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		<title>Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/great-power-rivalry-and-chinas-deepening-involvement-in-south-asia-gulf-states/</link>
		
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		<pubDate>Fri, 04 Aug 2023 15:34:57 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=10184</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="533" height="485" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/27-07-2015_UAE-China-ties.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" fetchpriority="high" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/27-07-2015_UAE-China-ties.jpg 533w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/27-07-2015_UAE-China-ties-300x273.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/27-07-2015_UAE-China-ties-462x420.jpg 462w" sizes="(max-width: 533px) 100vw, 533px" />&#160; Context In an endeavor to understand the emerging geopolitical realities, PoliTact partners with leading thought centers to understand the longitudinal multi-faceted tangents of a particular theme. One such topic is the political, security, and economic interconnections between South Asia and the Gulf States, and one of the subsets, Pakistan and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/great-power-rivalry-and-chinas-deepening-involvement-in-south-asia-gulf-states/">Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="533" height="485" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/27-07-2015_UAE-China-ties.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/27-07-2015_UAE-China-ties.jpg 533w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/27-07-2015_UAE-China-ties-300x273.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/27-07-2015_UAE-China-ties-462x420.jpg 462w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 533px) 100vw, 533px" /><p>&nbsp;</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal"><b><img decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-1827 alignnone" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/27-07-2015_UAE-China-ties-300x273.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="273" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/27-07-2015_UAE-China-ties-300x273.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/27-07-2015_UAE-China-ties-462x420.jpg 462w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/27-07-2015_UAE-China-ties.jpg 533w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></b></p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal"><b>Context</b></p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">In an endeavor to understand the emerging geopolitical realities, PoliTact partners with leading thought centers to understand the longitudinal multi-faceted tangents of a particular theme. One such topic is the political, security, and economic interconnections between South Asia and the Gulf States, and one of the subsets, Pakistan and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This relationship has taken on added significance in the context of ongoing great power rivalry and China’s wider engagement with the Middle East, which resulted in the Saudi-Iran détente in March.</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">This article presents a summary of three events held to date, especially the most recent one that took place on May 22.</p>
<p><b>US Presence in Afghanistan</b></p>
<p>The <a href="https://politact.com/examining-saudi-iran-tensions-and-its-impact-on-south-asia-china/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" shape="rect">first event to cover this theme was held on November 16, 2018</a> in collaboration with the Middle East Institute. With US still present in Afghanistan, obviously influenced the perspectives, but it was clear this interrelationship would become more pronounced in the future. The GCC nations, especially Qatar, was facilitating the peace talks between the Afghan Taliban and the US, which later led to the Doha Agreement in February 2021.</p>
<p><iframe title="YouTube video player" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Wq7cWEsaqcs?si=GDJhvWQSb8PDjwp2" width="400" height="315" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen"><span style="display: inline-block; width: 0px; overflow: hidden; line-height: 0;" data-mce-type="bookmark" class="mce_SELRES_start">﻿</span></iframe></p>
<p>One of the other significant trends was the continuing Indian economic encroachment of GCC, from where Pakistan has traditionally drawn support. One of the Panelist, former director for Pakistan and Afghanistan at the White House’s National Security Council, Shamila Chaudhary, had commented then:</p>
<p>“Pakistan does need to pay attention to the growing nexus between India and the Gulf States, especially when its transitioning from purely economic and into security and defense domains.</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal"><b>China-Iran Economic Deal and Abraham Accords</b></p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">On July 28, 2020, PoliTact held a webinar to discuss the potential <a href="https://politact.com/bidens-middle-east-policy-china-iran-ties-and-cpec/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" shape="rect">China-Iran $400 billion economic deal and its impact on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC</a>). China-Iran defense cooperation has been growing in the aftermath of President Trump’s decision in 2018 to unilaterally withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal reached in 2015 – which was a hallmark achievement of the Obama administration.</p>
<p><iframe loading="lazy" title="YouTube video player" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/4EkxkeAk6uU?si=BHV02vyCdZf6oqro" width="400" height="315" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen"></iframe></p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">Moreover, additional Muslim states, such as UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco officially recognizing the state of Israel as a consequence of Abraham Accords, reached during the Trump’s presidency in 2020.</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">These developments resulted in deepening of the contradictory pressures for Pakistan. On the one hand, the country is China’s closest strategic partner, which was also expanding its ties with Iran. On the other hand, Pakistan’s closest Arab allies, UAE and Saudi Arabia, were moving closer to Israel.</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">When it comes to the Indian alignment with Israel and its growing ties with the Gulf nations, a question was again assessed about how these relations undercut the traditional support Pakistan has generated from the Gulf region, as referenced above.</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">Commenting on this during the webinar, panelist and former Editor-in-Chief of Arab News and Saudi Gazette, Khaled Almaeena, stated: “Pakistan’s position has been undermined by the negative economic and security news consistently emanating from the country. And this has been occurring at a time when India has positioned itself as an information technology and economic powerhouse, and by investing in Saudi Arabia that brought jobs to the Kingdom.” He further added, “the younger leadership of KSA do not hold the same kind of affinity towards Pakistan as past leaders had.”</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal"><b>China and Saudi-Iran Detente</b></p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">PoliTact collaborated with the <a href="http://www.mei.edu/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" shape="rect">Middle East Institute</a> again on May 22 to analyze the <a class="yiv9021149290enhancr_card_7594571233" href="https://www.youtube.com/live/KngQHF25ZAs?feature=share" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" shape="rect">South Asia and GCC connection in the aftermath of China facilitated Saudi-Iran détente</a> announced in March.</p>
<p><iframe loading="lazy" title="YouTube video player" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/KngQHF25ZAs?si=jpHjQtm6NM3KdixL" width="400" height="315" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen"><span style="display: inline-block; width: 0px; overflow: hidden; line-height: 0;" data-mce-type="bookmark" class="mce_SELRES_start">﻿</span></iframe></p>
<p>The panel discussion, led by Gerald M. Feierstein, Director of MEI&#8217;s Arabian Peninsula Program, assessed Chinese foreign policy within the framework of the Arabian Gulf and South Asia, with a specific emphasis on great power competition. Gerald Feirstein highlighted that much of the attention surrounding the intensifying competition between the US and China has been focused on the Asia-Pacific region. However, China&#8217;s growing involvement in the Middle East and South Asia has increasingly become a significant concern for the US.</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">The panelists were Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the East Asia Program and Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center, Yun Sun; Senior Advisor on South Asia at the United States Institute of Peace, Dr. Daniel Markey; veteran Saudi journalist, Khaled Almaeena; and Syed Muhammad Ali; the South Asia expert Non-Residence Scholar at the Middle East Institute.</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">The panelists examined several key questions:</p>
<ol>
<li class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoListParagraphCxSpFirst">Are China&#8217;s objectives in the region primarily driven by economic interests or do they have political and security dimensions as well?</li>
</ol>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle">2. How do countries in the wider Middle East perceive their relationships with China?</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle">3. How does the US-India partnership influence China&#8217;s regional initiatives and impact    Pakistan&#8217;s interests in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor?</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoListParagraphCxSpLast">4. What is China&#8217;s vision and long-term goals in the region?</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal"><b>Chinese Perspective</b></p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">Yun Sun emphasized that Chinese foreign policy is well structured, viewing the Middle East and South Asia as distinct regions. China&#8217;s focus on the Middle East is primarily driven by its reliance on energy imports, with 52 percent of its energy sourced from the region. Beijing has effectively pursued its objectives in the Middle East by employing a diplomatic approach that seeks to balance economic and political engagements with all significant parties, including those in conflict with each other.</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">It is important to note that China does not see itself as a mediator responsible for the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the assumption that China will replace the United States as the primary security provider in the Middle East is premature – but this is an overarching perception.</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">She pointed out this perception in the Middle East that US will disengage with the region and pivot to Asia does play out well in the long run and needs to be countered. Overtime people will start believing this.</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">She went on to add, China lacks the necessary political, security, and military engagement in the region. Conversely, China&#8217;s interests in South Asia mainly revolve around regional security concerns, particularly counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as maintaining its influence by counterbalancing India at a sub-regional level.<b> </b></p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">While China aims to preserve a certain level of affinity with India to prevent it from completely aligning with the United States against China&#8217;s ambitions, Pakistan plays a crucial role in China&#8217;s South Asia regional strategy. There are two notable aspects in China&#8217;s foreign policy formulation concerning the Middle East and South Asia.</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">Firstly, due to its energy requirements, China aspires to establish an energy transportation corridor linking the two regions.</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">Secondly, China advances its commercial and political goals by considering the shared interests among Muslim-majority countries in the Gulf and South Asia.</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">The other panelists, Daniel Markey reiterated that China&#8217;s interests in the Middle East are primarily driven by energy, while its interests in South Asia are focused on security matters and partially aimed at counterbalancing India.</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">Markey highlighted that China is gradually displaying an opportunistic willingness to assume an active leadership role, leveraging its economic influence to gain political influence. Additionally, all countries in the Middle East and South Asia have their own unique interests and perceive collaboration with China as a mutual opportunity. This applies not only to India and Pakistan but also to Iran and Saudi Arabia. As different countries engage with China, its prospects for exerting political influence multiply.</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">Moreover, Daniel acknowledged that China has surpassed the need for relying solely on Pakistan&#8217;s support to maintain its favorable relations with the Muslim world.</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal"><b>Pakistan’s Perspective</b></p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">Syed Muhammad Ali, providing the Pakistani perspective on the country&#8217;s increasing dependence on China, emphasized that Pakistan&#8217;s relationship with China has predominantly revolved around security concerns. However, Pakistan aims to transform its geo-strategic position from being primarily security-oriented to becoming a geo-economic actor.<b> </b>Despite facing multiple crises such as political instability, terrorism, and economic challenges, Pakistan is actively pursuing engagement with the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. At the same time, US is the biggest market for Pakistan’s exports and China is never going to replace that.</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">Moreover, the Saudi-Iran détente provides it with the breathing space &#8211; as in the past the tensions between the two have played out in Pakistan. This could result in more focus on the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline.</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">Syed also pointed out that as the US-India strategic partnership grows, it will increasingly make US unable to play the mediator role between India and Pakistan. This will only increase Pakistan’s insecurity.</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal"><b>Gulf Perspective</b></p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">Khaled Almaeena presented the perspective of Gulf countries regarding China. He emphasized that in comparison to the West, these nations have overtime come to view China as a reliable economic partner and an impartial political mediator. China has gradually strengthened its diplomatic influence in the Middle East through a methodical and gradual approach.</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">Daniel Markey noted that the US decoupling from the Middle East, if it is happening, will take time to unfold, especially because of the military dimension. Furthermore, as China engages more with these nations, it may confront the same challenges and sentiments that US has had to deal with.</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal"><b>Uyghur Issue and China</b></p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">When its comes to the Uyghur issue, Daniel Markey commented that China has skillfully portrayed it as an internal matter related to national security. Furthermore, the significant economic interests shared between Muslim countries and China are of such magnitude that China&#8217;s political oppression of the Uyghur population does not jeopardize their relations.</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">Yun Sun added that although anti-China ethnic movements are gaining momentum in Central Asian countries, however, the involvement of Russia in Ukraine has led these countries to increase their reliance on China. As a result, they are unlikely to pose a potential threat to Chinese security and economic interests soon.</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">She also noted that in light of the Taliban&#8217;s takeover in Afghanistan, China has prioritized its security interests in Central and South Asia, leading to enhanced security cooperation with regional countries. Such as the Quadrilateral Group on Afghanistan which include Pakistan, Iran, and Russia.</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal"><b> China-Russia Relations</b></p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">Daniel Markey argued that Russia has become a junior partner to China in the region, but countries like India are attempting to maintain a balance between China and Russia based on their own strategic interests – and wedge between the two helps India.</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">On the other hand, Yun Sun stated that China views Russia as a helpful partner and has benefited from Russia&#8217;s involvement in the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia. China has found Russia&#8217;s strategy of creating chaos indirectly advantageous, providing China with more leverage. However, chaos in Ukraine can become a liability for China.</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">The discussion concluded by noting that China&#8217;s leadership role and influence in the Gulf and Asia regions are growing, with these countries welcoming China more favorably compared to the West, as pointed out by Khaled Almaeena earlier. China has become a significant player in geopolitical bloc politics. At the same time, many Arab nations aspire to become members of SCO. At the same time, Yun Sun stated that it’s not clear what tangible successes the organization has achieved.</p>
<p class="yiv9021149290ydpafe7d04dMsoNormal">Meanwhile United States has also formed alternative regional groupings driven by geopolitics, such as I2U2 and QUAD, but their effectiveness is questionable as well. As Daniel Markey commented, there is a question of rhetoric and reality when it comes to these organizations.</p>
<p><strong>Recommendations for US Policy</strong></p>
