a drawn-out insurgency it cannot control. The Taliban, aware of this asymmetry, prefer hybrid tactics, allowing the TTP to wage low-intensity proxy warfare inside Pakistan.

The Taliban dismiss Islamabad’s demands to curb the TTP, calling it a “domestic problem”. This refusal underscores their ideological kinship and the shared ambition to see Pakistan’s border tribal belt revert to Taliban-style Sharia governance. Ahmad warned that this dynamic is perilous: the TTP’s suicide battalions possess the capacity to incite urban terror within Pakistan, amplifying the country’s internal vulnerabilities.

Behind these clashes lies a larger ideological project—the Taliban’s belief, shared by TTP hardliners, that regional power is shifting back to the “Islamic Emirate” model. Sedney noted that radical circles envision a future, within a generation, where Pakistan and even India could see Taliban-like movements ascend. Whether delusional or strategic, this belief animates the persistence of militancy and shapes Islamabad’s deepening anxiety.

US Leverages and Pakistan’s Regime Change Dilemma

The question of whether the U.S. or Pakistan can leverage internal Taliban factionalism looms large. Within the movement, a pragmatic Haqqani network faction favors economic engagement and limited U.S. cooperation, while the isolationist Kandahar faction, led by Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada, rejects dependency and seeks autonomy. Although tensions exist, Akhundzada maintains ultimate control, preventing visible fragmentation that might invite civil war. For Pakistan, frustration with the Taliban’s defiance has sparked talk of supporting Afghan resistance groups. Yet Ahmad warns this path is fraught: funding insurgency would demand resources, while the disunited Afghan opposition lacks both cohesion and stamina.

Consequently, Islamabad’s strategy has shifted from influence to contingency—exploiting Taliban divisions when advantageous, but no longer betting on a “friendly” Kabul. As White put it, the myth of a compliant, pro-Pakistan “Pashtun leadership” in Afghanistan has always been just that—a myth. This reality has spurred a profound shift in mindset within Pakistan’s government. No longer divided between the “good Taliban” and “bad Taliban,” Islamabad increasingly sees a spectrum of “bad and worse Taliban.”

At an event held at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in February, 2022, the Special Representative for Afghanistan at the time, Tom West, had discussed the economic leverages US still holds and commented that Afghan Taliban has shown the least interest in future cooperation with the US in fulling the terms of their side of the Doha Accord. At the same time, West noted that US is not supporting any opposition to Afghan Taliban and is advising other nations to refrain from that, but some will do that sooner or later if Taliban does not show urgency. Answering a question, he commented that many players are realizing that not having US engagement in Afghanistan is not in their interest.

Regional Rivalries and Great Power Calculus

Beyond the Pakistan-Taliban binary, regional power competition has turned Afghanistan into a geopolitical chessboard once again. None of the major powers—China, Russia, India, or the U.S.—wants a total state collapse, yet each pursues a distinct agenda. India, for its part, has pivoted sharply. As Curtis noted, New Delhi is now actively courting elements within the Taliban to undermine Pakistan’s influence. The May 2025 conflict with Pakistan demonstrated India’s willingness to strike deep into Pakistani territory, signaling a readiness to rewrite the traditional escalation playbook.

Meanwhile, China and Russia tread cautiously. For Beijing, the overriding concern is protecting multibillion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) investments from militant spillover. Russia, despite its history of confrontation with Islamist movements, maintains unpublicized CT cooperation with the Taliban to prevent ISKP’s expansion into Central Asia. Trump’s renewed engagement with Central Asian leaders under the “C5+1 initiative”—focused on strategic minerals—has further rattled Moscow and Beijing, who view it as U.S. encroachment upon their regional sphere of influence.

Panelists such as White and Karp noted that China now holds more extensive economic leverage in both Pakistan and Afghanistan than any other actor. Despite attempts to mediate between them, Beijing’s balancing efforts have faltered. Nonetheless, economic interdependence has rendered China an unwilling stakeholder in both states’ stability.

For the Taliban, the Great Power rivalry offers an opportunity. In an assessment, PoliTact noted last year: “As Afghan Taliban celebrate 4^th year in power, the nation now finds itself at a crossroads of competing currents. The net effect is a cautious, multi-prong stance: keep Iranian channels open for trade and energy, nurture Indian economic alternatives through Chabahar, avoid burning bridges with Pakistan as it courts Washington, and remain pragmatically receptive to Chinese infrastructure where it serves Afghan interests.”

Javid Ahmad observed, the regime seeks “economic neutrality,” extracting benefits from all sides while avoiding puppeteering by any. Pragmatic factions engage Russia and China for investment; hardliners in Kandahar, wary of foreign intentions, prefer cautious distance. This balancing act defines Kabul’s foreign policy—a tactical survival strategy that keeps all powers interested, but none dominant.

Containment Over Resolution: The U.S. Strategic Dilemma

Dr. Weinbaum summarized the prevailing expert view succinctly: “There is no military solution to the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict—only conflict management.” After decades of direct engagement, the U.S. now acts as a remote balancer, occasionally intervening diplomatically but avoiding deep entanglement. Washington’s immediate goal is not victory, but containment: preventing Afghanistan’s collapse while denying extremist sanctuaries the freedom to orchestrate global terror. This means sustaining aid and limited engagement but conditioning every form of support on verifiable security behavior.

Panelists urged regional coordination involving China, Turkey, and Qatar, whose economic leverage could pressure the Taliban to restrain the TTP. However, as Karp pointed out, both Turkey and Qatar’s favoritism toward Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated movements complicates their credibility as neutral mediators.

Ahmad cautioned that the U.S. must abandon the pursuit of ideological “unicorns” and embrace pragmatic realpolitik—dealing with actors as they are, not as Washington wishes them to be. The mantra, he argued, should be “leverage first, ideals later.” Delayed engagement only increases risks of ungoverned chaos, but overreaction could trap the U.S. in another open-ended quagmire.

The Perpetual Balancing Act

As of 2025, U.S. policy in South Asia has evolved into a delicate balancing act—a calculated choreography between engagement and restraint. America’s current presence is limited but consequential: intelligence links, sporadic negotiations, and cautious cooperation with regional allies. Yet looming questions remain. If Afghanistan once again becomes a safe haven for transnational terrorist networks, what tools does Washington have to respond? Under Trump’s renewed mandate, analysts predict the U.S. would double down on counterterrorism partnerships—especially with Pakistan and India—to prevent another 9/11-style surprise.

However, as India’s outreach to the Taliban deepens, it risks entrenching the very militant alignments that destabilize Pakistan and jeopardize U.S.-Pakistan rapprochement. Such dynamics may inadvertently revive the ideological monster once defeated by the War on Terror. Moreover, the Taliban’s tacit encouragement of TTP demands—such as reversing Pakistan’s merger of tribal areas and enforcing Sharia law—threatens to seed an insurgent domino effect. This could erode Islamabad’s internal cohesion and ripple across borders, complicating U.S. peace efforts from Gaza to Central Asia. Trump’s Taliban policy would require broader public ownership of Pakistan’s CT strategy and preventing the budding India-Afghan ties from destabilizing Pakistan and the rejuvenated US-Pakistan ties.

Related Articles:

The Unbroken Alliance: Why the Afghan Taliban-TTP Nexus Is Dooming Peace with Pakistan – Nov 4, 2025
The Fragile Truce Between Pakistan And Afghanistan And The War Of Narratives – Nov 2, 2025
Afghanistan’s Strategic Outlook And New Geopolitical Realities – Aug 18, 2025
Afghanistan, Pakistan Relations and Great Power Rivalry – Jul 21, 2025
Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions, Trump, And Wakhan Corridor – Feb 3, 2025
Political Or Military Solution; Pakistan’s New Counter-Terrorism Operation Azm-e-Istehkam – Aug 1, 2024
Convergences in US Pakistan Ties and Afghanistan – Jan 1, 2024
Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP – Feb 22, 2023
Post Withdrawal Campaign Against Extremism In Afghanistan And US-Pakistan Relations – Sep 7, 2022
Emerging US Policy Towards Afghanistan After Withdrawal – March 2, 2022
Recalibrating The US-Pakistan Partnership In Afghanistan – Jun 22, 2021
US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden – Mar 2, 2021

The post The Future Of Afghan Taliban-Pakistan Conflict: Implications For Regional Stability And US Interests appeared first on Politact.

PoliTact’s Issue Brief

By Naade Ali

Context

After several rounds of intensive negotiations mediated by Qatar and Türkiye, Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to extend their ceasefire despite failing to achieve a major breakthrough. The decision followed a series of fierce cross-border clashes that caused heavy casualties on both sides. According to Türkiye’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, both countries also consented to establish a monitoring and verification mechanism to ensure the ceasefire’s implementation and to penalize any violations.

The latest round of talks in Istanbul followed the initial negotiations held in Doha, where Islamabad and Kabul first agreed to an immediate ceasefire and the creation of frameworks to consolidate peace and stability. During the Doha meeting, Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif and Afghanistan’s Acting Defense Minister Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob Mujahid signed a bilateral agreement prohibiting either country’s forces from targeting the other’s military, civilians, or critical infrastructure, while pledging mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Analysis

Throughout the negotiation process, several details have surfaced that expose the deep-seated fault lines underpinning the conflict between the two neighbors. Although cross-border hostilities have paused, a “war of narratives” has emerged in the aftermath of the Istanbul talks, with both Kabul and Islamabad accusing each other of distorting facts. Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid accused Pakistan’s military of fueling instability to pave the way for a U.S. return to Bagram Air Base, claiming Islamabad’s actions aim to create chaos. He said the Taliban do not trust Pakistan’s assurances of peaceful relations, adding that Pakistan’s demand for the Taliban to prevent militant attacks inside its territory was unrealistic. Mujahid also criticized Pakistan’s defense minister for making “threatening remarks” during the Istanbul talks, warning that “Afghans should never be spoken to in the language of threats.”

The principal point of contention remains the two sides’ differing perceptions of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which Islamabad designates as a terrorist organization and refers to as Fitna al-Khawarij—“deviant rebels sowing chaos.” Mujahid denied the presence of TTP leaders in Afghanistan, asserting that those identified by Pakistan were merely “Pakistani refugees” returning home. The Afghan side even offered to facilitate their repatriation, a claim Pakistan dismissed as deliberately distorted. Pakistan’s Information Ministry clarified that Islamabad had demanded action against militants operating from Afghan soil and, when Kabul insisted those individuals were Pakistani nationals, proposed that they be handed over via designated border posts.

