By Dr. Syed Mohammad Ali

Context

Like most other countries around the world, Pakistan was in a wait and see mode on how its relationship with the United States would be impacted with the arrival of Biden administration. Pakistan’s omission from the list of invitees for the first international summit on climate change, being hosted by President Biden on April 23 and 24, is considered a bad omen by those arguing for a reset of US-Pakistan ties.

The Biden administration has invited 40 world leaders to this climate summit, which includes not only its traditional allies, but also Russia and China. From South Asia, India, Bangladesh and even Bhutan have been sent invites. Yet, Pakistan which is the fifth most populous country in the world, and amongst the top ten countries most vulnerable to climate change, has been sidelined.

Why the Biden administration chose to sideline Pakistan from the climate summit is puzzling, especially when the recently released Global Trends assessment by the US government’s National Intelligence Council itself has warned that water insecurity poses a major risk for South Asia. According to United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) forecasts, Pakistan is confronted with absolute water scarcity by 2025 due to its poor water conservative practices, combined with the impacts of climate change.

Some see differences over how to approach the peace process in Afghanistan as the cause for Pakistan’s exclusion from the U.S. led climate summit. The Biden administration’s announcement to delay military withdrawal from Afghanistan till September 11^th has created a precarious situation for Pakistan. Pakistan will now be under tremendous pressure to help convince the Taliban not to withdraw from the negotiations process or begin targeting international forces now that the timeline for American withdrawal has been extended beyond the May deadline. However, attributing Pakistan’s exclusion from the climate summit as a signal of American frustration with the peace process in Afghanistan seems unlikely. There are instead a range of issues, including the very nature of US-Pakistan bilateral relations, which need to be considered to understand why Pakistan has been invited to Biden’s climate summit and what this decision in turn implies.

Analysis

Geopolitics and the Future of US – Pakistan Ties

In addition to Pakistan’s utility in helping negotiate peace and ensuring long term stabilization in Afghanistan, the growing role of China in South Asia, and the protracted rivalry between nuclearized India and Pakistan, all necessitate America’s continued engagement with the country.

China and Pakistan have developed much closer ties over the past two decades. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) initiative has become a flagship for the much more ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China has recently inked treaties with Iran and Afghanistan to bring them into the folds of the BRI as well. On the other hand, after hosting talks on the Afghan peace process, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has recently visited Pakistan and India. His trip to India crisscrossed with that of Biden’s climate czar John Kerry. Earlier on March 12, the virtual Quad summit was held, focusing amongst other matters, on an open and inclusive Indo-Pacific. This was followed by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s visit to India.

Under the Biden administration, the US remains keen to focus on India as a strategic partner. How India aims to balance its existing defense ties with Russia, while developing greater synergy with the US, has some parallel to the balance that Pakistan is attempting to achieve in its bilateral relations with China and US.

Some US strategists believe that while Pakistan remains a key stakeholder in furthering the tenuous peace process in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s utility is going to diminish after the US has physically exited the region. For example, speaking at a virtually event at the Karachi Council on Foreign Relations on January 12, former US ambassador to Pakistan Cameron Munter stated that under Biden, Pakistan will be less of a priority, and that US-Pakistan ties are likely to be defined more by multilateralism rather than bilateral engagements. However, by sidelining Pakistan from the climate summit, Biden also seems to be denying Pakistan the benefit of US led materialism on climate change.

While great-power rivalry may continue to escalate under Biden, dealing with climate change requires keeping politics out and working with countries which are most vulnerable to climate change, and where the potential of climate change poses the danger of becoming a ‘threat multiplier’. Excluding Pakistan from the climate summit does not only impact its bilateral relationship with the US, this move also implies foregoing some important opportunities for regional cooperation which have wide-ranging implications for American strategic interests as well.

Lost Opportunity 1 – Facilitating cooperation between China and US

As the U.S. continues to partner with Pakistan on extremism, its bilateral relationship with India has made major strides during the past two decades, partly in the bid to counter China’s growing influence in the region. Conversely, Pakistan has increasing begun to rely on China to meet its infrastructure and energy needs, culminating in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Initially welcoming Chinese investments in Pakistan as the means to help stabilize Pakistan, the US has become increasingly wary of CPEC turning into the flagship project for the ambition Belt and Road Initiative. The Trump administration adopted an increasingly maximalist view of Pakistan’s relationship with China, and it warned Pakistan of falling prey to Chinese debt diplomacy.

With the Biden administration aiming to explore a broader spectrum of engagements with China, including not only confrontation and competition, but also cooperation, Pakistan seemed well positioned to offer both countries a chance to collaborate.

Pakistani policy makers have been reiterating that they do not want to pick sides in the strategic rivalry between China and the United States. While Pakistan may not be able to replicate the facilitative role that it played during the Nixon era to facilitate the Sino-American rapprochement, it could offer American firms an opportunity to invest in Chinese funded projects within Pakistan. Pakistan could especially benefit from collaboration between the two great powers to help make CPEC energy projects greener.

It is unfortunate that the Biden administration has squandered an ideal opportunity to jointly discuss such possibilities with China and Pakistan at the upcoming climate summit in the US.

Lost Opportunity 2 – Encouraging environmental diplomacy between India and Pakistan

Another missed opportunity of not inviting Pakistan to the Biden climate summit is the possibility of exploring means to put in place needed climate mitigation measures between India and Pakistan. Biden’s decision of giving John Kerry, the President’s Envoy on Climate Change, a seat on the National Security Council acknowledges how climate change is a threat multiplier, with the potential to aggravate preexisting sources of friction.

Nowhere else is the threat of climate change exacerbating conflict as severe as in South Asia, where nuclear-armed India and Pakistan share waters of the fast-melting Himalayan glacier.

Having brokered the longstanding Indus Water Treaty which divided the Himalayan waterways between these neighboring rivals, the US is well positioned to help put in place measures to conserve the Indus basin, and encourage other mitigation measures to build confidence instead of worsening relations between India and Pakistan.

During John Kerry’s current trip to Bangladesh and India to prepare for the coming climate summit, he encouraged Bangladesh and India to consider measures to better manage the Ganges river. But he was unable to do the same in the case of India and Pakistan, as Pakistan was not invited to the climate summit, nor was it a destination on Kerry’s itinerary.

Lost Opportunity 3 – Addressing water sharing concerns between Pakistan and Afghanistan

Pakistan’s exclusion from the Biden climate summit should not be interpreted as sign of American frustration with Pakistan over problems plaguing the Afghan peace plan. Yet, the absence of Afghanistan and Pakistan from the climate summit does have important implications. There is no water sharing agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan on the Kabul river, and this problem is being exacerbated by water scarcity and impending climate change threatening glacial flows feeding their shared waterways. Pakistan is also concerned about the Shahtoot Dam on Kabul River, being built with Indian support.