<p>Recommendations were made for US policy, with panelists agreeing that the US should not completely disengage or overreact to Chinese influence in a state of anxiety. Instead, the US should adopt a clearer approach to its political, economic, and security interests in the region. Viewing US relations with its partners in the Middle East and Asia within the framework of great power competition with China may negatively impact the US approach and its interests.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/great-power-rivalry-and-chinas-deepening-involvement-in-south-asia-gulf-states/">Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>Status of Global Alliances: US Afghan Withdrawal, Evolution Of SCO, And Creation Of AUKUS</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/status-of-global-alliances-us-afghan-withdrawal-evolution-of-sco-and-creation-of-aukus/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Sep 2021 20:59:54 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=9713</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="696" height="554" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/China-Russia-2-1024x815.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/China-Russia-2-1024x815.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/China-Russia-2-600x478.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/China-Russia-2-300x239.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/China-Russia-2-768x611.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/China-Russia-2-696x554.jpg 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/China-Russia-2-1068x850.jpg 1068w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/China-Russia-2-528x420.jpg 528w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" />Context The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) held its head of state summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan on September 17. The conference took place in the backdrop of the collapse of Ashraf Ghani government in Afghanistan as Taliban took over. This was accompanied by the complete withdrawal of US and coalition troops – that has raised alarmed [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/status-of-global-alliances-us-afghan-withdrawal-evolution-of-sco-and-creation-of-aukus/">Status of Global Alliances: US Afghan Withdrawal, Evolution Of SCO, And Creation Of AUKUS</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="696" height="554" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/China-Russia-2-1024x815.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/China-Russia-2-1024x815.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/China-Russia-2-600x478.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/China-Russia-2-300x239.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/China-Russia-2-768x611.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/China-Russia-2-696x554.jpg 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/China-Russia-2-1068x850.jpg 1068w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/China-Russia-2-528x420.jpg 528w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" /><figure id="attachment_9724" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-9724" style="width: 300px" class="wp-caption alignleft"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-9724" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Aukus-2-300x197.jpg" alt="Two Australian warships standing side by side" width="300" height="197" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Aukus-2-300x197.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Aukus-2-768x506.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Aukus-2-696x458.jpg 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Aukus-2-638x420.jpg 638w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Aukus-2-741x486.jpg 741w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Aukus-2-600x395.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Aukus-2.jpg 1024w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-9724" class="wp-caption-text">The Australian ships HMAS MELBOURNE (FFG 4) and HMAS PERTH (DDG 38) moored at Naval Station Pearl Harbor during exercise RIMPAC 98.</figcaption></figure>
<p>Context</p>
<p>The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) held its head of state summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan on September 17. The conference took place in the backdrop of the collapse of Ashraf Ghani government in Afghanistan as Taliban took over. This was accompanied by the complete withdrawal of US and coalition troops – that has raised alarmed bells across the region and beyond.</p>
<p>The future of the US presence in the South and Central Asia, and increasingly Middle East region, have remained the focus of SCO. As early as June 2010, the then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev had commented that the future of Afghanistan was directly relational to security and stability in all SCO countries and most observer countries, and that the SCO must endeavor to increase cooperation and involvement in Afghanistan to try and ensure stability in a post-US scenario.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://politact.com/us-afghan-withdrawal-regional-geopolitics-and-biden-putin-summit/">withdrawal of US troops and NATO from Afghanistan</a> represents a significant shift in the regional and global balance of power – and while Taliban are in the process of establishing their government – they have not formally been recognized by any other nation yet. This is reflective of the wait and see approach. As Taliban get established and their domestic and foreign policies become more apparent &#8211; that is likely when the recognition process and financial support starts.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://politact.com/the-evolving-power-shift-multilateral-organization-conflicts-and-role-of-sco/">SCO matures</a>, other questions regarding its vision and capabilities also come in to play. The Dushanbe Declaration stated, it aspires:</p>
<p>“a more representative, democratic, just and multi-polar world order based on universally recognized principles of international law, cultural and civilizational diversity, mutually beneficial and equal cooperation of states under the central coordinating role of the UN.”</p>
<p>While the US has insisted that it will continue ‘over the horizon’ operations in Afghanistan as needed &#8211; the withdrawal from Afghanistan represents an attempt towards obtaining strategic clarity &#8211; and re-prioritizing its national interests. While US has been striving to Pivot towards Asia for a while, other global distractions have come in the way, and continue to pull US towards the War and Terror related hot-spots.</p>
<p>As the War Against Extremism was being waged, American sway in the Islamic world has been considerably reduced, and other than the Gulf Arab nations, its ties with Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan remain tense. It is interesting to note that Pakistan and India are already full members of SCO. Interestingly, <a href="https://politact.com/bidens-middle-east-policy-china-iran-ties-and-cpec/">Iran attained full membership</a>, while Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Egypt also achieved the observer status during the SCO 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary convention.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, US and NATO withdrawal increases pressures on SCO, and the member states, to maintain stability in Afghanistan. If it not managed well, it could escalate the <a href="https://politact.com/us-afghan-withdrawal-and-the-interplay-of-turkish-iranian-and-arab-influences/">regional tussles</a>.</p>
<p><strong>NATO, QUAD, and AUKUS </strong></p>
<p>While SCO contemplates with how it can safeguard its interest in other parts of the world where it carries significant stakes, like Afghanistan or the Pacific, a growing concern for the US is how much it can depend on NATO and other allies to counter threats emanating from global adversaries &#8211; such as China and Russia.</p>
<p>European nations have increasingly been seen dealing with both &#8211; building trade relations with China and Russia at the expense of US. Moreover, the European allies are increasingly acting as go-betweens &#8211; to mitigate ties with those nations with which US has less than amicable relations. For example:</p>
<ul>
<li>Under US pressure, UK banned Huawei from developing the 5G networks in 2020 due to security concerns, resulting in strong criticism from Chinese officials. Huawei had been operation in UK for at least 20 years and was an integral part of its 4G network.</li>
<li>In 2015, France backed away from selling two high tech Mistral warships to Russia, a deal worth $1.6 billion, reportedly due to Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. The deal was highly criticized by US since France is a NATO member and supplying of the ship would have augmented Russian military capabilities.</li>
<li>Then there is the controversial Nord Stream 2 Gas Pipeline that goes from Russia to Germany. Merkel government averted sanctions and reached a deal with the Biden Administration in July. The agreement involved investing more than 200 million euros in energy security in Ukraine and sustainable energy across Europe. US-Germany ties were strained considerably when Trump administration decided to pull out 9,500 US troops based in Germany.</li>
</ul>
<p>“Should Russia attempt to use energy as a weapon or commit further aggressive acts against Ukraine, Germany will take action at the national level and press for effective measures at the European level, including sanctions to limit Russian export capabilities to Europe in the energy sector,” a senior State Department official told a CNBC reporter in July.</p>
<ul>
<li>Other NATO member, Turkey, bought S-400 missile defense system from Russia in 2017. This resulted in Countering American Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAASTA) kicking in, claiming the deal would threaten NATO alliance and F-35 fighter jets in Turkish fleet. Enacted in 2017, CAASTA urged American allies and partners to not engage in transactions with Russia, Iran, and North Korea or risk sanctions. This has also prevented Pakistan from moving forward with Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project.</li>
<li>Another American ally, India, is also in the process of acquiring the S-400 air defense system at the cost of $5 billion. According to some reports, India will receive the system by the end of the year.</li>
<li>In December 2019, US gave a waiver to India to jointly develop the Chabahar Port with Iran, which is seen as a counter to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port &#8211; being erected with Chinese investment. It can serve as an alternative supply route for Afghanistan and to help the country diversify its export opportunities. While the US strategic partnership with India has been evolving, it has remained reluctant in talking stronger role against China or getting engaged in the security realm in Afghanistan. Not only that, it is also ironically a full member of SCO. And thus, serious questions continue to be raised about the efficacy of QUAD alliance.</li>
</ul>
<p>And this is where the trilateral alliance AUKUS, announced on September 15, comes into play. From the American perspective, one can observe what is the use of alliances or strategic partners that have significant divergent interests – as has been demonstrated from the behavior of European allies, that have to be cajoled to contribute more towards their defense spending &#8211; and cut down their dealings with adversarial powers. The quality of the alliance is more critical than the quantity of partners.</p>
<p><iframe loading="lazy" title="YouTube video player" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/jeQsfo-bvxw" width="450" height="315" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen"><span style="display: inline-block; width: 0px; overflow: hidden; line-height: 0;" data-mce-type="bookmark" class="mce_SELRES_start">﻿</span><span style="display: inline-block; width: 0px; overflow: hidden; line-height: 0;" data-mce-type="bookmark" class="mce_SELRES_start">﻿</span></iframe></p>
<p><strong>Managing the Rise of China </strong></p>
<p>For US the question has remained how best to counter China which since its admission to the World Trade Organization in 2001, has gotten fully intertwined in global trade. The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement signed in February 2016, and dumped by Trump in 2017, represented the economic approach to deal with China. The recently formulated AUKUS pact between Australia, UK, and US is a security-oriented alliance.</p>
<p>The best approach would involve more economic dimension – according to Fareed Zakaria&#8217;s Washington Post column, titled: To contain China, joining the Pacific trade pact might be more effective than new submarines. But there is another dimension to this debate that was last heard prominently during the Obama administration &#8211; and has to do with coexistence. Speaking at the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) event in July, the White House coordinator for Asia Pacific, Kurt Campbell, admitted that coexistence is still possible but expect a period of uncertainty and raised tensions.</p>
<p>Speaking at the <a href="https://politact.com/managing-the-rise-of-china-future-crisis-management/">inception ceremony of ASPI in 2014</a>, Henry Kissinger had stated while the Russian aggressiveness in Europe is clearly worrisome, it’s China that has the size and the economic wherewithal to challenge US. Moreover, this challenge does not appear to be a military one but perhaps more of an economic one. However, ever since, Chinese military capabilities are increasing by leaps and bounds.</p>
<p>Speaking at the same ASPI event in 2014, then Chinese Ambassador to the US, Cia Tiankai, had insisted they are not against the US presence in the Pacific; after all they have been there for a while. Furthermore, US businesses have large presence within China as well. What they (Chinese) are worried about is the US intent when it is building alliances in the region and conducting military exercises. When asked about what Kissinger’s advice would be for the Chinese and the US in the present circumstances (2014). He stated that he would tell China to not let the military issues overhang in their ties, while he will tell US not to get involved in military provocations, exercises in the region, or develop bases.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/status-of-global-alliances-us-afghan-withdrawal-evolution-of-sco-and-creation-of-aukus/">Status of Global Alliances: US Afghan Withdrawal, Evolution Of SCO, And Creation Of AUKUS</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>The War Against Extremism And The Return Of New Great Game</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/the-war-against-extremism-and-the-return-of-new-great-game/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Mar 2021 16:47:53 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Afghan Reconciliation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Americas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Campaign Against Extremism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global Power Tussles and Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global Realignment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO' Future Role]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pivot to Asia and South, Central Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South and Central Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vantage Point Analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Afghan Peace process]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AQ and Associates]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arab Spring]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Belt and Road Initiative]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Biden's China strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[BRI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[BRICS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chechnya]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China Russia ties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CPEC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Daesh]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dagestan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of NATO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Great Game]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indo Pacific Strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ISIS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Joe Biden's Pacific Strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[New Great Game]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Quad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SCO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US China Alasks talks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US India relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War against extremism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Xinjiang Muslims]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=9577</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="240" height="210" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Modi-and-Ghani.jpeg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" />Context PoliTact has consistently maintained that the longer the Afghan imbroglio continues it is bound to intersect with the other regional and global flashpoints &#8211; and the larger balance of power tussles. Not that it had not been in the past, but to a lesser degree. Since 9/11, and the subsequent war against extremism, the [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-war-against-extremism-and-the-return-of-new-great-game/">The War Against Extremism And The Return Of New Great Game</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="240" height="210" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Modi-and-Ghani.jpeg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" /><p><strong><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-9587 alignleft" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/US-China-Trade-Tesions.png" alt="" width="271" height="186" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/US-China-Trade-Tesions.png 271w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/US-China-Trade-Tesions-218x150.png 218w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/US-China-Trade-Tesions-100x70.png 100w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 271px) 100vw, 271px" />Context</strong></p>
<p>PoliTact has consistently maintained that the longer the Afghan imbroglio continues it is bound to intersect with the other regional and global flashpoints &#8211; and the larger balance of power tussles. Not that it had not been in the past, but to a lesser degree.<br />
Since 9/11, and the subsequent war against extremism, the global politics has been primarily shaped by cooperation in dealing with extremism. So much so that even legitimate struggles against oppression conveniently got linked with terrorism, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Kashmir.</p>
<p>As mentioned above, it would be wrong to assume that global power games, and the linked regional dimensions, had gone dormant as the campaign against extremism was being waged. It just had taken a different form. Consider the example of Arab Spring. As the uprising spread through the Arab world, it soon became apparent that the regime change that accompanied the popular revolts were risking the interests of Russia and China more.<br />