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s Foreign Office stated that the Taliban regime had effectively admitted the presence of TTP and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan, offering various justifications for not taking action against them. In a separate statement, Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif accused the Taliban regime of “treacherous and barbaric patronization of India-sponsored terrorism,” asserting that Pakistan harbored “no illusions” about Kabul’s intentions. Asif described the Taliban government as non-representative, deeply divided, and repressive toward Afghanistan’s ethnic minorities, women, and civil society. Amid these tensions, Pakistan is seeking a binding written agreement conditioning its cooperation on the Taliban’s commitment to prevent TTP from using Afghan territory for attacks. Asif stated that lasting peace would require the Taliban to end its support for the TTP, enforce a long-term ceasefire, and facilitate the repatriation of Afghan refugees.

The Taliban, however, rejected Asif’s characterization, insisting that the TTP issue is an internal matter for Pakistan. Doubts persist over the durability of the ceasefire and its ability to address the entrenched mistrust between the two countries. Anti-Pakistan and anti-Afghanistan sentiment has increasingly become part of national discourse on both sides, rapidly translating into broader social polarization. The growing hostility suggests that the prospects for durable peace or a return to normalcy between Islamabad and Kabul remain distant.

The Future of Ceasefire

Highlighting the fragility of the deal, Khawaja Asif cautioned that its success depends on the Taliban’s capacity to restrain militants targeting Pakistan. “Anything coming from Afghanistan will be a violation of this agreement,” he said, defending Pakistan’s right to carry out cross-border strikes. “They are in Kabul. They are everywhere. Wherever they are, we will attack them. Kabul is not a no-go area.” Asif emphasized that the ceasefire applies only to the Afghan Taliban and does not extend to the TTP, reaffirming that Islamabad will not negotiate with the group.

In response to Pakistan’s repeated threats of cross-border action, the Taliban have issued a strong warning through Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, asserting that Afghanistan would not tolerate any violation of its sovereignty. Haqqani cautioned that any aggression or incursion by Pakistan would be met with firm resistance, declaring, “If anyone attacks or invades our country, we will defend it. Our history speaks volumes about how Afghanistan has dealt with aggressors.” His remarks reflected the Taliban’s growing frustration over Islamabad’s rhetoric and underscored Kabul’s resolve to respond militarily if Pakistan carries out further strikes inside Afghan territory

Against this backdrop, it is unlikely that the agreement will substantially resolve Pakistan’s growing terrorism challenge. While ongoing tensions between the two countries offer no clear advantage to either side, they continue to hinder development and progress. Before the escalation, there were hopes that Afghanistan might participate in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Such economic interdependence, following the Chinese model, could have created a win-win scenario, reducing the likelihood of conflict and fostering regional collaboration. However, that prospect now appears increasingly remote.

As Pakistan enters Phase Two of CPEC and the U.S. begins investing in its critical minerals sector, Islamabad cannot afford to let terrorism persist. The Pakistani military faces mounting pressure from China, whose personnel and infrastructure have already come under attack. If any such incident were to occur with American ventures, it would have severe repercussions for Pakistan’s security apparatus and its relations with Washington. Hence, countering terrorism has become a top priority for the Pakistani military, which aims to ensure a secure environment for foreign investors in the country’s vast mineral resources.

The current ceasefire with Afghanistan is viewed as Pakistan’s last opportunity to compel the Afghan Taliban to reconsider their stance toward the TTP. However, if the Taliban fail to act, the situation could deteriorate further. The prospect of a wider Pakistan-Afghanistan confrontation cannot be ruled out, particularly as Kabul and New Delhi draw closer. India has recently upgraded its technical mission in Kabul to a full embassy, and last year, Indian Minister of External Affairs J.P. Singh held a landmark meeting with Taliban Defense Minister Mullah Yaqoob, who expressed hopes for enhanced defense ties with India.

Islamabad is concerned that the warming diplomatic relations between India and Afghanistan could evolve into security cooperation, extending Pakistan’s threat landscape. Pakistan has accused India of waging a low-intensity proxy war through Afghanistan, alleging that New Delhi aims to keep Islamabad preoccupied on both its eastern and western fronts.

Nonetheless, these developments reflect Islamabad’s deepening insecurity and impatience toward Kabul and raise the possibility that any India-Afghanistan defense cooperation could be perceived by Islamabad as a direct threat to its own security, potentially drawing the two countries into a broader conflict. Without addressing these core issues, any ceasefire will remain fragile, and true peace between the two neighbors, crucial to regional stability, will remain out of reach.

Related Articles:

Afghanistan’s Strategic Outlook And New Geopolitical Realities – Aug 18, 2025
Afghanistan, Pakistan Relations and Great Power Rivalry – Jul 21, 2025
Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions, Trump, And Wakhan Corridor – Feb 3, 2025
Political Or Military Solution; Pakistan’s New Counter-Terrorism Operation Azm-e-Istehkam – Aug 1, 2024
Convergences in US Pakistan Ties and Afghanistan – Jan 1, 2024
Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP – Feb 22, 2023
Post Withdrawal Campaign Against Extremism In Afghanistan And US-Pakistan Relations – Sep 7, 2022
Emerging US Policy Towards Afghanistan After Withdrawal – March 2, 2022
Recalibrating The US-Pakistan Partnership In Afghanistan – Jun 22, 2021
US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden – Mar 2, 2021

The post The Fragile Truce Between Pakistan And Afghanistan And The War Of Narratives appeared first on Politact.

Policy Brief – Analysis of Perceptions and Perspectives

Navigating India, Pakistan, Iran, and U.S. Pressures

Context

Afghanistan’s strategic outlook is undergoing a dramatic overhaul amid escalating connectivity disputes, geopolitical realignments, and regional conflicts. The combined pressures of India–Pakistan instability, U.S. trade friction with India, Iran-Israel hostilities, and Pakistan’s rising diplomatic leverage are forcing Kabul into a balanced posture—nurturing Indian, Iranian, Chinese, and Pakistani ties while maintaining neutrality in broader conflicts.

Fallout from the India–Pakistan Escalation

The recent missile and drone escalation between India and Pakistan, while brief, sent strong ripples across Afghanistan’s strategic thinking. For Kabul, the clashes underscored both the volatility of its neighborhood and the fragility of its trade lifelines. Afghanistan’s heavy dependence on Pakistani corridors for access to Indian markets became immediately apparent when border closures stranded hundreds of trucks and brought transit under the Afghanistan–Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement to a halt. This economic disruption has reinforced the Taliban government’s determination to diversify its trade routes and reduce over reliance on Pakistan, with particular focus on accelerating use of Iran’s Chabahar port—an initiative backed by India and bolstered by Kabul’s recent investment in the facility.

Diplomatically, Afghanistan responded with a careful balancing act, calling for restraint on both sides while deepening engagement with India. Meetings earlier in 2025 between Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi and Indian officials signaled a renewed willingness to explore closer economic ties, particularly through the Chabahar route, which would allow Afghanistan to bypass Pakistani territory entirely. This outreach also served to assert Kabul’s independence in regional diplomacy, reducing the perception of Pakistan as the sole gateway for Afghan connectivity.

At the same time, China seized the moment to mediate and position itself as an economic partner. Through Chinese facilitation in June 2025, Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed to restore ambassador-level diplomatic ties, with Kabul invited to formally participate in the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This not only offered Afghanistan access to infrastructure funding and regional integration but also came with commitments from the Taliban to address Pakistan’s concerns over cross-border militancy—particularly activity by the Pakistani Taliban (TTP). While Afghan officials have long denied harboring such groups, the inclusion of security assurances in the deal signaled a cautious willingness to engage on this sensitive issue.

However, the credibility of these pledges remains under scrutiny. Pakistan continues to voice concerns about militant sanctuaries on Afghan soil, and incidents of TTP-linked violence persist. For Afghanistan, managing this security profile will be central to sustaining the diplomatic thaw with Islamabad and maximizing the economic benefits of regional projects like CPEC.

In the end, the India–Pakistan conflict served as both a warning and an opportunity for Afghanistan. It highlighted the risks of over-dependence on a single trade corridor, incentivized diversification through Iranian and Indian partnerships, and opened doors for Chinese-backed connectivity initiatives. Yet, it also reinforced that regional credibility is not solely a function of military capability but also of sustained economic reliability and security cooperation.

US-India Economic Tensions

Against this backdrop, rising trade tensions between the United States and India are adding another layer of complexity to South Asia’s connectivity politics. Washington’s imposition of tariffs of up to 50% on Indian exports—including textiles, jewelry, and footwear—is expected to slow India’s growth, intensify pressure on its export industries, and strain the once-warm personal rapport between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and former President Donald Trump. The tariff amount includes 25% penalty for importing Russian oil and military equipment – and thus energizing its war machine in Ukraine. In response, India has delayed certain U.S. defense procurements, expanded outreach to BRICS partners, and signaled a more assertive, independent foreign policy stance.

For Afghanistan, this shift may mean a more determined Indian push to limit Kabul’s integration into China-led connectivity projects like CPEC. In the aftermath of the May 2025 India–Pakistan clashes, Indian strategists are reportedly concerned that closer Afghan–China ties could deepen Pakistan’s leverage in the region. New Delhi’s outreach to Kabul—centered on expanding trade via Chabahar—fits within this broader effort to offer alternatives to Chinese-backed corridors.

Yet, India’s evolving stance is not entirely about containment. Modi is expected to travel to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin from August 31 to September 1—his first visit since the deadly 2020 Galwan Valley clashes. The visit comes amid signs of a tentative thaw in relations, including the resumption of direct flights, new pilgrimage agreements, and eased Chinese export restrictions to India. While Modi’s presence at the SCO will be closely watched, Indian analysts stress this is not a wholesale pivot toward Beijing but rather an exercise in strategic autonomy—leveraging engagement with China to balance U.S. pressure without committing to China’s broader geopolitical vision.

For Pakistan, India’s maneuvering presents a mixed picture. On one hand, a more China-friendly India could soften some of the sharpest India–Pakistan tensions in multilateral forums. On the other, if India doubles down on keeping Afghanistan out of CPEC’s orbit, Islamabad could see increased competition for influence in Kabul. For Afghanistan, the outcome will likely hinge on whether New Delhi’s engagement translates into viable alternatives to Chinese-backed connectivity—or whether it remains largely symbolic in the face of China’s economic weight.

In short, the twin developments of India–Pakistan border tensions and U.S.–India trade frictions are accelerating New Delhi’s pursuit of a multi-vector foreign policy: resisting over-dependence on Washington, engaging with Beijing when tactically useful, and asserting itself more forcefully in regional connectivity debates involving Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Iran and Tensions in the Middle East

The June Iran–Israel war and the continuing Gaza crisis have spilled into Afghanistan’s neighborhood in very tangible ways. Iran’s internal security clampdown after the twelve-day war coincided with a surge in forced returns of Afghans from Iran—UNHCR estimated average daily deportations jumped to roughly 30,000 per day during the fighting—creating new humanitarian strain on western Afghanistan and exposing Kabul’s dependence on cross-border labor flows.

