PoliTact’s Global Security Study

With inputs from Naade Ali and Arif Ansar

Context

Negotiations on the Trump’s 20-point Gaza Peace Package has been ongoing in Egypt since Monday, and the deal on the first phase between Hamas and Israel was announced on October 8th. At first glance, the focus appears to be on tactical choices, such as cease-fires, hostage exchanges, the future of Gaza, the fate of Hamas, and whether the Abraham Accords survive the region’s new trauma. Trump’s plan is pragmatic: a phased cease-fire, hostage-prisoner swaps, an interim technocratic authority to oversee Gaza reconstruction and demilitarization. However, it’s much vaguer where the politics bite: long-term political status, refugee questions, and Palestinian statehood.

The leaders of eight Muslim-majority states: Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Türkiye, Indonesia, Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan, who met Trump on the sidelines of the 80th UN General Assembly in New York, had expressed support for the plan in a joint statement, praising his “sincere efforts to end the war in Gaza” and expressing confidence in his ability to achieve peace. However, the text of the plan released subsequently has raised concerns among Arab countries and drawn significant domestic criticism, as it deviates from the proposals of the foreign ministers of the eight Muslim states. Reports indicate that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu secured “the last word,” persuading Washington to make additional changes at a stage when it was harder for the Muslim countries to intervene.

How the Gaza question is resolved — whether as a primarily security-led stabilization by disarming, re-building, and technocratic governance or as a political settlement that recognizes Palestinian political rights in a durable way — is yet to be seen. An Israeli-U.S. approach that produces security and normalization without a credible, enforceable pathway to Palestinian political rights and without addressing refugee claims, settlements or permanent borders risks locking in a durable, managed status quo that advantageously cements Israeli gains and rewards Arab normalization while leaving Palestinian grievances unresolved.

For critics and many Palestinians, the plan’s biggest flaw is that it recapitulates the old “deal by omission” problem — postpone the hard political questions and hope that security fixes suffice. Robert Malley’s long reflection on the failure of past peace processes is a timely reminder that postponing core issues almost guarantees revival of conflict rather than durable peace.

Shift in the Middle East Balance of Power

Since Trump’s first term in power led to Abraham Accords in September 2020, the Middle East is undergoing tumultuous shift in the balance of power. This shift is away from Iran’s axis of resistance and towards those that signed the Abraham Accords – and others that were moving towards accepting it. Highlighting plans to expand the signatories to the Abraham Accord and emphasizing the strategic and economic benefits of cooperating with Israel, Trump recently stated:

“History has shown us that those who establish relations with Israel have thrived, while those who devote resources and attention toward the destruction — even the annihilation — of Israel have languished. Israel is not going anywhere. They are going to coexist with other peoples and countries in the region. The Abraham Accords demonstrate that nations are better off when they communicate, work together, and embrace new opportunities.”

The last five years have seen aggressive Israeli campaigns and intelligence operations directed at damaging — sometimes decisively — Iran’s regional network: kinetic blows, targeted assassinations of key operatives in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, and continued pressure on Iran’s enlistment of militias. Another focus has been the degrading of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, whether by eliminating key scientists, or by cyberattacks on its nuclear facility. In June, US also carried out bombing of the Iran’s nuclear facilities in Fordow, Isfahan, and Nanatz sites.

The net effect has been to cripple Iran’s reach: Hezbollah was weakened on the battlefield during the 2023–24 rounds of fighting; Iran’s Quds Force lost its most iconic commander in Qasem Soleimani in January 2020. Recently, Isreal shifted its focus to the political leadership, which lead to the assassination of Ismael Haniyeh on Iranian soil in July 2024, followed by elimination of Hassan Nasrullah in Lebanon in September 2024. However, it was the Israeli attack on Hamas negotiators in Doha last month that many experts believe may have broken the camel’s back. It blurred the line of who is Israel after – and what does it want to achieve with all the mayhem that followed Oct 7, 2023, tragic Hamas attack on Israel. The campaign against Iran has demonstrated that Israel can play with international rules at will and without any consequences. This will have grave long-term consequences for global order.

But degradation does not mean elimination — proxies adapt, civilian costs grow, and local politics evolve in unpredictable ways. Alongside coercion and violence, normalization diplomacy has quietly reshaped the balance. The Abraham Accords proved that several Arab states were prepared to prioritize trade, technology, and counter-Iran cooperation, over the old formula that required Palestinian statehood before normalization. This bargain created an “outside-in” model of Israeli influence — Israel’s security and economic ties extend into the Arab world even as its control over Palestinian territories and the facts on the ground become more entrenched.

That model has a dual consequence: it strengthens Israel’s regional legitimacy and deterred coalitions, but it also delegitimizes the Palestinian cause in some Arab capitals. Unless meaningful political concessions accompany normalization under the current rounds of peace accords – the situation may plan in the hands of hardliners in the longer run.

Reshaping the New Middle East

The 20-point Trump plan thus revolve around two linked wagers.

First: can an externally led, security-first approach end immediate bloodshed and create a stable environment for reconstruction? Second: can that short-term security compact be turned into a politically legitimate, durable settlement that includes Palestinian rights and prevents radicalization? If the answer to the second question is “no,” then any tactical success will be ephemeral — the security gains will ossify into new grievances and a renewed cycle of violence.

If the American-Israeli tack succeeds in producing a stable Gaza that is demilitarized, internationally managed and economically rebuilt — but without a credible pathway to Palestinian statehood, refugee resolution, or substantive political participation — the regional consequence is likely to be twofold:

(a) the anti-Abraham Accord camp will consolidate, and (b) the Palestinian national cause shifts from mainstream diplomacy back to asymmetric forms of resistance and transnational advocacy. That benefits actors that can exploit grievances — whether non-state actors in the region or international rivals that seek influence by presenting themselves as alternatives to the U.S. model.

Middle East and the Global Balance of Power

Potential failure of the U.S.-Israeli approach does not automatically favor China and Russia — but it creates openings. China and Russia are playing a long game: both have expanded political and economic ties in the Middle East, offering infrastructure, arms, and diplomatic cover without the political conditionalities the West often attaches. Beijing’s economic footprint, growing role in regional institutions, including BRICS partners, and willingness to court Gulf states for energy and investment means it can offer attractive alternatives to American dependency.

Moscow, for its part, remains an arms supplier and a diplomatic interlocutor (especially in Syria), and it relishes opportunities to undercut U.S. influence. If Washington’s approach produces stability without justice, public sentiment may turn away from the U.S. narrative and look to non-Western partners who promise investments or political balance-as as has already started to occur. That said, China and Russia do not currently possess the same depth of security integration with Israel or the same network of alliances that would let them ‘replace’ American influence overnight — what they can do is exploit U.S. credibility gaps to gain economic and political footholds.

The Way Forward

Three practical conclusions emerge from a realistic appraisal of Trump’s 20-point plan:

1. Security outcomes are necessary but not sufficient. Short-term stabilization that includes hostage releases, ceasefires, and reconstruction, is important and politically urgent — but by itself it will not end the conflict’s structural drivers. The old lesson of Oslo remains: postponing core grievances breeds future crises.
2. Normalization without a political track is a strategic accelerant for some actors and a strategic liability for others. States that prioritize economic and security ties with Israel will gain leverage; however, the Arab and Muslim Street will judge outcomes by whether justice is achieved for Palestinians.
3. Geopolitically, every gap left by U.S. leadership, or perceived U.S. indifference to justice, creates space for China and Russia to expand influence — primarily through diplomacy and investment, and secondarily through arms and political support. But neither Beijing nor Moscow offers a ready-made substitute for U.S. regional security guarantees; rather, they offer alternative hedges that regional states will use in pursuit of their own short-term interests.

If Cairo deal and the Trump package are to avoid merely delaying the next crisis they must do three things simultaneously:

Secure an immediate end to mass killing and human suffering; create an inclusive, accountable reconstruction process that gives Palestinians meaningful agency; and set out an enforceable, internationally backed political roadmap that addresses, not postpones, refugee claims, borders and sovereignty – as was done in the Oslo Accords. Without that tripod, any “victory” will be tactical, not strategic — and the balance of power will keep shifting unpredictably, with winners among states and non-state actors who are best at exploiting unresolved grievances.

Related Articles:

Israel Airstrike Targets Hamas Negotiators In Doha, Threatening Gaza Ceasefire Talks – Sep 15, 2025
Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions – April 26, 2025
Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran – February 25, 2025
Assad’s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East – Dec 26, 2024
The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump – Dec 5, 2024
Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences – Aug 30, 2024
The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities – Sep 27, 2024
What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply? – Aug 4, 2022

The post From Oslo To Trump’s Abraham Accords And 20-Point Peace Plan For Gaza appeared first on Politact.

PoliTact’s Analysis of Perception and Perspective

Context

President Donald Trump’s second term has ushered in a foreign policy that departs sharply from the liberal internationalist consensus of the post–Cold War era. Instead of multilateralism and institution-building, the Trump administration has embraced transactional diplomacy, tariff-based leverage, and a CEO-style approach to global power. The guiding logic is less about sustaining a rules-based order than about extracting concessions in a world Trump views as fundamentally zero-sum.

This orientation—the so-called Trump Doctrine—is reshaping the United States’ posture toward rivals and allies alike. He frames his foreign policy as an extension of his populist domestic agenda: “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) through trade realignment, industrial re-shoring, and hard bargaining. Yet while tariffs and deal-making remain his preferred tools, Trump also harbors ambitions for statesmanship, including a quixotic pursuit of a Nobel Peace Prize. His attempts to mediate conflicts from Ukraine to South Asia illustrate both the promise and the peril of his approach. The result is a high-risk strategy that could redefine America’s global role—and shape the political landscape of the next U.S. elections.

Tariffs as Tools of Statecraft

During his first term, as Robert Blackwill of the Council on Foreign Relations had noted, Trump consistently makes major foreign policy decisions against the advice of seasoned advisors, amid unprecedented turnover in senior defense and diplomatic posts. A 2020 Senate Democratic report accused him of transforming U.S. foreign policy into a tool of personal and business interests, undermining alliances and institutions alike.

At the heart of Trump’s foreign policy is the use of tariffs and trade leverage. Where previous presidents relied on sanctions or diplomatic pressure, Trump employs tariffs as his signature instrument—against adversaries and allies alike.