And thus, the Spring came to a stop in the case of Syria, where Russia intervened militarily to save Bashar al-Assad, and by default its naval facility in Tartus. Syrian example also illustrated that different groups of extremists were being backed by array of state players, and thus it become a full fledge proxy war.</p>
<p>In the case of Egypt, the then General Fatah el-Sisi ousted democratically elected Islamist Mohammed Morsi in 2013. Morsi had arrived at the helm after the removal of Hosni Mubarak, as a result of the Egyptian revolution in 2011.</p>
<p>Libya provided another case where a different configuration of regional and global players emerged in the aftermath of the removal of Muammar Qaddafi, attempting to restore a semblance of order. Russia got involved militarily in Libya through its version of Black Water type mercenaries.</p>
<p>In most cases, China has remained on the sidelines. Instead, it has focused on economic route and developing strategic deals with both the Shia and Sunni states. It spoke in favor of state sovereignty and against foreign interventions.</p>
<p>In the emerging environment, the extremists with global aspirations, such as Al Qaeda (AQ) and Deash (ISIS), remained in the pariah status. However, the same could not be claimed for groups that came to be known as the associates of AQ and Daesh. These factions often had regional ambitions, grievances, and causes, which were either beneficial or detrimental to the interests of the regional and global stakeholders. In essence, the new reality was reflective of the political and security dynamics that existed before 9/11. And as the Cold War like situation returns, these local grievances and ambitions are likely to play a pivotal role.</p>
<p><strong>The New Global Power Calculus</strong></p>
<p>The metamorphosis of the war against extremism also applies to the South Asia region. While US and NATO have been doing the heavy lifting when it comes to the situation of Afghanistan, China and Russia have played a reconciliatory role. In the post 9/11 environment, and even before, China and Russia were threatened by their own brand of Islamic extremists, in Xinjiang, and Dagestan and Chechnya region, respectively. And they have remained worried about their extremists getting hooked up with the global extremists or their associates. In essence, helping in the war against extremism also diminished the domestic threats for these powers.</p>
<p>However, as we enter an era where the global power tussles will define politics once more, the reconciliatory role in Afghanistan is likely to evaporate. This does not bode well for the peace process. At the same time, it does not reflect well for Russia and China either. The theater for the Great Game is likely to get extended where the Pacific, including the Ladakh region, are already active. In short, Afghanistan, could become a quid pro quo on a much larger canvas.</p>
<p><strong>Revitalizing NATO</strong></p>
<p>As history teaches us, one of the critical steps in fighting global rivalries is by solidifying alliances and weakening those of the adversaries. And linked with that is an assessment of the kinds of threats being confronted. The type of alliance needed to fight non-state extremists is markedly different than the one to counter state actors.</p>
<p>The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came into being in 1949 in the aftermath of World War II. The first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay, had famously stated the organization’s goal was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” With the end of the Cold War and the Warsaw Pact, one of the main premises upon which the NATO military alliance was formulated was gone. The alliance began to look for a new purpose and identity that would keep it united against the emerging threats. The war against terror has proven to be one such unifying factor, as has dealing with rogue dictators and nations that threaten western interests, such as Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qaddafi and recently Iran. However, these motives have proven to be short lived in the present multi-polar world. But the return of great power politics, and Cold War like dynamics, can reinvigorate the alliance.</p>
<p>After the neglect suffered during the Trump’s presidency, the Biden Administration is busy strengthening alliances. To assure allies, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken visited Japan, South Korea, and NATO headquarters in Brussels. On the other hand, Secretary of Defense Loyd Johnson was in India and Afghanistan.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, on March 12 a virtual meeting of the QUAD leaders was held between the leaders of US, India, Japan, and Australia. In the press briefing after the meeting, US affirmed the ‘centrality of the Indo-Pacific in the US national security’. And, this was accompanied by the US-China strategic talks held in Alaska, that set the tone for the ties under Biden.</p>
<p><strong>The Future of BRICS, SCO</strong></p>
<p>On the other hand, an organization representing the emerging powers of Brazil, Russia, China, and India (BRICS) started off in 2011 with much fanfare, promoting commercial, political, and cultural cooperation. Its primary motive was to give voice to the realities of the multipolar world. In 2013, BRICS agreed to create global institutions to rival those of Western controlled IMF and World Bank. However, the economic recession of 2008 and the fluctuating global market has impacted the BRICS disproportionately. While China and India have continued to grow, the economies of Russia and Brazil have had a tougher time. This has obviously impacted the wherewithal of the organization.</p>
<p>More recently, China has been successful in handling the coronavirus pandemic and has been the least impacted economically &#8211; as compared to the West. This could also be the reason why the tensions between US and China have escalated.</p>
<p>The Chinese dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was formed in 2001 mainly as a security forum. The member governments have common security concerns, with emphasis on tackling terrorism, religious extremism, and ethnic separatism. In 2017, the organizing reached a milestone when India and Pakistan joined the organization as full members. Other members include China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Afghanistan and Iran have an observer status while Turkey is a dialogue partner of SCO.</p>
<p>As the global focus shifts from the campaign against extremism and towards great power challenges, the nature of BRICS and SCO is likely to morph as well. No other issue is more consequential to the future of these organizations than the role of India. The nation is also aligned with the Indo-Pacific strategy and QUAD. It simply cannot be a member of the emerging power club while supporting the established powers at the same time. Sooner or later, India would have to choose.</p>
<p>A case can be made that the present border tensions between India and China are a direct result of Indian decision to revoke the special status of Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019. Under the garb of US-China rivalry it attempted to settle an internationally recognized dispute unilaterally.</p>
<p>The Great Game of the earlier times was about the dangers of Russian invasion on British India via Afghanistan, the emerging one appears to be about protecting American India against Chinese penetration. While US would want to weaken the Sino-Russian partnership, a successful strategy would likely work by placating one of them, not by alienating both at the same time.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-war-against-extremism-and-the-return-of-new-great-game/">The War Against Extremism And The Return Of New Great Game</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>Biden’s Middle East Policy, China-Iran Ties, and CPEC</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/bidens-middle-east-policy-china-iran-ties-and-cpec/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 28 Dec 2020 01:22:46 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[China and Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global Power Tussles and Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global Realignment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global Security Advisor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Arab Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Iran Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Turkey Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pivot to Asia and South, Central Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South and Central Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US and Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Abraham Accords]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Asia Pacific]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Belt and Road Initiative]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Biden's Iran Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Biden's Middle East Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Boeing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chabahar Port]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China Iran economic and security deal]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China Iran ties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China Pakistan Economic Corridor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CPEC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[East West Institute]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[First Island Chain]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of Middle East and North Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of South Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics of Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics of South Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gwadar Port]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indian Ocean]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indo Pacific Strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[JCPOA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Karachi Council on Foreign Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LAC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ladakh]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Line of Action]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East Institute]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East Peace Process]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Outside Approach to Middle East Peace Process]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Iran Gas Pipeline project]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Quad Strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Saudi Foreign Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shanghai International Port Group]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South China Sea]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=9435</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="696" height="392" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-1024x576.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-1024x576.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-300x169.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-768x432.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-696x392.jpg 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-1068x601.jpg 1068w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-747x420.jpg 747w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-600x338.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault.jpg 1280w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" />Guest Analyst Muhammad Siraj ul Huda Khan assisted in researching and developing this article. Context PoliTact periodically invites leading regional and global experts to understand the changing geopolitical situations and significant emerging themes. One such theme is the budding China-Iran economic and security partnership. China and Iran are entering a $400 billion 25 year economic [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/bidens-middle-east-policy-china-iran-ties-and-cpec/">Biden’s Middle East Policy, China-Iran Ties, and CPEC</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="696" height="392" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-1024x576.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-1024x576.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-300x169.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-768x432.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-696x392.jpg 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-1068x601.jpg 1068w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-747x420.jpg 747w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault-600x338.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/maxresdefault.jpg 1280w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" /><p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-9439 alignleft" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/First_Peace_Treaty_between_Israel_and_an_Arab_State-300x200.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="200" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/First_Peace_Treaty_between_Israel_and_an_Arab_State-300x200.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/First_Peace_Treaty_between_Israel_and_an_Arab_State-630x420.jpg 630w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/First_Peace_Treaty_between_Israel_and_an_Arab_State-600x400.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/First_Peace_Treaty_between_Israel_and_an_Arab_State.jpg 632w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" />Guest Analyst Muhammad Siraj ul Huda Khan assisted in researching and developing this article.</p>
<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>PoliTact periodically invites leading regional and global experts to understand the changing geopolitical situations and significant emerging themes. One such theme is the budding China-Iran economic and security partnership.</p>
<p>China and Iran are entering a $400 billion 25 year economic and security deal that would lead to enhanced military and trade relations. The agreement ensures Chinese investment in Iranian telecommunication, transportation, and military fields. The military cooperation includes exercises, intelligence sharing, and joint research and development of weapons. China will also procure its energy needs from Iran on discounted price for over next 25 years.</p>
<p>On July 28, 2020, PoliTact held a webinar to discuss the potential China-Iran economic deal and its impact on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The panelists analyzed the major developments taking place in the South Asia and Middle East regions and provided perspectives on the evolving situation. The theme has taken on added significance in the aftermath of US elections and with additional Muslim states, such as UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco officially recognizing the state of Israel.</p>
<p>CEO and Chief Analyst of PoliTact, Arif Ansar, moderated the panel discussion. The opening remarks were made by Ikram Sehgal, who is a Chairman of the Karachi Council on Foreign Relations, CEO of Pathfinder Group, and member of the East West Institute’s Board of Directors.</p>
<p>The panel included:</p>
<ul>
<li>Ambassador Mustafa Kamal Kazi – Senior Vice Chairman at the Karachi Council on Foreign Relations, former Foreign Secretary and Ambassador of Pakistan to the Russian Federation, the Kingdom of Netherlands, Republic of Indonesia and Republic of Iraq.</li>
<li>Khaled Almaeena – Former Editor-in-Chief of Arab News and Saudi Gazette, CEO of a PR Firm, and Saudi Television news anchor.</li>
<li>Claude Rakisits – Honorary Professor at the Asia Pacific College of Diplomacy at the Australian National University. He is also a Director at PoliTact and covers the South Asia and Middle East region.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>The Webinar explored the following key questions:</strong></p>
<ol>
<li>What are the implications of the China-Iran economic and security deal on the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)?</li>
<li>Assessing Chinese influence in the Middle East region and does the China-Iran deal represent a Chinese pivot to the Middle East? Moreover, how does Chinese sway play out against that of India, Israeli, and the US in the region?</li>
<li>How the does the China-Iran treaty correlates with the Quad and Indo-Pacific strategy?</li>
<li>Will China use the Iran deal as a leverage in its dealing with the US, just as Russia has done?</li>
<li>History informs that Muslim nations or empires have often sided with one or the other global power – and then fought directly with each other. What can be done to prevent such an outcome in the framework of the present regional and global geopolitics?</li>
</ol>
<p><iframe loading="lazy" width="375" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/4EkxkeAk6uU" title="YouTube video player" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen></iframe></p>
<p><strong>Implications of the potential China-Iran Deal on China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)</strong></p>
<p>There are multiple angles to review this connection; that of Pakistan and Iran, and one cannot ignore the positions of China and the US.</p>
<p>Pakistan sees no negative impact of the potential China-Iran deal on CPEC. Former foreign minister Sartaj Aziz once stated that the Chabahar Port was not competing with the Gwadar port, in fact they were seen as complimentary. Media reports have also indicated that a road was to connect the two closely located ports at some point.</p>
<p>On the other hand, Iran is likely to see the Chinese deal as a blessing in disguise. Fearing US sanctions, Pakistan has been dragging its feet on the Iran Gas pipeline project for years, and India has also been slow in developing the Chabahar Port. In all likelihood, once the deal is finalized, Chinese investments will start flowing in quickly and provide immense relief to the much-penalized Iran. More importantly, the China-Iran deal would provide the strategic counterbalance to the American, Israeli, and Arab pressure.</p>
<p>According to Ambassador Kazi, the US withdrawal from the Iranian deal of 2015, and mismanagement of the multipolar world, is one of the reasons China-Iran economic and security partnership is coming to fruition.</p>
<p>However, for China, the treaty with Iran diversifies the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) providing it with another tributary. This is especially true if the CPEC route runs into trouble, or if the work slows down considerably due to the American, Indian, and Arab pressure on Pakistan.</p>
<p><strong>Chinese Pivot to the Middle East and American, Israeli and Indian Coalition</strong></p>
<p>China has been building strategic ties with the Middle East for some time now – in addition to the Asia Pacific, Middle East represents its other flank. Khaled Almaeena pointed out that the Saudi ties with China got underway in the 90s, as the Gulf region started to balance ties between China and the US. On the other hand, Dr. Claude Rakisits noted that the Chinese push westward is not necessarily a pivot, irrespective, the Iran deal will be seen negatively in both Saudi Arabia and the US.</p>