Politically, the Taliban sought a posture of guarded alignment with Tehran without direct entanglement: Kabul condemned Israeli strikes (and later U.S.) on Iran while calling for regional restraint—signals aimed at maintaining Iranian goodwill for trade and transit via the Chabahar route, but also at avoiding open confrontation with larger powers.

Against this volatile backdrop, a rare and highly symbolic development occurred: Pakistan Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir was invited for a private lunch at the White House—a groundbreaking move that was quickly interpreted as a U.S. outreach toward Islamabad during rising Middle East tensions. As Trump reportedly praised Munir for helping avert an outright war with India, he also acknowledged Pakistan’s crucial insight into the Iran–Israel conflict—signaling potential U.S. interest in leveraging Pakistani mediation efforts in a region on the brink of broader conflict.

Munir’s meeting—and Pakistan’s positioning—reflect Islamabad’s growing role as an interlocutor in the Iran–Israel standoff, balancing ties with both Tehran and Washington while contending with regional instability. Islamabad has publicly condemned Israeli strikes on Iran and underscored the need for diplomatic solutions, deepening its appeal as mediator.

At the same time, the Iran-Israeli tensions and Pakistan’s growing diplomatic role complicates Afghanistan’s reliance on the Chabahar Port as an alternative trade route to Pakistan, which US had previously exempted from sanctions on Iran. The Port is being developed by Iran in partnership with India. President Trump has already conveyed his dismay to India for buying oil from Russia, benefiting the country in sustaining its policies towards Ukraine. Some experts claim that if the high-stake meeting between President Trump and Putin goes well on August 15, the pressure on India will likely ease as well.

Conclusion

As Afghan Taliban celebrate 4^th year in power, the nation now finds itself at a crossroads of competing currents. The net effect is a cautious, multi-prong stance: keep Iranian channels open for trade and energy, nurture Indian economic alternatives through Chabahar, avoid burning bridges with Pakistan as it courts Washington, and remain pragmatically receptive to Chinese infrastructure where it serves Afghan interests. In practice, that means neutral rhetoric on Middle East tensions, practical cooperation with Iran on border management amid deportations, and transactional engagement with India, Pakistan, and China to keep multiple corridors viable despite shifting great-power winds. However, as it stands now, U.S. pressure on Iran and India have restricted options for Afghanistan.

Related Articles:

The post Afghanistan’s Strategic Outlook And New Geopolitical Realities appeared first on Politact.

By Naade Ali

Context

Afghanistan is once again at the dead center of great power rivalries. The then Soviet Union departed Afghanistan in 1989 abandoning the quest for access to warm waters and subsequently losing the Cold War, and then US left in 2021 after claiming to have achieved the primary goals of War Against Extremism.

The departure of U.S. from Afghanistan did not mean that it did no longer had any interests left in the country. It made sure to maintain over the horizon counter-terror capabilities. While the government of Pakistan at the time facilitated the peace talks between the US and Afghanistan and the withdrawal that followed – it was reluctant to offer further assistance as it related to fighting terrorists in Afghanistan. Many believe, this led to the fall of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government in Pakistan.

As the balance of power tussles escalate, with the US on the one side, and Russia and China on the other, the significance of Afghanistan is fast changing. The UN General Assembly recently adopted a resolution despite US objections, and abstentions of China, Russia, India and Iran, and with 116 nations including Pakistan voting in favor. The resolution calls on Taliban to reverse their growing oppression of women and girls and eliminate all terrorist organizations operating from its soil.

On the other hand, Russia that emerged from the ashes of Soviet Union, became the first country in the world to officially recognize Afghanistan on July 3rd, as US removed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which now is in power in Syria, from its list of terrorist organizations. This was after quick Western legitimation of Islamic authorities in Syria led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, a former al Qaeda member. Meanwhile, China congratulated Russia for recognizing Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan with it foreign ministry commenting, Afghanistan “should not be excluded from the international community”. Earlier in January 2024, China had recognized Bilal Karimi, as an official envoy to Beijing out of security concerns and economic interests.

The international configuration formulated in the aftermath of 9/11 to fight the Global War on Terror (GWOT) appears to be dismantling with the potential reemergence of traditional game play of ‘proxy wars.’ While US stance towards Afghan Islamic Emirate appears to be easing since the withdrawal, it does not look any closer to bestow recognition.

Where Does US Stand on Afghanistan?

Although the U.S. removed a $10 million bounty on Sirajuddin Haqqani, State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce clarified recently that many Taliban leaders remain designated terrorists and that this position remains unchanged. This statement came in the wake of a U.S. delegation’s visit to Kabul in March, where they secured the release of American hostages and held important meetings with Taliban leadership. During the meetings, the Taliban expressed their interest in re-engaging with the U.S. and resetting bilateral ties. They offered to reopen the U.S. embassy in Kabul in exchange for the transfer of control of the Afghan Embassy in Washington to the Taliban government.

Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi has repeatedly called on Washington to engage with the Taliban administration—a message he reiterated during trips to Saudi Arabia and Qatar in April. Muttaqi, explaining his interaction with American counterparts, said that during their discussions, he dismissed concerns about instability and the Taliban’s perceived lack of public support. He asserted, “No power can control Afghanistan without the support of its people. This truth must be acknowledged, and engagement with this government must take place.” He further argued that Taliban rule has brought enhanced internal stability and cautioned that any effort to weaken their government could lead to renewed instability in Afghanistan, threatening broader regional peace and security.

Despite the Taliban’s diplomatic overtures, the Trump administration has so far ruled out the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul or the formal recognition of the interim Taliban government. State Department spokesperson Bruce stated , “The United States does not recognize any entity as the government of Afghanistan and therefore has no plans to allow for the reopening of its embassy.” National Security Council spokesperson James Hewitt reinforced this stance, saying, “We have made no commitments regarding the Afghan Embassy in Washington, and there are no discussions underway concerning the status of the U.S. Embassy compound in Kabul.”

Pakistan-U.S. Pressure on Taliban

Washington’s continued refusal to recognize the Taliban regime is also widely seen as part of a coordinated counterterrorism understanding with Pakistan, aimed at pressuring the Taliban to break its ties with the internationally designated terrorist groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Pakistan has raised concerns about the U.S.-weapons left behind during the American withdrawal falling into the hands of terrorist organizations. A Washington Post report revealed that the perpetrators of the March Jaffar Express train attack in Balochistan used these abandoned U.S. weapons. Although President Trump had previously threatened to permanently suspend U.S. aid to Afghanistan unless the Taliban returned the military equipment, the Taliban flatly rejected the demand, declaring that the remaining American weapons “now belong to the Taliban and will not be returned.”

However, recent developments suggest a significant shift in the Taliban’s stance as U.S. and Pakistani pressure intensifies. In a phone call between U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar reported in April, both leaders underscored the urgency of neutralizing the threat posed by these weapons. Shortly after, Pakistan’s special envoy for Afghanistan, Muhammad Sadiq Khan, issued a stern warning that “all deals with Afghanistan are off” if the Taliban failed to address Islamabad’s terrorism concerns. He then traveled to Kabul to participate in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Joint Coordination Committee (JCC), aimed at restarting dialogue and addressing key security issues, particularly the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) threat.

According to media reports, the Taliban leadership has, for the first time, shown signs of flexibility suggesting a potential policy shift in response to Pakistan’s demands. Analysts point to mounting pressure from both Washington and Islamabad, including U.S. aid suspension and Pakistan’s mass expulsion of Afghan refugees, as key factors forcing the Taliban to reconsider their approach. With limited capacity to manage a large influx of returning refugees, the Taliban government now face the risk of a deepening humanitarian crisis. On the other hand, with the on-going tensions between Iran and Israel in the Middle East, Iran has also started deporting undocumented Afghan immigrants.

Afghanistan-India and U.S.

At the same time, growing Indian engagement in Afghanistan warrants equal attention. As a key U.S. strategic partner, India—owing to its improving ties with the Taliban regime—is well positioned to tap into Afghanistan’s vast mineral reserves, including rare earth elements vital for semiconductor manufacturing. With India striving to become a global semiconductor hub in collaboration with the U.S., Afghanistan could serve as a crucial resource partner. India’s trade with Afghanistan has already hit a record $642.29 million in 2023–24, according to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

If India succeeds in establishing a firm strategic and economic presence in Afghanistan, the U.S. could advance its goal of curbing China’s growing influence in Central Asia—without reintroducing a military footprint. Washington is well placed to leverage its bilateral relationships with both India and Pakistan in this context. While continuing to support Pakistan in counter-terrorism operations, the U.S. may once again delegate regional security responsibilities to Islamabad.

At the same time, it could enable India to expand its geo-economic role in Afghanistan, effectively advancing U.S. interests. This dual-track strategy—outsourcing security to Pakistan and economic engagement to India—offers a cost-effective, high-return approach for the U.S., especially when Trump prefers limited, transactional relations with South Asia. With larger foreign policy priorities elsewhere, this model allows Washington to remain influential in the region without committing significant resources.

U.S.-China and Afghanistan

The House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Authorization and Oversight Plan for the 119th Congress explicitly identified China as its top oversight priority and aligns with the central foreign policy objective of the Trump administration, underscoring countering Chinese influence while offering alternative development paths.

Part of the challenge from the American perspective is that Pakistan is strategically aligned with China, which is actively engaged to reconfigure the region around its interests, and the recent inclusion to this vision is Bangladesh. Pakistan’s Foreign Office Spokesperson Shafqat Ali Khan commented earlier this month on the topic that the cooperation between China, Bangladesh, and Pakistan is part of Beijing’s development agenda.

China holds significant geo-strategic stakes in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. As a key ally to Pakistan, China would face substantial setbacks if relations between the two neighbors further deteriorate. Beijing has sought to leverage its Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Global Development Initiative (GDI) as frameworks to promote peace, counter-terrorism cooperation, and economic development in the region. Chinese Ambassador to Afghanistan Zhao Xing, in a recent interaction with Taliban leaders, proposed key strategies to enhance collaboration with Afghanistan, which could potentially restore its strained relations with Pakistan.

It’s due to these interests that a trilateral summit between China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan was held on May 21 in Beijing soon after the four-day conflict between India and Pakistan. Some of the major outcomes of the meeting was the restoration of diplomatic ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan leading to the exchange of ambassadors. Moreover, the Chinese foreign ministry announced that China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) would now also be extended to Afghanistan.