During his first term, tariffs targeted China, the EU, and even Canada and Mexico. His second term has expanded this logic into a global bargaining strategy: tariffs are cast not merely as economic tools but as instruments of national security. Trump argues that tariffs protect American workers, pressure foreign governments into concessions, and restore industrial self-sufficiency.

The long-term effects remain uncertain. Economists warn that trade wars increase consumer costs and disrupt supply chains. Yet Trump has succeeded in re-framing tariffs as patriotic policy, appealing to swing-state voters who see globalization as a betrayal. Going into the next election cycle, this rhetoric will be central to his pitch: only a tariff-wielding America, he claims, can reclaim greatness.

French observer of American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville, once warned that democracies risk losing their moral compass when governed solely for material gain. Trump’s America First agenda, rooted in tariffs and short-term bargaining, embodies this danger. For him, alliances and norms are not ends in themselves but bargaining chips.

Trump as Peace and Deal Maker

The Ukraine-Russia Stalemate

Trump’s most high-profile attempt at statesmanship came with the August 2025 Alaska Summit, where he hosted Vladimir Putin on U.S. soil—the first such visit since 2007. Styled as CEO-style deal-making, the summit bypassed traditional diplomats. Analysts at Chatham House concluded that the meeting emboldened Putin, who intensified his war aims rather than compromising. The Council on Foreign Relations reported that Putin’s demands remained maximalist: Ukrainian neutrality, demilitarization, and recognition of annexed territories.

Far from resolving the conflict, Trump’s intervention muddled U.S. messaging while alienating allies and NATO. Reuters called the summit a tilt toward Moscow, while AP noted it granted Putin undeserved legitimacy. European leaders have since moved to fill the vacuum, training Ukrainian forces and planning “reassurance forces” with limited U.S. backing. The Ukraine episode illustrates Trump’s foreign policy paradox: eager for dramatic breakthroughs, he often undercuts long-term credibility in pursuit of short-term optics.

Iran and the Quest for a Nobel Prize

Trump has repeatedly hinted that he seeks a Nobel Peace Prize, viewing it as the ultimate validation of his leadership. His prior efforts—such as the Abraham Accords in the Middle East—bolstered his claim but fell short of Nobel recognition.

Looking ahead, Trump is likely to focus on Iran’s nuclear program as the most dramatic arena for a potential peace deal. He has oscillated between threats of military action and promises of “the best deal ever.” His critics note that scrapping the 2015 JCPOA nuclear accord in his first term weakened U.S. leverage and pushed Iran closer to enrichment thresholds. Yet Trump now suggests he alone can broker a new accord, one tougher than his predecessors achieved.

Israel, Palestine, and the Limits of Transactionalism

Trump’s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains deeply shaped by his earlier recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and the Abraham Accords. In his second term, he presents himself as uniquely capable of brokering a “grand bargain” between Israel and Arab states.

Yet Palestinians remain sidelined, and violence in Gaza and the West Bank has escalated. European analysts argue that Trump’s transactional diplomacy—focused on Arab-Israeli normalization—ignores the structural roots of Palestinian grievances. Without addressing Palestinian claims to sovereignty, however, any settlement risks being cosmetic.

The recent Israeli attack on Hamas negotiators in Doha has threatened the entire architecture of U.S. strategy in the Middle East. GCC now confronts the reality that Washington either could not—or would not—prevent Israel from striking within their borders. The strike risks driving Gulf nations to reconsider their reliance on U.S. guarantees and to explore alternative security alignments, as Saudi Arabia demonstrated by concluding a defense treaty with Pakistan.

Not only that, on the domestic front, the incident has reinforced the MAGA-Israeli rift. Many America First voters have started to question Trump’s policy of prioritizing Israeli support over American interests. How this plays out will be utterly consequential for the future of American politics.

India and Pakistan Tensions

Trump has also cited his efforts to mediate between India and Pakistan, two nuclear-armed rivals, as evidence of his unique statesmanship. After the recent four-day conflict, he offered to broker talks over Kashmir, even claiming that Prime Minister Narendra Modi requested U.S. intervention. While India denied such overtures, Trump continued to highlight his role in lowering tensions during border skirmishes. Irrespective, Trump revives this narrative, portraying himself as the only leader willing to bring two nuclear powers to the table.

For domestic audiences, the image of Trump as peacemaker between two nuclear states reinforces his argument that he alone can prevent catastrophic wars—an argument likely to feature prominently in his re-election campaign.

No More Soft Power

Traditional presidents—including many of the Founders—understood that America’s influence lay in both persuasion and force. George Washington counseled avoiding entangling alliances, but also promoting republican values. Trump’s policy inverts this balance: U.S. soft power—the tools of USAID, VOA—is slashed, replaced by tariffs, threats, and military posturing.

Removing soft power tools weakens long-term credibility. A legislative report warned Trump’s instincts make U.S. a “bystander in international efforts,” undermining democracy promotion and global cooperation. Institutions like WHO, climate accords, and multilateral forums are dismissed, even as authoritarian players fill the void.

Trump’s defense of using military power against Iran’s nuclear program—despite ongoing talks—underscores reliance on hard tools over diplomacy. His use of economic coercion—tariffs on allies and adversaries alike—challenges norms of trade reciprocity.

At home, this approach reflects his populist stance: reclaiming leverage against countries like India by imposing tariffs and stricter oversight of H1B Visa Program, while demanding Europe meet NATO obligations. While Trump distances U.S. from multilateralism, countries like China and Russia are deepening cooperation via BRICS, SCO, and other forums. Meanwhile, U.S. has alienated NATO and EU—evident in the diplomatic backlash after Alaska.

On the other hand, European efforts to assure Ukraine’s security—a potential buffer zone, peacekeepers—are gaining momentum and autonomy, though still needing U.S. support. Emerging countries view Trump’s U.S. as transactional and surveys by the European Council on Foreign Relations indicated that global responses to his second term reflect hedging, not alliance-building.

Trump’s foreign policy represents a break with the post-1991 liberal order, which emphasized collective security, open markets, and democratic values. Instead, his worldview echoes 19th-century great-power politics, in which spheres of influence and economic coercion dominate.

Trump’s posture harks back to classic great-power thinking. Scholars have noted that U.S. resistance to Russian or Chinese spheres of influence is a post–Cold War construct. Historically, the U.S. itself wielded Monroe Doctrine-style influence and accepted postwar spheres such as Eastern Europe under Soviet control. He appears to embrace that tradition—viewing global competition through the lens of zero-sum regional hierarchies, especially across Eurasia. He prioritizes a strategy of wedge-driving between Russia and China, rather than accepting a multi-polar order.

The conventional wisdom in think-tank literature—a world moving towards multi-polarity, with diplomatic messiness but strategic balance—is largely ignored. Some argue multipolarity may be more hazardous than bipolarity. However, Trump avoids such debates: instead, he seems to seek a revival of bilateral leverage, playing off great powers to U.S. advantage where possible.

Election Implications: Tariffs and Populism at Home

Trump’s foreign policy represents a radical experiment in realpolitik. It replaces liberal order with transactional bargaining, elevates tariffs to tools of statecraft, and prizes symbolic breakthroughs—especially peace deals that might burnish Trump’s legacy.

For the next election, Trump’s tariff-driven populism may prove a potent political weapon at home. His campaign will emphasize tariffs, industrial re-shoring, and economic nationalism as proof of “America First” success. Swing-state voters, especially in the Midwest, may respond favorably to tariff-driven protection of steel, autos, and manufacturing. Yet suburban and business constituencies could rebel against higher consumer prices and global instability.

But internationally, America risks being seen less as a reliable leader than as a transactional actor chasing deals and prestige. Allies face uncertainty about whether U.S. commitments will endure. The credibility gap—created by Trump’s personalized, ad-hoc decision-making—risks long-term erosion of American leadership, regardless of who wins in the next election.

Equally, it’s critical to keep in perspective the sense of exploitation which resulted in the America First Mantra, using which President Trump came into power for the second time. If America First policy does not produce economic dividends for common Americans in the short and long term, it will further complicate the domestic politics and confusion regarding its global role and future direction. In this, how Trump balances his foreign policy regarding Israel will be critical.

Related Articles

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Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions – Apr 26, 2025
Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran – Feb 25, 2025
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What Would Trump 2.0 Mean For The Future Of NATO? – Oct 29, 2024
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The post The End of Liberal Internationalism? Trump’s Foreign Policy Revolution and Its Electoral Implications appeared first on Politact.

Risk Assessment

Israel Strike in Doha Shakes Middle East Stability

Context

Israel struck Doha on September 9th—an attack that targeted Hamas political leaders during Gaza ceasefire negotiations and has pushed the Middle East into a new phase of instability. The incident killed at least six people, including a Qatari security officer and the son of a senior Hamas negotiator, and sent shockwaves through the already fragile Gaza peace process. The strike was remarkable not only for its timing, but for its location: an unprecedented Israeli operation on the sovereign soil of Qatar, a key player in Israel-Hamas mediation.

The immediate impact on the Gaza ceasefire talks has been devastating. Hamas quickly announced that its demands had not changed—insisting on a full ceasefire, Israeli withdrawal, humanitarian aid, and a prisoner-hostage exchange—while condemning Israel for sabotaging negotiations. Qatar, which has long played host to Hamas’ political bureau and served as a linchpin in past ceasefire talks, declared that the attack had “killed any hope” of a near-term agreement. The perception is now widespread that Israel is prioritizing military elimination of adversaries over a negotiated solution, a view reinforced by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s repeated calls for the “total defeat” of Hamas. This narrative threatens to undermine confidence in ongoing Gaza peace initiatives.

For Qatar and the broader Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the strike represents not only a political affront but a strategic shock. Doha has convened emergency consultations, and GCC states from Saudi Arabia to the UAE have summoned Israeli envoys to protest the violation of sovereignty. An Arabic-Islamic leaders’ summit is scheduled for September 15 to discuss the situation created by the Israel strike. The summit will be attended by members of Arab League and Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

After decades of multibillion-dollar arms purchases and hosting of U.S. military bases, the GCC now confronts the reality that Washington either could not—or would not—prevent Israel from striking within their borders. The strike risks driving Gulf nations to reconsider their reliance on U.S. guarantees and to explore alternative security alignments. The Israeli strike has shaken Gulf confidence in the American security umbrella. Qatar’s Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani also met with President Trump in New York on September 12 but the details of the meeting were not disclosed.