Afghanistan not getting an invite for Biden’s climate summit is perhaps understandable due to its uncertain political and security situation at present. However, the US could have invited the Pakistan government and worked with it to devise mechanism to better manage the Kabul river, which will only continue to grow in the future.

Moving Forward

Pakistan’s government seems caught off guard by the apparent American rebuke of being excluded from Biden climate summit. Pakistan continues brandishing its credentials to address climate change via its internationally acknowledged forestation drive. However, Pakistan has not yet been able to put in place effective measures to curb pollution or to develop an effective water conservation strategy. While the nation remains a low emitter, this is not a major accomplishment either, given the size of its economy.

While Prime Minister Imran Khan pledged the country will produce 60% of its energy via renewable resources at the Climate Ambition summit last year, the country’s energy portfolio remains heavily dependent on fossil fuels.

Pakistan certainly had much to gain from inclusion in an American-led climate summit. Despite this omission, Pakistan must keep its eye out for subsequent opportunities for international cooperation, especially during the UN climate summit to be held in November. The fact that Pakistan’s tree tsunami won accolades at the Word Economic Forum, and now Saudi Arabia is thinking of emulating this initiative are encouraging moves. However, Pakistan still needs to secure broad support for its efforts to contend with multifaceted climate related threats.

One major area where Pakistan can still aim to secure needed international cooperation is by attempting to make ongoing CPEC investments more environmentally friendly. Greening of CPEC can provide a blueprint for the Chinese financed infrastructure and energy projects in other countries.

While U.S. may be unwilling to help Pakistan achieve this goal, European countries with greater stake in the BRI may be more proactive partners to facilitate this goal – and perhaps this where the focus should be before the UN based climate summit scheduled for the end of this year.

Dr. Syed Mohammad Ali is a Senior Fellow at PoliTact

The post Broader Implications Of Pakistan’s Omission From Biden’s Climate Summit appeared first on Politact.

Context

PoliTact has consistently maintained that the longer the Afghan imbroglio continues it is bound to intersect with the other regional and global flashpoints – and the larger balance of power tussles. Not that it had not been in the past, but to a lesser degree.
Since 9/11, and the subsequent war against extremism, the global politics has been primarily shaped by cooperation in dealing with extremism. So much so that even legitimate struggles against oppression conveniently got linked with terrorism, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Kashmir.

As mentioned above, it would be wrong to assume that global power games, and the linked regional dimensions, had gone dormant as the campaign against extremism was being waged. It just had taken a different form. Consider the example of Arab Spring. As the uprising spread through the Arab world, it soon became apparent that the regime change that accompanied the popular revolts were risking the interests of Russia and China more.
And thus, the Spring came to a stop in the case of Syria, where Russia intervened militarily to save Bashar al-Assad, and by default its naval facility in Tartus. Syrian example also illustrated that different groups of extremists were being backed by array of state players, and thus it become a full fledge proxy war.

In the case of Egypt, the then General Fatah el-Sisi ousted democratically elected Islamist Mohammed Morsi in 2013. Morsi had arrived at the helm after the removal of Hosni Mubarak, as a result of the Egyptian revolution in 2011.

Libya provided another case where a different configuration of regional and global players emerged in the aftermath of the removal of Muammar Qaddafi, attempting to restore a semblance of order. Russia got involved militarily in Libya through its version of Black Water type mercenaries.

In most cases, China has remained on the sidelines. Instead, it has focused on economic route and developing strategic deals with both the Shia and Sunni states. It spoke in favor of state sovereignty and against foreign interventions.

In the emerging environment, the extremists with global aspirations, such as Al Qaeda (AQ) and Deash (ISIS), remained in the pariah status. However, the same could not be claimed for groups that came to be known as the associates of AQ and Daesh. These factions often had regional ambitions, grievances, and causes, which were either beneficial or detrimental to the interests of the regional and global stakeholders. In essence, the new reality was reflective of the political and security dynamics that existed before 9/11. And as the Cold War like situation returns, these local grievances and ambitions are likely to play a pivotal role.

The New Global Power Calculus

The metamorphosis of the war against extremism also applies to the South Asia region. While US and NATO have been doing the heavy lifting when it comes to the situation of Afghanistan, China and Russia have played a reconciliatory role. In the post 9/11 environment, and even before, China and Russia were threatened by their own brand of Islamic extremists, in Xinjiang, and Dagestan and Chechnya region, respectively. And they have remained worried about their extremists getting hooked up with the global extremists or their associates. In essence, helping in the war against extremism also diminished the domestic threats for these powers.

However, as we enter an era where the global power tussles will define politics once more, the reconciliatory role in Afghanistan is likely to evaporate. This does not bode well for the peace process. At the same time, it does not reflect well for Russia and China either. The theater for the Great Game is likely to get extended where the Pacific, including the Ladakh region, are already active. In short, Afghanistan, could become a quid pro quo on a much larger canvas.

Revitalizing NATO

As history teaches us, one of the critical steps in fighting global rivalries is by solidifying alliances and weakening those of the adversaries. And linked with that is an assessment of the kinds of threats being confronted. The type of alliance needed to fight non-state extremists is markedly different than the one to counter state actors.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came into being in 1949 in the aftermath of World War II. The first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay, had famously stated the organization’s goal was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” With the end of the Cold War and the Warsaw Pact, one of the main premises upon which the NATO military alliance was formulated was gone. The alliance began to look for a new purpose and identity that would keep it united against the emerging threats. The war against terror has proven to be one such unifying factor, as has dealing with rogue dictators and nations that threaten western interests, such as Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qaddafi and recently Iran. However, these motives have proven to be short lived in the present multi-polar world. But the return of great power politics, and Cold War like dynamics, can reinvigorate the alliance.

After the neglect suffered during the Trump’s presidency, the Biden Administration is busy strengthening alliances. To assure allies, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken visited Japan, South Korea, and NATO headquarters in Brussels. On the other hand, Secretary of Defense Loyd Johnson was in India and Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, on March 12 a virtual meeting of the QUAD leaders was held between the leaders of US, India, Japan, and Australia. In the press briefing after the meeting, US affirmed the ‘centrality of the Indo-Pacific in the US national security’. And, this was accompanied by the US-China strategic talks held in Alaska, that set the tone for the ties under Biden.

The Future of BRICS, SCO

On the other hand, an organization representing the emerging powers of Brazil, Russia, China, and India (BRICS) started off in 2011 with much fanfare, promoting commercial, political, and cultural cooperation. Its primary motive was to give voice to the realities of the multipolar world. In 2013, BRICS agreed to create global institutions to rival those of Western controlled IMF and World Bank. However, the economic recession of 2008 and the fluctuating global market has impacted the BRICS disproportionately. While China and India have continued to grow, the economies of Russia and Brazil have had a tougher time. This has obviously impacted the wherewithal of the organization.