The trilateral meeting occurred after Afghan side has progressively adjusted its position regarding the criticism emanating from Pakistan on providing support to TTP. The Afghan Taliban government has publicly denied accusations of supporting the TTP and allowing them to operate from Afghan soil. They have reiterated their commitment to preventing any group from using Afghanistan to threaten other countries. In a recent move, Afghan officials announced, “Sheikh Hibatullah’s diktats bind all groups pledging allegiance to him, and his diktat is that attacking Pakistan is haram.”

The Afghan Game Plan

In the evolving great power rivalry Afghanistan appears to be courting both US and China to get involved in Afghanistan, especially to address the security concerns emanating from the country – and using that as a leverage to gain international recognition. This approach seems to have worked in the case of Russia. Moreover, it’s also exploiting the vulnerabilities of Pakistan and China from India – possibly suggesting its potential utility to the U.S.

On the other hand, the Chinese strategy involves getting more involved in trade and connectivity of Afghanistan, through its partnership with Pakistan, pushing Afghans to change their behavior. However, U.S. appears to be employing the same approach towards Afghanistan, utilizing its partnership with India, to change Pakistan’s calculations.

Related Articles:

Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions, Trump, And Wakhan Corridor – Feb 3, 2025
Political Or Military Solution; Pakistan’s New Counter-Terrorism Operation Azm-e-Istehkam – Aug 1, 2024
Convergences in US Pakistan Ties and Afghanistan – Jan 1, 2024
Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP – Feb 22, 2023
Post Withdrawal Campaign Against Extremism In Afghanistan And US-Pakistan Relations – Sep 7, 2022
Emerging US Policy Towards Afghanistan After Withdrawal – March 2, 2022
Recalibrating The US-Pakistan Partnership In Afghanistan – Jun 22, 2021
US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden – Mar 2, 2021

The post Afghanistan, Pakistan Relations and Great Power Rivalry appeared first on Politact.

Arif Ansar

Context

After long and arduous negotiations, the US reached an agreement with the Afghan Taliban in 2020, which came to be known as Doha Accords. While the treaty was agreed on during the Trump administration, it was the Biden government that abruptly decided to withdraw all forces from Afghanistan in 2021.

In the aftermath off 9/11, US had launched a full-fledged military operation against the Mullah Omar led Taliban regime in Afghanistan, for providing refuge to the planner of the first strikes on American soil since Pearl Harbor, Osama bin Laden, and subsequently refusing to break ties with Al Qaeda (AQ).

Afghan Taliban’s closest ally at the time, Pakistan, was conveyed a stern message, “you are either with us or against us”. The then military ruler General Pervaiz Musharraf, who had overthrown the democratic government of Nawaz Sharif in 1999, considered it a god-send opportunity to gain international credibility and getting on the good side of the US. Thus began the double game the nation was accused of, providing hinterlands to the Afghan Taliban in its tribal areas (previously FATA) while also allowing access to the NATO supply lines, running from Karachi to Afghanistan.

This approach complicated matters domestically and provided stimulus to the growth of local militants, such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). TTP began to strike security and military targets deep inside Pakistan while assisting Afghan Taliban to fight NATO forces.

Good versus Bad Taliban

As the US launched an offensive in Afghanistan following 9/11, most of the Taliban and AQ leadership dispersed, ending up in Pakistan. And thus pressure built on the country to take military action against such elements. While initially reluctant, with military equipment and financial support from the US, Pakistan conducted a number of such operations in formerly FATA region to flush out the militants. This list includes Al-Mizan, Rah-e-Raast, Rah-e-Nijat, Zarb-e-Azb, and Rad-ul-Fasaad.

The nations participation in the campaign against extremism was marked by what came to be known as Good versus Bad Taliban. TTP was labelled as the Bad Taliban and Pakistan’s security forces would take military action against them – but would not act against Haqqani Network, a faction of Afghan Taliban. Haqqani Network were considered Good Taliban and concentrated their activities to fight NATO in Afghanistan. NATO and US security officials had consistently warned that this approach would one day backfire.

US decision to negotiate a settlement with Afghan Taliban did not come easily. In fact, Pakistan had been conveying to the American counterparts from the get-go, the best approach to Afghan years long quagmire was to reach a negotiated settlement. The angry superpower was in no mood for any talks in the beginning and used its military and technological might to crush the rag-tag Taliban. In fact, every time Pakistan tried to make deals with local militant groups, which were attacking Pakistan’s security forces and supporting Afghan Taliban across the border, the leaders of these groups would end up dead at the hands of mysterious drone strikes. The list includes the names of notorious leaders such as Hakimullah Mehsud and Baitullah Mehsud. When pushed by US authorities to act against militant groups in FATA, Pakistan officials reportedly would claim, you Americans will leave one day but we have to live over here. And obviously, the country always had its archenemy India in the back of its mind.

Reconcilable versus Irreconcilable

Up until 2009, the US under Obama was surging its forces in Afghanistan as the fighting escalated. On the other hand, overtime US strategic thinking towards the array of extremist groups operating in the region evolved into what was called the Reconcilable versus Irreconcilable groups.

Under this approach, local groups such as Afghan Taliban with local grievances were considered reconcilable. However, groups like AQ carrying global agenda, and responsible for 9/11 and attacks in other parts of the world, were deemed irreconcilable and terrorists. Thus, the military pressure against Afghan Taliban was to bring them to the negotiation table, while emphasis was on eliminating AQ and its leadership altogether. Under the Doha Agreement, Afghan Taliban agreed to break ties with whatever was left of AQ. Moreover, to prevent Afghan soil from being used for attacks against American allies. The language was vague about if allies included Pakistan.

Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, Afghanistan, and TTP

Since US withdrew its forces from Afghanistan in 2021, there have been occasional attacks attributed to Daesh, but the country has largely been peaceful. This cannot be stated about its neighbor Pakistan.

Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) led government assisted the American departure from Afghanistan and exerted its pressure on Afghan Taliban to facilitate dialogue with the US. US position to negotiate with the Taliban aligned with what Imran Khan had propagated for a long time as the solution for the stalemate in Afghanistan. As the US left, the question of how to deal with Bad Taliban, such as TTP, became center-stage for Pakistan.

The PTI government and the then military chief Qamar Javed Bajwa attempted to use negotiations and connections with the Afghan Taliban to reign-in TTP. As the foreign occupier had no more presence, it was hoped that TTP would suspend its activities as well. This is not how matters have turned out.

During the phase of talks with TTP, the situation remained relatively calm within Pakistan. However, as TTP presented its key terms, some of them were deemed dead on arrival. One of them being that Pakistan remove its forces from tribal areas and reverse the merger of FATA with the mainland. Moreover, it also emerged that Afghan Taliban while were promoting talks between the TTP and Pakistan but were unwilling to step further if TTP does not listen. Afghan Taliban did offer to relocate the militants from the border areas to other parts in Afghanistan. Thus, it appeared that relying solely on negotiations with TTP may not work.

As this was taking shape, another thorny issue also started to develop between the US and Pakistan. While the US had militarily vacated from Afghanistan, it committed to maintain over the horizon (without boots on the ground) pressure on the Afghan Taliban, and to prevent AQ and other extremists from regrouping. For this, reportedly it sought military cooperation with Pakistan, which the PTI government refused. PTI and its leader Imran Khan were highly sensitive to the steep toll the nation had paid in blood and treasure for its involvement in the campaign against terror.

From Negotiation to Military Operations

The elimination of Ayman al Zawahiri through a Kabul drone strike in July 2022 demonstrated that Afghan Taliban were not fully living up to their promises – and that US was maintaining over the horizon assault capabilities. Moreover, recent reports indicate collusion between TTP, Baloch insurgents and India, to counter CPEC.

Targeting of Chinese personnel working on CPEC related projects, accompanied by political chaos and economic meltdown that accompanied the removal of PTI government, complicated the challenge for the present civil-military establishment on how to deal with the threat posed by TTP. In other words, it was not just US seeking Pakistan’s assistance to maintain pressure on different brands of extremists, but now also China.

On June 23rd, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced Pakistan’s new counter-terrorism operation, Azm-e-Istehkam (Resolve for Stability), to enhance the country’s efforts against terrorism and extremism. This initiative integrates kinetic military actions with non-kinetic measures, engaging all branches of the state.

Azm-e-Istekham’s represents a significant shift in Pakistan’s security strategy. It recognizes that policies that accommodate extremists through peace dialogues and supporting the Afghan Taliban’s return to power have proven detrimental. The military has announced that, in addition to small-scale operations targeting traditional terrorist groups, it will also take action against political dissenters especially those labeled as “digital terrorists” for spreading anti-military sentiments on social media.

Azm-e-Istekham and Pakistan-China Ties

The launch of Azm-e-Istekham is widely seen as Pakistan’s last-ditch effort to address growing Chinese security concerns regarding the safety of its 29,000 citizens in Pakistan, including 2,500 working on the $62 billion CPEC projects. Pakistan’s failure to mitigate the vulnerability of Chinese personnel and infrastructure, which have been targeted in recent terrorist attacks, has tested China’s patience and its reliance on Pakistan as an effective security provider. Frustrated by the political instability and volatile security situation in Balochistan and KPK, where over half of the CPEC projects are located, China has gone so far as to demand that Pakistan hand over security to Chinese forces, hinting at the possibility of establishing a Chinese military base on the Arabian Sea shores near Gwadar Port.

Pakistan cannot afford to allow Chinese military bases on its soil, as this would severely compromise its reputation as a sovereign nation and undermine the credibility of its military. Additionally, this would be seen as a highly threatening escalation as it relates to the great power rivalry.

In June, Prime Minister Sharif and military chief Asim Munir made a five-day trip to China to reassure the Chinese government of their commitment to providing security. This visit was followed by Senior Chinese official Liu Jianchao’s trip to Pakistan, during which he strongly expressed Chinese concerns about Pakistan’s political instability and deteriorating security situation, emphasizing the need for political consensus and enhanced security measures. Through Azm-e-Istekham, Pakistan is taking a gamble to regain China’s trust and demonstrate its capability to manage the situation before China resorts to more assertive actions.

Azm-e-Istekham and US-Pakistan Ties

The Azm-e-Istekham operation capitalizes on the shared interests between US and Pakistan towards combating extremism. For Pakistan, the operation would reinvigorate counter terrorism cooperation with the US. Demonstrating support for this new initiative, the US expressed its intention to establish high-level counter terrorism dialogue, including funding robust counter terrorism capacity-building programs, and supporting a series of US-Pakistan military-to-military engagements.

Azm-e-Istekham consists of three components: doctrinal, societal, and operational. Work is already being done on the first two phases, and the third phase is set to be implemented soon, contingent on the delivery of sophisticated small arms and communication equipment.