The Future of Hamas

Whether Hamas keeps political and military control or is replaced in Gaza, and how any post-conflict governance would work, remains the key stumbling block. Israel has pressed for assurances related to demilitarization while Hamas rejects disarmament demands or removing its political authority without a full agreement.

For Hamas, its armed wing is more than just a military tool—it is central to its political identity. The group insists that its “weapon of resistance” is sacred and non-negotiable. In recent ceasefire discussions, Hamas has repeatedly declined to give up its military capabilities without a comprehensive deal that includes guarantees of Palestinian statehood, Israeli withdrawal, and full respect for humanitarian and governance rights. Any demilitarization demand, from this perspective, is seen as a demand for surrender.

On the Israeli side, demilitarization is non-negotiable. Israel views Hamas’s military and governing structure as the main obstacle to peace and security. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other officials have made clear that any viable ceasefire or peace agreement must include: the destroying or dismantling of Hamas’s military infrastructure; the exclusion of Hamas from any future governance of Gaza; and the establishment of long-term oversight or guarantees that Gaza will not again become a base for armed attack.

For Israel, the demilitarization demand serves several purposes: a way to neutralize threats (rockets, tunnels, armed operations), to reassure its domestic political coalition especially hardline elements who see any compromise as weakness, and to prevent the recurrence of another large-scale conflict.

Third-party mediators, including Egypt, Qatar, and the United States, recognize that full instantaneous demilitarization is extremely unlikely. Hamas is deeply embedded in Gaza society, not only militarily but also through governance, social services, charities, religious institutions, and local legitimacy. Stripping it of arms without offering political, security, and governance compensations risks collapse of both trust and order.

The Israeli strike on Hamas negotiator’s in Doha can be seen as a tactics to pressure Qatar, and other Arab interlocutors, to support the demand for not only disarming Hamas-but to prevent any future role for the group in governance. Not doing so, now risks their own security.

Religious Dimension

By striking Hamas negotiators on Sunni Arab soil, Israel risks reframing its conflict as a broader war against Islam. For years, Israel’s regional clashes were directed largely against Shiite state actors such as Iran and groups affiliated with it. By striking Hamas leaders on Sunni Arab soil, Israel may have inadvertently broadened perceptions: that its war is not just against specific militant or extremist groups, but against Islam itself.

This is precisely the narrative that the U.S. sought to avoid during the War on Terror when American officials took pains to distinguish between global extremist movements like Al Qaeda and Daesh, and groups with localized political grievances like the Afghan Taliban. Ironically, the Taliban peace deal that the U.S. eventually negotiated was known as the Doha Accords, named for the very city that has now been bombed by Israel. The targeting of Hamas negotiators in Doha erodes the perception that there are safe spaces for diplomacy, and risks fueling extremist narratives.

Netanyahu’s own trajectory adds fuel to this interpretation. In recent weeks, he has doubled down on settlement expansion in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, bluntly declaring that “there will be no Palestinian state.” Reports suggest he has ordered preparations for a full military takeover of Gaza, with evacuation of civilian populations and consolidation of Israeli control.

At the same time, momentum is building at the United Nations for recognition of Palestinian statehood. The non-binding resolution sponsored by France and Saudi Arabia, named the ‘New York Declaration’, was presented on September 12. The resolution supporting the two-state solution was endorsed by 142 states with 12 nations abstaining. U.S. and Israel voted against the resolution. Netanyahu is expected to reject such recognition outright, portraying it as a reward for terrorism and a betrayal of Israeli security. Indeed, his government may respond by accelerating annexation policies to establish irreversible “facts on the ground.”

Implications for US

For the United States, the diplomatic fallout is complex. Qatar has been a vital partner in Hamas mediation and hostage negotiations and hosts the largest U.S. airbase in the Middle East. The GCC’s strategic importance to U.S. energy, counter-terrorism, and anti-Iran strategies makes the Israeli strike particularly sensitive.

Israel, meanwhile, remains Washington’s closest regional ally. The strike in Doha thus forces U.S. policymakers to confront the uncomfortable question: will American policy sacrifice credibility with Arab allies to defend Israel’s unilateral actions? The Trump administration’s own dismay was evident when President Trump declared himself “very unhappy” with the strike. The incident comes at a critical time for the Abraham Accords, the Trump initiative carried over from his first term, to normalize Israel’s relations with Arab states, potentially undermining Israel-Gulf diplomatic relations.

The implications for U.S. strategy are stark. Washington risks losing its credibility as a mediator, damaging its relations with the Gulf, and undermining its own long-term vision for Middle Eastern stability while benefiting China and Russia. More dangerously, it risks fueling the perception that Israel—and by extension its American backer—is engaged in a wider war against Islam. This perception could radicalize new generations across the Arab and Muslim world, erasing the careful distinctions that U.S. officials have drawn for decades between extremist groups and sovereign states.

The Israeli strike on Qatar is a wake-up call. It threatens not only the Gaza peace process, but the entire architecture of U.S. strategy in the Middle East. Unless Washington can re-balance its approach—standing firm on sovereignty, reviving diplomacy, and reaffirming its partnerships—it risks watching both the peace process and its regional influence collapse.

Related Articles:

Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions – April 26, 2025
Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran – February 25, 2025
Assad’s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East – Dec 26, 2024
The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump – Dec 5, 2024
Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences – Aug 30, 2024
The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities – Sep 27, 2024

The post Israel Airstrike Targets Hamas Negotiators In Doha, Threatening Gaza Ceasefire Talks appeared first on Politact.

By Naade Ali
South Asia and Middle East Fellow

Context

In the post October 7, 2023, Hamas led attack on Israel, the geopolitics of Middle East is fast evolving. This has been accompanied by the loss of Hezbollah leadership in Lebanon and the fall of Assad regime in Syria in December 2024. The inauguration of President Trump on January 20, 2025, has presented unique threats and opportunities regarding the future of two-state solution and Iran.

The likelihood of a broader conflict between Iran and Israel hangs in balance as President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have forged a strong strategic alignment. Meeting with Trump on Feb 4, Netanyahu tried to ensure that U.S. policy remained closely aligned with Israel’s objective of weakening Iran’s defense capabilities, particularly preventing it from ever acquiring nuclear missile power. On the other hand, Iran had hoped that Trump would adopt a pragmatic approach and revive nuclear talks leading to easing of economic pressure. To Iran’s disappointment, Trump pursued the reinstatement of “maximum pressure” policy on Tehran.

However, difference of opinion exists where Netanyahu, sensing an opportunity, is lobbying for a military solution towards Iran. Conversely, Trump is vying for a negotiated settlement while keeping hopes alive for a two-state solution. This he is doing by raising the stakes for the Gulf and Arab nations, who met in Riyadh on February 21 to discuss the future of Gaza. A follow-up emergency meeting of the Arab League is planned on March 4th in Egypt, to present a counter plan to what Trump has proposed.

Trump’s Carrot-and-Stick Approach

The “maximum pressure” doctrine portrays Iran as a destabilizing force and a significant threat to U.S. national interests, centered on three key objectives:

First, it seeks to cripple Iran’s nuclear program through harsh diplomatic and economic sanctions. Second, it aims to weaken Iran’s regional influence by dismantling its network of “proxies” and axis of resistance. This objective has taken on additional significance with the on-going Gaza crisis, elimination of Hezbollah leadership, and the fall Assad regime in Syria. Third, it strives to isolate Iran on the global stage, a move Iran’s president condemned as an attempt to “bring Iran to its knees.”

Justifying his approach, Trump claimed the timing was ideal, stating, “Iran, terrified after losing almost all its air defenses, would love to make a deal with the United States.” Confident that relentless pressure would force Iran into submission, he remains committed to a strategy of economic and diplomatic coercion.

Despite his tough rhetoric, Trump ruled out military intervention, dismissing reports of a potential U.S.-Israel strike as “greatly exaggerated.” While acknowledging Iran’s military ambitions—describing it as “very militant”—he firmly rejected the idea of bombing Iran, stating, “I would much prefer a Verified Nuclear Peace Agreement, which will let Iran peacefully grow and prosper.”

Meanwhile, key Republican leaders, including U.S. Rep. Mike Turner, have stated that Trump’s strategy is designed to “secure a long-term solution that guarantees Israel’s security by preventing Iran and its proxies from ever threatening its sovereignty.” Likewise, Rep. Joe Wilson has praised the maximum pressure campaign, asserting that it would ultimately weaken Iran and dismantle its network of terror proxies.

Israeli Plans

While U.S. President Donald Trump has shown reluctance to engage in direct military action against Iran, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has taken a more assertive approach. According to multiple credible reports, with Iran’s air defense systems significantly weakened and its regional proxies under strain, Netanyahu sees a strategic window to target Iran’s nuclear facilities—whether or not the U.S. supports the move. The American intelligence assessments indicate that Israel is actively considering large-scale strikes on Iranian nuclear sites in the latter half of the year, with Israeli officials expected to urge the Trump administration and key Republican leaders to endorse their plans.

The recent approval by the U.S. State Department of a $7.4 billion arms sale to Israel—including thousands of bombs and missiles set for delivery this year—suggests a broader effort to reinforce Israel’s military capabilities against potential regional threats. Israel already possesses U.S.-made bunker-busting munitions capable of striking Iran’s underground nuclear sites, particularly those concealed within the mountainous terrain of Fordow near Qom. This growing military buildup highlights Israel’s preparedness to neutralize Iran’s security infrastructure if necessary.

Israeli officials have repeatedly affirmed that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are fully prepared to launch strikes on Iranian nuclear sites. Defense Minister Israel Katz has hinted at the possibility of an attack in the coming months. In a letter to incoming U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, Katz wrote:

“The months ahead present both challenges that demand military readiness and opportunities to advance our strategic objectives.” He has previously stated that “Iran’s nuclear facilities are more vulnerable than ever,” suggesting that this moment may offer the best chance to neutralize what Israel perceives as an existential threat.

In essence, the emphasis of the approach is twofold: Israel exerting military pressure while the U.S. working on the economic squeeze. The outcome of the two would either result in a regime change led by the Iranian people – or push the Iranian government to strike a deal with Trump. According to some media reports, if Tehran does not reach an agreement with the U.S. by October, Israel is likely to initiate a military action.

How is Iran Preparing?