More recently, China has been successful in handling the coronavirus pandemic and has been the least impacted economically – as compared to the West. This could also be the reason why the tensions between US and China have escalated.

The Chinese dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was formed in 2001 mainly as a security forum. The member governments have common security concerns, with emphasis on tackling terrorism, religious extremism, and ethnic separatism. In 2017, the organizing reached a milestone when India and Pakistan joined the organization as full members. Other members include China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Afghanistan and Iran have an observer status while Turkey is a dialogue partner of SCO.

As the global focus shifts from the campaign against extremism and towards great power challenges, the nature of BRICS and SCO is likely to morph as well. No other issue is more consequential to the future of these organizations than the role of India. The nation is also aligned with the Indo-Pacific strategy and QUAD. It simply cannot be a member of the emerging power club while supporting the established powers at the same time. Sooner or later, India would have to choose.

A case can be made that the present border tensions between India and China are a direct result of Indian decision to revoke the special status of Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019. Under the garb of US-China rivalry it attempted to settle an internationally recognized dispute unilaterally.

The Great Game of the earlier times was about the dangers of Russian invasion on British India via Afghanistan, the emerging one appears to be about protecting American India against Chinese penetration. While US would want to weaken the Sino-Russian partnership, a successful strategy would likely work by placating one of them, not by alienating both at the same time.

The post The War Against Extremism And The Return Of New Great Game appeared first on Politact.

Arab-Israel Normalization of Ties and US Middle East Policy

Context

With the normalization of ties between UAE, Bahrain and Israel, the so-called ‘Outside-In Approach’ to the Middle East Peace Process is now in full swing. Most GCC and Arab nations are on the way to normalizing of ties with Israel. This was predicted as regional situation dramatically shifted during the war against extremism, and as a consequence of Arab Spring. During this time, the threat perceptions of the Arabs have also gradually shifted away from Israel and towards Iran. What was the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, transformed in to an Arab-Israeli conflict, and now appears to have become Arab-Israeli versus Iran conflict.

At an event hosted by Atlantic Council on May 7, 2015, PoliTact’s Chief Analyst Arif Ansar asked the former US special envoy for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations Martin Indyk, about how the Iranian nuclear deal and the US-Gulf partnership can help or hinder the Middle East Peace Process.

Martine Indyk replied that the prospects of a solution emerging from an ‘Inside Out’ approach i.e., from within Israel and Palestine, and independent of whatever else is going on in the Middle East, are not good. However, the potential for an ‘Outside In’ solution which has emerged because of the possible Iran nuclear deal and Israeli and Arab countries being on the same side, might emerge with positive response because of the new strategic alignment in the region.

The regional and global shift in the balance of power have also played a key role in this evolution – and caries critical implications for the South and Central Asia – and the strategic ties of India and Pakistan with the Gulf region – and for Afghan reconciliation and Kashmir quagmire by association. While there is a time during which the balance of power is in transition, obviously, there comes a time when the power shifts decisively and a new alignment starts to manifest. This is exactly what has transpired.

While PoliTact has been writing about the waning American influence in the non-Arab Islamic world, it had continued to maintain its sway in the Middle East and GCC. PoliTact has also recently contemplated and examined a scenario that explores why US would even want to maintain its presence in the Middle East – as it is now self-sufficient when it comes to energy needs. Moreover, if the region was left to implode, the global adversaries of China and Russia are likely to be more impacted.

And as such there is no direct threat from the region to the US, whether it be in the form of extremism or WMD. While no such weapons were discovered in Iraq, any such threat from Iran was curtailed as a result of Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) reached in 2015 but later scuttled by President Trump. An argument can be made that the US policy towards Middle East now is mainly driven by protecting its regional ally Israel – and in turn its present and future allies. These new Arab allies will now likely take the frontal role in protecting Israel and could also become the main battlefield.

Future of War Against Extremism

The most used term during the Bush and Obama administrations that is no longer as popular is the War against Extremism. Several questions can be raised on why that is the case. Was the campaign won, the extremist ideologies that led to 9/11 eliminated, or were the organizations such as Al Qaeda (AQ) and Daesh (ISIS) dismantled. Moreover, what happened to the allies that were leading the fight against terrorists? The examination of these inquiries reveals clues about the emerging scenarios.

While the war against extremism has transformed, the risks to the Israel’s Arab allies are only quadrupling. The threats posed by the global extremists, such as AQ and ISIS and their associates, are only going to magnify after normalizing of their ties with Israel. After all the very premise these groups have used to inspire is their lack of action on the causes such as Palestine – along with allowing western military presence.

In addition, the dynamics of Arab Spring have been further aggravated by circumstances created by the Coronavirus pandemic and has limited the maneuvering space for many Arab states. Decreasing reliance on US for energy resources have left them further vulnerable and amenable to external pressures.

Nearly two decades of war against extremism has transformed societies and galvanized them towards nationalistic and conservative leaderships, such as Tayyab Erdogan in Turkey and Imran Khan in Pakistan. The political leaders close to the West, or needing their support, are no longer considered viable.

Global Power Dynamics

While the extending regional threat from Iran has been playing out in places like Yemen, Lebanon and Syria, the prospective China-Iran economic and security deal is a different ball game altogether. It has indicated that like Russia backed the Syrian regime, China appears willing to do that for Iran. And this is occurring at a time when Trump administration has completely reversed course on the Iran nuclear deal. It has exerted maximum pressure on the country to renegotiate the deal; now to encompass its missile program, accompanied by stricter monitoring, and wider behavior in the region.

The potential $400 billion China–Iran treaty must have been an ominous development from the perspective of the Arabs and the US. However, the talks have been proceeding for a while, and as has been the ‘Outside-In Approach’ to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has become an active player in the Middle East with strategic ties with a number of regional players, to include Saudi Arabia. As its influence increases gradually, it could become an active interlocutor between Israel and the Palestinians, and other conflicts of the Middle East. However, it’s not clear if China desires to get involved in the security affairs of the region, like Russia has in Syria.

Speaking at the Saudi embassy in China in July on the occasion of the 30 anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties, Saudi Ambassador Turki M. A. Almadi commented: “our relations are all-round, multi-field, not only about bilateral trade and mutual investment, but also extended to cooperation in the fields of culture, science and technology, and health.”

Zhai Jun, China’s special envoy on Middle East affairs indicated at the occasion that the bilateral trade volume between the two nations stood at $78.04 billion at the end of 2019. He added Saudi Arabia was the largest supplier of crude oil to China, and also the Arab nations largest trading partner.

Chinese analysts close to the government present a case the nation wants to be more involved in providing economic support than to get involved in security affairs of the Middle East. Nonetheless, it has good political and military relations with both Iran and Israel. As part of BRI, China has been extending its trade relations with Israel and lately US has objected strongly to some of them citing security concerns – such as the Chinese company Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) running a container terminal at the Port of Haifa – near an Israeli naval base that is frequently visited by the US Sixth Fleet.