U.S. has delivered limited support to Pakistan’s law enforcement agencies. Last year, US Ambassador to Pakistan, Donald Blome, had announced an $8 million package to upgrade the anti-terrorist police force in Balochistan.

It is highly likely that the US, which renewed its defense pact named Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) with the country last year, will provide additional military aid to help Pakistan combat terrorism. This would be the reflection of President Biden’s renewed interest in Pakistan. In his letter to Prime Minister Shehbaz in March he expressed Washington’s desire to renew partnership with Islamabad to tackle pressing global and regional challenges.

US Elections and Azm-e-Istehkam

In the grand scheme of things, the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan in 2021 was based on a thinking portrayed by former president Donald Trump. He wanted to focus on the US more – calling it Making America Great Again (MAGA). In Europe, he stressed NATO to pay more for its defense needs if it desires American security guarantees. And in Afghanistan, it was the evolution of the strategy: what could be militarily done was achieved, by weakening and dismantling AQ, and thus a political solution was needed. Moreover, it was a realization that war against extremism had distracted it from dealing with global rivals, China and Russia.

In Pakistan, the reverse appears to be occurring. While it favored political solution in Afghanistan, it is turning to a kinetic approach when it’s in a least favorable position to do so – economically and politically, and without much needed public support.

From the conditions TTP presented it’s clear it aspires for a space from where to extend their reach. Moreover, how TTP wants to achieve these demands, i.e., through terrorism – as compared to negotiations, needs to be transformed. To change the way TTP is going about its demands will require a change in Afghan Taliban thinking first. While Afghan Taliban were fighting foreign troops, there is no such validity in case of TTP – as it relates to Pakistan. TTP using the argument that it seeks to implement Sharia does not garner much merit.

To alleviate the source of TTP’s appeal requires integration of FATA into the mainstream while improving the infrastructure and economic wherewithal of the areas involved. Moreover, to empower groups like Pashtun Tahafaz Movement (PTM) in helping to bring the disgruntled towards political inclusion and addressing grievances.

While the Biden administration has been supportive of the present regime in Pakistan, Trump may take a different approach. Trumps foreign policy, also reflected by the selection of VP nominee JD Vance, would be to appease Russia and end the Ukraine conflict, as they’ve already stated. The key emphasis would be to dent the China-Russia strategic ties. In the Middle East, Trump will likely pick up the Abraham Accords from where it was interrupted, due to the October 7 attack by Hamas on Israel. This would mean recognition of not only the two-state solution, but also Israel, and going hard against Iran.

In South Asia, Trump is likely to exert pressure on both India and Pakistan to counter China. Any anti-terror campaign will be seen through this lens – and the emphasis will likely be more on India oriented militants. In his previous term, Trump had even talked about facilitating the resolution of the issue of Kashmir between India and Pakistan.

PoliTact’s South Analyst Naad-E-Ali Sulehria contributed to this article

The post Political Or Military Solution; Pakistan’s New Counter-Terrorism Operation Azm-e-Istehkam appeared first on Politact.

Context

As the new government settles in Pakistan, in addition to the economy, one of the key questions is how it will handle the relations with its neighbors and extremism. Pakistan’s ties with India have always been tense, now Iran and Afghanistan have been added to the list. However, while the border with India is untraditionally calm, that cannot be stated for Iran and Afghanistan.

The most dramatic escalation occurred when Iran launched counter strikes for the terrorist attacks at the funeral of Qassem Soleimani on January 4 – not only in Syria and Iraq, but on January 16 on its nuclear-powered neighbor Pakistan, going after Jaish-al-Adl hideouts. These raids essentially connected the conflict that was mainly pestering the Middle East – to South Asia. Pakistan retaliated on January 18, by launching missiles at Baloch nationalist groups operating from Iran.

Barely two months after responding to the Iranian strike, Pakistan retaliated against extremists hideouts in Afghanistan on March 18 for attacks on its forces near its north-west border that killed 7 soldiers. Pakistan accused Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) which takes refuge in Afghanistan, for the attack. The country also accuses Afghan Taliban for harboring TTP and alleges India’s intelligence agency, RAW, for funding and training them through Afghan proxies.

Stocking further tensions, India seized a Pakistan-bound cargo ship on January 23 for allegedly carrying materials usable for its nuclear program, which Pakistan refutes. The ship was travelling from China to Karachi and had stopped at Navi Mumbai’s Nhava Sheva port. This has been followed up by three coordinated strikes on Chinese interests in Pakistan when terrorists struck the Gwadar port, Turbat Naval base, and a convoy travelling towards Dasu dam resulting in the death of five Chinese workers. The Baloch Liberation Army claimed responsibility for the attack on a government facility in Gwadar and the naval base.

The recent incidents highlights Pakistan’s worsening relations with Afghanistan and Iran, which inadvertently benefit India’s strategic goals in the region. It pushes Pakistan to normalize ties with India. However, significant challenges remain in normalizing ties with India.

Analysis

New Government and India

The recent political changes in Pakistan, marked by Shehbaz Sharif’s ascension to the Prime Minister’s office and the return of Asif Zardari as President, have sparked renewed interest in the future direction of India-Pakistan relations. Both Sharif and Zardari, with past experiences of engagement with India, offer a glimmer of hope for resetting ties. During his previous tenure, Shehbaz Sharif expressed his desire for peaceful ties and later offered to open talks with India. While President Zardari, also known for his reconciliatory approach during his previous term in the office, earned a reputation for prioritizing peace with India.

After Shehbaz Sharif’s inauguration, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi extended his felicitations, reciprocated positively by Shehbaz. The US also added its expression of support for facilitating “productive and peaceful talks” between the two neighbors. Nonetheless, translating these aspirations into action remains a challenge. The path forward remains fraught with historical baggage, proxy wars, and the ever-present influence of hostile domestic politics.

The Point of Contentions

For Pakistan, the 2019 Indian revocation of Jammu & Kashmir’s special status stands as a significant issue. The country vehemently opposes this step, seeing it as a violation of Kashmiri rights and prior international agreements. Consequently, Pakistan halted its bilateral trade and downgraded diplomatic relations with India. As the trade suspension began to affect Pakistan’s economy, then Prime Minister Imran Khan briefly reinstated trade ties with India in 2021. However, political pressure led to a reversal of this decision. Meanwhile, India remains concerned about Pakistan’s ongoing support for Kashmiri separatists.

Prime Minister Sharif has conditioned any talks with India to the restoration of Kashmir’s autonomy, like his predecessor, while India demands Pakistan to stop cross-border terrorism before engaging in any dialogue. These conditionalities have created a seemingly insurmountable impasse. Furthermore, India’s success last year in securing a joint statement with the US which condemns Pakistan’s alleged role in terrorism further strained their relations. Pakistan rejects these accusations, instead terming India a state sponsor of terror for supporting groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Baloch separatists.

Areas of Cooperation

Despite these tensions, some crucial steps highlight a commitment to de-escalation. For instance, both countries continue to adhere to a decades-long protocol of exchanging nuclear installation lists, showcasing their commitment to prevent nuclear war.

The ceasefire agreement along the Line of Control in Kashmir, albeit fragile, has been held for several years, marking one of the longest periods of relative calm in the region’s history. Even with severed diplomatic ties, Pakistan issued visas to Indian pilgrims in 2023, demonstrating a willingness to facilitate cultural exchange.

Both nations face numerous shared challenges, including climate change, air pollution, and water scarcity. Addressing these issues requires cooperation, not confrontation.

India, Iran, and Pakistan

The recent unprecedented incidents of cross border strikes Iran and Pakistan carried out at against each other has underscored the fundamental challenges Iran and Pakistan face in countering terrorism and highlights Indian role.

Both Pakistan and Iran have long accused each other of providing safe havens to their respective enemies. Pakistan consistently maintains that India’s intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), is operating from Iranian soil, orchestrates attacks in Pakistan’s Balochistan region – and supports the anti-Pakistan Baloch separatist movement. Conversely, Iran blames Pakistan for its inaction against anti-Iran terrorist sanctuaries in the Balochistan bordering region, and for not taking decisive action against infiltrators into its territory through human trafficking and smuggling of weapons.

In 2016 Pakistan had arrested what it claims to be an Indian spy, posing as an Iranian businessman. There are different versions of how and where Kulbhusan Yadav was captured. Indian media had claimed, Kulbhushan was abducted by Jaesh al-Adl and handed over to Pakistan’s intelligence organizations. However, in a confession statement made under Pakistan’s custody, Kulbushan stated his main task was to sabotage CPEC (China, Pakistan Economic Corridor) and create unrest in Karachi and Balochistan. For this mission, he was in touch with leaders belonging to Baloch separatist groups. These dynamics indicate, India has been a player when it comes to regional proxy games involving Afghanistan and Iran and targeting Pakistan interests.

Future Expectations And Challenges

The future of India-Pakistan relations depends a whole lot on the outcome of India’s upcoming elections scheduled from April 19 to June 1 – and the posture the new government adopts. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) heavily depends on anti-Pakistan rhetoric for its political campaigns and voter appeal. Offering an olive branch to Pakistan during election cycle would be viewed as political suicide. In fact, just before the last balloting in 2019, India had launched an air raid in Balakot, Pakistan, to rile up nationalist voter sentiments.

On the other hand, Pakistan’s powerful military establishment exerts significant influence over the nation’s foreign policy, and it has traditionally opposed rapprochement with India. Along those lines, Shehbaz Sharif’s reliance on the support from military establishment limits his ability to pursue a more conciliatory approach towards India. However, Pakistan’s economic predicament and dependence on IMF may change this outlook and necessitate peace with India. Additionally, Pakistan’s financial backer of the last resort, such as Saudi Arabia and UAE, have also expanded trade and security ties with India. This would further pressurize the new government to mend ties with its archrival.

The greatest challenge is likely going to be the absence of public narrative to pursue peace. For instance, the prevalence of hate culture and growing hostile political rhetoric especially in India – towards peace with Pakistan. Conversely, the new government in Pakistan lacks credibility, due to allegations of election rigging, to pursue any sensitive initiatives. Both nations would have to build public support if reconciliation is to ensue. And if Pakistan-India ties do not normalize, it’s likely the proxy-war being waged against Pakistan through Afghanistan and Iran would continue. India would want to keep Pakistan busy so it cannot pose a threat on the Line of Control (LOC) with India. This would also mitigate tensions with China on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), which many believe are designed to prevent India from projecting power towards the South China Sea.

PoliTact’s South Asia Fellow Naad-e-Ali Sulehria contributed to this piece.