<p>Speaking at the Saudi embassy in China in July on the occasion of the 30 anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties, Saudi Ambassador Turki M. A. Almadi commented: “our relations are all-round, multi-field, not only about bilateral trade and mutual investment, but also extended to cooperation in the fields of culture, science and technology, and health.”</p>
<p>Zhai Jun, China’s special envoy on Middle East affairs indicated at the occasion that the bilateral trade volume between the two nations stood at $78.04 billion at the end of 2019. He added Saudi Arabia was the largest supplier of crude oil to China, and also the Arab nations largest trading partner.</p>
<p>Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has become an active player in the Middle East with strategic ties with a number of regional players, to include Saudi Arabia. As its influence increases gradually, it could become an active interlocutor between Israel and the Palestinians, and other conflicts of the Middle East. However, it is not clear if China aspires to get involved in the security affairs of the region, like Russia has in Syria.</p>
<p>Chinese analysts present a case that the nation wants to be more active in providing economic support than engaging in security affairs of the Middle East. Nonetheless, China has amicable political and military relations with both Iran and Israel. As part of BRI, China has been extending its trade relations with Israel and lately US has objected strongly to some of them citing security concerns – such as the Chinese company Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) running a container terminal at the Port of Haifa – near an Israeli naval base that is frequently visited by the US Sixth Fleet.</p>
<p>If the China-Israeli economic ties continue to strengthen uninhibited, overtime China will be able to build leverages that can potentially undercut US primacy in the affairs of the Middle East. The Israelis disagree on this possibility, stating that the nature of its ties with China and the US are of totally different nature. Nonetheless, the push under President Trump to normalize ties between Israel and the Arab nations can be seen as an attempt to counter China becoming an influential Middle Eastern player in the future.</p>
<p>When it comes to the Indian alignment with Israel and its growing ties with the Gulf nations, a different question is raised. How do these relations undercut the traditional support Pakistan has generated from the Gulf region?  In November 2018, PoliTact collaborated with the <a href="http://www.mei.edu/">Middle East Institute</a> to examine the <a href="https://politact.com/examining-saudi-iran-tensions-and-its-impact-on-south-asia-china/">political, security, and economic interconnections between South Asia and the Gulf States</a>, and one of the subsets, Pakistan and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The report pointed out to how India was strategically undermining Pakistan, a risk that has matured now.</p>
<p><iframe loading="lazy" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Wq7cWEsaqcs" width="350" height="250" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen"><span style="display: inline-block; width: 0px; overflow: hidden; line-height: 0;" data-mce-type="bookmark" class="mce_SELRES_start">﻿</span></iframe></p>
<p>Commenting on this during the webinar, Khaled Almaaena stated that Pakistan’s position has been undermined by the negative economic and security news consistently emanating from the country. And this has been occurring at a time when India has positioned itself as an information technology and economic powerhouse, and by investing in Saudi Arabia that brought jobs to the Kingdom. He further added, the younger leadership of KSA do not hold the same kind of affinity towards Pakistan as past leaders had.</p>
<p>Irrespective, we can see an attempt to undermine both the Chinese and <a href="https://politact.com/examining-saudi-iran-tensions-and-its-impact-on-south-asia-china/">Pakistan connections in the Middle east</a> as they compete with the American, Israeli and Indian interests.</p>
<p><strong>China-Iran Deal and Quad Strategy</strong></p>
<p>Answering the moderator, and as noted above, Dr. Claude Rakisits noted that the Chinese push westward does not represent its pivot to the Middle East &#8211; and how this relates to the Quad strategy is a different angle.</p>
<p>Dr. Claude added that Quad is meant to “keep China within its borders”. And as a counter, China is pushing US away from the first island chain by building artificial islands in the South China Sea. Moreover, China-Iran deal counteracts Quad and the Indo-Pacific strategy by providing China with a key footprint in the Indian Ocean, which together with Gwadar and Djibouti, enhances Chinese naval potential.</p>
<p>While Quad would desire to box-in China, conversely China wants to limit the Indian role in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, by keeping it busy within its borders. This dynamics can be witnessed by the present tensions and <a href="https://politact.com/china-india-border-skirmishes-brics-versus-quad/">skirmishes on the Line of Actual control (LAC) and the Ladakh region</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Biden’s Middle East Policy, Iranian Sanctions, and Chinese Leverage</strong></p>
<p>A related inquiry has to do with sanctions on Iran and how will China navigate them? Previous European attempts to build trade relations with the nation hit numerous roadblocks. As soon as Trump administration took oath in January 2017, within almost a year and a half of signing the Iran nuclear deal (July 2015), US started to build pressure on western companies attempting to build trade relations with Iran. As a result, even the $20 billion aircraft deal Boeing had signed with Iran had to be scrapped.</p>
<p>Under President Elect Biden’s Iran Policy, will these sanctions be eased if US rejoins the treaty? This will all depend on how the Biden administration re-engages Iran. Recently Biden has indicated that it will want to renegotiate the Iran deal to include its missile program, and wider behavior in the region; these were widely seen as major weaknesses of the 2015 deal.</p>
<p>This, however, will likely be a non-starter for Iran. The country has expressed it would not enter fresh negotiations with the US when even the terms and guarantees of the 2015 agreement were not kept.</p>
<p>A parallel concern is, with the ‘Outside In’ approach to the Middle East Peace Process so far along resulting in the Abraham Accords, will President Elect Biden be able to reverse it and thus jeopardize the present Arab-Israeli normalizing process? A more likely approach would be that the normalization process would have to incorporate the two-state solution under Biden – including a more transparent give and take by the Israelis – of the type that is frequently hinted by the Saudi leadership.</p>
<p><iframe loading="lazy" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/KJzuPWM960g" width="350" height="250" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen"></iframe></p>
<p>Irrespective, Dr. Claude was of the opinion that China will continue its dealings with Iran, despite the sanctions, and will push back on any efforts to restrict the ties between Iran and China. It is also possible that China will use the Iran deal as a leverage in its dealing with the US, just as Russia has done in the past. On several occasions when Russian ties stumbled with the West, it threatened to supply Iran with modern weaponry that could help it withstand any attack on its nuclear program.</p>
<p>The US Iran policy has circled around two approaches recently: the negotiated settlement was adopted by President Obama by signing the JCPOA in 2015, which sidelined the aggressive route against Iran propagated by Israel and Saudi Arabia. Trump took on the more militaristic alternative – moving away from the two-state solution, with wider recognition of Israel from the GCC and Arab States. The assassination of two top Iranian officials recently, Major General Qassim Soleimani and nuclear scientist Mohsin Fakhrizadeh, are linked to this approach.</p>
<p>The challenge is that a military solution towards Iran would be unacceptable for both China and Russia. Similarly, the reenactment of the JCPOA, along with potential China-Iran deal, will make China a stronger player in the Middle East. It could possibly utilize its clout to bring about Israeli-Palestinian agreement, which US has not been able to do alone.</p>
<p>On the one hand this cooperation between China and the US would be an immensely positive development that can bring about peace in the Middle East. However, this directly contradicts with what is transpiring in the Asia Pacific and resulting Indo-Pacific and the Quad strategy. And this also does not factor in Russian role in the whole scenario – and the <a href="https://politact.com/whats-next-in-the-growing-saudi-uae-power-tussles-with-turkey-iran/">interplay of the Muslim Middle powers</a>, such as Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.</p>
<p><strong>Islamic World and Global Power Tussles</strong></p>
<p>In the past Muslim nations or empires have often <a href="https://politact.com/understanding-jinnahs-position-on-world-war-i-and-ii-lessons-to-be-learned/">sided with one or the other global power</a> – and then fought directly with each other. And the question becomes what can be done to avert such an outcome in the framework of the present regional and global geopolitics.</p>
<p>Replying to the moderator, Khaled Almaeena pointed out that the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) is unable to fulfill this role. He added this requires strong Islamic leadership to prevent being exploited, commitment to their citizens, and rule of law. Moreover, he stated that ‘if Iran suffers, the Arabs will suffer too’. In his opinion CPEC can play a constructive role by being a bridge, ‘good economics makes good politics,’ he stated.</p>
<p>On the other hand, Ambassador Kazi was critical of the role the GCC nations have played in this regard and pointed to the infighting between the Arab nations. He noted that ‘what happens in the Arab world, impacts the Islamic world’.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Ikram Sehgal added the role of Turkey is important, and one should not forget the Regional Cooperation for Development Organization (RCD) formed between Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey in 1964, and replaced by Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in 1979. He emphasized that Russia and China have good ties with Pakistan, Turkey and Iran, and that ‘constructive engagement can be a harbinger of peace’.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>While Saudi Arabia has delayed recognizing the statehood of Israel, and while Qatar remains closer to Turkey, the shifting alliance of most GCC and Arab nations towards Israel and the US, represents a decisive shift in the balance of power. Adopting the threat perception that centers on Iran, and without any clear give and take from Israel in the context of Abraham Accords, is likely to revitalize the message of non-state actors.</p>
<p>While China has made an economic entry in the Middle East, it has not decided to influence the security affairs – other than under the umbrella of UN and for maritime security purposes. In Syria too, it has adopted a non-interventionist approach and has supported the Assad regime.</p>
<p>However, economic leverages will eventually lead to influences in other areas. And China would have to utilize its sway &#8211; especially when it has the most to lose if a conflict breaks out in the region. One measure of if matters are heading in that direction would be the establishment of military bases, like the one in Djibouti, and potential militarization of Gawadar and Chabahar port. And in this context, the China-Iran economic and security deal takes on an added emphasis.</p>
<p>In the long run, US would want to create a wedge between China and Russia. Since attaining self-sufficiency in its energy needs, the US interests in Middle East is primarily to prevent nuclear weapons from falling in the hands of rogue states, or non-state actors, and this this a goal it shares with Israel. At the same time, US would not want to lose its primacy in the Middle East, but to exploit the existing fault lines to further extend its reach &#8211; to the detriment of China and Russia.</p>
<p>At the same time, under President Elect Biden, there is an opportunity to move away from the zero-sum approach to world affairs &#8211; by reaching out to China for a wider détente and cooperation – and the geopolitics resulting from the Coronavirus related pandemic especially necessitates this. Reaching that stage, however, would require first a smooth transition of power in the US.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/bidens-middle-east-policy-china-iran-ties-and-cpec/">Biden’s Middle East Policy, China-Iran Ties, and CPEC</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>Evolving QUAD And Australian Participation In The Malabar Exercise 2020</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/evolving-quad-and-australian-participation-in-the-malabar-exercise-2020/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 24 Oct 2020 16:30:15 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Asia Pacific]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pivot to Asia and South, Central Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US-China Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vantage Point Analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American elections and QUAD]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Australia and Quad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China and QUAD]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China Australia ties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China India tensions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of QUAD]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics of Asia Pacific]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Implications of Malabar exercise]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India Australia ties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indo Pacific]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indonesia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[its 9-dash claim]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Japan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LAC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ladakh]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Line of Actual Control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Malabar exercise 2020]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Quad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Quad Comprehensive Strategic Partnership]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Quadrilateral Security Dialogue]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South China Sea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.politact.com/?p=9327</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="683" height="1024" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Australian-Navy.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" />Dr Claude Rakisits Context India has formally invited Australia to join the large-scale naval exercises to be conducted in the Bay of Bengal (3-6 November) and the Arabian Sea (17-20 November), involving in addition to the navies of India and Australia naval assets of the US and Japan. This is a very significant development—if not [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/evolving-quad-and-australian-participation-in-the-malabar-exercise-2020/">Evolving QUAD And Australian Participation In The Malabar Exercise 2020</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="683" height="1024" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Australian-Navy.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" /><figure id="attachment_9331" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-9331" style="width: 1024px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-9331" src="https://www.politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/US-India-Navy.jpg" alt="" width="1024" height="682" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-9331" class="wp-caption-text">SASEBO, Japan (June 10, 2016)  Rear Adm. Brian Hurley, center, deputy commander, U.S. 7th Fleet, tours the Indian navy Kora-class corvette INS Kirch (P62) during Malabar 2016.  (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Ryan J. Batchelder/Released)160610-N-EH218-322</figcaption></figure>
<p>Dr Claude Rakisits</p>
<h6><strong>Context</strong></h6>
<p>India has formally invited Australia to join the large-scale naval exercises to be conducted in the Bay of Bengal (3-6 November) and the Arabian Sea (17-20 November), involving in addition to the navies of India and Australia naval assets of the US and Japan.</p>
<p>This is a very significant development—if not militarily, certainly symbolically—for the future of peace and security in the Indo-Pacific. This will be the first time that the navies of the four countries will be participating together in naval exercises.</p>
<p>Australia, India, Japan and the US are members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, better known as the Quad—a grouping of four Indo-Pacific democracies founded in 2007 whose main mission is to ensure a Free and Open Indo-Pacific primarily through the maintenance of the rules-based international order.</p>
<h6><strong>The Timing of India’s Invitation to Australia</strong></h6>
<p>India’s decision to invite Australia to join Exercise Malabar 2020 comes in the wake of three important geopolitical developments.</p>
<p>First, an in-person meeting of the four foreign ministers of the Quad in Tokyo earlier this month—a significant symbolic event given the tight Covid-19 travel restrictions. At this meeting the ministers reinforced their countries’ determination to cooperate in a range of areas, including critically but not solely, in the maritime security domain. Except for US Secretary of State Pompeo, no one mentioned China specifically. But the 800-pound gorilla was very much at the meeting.</p>
<p>Second, India and Australia agreed on the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership on 4 June 2020, an agreement which progresses cooperation in a significant number of fields, including in the military and security spheres.</p>
<p>Third, in April-May this year <a href="https://www.politact.com/china-india-border-skirmishes-brics-versus-quad/">India and China were involved in deadly clashes</a> along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh. Whilst tension has diminished since then, with the holding of several meetings of the corps commanders on both sides and a meeting of the Foreign Ministers last month, this on-going issue with Beijing has been a wake-up call for the Indian defense forces and Prime Minister Narendra Modi—his informal approach to dealing with Chinese President Xi now in tatters.</p>