If the China-Israeli economic ties are allowed to strengthen uninhibited, overtime China will be able to build leverages that potentially can undercut US primacy in the affairs of the Middle East. The Israelis disagree on this, stating that the nature of its ties with China and the US are of totally different nature.

Conclusion

While Saudi Arabia has delayed recognizing the statehood of Israel, and Qatar remaining closer to Turkey, the shifting alliance of most GCC and Arab nations towards Israel and the US represents a decisive shift in the balance of power – that has serious costs associated with it. Adopting the threat perception that centers on Iran, and without any clear give and take on the Middle East Peace Process yet, is likely to revitalize the non-state actors.

While China has made an economic entry in the Middle East, it has not decided to influence the security affairs – other than under the umbrella of UN and for maritime security purposes. In Syria too, it has adopted a non-interventionist approach and has supported the Assad regime.

However, economic leverages will eventually lead to influences in other areas. And China would have to use its sway especially when it has the most to lose if a conflict breaks out in the region. One measure of if it’s heading in that direction would be the establishment of military bases, like the one in Djibouti, and potential militarization of Gwadar port. And in this context, the Iran-China economic and security deal takes on an added emphasis.

The post The Future Of Middle East Peace Process, Extremism, And China-Iran Deal appeared first on Politact.

Is the Internal or external Dynamics more Important?

Context

After numerous promising starts and hard stops, Afghan peace process is once again making progress. The initiation of intra-Afghan peace process is now almost certain despite the hick-ups related to the release of last tranche of Taliban prisoners held by the Ashraf Ghani’s government. While many challenges have been overcome, several intricate obstacles remain. Such as the status of foreign troops withdrawal, the shape of future government, women rights, and the role of Sharia in governance etc.

However, the internal dynamics of Afghanistan is only one aspect of the puzzle. At this juncture, the external environment tied to the fast moving regional and global dynamics appears more critical. PoliTact has long contended that while there is an overemphasis on understanding the Afghan quagmire in a compartmentalized way, it is very much intertwined to the tussles of the regional and global balance of power. And this external context may prove to be more consequential. In this, the rise of China and affairs of Middle East are paramount, where some key Arab nations are on a trajectory of normalizing ties with Israel.

China and India are central to many changes taking shape in the regional geopolitics, whether it be the tension on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the potential China-Iran economic and security deal, or the China-Pakistan economic corridor (CPEC). In all of these, the outcome impacts India adversely, and the US by association.

How the American elections play out and impact the Afghan future, and the associated US-Pakistan relations, is equally critical. After a rocky start, during the Trump administration US-Pakistan ties have remained normal and absent the tumult witnessed during the Bush and Obama administrations.

India and Afghanistan

India has most to lose if there is a resolution to the Afghan conflict. It benefits from the long-term entanglement of Pakistan – but this also means US has to expend substantial blood and treasure to maintain its presence there. With Pakistan preoccupied in dealing with Afghanistan and extremism, India could ensure that the thorny issue of Kashmir can be resolved as it wishes.

However, that premise has tumbled ever since US and Taliban agreed on a peace deal in February. India perceives the treaty as not addressing its concerns and interests in Afghanistan, and the growing influence of AQIS (Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent) in India and Kashmir. In the emerging scenario, Taliban are likely to become a partner and bulwark against ISIS and AQ inspired extremism, a goal shared by US, Taliban and Pakistan.

On the other hand, the abolishment of the special status of Kashmir on August 5 last year, and the brutal lock-down that ensued, India has further aggravated the situation. Through such draconian steps, India has exhibited that it has little respect for UN resolutions or human rights and this will play right in the hands of extremists.

Nonetheless, to placate Indian concerns, US Afghan Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad stated in May that India should establish direct talks with the Taliban to address concerns. While talking to The Hindu, he added, “India is an important force in Afghanistan and it would be appropriate for that [India-Taliban] engagement to take place”.

India is caught in a quandary on whether to establish direct talks with the Taliban, which it believes it to be the proxy of Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan is improving its ties with the Afghan government in earnest. It is not clear at this point if India has bought in to the emerging Afghan peace process. Meanwhile the nightmare of being blacklisted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) still hangs in balance for Pakistan – as its efforts to bring Madrassa’s in the mainstream are making headway.

China-India-Iran Dynamics

The tensions between China and India along the LAC escalated in June when 20 Indian soldiers were killed in a clash in Ladakh. Numerous rounds of talks have failed to alleviate tensions. If the standoff extends to India taking steps in the South China Sea, then it is likely to complicate matters in Afghanistan and along the Line of Control (LOC) as well. But one thing is clear, Chinese actions along the LAC has shown that India cannot act with impunity and compromise Chinese interests in Afghanistan or Pakistan – and that is where CPEC comes in the picture.

While India has been attempting to globally isolate Pakistan, CPEC has provided the nation a much need shot in the arm. The country has paid a heavy economical and societal price for more than a decade of war against extremism.

China also wants to bring Afghanistan in to its One Belt One Road Initiative and the economic benefit of that far outweigh anything India can offer to the war-ravaged country. Afghanistan has hedged its bets, but with India being asked to pack-up its much-delayed infrastructure, rail, and energy projects in Iran, that dynamics is changing. Iran is instead moving forward with economic and security deal with China, that will bring $400 billion investments over 25 years. Afghanistan’s strategic calculation will obviously shift as a result of these developments.

Simply put, from the Chinese perspective it can no longer afford Indian shenanigans on the LAC, LAC, and in Afghanistan without India paying a price for it.

The Dynamics of Middle East

In addition to putting pressure on Pakistan through organizations such as FATF, India has consistently work to undercut its traditional ties with the Gulf region – and in turn weaken its position on Afghanistan and Kashmir. Through its newfound economic clout, and alliance with Israel and the US, India has had success in this.

Not only that, this unified juggernaut has also resulted in pushing some key Arab nations on a path to normalize ties with Israel – while the non-Arab nations of Turkey and Iran stand in stark contrast.

In theaters like Libya, Turkey and Qatar are backing the UN supported unity government, while Khalifa Haftar has the blessing of UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. This is pretty much the same configuration that applies to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Will this alignment also be matched in the South and Central Asian theater of operations, and Afghanistan, is yet to be seen – but the telltale signs point in that direction. And in this is the reason why the potential China, Iran security and economic deal carries serious repercussions.

Iran and Pakistan are two nations that are close Chinese allies and significant part of its One Belt One Road Initiative. Iran, including Turkey, are also strongly opposed to any normalizing of ties with Israel without the resolution of Palestinian conflict, and are vocal about India atrocities in Kashmir.

