PoliTact’s Analysis of Perception and Perspective

Context

President Donald Trump’s second term has ushered in a foreign policy that departs sharply from the liberal internationalist consensus of the post–Cold War era. Instead of multilateralism and institution-building, the Trump administration has embraced transactional diplomacy, tariff-based leverage, and a CEO-style approach to global power. The guiding logic is less about sustaining a rules-based order than about extracting concessions in a world Trump views as fundamentally zero-sum.

This orientation—the so-called Trump Doctrine—is reshaping the United States’ posture toward rivals and allies alike. He frames his foreign policy as an extension of his populist domestic agenda: “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) through trade realignment, industrial re-shoring, and hard bargaining. Yet while tariffs and deal-making remain his preferred tools, Trump also harbors ambitions for statesmanship, including a quixotic pursuit of a Nobel Peace Prize. His attempts to mediate conflicts from Ukraine to South Asia illustrate both the promise and the peril of his approach. The result is a high-risk strategy that could redefine America’s global role—and shape the political landscape of the next U.S. elections.

Tariffs as Tools of Statecraft

During his first term, as Robert Blackwill of the Council on Foreign Relations had noted, Trump consistently makes major foreign policy decisions against the advice of seasoned advisors, amid unprecedented turnover in senior defense and diplomatic posts. A 2020 Senate Democratic report accused him of transforming U.S. foreign policy into a tool of personal and business interests, undermining alliances and institutions alike.

At the heart of Trump’s foreign policy is the use of tariffs and trade leverage. Where previous presidents relied on sanctions or diplomatic pressure, Trump employs tariffs as his signature instrument—against adversaries and allies alike.

During his first term, tariffs targeted China, the EU, and even Canada and Mexico. His second term has expanded this logic into a global bargaining strategy: tariffs are cast not merely as economic tools but as instruments of national security. Trump argues that tariffs protect American workers, pressure foreign governments into concessions, and restore industrial self-sufficiency.

The long-term effects remain uncertain. Economists warn that trade wars increase consumer costs and disrupt supply chains. Yet Trump has succeeded in re-framing tariffs as patriotic policy, appealing to swing-state voters who see globalization as a betrayal. Going into the next election cycle, this rhetoric will be central to his pitch: only a tariff-wielding America, he claims, can reclaim greatness.

French observer of American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville, once warned that democracies risk losing their moral compass when governed solely for material gain. Trump’s America First agenda, rooted in tariffs and short-term bargaining, embodies this danger. For him, alliances and norms are not ends in themselves but bargaining chips.

Trump as Peace and Deal Maker

The Ukraine-Russia Stalemate

Trump’s most high-profile attempt at statesmanship came with the August 2025 Alaska Summit, where he hosted Vladimir Putin on U.S. soil—the first such visit since 2007. Styled as CEO-style deal-making, the summit bypassed traditional diplomats. Analysts at Chatham House concluded that the meeting emboldened Putin, who intensified his war aims rather than compromising. The Council on Foreign Relations reported that Putin’s demands remained maximalist: Ukrainian neutrality, demilitarization, and recognition of annexed territories.

Far from resolving the conflict, Trump’s intervention muddled U.S. messaging while alienating allies and NATO. Reuters called the summit a tilt toward Moscow, while AP noted it granted Putin undeserved legitimacy. European leaders have since moved to fill the vacuum, training Ukrainian forces and planning “reassurance forces” with limited U.S. backing. The Ukraine episode illustrates Trump’s foreign policy paradox: eager for dramatic breakthroughs, he often undercuts long-term credibility in pursuit of short-term optics.

Iran and the Quest for a Nobel Prize

Trump has repeatedly hinted that he seeks a Nobel Peace Prize, viewing it as the ultimate validation of his leadership. His prior efforts—such as the Abraham Accords in the Middle East—bolstered his claim but fell short of Nobel recognition.

Looking ahead, Trump is likely to focus on Iran’s nuclear program as the most dramatic arena for a potential peace deal. He has oscillated between threats of military action and promises of “the best deal ever.” His critics note that scrapping the 2015 JCPOA nuclear accord in his first term weakened U.S. leverage and pushed Iran closer to enrichment thresholds. Yet Trump now suggests he alone can broker a new accord, one tougher than his predecessors achieved.