The post Pakistan’s Flareup With Afghanistan, Iran Clashes, Intensifying Attacks On Chinese Interests, And Role of India appeared first on Politact.

Context

Since the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, the Afghan Taliban character has been evolving and so are ties with Pakistan. The widely held apprehension that US exit will make Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) bolder is coming to fruition – as the number of TTP linked extremist attacks continue to rise in Pakistan with Baloch insurgency also simmering.

At the same time, there is a role reversal. While in the past US relied on Pakistan in dealing with matters related to the Afghan Taliban. Now, as Pakistan’s ties with Afghan Taliban deteriorate, it is resorting to seek US help to address the extremist menace emanating from Afghan soil. Pakistan’s Army Chief’s visit to the US reportedly was primarily to seek military cooperation to tackle the TTP threat. Conversely, the US emphasis is on economics and climate change.

There are a few significant grievances between Pakistan and Afghanistan. One, Pakistan has consistently demanded that Afghan Taliban deal sternly with TTP and Islamic State’s Khorasan branch (IS-K) operating from Afghanistan. US shares concerns related to IS-K but not necessarily on TTP. Although, in the past, US has assisted Pakistan in going after high value TTP targets through drone strikes. Pakistan’s decision to deport illegal Afghan refugees has added stress to the bilateral ties.

On the other hand, US seems to be increasingly satisfied with Afghan Taliban for pressure on IS-K, which makes them less likely to act against its erstwhile ally TTP. This creates a dilemma for Pakistan. Additionally, US intelligence indicates that Al Qaeda (AQ) has been weakened to the point of extinction. Pakistan is thus looking for convergences in its ties with the US to confront TTP by exerting pressure on Afghan Taliban.

Since the removal of Pakistan’s Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government in 2022, the government policy has shifted away from negotiating with TTP and towards using force – and has thus sought more counter-terrorism assistance. Ironically, the former Prime Minister had refused any military cooperation with the US in dealing with the extremist threat in Afghanistan – and some analysts pointed to this as the main reason for his removal – in addition to ill-timed trip to Russia to meet Putin.

Analysis

Zia-ul-Haq, Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, and Iranian Revolution

Since the Afghan Jihad of the 80s, Pakistan’s security perils have largely been linked to the situation of Afghanistan and periodic military escalation with India. While traditionally political unanimity has existed when it comes to handling India, the case of Afghanistan has led to political polarization and instability in the country – and has impacted its foreign relations in ways that have proved extremely detrimental to the social and economic wellbeing of the nation in the long run.

For example, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 provided the military ruler Zia-ul-Haq an opportunity to reset his utility for the West. He had earlier removed the political government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1977, who was later hanged in 1979. The Iranian Revolution and fall of Pahlavi dynasty, also in 1979, had greatly unnerved the US – and Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan fit well with the Domino Theory. These dramatic events in 1979 assisted Zia-ul-Haq to reset ties with the West.

The removal of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, with which US had cordial ties, represented a shift in the Middle East balance of power. Zia capitalized on the changing winds. With help from the Gulf Arabs and the US, Sunni proxies were created to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan – they also served as an ideological counterweight to the Shiite revolutionaries in Iran. This process also linked Pakistan more closely to the Arabs.

The Iranian revolution also initiated a chain of events in the Middle East. Fearing the repercussions on Iraq’s ethnic mix, Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in 1980, a war that lasted until 1988. He also wanted to establish Iraq as the primary force in the Arab world. Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990, leading to the First Gulf War in 1991. Pakistan sided with the Gulf Arabs and even deployed forces on the Saudi border with Iraq to prevent any invasion.

It was on September 11, 2001, when the Sunni-non state actors that fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets launched a horrendous attack on American soil – and thus started the Global War Against Terrorism (GWOT) that sucked in Pakistan once again.

Pervez Musharraf, 9/11, and Global War Against Terror (GWOT)

9/11 provided an opportunity to another military ruler in Pakistan to gain international credibility and reset ties with the US. In the aftermath of the 1999 short and bloody Kargil conflict, Gen Pervez Musharraf had overthrown the civilian government in October 1999, removing Nawaz Sharif from power. For this US had slapped sanctions, which were in addition to the ones imposed on Pakistan and India in the aftermath of 1998 nuclear tests. For Musharraf’s support in Afghanistan after 9/11, Bush lifted all sanctions on Pakistan in October 2001.

Prior to 9/11, Pakistan had been one of the few nations, including UAE and Saudi Arabia, that recognized the Taliban government. As the campaign against terrorism progressed, Pakistan focused its efforts more or Al Qaeda and less on Afghan Taliban – and was accused of providing safe havens for them.

While US got distracted by going into Iraq again in 2003 (Second Gulf War), Bush administration mounted pressure on Pakistan to launch military operations in FATA and eliminate what it termed as safe havens. Pakistan moved nearly hundred thousand troops from the Indian border towards Afghanistan to conduct operation which led to internal dislocation of up to 5 million people. US also conducted thousands of drone strikes in FATA between 2004 and 2018 chasing extremist leaders hiding there.

Pakistan’s military operations in FATA, including the Lal Masjid operation in July 2007, accompanied by drone strikes, started to create an ominous backlash internally. It was unclear if the US drone strikes were occurring with Pakistan’s acquiescence – but it would publicly protest the strikes vehemently as violation of its sovereignty.

Many high value targets were hit in Pakistan as extremist reprisal spread, with thousands of civilian and soldiers killed and maimed. According to Dawn newspaper, Pakistan’s economic loss in the war against terror was a figure around $126.79 billion. The security and political turmoil, including the civil-military divide, was reflected by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007.

The internal politics of Pakistan had gotten fully intertwined with the support it was providing to the US in the war against extremism, and more importantly, at what cost. While Musharraf had become gradually unpopular, and US grievances with him grew, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto demonstrated that this was a battle for Pakistan’s survival too. The Mumbai Attack in November 2008 created fresh headaches for Pakistan on how it was dealing with what are called good and bad extremists.

General Asim Munir, Post US Withdrawal Afghanistan, and US Pakistan Relations

As Pakistan’s new Amry Chief Asif Munir visits US to reset ties, the above historical context needs to be considered. While the nation’s position to counter threat from TTP has been shifting between a negotiated solution to a military one, with different global powers moving in and out of Afghanistan overtime, Pakistan’s own political polarization is swelling, economic prospects dwindling, and social fiber in tatters. Ukraine may have been imagined as the new Cold War that could help reset ties with the US. However, the events unfolding in Gaza have checked that conceptualization. Meanwhile, China facilitated Saudi, Iran detente has provided temporary relief and prevent ethnic tensions from boiling.

In retrospect, 1979 was a tumultuous year – the demise of western supported regime in Iran initiated the transfer of the regional balance of power towards the Sunni Gulf Arabs – with Saddam the casualty in the long run. The collapse of Soviet Union and end of Cold War by the beginning of 90s meant that the US had won the great power rivalry – with Pakistan’s pivotal role. However, in October 1990, US imposed sanctions in the form of Pressler Amendment. The amendment made military and economic aid to Pakistan conditional on it not acquiring nuclear weapons – and for US administration to certify that to be true. US apparently did not want Pakistan to benefit from their shared victory in Afghanistan.

Stalemate ensued as in-fighting between former mujahadeen leaders and factions in Afghanistan continued in the aftermath of Soviet withdrawal. The affairs finally came to climax as Taliban took control of almost entire Afghanistan. The popular Taliban opposition leader, Ahmad Shah Mehsud, was assassinated two days before 9/11 attack. If 9/11 had not occurred, Pakistan and Gulf State supported Taliban would have potentially extended influence further into Central Asia.

What can be expected in the aftermath of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, especially when Pakistan has built strategic ties with China, and India has become a strong American ally towards the ambition of countering global rival China? Moreover, unlike Soviet withdrawal in late 80s, following US departure, Taliban are in complete control of Afghanistan, with other players engaging directly with them. Burning bridges with Afghanistan will come at Pakistan’s own expense – and prevent it from gaining any mileage for the immense cost in blood and treasure the nation has paid over almost half a century. While the nation cannot delink from Afghanistan, patient diplomacy is the only way forward to engage and resolve the thorny issues.

The post Convergences In US-Pakistan Ties And Afghanistan appeared first on Politact.

How to Deal with Afghanistan’s Extremist Landscape?

Context

Since the full withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan in August 2021, it was assumed that Pakistan’s war against extremism had come to an end. There was a perception that the installation of Afghan Taliban in Kabul will make Pakistan’s regional influence grow. Besides, the nation was blamed for supporting the Taliban and providing them safe havens. Prior to 9/11 attacks, Taliban had extended its control to almost all of Afghanistan – and there were fears of its influence extending even further into Central Asia while threatening Iran. In 1998, 11 Iranian diplomats were killed in Mazar-e-Sharif in a battle between Iranian supported Northern Alliance and the Taliban forces – bringing the two close to a full blown conflict.

What transpired in the aftermath of 9/11 saw the reversal of the Taliban fortunes – and along with them with their supporters, particularly Pakistan. At the peak of the war against extremism, all major cities of the country were targeted by terrorists including its security forces. According to one estimate 83,000 lives were lost with an economic toll of about US$126 billion. The extremists accused Pakistan of supporting the infidels and providing bases and supply lines for NATO forces fighting Taliban.

However, since the US withdrawal, after a brief lull, the situation got progressively worse for Pakistan. Especially since the fall of Imran Khan’s government in April 2022. First came the elimination of Al Qaeda (AQ) mastermind Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul in July 2022, which demonstrated that Taliban were not holding up to their promise of breaking ties with AQ. Second, Pakistan was hoping that after US left Afghanistan, it could convince Taliban to act against Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). TTP had found refuge in Afghanistan since the operations carried out by Pakistan’s military in Swat and other Tribal Areas.

The horrific attack in Peshawar late January this year, which claimed the lives of more than 100 worshiping policemen, has reminded the country of the worse times of the war against extremism. This was followed by an attack on the police headquarters in Karachi on February 17. The country is once again grappling with the question of how to deal with Afghan Taliban and TTP.

Pakistan and TTP

Speaking at the Munich Security Conference on Feb 18, Pakistan’s foreign minister Bilawal Bhutto highlighted the risk:

“The concern is that if we and the interim (Afghan) government don’t take these groups seriously and they don’t demonstrate the will and the capacity to take on terrorist groups then they will conduct terrorist activities in the region first — we are already witnessing an uptick in terrorist activity in Pakistan since the fall of Kabul — but it won’t be long before it reaches somewhere else.”