President Masoud Pezeshkian has warned that while Israel or its allies “may succeed in damaging Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, they will not be able to strip the country of its ability to rebuild.” His statement came after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected negotiations with the Trump administration, asserting that past talks had neither been rational nor honorable. “Negotiations with America do not solve any of our problems,” Khamenei declared.

President Pezeshkian has accused Trump of engaging in deceptive diplomacy while simultaneously working to undermine his government. While reaffirming that Iran does not seek war, he warned that “Iran will never bow to foreign pressure.” Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi echoed this sentiment, stating that negotiating with Trump would amount to surrender. He further cautioned that any military action by Israel or the U.S. against Iran’s nuclear facilities would trigger an “all-out war,” calling it one of the greatest strategic miscalculations Washington could make.

Last year, Iran announced plans to triple its military budget. Western think tanks estimate that Iran was the fourth-largest military spender in the Middle East in 2023, with a defense budget of approximately $10.3 billion.

On the other hand, Iran has deepened its military and economic cooperation with China and Russia. Despite crippling U.S. sanctions, Iran has found alternative economic mechanisms to sustain itself and remains a key player in the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS.

Some reports suggest that Iran is ramping up its missile program, with a vessel carrying 1,000 tons of Chinese-made chemicals—potentially crucial for missile fuel—recently arriving at an Iranian port. Furthermore, Iranian military has launched its first drone carrier ship, capable of launching stealth attacks, and has acquired Russian Sukhoi-35 fighter jets to modernize its aging air force. A strategic cooperation agreement signed with Moscow in January has further reinforced Tehran’s defense ties. Despite Israel’s escalating rhetoric, Iranian military officials insist that the country’s air defense remains intact and more resilient than ever.

Conclusion

For years, Israel and Iran have been engaged in a shadow conflict, carefully calibrating their actions to avoid all-out war. Recently, Iran has adopted a strategic paradigm described as ‘strategic patience’—a calculated approach that has shielded it from large-scale destruction while reinforcing its self-sufficiency. Iranian Vice President Javad Zarif has dismissed speculation that Iran might resort to nuclear weapons as a last-ditch effort for survival or deterrence. Instead, he emphasized that the nation’s self-reliant defense strategy ensures resilience against external pressure.

However, The New York Times has reported that Iran may be discreetly exploring the possibility of developing nuclear weapons should its leadership decide to take that path. According to the report, since resuming fuel production, Iran has accumulated enough enriched uranium to construct at least four nuclear bombs. While Iran has the technical expertise to develop a basic nuclear device relatively quickly, it currently lacks the capability to integrate such a weapon into a ballistic missile system. Nonetheless, a successful nuclear test could allow Iran to declare itself a nuclear-armed state, significantly altering the strategic balance in the region.

While Iran’s conventional military strength does not match that of Israel or the U.S., it retains the capability to inflict serious damage on both adversaries. As the main supporter of Hamas and Hezbollah, the question of Iran is directly linked to the present Gaza crisis and what comes next. While many Gulf and Arab nations have privately loathed Hamas for the Oct 7, 2023, attack on Israel and for disrupting the progress achieved through Abraham Accords, the Trump plan to take over Gaza, has forced them to back up their sentiments with action. It also represents the final step in the full culmination of the Outside-In approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Related Articles:

Assad’s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East – Dec 26, 2024
The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump – Dec 5, 2024
Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences – Aug 30, 2024
The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities – Sep 27, 2024

The post Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran appeared first on Politact.

Context

Voting began on April 19^th in India and the results will be announced in the first week of June. With over 986 million eligible voters, elections in India have been described as the largest democratic exercise in the world. However, despite all the fanfare, the results of the Indian balloting seem all but a foregone conclusion. Prime Minister Modi has perfected the art of turning India into an ethno-majoritarian state over his past two terms in office. Modi continues to subjugate the minorities, while simultaneously working to turn India into a powerful Hindu state.

Modi is now seeking to secure a third term in office using the same playbook which enabled him to secure a landslide victory in 2019, namely by stifling dissenting voices, undermining the political opposition, terrorizing religious minorities, and acting tough against neighboring China and Pakistan.

Under Modi, India has rapidly undermined its credentials of being a secular democracy. Just because the country holds elections regularly, and its military does not intervene in politics, does not make the Indian polity automatically tolerant. In recent years, Modi has expedited economic growth, but inequality remains a major problem since the top 10% of the population now owns 77% of the nation’s wealth. Modi deflects economic disgruntlement of the masses by infusing in them a xenophobic sense of Hindu pride, which undermines the rights of all other religious minorities.

The inauguration of the Ram temple on the site of the razed mosque in Ayodhya, and the operationalization of the controversial Citizenship Amendment Act of 2019, have become overt symbols of Modi’s continued desire to repress India’s sizeable Muslim population. The Supreme Court’s decision this past December to endorse Modi’s revocation of Kashmir’s autonomous status has further boosted his image as a decisive leader who will not allow any insurgent movement, especially one spearheaded by Muslims, to threaten India’s territorial integrity.

Nonetheless, despite once being considered an international pariah for his role in the Gujrat communal massacre, Modi now rubs shoulders with the most powerful leaders in the world. Under his leadership, India became the first nation to land a spacecraft on the south pole of the moon. To top it all, Modi is now actively working with the US to help contain Chinese influence across South Asia. With these impressive credentials, most political pundits agree that Modi is likely to make a comeback in the next round of elections.

Pakistan-India Rapprochement

With India most likely remaining under the grip of Modi’s ultranationalism for another five years, and Pakistan struggling with multiple domestic security and economic challenges, as well as a crisis of political legitimacy, it is worth taking stock of how these two largest South Asian countries may respond to each other in coming years.

In the emerging geopolitical environment due to the ongoing Gaza crisis, the future of Pakistan India ties appears more challenging. Learning from Israel, India may also take on more heavy-handed policies and unilateral approaches.

The new leadership in Pakistan has at least demonstrated its intent to attempt rapprochement with India. The foreign minister appointed by the Sharif brothers recently hinted at the possibility of resuming trade with India, even though the Foreign Office then quickly reiterated Pakistan’s stance of not resuming trading with India till its government restores Kasmir’s special status. Despite these mixed signals, trying to improve trade relations with India is plausible. Cross-border tensions have not flared up between the two neighboring rivals since the past three years.

Pressure from Gulf States

The Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have strong ties with both India and Pakistan, also seem keen to help mend ties between these neighboring rivals. The UAE, is reported to have helped broker the 2021 ceasefire between India and Pakistan, and it has also been engaging in backchannel diplomacy to help improve ties between India and Pakistan.

The Saudi Crown Prince has also explicitly stressed the need for an India-Pakistan dialogue, during Prime Minister Shabaz Sharif’s visit to Saudi Arabia, in the bid to secure more Saudi financial support and investments. In addition to the desire to broker a dangerous conflict between two close allies, the Saudis want Pakistan to focus on economic growth and regional cooperation, instead of expending further energies on contending with India’s growing military might.

Kashmir and Cross Border Militancy

Indian repression in Kashmir continues to persist, and Pakistan has little chance of pressing India to walk back on its Kashmir policy, even if this mistreatment of Kashmiri Muslims remains a major source of friction. Moreover, on the heels of Canadian and American accusations of India sanctioning targeted killings of Sikh dissidents on their soil, Pakistan has also accused India of engaging in extraterritorial killings of Kashmiri and other extremist militants based within Pakistan.

The fact that India has moved swiftly to build ties with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and its suspected ability to continue aiding Baluch insurgents and TTP terror attacks on Pakistani soil via Afghanistan, also remain issues of major concern for Pakistan  While its recent hostilities with Iran did not escalate, Pakistan does need to focus more on its western border to prevent cross-border militancy to spark another crisis with Iran. Due to the broader insecurity emanating from the Israeli war on Gaza, Iranian sensitivity regarding the activities of Jaysh ul-Adl (formerly Jundallah) have increased tremendously.

On the other hand, regional experts have warned American policy makers to be wary of exacerbating Pakistani insecurities in the bid to bolster Indian military capabilities meant to stand up to China. The US is no longer considered a neutral arbitrator by Pakistan, which increases the risk of another cross-border crisis between India and Pakistan escalating into a catastrophic conflict. The danger of a terror attack in India, which is blamed on Pakistan, could quickly re-escalate tensions between the nuclear armed neighbors.

Economic Dimension

Besides these emergent security challenges on its other borders, which would make it very difficult for Pakistan to simultaneously cope with renewed tensions with India, the Pakistani economy is also experiencing major problems. Improving economic conditions in the country may in fact be the biggest priority for the country’s establishment and politicians, due to which resuming trade with India has become a more palatable option.

Pakistan was importing around $2 billion worth of Indian imports and exported neared $500 million worth of goods back in 2018. The countries suspended trade in 2019 after the suicide attack on Indian soldiers in Pulwama district which led India to revoke Pakistan’s most favored nation status – granted back in 1996.

Pakistan then cut trade ties completely after India revoked Kashmir’s special status a few months later. Thus, formal trade between the two countries came to a grinding halt and all cross- border goods must now be funneled through neutral places like Dubai, which significantly increases costs. Research by entities such as the World Bank suggests that fully opening up trade with India could increase Pakistani exports by as much as 80 percent, which could do wonders for its slugging economy.

India now has a much larger economy, and it is well integrated with other South Asian states, so it also has less need to normalize trade ties with Pakistan. Yet, given that India could significantly increase its exports by trading with Pakistani’s burgeoning market is also a reasonably attractive incentive. Currently, Modi is too preoccupied with the elections, but he may be willing to try improving ties with Pakistan under the Sharifs again, as was attempted during the last Nawaz Sharif premiership, over a decade ago.

Critical Pathways to Improving India and Pakistan Ties

In the prevailing geopolitical environment, India is unlikely to bolster the economy of its arch-rival without a wider rapprochement with Pakistan which would include Kashmir. Irrespective of who is to blame, the cross border threats from non-state actors to Pakistan, India, Iran, and Afghanistan – pose the single most potent risk to the region – and to the mutual ties of these nations. The recent spat between Pakistan and Iran involving Jaysh -ul-Adl, attack on a music concert hall in Russia in March linked to ISIS-K, and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) affiliated strikes in Pakistan, are prime examples.

In the context of great power rivalry, there seem to be two significant mutually exclusive pathways – with one leading to the improvement in Pakistan-India ties and the other towards deterioration.

1 The continuation of CPEC and Iran Pakistan Gas Pipeline Projects are unlikely to produce improvement in Pakistan-India ties – unless there is US-China detents of some sorts.