Israel, Palestine, and the Limits of Transactionalism

Trump’s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains deeply shaped by his earlier recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and the Abraham Accords. In his second term, he presents himself as uniquely capable of brokering a “grand bargain” between Israel and Arab states.

Yet Palestinians remain sidelined, and violence in Gaza and the West Bank has escalated. European analysts argue that Trump’s transactional diplomacy—focused on Arab-Israeli normalization—ignores the structural roots of Palestinian grievances. Without addressing Palestinian claims to sovereignty, however, any settlement risks being cosmetic.

The recent Israeli attack on Hamas negotiators in Doha has threatened the entire architecture of U.S. strategy in the Middle East. GCC now confronts the reality that Washington either could not—or would not—prevent Israel from striking within their borders. The strike risks driving Gulf nations to reconsider their reliance on U.S. guarantees and to explore alternative security alignments, as Saudi Arabia demonstrated by concluding a defense treaty with Pakistan.

Not only that, on the domestic front, the incident has reinforced the MAGA-Israeli rift. Many America First voters have started to question Trump’s policy of prioritizing Israeli support over American interests. How this plays out will be utterly consequential for the future of American politics.

India and Pakistan Tensions

Trump has also cited his efforts to mediate between India and Pakistan, two nuclear-armed rivals, as evidence of his unique statesmanship. After the recent four-day conflict, he offered to broker talks over Kashmir, even claiming that Prime Minister Narendra Modi requested U.S. intervention. While India denied such overtures, Trump continued to highlight his role in lowering tensions during border skirmishes. Irrespective, Trump revives this narrative, portraying himself as the only leader willing to bring two nuclear powers to the table.

For domestic audiences, the image of Trump as peacemaker between two nuclear states reinforces his argument that he alone can prevent catastrophic wars—an argument likely to feature prominently in his re-election campaign.

No More Soft Power

Traditional presidents—including many of the Founders—understood that America’s influence lay in both persuasion and force. George Washington counseled avoiding entangling alliances, but also promoting republican values. Trump’s policy inverts this balance: U.S. soft power—the tools of USAID, VOA—is slashed, replaced by tariffs, threats, and military posturing.

Removing soft power tools weakens long-term credibility. A legislative report warned Trump’s instincts make U.S. a “bystander in international efforts,” undermining democracy promotion and global cooperation. Institutions like WHO, climate accords, and multilateral forums are dismissed, even as authoritarian players fill the void.

Trump’s defense of using military power against Iran’s nuclear program—despite ongoing talks—underscores reliance on hard tools over diplomacy. His use of economic coercion—tariffs on allies and adversaries alike—challenges norms of trade reciprocity.

At home, this approach reflects his populist stance: reclaiming leverage against countries like India by imposing tariffs and stricter oversight of H1B Visa Program, while demanding Europe meet NATO obligations. While Trump distances U.S. from multilateralism, countries like China and Russia are deepening cooperation via BRICS, SCO, and other forums. Meanwhile, U.S. has alienated NATO and EU—evident in the diplomatic backlash after Alaska.

On the other hand, European efforts to assure Ukraine’s security—a potential buffer zone, peacekeepers—are gaining momentum and autonomy, though still needing U.S. support. Emerging countries view Trump’s U.S. as transactional and surveys by the European Council on Foreign Relations indicated that global responses to his second term reflect hedging, not alliance-building.

Trump’s foreign policy represents a break with the post-1991 liberal order, which emphasized collective security, open markets, and democratic values. Instead, his worldview echoes 19th-century great-power politics, in which spheres of influence and economic coercion dominate.

Trump’s posture harks back to classic great-power thinking. Scholars have noted that U.S. resistance to Russian or Chinese spheres of influence is a post–Cold War construct. Historically, the U.S. itself wielded Monroe Doctrine-style influence and accepted postwar spheres such as Eastern Europe under Soviet control. He appears to embrace that tradition—viewing global competition through the lens of zero-sum regional hierarchies, especially across Eurasia. He prioritizes a strategy of wedge-driving between Russia and China, rather than accepting a multi-polar order.