He went on to add that Pakistan wants to work with Afghan Taliban to deal with TTP and to build its counter-terrorism capabilities, and is not looking to interfere in Afghanistan militarily. However, media reports indicate that Pakistan has targeted TTP linked leadership in Afghanistan several times since last April – and when Afghan Taliban are unwilling to assist. It reportedly carried out air strikes in April 2022 in Eastern Afghanistan. In August 2022, TTP commander Omar Khalid Khorassani was killed in a IED attack.

But it’s not clear if US desires to focus on Afghanistan – as its attention is presently preoccupied with Ukraine, Russia, and China. Even Europe is in the process of decoupling from China. On the other hand, Pakistan claims China to be a strategic partner, and it was the former prime minister Imran Khan’s visit to Moscow in February 2022 that unnerved the US. Soon after, his government fell in April 2022.

Prior to his visit to Moscow and since the US Afghan withdrawal, a debate had been raging about how US would maintain pressure on the global jihadists present in Afghanistan from repeating a 9/11 type attack – or from pulling a serious attack on India. Reportedly, US had wanted bases in Pakistan from where to maintain kinetic pressure on global extremists in Afghanistan. Imran Khan’s government was vehemently against providing any such cooperation since his political mantra was based on a negotiated approach – at least as far as groups like TTP were concerned. Moreover, he had consistently questioned the wisdom of Pakistan’s previous involvement in the campaign against extremism in support of NATO at a tremendous cost of blood and treasure.

During his time in power, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) led government had sought Afghan Taliban assistance in pacifying TTP, resulting in a ceasefire that fell apart in November 2022 – and resumption of TTP attacks against Pakistan. The TTP demands related to release of prisoners were met to some extent. On the other hand, their requirements of decreasing the number of security forces in FATA – and rescinding of FATA merger are more complicated.

These conditions truly show that TTP aspires for a space from where AQ and Afghan Taliban can extend their reach. Moreover, how TTP wants to achieve these demands i.e., through terrorism – as compared to negotiations, needs to be transformed. To change the way TTP is going about its demands will require a change in Afghan Taliban thinking first. While Afghan Taliban were fighting foreign troops, there is no such validity in case of TTP – as it relates to Pakistan. TTP using the argument that it seeks to implement Sharia does not garner much merit.

To alleviate the source of TTP’s appeal requires integration of FATA into the mainstream while improving the infrastructure and economic wherewithal of the areas involved. Moreover, to empower groups like Pashtun Tahafaz Movement (PTM) in helping to bring the disgruntled towards political inclusion and addressing grievances.

US and TTP

The presence and elimination of AQ mastermind Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul was a clear violation of Doha Agreement reached in February 2020. One of the key terms of the treaty stipulated Taliban will not allow Al Qaeda, ISIS-K and other International terrorist groups and individuals to use Afghan territory to launch attacks against US and its allies.

These allies could be interpreted to mean India and Pakistan. Over the years Afghanistan has become a hotbed for extremists from all brands. For example, AQ and Daesh (ISIS-K) targeting the US prior to withdrawal, TTP carrying out attacks against Pakistan, Lashker-e-Taiba (LeT) and related groups striking India, while East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) was linked to terrorist activities in China. What Bilawal’s comments quoted above may be referring to is the nightmare scenario of a terrorist attack occurring in India which can trigger a wider regional war.

A report published by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) recently indicates that on one hand US does not consider TTP to be a direct threat to US – but at the same time worsening security situation of nuclear Pakistan is deemed a security concern for the US.

The reality is there is an ominous lack of public support and political consensus in Pakistan on how to deal with extremists, especially with the likes of TTP. Additionally, the economic woes of the country prevents it from dealing aggressively with extremism. This could change if TTP were to launch and claim more deadly attacks within Pakistan. On the other hand, if the threat perception from TTP were to change towards being perceived as a direct threat to the US – the calculus could alter. Moreover, if fresh elections are held in Pakistan, and Imran Khan governments returns to the helm, he may take a different approach to dealing with TTP and galvanize public support.

While it remains unclear where the assets used for eliminating Ayman al-Zawahiri were based, it’s clear that US retains the capability to deal with risks from global extremists that directly threaten it. Will US allow these assets to be used against TTP, like in the past, remains ambiguous. Pakistan needs to develop a wider political consensus on how it wants to deal with extremism and reevaluate its ties with Afghan Taliban. This is very difficult to do for a nation amidst political and economic meltdown.

Understanding Afghan Taliban

The evolving extremism landscape in Afghanistan provide hints towards the future of the campaign against extremism. As Afghan Taliban have settled in – it’s not clear if they are willing to break ties with global extremists such as AQ, or act against local affiliates like TTP. On the other hand, its ability to counter ISIS-K is also questionable. So far, it’s not accepted any assistance in this regard fearing being labelled as a Western collaborator. Attacks from Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) in Pakistan are also on the rise, especially related to CPEC.

The opportunistic postures of Afghan Taliban are meant to exploit the fears of stakeholders like US, China, Russia, Pakistan, India, and Iran – and by maintaining a leverage of extremism over all of them. For example, it has kept the TTP gambit over Pakistan, while at the same time offering India to keep a check on LeT and Al Qaeda in the Indian Sub Continent (AQIS), and then delicately adjusting its policy towards global extremists (AQ and ISIS-K) and other Western concerns – including women rights and inclusion of minorities in governance.

Writing in the National Interest after his recent visit to Afghanistan, former senior policy advisor to the US State Department Secretary’s Office of Religion and Global Affairs, Qamar-ul Huda commented: “Washington must realize that religious-political actors like the Taliban are acutely aware of their value in regional politics; they understand that local governments and global coalitions are seeking them out to counterbalance the weight of violent extremism and build multilateral ties for stability and economic benefits. The key question is whether the Taliban can transform from militia-minded fighters to nation-building technocrats and deliver for Afghanistan.”

Speaking at a webinar organized by Karachi Council on Foreign Relations on January 11, 2022 Taliban’s Representative in Pakistan Sardar Ahmed Khan Sakeeb took a stance on Durand Line that is not much different from the Ashraf Ghani and Karzai governments. He stated that his administration wants to take the matter to the Afghan people and then discuss the matter further.

On relations with India and Pakistan’s apprehensions, the Taliban representative explained that they wanted to pursue economic and political relations with India, and will not make it an enemy because of Pakistan, or make anyone else an adversary because of India – and this is beneficial for all. Replying to criticism for not speaking up for Indian atrocities in Kashmir, he added that they will speak out whether the atrocities are being committed by India or anyone else. He advised on solving all matters though negotiations.

Conclusion

The unfolding scenario of Afghanistan is directly impacting the political and security situation of Pakistan. Its ability to convince Afghan Taliban to act against TTP has only produced facilitation of negotiations. This has greatly frustrated the new Pakistan government and perhaps has pressured it towards more counter-terrorism cooperation with the US – for which there is little public buy-in in Pakistan. And this puts the economically fragile nation in a quandary.

Faced with growing US-India strategic partnership, counter-terrorism cooperation with the US could provide the security and economic lifeline Pakistan desperately needs. However, US has shifted away from counter-terrorism to strategic competition with China and Russia. And thus, the question becomes where do Afghan Taliban, including regional and global extremists, and for that matter Pakistan, fit in the great power rivalry equation. On the other hand, it’s likely the joint pressure of China and Pakistan, to protect their common interests, could nudge the Afghan Taliban in the direction of more serious action and curtailing the activities of TTP, ETIM, and BLF.

Correction: A previous version had stated Omar Khalid Khorassani was killed in a drone strike – he died in an IED attack.

The post Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP appeared first on Politact.

Context

As great power competition has gradually picked pace, it was assumed that the Campaign Against Extremism has subsided. In fact, US has admitted that this campaign has distracted it from preparing and dealing with global adversaries such as China and Russia.

However, recent events have demonstrated that the character of the campaign has changed – but the threat from the radicals has not evaporated. In fact, history has shown that as the global power tussles heat up – the extremist become proxies and operate with new purpose and vigor. And that gets into what constitutes terrorism. Defining terrorism is not an easy task, and the recent formulation came under the shadow of the tragic events of 9/11.

The UN General Assembly Resolution 49/60 describes it as:

“criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”

FBI lists International Terrorism as:

“Violent, criminal acts committed by individuals and/or groups who are inspired by, or associated with, designated foreign terrorist organizations or nations (state-sponsored).”

While FBI lists Domestic Terrorism as:

“Violent, criminal acts committed by individuals and/or groups to further ideological goals stemming from domestic influences, such as those of a political, religious, social, racial, or environmental nature.”

Clearly there is realization of the two dimensions representing the menace, an internal and an external one. On the other hand, there are Non-State and State Sponsors of Terror – that are dealt with differently. Broadly, and without getting bog down in technicalities, Terrorism can be defined as using violence to achieve one’s objectives believing that negotiated settlements or political recourses are no longer possible – and is premised on a serious real – or perceived grievance.

In contemporary terms, the grievances of Muslim extremists are of religious and political nature, but the underpinnings are composed of social and racial issues as well. There is also a chain reaction dynamic to this phenomenon – in terms of what was deemed as the original sin. The subsequent generations often adopt the grievance without experiencing its dynamics themselves.

And in this sense the Past, and how much further back to go in time, to understand the misgiving, is an important aspect. Part of the equation involves self-absolving from having played any role in the predicament. Eventually, this becomes part of indoctrination and assists in framing a particular world view in which others are blamed – and external dimension carries all the weight.

The legacy of Colonialism, the unresolved issues of Palestine and Kashmir, illegitimate rulers and corruption, have all contributed towards the rise of non-state actors with global ambitions like Al Qaeda (AQ) and Daesh – and their affiliates. And thus developing an effective counter-narrative has been an on-going challenge, especially when local leaders are perceived as corrupt and lacking public support.

US Withdrawal from Afghanistan

US withdrawal from Afghanistan that completed in August 2021 was a culmination of extensive talks with the Afghan Taliban. These negotiations highlighted that talks with extremists with local agenda can be conducted. However, it clearly delineated that kinetic approaches would continue against extremists with global agenda, such as AQ and Daesh, as demonstrated by the elimination of Ayman Al Zawahiri in a Kabul drone strike on July 31.

Officials claim the presence of AQ mastermind in Kabul was a clear violation of Doha Agreement reached in February 2020. One of the key terms of the Agreement stipulated Taliban will not allow Al Qaeda, ISIS-K and other International terrorist groups and individuals to use Afghan territory to launch attacks against US and its allies.

Pakistan has also been impressing on Afghan Taliban to increase pressure on Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has been carrying out terrorist activities against Pakistan and have refuge in Afghanistan. Since Afghan Taliban came to the helm, TTP activities have intensified, and Afghan Taliban have not carried out any strong action to restrict them. This is due to the complex history of how the non-state actor phenomena has evolved in the region.