<p><iframe loading="lazy" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/4EkxkeAk6uU" width="450" height="315" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen"><span style="display: inline-block; width: 0px; overflow: hidden; line-height: 0;" data-mce-type="bookmark" class="mce_SELRES_start">﻿</span></iframe></p>
<h6><strong>Can China Hurt Australia For Participating in Exercise Malabar 2020?</strong></h6>
<p>Canberra has very much welcomed India’s invitation to the Malabar exercise. Australia’s defense minister, Senator Linda Reynolds, stated &#8220;High-end military exercises like Malabar are key to enhancing Australia&#8217;s maritime capabilities, building interoperability with our close partners, and demonstrating our collective resolve to support an open and prosperous Indo-Pacific&#8221;.</p>
<p>Australia last participated in Exercise Malabar in 2007. The then Australian prime minister, mandarin-speaking Kevin Rudd, decided to pull out of the following year’s exercise to avoid offending China. However, this did not prevent a significant deterioration in the bilateral relations down the road.</p>
<p><iframe loading="lazy" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/jeQsfo-bvxw" width="450" height="315" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen"><span style="display: inline-block; width: 0px; overflow: hidden; line-height: 0;" data-mce-type="bookmark" class="mce_SELRES_start">﻿</span></iframe></p>
<p>Bilateral relations were already at an all-time low. In response to Australia’s call for an independent investigation into the origin of the Coronavirus and China’s handling of it, China slapped huge tariffs on Australian barley in May. New tariffs have also been imposed on Australian beef. And wine exports could be next.</p>
<p>Last month China expelled the last two Australian journalists from the country. It’s been almost 50 years since there hasn’t been Australian media in China. Given that China is Australia’s largest export market, taking 30 per cent of all exports, Beijing could start to really hurt Australia’s economy if it wished to do so.</p>
<h6><strong>The Quad is Getting Ready to Resist China</strong></h6>
<p>More broadly, China will not be too worried about the military aspects of the Malabar exercise, however, it will note the significant diplomatic push-back it represents to its aggressive military activities in the region, notably its effective unilateral changing of the LAC in Ladakh, its 9-dash claim over most of the South China Sea and the accompanying massive build-up of military-purposed artificial islands, and its ongoing low-level military harassment of Taiwan.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Put differently, while until relatively recently China was willing to play by the rules of the Western-led international order, this has changed progressively since President Xi took over as the head of the Communist Party of China in 2012. Accordingly, the battle lines are starting to get clearer and the Quad is firming up its resolve to stand up to China.</p>
<p>While not being an alliance per se, the Quad could nevertheless become the key security vehicle for the Indo-Pacific. However, the strengthening of the Quad will really depend on the members’ resolve to stand united in the face of the inevitable Chinese response—military, diplomatic and economic—to what Beijing will perceive as a ganging up on the Middle Kingdom.</p>
<h6><strong>Biden Presidency Might Act Tough on China—Good News for the Quad</strong></h6>
<p>Needless to say, future unacceptable Chinese military activity will not attract equal interest or response from the different Quad members. And Beijing knows this only too well and will accordingly exploit these differences for all its worth.</p>
<p>So what is the future of the Quad? As noted above, much will really depend on the cohesiveness of the grouping and how it responds to future Chinese behavior. A likely Biden administration in Washington would probably be tough on China. This would be good news for the Quad. The display of American political will to fly the flag would reassure the other members of the Quad and make it more worthwhile for others, such as Canada, France, Indonesia, New Zealand and the UK to name some obvious credible candidates, to join the grouping. As Joe Stalin once said, “Quantity has a quality all its own”, a statement President Xi would surely relate to.</p>
<p><em>This piece originally appeared in The Quint.</em></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/evolving-quad-and-australian-participation-in-the-malabar-exercise-2020/">Evolving QUAD And Australian Participation In The Malabar Exercise 2020</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>China-India Border Skirmishes; BRICS Versus Quad</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/china-india-border-skirmishes-brics-versus-quad/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Jun 2020 03:56:09 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Asia Pacific]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emerging, Established Power Ties]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.politact.com/?p=9301</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="300" height="168" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ModiXi.jpeg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" />What Is Pushing India to Extreme Policies? Context In the COVID-19 environment, the Asia Pacific is increasingly an active theater. A number of inquiries are being contemplated on the role and policy of China as the world grapples on how to deal with the pandemic. Then there is the angle of how China was able [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/china-india-border-skirmishes-brics-versus-quad/">China-India Border Skirmishes; BRICS Versus Quad</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="300" height="168" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ModiXi.jpeg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" /><p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-9273" src="https://www.politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/putinmodijinping-300x169.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="169" /></p>
<figure id="attachment_9276" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-9276" style="width: 300px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-9276" src="https://www.politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Xi-and-Modi-300x184.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="184" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Xi-and-Modi-300x184.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Xi-and-Modi-356x220.jpg 356w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Xi-and-Modi-600x368.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Xi-and-Modi.jpg 640w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-9276" class="wp-caption-text">GOA, INDIA OCTOBER 16, 2016: Russia&#8217;s President Vladimir Putin, India&#8217;s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and China&#8217;s President Xi Jinping (L-R) at a meeting of the BRICS leaders with BRICS Business Council members. Mikhail Metzel/TASS (Photo by Mikhail MetzelTASS via Getty Images)</figcaption></figure>
<p>What Is Pushing India to Extreme Policies?<br />
<strong>Context</strong><br />
In the COVID-19 environment, the Asia Pacific is increasingly an active theater. A number of inquiries are being contemplated on the role and policy of China as the world grapples on how to deal with the pandemic. Then there is the angle of how China was able to tackle the virus quickly while others are faltering? And thus perhaps indicating Beijing is the net beneficiary so far &#8211; as others are being economically weakened.<br />
The focus had shifted to the Pacific long before the arrival of Coronavirus. With a pre COVID-19 annual growth rate of more than 6%, China has been on the trajectory to challenge the US for a while now. And that is the reason substantial intellectual capital has been committed to devise approaches to counter its rise. These discussions have revolved around coexistence to competition, and containment.<br />
During the Obama administration the emphasis was on economic collaboration with allies through trade deals like TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) and emphasis on the military Pivot to Asia. Under the American First doctrine, Trump quickly annulled TPP and increased economic pressure on China. On the other hand, <a href="https://www.politact.com/the-impact-of-trumps-victory-on-us-australia-alliance-pivot-to-asia/">Pivot to Asia</a> has morphed into the Indo-Pacific strategy.<br />
And then there is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that China has launched to reconfigure the world based on its vision – and is perceived as highly threatening by the West. The scientific and technological advancement is another dimension of the risk, such as the next generation 5G technologies. US is vehement in impressing upon its allies to avoid these Chinese technologies as that would create vulnerabilities for the western economic and security alliances.<br />
<strong>Weakened America</strong><br />
The increasing tension in the Asia Pacific is a reflection of the COVID-19 related defense and security reassessments that different players are conducting. The perception that China was able to deal with the Coronavirus early on &#8211; has reinforced the impression that it has emerged a little unblemished under the changing geopolitical and geostrategic context. On the other hand, the inept handling of the pandemic, followed by <a href="https://www.politact.com/coronavirus-race-relations-and-upcoming-elections-in-the-us/">inter-racial riots</a>, has created an image that US is imploding and losing its global preeminence. And thus the American allies are recalibrating on how to position and place their bets, while other powers consider what a weakened and inward-focused America would mean for the world.<br />
<strong>China-India Border Tensions</strong><br />
If it is assessed that US has indeed been weakened by the Coronavirus, it represents an opportunity for other players to exert and test new scenarios. And this may be what has transpired on the China, India border as it relates to the broader disputed region of Kashmir. However, it was India that triggered the recent action-reaction cycle.<br />
In August 2019, India had revoked the special status of Jammu and Kashmir, granted under article 370 and 35A of the constitution, and divided it into union territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh. Following the move, India sent additional troops and placed Jammu and Kashmir in a complete lockdown, cut-off telecommunications and Internet, and jailed political leaders. India removed the ‘permanent status’ clause demonstrating it wanted to change the facts on the ground to bring about the desired outcome.<br />
Since revoking the special status of Kashmir, Indian officials repeatedly made claims regarding the Pakistan administered Kashmir, suggesting it was ready to tackle it head on. The neighbors of India wearily looked on these aggressive Indian actions, especially China. To them the message was clear; under the garb of Quad and its strategic alliance with the US, India was trying to change the status of these border disputes in violation of previous treaties and historical understandings.<br />
<strong>Why is India Provoking its Neighbors?</strong><br />
The question becomes why is India acting rashly? The nation has recently suffered a series of humiliating setbacks to economically and militarily punish Pakistan for its role in Kashmir.<br />
In February 2019, India claimed to have carried out a preemptive attack inside Pakistan while destroying the terrorist training camp located there. This was after it blamed Pakistan for the <a href="https://www.politact.com/pulwana-attack-and-the-indian-strategic-calculus-against-pakistan-from-cold-start-to-surgical-strikes/">Pulwama attack</a>. International media widely discrediting the Indian claims that any such camp was hit in Balakot. Subsequently, Modi government continued the jingoism even in the face of a dogfight with Pakistani jets that resulted in two of Indian fighter planes crashing &#8211; and a pilot being captured.<br />
Before this escalation, in 2016 India asserted to have carried out surgical strikes, a term usually reserved for the US in its campaign against extremism, on Pakistan’s side of the Kashmir. These claims were mostly unverifiable. India attempts to link instability on its side of Kashmir with Pakistan supported terrorism, while Pakistan claims it to be a locally supported insurgency against Indian brutality – and recognized by UN as the unsettled business of the 1947 partition.<br />
New Delhi has also been unable to globally isolate and economically marginalize Pakistan, though it made inroads to put distance between Pakistan and its traditional support emanating from the <a href="https://www.politact.com/core-versus-peripheral-islamic-world-and-covid-19-pandemic/">Gulf States</a>. However, Pakistan was mostly able to counter that via China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a major tributary of the BRI. Moreover, despite considerable efforts India was unsuccessful in diminishing the centrality of Pakistan in the Afghan peace process.<br />
All of this is pushing India towards riskier steps and behavior– example being the disastrous step of revoking the special status of Jammu and Kashmir- that possibly led to the deadly June 15<sup>th</sup> skirmishes in Galwan Valley with China.<br />
<strong>Indian Strategic Narrative and China</strong><br />
As the events unfold, Indian strategic narrative is revealing. It portrays the border skirmishes with China as a consequence of its brazen regional and global policy, which includes Hong Kong and Taiwan. India attempts to link the cause of the clashes with China with the raison d’être for the Indo-Pacific strategy and Quad alliance, which includes US, Japan, and Australia. While this may benefit the full stake membership of India to the Quad, it will make Indian economic outlook less diversified – while firmly pegging its dependence.<br />
For China it is hard to understand why India would continue to undermine its interests while they have considerable convergences. India and China have significant economic stakes with bilateral trade expected to cross $100 billion in 2020. More importantly, they both are members of the club of emerging nations known as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). India, like Pakistan, is also now a full member of the China and Russia dominated SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization).<br />
Despite the convergences, India rattled China by toying with the idea of supporting Taiwan for an observer status in the World Health Organization (WHO) in May. New Delhi has also been contemplating linking Chinese support for Kashmir in the Security Council &#8211; to lending more support for Taiwan and challenging the ‘One-China’ policy. Moreover, India has backed calls for WHO to investigate Chinese role in the spread of Coronavirus.<br />
And thus, just like in the US Coronavirus related vilifying of China has impacted the Wall Street and started a larger debate about reorienting the supply chains – India may be heading in the same direction &#8211; leading to internal polarization regarding its future outlook.<br />
In changing the status of Ladakh, India miscalculated and seriously provoked Beijing. While India has played macho on border disputes with smaller neighbors like Pakistan and Nepal, China is a different ball game altogether. The Israeli style annexations only work when there is no big party with direct involvement in the conflict. Through its unilateral action on August 2019, India has linked LOC with LAC like never before, and for this it has no one else to blame.<br />
In the aftermath of the present border skirmishes, India may question the efficacy of the Quad alliance and the significance of Russia is likely to be escalated, which Putin will surely leverage against the US. According to the media reports, President Trump is likely to invite Russia, including India, Australia, and South Korea, to the expanded G7 meeting in September. Trump has proposed extending the grouping to G10 or G11 &#8211; for dealing with China. President Trump revealed his intentions to invite Russia after Angela Merkel had declined to attend the G7 meeting mentioning Coronavirus concerns. Canada and UK have also resisted the inclusion of Russia. It’s also questionable if Russia would want to play any role to counter China &#8211; when it’s one of its closest strategic ally.<br />
Also read:<br />
<a href="https://www.politact.com/examining-saudi-iran-tensions-and-its-impact-on-south-asia-china/">Examining Saudi-Iran Tensions And Its Impact On South Asia, China</a><br />
Watch video: PoliTact&#8217;s Collaboraion with the Middle East Instutute &#8211; Pakistan&#8217;s Deepening Involvement in the Gulf</p>
<p><iframe loading="lazy" width="696" height="392" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Wq7cWEsaqcs?feature=oembed" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen></iframe></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/china-india-border-skirmishes-brics-versus-quad/">China-India Border Skirmishes; BRICS Versus Quad</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>North Korean Crisis, US-Pakistan Tensions, and Afghanistan</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/north-korean-crisis-us-pakistan-tensions-afghanistan/</link>
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		<pubDate>Sun, 20 Aug 2017 23:15:01 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Afghan Reconciliation]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.politact.com/?p=8401</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="300" height="168" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Trump-and-Xi.jpeg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" />By Arif Ansar Context The North Korean crisis has emerged as another serious foreign policy challenge for the Trump administration. And this is happening at a time when his presidency is confronted with a number of difficult issues at the domestic and international front. Normally the American president has considerable discretion when it comes to [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/north-korean-crisis-us-pakistan-tensions-afghanistan/">North Korean Crisis, US-Pakistan Tensions, and Afghanistan</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="300" height="168" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Trump-and-Xi.jpeg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" /><p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-8403 alignleft" src="https://www.politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Trump-and-Xi.jpeg" alt="trump-and-xi" width="300" height="168" />By Arif Ansar</p>
<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>The North Korean crisis has emerged as another serious foreign policy challenge for the Trump administration. And this is happening at a time when his presidency is confronted with a number of difficult issues at the domestic and international front. Normally the American president has considerable discretion when it comes to the foreign affairs front, and they often leverage it when they find themselves on the back foot domestically &#8211; to reassert authority.</p>