The Great Game

Afghanistan is a high-stake proposition. Like in the past, it will be the regional and global balance of power tussles that will play an instrumental role in determining its future. If the Afghan government assesses that they gain more by going along with the One Belt and One Road initiative, like Pakistan and Iran, then its game over. And in such an eventuality, Indian role will be relegated.

The question becomes why would US want to leave Afghanistan to other powers. Under the American First doctrine, perhaps it wants to focus on other flanks where it enjoys an advantage, such as the South China Sea and the Middle East. Plus, US is extremely perturbed with its allies that desire it to lead the fight to protect their interests but are unwilling to commit resources and troops – whether it be NATO or India.

If elections all go well, will this change if Biden wins? Will Americans once again start to lead where the allies are unwilling? Will the world return to the form of globalization where the allies benefit more at the cost of US? The fate of these inquiries will be settled first in the elections – and the Americans are going to base their vote on their economic prospects and not on the foreign policy premises.

The post The Future of Afghan Quagmire appeared first on Politact.

Context
As the direct peace talks between the US and Afghan Taliban move along – the sixth round of talks started in Doha on May 1, while another session of talks were also facilitated by Russia from May 28-30. Meanwhile questions are being raised regarding the prospects of success. 

To demonstrate the relevance of his government, and to counter the sentiment of being left out, President Ashraf Ghani convened the Loya Jirga in late April and also demanded a ceasefire. However, prominent leaders did not attend, which amongst others included CEO Abdullah Abdullah, Gulbadin Hekmatyar, and Hamid Karzai.

Any negotiations have to consider the positions of various stakeholders. More importantly, first the stakeholders have to agree to talk and then continue the process until a reasonable accommodation has been reached. Then there are spoilers. In this context, how can one evaluate the on-going talks keeping the perspectives of various parties in mind?

There are three main interlocutors to these talks: Afghan Taliban, the Afghan Government, and the US, which is also leading an alliance of foreign troops in Afghanistan. Meanwhile Pakistan is facilitating at this point and is not directly participating.

For US and Afghan Taliban to hold direct talks was a first step that indicated the willingness of the both interlocutors to engage. The US and Afghan Taliban have also held face to face discussions in the past, but they have been subject specific. For example, when both negotiated on the release of POWs – such as recently on the fate of US Army soldier Bowe Bergdhal.

The US has now decided to take a holistic approach to talks with the Taliban. According to Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad, there will be no agreement until everything is agreed upon. The primary focus areas include a complete ceasefire, foreign troops withdrawal, counter-terrorism assurances, and intra-Afghan dialogue. However, the sequencing of what comes first is proving to be challenging. What steps are taken first, gives an advantage to the other party, and means a loss of leverage for the other. Then there is the element of trust and how the agreed guarantees will be implemented.

On the other hand, the main demand of Afghan Taliban has been to hold direct talks with the US and complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan before moving on to other guarantees.

The achilles heel of the whole peace process is that other regional and global events are equally connect to what transpires in Afghanistan. The events include US-Iran tensions, US-China trade war, escalating Pakistan-India conflagration, and the introduction of ISIS in the Afghan non-state actor landscape. The longer it takes to develop a common ground over Afghanistan – the more complicated the talks become.

Analysis

US-Afghan Talks

According to media reports, the US wants an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire before it makes a decision on the shape of the withdrawal of forces. And Afghan Taliban would not offer a truce until it has a decision on the departure of foreign troops, and an agreement on the set up of future Afghan government. The intra-Afghan dialogue appears to be the last thing on the list. That does not mean contacts between the Taliban and other Afghan leaders and representatives are not taking place.

If US and Afghan Taliban talks were to succeed, Ashraf Ghani’s government, which is backed by India, a strategic US ally, has most to loose. Especially when the intra-Afghan dialogue has not fully taken off. From the Indian perspective, the success of Afghan peace process would mean Pakistan could fully focus towards it. Thus Pakistan-India détente is an essential prerequisite for peace in Afghanistan.

US-Iran Tensions

Then there are the secondary stakeholders of Afghan peace talks, which involve Iran, Russia, and China. In the face of unilateral US withdrawal from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) last year and re-imposition of sanctions, on May 8 Iran decided to incrementally withdraw from the agreement too, unless the other signatories (UK, France, Germany, China and Russia) ease restrictions placed on its banking and oil sectors in sixty days. 

These developments, including any military escalation, are bound to complicate the Afghan peace process. China and Russia are cooperating on the Afghan peace process, and a number of related meetings have taken place in Russia. However, China and Russia are also close to Iran, with China being the largest crude oil customer for Iran, and India the second. Iran is a vital pillar of Russian Middle East strategy, to include Syria.

Iran has also undergone a transformation of views regarding the Afghan Taliban. Because of its heavy involvement in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon, to Iran Afghanistan increasingly represents another flank – where it will likely confront similar dynamics as in the Middle East theater of operation. In this, the Afghan Taliban represent a saner local player for Iran to work with and to counter threats from ISIS and other Sunni extremists.

Thus Russia, China, and Iran can complicate the Afghan peace process if their tensions with US continue to increase, with US-China trade war also escalating. Although the cost of extended Afghan conflict are more for China, and its strategic ally Pakistan, than for the US. Nonetheless, engaging in talks with the Afghan Taliban helps to ascertain the positions of various stakeholders and then refine the strategy accordingly.

India-Pakistan Conflict

While the Pakistan-India tensions are known to flare up occasionally, the present one over the February 14 Pulwama incident has calmed down for the time being. However, in the absence of any political dialogue related to Kashmir, there is likely to be a next episode.

In the present circumstances,Afghan reconciliation would likely have a stabilizing impact on Pakistan and will reinforce its influence – possibly taking the region back to the pre 9/11 geopolitical environment. Using its strategic ties with the US, India has propagated the perspective that if the safe havens in FATA are eliminated, and with pressure on the Afghan Taliban, the present Afghan government has a better chance of succeeding.

India and Israel are the two states that have derived considerable political mileage since 9/11. They were able to label Palestine and Kashmir conflicts as being supported by extremists that are using violence to achieve political ends. The settlement of Afghan conflict will lend support to the argument that there is a difference between the terrorism unleashed by Al Qaeda andISIS- and what is talking place in Kashmir and Palestine.

In such circumstances, it is literally impossible to achieve Afghan reconciliation without getting India onboard and progress on India-Pakistan détente. In the post Pulwama environment, and with the reelection of Narendra Modi, the position of India is unlikely to change towards Pakistan.

ISIS Versus Afghan Taliban

The interjection of ISIS to the Afghan extremist landscape has added another hurdle to the Afghan peace process – that can possibly disrupt the traditional interlinkages of the extremist and proxy groups in the region, and potentially cause a conflict between India and Pakistan.