The conventional wisdom in think-tank literature—a world moving towards multi-polarity, with diplomatic messiness but strategic balance—is largely ignored. Some argue multipolarity may be more hazardous than bipolarity. However, Trump avoids such debates: instead, he seems to seek a revival of bilateral leverage, playing off great powers to U.S. advantage where possible.

Election Implications: Tariffs and Populism at Home

Trump’s foreign policy represents a radical experiment in realpolitik. It replaces liberal order with transactional bargaining, elevates tariffs to tools of statecraft, and prizes symbolic breakthroughs—especially peace deals that might burnish Trump’s legacy.

For the next election, Trump’s tariff-driven populism may prove a potent political weapon at home. His campaign will emphasize tariffs, industrial re-shoring, and economic nationalism as proof of “America First” success. Swing-state voters, especially in the Midwest, may respond favorably to tariff-driven protection of steel, autos, and manufacturing. Yet suburban and business constituencies could rebel against higher consumer prices and global instability.

But internationally, America risks being seen less as a reliable leader than as a transactional actor chasing deals and prestige. Allies face uncertainty about whether U.S. commitments will endure. The credibility gap—created by Trump’s personalized, ad-hoc decision-making—risks long-term erosion of American leadership, regardless of who wins in the next election.

Equally, it’s critical to keep in perspective the sense of exploitation which resulted in the America First Mantra, using which President Trump came into power for the second time. If America First policy does not produce economic dividends for common Americans in the short and long term, it will further complicate the domestic politics and confusion regarding its global role and future direction. In this, how Trump balances his foreign policy regarding Israel will be critical.

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The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump – Dec 25, 2024
What Would Trump 2.0 Mean For The Future Of NATO? – Oct 29, 2024
Ukraine-Russia: Stalemate Ensues, Concerns Multiply – Jan 27, 2024
Ukraine Conflict And Global Balance Of Power Tussles In Europe – Jan 5, 2023
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The post The End of Liberal Internationalism? Trump’s Foreign Policy Revolution and Its Electoral Implications appeared first on Politact.

Trump had criticized NATO even in his first term, and the prospect of him getting re-elected is making the European allies worried. Trump has consistently questioned NATO’s relevance, criticized member countries for not meeting defense spending commitments, and pushed for a more transactional approach to alliances.

This strategy could lead to several significant outcomes in terms of U.S. influence, its global standing, and its ability to manage rising geopolitical tensions, especially in the context of great power rivalry with China and Russia.

1. Erosion of U.S. Influence in Europe

Trump’s skeptical view of NATO could weaken transatlantic relations, leading to a reduced U.S. leadership role in Europe, think tanks such as Brooking Institutions and Council on Foreign Relations have written extensively on this. NATO is a cornerstone of American power projection in the region and beyond since the end of World War II. It has served not only as a military alliance but also as a vehicle for maintaining U.S. influence over European affairs. Trump’s criticism of the alliance as “obsolete” or overly reliant on American funding creates uncertainty within NATO and potentially undermines the unity and strategic coherence of the organization.

If Trump undermines NATO further, European countries may begin to pursue more independent security policies, potentially seeking alternative alliances or focus more on strengthening European Union defense capabilities. Such responses could diminish U.S. leverage in European geopolitical affairs, leading to greater fragmentation within the West and provide opportunities for Russia to exploit these divisions. Russia, already seeking to weaken NATO’s eastern flank, would likely see this as a strategic opportunity to reassert its influence over former Soviet states and weaken Western deterrence.

The erosion of U.S. influence in Europe would also undermine its ability to project power into regions like the Baltics, Eastern Europe, and even the Middle East and North Africa, where NATO missions have played a role in stabilizing conflict zones and countering terrorism.

2. Reduced Deterrence Against Russia

NATO serves as the primary bulwark against Russian aggression in Europe, particularly in Eastern Europe and the Baltics, where countries like Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania depend on the alliance for security guarantees. Trump made a statement in February 2024, that if NATO countries do not raise their defense spending, he will allow Russia to ‘whatever the hell they want’. A farewell visit from President Biden to Europe did little to calm European anxiety regarding upcoming US Elections and what Trump might do if he is elected.

Trump’s reduction of focus on NATO could embolden Russia, as Moscow would see a weakened NATO as an opportunity to further destabilize Eastern Europe, whether through direct military action (as seen in Ukraine) or hybrid warfare tactics like cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and energy manipulation.