<p>In this context, President Trump has had to face repeated setbacks in his efforts to repeal the Obamacare health care system, and this happened despite Republicans controlling the House and the Senate. His presidency also continues to be bedeviled by the investigation related the Russian interference in the American election, and the contacts between a number of his close associates with people close to Putin. The appointment of Robert Mueller as a special counsel to oversee the probe looks further ominous.</p>
<p>Reset with Russia was one of the pivots around which Trump’s policy was anchored. However, Trump has been unable to make progress towards this goal. Soon after the July meetings with Putin during the G20 Summit held in Hamburg, Germany, Congress imposed more sanctions against Russia. Putin reciprocated by evicting close to 750 American diplomats from Russia.</p>
<p>On the other hand, review of the Afghan policy is also ongoing but much delayed and there is considerable anxiety in the policy-making circles about this. This has led Senator McCain to announce his own Afghan strategy. The Trump administration also appears to be moving towards nullifying the Iran nuclear deal.</p>
<p>And as if this was not enough, the North Korean crisis has taken a turn for the worst and is impacting US-China affairs. Increasingly, China is being asked to use its influence, if it has any, to control the belligerence of North Korea. Meanwhile, the country has continued its ballistic missile tests. After imposition of additional sanctions against it, North Korea raised the stakes by threatening to launch missiles towards the American territory of Guam.</p>
<p><strong>China, North Korea, and Russia</strong></p>
<p>As these matters unfold, a thinking is developing in the US that if China cannot stop North Korea, then it should suffer the consequences of any military escalation. Meanwhile, as Trump delivered his dramatic ‘fire and fury’ comments, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford travelled to China to convey that military solution will only be implemented if political and economic routes to prevent the North Korean regime from developing nuclear tipped ballistic missiles have been exhausted. The crisis seems to have deescalated for now and Kim Jong Un also appears to have put his plans to fire missiles towards Guam on hold.</p>
<p>The collapse of North Korean regime poses a serious challenge for China. It would cause floods of refugees to cross over to China. Moreover, the fall of an ally in the Pacific would be the last thing China would want to see. At the same time, there is the question of what purpose does North Korea serve for China. Could it be that through Kim Jong Un’s rash behavior China is testing the response and will of the US, realizing that the Americans have been military involved for more than a decade in Afghanistan and the Middle East.</p>
<p>The element of ‘testing the US response’ could also have played a role when Russia acted more assertively in Syria and in Europe, especially relating to the affairs of Ukraine and taking over of Crimea. On the other hand, China has up to this point escaped any direct external military involvement, but this may change in the future.</p>
<p>China remains anxious regarding the emerging US policies in the Pacific region, particularly towards Taiwan and the disputed islands of South China Sea. Additionally, China probably draws a parallel to the situation in the Middle East &#8211; and whether a regime changes-type formula might be applied to the rash regime of North Korea. Not surprisingly, China has protested the deployment of the THAAD (anti-missile system) in South Korea. The country has also recently increased its involvement in Afghanistan, which represents the other flank for China.</p>
<p>In addition to skirmishes along the Pakistan, India Line of Control, tensions are also building between China and India over their shared border. The armed forces of both nations are face to face since June in the plateau area known as Donglang and Dokhlam. Quoting Indian sources, Reuters recently reported that Chinese forces tried to enter the Indian territory of Ladakh, Jammu and Kashmir State.</p>
<p>China has also built its first military base in Djibouti, located in the strategic Horn of Africa. While the projected focus of this base is primarily geared towards anti-piracy and humanitarian crises related missions, its strategic location will help China monitor its interests in Africa and the Middle East.</p>
<p>When it comes to South Asia, the success of China’s “One Belt One Road” economic initiative, and one of its tributaries is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project, is heavily dependent on the security situation of Pakistan and Afghanistan. And the associated Gwadar Port provides China an alternative sea access in case the Strait of Malacca was blocked, and there are rumors regarding militarization of this port at some point in the future.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>In this perspective, North Korea helps China, and Russia, balance the affairs of the Pacific, and to counter assertive actions being taken by an alliance represented by India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and the US. In the South Asia region, this balancing role is more and more being played by Pakistan, in particular reference to the affairs of Afghanistan and India. The future of Afghanistan will determine the balance of power in South and Central Asia, and in this regard there are three possibilities:</p>
<p>The first one being, the major powers agree to the right mix of representation in the future Afghan government. The second possibility being that one or the other side wins comprehensively &#8211; and then decides the shape of future government in its favor. The third likelihood is reflected by the present stalemate in which no one clearly wins, but the situation continues to drain the powers directly involved.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/north-korean-crisis-us-pakistan-tensions-afghanistan/">North Korean Crisis, US-Pakistan Tensions, and Afghanistan</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Third American-Afghan War And Transformation Of Perception On Afghan Taliban</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/third-american-afghan-war-transformation-perception-afghan-taliban/</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 08 Aug 2017 02:21:44 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Afghan Reconciliation]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.politact.com/?p=8390</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="286" height="176" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Xi-And-Putin.jpeg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Xi Jinping And Vladimir Putin" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" />By Arif Ansar and Dr Claude Rakisits Context For all intents and purposes US is entering the third stage of its military engagement in Afghanistan. The first one w­­as right after 9/11 when George W. Bush launched an attack against the perpetrators and their supporters, Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban respectively. The second phase was [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/third-american-afghan-war-transformation-perception-afghan-taliban/">The Third American-Afghan War And Transformation Of Perception On Afghan Taliban</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="286" height="176" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Xi-And-Putin.jpeg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Xi Jinping And Vladimir Putin" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" /><p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-8392 alignleft" src="https://www.politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Xi-And-Putin.jpeg" alt="xi-and-putin" width="286" height="176" />By Arif Ansar and Dr Claude Rakisits</p>
<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>For all intents and purposes US is entering the third stage of its military engagement in Afghanistan. The first one w­­as right after 9/11 when George W. Bush launched an attack against the perpetrators and their supporters, Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban respectively. The second phase was represented by the tenure of Barrack Obama, while the third stage is reflected by the arrival of Donald Trump to the helm.</p>
<p>As President Trump’s review of the Afghan strategy nears completion, the suspense continues on what may be the way forward. As has happened in the past in regards to many other recent deliberations, including related to Iraq, the political pundits are narrowing the debate to a few simple options. And because of this, the alternatives appear to be limited. It is very similar to when President Obama ordered his review of the Afghan strategy &#8211; and the generals presented him with few options. He had to go around, to diversify the choices on the table.</p>
<p>Leaders often have to be creative to broaden the alternatives available, to not get boxed in, and to augment sophistication and flexibility in their decision-making. Moreover, policy has to stay attuned to the changing circumstances otherwise it risks becoming irrelevant, this is especially true if the conflict is spread over a protracted period of time</p>
<p><strong>Options</strong></p>
<p>The present options seem to include:</p>
<ul>
<li>The troop levels in Afghanistan, and more importantly, their mission. Linked with this question is preparedness of Afghan Security Forces (ASF), and the weapons they need to take on the challenge head on. For example, the lack of air support has emerged as one of the key limitation for ASF.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>The role of Pakistan to bring about reconciliation in Afghanistan, and at the same time exerting military pressure against Afghan Taliban. Associated with this challenge is whether to utilize carrot or sticks towards the country &#8211; where allegedly the safe havens for the dreaded Haqqani Network still persist.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Should Afghan policy be linked to Pakistan and India dynamics? As happened early on during the Obama presidency, there was an attempt to make this association, but under pressure from the Indian lobby the strategy was left with the acronym of Af-Pak. This does not imply that that the policy was oblivious to this dynamics, especially in the aftermath of 2008 Mumbai Attack, but it was relegated to behind the scenes dealing.</li>
</ul>
<p>Absent from public debate is the realization of how complex the geopolitical and geo-economic reality has become. The global campaign against extremism and the transition in the global balance of power have become fully intertwined. As PoliTact had forecasted, the dynamics of the Middle East has now caught up with that of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Moreover, China and Russia are both involved in the Afghan Great Game &#8211; and it is critical to look at Afghanistan from the eyes of China, Russia, and Iran too. In other words, the American South Asia policy will have to be understood in relation to how these powers view the region and the role of the Afghan Taliban.</p>
<p><strong>Understanding What Afghanistan Means for China, Russia, and Iran</strong></p>
<p><strong>Russia</strong></p>
<p>The significance of Afghanistan for Russia has increased gradually, especially after the West imposed sanctions on Russia due to its actions in Crimea and Ukraine. Russians have felt that while it was cooperating with the West on a number of global concerns, and in relations to extremism, NATO was not reciprocating. Additionally, NATO did not desist from its expansion activities in the Russian Near Abroad.</p>
<p>In the Middle East too, Russians had been slowly loosing ground and it no longer enjoyed the kind of influence it once had under the Soviet Union. The removal of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi further reinforced Russian sensitivities. In case of Libya, China and Russia shared the position that NATO went beyond its stated objective, and that foreign powers should not interfere in the affairs of sovereign states. This was one reason that Syria became such a test case for Russia, forcing it to intervene military and come to the defense of its ally.</p>
<p>Russian involvement in Syria is not just to fight extremists, but more importantly to protect an Arab Spring-inflicted ally, whose government provides military facilities for the Russians. In essence, Syria occupies a key position for Russian power projection in the region and beyond.</p>
<p>Timing was another factor. As EU went through an economic recession, Putin watched keenly and exploited the vulnerabilities &#8211; especially in the energy sector. Russia has also been working on building closer ties with France and Germany. Moreover, Putin saw that after heavy military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US was over-stretched. However, when NATO started to re-exert itself in Syria and Europe under Obama, Russians slowly started to get more involved in Afghanistan and to nurture this leverage as part of a grand plan. This was occurring when Russia and China were also working with the US on the Iran nuclear deal.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, Russians initially established contacts with the Afghan Taliban. Moreover, they started to develop better economic and defense ties with Pakistan, despite opposition from its staunch Cold War ally, India. More recently, reports have emerged that Russia has also started to arm the Afghan Taliban and launched its own peace initiative for Afghanistan, which has had several meetings. The Russian’s consider Afghan Taliban to be the bulwark against the spreading influence of Daesh in the region.</p>
<p><strong>Iran</strong></p>
<p>Another Russian ally in the Middle East, Iran, has also undergone a transformation of views regarding the Afghan Taliban. Because of its heavy involvement in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon, to Iran Afghanistan increasingly represents another flank where it will likely confront similar dynamics as in the Middle East Theater of Operation. In this, the Afghan Taliban represent a saner local player for Iran to work with and to counter threats from Deash and other Sunni extremists.</p>
<p><strong>China</strong></p>
<p>Meanwhile, China has launched its “One Belt One Road” economic initiative, and one of its tributaries is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project. The success of the economic corridor is heavily dependent on the security situation of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Moreover, China has its own concerns regarding extremism sprouting from the region and impacting its Muslim population. Gwadar Port provides China an alternative sea access in case the Strait of Malacca was blocked, and there are rumors regarding militarization of this port at some point in the future.</p>
<p>China’s concerns on US and NATO policies are not significantly different from the Russians’. After all, this conformity of views is what led to the successful creation of organizations such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which recently included both India and Pakistan into its fold.</p>
<p>As is the case for Iran and Russia, Afghanistan represents another flank for the Chinese. As for the other flank, at its core, China is anxious regarding the emerging US policies in the Pacific region, which includes Taiwan and the “One China” Principle. Additionally, China’s draws a parallel to the situation in the Middle East &#8211; and whether a regime changes-type formula might be applied to the rash regime of North Korea. Not surprisingly, China and Russia have both protested the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile defense system in South Korea. Russia has similar apprehensions for the American Missile Defense Shield in Europe, which apparently is meant to counter missile threats from Iran &#8211; but Russia thinks the system is directed towards its capabilities.</p>
<p><strong>Domestic Politics of Pakistan, Afghan Policy Review and India Ties</strong></p>
<p>As this global context evolves and the American review of Afghan policy continues, the domestic politics of Pakistan is becoming unstable, seemingly oblivious to the regional and global situation.</p>
<p>Last week the Supreme Court of Pakistan unanimously declared that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was not “honest” and that therefore he was “disqualified to be a member of Parliament”. Mr Sharif subsequently resigned, promising to use all available legal and constitutional means to challenge the verdict.</p>
<p>This long-awaited decision was the culmination of over a year of investigation into the business affairs of the prime minister and three of his children following disclosures in the Panama Papers. The Sharif family members were unable to provide valid documentation to prove how they had accumulated such vast wealth, including very expensive London apartments, in a legitimate fashion.</p>
<p>Sharif’s departure is unlikely to change much domestically and externally, especially given that he will retain the leadership of his party, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N). It’s ironic that Sharif’s disqualification was based on constitutional amendments put in place during President Gen Zia-ul-Haq’s rule (1977-1988) given that Gen Zia was effectively Sharif’s mentor who helped him establish his political credentials in Punjab.</p>
<p>Needless to say, Sharif’s supporters believe all this to be a conspiracy by the military which was determined to get rid of him once and for all. It’s important to remember that Sharif hasn’t always had a good relationship with the country’s all-powerful army. His first stint as prime minister ended when the Chief of the Army Staff forced him to resign in 1993 following corruption charges. His second premiership was cut short in 1999 when Gen Musharraf toppled him and sent him into exile in Saudi Arabia for the better part of a decade.</p>
<p>During this third term, which started in 2013, Sharif’s relationship with the military was also strained. Soon after taking office Sharif was determined to negotiate with the Pakistan Taliban (the TTP as it is known here) as he had promised during the election campaign. The army was dead set against these talks, having lost 5000 men fighting the terrorists in the tribal areas along the border with Afghanistan. These talks, which were going nowhere, ended following an attack on Karachi airport in June 2014. Following the horrendous TTP attack on a school in December 2014, the military was determined that its wide-scale operation in the tribal areas would hunt down all militants, Pakistani and Afghan. On the whole, this military operation has been effective in eliminating, degrading and disrupting the various terrorist groups.</p>
<p>However, there is still lingering suspicion in the higher echelons of the military and the bureaucracy in Washington that the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network are still getting assistance from elements of the Pakistan military for their attacks against civilian and military targets in Afghanistan. These doubts as to whether Pakistan is running with the hare and hunting with the hounds is nagging American policy-makers. So increasingly officials are wondering what sort of pressure can be put on Pakistan to change its ways.</p>