In 2014, PoliTact had noted:

“In the future, IS could become the centripetal force for disgruntled extremists of all sorts, leading to friction and infighting between various configurations of extremists, with the states caught in the middle, as is the case in the Middle East. This could further complicate Afghan reconciliation and normalization of Pakistan-India ties. On a more ominous note, ISIS could potentially compete against Pakistan’s alleged influence over some groups. While the consistent pressure on Core AQ may have indeed weakened it, the emergence of ISIS has created an opportunity and a focal point for the Associates of AQ to gravitate towards. This is a potent reason for Pakistan and India to resume results oriented dialog.”

This, however, should also be the reason and motivation factor for Afghan Taliban to hurry-up the reconciliation process, as ISIS will aspire to steal the platform. And while the grievances of Taliban are local, ISIS, like AQ, carries global agenda.

Conclusion

While in the past focus of the war against extremism has concentrated on state actions against non-state actors. The tussles of the global balance of power has transformed this campaign in to a full fledge proxy wars in many regions. Unless the basic framework that defined world politics in the aftermath of 9/11 is redesigned, the campaign is heading towards interstate conflicts.

Moreover, in the absence of any political resolution of the lingering Arab-Israeli conflict and Kashmir, the prospects for Afghan reconciliation are bleak. Meanwhile, new quagmires such as Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen, have been added to the sources of regional instability. Unless everything is settled, and the balance of power is once again restored, it would be naïve to think that a piece meal approach has a potential to succeed at this juncture. Will this balance amongst the global powers, and their regional allies, be restored militarily, or politically, remains to be seen – including how long it will take to achieve this.

The post Prospects for Afghan Peace and Restoration of Global Balance of Power appeared first on Politact.

Does The Road To Peace In Afghanistan Originate In Kashmir?

By Arif Ansar

Context

The conflict in Afghanistan has been continuing for the last 30 years or so. The present phase got underway after the tragic incident of 9/11. US launched a campaign against the perpetrators of the attack, Al Qaeda, and those that provided them refuge, the Afghan Taliban.

While the Al Qaeda menace has been controlled for the most part in the region, the Taliban have remained a lethal force even after billions of dollars were spent to counter them. Under the Obama administration’s troop surge, more than 100,000 soldiers were deployed in Afghanistan.

The question though remains, why have Taliban not been managed even after spending so much in blood and treasure. An inaccurate answer to this question can and have caused many new complications, while prolonging the war.

The causes for this not only lie inside Afghanistan but also relate to the India-Pakistan rivalry, including the impact of Iran-Saudi tussles in the Middle East. In addition, the global power tensions between US, China, and Russia have escalated the tugs of the global balance of power. There is also a need to understand the transformation of the extremism phenomenon that has lead the emergence of Daesh to replace Al Qaeda.

In this complicated dynamics, the Indian motives in Afghanistan are the least understood, and perhaps hold the key to make progress on lasting Afghan peace.

Lack of Afghan Purpose

If we look at the reasons internal to Afghanistan, there are factors connected to the Afghan political, economic, and security capacity to continue to fight this seemingly endless war. In January, President Ashraf Ghani himself admitted that without US support, Afghan Army couldn’t be sustained for six months.

Any army needs to have clear-cut goals and purpose in order to put up a decisive fight; this is especially true when the Afghans are fighting their fellow countrymen. The Afghan Army is fighting Taliban, including extremists like Al Qaeda and Daesh, with limited military capability, and has to rely on air and advisory support to conduct operations.

On the other hand, Afghan Taliban have a transparent message that they are conducting a jihad against foreign occupiers, historically an honorable Afghan occupation. Their most apparent demands for peace talks include complete withdrawal of foreign troops, and to negotiate directly with the Americans, and not its ‘puppet’ Afghan government.

As opposed to this, the coalition demands from Taliban a clear break with global jihadists like Al Qaeda. Furthermore, to renounce violence and accept the present Afghan constitution and government. On the surface, all major external stakeholders have demanded that peace process should be Afghan owned and Afghan led, a noble aim indeed.

Who Can Bring About Afghan Reconciliation?

Many talk about the Afghan Reconciliation in simplistic terms. Since the kinetic approaches have not worked, it is automatically assumed the next step should be the peace process. There are many limitations to that. At this point, Afghan Taliban have splintered into many groups and it’s not clear who can politically represent them, and has the sway over all groups.

Another premise that accompanies the above argument is that while there are many stakeholders to the conflict, the peace process should be Afghan owned and Afghan led. Put it more succinctly, the Western backed Afghan government should be spearheading the peace initiative. With the interests of many regional and global stakeholders at stake, to expect the weakest partner to perform this job is hoping for the impossible.

The Afghan reconciliation is an auxiliary to Afghan Peace Process. Meaning that the Afghan reconciliation by itself will not bring peace to Afghanistan – in absence of settlement between the regional and global stakeholders, particularly India and Pakistan, and the US and China.

A successful approach to Afghan peace should first involve careful scrutiny of the interests of the key stakeholders, starting from the Afghan government and different factions of Afghan Taliban. The motives of the fragile Afghan government are not clear on why it would want to share power with Afghan Taliban. They lack credibility and are corrupt. The political leadership benefits the most from the continuing infighting in Afghanistan as it attracts millions of dollars of military and economic support, which provides opportunities for more corruption.

The turmoil that resulted from the 2014 Afghan election was only settled after former US Secretary of State John Kerry assembled a Unity Government and developed a power sharing formula between the CEO and the President. This provides one example of how a facilitated wider power-sharing model, which includes the Afghan Taliban, could work.

The uncertainty regarding the much-delayed parliamentary elections has continued. Many of the election reforms are still not in place and there is little time left to do that. The presidential elections scheduled for mid-2019 could very well result in another phase of political chaos while the security situation of the country dwindles further. This is one more reason to quicken the pace of finding a peace formula for Afghanistan.

Understanding the Indian Position on Afghan Reconciliation

The media attention is usually fixated on the American interests and that of Pakistan as they are linked with the Afghan reconciliation. However, this debate lacks assessment of those players that do not want Afghan peace process to be successful, for example India. How does it benefit or lose from peace in Afghanistan? To talk about reconciliation in Afghanistan in the absence of this analysis will not be doing justice with the objective of achieving peace.

The country is perhaps the least interested in Afghan reconciliation. And we only need to look at the pre 9/11 Afghanistan to understand the reasons for that.

This was the time when militants and extremists with regional and global ambitions were cross-pollinating in Afghanistan after they had fought the jihad against the Soviets in the 80s, and this resulted in several attacks inside India, and ultimately leading to 9/11.