2. In the aftermath of the on-going Gaza conflict, the future of Abraham Accords is uncertain. However, if the two-state solution prevails – pressure on Pakistan will likely increase in the future to recognize Israel. With the close trade ties between GCC and India, this will likely improve chances of India-Pakistan détente as well.

However, if there is a direct conflict between Iran and Israel and the Abraham Accords dismantle, the pressure will increase on the GCC and Arab nations to either side with Iran or Israel. This quandary will be the same for Pakistan and India. However, the role of China and Russia would become paramount to preserve the Saudi-Iran détente reached in March this year. This is the context which makes the upcoming visit of the Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi to Pakistan all the more consequential.

The post Indian Elections, Future of Pakistan-India Ties And Centrality of Iran appeared first on Politact.

Context

In the previous articles, we have been examining the various dimensions of the Arab-Israeli rapprochement that got underway as a consequence of the Abraham Accords, signed during the Trump administration in 2020. As a result, UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco officially recognized Israel.

Progressively alarmed by the growing Chinese involvement in the region, demonstrated by the Chinese facilitated Saudi-Iran Détente reached in March, Biden administration had fasten its efforts to normalize ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel as well. Another factor of concern has been the changing politics of Israel – as Netanyahu seemed to have lost interest with the two-state solution.

During his visit to the US to attend the UN General Assembly meetings in September, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman indicated that the normalization process was moving along well, a sentiment shared at the time by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. However, since the signing of Abraham Accords, the paranoia on the Palestinian side had been mounting. All along, it was not clear what the Accords would mean for the Palestinians. Will it include a statehood for Palestinians and cessation of settlements?

While the first Saudi envoy for Palestinian Authority Nayef al-Sudairi did visit West Bank in September – it proved to be a little late in taming Palestinian concerns, especially Hamas. From a purely Israeli point of view, if the Arab states that have traditionally supported the Palestinian cause, agree to recognize Israel – the leverage of Palestinians in any negotiations is greatly reduced.

Things finally blew up on October 7 when Hamas members stormed into Israel killing almost 1400 and taking about 200 hostages. In reprisal, close to 7,000 Palestinians have been killed to date by Israeli bombardments – and the ground operation is imminent. Fears are growing the Israeli ground operation into Gaza will likely result in Hezbollah also becoming fully entangled, and thus widening the war. Moreover, the street pressure in Sunni Arab capitals is likely to push the respective governments to respond – especially if Iran holds true to its statements of not holding back if Israeli military actions continue.

Since the attack, President Biden has offered full support to Israel towards its aim to  eliminate Hamas, and at the same time he clarified that all Palestinians are not Hamas: “The vast majority of Palestinians are not Hamas. Hamas does not represent the Palestinian people.”

In his October 19 Speech, Biden stated: “History has taught us that when terrorists don’t pay a price for their terror, when dictators don’t pay a price for their aggression, they cause more chaos and death and more destruction.”

“As hard as it is, we cannot give up on peace. We cannot give up on a two-state solution,” Biden added.

Response from BRICS

As opposed to the US, China and Russia have stopped short of blaming Hamas while demanding cease fire and offering to mediate. Both have also affirmed that they’ll coordinate their policy for the Middle East. In essence, their position is close to those adopted by the Arab nations. According to media reports, China’s Middle East envoy Zhai Jun told his Russian counterpart, Mikhail Bogdanov, during his current trip to the region: “The fundamental reason the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has reached its current state is that the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people have not been protected.”

On the other hand, South Africa has adopted a more nuanced approach and has stated that its backing for Palestine cause does not mean it supports Hamas. It generally equates its own experience under apartheid as the same as being experienced by the Palestinians. South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) commented that its Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor got a request to speak with Ismail Haniyeh – and that the call was in line with nations policy to “engage will all parties in facilitating dialogue.”

On the other hand, India seems to have reversed its position of backing the Palestinians and has stood squarely with Israel. One of the reasons for that could be because ruling Bahartiya Janata Party (BJP) has given up any hope of receiving Muslim vote in the election next year. This seems similar to the United States where because of the policies adopted by Democratic Party in the Middle East and South Asia, Democratic American Muslims are thinking to shift in mass to the Republican Party. The dilemma being the Republican Party is even more hard-line when it comes to Iran and the Palestinian Issue. It was during the Trump administration in 2018 that the US decided to transfer its embassy to Jerusalem and withdraw from Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA). The agreement was painstakingly reached during Obama’s tenure. However, Trump did develop good relations with Saudi Arabia and Imran Khan in Pakistan.

India may also be evaluating the postures of the Arab world against Hamas vis a vis the Kashmir situation – and what it terms as cross-border terrorism from Pakistan.

Changing Middle East and South Asia

The recognition of Israel by Saudi Arabia would have represented a titanic event in the Islamic world – especially as it relates to the Core versus the Peripheral Islamic world. As a result of Abraham Accords, Pakistan’s other Arab and GCC allies were moving closer to Israel as well. It would have brought tremendous pressure on the peripheral Islamic nations, especially Pakistan, which takes clues from Saudi Arabia when it comes to the maters of Palestinians. On the one hand, Pakistan is China’s closest strategic partner, which is also expanding ties with Iran.

In earlier assessment, PoliTact had noted: “While most of the GCC nations are autocratic – a broken democracy still exists in Pakistan. Irrespective, under the present circumstances, Saudi recognition of Israel anytime soon, will gravely unsettle the political and security situation of the country, particularly if it were to be accompanied by economic and political pressure from Saudi Arabia, and other GCC nations, to follow suit. As for the timeline, President Biden would want an agreement before the US elections next year.

These high-stake decisions need public debate and political ownership – that are presently missing in Pakistan. In fact, the crackdown against PTI hardly creates a conducive environment to build consensus on these fast moving regional and global changes.”

Since the October 7 attack, the scenario has switched, and the Saudi-Israel normalization has all but collapsed. A whole lot will now depend on if Israel launches a ground operation in Gaza. If the war theater expands, the following pressures are likely to play out for Pakistan:

• Most likely the country will have to side with the Arab world and that will make it stand at odds with US and Israel. Pakistan’s caretaker foreign minister Jalil Abbas Jilani had stated on October 8, “We stand in solidarity with Palestinians and call for an immediate end to the violence and oppression by Israeli occupation forces. A viable and sovereign state of Palestine must be established on the basis of pre-1967 borders and UN resolutions.”
• If Pakistan sides with US and Israel – it will put it at odds with its other ally China, its neighbor Iran, and its own public opinion. A lot will depend on If Iran directly or indirectly intervenes in the conflict – and what position Arab states take at that point. China and Russia will likely both support Iran.
• Moreover, if Pakistan stays idle it would greatly dent its stance on Kashmir. And if in the future India takes a similar approach towards Kashmir – as Israel has now on Gaza – it will gravely complicate options for Pakistan.

The future of Abraham Accords and Saudi-Israel normalization now hangs on if Israel will launch a ground operation in Gaza. Reportedly, President Biden is doing his utmost to restrain Israel – and that was one of the aims of his visit. And if that can be accomplished – then the Palestinians would have to be at the dead center of any future negotiations. In other words, there can be no Arab-Israel normalization without first settling the Palestinian issue.

The post Hamas Attack On Israel, Abraham Accords, And South Asia appeared first on Politact.

Saudi-Israel Normalization and Beyond

Context

In a previous article we focused on understanding the changing geopolitics of the Middle East. Especially, the political, security, and economic interconnections between South Asia and the Gulf States, and one of the subsets, Pakistan and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This relationship has taken on added significance in the context of ongoing great power rivalry and China’s wider engagement with the Middle East, which resulted in the Saudi-Iran détente in March.

On July 28, 2020, PoliTact held a webinar to discuss the potential China-Iran $400 billion economic deal and its impact on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). China-Iran defense cooperation has been growing in the aftermath of President Trump’s decision in 2018 to unilaterally withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal reached in 2015 – which was a hallmark achievement of the Obama administration.

Moreover, additional Muslim states, such as UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco officially recognizing the state of Israel as a consequence of Abraham Accords, reached during the Trump’s presidency in 2020.These developments resulted in deepening of the contradictory pressures for Pakistan. On the one hand, the nation is China’s closest strategic partner, which was also expanding its ties with Iran. On the other hand, Pakistan’s other Arab allies, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar were moving closer to Israel.

In an event held on May 22 in collaboration with the Middle East Institute, the growing role of China in the Middle East was examined. The panelists had made the policy recommendations that US should not completely disengage or overreact to Chinese influence in a state of anxiety. Instead, the US should adopt a clearer approach to its political, economic, and security interests in the Middle East. Viewing US relations with its partners in the Middle East and Asia within the framework of great power competition with China may negatively impact the US approach and its interests.

Saudi-Israel Normalization

Progressively alarmed by the fast-moving dynamics of the Middle East and growing Chinese involvement has meant that the US administration could not sit idly. President Biden has launched an aggressive diplomatic engagement with Saudi Arabia, the country being seen as acting ever more unpredictably. At the same time, the changing politics of Israel is also a complicating factor as Netanyahu loses interest with the two-state solution.

According to New York Times, in at least two trips taken in the last couple of months by the national security adviser Jack Sullivan, Saudis have demanded a civil nuclear program in which they could enrich their own Uranium, not like UAE where they are shipped enriched material. In addition, they want a NATO style mutual security agreement in return for recognition of Israel. On the other hand, China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) has proposed to Saudi Arabia building a nuclear plant near its borders with Qatar and UAE. The move is to pressure the US to be more flexible in aiding its nuclear program.

According to a White House statement, Sullivan traveled to Jeddah:

“to discuss bilateral and regional matters, including initiatives to advance a common vision for a more peaceful, secure, prosperous, and stable Middle East region interconnected with the world.”

The gist of the Biden administrations diplomatic blitzkrieg is to keep Saudi’s from moving closer to China or Russia, build its ties with Israel, and coordinate against Iran. In the BRICS conference held in Johannesburg, Saudi Arabia and Iran were both invited to join BRICS. UAE and Egypt are also set to become BRICS members from January 2024.