<p>The chairman of Pakistan’s Senate Defense Committee, Senator Mushahid Hussain, recently said at a meeting here in Washington that he was hoping that there would be clarity from the Trump administration on its approach to South Asia. Unfortunately, given the internal infighting in the White House on this issue (and many others), it’s unlikely that we will be getting clear guidance on this matter in the near future.</p>
<p>When it comes to Pakistan’s relationship with its two large neighbors, China and India, no one expects any changes. Chinese officials were quick to reassure everyone that CPEC wouldn’t be affected by Sharif’s downfall. As for India, no one is expecting changes either in the bilateral relationship, if anything, it will probably get worse before it gets better. There had been much hope that PM Modi and PM Sharif—two business-friendly leaders—would move the relationship forward. However, nothing came of that, instead relations deteriorated in the wake of terrorist attacks in India by Pakistan-based jihadists.</p>
<p>So while on the whole the ousting of Nawaz Sharif is good news for trying to improve the poor state of governance in Pakistan. It’s unlikely to make too much of a difference in the long-term. Many more corrupt politicians would need to be disqualified to run for office before the people of Pakistan would be convinced that there is a genuine change in the air.</p>
<p>Proof, if proof is necessary, that little will change is the fact that Nawaz Sharif had chosen his brother, Shahbaz Sharif, who is the Chief Minister of Punjab, to eventually replace him as prime minister of Pakistan. However, there’s a feeling in the party that it might be best not to replace Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, the newly-installed temporary prime minister, and instead let him contest the federal election due to be held around June 2018. Regardless as to who is eventually chosen as prime minister, as leader of the party, Nawaz Sharif will make sure that his successor makes no changes without his approval.</p>
<p>The question becomes, under this political instability will Pakistan be able to meet the demands that may result of the American Afghan policy review. Pakistan’s political setup is increasingly busy with infighting and is unlikely to be able to focus and deliver when it comes to Afghanistan. Moreover, tensions in the civil-military relations will further complicate implementation when it comes to matters of Afghanistan and India. The risk being that similar to the recent events of Turkey and Saudi Arabia, a hardliner could emerge.</p>
<p><strong>American South Asia Policy</strong></p>
<p>On Pakistan’s security concerns vis-à-vis India, US has traditionally taken a balanced approach. However, this began to change during the era of Bill Clinton, when foundational steps for building strategic ties with India were laid. This policy has continued over Democratic and Republican administrations and now is reaching maturity. Under President Trump, the trajectory is likely to continue.</p>
<p>The dilemma for US policy has continued. Pakistan has and offers to cooperate in the campaign against extremism when it comes to those groups that carry global ambitions &#8211; but it is quite sensitive to protecting its interests when it comes to India. US has used the political, economic, and military leverages at its disposal to try to change Pakistan’s behavior in this regard, but those have had limited efficacy.</p>
<p>In the evolving balance of power of the region, China and Russia have moved closer to Pakistan, which otherwise was a customary US partner. On the other hand, Russia’s Cold War ally, India, has moved heavily towards the US. Afghanistan itself is building its ties with both China and Russia but the regime’s heavy dependence on Western support for survival would only allow it to go so far in that direction.</p>
<p>In this context, American détente with Russia has become a necessity not a desire. US appears willing to show flexibility over Syria and to entertain Russia. However, Trumps romance with Putin has deeply worried the European powers and the domestic opposition has also continued. With American flexibility over Syria, Russia would have likely reciprocated in the South Asian theater. Moreover, the détente with Russia would have been a bad omen for Russian and China bonhomie, BRICS and SCO, including Iran.</p>
<p>In the prevailing political atmosphere of the US, the detente with Russia looks unlikely. This will only increase the utility of Pakistan over time, like Saudi Arabia in the Middle East, to counter Iran and Russia.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/third-american-afghan-war-transformation-perception-afghan-taliban/">The Third American-Afghan War And Transformation Of Perception On Afghan Taliban</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>Repercussions Of Growing Pakistan-Iran Ties</title>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 17 Apr 2017 01:46:19 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="696" height="424" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Hassan_Rouhani_in_meeting_with_Pakistani_Prime_Minister_Nawaz_Sharif_in_Saadabad_Palace_04.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Hassan_Rouhani_in_meeting_with_Pakistani_Prime_Minister_Nawaz_Sharif_in_Saadabad_Palace_04.jpg 800w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Hassan_Rouhani_in_meeting_with_Pakistani_Prime_Minister_Nawaz_Sharif_in_Saadabad_Palace_04-600x365.jpg 600w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" />Context Pakistan-Iran relations have been complicated since Partition, and even more so since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The two countries have worked together on trying to bring stability to Afghanistan, although they do not see eye-to-eye on a future role for the Taliban. There is much potential in their relationship, especially with regard to the [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/repercussions-growing-pakistan-iran-ties/">Repercussions Of Growing Pakistan-Iran Ties</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="696" height="424" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Hassan_Rouhani_in_meeting_with_Pakistani_Prime_Minister_Nawaz_Sharif_in_Saadabad_Palace_04.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Hassan_Rouhani_in_meeting_with_Pakistani_Prime_Minister_Nawaz_Sharif_in_Saadabad_Palace_04.jpg 800w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Hassan_Rouhani_in_meeting_with_Pakistani_Prime_Minister_Nawaz_Sharif_in_Saadabad_Palace_04-600x365.jpg 600w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" /><p><strong><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone size-full wp-image-8372" src="https://www.politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Hassan_Rouhani_in_meeting_with_Pakistani_Prime_Minister_Nawaz_Sharif_in_Saadabad_Palace_04.jpg" alt="hassan_rouhani_in_meeting_with_pakistani_prime_minister_nawaz_sharif_in_saadabad_palace_04" width="800" height="487" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Hassan_Rouhani_in_meeting_with_Pakistani_Prime_Minister_Nawaz_Sharif_in_Saadabad_Palace_04.jpg 800w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Hassan_Rouhani_in_meeting_with_Pakistani_Prime_Minister_Nawaz_Sharif_in_Saadabad_Palace_04-600x365.jpg 600w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px" />Context</strong></p>
<p>Pakistan-Iran relations have been complicated since Partition, and even more so since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The two countries have worked together on trying to bring stability to Afghanistan, although they do not see eye-to-eye on a future role for the Taliban. There is much potential in their relationship, especially with regard to the export of energy. Cross-border security issues in Balochistan and the frequent massacre of Shiites in Pakistan continue to be irritants in the relationship. China’s relationship with both will have a critical role in bringing the two closer together but, while bilateral relations will continue to expand, they will never be as close as Pakistan’s relations with Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p><strong>Analysis</strong></p>
<p>It has been well over a year since the “Iran Deal” – officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – between Iran and the P5 + 1 (US, China, Russia, France, UK and Germany, was signed in July 2015 and just over a year since the breaking of bilateral relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia following the execution of a prominent Saudi Shiite cleric on terrorism charges. Given the significance of these two events and their potential impact on Pakistan, it is an opportune time to examine the bilateral relationship between Islamabad and Tehran and to discuss where it may be heading.</p>
<p>Pakistan will progressively deepen its relationship with Iran while at the same time maintaining a very close relationship with Saudi Arabia, with which it has had long and deep ties, but which is also Iran’s principal strategic rival in the region. Moreover, Pakistan’s approach to Iran will also be informed by its relationship with China, its interests in Afghanistan and Central Asia, and its ongoing enmity with India. The leaders of Pakistan will also be mindful of the country’s domestic factors, notably sectarian differences and the continuing unrest in Balochistan, when proceeding with the deepening of their relationship with Tehran. All in all, the handling of the bilateral relationship will require agility, careful diplomacy and patience. If properly handled, however, a deepening of Pakistan-Iran relations would be in both countries’ (and the region’s), long-term interests, without necessarily threatening Pakistan-Saudi ties.</p>
<p><strong>The Afghanistan Angle</strong></p>
<p>Although there was no co-ordination on how they should respond to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Iran and Pakistan nevertheless saw eye-to-eye on this issue – at least in the early days.  A few weeks after the invasion, the Iranian foreign minister stated in unequivocal terms that ‘we are the most concerned nation about the situation in Afghanistan. We cannot tolerate this Soviet invasion.’<a name="_ftnref1"></a><a href="http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/pakistan-iran-bilateral-relations-growth-not-close-part-one-afghanistan-india-china/#_ftn1"><sup>[1]</sup></a>Both countries now had Soviet troops on their respective borders. By the mid-1980s, however, Iran had become less engaged in the Afghan conflict and this bred Iranian suspicion about Pakistan’s end game in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>There were two reasons for that. First, Iran was focused on the costly war with Iraq and therefore had less time and resources to spend on the Afghan conflict. Second, the bulk of the <em>mujahideen</em> (freedom fighters), were Sunni, with their tribal bases in the south, east and north of Afghanistan. There were seven groupings of moderate Islamists and Muslim fundamentalists based in Peshawar, Pakistan. The Pakistani army intelligence kept a tight control over the distribution of the funding that was coming principally from Saudi Arabia.<a name="_ftnref2"></a><a href="http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/pakistan-iran-bilateral-relations-growth-not-close-part-one-afghanistan-india-china/#_ftn2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> Four smaller Shi’a groups were based in Iran, but they did not have access to as substantial amount of funds and weapons. Moreover, these latter groups were less united and the divisions among them were often deep.<a name="_ftnref3"></a><a href="http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/pakistan-iran-bilateral-relations-growth-not-close-part-one-afghanistan-india-china/#_ftn3"><sup>[3]</sup></a></p>
<p>Pakistan’s role as a “frontline state”, host to three million Afghan refugees and provider of safe havens for the <em>mujahideen</em>, was crucial to Washington’s plan to have Pakistan and Saudi Arabia together become the south-west pillar of its strategic scheme to block any Soviet move towards the Indian Ocean.<a name="_ftnref4"></a><a href="http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/pakistan-iran-bilateral-relations-growth-not-close-part-one-afghanistan-india-china/#_ftn4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> It was this American policy, the “Carter Doctrine”, which kick-started the deep relationship between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, one which later would have far-reaching negative consequences for Pakistan’s polity. But it was a relationship which dovetailed nicely with General Zia’s Islamisation programme at home. The ever tightening Pakistani-Saudi relationship would have an impact on Pakistan-Iran relations further down the road.<a name="_ftnref5"></a><a href="http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/pakistan-iran-bilateral-relations-growth-not-close-part-one-afghanistan-india-china/#_ftn5"><sup>[5]</sup></a></p>
<p>Although the Americans distrusted the Iranians and their motives in the region, they welcomed Pakistan’s relationship with Teheran because it helped to keep the Iranians engaged on the Afghan issue. Moreover, and despite the animosity between Iran and the US, Washington did not want to see a weakening or even the break-up of Iran because this would facilitate Moscow’s perceived drive to reach the shores of the Indian Ocean and establish a warm-water port, a key concern of Washington in those days<a name="_ftnref6"></a><a href="http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/pakistan-iran-bilateral-relations-growth-not-close-part-one-afghanistan-india-china/#_ftn6"><sup>[6]</sup></a> and a narrative in which Pakistan had a crucial role to play.</p>
<p>In the early days of Iran’s involvement in Afghanistan, two issues were of greatest interest to Tehran then and, importantly, remain so today. First, Iran wanted to maintain, if not increase, its influence in western Afghanistan. This it did by supporting the <em>mujahideen</em> based in Iran and the local warlords over the Afghan border, such as Mohammad Ismail Khan in Herat. The second issue was promoting the interests of the Shiite community, particularly the Hazaras. Unfortunately, these two Iranian interests clashed with those of Pakistan. Following the departure of the Soviets from Afghanistan in 1989 and the end of the subsequent, bloody civil war which lasted until 1996, the Taliban – a Pakistani and Saudi-backed Pashtun militant group – eventually took over the country, having effectively defeated the other <em>mujahideen</em> groups. The defeated groups, which were in an ever- changing loose coalition of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras called the “Northern Alliance”, were supported by India and Iran.<a name="_ftnref7"></a><a href="http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/pakistan-iran-bilateral-relations-growth-not-close-part-one-afghanistan-india-china/#_ftn7"><sup>[7]</sup></a> Those constituent elements of the former alliance are, on the whole, still supported by India and Iran today.</p>
<p>During their rule, the Taliban imposed their harsh and retrograde Salafist version of Islam, which included repressing the Shiite community. Even today, after having been ousted from power in October 2001 by a coalition of Western forces, the Taliban continue to adhere to those same archaic religious values. The Taliban has been conducting an <a href="http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/letter-from-washington-afghanistan-and-the-changing-of-the-american-guard/">increasingly successful insurgency</a> against the Western forces, significantly reduced since 2015, and the Afghan security forces. Were they to return to power – alone or as part of a coalition, they would most likely try to again impose their version of Islam. That would be an outcome that Iran would not welcome.</p>
<p>In addition to the points discussed above, Iran has a deep interest in the economic potential of Afghanistan, both as a market for its energy and as a transit route for the sale of energy to Central Asia and China.<a name="_ftnref8"></a><a href="http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/pakistan-iran-bilateral-relations-growth-not-close-part-one-afghanistan-india-china/#_ftn8"><sup>[8]</sup></a> Iran signed an agreement with Afghanistan in 2011 for the export of energy to that country. In 2012, Afghanistan was Iran’s fourth-largest trading partner, having exported some US$2 billion worth of energy to Kabul.<a name="_ftnref9"></a><a href="http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/pakistan-iran-bilateral-relations-growth-not-close-part-one-afghanistan-india-china/#_ftn9"><sup>[9]</sup></a> Given Iran’s political and economic investment in Afghanistan and its legitimate strategic and defence interests about the future of Afghanistan, Iran must eventually be brought into the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (the US, China, Pakistan and Afghanistan), which is the framework set up to move forward the stalled Afghan peace and reconciliation process.  This is critical because, unless it is part of the peace process, Iran will have no stake in the outcome, and, therefore, no interest in ensuring that it is successfully implemented.<strong><em> </em></strong></p>
<p><strong>The Indian Reach</strong></p>
<p>Iran’s desire to deepen its economic involvement in Afghanistan will have been given a major impetus with its signing in May 2016 of twelve agreements with India, including one which involves the development of the port of Chabahar, on the Gulf of Oman. The Chabahar deal commits <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/long-overdue-indias-modi-visits-iran-signing-key-agreements-setting-broad-agenda/">India to invest</a> immediately US$500 million in the Iranian free trade zone. Prime Minister Modi also vowed to spend an additional US$2 billion to equip Chabahar with <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/06/iran-india-modi-visit-chabar-investment.html">roads and railways</a> that would head north to the Afghan border. While this Indian financial commitment is commendable given that the building of the infrastructure would benefit both countries, if not the whole region, it is also a known fact that India is not awash with funds. In recent years, it has had to seek major funding from <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-29249268">China</a> and <a href="http://www.voanews.com/a/japanese-prime-minister-leaves-india/3101049.html">Japan</a> to develop its own decrepit infrastructure. So, whether this becomes a reality is a moot point. Still, the Indians have an additional impetus to proceed with this large project given that Afghanistan and India signed a Strategic Agreement in 2011 which <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/india-stepping-up-to-the-plate-in-afghanistan/">brings the two countries closer</a> together and provides some sense of long-term certainty with the provision of training, equipping, and capacity-building programmes.</p>