For India the nightmare scenario would be the return of the Afghan Taliban and other religious zealots, which would be the outcome of any kind of Afghan reconciliation. It fears this will have a direct impact on the insurgency in Kashmir. While India provides economic aid to Afghanistan and supports development projects to improve its soft image, the main aim of India would be to prevent any kind of Afghan patch-up that puts the Afghan Taliban back in the government. Instead, it has focused all its efforts to malign the image of Pakistan as a supporter of extremists in Kashmir and Afghanistan.

Indian objective would be to weaken Pakistan to such an extent that it abandons any claim on Kashmir, or accept a resolution of the conflict based on Indian terms. This is not much different than what just transpired in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The politics of the Middle East has changed to such an extent, that the traditional supporters of the Palestinian cause like Saudi Arabia and Egypt have moved their position closer to that of Israel. This changing political landscape recently resulted in the Trump administration’s decision to move the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

Based on this assumption, Indian strategy has been to use its increasing clout to sideline Pakistan in the international arena, and to short-circuit channels through which Pakistan has traditionally garnered support, such as the GCC and the US. And in this endeavor, it has allied with Israel. In this context, the emerging Indian Middle East posture is interesting to watch and quite risky for Pakistan.

India’s Emerging Middle East Posture

Pakistan-India tensions are tied to the Kashmir issue and the associated skirmishes on the LOC. This rivalry has now fully engulfed the Afghan conflict, where Pakistan blames India for using the turmoil in Afghanistan as a stepping-stone to destabilize and weaken Pakistan. It does this by carrying out terrorist activities within Pakistan, and by supporting Baloch separatist. On the other hand, India blames Pakistan for supporting the Kashmiri militants and Afghan Taliban.

Despite years of dialogue between US and Pakistan, US has gradually given more credence to the argument presented by India. Moreover, the maturing US-India strategic ties are a source of great concern for Pakistan.

In addition to the US, Pakistan has also enjoyed strong support from the Middle East nations, especially from the GCC. In times of emergencies and political crises, Pakistan has always been able to harness political and financial support from its oil rich Islamic brethren.

However, due to the tremendous change being brought upon by the campaign against extremism, the Iran-Saudi tensions, and the transformation in the energy industry, the geopolitics of the Middle East is changing dramatically. India is positioning itself to exploit the opportunities being created to undermine the customary support Pakistan has enjoyed in the region.

This was recently at display when Prime Minister of Israel visited India in January for six days, followed by Modi’s trip to Palestine in February. In his meeting with the Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas, he ironically backed the cause of independent Palestine. India has historically supported the Palestinians but its extra-ordinary close ties to Israel makes a mockery of this claim. And these trips have taken place in the aftermath of highly controversial US decision to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. During his trip, he also visited UAE, Oman, and three nations of West Africa.

The Indian analysts projected the nations Middle East diplomacy as an attempt to balance its ties with the Arab states that employ a large number of Indian workers. However, this is hardly digestible when other Arab nations such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt have themselves moved closer to the position of Israel. Reportedly, it was due to their private consent that emboldened President Trump to take the decision of moving the embassy to Jerusalem.

Needless to say, during this timeframe Pakistan was itself busy with hosting President Abdullah II of Jordan. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s Army Chief visited Saudi Arabia in early February and met with Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman. On February 20^th came the decision to post a contingent of Pakistani troops to the Kingdom for training and advisory mission.

The reasons for aggressive Indian Middle East diplomacy are multidimensional. With large Muslim population, India desires to project its suitability for the seat on the reformed UN Security Council, and as a credible future arbiter in the almost dead Middle East Peace Process. Moreover, to undercut the customary support for Pakistan in the Arab world for the Kashmir cause and matters related to Afghanistan.

Conclusion

The above assessment provides several clues on how to approach the Afghan peace process. Firstly, the motives of the Afghan government need to be looked at closely. The reason Obama administration gave a timeline for the American withdrawal was not to alert the enemy but recognizing history. Without Afghan’s taking responsibility for their country, the nation will remain dependent on the West and billions will continue to be wasted. And as soon as the aid dries up, the infighting will start.

Second, the missing component on Afghan reconciliation has to do with India. India should be expected to clearly lay out a minimal acceptable formula for Afghanistan. And it cannot be that it wouldn’t accept Afghan Taliban in any potential power sharing formula. Moreover, without entering into a dialogue with Pakistan on the resolution of Kashmir, it risks a wider conflagration.

Thirdly, to achieve Afghan Peace, will require Western facilitation like the power sharing model crafted in 2014 with the active US support.

On the flip side, Afghan Taliban would have to accept any power sharing formula that results from the negotiations, and that their religious aspirations would have to be attained through a consultative mechanism. Moreover, they would have to break ties with global extremists. They should recognize the leverage of being a bulwark against the aims of Deash in the region.

The post Afghan Peace Process And Kashmir appeared first on Politact.

The US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton has urged lawmakers not to undercut US efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Speaking to the House of Foreign Affairs Committee, Clinton said “we should build on our momentum, not undercut our progress.”

The US Congress expressed its apprehension over the flow of aid to the South Asian countries as well as links between the Pakistani intelligence and militants. Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s statement that his country would side with Pakistan in the event of a conflict between Islamabad and Washington has also raised concerns about the loyalty of the Afghan government to the US.

She insisted that Pakistan should support the Afghan peace process, help bring different Afghan factions to the negotiation table, eliminate safe havens and act against Haqqani network.

Hillary Clinton on Thursday insisted the US could not afford to disengage from the region as they did against the Soviets in the Cold War. While acknowledging the lawmakers apprehensions, Clinton argued the US had no better alternative available.

The post Secretary Clinton Seek Lawmakers Support for Afghanistan, Pakistan appeared first on Politact.

According to media sources, Pakistani military claims it can bring the infamous Haqqani network to the negotiating table. The US, however, wants Pakistan to conduct military operations against Haqqani sanctuaries in the tribal areas. The network has ties to both Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and is blamed for many of the major assaults in Afghanistan, especially the often daring attacks in the capital Kabul. Earlier this week, Washington declared Haqqani commander Mullah Sangeen Zadran as a terrorist, barring US nationals from doing business with him and freezing any of his assets in America.

The post Pakistan Offers To Bring Haqqani Network To Negotiate appeared first on Politact.

The US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton has urged lawmakers not to undercut US efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Speaking to the House of Foreign Affairs Committee, Clinton said “we should build on our momentum, not undercut our progress.”

The US Congress expressed its apprehension over the flow of aid to the South Asian countries as well as links between the Pakistani intelligence and militants. Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s statement that his country would side with Pakistan in the event of a conflict between Islamabad and Washington has also raised concerns about the loyalty of the Afghan government to the US.

She insisted that Pakistan should support the Afghan peace process, help bring different Afghan factions to the negotiation table, eliminate safe havens and act against Haqqani network.

Hillary Clinton on Thursday insisted the US could not afford to disengage from the region as they did against the Soviets in the Cold War. While acknowledging the lawmakers apprehensions, Clinton argued the US had no better alternative available.