Wider Implications

The normalization of Saudi ties with Israel would be the extension of the Abraham Accord. The recognition of Israel by Saudi Arabia would be a titanic event in the Islamic world – especially as it relates to the Core versus the Peripheral Islamic world. It would bring tremendous pressure on the peripheral Islamic nations, especially Pakistan which takes clues from Saudi Arabia when it comes to the maters of Palestinians. According to the polls conducted by the Washington Institute in 2022, public opinion in Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain that were initially favorable towards Abraham Accords have become less so ever since.

If a such a transformation is indeed achieved, a lot will depend on the scope of concessions provided to the Palestinians as part of the deal. Will it include a statehood for the Palestinians and cessation of settlements? With the right-wing government in Israel, why would it agree to any of such demands, especially when the outside-in approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has largely proven to be successful.

While most of the GCC nations are autocratic – a broken democracy still exists in Pakistan. Irrespective, under the present circumstances, Saudi recognition of Israel anytime soon, will gravely unsettle the political and security situation of the country, particularly if it were to be accompanied by economic and political pressure from Saudi Arabia, and other GCC nations, to follow suit. As for the timeline, President Biden would want an agreement before the US elections next year.

Pakistan is overwhelmed by domestic affairs presently, there is little bandwidth for a public debate on this fast-moving situation of the Middle East. Pakistan’s traditional position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was reiterated by its former Prime Minister Imran Khan presently in incarceration:

“Whatever any country does, our position is very clear. And our position was made clear by [Pakistan’s founder] Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah … in 1948: that we cannot ever accept Israel as long as Palestinians are not given their rights and there is no just settlement.”

Moreover, such a transformational step will also have a direct effect on the narrative of extremist organizations such as AQ, Daesh and their Associates. After all, the Palestinian predicament was one of the primary motivation behind why founders of these groups lobbied for violent means to achieve justice.

These extremist organizations targeted governments of the Islamic nations because they were believed to be complicit with the West, and with their support Israel was committing atrocities against Palestinians. Thus, if the justice is delivered, and is seen as such, this could pose far reaching consequences for the future of Islamic extremists – and for the relations of the Islamic world with Israel and the West.

It could also convince those groups that are active on the Kashmir front, that the rise of China could force peaceful resolution of long-standing conflicts – seen to be the unfinished business from when the balance of power shifted last. However, if the deal if reached without much public support or debate and is perceived as a sell off, it would pose tremendous risks for the future of normal governance in the Islamic regions.

This is what happened in the case of Libya recently, when its foreign minister Najla Mangoush met secretly with Israeli counterpart in Rome to normalize ties. The news of the meeting was made public by Israeli foreign minister Eli Cohen and ignited strong street protests in Libya. This caused Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah to suspend Mangoush claiming that she has acted individually and Libya feels strongly for the Palestinian cause.

The post Will The Fear Of China Aid Middle East Peace? appeared first on Politact.

Context

Syria has emerged as one of the most critical fault line for the global balance of power struggles. It is perhaps the only place in the world where both the global and regional powers have boots on the ground – such as US, Russia, and Turkey. US has about 900 soldiers based there, while Russian presence constitutes about 5,000 troops, and Turkey according to some estimates has more than 10,000 soldiers in northern Syria carrying out military operations.

Syria is also home to Iranian backed proxies which includes Shiite Hezbollah, and Sunni extremist groups such as ISIL and Al Qaeda. Moreover, there are other local non-state actors that are fighting against the Assad regime, such as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Free Syria Army (FSA), with western support and backing of Turkey and other Arab nations, such as UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. And then there is legacy business of Kurds, Syrian Kurds (YPG) operate from northern Syria against Turkey while also receiving US support for the fight against ISIL.

Arab Spring and Syria

The Arab Spring protests in Syria began in March 2011 as part of a series of pro-democracy demonstrations that swept across the Middle East. The protests initially called for increased civil liberties, greater freedom of speech, and the end of the Ba’ath Party’s rule. The Syrian government responded with a brutal crackdown on protesters, resulting in hundreds of deaths and thousands of arrests. As the protests continued, the government’s reaction grew increasingly violent, and the conflict escalated into a full-scale civil war and millions of refugees. Close to 3.5 million Syrian refugees migrated to Turkey while others went to different places in MENA region, Europe, and the US.

The threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) emerged in Syria around 2011. The group joined forces with other extremist groups in the region to fight against the Assad government – and quickly gained control over large swathes of territory in the country. ISIL was eventually defeated in Syria in March 2019.

The Assad regime in Syria was able to survive largely due to support from Russia, Iran, Hezbollah. They provided the Assad regime with military and financial support, enabling it to remain in power despite the civil war and international sanctions. Iran sent thousands of militiamen to fight alongside Syrian government forces in their fight against ISIL, SDF, and FSA that were operating to topple the Syrian government. Additionally, the Assad regime was able to rely on its strong security apparatus to repress domestic opposition and maintain control over the country. At the same time, while US, Turkey, and UAE were backing groups such as SDF and FSA to remove Assad, they were also fighting against ISIL.

As the extremist threat diminished, which was a common threat for state actors operating in Syria, the fissures became apparent along the respective geopolitical interests that are tied to the great power competition.

The Fight to Remove Assad’s Regime and Iran

Since the beginning of Arab Spring, one of the overarching aspirations has been to do deal with the wider Iranian behavior and influence in the Middle East, and constraining its nuclear and missile program. From the perspective of Israel and the US, any potential regime change in Syria would have undermined Iran and its control over Hezbollah – that extends its influence into Lebanon and Palestinian territories. Moreover, Iranian proxies also complicate the Middle East Peace Process between Israel and Palestine.

To counter this, Israel has simultaneously been working on what has come to be known as the Outside-In Approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and associated with it the ‘War between Wars’ strategy. The premise of the Outside-In approach has been to alter the regional dynamics to such an extent that it leads to diminished Arab support for the Palestinian cause – this would make the Palestinian more amenable to accept peace on Israeli terms. The approach also envisions undermining Iran’s nuclear and missile program while maintaining the threat of military action against Iran. This overtime led to the agreements which came to be known as Abraham Accords in 2020 and normalization of ties between UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco and Israel.

One the other hand, the main focus of the ‘War between Wars’ strategy is to prevent Iran from getting entrenched in Syria and thus threatened Israel directly via Lebanon. According to some estimates close to 2500 Iranian Revolutionary Guard members are operating in Syria.

Russian Role in Syria

The Russian support of Assad’s government and military intervention in 2015, directly undercuts the objective of regime change. Moreover, Israeli strikes against Iranian targets and Hezbollah in Syria risks hurting ties with Russia. Yet Israel has maintained close ties with Russia despite their differences over the Syrian conflict. Israel and Russia cooperate on a variety of matters, including security and trade. Additionally, the two countries have developed a mechanism to de-conflict their operations in Syria and ensure that their forces do not come into conflict with one another. Despite their differences, Israel and Russia have managed to maintain a good working relationship.

On the other hand, Russia has provided the Assad regime with military, financial, and political support, helping to keep it in power despite international sanctions and widespread opposition. Additionally, Russia has deployed thousands of troops and airpower to support the government in its fight against the FSA, SDF, and ISIL. To keep amicable ties with Turkey, Russia has generally maintained a neutral stance towards the Kurdish-led YPG in Syria.

In addition to air bases, Russia also maintains a naval base in Tartous. The larger Russian strategy is not only to protect the Assad regime but also maintain a foothold in the larger Middle East and North Africa. Russia is also military involved directly or through mercenaries in Libya and Sudan. But the conflict in Ukraine has had a significant impact on Russia’s military presence in Syria. Following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2014, the United States and its allies imposed economic sanctions on Russia hitting its economy. As a result, Russia has had to reduce its military presence in Syria and focus its resources on the conflict in Ukraine.

Turkey, YPG, PKK and Syria

Turkey is another stakeholder to the conflict in Syria, it has carried out military operations against the Kurdish-led YPG. Additionally, Turkey has sought to maintain a buffer zone along its border with Syria, which has been opposed by the YPG. Turkey’s actions against the YPG have caused tensions with the United States since it supports the group in its fight against ISIL – and YPG has collaboration with SDF and FSA to topple Assad’s regime. Being a NATO member, Turkey has also provided the SDF and FSA with arms, training, and financial support in their fight against the Assad regime.

On the other hand, both Russia and Iran have not directly engaged in the conflict between YPG and the Assad government and accused the group of cooperating with the United States and other foreign powers.

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Kurdish-led YPG in Syria have a close ideological and organizational relationship. The PKK has provided the YPG with military and financial support in its fight against ISIL, as well as political and diplomatic support in international forums. Additionally, many members of the PKK have joined the YPG in its fight against ISIL.

Like Turkey, US and EU consider PKK a terrorist organization. This approach which supports YPG in Syria but considers PKK a terrorist group, complicates US and European ties with Turkey and NATO – and raises Turkish concerns about the real intent behind supporting separatist YPG.

Saudi-Iran Detente

The question becomes how the situation of Syria will impact the Chinese facilitated Saudi-Iran truce reached in March. Or, in other words, what are the key terms of the détente reached by Saudi Arabia and Iran, that will facilitate establishing a regional balance of power and resolve proxy wars in places like Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, and Palestine. Moreover, what does it imply for the budding great power rivalry in South Asia.

One of the immediate benefits of the truce has been the ceasefire in Yemen, followed up by exchange of prisoners. The foreign minister of Syria has also visited Saudi Arabia, reciprocated by the Saudi Foreign Minister’s trip to Syria – raising hopes for potential reentry of Syria into the Arab League. Earlier in March, Assad had also visited UAE to rebuild ties that had been cut-off due to the support provided by Gulf States to anti-Assad Forces.

Iran’s nuclear program and the threat posed by its wider behavior in the region, represented the threat perception that had moved the Arab world closer to Israel – and by extension to the US. Additionally, the criticism of the Abraham Accord, reached in 2020, has been that it has not resulted in any quid-pro-quo when it comes to Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In fact, with the return of Netanyahu’s right-wing government and the aggressive actions it has taken, has reversed the gains made under the Abraham agreement. This has adversely impacted Israeli ties with the US.

However, it is also a fact that US interests in the Middle East have transformed in the aftermath of the campaign against extremism, and military withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan. It is no longer dependent on the energy resources of the region, as China is, but it is engaged head on in the great power rivalry with China and Russia. The Middle Powers are caught in the middle of these power tussles. According to the White House Coordinator for MENA, Brett McGurk, the main objectives of US in Syria are to reduce the violence, maintain a check on the activities of ISIL, help the Syrian humanitarian crisis, and back Israel.