Russia has long viewed NATO expansion and U.S. military presence in Eastern Europe as a threat to its sphere of influence. If Trump were to further pull back from NATO or question the U.S. commitment to Article 5, the collective defense clause, it could undermine deterrence against Russian aggression. Eastern European countries, feeling less secure under the U.S. security umbrella, might either seek new alliances or pursue policies of appeasement towards Russia to safeguard their own security.

A weaker NATO would allow Russia to challenge U.S. influence more aggressively in Europe, possibly leading to increased Russian intervention in places like Ukraine, Georgia, and even the Balkans, where Russian-backed forces or political parties have significant influence.

3. Shift of U.S. Focus to Bilateral and Transactional Alliances

Under Trump, the U.S. could shift away from multilateral alliances like NATO and focus more on bilateral or ad-hoc agreements that are more transactional in nature. Trump has long favored a more “America First” approach, expecting allies to pay more for U.S. protection and to contribute more to shared defense goals. This approach could lead to a recalibration of U.S. alliances, with Washington seeking more cost-effective, flexible partnerships in regions it deems strategically important.

This shift would likely see the U.S. working more closely with countries like Poland, the U.K., or other European states that are willing to increase defense spending or pursue joint military projects on more favorable terms to the U.S. However, these ad-hoc alliances would lack the collective strength and unity that NATO provides, making U.S. power projection less consistent and reliable.

Moreover, Trump’s skepticism towards NATO could push European countries to seek greater autonomy, leading to the development of EU-led defense initiatives, which could dilute U.S. influence further. France has made a case for European defense force in the past as well. While European nations might still value U.S. support, they may increasingly turn towards France or Germany for leadership within Europe, weakening U.S. dominance over transatlantic security matters.

France has been one of the uneasy members of the alliance that had initially left NATO in 1958, on quarrels related to its unequal status vis-a-vis the special relationship of United States and the United Kingdom. Then president of France Charles De Gaulle sought to establish a tripartite commission which would put France on equal footing with United States and United Kingdom. It had also wanted to extend the geographic reach of NATO to include Algeria, where France needed NATO’s help in fighting an insurgency. Furthermore, France wanted maneuvering room to negotiate its own peace with communist Eastern European nations, independent of NATO-Warsaw rivalries. (Under Nicholas Sarkozy, France has returned as a member of NATO since April 2009.)

4. Impact on Power Projection in Asia and the Middle East

While Trump has largely focused his criticisms on NATO, any weakening of U.S. multilateral commitments could have ripple effects in other regions where American alliances are critical for power projection. In Asia, where the U.S. relies on a network of alliances to counter China’s growing influence, Trump’s de-emphasis on collective security arrangements could raise questions about the U.S. commitment to alliances like those with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines. China could exploit any perception that the U.S. is retreating from multilateral alliances to assert more control over the South China Sea, expand its Belt and Road Initiative, and influence other Asian nations to align with Beijing.

Similarly, in the Middle East, U.S. power projection has often relied on partnerships with countries like Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the Gulf states, but these relationships have also been supported by broader international coalitions. Trump’s focus on more transactional, bilateral deals, such as a possible NATO-style nuclear security pact with Saudi Arabia, could strain multilateral efforts to address issues like Iranian influence, terrorism, or stability in the region.

5. China and Russia Taking Advantage of a U.S. Retreat

China and Russia would likely see Trump’s de-emphasis on NATO and broader multilateral commitments as a strategic opportunity to fill the vacuum left by a less engaged U.S. In Europe, Russia would see a weakened NATO as a chance to reassert its influence over its Near Abroad. In Asia, China would push to expand its influence in the South China Sea, assert more control over Taiwan, and strengthen its economic and military ties with Southeast Asian countries that might question U.S. reliability.

Both powers could also collaborate more closely to undermine U.S. influence in key regions, as seen through China and Russia’s growing cooperation in military, energy, and diplomatic matters. If the U.S. under Trump pulls back from its global commitments, China and Russia could further position themselves as alternative global powers, offering security and economic deals to countries wary of relying on a less predictable U.S. ally. Such as through BRICS conference, being held in Kazan, China and Russia will demonstrate the alternative to Western model exists, and also in the form of SCO.