The post Clinton Urges Congress To Not ‘Undercut’ US Progress in Afghanistan And Pakistan appeared first on Politact.

Context
Most conflicts arise from differences of perspectives as to how to view the world, which spring from historical contexts and interests, which in turn also frames threat perceptions. Power enables an international actor to impose its will and perspective on other actors, via coercion, the exercise of influence, diplomacy, or any combination of these. Power, of course, does not remain constant and most often it is assumed that there is a zero-sum dynamics involved. That is to say, one actor’s gain is another’s loss.  Historically, during periods of shifts in power dynamics, tremendous upheavals have taken place; such areas are the settings of potential future threats. Such disruptions of the balance of power are usually settled decisively by wars. For example, the present system of governance came out of World War II: the United States became the preeminent world power, succeeding Great Britain and the victorious powers subsequently established the United Nations and the Security Council, with its five permanent veto-holding members.

At present, we are now witnessing the emergence of new centers of power, located in various spheres of influence: for example, the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China). This has led to disturbances to the existing balance of power, resulting in realignments to counter budding threats in today’s global and interconnected world.

Analysis

The Middle East is currently witnessing a rapid power shift. The creation of the state of Israel and the unresolved issues of Palestine and the status of Jerusalem dating to the post-World War II era have remained burning issues, with huge repercussions spanning the Muslim world. Numerous Islamic movements and revivalist groups were energized by the Palestinian hardships and loss of Al Aqsa Mosque and Dome of the Rock, including the forefathers of AQ in Egypt.

The United States has long been the chief protector of the oil-rich sheikdoms of the Arab world, as well, of course, of the state of Israel. Saudi Arabia, on whose soil stands the holiest of holy places of Islam, is governed by a monarchy, which is not a system of government prescribed by Islam. The sheikdoms of the Middle East have been vehement on the Palestinian issue, which has given them substantial credibility in the Islamic world, but on a practical level, their dependence on the U.S. meant they could hardly do anything meaningful vis-a–is Israel’s policies regarding the Muslims of Palestine.

Historically, Saudi Arabia and even Saddam Hussein have provided substantial financial support to the Palestinian people’s jihad against Israel. After 911, Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian Authority splintered, resulting in the emergence of the Fatah and Hamas groups.  The pro-Western Arab countries reacted by supporting the moderate Fatah group, located on the West Bank, while Iran sponsored the Hamas, headquartered in Gaza, which favors military action. Egypt’s recent support has been critical to Israel’s attempts to block the border to Gaza and reduce support for Hamas. Furthermore, in 2006, Iran and Syria supported Hezbollah’s successful efforts to stand up to the might of Israel; many in the Muslim world applauded what they perceived as Hezbollah’s ability to humiliate Israel via small rocket showers.

Thus, the influence of Shiite Iran has increased incrementally at the expense of Sunni Saudi Arabia and its allies in the Middle East and South Asia. There has been a subtle shift in the Islamic public opinion regarding who genuinely stands up for its interests.  Iran’s unwavering support of the militant Shiite Hezbollah and Sunni Hamas in the face of Israeli and American opposition has only increased the favorable images of Iran and the Shiite sect of Islam, while making pro-West Arab countries appear impotent. This was further illustrated in Iraq, where the United States had to rely on Iran to reduce tensions, at the cost of increasing Shiite influence in Iraq, which had been historically ruled by Sunnis, even though they are a minority.  Another tension point is Lebanon, where Iran- and Syrian-supported Shiite groups (the Hezbollah) are far more influential then Saudi-sponsored Sunni groups.

Largely as a result of Israel’s harsh policies in Gaza and America’s Global War on Terror (GWOT), the military approach to the Palestinian issue gained ground and pro-Western Arab governments supporting negotiated settlement of the Palestinian conflict lost credibility among the Muslim public. Reacting to this situation, Prince Turki al-Faisal recently wrote in The Financial Times on January 22nd:

“So far, the Kingdom has resisted these calls, but every day this restraint becomes more difficult to maintain. When Israelis deliberately kill Palestinians, appropriate their lands, destroys their homes, uproot their farms and impose an inhumane blockade of them; and as the world laments once again the sufferings of the Palestinians, people of conscience from every corner of the world are clamoring for action. Eventually, the Kingdom will not be able to prevent its citizens from joining the worldwide revolt against Israel. Today, every Saudi is a Gazan, and we remember well the words of our late King Faisal:

“‘I hope you will forgive my outpouring of emotions, but when I think that our Holy Mosque in Jerusalem is being invaded and desecrated, I ask God that if I am unable to undertake the Holy Jihad, then I should not live a moment more.’ ”

These public pressures on – and historical rivalries between – Turks, Arabs and Persians have also exacerbated Turkey’s dilemma. Turkey’s Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, recently walked out of a panel discussion held in Davos, Switzerland. He also severely criticized Israeli President Shimon Peres for killing innocent people and children in Gaza. Turkey’s relationship is currently improving with Iran while deteriorating with Europe; some experts call this a symptom of Neo-Ottomanism.

With respect to Afghanistan, the U.S. need Iran’s help to pacify that country, just as in Iraq. In Afghanistan, the conflict is between the Sunni AQ, aided by the Taliban and the pro-Western Sunni Pakistani and Saudi governments allied to the U.S.

In Afghanistan, as in the Middle East, the Sunni Saudi government stands to lose if Iran’s sphere of influence grows. This prospect of the shift in the historic balance of power from Sunnis to Shiites is causing increasing concern to Sunni countries. This is part of the threat perception that is currently shaping the thinking of the establishment in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Pakistan has a double whammy to worry about: India, its traditional rival, is flirting with U.S., Pakistan’s ally. If U.S./Iran relations improve as a result of efforts to resolve the situation in Afghanistan, Sunni and Saudi influence may diminish even further.

This context explains why the Saudis have switched to fast mode in Afghanistan and Pakistan, using its influence with the Sunni groups and political parties who are open to negotiation. This is a challenge, for two reasons. The first is that these groups have long subscribed to the very different ideology propagated by the U.S., Pakistan and Saudi Arabia itself during the time of the Soviet Jihad. The second is that Iran is gaining new spheres of influence by adopting a militant policy and supporting clans hostile to the U.S., regardless of what Islamic sect they belong to.  The latter factor explains why AQ and other affiliated Sunni groups, (for example, the Taliban), are gaining ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan, disseminating a militaristic approach against the West, the so-called pro-Western, puppet Muslim governments and the Shiites. These Sunni “terrorist” groups are filling the vacuum, increasingly viewed by the Sunni Muslim masses as their champions and enemies of Iran, to the great cost of pro-Western Sunni governments.

The post The Changing Balance of Shiite and Sunni Influence in the Middle East and its Implications for Afghanistan and Pakistan appeared first on Politact.