The shift in UAE and Saudi position reflects a realization the Assad’s regime has survived the worse with Russian and Iranian support. The China, Iran Economic and Security Deal reached in 2020 demonstrated that China was also throwing its weight behind Iran, which has traditionally been also backed by Russia. PoliTact had pointed out at that time that the pact represented China’s pivot to the Middle East. With the China facilitating the Saudi-Iran truce, the balance of power appear to be shifting away from the US, which is increasingly been seen as an unreliable partner. Commenting on the deal, former Israeli prime minister commented that “This is a fatal blow to the effort to build a regional coalition against Iran.”

Will Israel counter or accept any potential guarantees from China that it can manage Iranian nuclear program and wider behavior in the region, remains to be seen. The new Chinese foreign minister Qin Gang recently stated that it is ready to mediate peace talks between Israel and Palestine.

Meanwhile, the Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had warned Israel in 2019 to reduce its economic and security ties with China or risk reduced security cooperation from US. During his visit to Saudi Arabia in 2022, President Biden had stated, “We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia or Iran … We will seek to build on this moment with active, principled, American leadership.”

Related:

• What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply? Aug 4, 2022
• Biden’s Middle East Policy, China-Iran Ties, and CPEC
  On July 28, 2020, PoliTact held a webinar to discuss the potential China-Iran economic deal and its impact on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

• PoliTact’s Chief Analyst Arif Ansar’s interview on the situation of Syria on Pakistan Television, March 2023

• The Emerging ‘Outside In’ Approach To Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Afghan Reconciliation, And Kashmir Issue. July 15, 2015

The post Saudi-Iran Détente, Syria, And Changing MENA appeared first on Politact.

Great Power Rivalry in the Middle East – What it means for South Asia?

Context

The New Cold War paradigm and great power rivalry framework is settling in and beginning to define international affairs. After Europe and Pacific, Middle East is emerging as another hotly contested theater between the global powers. While Ukraine has been consuming most of the media bandwidth, matters related to Iran’s nuclear program and Israeli-Palestinian conflict had taken more of a back seat. Nonetheless, after the War Against Terror, Ukraine has become the new pivot increasingly defining geopolitics, and meanwhile galvanizing NATO and EU.

President Biden’s visit to Israel and Palestinian territories in July, and then to Saudi Arabia, signaled that US aspires to reinvigorate its traditional ties with the Arab world – as it attempts to harness their support against Russia and China. And this was stated by none other than the President himself while speaking to the GCC during his visit to Saudi Arabia,

“We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia or Iran … We will seek to build on this moment with active, principled, American leadership.”

US withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, and from Afghanistan in 2021, gave the impression that America was no longer interested in the Middle East – a perception that was reinforced by mantras such as ‘Pivot to Asia’ used during the Obama administration (2009-2017). Moreover, Iran nuclear deal (also known as JCPOA) reached in July 2015 had greatly unnerved the Israelis and the Gulf States regarding the balance of power in the region and US intent.

After coming to power, one of the first nation visited by former president Trump in 2017 was Saudi Arabia. However, he withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018. During his tenure, US once again established cordial ties with Israel that have been damaged during the Obama presidency. One of the common themes that brought the Arabs and Israel closer has been the expanding influence of Iran in the region. Trump also applied maximum pressure on Iran. In a drone strike in January 2020, Iranian intelligence chief Qasem Soleimani was eliminated in Baghdad. On the other hand, Israel also kept the pressure on the country to stall its nuclear ambitions. The chief of Iran’s nuclear program, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, was assassinated in November 2020.

In parallel and on the diplomatic front, Trump administration worked towards improving ties between the Arabs and Israel, which culminated in Abraham Accords in August 2020. As a result, UAE, Bahrain, and subsequently Sudan and Morocco, also normalized ties with Israel. It was believed that Saudi Arabia will also soon follow, and according to some analysts, other key non-Arab nations, like Pakistan, are also being pressured towards this reorientation of the regional threat perception. The other key Muslim state, Turkey, already has normal ties with Israel.

Revitalized NATO

While Trump was exerting pressure on Iran, pulling out of the nuclear deal also alienated American European allies who had strived greatly to secure the deal. Moreover, not contributing enough towards NATO has also been a persistent source of tension between the US and its European allies. The Ukraine crisis has helped reverse this while attracting new aspirants, like Sweden and Finland, for NATO membership. Just before travelling to the Middle East, Biden was in Europe attending the NATO and G7 gatherings. One of the top-most agenda during the NATO meetings was to come up with a new concept that unites and define the NATO alliance for the future. NATO’s updated mission statement for the first time mentions Russia as the greatest threat and China-Russian alliance as a counter to its values.

While NATO looks to thwart Russia in Ukraine, Middle East represents the other flank. There is less consensus on how much time and resources it will take to achieve the goals in Ukraine and elsewhere. Disruption of supply chains and rising energy costs are some of the direct consequences of the conflict, including inflation, when nations were just beginning to come out of Covid-19 induced economic woes.

China- Russia and Middle East

China and Russia both have been extending their influence in the Middle East. The $400 billion China–Iran treaty signed in March 2021 must have been an ominous development from the perspective of the Gulf Arabs and the US. However, the talks have been proceeding for a while, as has been the ‘Outside-In Approach’ to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has become an active player in the Middle East with strategic ties with a number of regional players, to include Saudi Arabia. As its influence increases gradually, it could become an active interlocutor between Israel and the Palestinians, and other conflicts of the Middle East. However, it’s not clear if China desires to get involved in the security affairs of the region, like Russia has in Syria – as far as the Middle East is concerned. Soon after Biden’s visit to the Middle East, Putin and Erdogan visited Iran and discussed the evolving situation in Syria, and allowing shipment of Ukrainian grain through the Black Sea. According to media reports, Khamenei called for long-term cooperation between Russia and Iran and to guard against ‘Western deception’.

Chinese analysts present a case the nation wants to be more involved in providing economic support than engaging in the security affairs of the Middle East. Nonetheless, it has good political and military relations with both Iran and Israel. As part of BRI, China has been extending its trade relations with Israel and lately US has objected strongly to some of them citing security concerns – such as the Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) running a container terminal at the Port of Haifa – near an Israeli naval base that is frequently visited by the US Sixth Fleet. The Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had warned Israel in 2019 to reduce its economic and security ties with China or risk reduced security cooperation from US.

If the China-Israeli economic ties are allowed to strengthen uninhibited, overtime China will be able to build leverages that can potentially undercut US primacy in the affairs of the Middle East. The Israelis disagree on this, stating the nature of its ties with China and the US are of totally different nature.

Conclusion

Thus, Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia represents a push to counter China and Russia and meanwhile providing continuity to the policy undertaken by Trump, which resulted in Abraham Accords. At the same time, engaging and supporting the Palestinian authorities, and reiterating that two-state solution remains the best way forward to resolving the conflict.

The fresh engagement also envisions a new security architecture for the region that some have called the Arab NATO. During the G7 meeting held in the Bavarian Alps, the leaders also announced the $600 billion Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment program, seen as an alternative to Chinese BRI.

With their energy resources UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, have also come to play an increasingly critical role when it comes to the affairs South Asia, most recently exhibited in Afghanistan. Then there are the expanding Indian ties with the Gulf nations that have overshadowed the traditional Pakistan’s influence. And this change has undercut the financial support from the region Pakistan had relied upon in the past. PoliTact had covered this shift in a joint event with the Middle East Institute in November 2018.

The reoriented US engagement with the Arab world will also have a profound impact on the affairs of South Asia – and the present political and economic turbulence in Pakistan could be the direct result of this flux in Middle East – and surge of great power tussles there.

The post What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply? appeared first on Politact.

Guest Analyst Muhammad Siraj ul Huda Khan assisted in researching and developing this article.

Context

PoliTact periodically invites leading regional and global experts to understand the changing geopolitical situations and significant emerging themes. One such theme is the budding China-Iran economic and security partnership.

China and Iran are entering a $400 billion 25 year economic and security deal that would lead to enhanced military and trade relations. The agreement ensures Chinese investment in Iranian telecommunication, transportation, and military fields. The military cooperation includes exercises, intelligence sharing, and joint research and development of weapons. China will also procure its energy needs from Iran on discounted price for over next 25 years.

On July 28, 2020, PoliTact held a webinar to discuss the potential China-Iran economic deal and its impact on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The panelists analyzed the major developments taking place in the South Asia and Middle East regions and provided perspectives on the evolving situation. The theme has taken on added significance in the aftermath of US elections and with additional Muslim states, such as UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco officially recognizing the state of Israel.

CEO and Chief Analyst of PoliTact, Arif Ansar, moderated the panel discussion. The opening remarks were made by Ikram Sehgal, who is a Chairman of the Karachi Council on Foreign Relations, CEO of Pathfinder Group, and member of the East West Institute’s Board of Directors.

The panel included:

• Ambassador Mustafa Kamal Kazi – Senior Vice Chairman at the Karachi Council on Foreign Relations, former Foreign Secretary and Ambassador of Pakistan to the Russian Federation, the Kingdom of Netherlands, Republic of Indonesia and Republic of Iraq.
• Khaled Almaeena – Former Editor-in-Chief of Arab News and Saudi Gazette, CEO of a PR Firm, and Saudi Television news anchor.
• Claude Rakisits – Honorary Professor at the Asia Pacific College of Diplomacy at the Australian National University. He is also a Director at PoliTact and covers the South Asia and Middle East region.

The Webinar explored the following key questions:

1. What are the implications of the China-Iran economic and security deal on the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)?
2. Assessing Chinese influence in the Middle East region and does the China-Iran deal represent a Chinese pivot to the Middle East? Moreover, how does Chinese sway play out against that of India, Israeli, and the US in the region?
3. How the does the China-Iran treaty correlates with the Quad and Indo-Pacific strategy?
4. Will China use the Iran deal as a leverage in its dealing with the US, just as Russia has done?
5. History informs that Muslim nations or empires have often sided with one or the other global power – and then fought directly with each other. What can be done to prevent such an outcome in the framework of the present regional and global geopolitics?

Implications of the potential China-Iran Deal on China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

There are multiple angles to review this connection; that of Pakistan and Iran, and one cannot ignore the positions of China and the US.

Pakistan sees no negative impact of the potential China-Iran deal on CPEC. Former foreign minister Sartaj Aziz once stated that the Chabahar Port was not competing with the Gwadar port, in fact they were seen as complimentary. Media reports have also indicated that a road was to connect the two closely located ports at some point.