6. Weakened U.S. Global Leadership and Soft Power

NATO is not just a military alliance but also a symbol of U.S. leadership in the post-World War II liberal order. A retreat from NATO and multilateralism could weaken U.S. soft power globally, as countries increasingly view the U.S. as an unreliable partner. This would reduce America’s ability to lead on global issues, whether in addressing climate change, global health crises, or humanitarian interventions.

Weaker alliances would also mean that the U.S. has less diplomatic leverage in shaping the policies of its allies, making it harder to forge consensus on global challenges like counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, and non-proliferation. Meanwhile, China’s influence through initiatives like the Belt and Road, and Russia’s use of hybrid warfare, could rise, with both powers offering alternatives to a U.S.-led international order.

The post What Would Trump 2.0 Mean For The Future Of NATO? appeared first on Politact.

Naad-e-Ali Sulehria – South Asia Fellow, PoliTact

As the conflict between Ukraine and Russia continues, statement has set in. In recent negotiations, both sides rejected each other’s terms thus suggesting that finding a resolution remains elusive.

Despite previous indications of openness to a ceasefire, Russia, in a Security Council meeting this Monday, criticized and rejected Ukraine’s peace proposal. Russia denounced President Zelensky’s plans, which include the withdrawal of Russian troops from all Ukrainian territory and the prosecution of Russian officials for war crimes. Russia asserted its readiness to negotiate for peace but not on compromising terms while declaring the present plan a guise to continue Ukraine’s war ambitions while obtaining more western funds.

Zelensky, in turn, has rejected Russia’s offer for a ceasefire, expressing concerns that any frozen conflict would likely reignite. By exploiting Ukraine’s vulnerabilities, Russia can launch a new aggression that could expand to other countries. Zelensky believes that accepting a ceasefire at the current positions, where Russia has already annexed four Ukrainian regions, would provide Russia with a claim to victory. Meanwhile, Ukraine will lose the gains it has made or could make in its offensive against Russia.

Last week at the World Economic Forum, Zelensky voiced his fear that any shortage of military equipment and ammunition will result in strengthening Putin, especially as the EU and the US, have shown reluctance to fulfill their commitments.

In response, the US and EU have affirmed their support for Ukraine, with promises from US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. However, despite renewed commitments, Zelensky’s hopes for a significant breakthrough may be dashed as attention has been diverted by the Gaza-Israel conflict and upcoming US elections.

Support for Ukraine is contingent upon the outcome of the US presidential elections. European allies, including NATO, are also anxious about the result of these elections. Zelensky has expressed concern over Donald Trump’s suggestion that he could swiftly end the Russia-Ukraine war if he returns to the White House. Apprehensive about the past ties between Putin and Trump, Zelensky insists that any unilateral decisions by Trump would undermine Ukraine’s genuine demands and would weaken Ukraine’s position.

The post Ukraine-Russia: Stalemate Ensues, Concerns Multiply appeared first on Politact.

Context

From time to time there is a need to ascertain the status of global Balance of Power, is it in equilibrium or moving in the favor of one or the other power. While the global Balance of Power and the associated Spheres of Influence are not the only construct to assess power dynamics – they are the most prevalent presently.

In this conceptualization, usually empires or states are either emerging – challenging the established powers or coalescing with them – and deemed to be either ascending or descending in ranking. It is primarily based on a zero-sum world view i.e., the gain of one is at the expense of the other. It visualizes the world as having limited resources which need to be competed for, controlled, and leveraged.

Cold War and War Against Terror

The Cold War got triggered soon after the end of World War II, between US dominated Western alliance and the USSR, and is an illustration of how the balance of power tussles usually playout. The Western alliance came out victorious as USSR collapsed in the aftermath of the Afghan debacle of the 80s. This was followed by a period of calm – or as some would call the emergence of Unipolar world led by the US.

However, this relative tranquility did not last for long. 9/11 disturbed the calm that prevailed since the collapse of USSR. It appeared that the Islamic extremists were planning to upend the global order and the nation-state system – which according to them was unjust and established on the ashes of Ottoman Empire.