Both Afghan Taliban and TTP are part of the regional extremist landscape which has come to be known and as AQ and Associates or Affiliates. Afghan Taliban provided refuge to AQ that was responsible for planning and conducting the 9/11 attacks. Subsequently, Afghan Taliban were fighting NATO forces in Afghanistan, and TTP was targeting military and civilian targets in Pakistan while also helping out across the border. As a result of the Doha Agreement, Afghan Taliban were expected to break ties with AQ and restrict the activities of other affiliates, like TTP – and it seems to have done neither. Afghan Taliban claim that they are fully in control over the activities of their arc nemesis, Daesh. It also fears pressure on TTP could possibly make them switch and join ISIS-K, the Deash branch in Afghanistan.

Two recent assessments have presented the emerging picture. In a briefing to the Security Council, UN counter terrorism chief Vladimir Voronkov stated:

“Da’esh and its affiliates continue to exploit conflict dynamics, governance fragilities and inequality to incite, plan and organize terrorist attacks. Moreover, they are also exploiting the pandemic, digital space, and increasing use of drones.”

On the other hand, a US intelligence assessment prepared after Ayman al-Zawahri was eliminated, describes a less serious situation as far as AQ is concerned. It states that the group has not reconstituted in Afghanistan, but it would rely on its affiliates outside the region to carry out attacks. It is also notes that AQ members have more freedom to operate since Afghan Taliban came into power. One of its regional affiliates is also Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) with activities focused on India, Bangladesh and Pakistan.

Post Withdrawal Campaign Against Extremism

The evolving extremism landscape in Afghanistan provide hints as it relates to the future of War Against Extremism. As Afghan Taliban settle in – it’s not clear if they are willing to break ties with global extremists such as AQ, or act against local affiliate like TTP. On the other hand, it’s ability to counter Daesh is also questionable. So far, it’s not accepted any assistance in this regard fearing being labelled a Western collaborator. Attacks from Baloch Liberation Front in Pakistan have also risen.

This unfolding scenario is directly impacting the political and security situation of Pakistan. Its ability to convince Afghan Taliban to act against TTP has only produced facilitation of negotiations. This has greatly frustrated the nation and perhaps has pressured it towards more counter-terrorism cooperation with the US – for which there is little public appetite. And this puts the economically fragile nation in a quandary. Faced with growing US-India strategic partnership, counter-terrorism cooperation with the US could provide the security and economic lifeline it desperately needs.

Speaking at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) on February 15, the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Bureau of South and Central Asia Affairs, Thomas West, explained the emerging US policy. Replying to a question on what leverage does the US have now if Afghan Taliban does not abide by the agreement and demands of the international community, Mr. West stated that when it comes to security cooperation, the Afghan Taliban has shown the least interest in future cooperation with the US in fulling the terms of their side of the Doha Accord. At the same time, West noted that US is not supporting any opposition to Afghan Taliban and is advising other nations to refrain from that, but some will do that sooner or later if Taliban does not show urgency. Answering a question, he commented that many players are realizing that not having US engagement in Afghanistan is not in their interest.

As the great power rivalry escalates over the matters of Ukraine and Taiwan, it is doubtful if US, China, and Russia would continue to cooperate on affairs related to non-state and state actors of terrorism. It likely will not be the card blanche it used to be. The collaboration on the on-going Iran nuclear talks, and its wider regional behavior, is a case in point. Moreover, the term of Good versus Bad extremists could come in to play again – including what constitutes terrorism, especially when they are employed in the context of global and regional balance of power tussles.

The post Post Withdrawal Campaign Against Extremism In Afghanistan And US-Pakistan Relations appeared first on Politact.

Context

The abrupt withdrawal of US and coalition forces from Afghanistan last August, and the arrival of Afghan Taliban at the helm, represented a key turning point in the region and beyond. The attention in the past had remained on the risks of what the return of Afghan Taliban would mean. Now that it is the reality, the inquiry becomes what do their initial policies reflect about the future – particularly as it relates to the primary concerns of two principal stakeholders, US and Pakistan.

Since the arrival of US and coalition forces soon after 9/11, the focus was on dismantling Al Qaeda (AQ) and the support structure that created the safe havens for the planning of attack. In the so-called War Against Terror, the assistance of Pakistan was instrumental. However, while the nation has supported efforts to go after AQ, it was always apprehensive about taking the same line against Afghan Taliban.

Over the years, Pakistan had tried to convince US that the best approach would be to reconcile with the Afghan Taliban – while US strived to influence Pakistan to go after all brands of extremists, including those oriented towards India. The differentiation would come to be known as the Good versus Bad Extremists – those that were targeting Pakistan and those that were not.

Based on the state-of-affairs when the Soviets left Afghanistan in the late 80’s – and subsequent loss of US interest, Pakistan calculated that one day US and coalition forces would also depart – and then the country would be left to fend for itself.

Analysis

Doha Accord, Fall of Ashraf Ghani Government and US Withdrawal

The talks in Doha represented the negotiated path to settlement with the Afghan Taliban and these went through various phases. US sought assurances that Afghan Taliban would break ties with AQ and prevent Afghan territory to be used against any other nation again, respect human rights and minorities, and not hinder access of girls to education and professional careers. US and Afghanistan signed the peace accord in February 2020.

On the other hand, while not overtly stated Pakistan expected favorable policies from Afghan Taliban as it relates to India and Baluch insurgents – and firmer stand against the activities of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). TTP is responsible for several deadly terror attacks in Pakistan and against its security forces, while at the same time assisting Afghan Taliban. These ties represent a complex web of ties between extremist groups.

Doha agreement envisioned reduction in violence, withdrawal of foreign troops, intra-Afghan negotiations, and rewriting of the constitution. The manner in which the Ashraf Ghani government collapsed in the end, accompanied by US withdrawal, left many of the terms of agreement in ambiguity. However, Afghan Taliban did allow US forces to evacuate in safety, indicating that it meant to abide with some terms of the agreement. It is not clear if Afghan Taliban had given assurances that it would not militarily take over the government.

Afghan Economy and US Emerging Policy

Mired in conflict for years, the economy of Afghanistan was never doing well, and it was widely known that minus foreign support it would collapse. According to World Bank estimates, 45% of the GDP and 75% of government spending was foreign aid.

Therefore, taking over the government was one thing but running and governing the nation was a totally different matter. Experts agree that Afghan Taliban were not well equipped in the lateral and lacked professional expertise required to run the economy in shambles. And these circumstances offer an ideal environment for humanitarian crisis, which could then provide the ecosystem for the return of extremists.

Soon after withdrawal, US suspended more $7 billion worth of Afghan foreign reserves. The sanctions that were applicable previously on Afghan Taliban as a terrorist group got reinstated as well. All of this makes it very difficult to do business with the country. According to some estimates half of the nations 40 million population is facing hunger this year, made worse by severe drought. Under mounting pressure from aid groups, in a controversial decision US agreed to unfreeze $3.5 billion worth of frozen Afghan assets – the other $3.5 would be given to the families of 9/11 victim.

Speaking the USIP on February 15, the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Bureau of South and Central Asia Affairs, Thomas West, explained the emerging US policy and the quandary.

He stated that US wants to help the Afghan people but not Afghan Taliban. Replying to a question on what leverage does the US have now if Afghan Taliban does not abide by the agreement and demands of international community, Mr. West did not mention the immense economic leverage US has and is using.

However, when it comes to security cooperation, the Afghan Taliban has shown the least interest in future cooperation with the US in fulling the terms of their side of the Doha Accord, he added. At the same time, West noted that US is not supporting any opposition to Afghan Taliban and is advising other nations to refrain from that, but some will do that sooner or later if Taliban does not show urgency. Answering a question, he commented that many players are realizing that not having US engagement in Afghanistan is not in their interest.

He went on clarify, while US is trying to avert the humanitarian crisis, stabilize the Central bank and increase liquidity, it is not planning any major bilateral program and development assistance for the country. And even for the humanitarian aid, US will work through professionals and Taliban will have no say in that.

Afghan Taliban and Pakistan

Often blamed for supporting the Afghan Taliban and providing them refuge, Pakistan has shared the international demands of them – before any sort of recognition can take place. At the same time, the nation is worried by the brewing humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan which can send thousands of refugees its way once again – and create the kind of instability posing serious security and economic challenges for the country.

Since the Afghan Taliban came into power, and except a few ISIS-K claimed attacks, Afghanistan has witnessed the safest six months for quite some time. This however cannot be claimed for Pakistan where the TTP linked attacks are on the rise. The country has made great strides in its own war against extremists – as compared to the heydays.

Recent policy postures from Afghan Taliban reflect its falling short of many expectations important to Pakistan. These issues include the status of Durand Line, exerting pressure on TTP, and taking a tougher line on India.

Speaking at a webinar organized by Karachi Council on Foreign Relations on January 11, Taliban’s Representative in Pakistan Sardar Ahmed Khan Sakeeb took a stance on Durand Line that is not much different from the Ashraf Ghani and Karzai governments. He stated that his administration wants to take the matter to the Afghan people and then discuss the matter further.

On relations with India and Pakistan’s apprehensions, the Taliban representative explained that they wanted to pursue economic and political relations with India, and will not make it an enemy because of Pakistan, or make anyone else an adversary because of India – and this is beneficial for all. Replying to criticism for not speaking up for Indian atrocities in Kashmir, he added that they will speak out whether the atrocities are being committed by India or anyone else. He advised on solving all matters though negotiations.

When it came to the activities of TTP, Afghan Taliban have facilitated talks between Pakistan and TTP that had led to a temporary ceasefire which expired in December – but does not seem to have gone beyond that i.e., preventing the use of its territory for launching attack on others. According to the US Afghan Special Representative, this could be because of capacity and not the absence of will to act against groups such as ISIS-K. West fears the ISIS-K attacks could increase in Afghanistan once the weather becomes warmer.

Way Forward

Clearly, the nascent Afghan Taliban government is trying to develop independent positions and does not want to appear a lackey for anyone. It is too early to tell if the Afghan Taliban government intends to abide by the terms of Doha Accord related to security assurances, women and minority rights, and forming an inclusive government. It has shown the least progress when it comes to developing a government that represents the Afghan society.

The recognition of Afghan government and major humanitarian assistance is likely to be ultimately linked to what counter-terrorism cooperation Afghan Taliban can offer, in addition to progress in other areas mentioned above. This is especially true if the security situation deteriorates in Afghanistan as the weather warms up, and then spreads to Pakistan as the security officials of the country fear. And this predicament will also increase pressure on Pakistan to offer more assistance when it come to over the horizon operations.

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