On the other hand, Iran is likely to see the Chinese deal as a blessing in disguise. Fearing US sanctions, Pakistan has been dragging its feet on the Iran Gas pipeline project for years, and India has also been slow in developing the Chabahar Port. In all likelihood, once the deal is finalized, Chinese investments will start flowing in quickly and provide immense relief to the much-penalized Iran. More importantly, the China-Iran deal would provide the strategic counterbalance to the American, Israeli, and Arab pressure.

According to Ambassador Kazi, the US withdrawal from the Iranian deal of 2015, and mismanagement of the multipolar world, is one of the reasons China-Iran economic and security partnership is coming to fruition.

However, for China, the treaty with Iran diversifies the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) providing it with another tributary. This is especially true if the CPEC route runs into trouble, or if the work slows down considerably due to the American, Indian, and Arab pressure on Pakistan.

Chinese Pivot to the Middle East and American, Israeli and Indian Coalition

China has been building strategic ties with the Middle East for some time now – in addition to the Asia Pacific, Middle East represents its other flank. Khaled Almaeena pointed out that the Saudi ties with China got underway in the 90s, as the Gulf region started to balance ties between China and the US. On the other hand, Dr. Claude Rakisits noted that the Chinese push westward is not necessarily a pivot, irrespective, the Iran deal will be seen negatively in both Saudi Arabia and the US.

Speaking at the Saudi embassy in China in July on the occasion of the 30 anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties, Saudi Ambassador Turki M. A. Almadi commented: “our relations are all-round, multi-field, not only about bilateral trade and mutual investment, but also extended to cooperation in the fields of culture, science and technology, and health.”

Zhai Jun, China’s special envoy on Middle East affairs indicated at the occasion that the bilateral trade volume between the two nations stood at $78.04 billion at the end of 2019. He added Saudi Arabia was the largest supplier of crude oil to China, and also the Arab nations largest trading partner.

Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has become an active player in the Middle East with strategic ties with a number of regional players, to include Saudi Arabia. As its influence increases gradually, it could become an active interlocutor between Israel and the Palestinians, and other conflicts of the Middle East. However, it is not clear if China aspires to get involved in the security affairs of the region, like Russia has in Syria.

Chinese analysts present a case that the nation wants to be more active in providing economic support than engaging in security affairs of the Middle East. Nonetheless, China has amicable political and military relations with both Iran and Israel. As part of BRI, China has been extending its trade relations with Israel and lately US has objected strongly to some of them citing security concerns – such as the Chinese company Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) running a container terminal at the Port of Haifa – near an Israeli naval base that is frequently visited by the US Sixth Fleet.

If the China-Israeli economic ties continue to strengthen uninhibited, overtime China will be able to build leverages that can potentially undercut US primacy in the affairs of the Middle East. The Israelis disagree on this possibility, stating that the nature of its ties with China and the US are of totally different nature. Nonetheless, the push under President Trump to normalize ties between Israel and the Arab nations can be seen as an attempt to counter China becoming an influential Middle Eastern player in the future.

When it comes to the Indian alignment with Israel and its growing ties with the Gulf nations, a different question is raised. How do these relations undercut the traditional support Pakistan has generated from the Gulf region?  In November 2018, PoliTact collaborated with the Middle East Institute to examine the political, security, and economic interconnections between South Asia and the Gulf States, and one of the subsets, Pakistan and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The report pointed out to how India was strategically undermining Pakistan, a risk that has matured now.

Commenting on this during the webinar, Khaled Almaaena stated that Pakistan’s position has been undermined by the negative economic and security news consistently emanating from the country. And this has been occurring at a time when India has positioned itself as an information technology and economic powerhouse, and by investing in Saudi Arabia that brought jobs to the Kingdom. He further added, the younger leadership of KSA do not hold the same kind of affinity towards Pakistan as past leaders had.

Irrespective, we can see an attempt to undermine both the Chinese and Pakistan connections in the Middle east as they compete with the American, Israeli and Indian interests.

China-Iran Deal and Quad Strategy

Answering the moderator, and as noted above, Dr. Claude Rakisits noted that the Chinese push westward does not represent its pivot to the Middle East – and how this relates to the Quad strategy is a different angle.

Dr. Claude added that Quad is meant to “keep China within its borders”. And as a counter, China is pushing US away from the first island chain by building artificial islands in the South China Sea. Moreover, China-Iran deal counteracts Quad and the Indo-Pacific strategy by providing China with a key footprint in the Indian Ocean, which together with Gwadar and Djibouti, enhances Chinese naval potential.

While Quad would desire to box-in China, conversely China wants to limit the Indian role in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, by keeping it busy within its borders. This dynamics can be witnessed by the present tensions and skirmishes on the Line of Actual control (LAC) and the Ladakh region.

Biden’s Middle East Policy, Iranian Sanctions, and Chinese Leverage

A related inquiry has to do with sanctions on Iran and how will China navigate them? Previous European attempts to build trade relations with the nation hit numerous roadblocks. As soon as Trump administration took oath in January 2017, within almost a year and a half of signing the Iran nuclear deal (July 2015), US started to build pressure on western companies attempting to build trade relations with Iran. As a result, even the $20 billion aircraft deal Boeing had signed with Iran had to be scrapped.

Under President Elect Biden’s Iran Policy, will these sanctions be eased if US rejoins the treaty? This will all depend on how the Biden administration re-engages Iran. Recently Biden has indicated that it will want to renegotiate the Iran deal to include its missile program, and wider behavior in the region; these were widely seen as major weaknesses of the 2015 deal.

This, however, will likely be a non-starter for Iran. The country has expressed it would not enter fresh negotiations with the US when even the terms and guarantees of the 2015 agreement were not kept.

A parallel concern is, with the ‘Outside In’ approach to the Middle East Peace Process so far along resulting in the Abraham Accords, will President Elect Biden be able to reverse it and thus jeopardize the present Arab-Israeli normalizing process? A more likely approach would be that the normalization process would have to incorporate the two-state solution under Biden – including a more transparent give and take by the Israelis – of the type that is frequently hinted by the Saudi leadership.

Irrespective, Dr. Claude was of the opinion that China will continue its dealings with Iran, despite the sanctions, and will push back on any efforts to restrict the ties between Iran and China. It is also possible that China will use the Iran deal as a leverage in its dealing with the US, just as Russia has done in the past. On several occasions when Russian ties stumbled with the West, it threatened to supply Iran with modern weaponry that could help it withstand any attack on its nuclear program.

The US Iran policy has circled around two approaches recently: the negotiated settlement was adopted by President Obama by signing the JCPOA in 2015, which sidelined the aggressive route against Iran propagated by Israel and Saudi Arabia. Trump took on the more militaristic alternative – moving away from the two-state solution, with wider recognition of Israel from the GCC and Arab States. The assassination of two top Iranian officials recently, Major General Qassim Soleimani and nuclear scientist Mohsin Fakhrizadeh, are linked to this approach.

The challenge is that a military solution towards Iran would be unacceptable for both China and Russia. Similarly, the reenactment of the JCPOA, along with potential China-Iran deal, will make China a stronger player in the Middle East. It could possibly utilize its clout to bring about Israeli-Palestinian agreement, which US has not been able to do alone.

On the one hand this cooperation between China and the US would be an immensely positive development that can bring about peace in the Middle East. However, this directly contradicts with what is transpiring in the Asia Pacific and resulting Indo-Pacific and the Quad strategy. And this also does not factor in Russian role in the whole scenario – and the interplay of the Muslim Middle powers, such as Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.

Islamic World and Global Power Tussles

In the past Muslim nations or empires have often sided with one or the other global power – and then fought directly with each other. And the question becomes what can be done to avert such an outcome in the framework of the present regional and global geopolitics.

Replying to the moderator, Khaled Almaeena pointed out that the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) is unable to fulfill this role. He added this requires strong Islamic leadership to prevent being exploited, commitment to their citizens, and rule of law. Moreover, he stated that ‘if Iran suffers, the Arabs will suffer too’. In his opinion CPEC can play a constructive role by being a bridge, ‘good economics makes good politics,’ he stated.

On the other hand, Ambassador Kazi was critical of the role the GCC nations have played in this regard and pointed to the infighting between the Arab nations. He noted that ‘what happens in the Arab world, impacts the Islamic world’.

Meanwhile, Ikram Sehgal added the role of Turkey is important, and one should not forget the Regional Cooperation for Development Organization (RCD) formed between Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey in 1964, and replaced by Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in 1979. He emphasized that Russia and China have good ties with Pakistan, Turkey and Iran, and that ‘constructive engagement can be a harbinger of peace’.

Conclusion

While Saudi Arabia has delayed recognizing the statehood of Israel, and while Qatar remains closer to Turkey, the shifting alliance of most GCC and Arab nations towards Israel and the US, represents a decisive shift in the balance of power. Adopting the threat perception that centers on Iran, and without any clear give and take from Israel in the context of Abraham Accords, is likely to revitalize the message of non-state actors.

While China has made an economic entry in the Middle East, it has not decided to influence the security affairs – other than under the umbrella of UN and for maritime security purposes. In Syria too, it has adopted a non-interventionist approach and has supported the Assad regime.

However, economic leverages will eventually lead to influences in other areas. And China would have to utilize its sway – especially when it has the most to lose if a conflict breaks out in the region. One measure of if matters are heading in that direction would be the establishment of military bases, like the one in Djibouti, and potential militarization of Gawadar and Chabahar port. And in this context, the China-Iran economic and security deal takes on an added emphasis.

In the long run, US would want to create a wedge between China and Russia. Since attaining self-sufficiency in its energy needs, the US interests in Middle East is primarily to prevent nuclear weapons from falling in the hands of rogue states, or non-state actors, and this this a goal it shares with Israel. At the same time, US would not want to lose its primacy in the Middle East, but to exploit the existing fault lines to further extend its reach – to the detriment of China and Russia.

At the same time, under President Elect Biden, there is an opportunity to move away from the zero-sum approach to world affairs – by reaching out to China for a wider détente and cooperation – and the geopolitics resulting from the Coronavirus related pandemic especially necessitates this. Reaching that stage, however, would require first a smooth transition of power in the US.

The post Biden’s Middle East Policy, China-Iran Ties, and CPEC appeared first on Politact.