As the Global War Against Terrorists (GWOT) progressed, it bifurcated along extremists with global ambitions such as Al Qaeda (AQ) and ISSI (Daesh) – and others with local and regional grievances, like the Afghan Taliban, Baloch Liberation Front and Baloch Liberation Army, Kurds, or Al Shabab. The Kurds go by different names depending in which state they exist: YPG in Syria, and PKK in Turkey. Turkey accuses the West of supporting PKK and YPG.

While the GWOT is by no way over, with the passage of time it became apparent that balance of power tussles had infiltrated and became intertwined with the GWOT, especially when it came to extremists with local or regional grievances. Alarmingly, some of these regional groups also assist AQ and ISIS – and are also known as ‘AQ and Associates’ or ‘ISIS and Associate’.

For example, the deal between Afghan Taliban and US in the form of Doha Agreement – was only sealed after guarantees that they will delink from AQ. Moreover, Afghan Taliban will not support groups like TTP (Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan) – or allow for the use of Afghan territory to launch attacks against other countries, like Pakistan and India. The discovery of Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul, and resurging TTP activities in Pakistan, suggest Afghan Taliban have renegaded on both terms.

Globalization, COVID-19, and Emerging Powers

While US was paying in blood and treasure in GWOT, emerging powers like China and Russia, had no such stakes, even though they cooperated in the Campaign against Extremism. Moreover, globalization was further strengthening the economic wherewithal of the emerging powers, with Western multinationals facilitating this transfer of wealth. This became the fuel for populist rhetoric spewed by leaders like Donald Trump under the mantra of Making America Great Again (MAGA), which was later adopted with modification by President Biden and naming it ‘Made in America’. Under Biden’s approach, the centrality of Europe was revitalized, which previously faced neglect and acrimony under Trump.

In the wake of GWOT, the crux of American concerns stem from a sense of exploitation at the hands of allies, and thus confusing the ability to clearly define strategic enemies. That was rectified in the subsequent National Defense Strategies, declaring that global adversaries, such as China and Russia, need to be confronted and contained in different spheres of influence. In consideration of the above context, the economic order that is making the adversarial emerging powers stronger also needs to re-engineered.

With many other unfavorable affects, COVID-19 aided the disruption of supply chains related with globalization. The tense ties between US and China, tit for tat sanctions, and tariff battles, have taken a toll on American business and consumers. Nonetheless, there is an attempt to reorient global economic and security order to make it more beneficial for the US and its allies – and detrimental for those showing inclination towards adversarial rising powers.

European Spheres of Influence, Ukraine, and China

Europe is one of the most important spheres of influence for the US and critical to its global power projection. However, the dependence of Europe on Russian energy resources, accompanied by economic penetration from China, was gradually eroding American sway and jeopardizing the raison d’etre for NATO.

Alarmingly, China overtook US as EU’s biggest trading partner in 2020. While US and UK were the largest export market, the trade volume has been consistently dropping. US witnessed a drop in imports of 13.2% and export of 8.2%. In 2019, EU trade volume with US stood at $746bn and decreasing to $671bn in 2020.

In addition, after seven years of negotiations, China and EU agreed on an investment deal that came to be known as the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment. Because of Chinese support for Russian position on Ukraine, tensions between EU and China continued mounting, and as a consequence the deal could not be ratified. Not only that EU imposed sanctions on China, which were reciprocated, for human right abuses in Xinjiang.

European powers are caught in a dilemma; they do not want to economically distance themselves from China – or appear to be working at cross-interests to the US. While aligning with US on Ukraine, they are paying heavily for shortage of energy resources due to dependence on Russia. On the other hand, US realizes that in order to have maximum impact on China and Russia, Europe would have to act in parallel.

According to a CNN article: “The COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and tit-for-tat sanctions between China and EU lawmakers have strained relations since. The United States, which imposed controls on exports of semiconductors to China in October, is reportedly exerting pressure on Europe to adopt a similarly hard line.”

The same article quotes Ricardo Borges de Castro, associate director at the European Policy Center, as stating.

“I don’t see [the EU’s strategy] as a decoupling strategy. I think the EU strategy, for the moment, is a diversification strategy… the lesson [from Russia] is that you cannot have a single provider.”

Two leading European powers, Germany and France, seem to illustrate this strategy. UK on the other hand, since Brexit, has acted most aggressively on decoupling from China and restricting access to Chinese businesses and technology.