<p>But Iran is not putting all its eggs in the Indian basket. On the contrary, it is keen to get more players involved financially in the development of the Chabahar port, notably Pakistan and China.<a name="_ftnref10"></a><a href="http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/pakistan-iran-bilateral-relations-growth-not-close-part-one-afghanistan-india-china/#_ftn10"><sup>[10]</sup></a> Wider external involvement in this project is <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/06/iran-india-modi-visit-chabar-investment.html">now easier</a> with the lifting of the sanctions against Iran following the signing of the JCPOA in 2015. Also, Iran would not want to jeopardise its long-term relationship with Pakistan and China over a project that India may not be able to deliver on. It is important to remember that India has been sitting on the project since 2003 and nothing has happened in 13 years. But, regardless of which countries ultimately get involved, the aim of the Iranian leaders’ is to turn Chabahar into an economic hub which could benefit the Middle East, South Asia and Central Asia.</p>
<p><strong>The China Connection</strong></p>
<p>Although China is presently involved in developing the port of Gwadar in Pakistan, some 70 kilometres along the Indian Ocean coast from Chabahar, as part of its massive US$46 billion investment in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project, Beijing may also be interested in participating in the Chabahar project.<a name="_ftnref11"></a><a href="http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/pakistan-iran-bilateral-relations-growth-not-close-part-one-afghanistan-india-china/#_ftn11"><sup>[11]</sup></a> For geostrategic reasons, China’s involvement in that project would prevent India from having a monopoly in the development of Chabahar and getting a toehold in south-west Asia. Moreover, given how China’s economy compares so much more favourably than India’s in size, Beijing could easily outspend New Delhi on this project and actually deliver on its contractual commitments, something that India cannot guarantee. For practical reasons and, given the proximity of the two ports, Chabahar and Gwadar could complement each other and eventually be a critical hub of economic activity for the region.</p>
<p>If nothing else, Chinese and Pakistani involvement would outflank India and prevent it from breaking out of the South Asia strategic space. So, all in all, one should not be surprised if, indeed, China did get involved in the Chabahar project, as it would be another building block in Beijing’s “One Belt, One Road” project that links China with South and Central Asia and beyond. Participating in the project would also fit China’s overall policy of developing its bilateral relationship with Iran. It is generally not known, but China was a key player in the JCPOA negotiations, convincing the Iranians to make concessions on their nuclear programme. Theirs is a bilateral relationship which has a lot of potential for growth in many fields, especially in defence and trade and such developments would be good news for Pakistan.</p>
<p>Another important reason why China could get involved in the Chabahar project is its <a href="http://dailytimes.com.pk/pakistan/11-May-16/pakistan-eyes-china-to-fund-iran-pipeline-project">financial involvement</a> in the construction of the 1,800 kilometre-long Pakistani gas pipeline to join up with Iran’s already-completed end of the pipeline. The US$7 billion project, which was first conceived in the 1990s, was meant to connect Iran’s giant South Pars gas field to India via Pakistan, but India pulled out of the project in 2009, citing security and cost reasons.<a name="_ftnref12"></a><a href="http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/pakistan-iran-bilateral-relations-growth-not-close-part-one-afghanistan-india-china/#_ftn12"><sup>[12]</sup></a> The project has been dormant for years for a number of reasons, including due to the financial sanctions imposed on Iran because of its nuclear programme.</p>
<p><strong> Economic Links</strong></p>
<p>According to the Pakistani Minister for Petroleum and Natural Resources, the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project will be <a href="http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2016/06/12/470044/Iran-Pakistan-gas-project">completed by 2018</a>. Upon completion, it will bring much-needed relief to <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-iran-pipeline-iduskcn0ws0la">energy-starved Pakistan</a>. Moreover, it has been suggested that once this pipeline – coined the “peace pipeline” – is fully operational, it could bring up to US$500 million to Islamabad’s coffers.<a name="_ftnref13"></a><a href="http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/pakistan-iran-bilateral-relations-growth-not-close-part-one-afghanistan-india-china/#_ftn13"><sup>[13]</sup></a>  Needless to say, that would be a <a href="http://www.dawn.com/news/1177635">major boost</a> to the present low level of bilateral trade which is estimated to be only about US$1 billion a year, down from US$1.32 in 2008-09. It is worth contrasting these low figures with the US$4 billion in bilateral trade <a href="http://ciss.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/P-3-I.-3-V.-3.pdf">between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia</a>, and the US$4 billion in remittances that Pakistani workers send back to Pakistan annually. On an official visit to Pakistan in March 2016, Iranian President Rouhani and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif signed an agreement <a href="http://ciss.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/P-3-I.-3-V.-3.pdf">to increase</a> annual bilateral trade volumes to US$5 billion by 2021. Even with the US, UN and EU sanctions against Iran lifted, it is difficult to imagine that the two countries will achieve this highly ambitious target within five years given the low level of bilateral trade today.  The agreement complements the previous 2004 <a href="http://wits.worldbank.org/GPTAD/PDF/archive/Iran-Pakistan.pdf">Preferential Trade Agreement</a> with the aim of signing a free trade agreement between the two countries in the near future. Deepening defence relations would be another objective that both countries would like to achieve in the post-JCPOA period.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>As Afghanistan became the battle ground for regional and external players, including China and Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s relations with Saudi Arabia significantly deepened. That, of course, would have an impact on Pakistan-Iran relations. Afghanistan provides an additional source of friction in that Iran is keen to maintain its influence in the west of the country and would not welcome the return to power in Kabul of the Pakistan-friendly, anti-Shiite Taliban.</p>
<p>Given China’s increasing importance in the region, including in the implementation of the One Belt, One Road programme, the relative importance of the US will diminish accordingly. That, too, will help bring the two countries closer together. Even so, the target of boosting the value of bilateral trade to US$5 billion within five years appears overly ambitious.</p>
<p>Even though Iran may be geographically close to Pakistan, Islamabad’s relations with Saudi Arabia are much tighter and will remain so for the foreseeable future.</p>
<p><em>A version of this article also appeared in the Australian based Future Directions International, and Pakistan based Defense Journal.</em></p>
<p><strong> *****</strong></p>
<p><a name="_ftn1"></a><a href="http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/pakistan-iran-bilateral-relations-growth-not-close-part-one-afghanistan-india-china/#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Vatanka, A., <em>Iran and Pakistan – Security, Diplomacy and American Influence</em>, New York: I. B. Tauris &amp; Co. (2007), p. 168<em>.</em></p>
<p><a name="_ftn2"></a><a href="http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/pakistan-iran-bilateral-relations-growth-not-close-part-one-afghanistan-india-china/#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Along with China, Saudi Arabia contributed some US$250 million in military aid to the Afghan fighters. <em>The Economist</em>, 11 May 1985.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn3"></a><a href="http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/pakistan-iran-bilateral-relations-growth-not-close-part-one-afghanistan-india-china/#_ftnref3">[3]</a> Vatanka, pp. 185-90<em>.</em></p>
<p><a name="_ftn4"></a><a href="http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/pakistan-iran-bilateral-relations-growth-not-close-part-one-afghanistan-india-china/#_ftnref4">[4]</a> <em>Far Eastern Economic Review</em>, 11 December 1984, p. 18.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn5"></a><a href="http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/pakistan-iran-bilateral-relations-growth-not-close-part-one-afghanistan-india-china/#_ftnref5">[5]</a> By the mid-1980s, the number of Pakistani military personnel reportedly stationed in Saudi Arabia was around 40,000 (Vatanka, p. 179).</p>
<p><a name="_ftn6"></a><a href="http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/pakistan-iran-bilateral-relations-growth-not-close-part-one-afghanistan-india-china/#_ftnref6">[6]</a> ‘US Policy toward Iran’, <em>White House Memorandum</em>, MSC/ICS 402010, 11 February 1980, cited in Vatanka, p. 169.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn7"></a><a href="http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/pakistan-iran-bilateral-relations-growth-not-close-part-one-afghanistan-india-china/#_ftnref7">[7]</a> Alam, S., <em>Iran-Pakistan Relations</em>, Strategic Analysis, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses,     Vol. 28, № 4, (2004), p. 537.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn8"></a><a href="http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/pakistan-iran-bilateral-relations-growth-not-close-part-one-afghanistan-india-china/#_ftnref8">[8]</a> Barzegar, K., ‘Iran’s Foreign Policy in Post-Taliban Afghanistan’, <em>Washington Quarterly</em>, Vol. 37, № 2, (2014), pp. 120-22.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn9"></a><a href="http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/pakistan-iran-bilateral-relations-growth-not-close-part-one-afghanistan-india-china/#_ftnref9">[9]</a> Barzegar, p. 121.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn10"></a><a href="http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/pakistan-iran-bilateral-relations-growth-not-close-part-one-afghanistan-india-china/#_ftnref10">[10]</a> As a matter of fact, according to Iranian officials, <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/06/iran-india-modi-visit-chabar-investment.html">Pakistan was first </a><a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/06/iran-india-modi-visit-chabar-investment.html">approached</a>for the development of Chabahar.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn11"></a><a href="http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/pakistan-iran-bilateral-relations-growth-not-close-part-one-afghanistan-india-china/#_ftnref11">[11]</a> For a good discussion comparing Gwadar to Chabahar, see: M. Daim Fazil, ‘5 Reasons Gwadar Port Trumps Chabahar’, <em>The Diplomat</em>, 9 June 2016.<a href="http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/5-reasons-gwadar-port-trumps-chabahar/">http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/5-reasons-gwadar-port-trumps-chabahar/</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn12"></a><a href="http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/pakistan-iran-bilateral-relations-growth-not-close-part-one-afghanistan-india-china/#_ftnref12">[12]</a> Munir, M., Ahsan, A. and Zulfqar, S., ‘Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline: Cost-Benefit Analysis’, <em>Journal of Political Studies</em>, Vol. 20, № 2, (2013), pp. 161-78.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn13"></a><a href="http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/pakistan-iran-bilateral-relations-growth-not-close-part-one-afghanistan-india-china/#_ftnref13">[13]</a> Pant, H.V., ‘Pakistan and Iran’s Dysfunctional Relationship’, <em>Middle East Quarterly</em>, Vol. 16, № 2, (2009), p. 49.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/repercussions-growing-pakistan-iran-ties/">Repercussions Of Growing Pakistan-Iran Ties</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Relevance Of Japanese Amau Doctrine To Modern Day Mega Trade Pacts</title>
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		<pubDate>Sun, 08 Jan 2017 16:28:12 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[American Experiment]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="400" height="335" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Japaneses-buildup-to-world-war-2-3.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" />How Weak Countries Carrying Economic Significance Become Playground For Foreign Interests Originally published on June 9, 2009 and being republished with additions. Another modification was made to this article on January 16, 2017. It is important to understand the present day political, economic, and defense policies of various international actors with the appropriate historical context. [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-japanese-amau-doctrine-2/">The Relevance Of Japanese Amau Doctrine To Modern Day Mega Trade Pacts</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="400" height="335" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Japaneses-buildup-to-world-war-2-3.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" /><p><strong>How Weak Countries Carrying Economic Significance Become Playground For Foreign Interests</strong></p>
<p>Originally published on June 9, 2009 and being republished with additions. Another modification was made to this article on January 16, 2017.</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-8225 alignleft" src="https://www.politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Japaneses-buildup-to-world-war-2-3.jpg" alt="Japanese Expansion 1895-1938.ai" width="400" height="335" />It is important to understand the present day political, economic, and defense policies of various international actors with the appropriate historical context. After all, in the absence of this relativity, it would be difficult to give meaning to the unfolding events, and predict their future trajectory. Looking at the past often leads to the discovery of historical parallels and analogies making it easier to grasp contemporary paradoxes.</p>
<p>When exploring such parallels, the attempt should not be to spell out every minute detail of the relevance – but to witness the irony of how history repeats and provides continuity, irrespective of if we are aware are not. And then it is up to the intrigue and ingenuity of the reader to draw the necessary connections and lessons.</p>
<p>The Japanese Amau Doctrine provides such a parallel, to make sense of the present-day mega economic projects, such as the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), or the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative that China has unveiled. And to see how these projects are an example of the present global realignment and shift in the balance of power.</p>
<p>While Amau Doctrine was directed at a weaker China, it is China now that has emerging stronger and is attempting to shape the world affairs. An additional question that comes to mind is that how does the dynamics surrounding Amau Doctrine, described below, helps us understand the future of Europe and European Union, especially in the aftermath of Brexit, and the election of Donald Trump on a nationalist and a protectionist agenda.</p>
<p>The Amau Doctrine is the Japanese equivalent of America’s Monroe Doctrine (1823), which was designed to protect American interests in the Western Hemisphere. The premise of Amau, formulated around 1934, is that Japan reserves the right to act unilaterally in order “to preserve peace and order in East Asia.” The context was the depression of the 30s, when Japan lost a substantial amount of its trade as a result of international trade barriers. The Doctrine was chiefly intended to convert the then feeble China into a client state and to establish Japan as the dominant power in the Pacific while containing Russia, resurgent then as now. For Japan, China was the main source of raw materials, as well as possessing tremendous strategic importance in its struggle with Russia.</p>
<p>In the Amau Doctrine, Japan also declared that China does not have the right to seek foreign assistance or to resist Japan in establishing a new order under the aegis of an East Asian League and furthermore, that any third parties involved in China would have to consult Japan. Historians believe that between 1933 and 1937 two events occurred that made Japan nervous: first, the increased Soviet presence on the Manchukuoan frontier and second, the formation, in 1936, of an anti-Japanese alliance consisting of Chinese Nationalists and Communists, enjoying Soviet support.</p>
<p>In addition, the Amau Doctrine directly challenged the so-called Open Door policy, under which many other powers, including Britain and United States, enjoyed special economic privileges in China. Britain’s China Lobby formulated what was to become England’s China policy in the Far East, which was that the government would safeguard Britain’s economic interests in China, enter into cooperation and competition with Japan and try to establish a China-Japan Detente.</p>
<p>During the 30s, Britain and France wished above all to avoid confrontation with Germany, which lead them to be forbearing with Japan, even in the face of its aggression. Moreover, at a time of global depression many of the big powers wanted to refrain from actions that could injure trade relations with Japan. The latter allied itself with Nazi Germany in 1936, then in July of the following year invaded China. This was followed by the infamous ‘Rape of Nanking’ in December 1937, in which between 250,000 to 300,000 Chinese civilians were massacred by the Imperial Army of Japan. These memories linger and continue to have a negative effect on Sino-Japanese relations.</p>
<p>The American policy towards China was largely the work of the American Asian Association (AAA) and proved less successful in promoting the national interest in China compared to the one devised by its counterpart, Britain’s China Lobby. Historians maintain that another factor was that the United States carried on a relatively small amount of trade with China at the time, in contrast to Britain, which had large merchant and banking houses in Shanghai.</p>
<p>The story of Japan in the 1930’s is pertinent to the current economic crisis in a number of ways. First, its Amau Doctrine emerged in response to a global recession and is an example of how such a catastrophe can impact major players and influence their decision-making. Secondly, weak countries, in this case, China, possessing vast resources and strategic importance, can become the arena where international power struggles are played out.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-japanese-amau-doctrine-2/">The Relevance Of Japanese Amau Doctrine To Modern Day Mega Trade Pacts</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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