The German Chancellor Olaf Scholz visited China in November, the symbolism suggests they want to continue doing business, what is known as ‘Business First’ approach, despite pressure from the US. He was the first leader of G7 nations to visit and the critics point out to lack of cohesion within EU. Chinese and German economies are broadly connected, and China is a key market for German machinery and automobiles. Olaf also agreed to Chinese investment in its leading terminal, Hamburg Port.

The French leader is expected to visit China in January but before that Macron visited US where he had extensive talk with his American counterparts in November. While France shares US concerns on Ukraine and China’s aggressive positioning in the Indo-Pacific, Biden’s Inflation reduction Act (IRA) has sent alarm bells ringing in Europe and France. Europeans, including France, consider the Act which was signed by Biden on August 16, as protectionism.

The law provides $370bn of green subsidies towards manufacturing of wind turbines, solar panels, microprocessors and electronic vehicles. Moreover, the most controversial part of the bill is that it offers tax credit of $7,500 to American buyers of cars manufactured in the US and locally built batteries. Reportedly Macron stated: “I think that this is not in line with the rules of the World Trade Organization and that it is not in line with friendship.” Biden and Macron agreed to continue discussions and minimize the negative impact of the IRA.

Conclusion

Europe represents the epicenter for the tussles of the balance of power, which then transfuses into other regions of the world, to be examined in future articles. COVID-19 has facilitated the upending of the existing supply chains – and provide an opportunity to reorient them and prevent them from benefiting global adversaries such as China and Russia. Moreover, climate change has become another factor to be used as a leverage – in terms of resources and technologies needed to address its negative consequences.

Just as in Europe, existing spheres of influence are also in friction in other nations – and its likely be tough going for their respective citizens economically. While the developed nations strive to protect their economic and financial interests – it’s going to be a particularly rough ride for the developing and underdeveloped nations. This will result in deteriorating social order and mounting political polarization – as power and political alignments change at the local level. Sadly, many may not be able to adapt to the economic and security flux – and tugs and pulls of the shift in the global balance of power – in a timely fashion.

The post Ukraine Conflict And Global Balance Of Power Tussles In Europe appeared first on Politact.

Great Power Rivalry in the Middle East – What it means for South Asia?

Context

The New Cold War paradigm and great power rivalry framework is settling in and beginning to define international affairs. After Europe and Pacific, Middle East is emerging as another hotly contested theater between the global powers. While Ukraine has been consuming most of the media bandwidth, matters related to Iran’s nuclear program and Israeli-Palestinian conflict had taken more of a back seat. Nonetheless, after the War Against Terror, Ukraine has become the new pivot increasingly defining geopolitics, and meanwhile galvanizing NATO and EU.

President Biden’s visit to Israel and Palestinian territories in July, and then to Saudi Arabia, signaled that US aspires to reinvigorate its traditional ties with the Arab world – as it attempts to harness their support against Russia and China. And this was stated by none other than the President himself while speaking to the GCC during his visit to Saudi Arabia,

“We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia or Iran … We will seek to build on this moment with active, principled, American leadership.”

US withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, and from Afghanistan in 2021, gave the impression that America was no longer interested in the Middle East – a perception that was reinforced by mantras such as ‘Pivot to Asia’ used during the Obama administration (2009-2017). Moreover, Iran nuclear deal (also known as JCPOA) reached in July 2015 had greatly unnerved the Israelis and the Gulf States regarding the balance of power in the region and US intent.

After coming to power, one of the first nation visited by former president Trump in 2017 was Saudi Arabia. However, he withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018. During his tenure, US once again established cordial ties with Israel that have been damaged during the Obama presidency. One of the common themes that brought the Arabs and Israel closer has been the expanding influence of Iran in the region. Trump also applied maximum pressure on Iran. In a drone strike in January 2020, Iranian intelligence chief Qasem Soleimani was eliminated in Baghdad. On the other hand, Israel also kept the pressure on the country to stall its nuclear ambitions. The chief of Iran’s nuclear program, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, was assassinated in November 2020.

In parallel and on the diplomatic front, Trump administration worked towards improving ties between the Arabs and Israel, which culminated in Abraham Accords in August 2020. As a result, UAE, Bahrain, and subsequently Sudan and Morocco, also normalized ties with Israel. It was believed that Saudi Arabia will also soon follow, and according to some analysts, other key non-Arab nations, like Pakistan, are also being pressured towards this reorientation of the regional threat perception. The other key Muslim state, Turkey, already has normal ties with Israel.

Revitalized NATO

While Trump was exerting pressure on Iran, pulling out of the nuclear deal also alienated American European allies who had strived greatly to secure the deal. Moreover, not contributing enough towards NATO has also been a persistent source of tension between the US and its European allies. The Ukraine crisis has helped reverse this while attracting new aspirants, like Sweden and Finland, for NATO membership. Just before travelling to the Middle East, Biden was in Europe attending the NATO and G7 gatherings. One of the top-most agenda during the NATO meetings was to come up with a new concept that unites and define the NATO alliance for the future. NATO’s updated mission statement for the first time mentions Russia as the greatest threat and China-Russian alliance as a counter to its values.

While NATO looks to thwart Russia in Ukraine, Middle East represents the other flank. There is less consensus on how much time and resources it will take to achieve the goals in Ukraine and elsewhere. Disruption of supply chains and rising energy costs are some of the direct consequences of the conflict, including inflation, when nations were just beginning to come out of Covid-19 induced economic woes.

China- Russia and Middle East

China and Russia both have been extending their influence in the Middle East. The $400 billion China–Iran treaty signed in March 2021 must have been an ominous development from the perspective of the Gulf Arabs and the US. However, the talks have been proceeding for a while, as has been the ‘Outside-In Approach’ to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has become an active player in the Middle East with strategic ties with a number of regional players, to include Saudi Arabia. As its influence increases gradually, it could become an active interlocutor between Israel and the Palestinians, and other conflicts of the Middle East. However, it’s not clear if China desires to get involved in the security affairs of the region, like Russia has in Syria – as far as the Middle East is concerned. Soon after Biden’s visit to the Middle East, Putin and Erdogan visited Iran and discussed the evolving situation in Syria, and allowing shipment of Ukrainian grain through the Black Sea. According to media reports, Khamenei called for long-term cooperation between Russia and Iran and to guard against ‘Western deception’.

Chinese analysts present a case the nation wants to be more involved in providing economic support than engaging in the security affairs of the Middle East. Nonetheless, it has good political and military relations with both Iran and Israel. As part of BRI, China has been extending its trade relations with Israel and lately US has objected strongly to some of them citing security concerns – such as the Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) running a container terminal at the Port of Haifa – near an Israeli naval base that is frequently visited by the US Sixth Fleet. The Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had warned Israel in 2019 to reduce its economic and security ties with China or risk reduced security cooperation from US.

If the China-Israeli economic ties are allowed to strengthen uninhibited, overtime China will be able to build leverages that can potentially undercut US primacy in the affairs of the Middle East. The Israelis disagree on this, stating the nature of its ties with China and the US are of totally different nature.

Conclusion

Thus, Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia represents a push to counter China and Russia and meanwhile providing continuity to the policy undertaken by Trump, which resulted in Abraham Accords. At the same time, engaging and supporting the Palestinian authorities, and reiterating that two-state solution remains the best way forward to resolving the conflict.

The fresh engagement also envisions a new security architecture for the region that some have called the Arab NATO. During the G7 meeting held in the Bavarian Alps, the leaders also announced the $600 billion Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment program, seen as an alternative to Chinese BRI.

With their energy resources UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, have also come to play an increasingly critical role when it comes to the affairs South Asia, most recently exhibited in Afghanistan. Then there are the expanding Indian ties with the Gulf nations that have overshadowed the traditional Pakistan’s influence. And this change has undercut the financial support from the region Pakistan had relied upon in the past. PoliTact had covered this shift in a joint event with the Middle East Institute in November 2018.

The reoriented US engagement with the Arab world will also have a profound impact on the affairs of South Asia – and the present political and economic turbulence in Pakistan could be the direct result of this flux in Middle East – and surge of great power tussles there.

The post What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply? appeared first on Politact.

The Return of ‘Spheres of Influence’ Politics

Context

While there are different angles to interpret the fast-moving flux in the global political, economic and security situation, the great power rivalry perspective is clearly ascendant.

There is usually a period of calm when one power dominates or when there is stability in the balance of power equation. The rapid economic rise of China and infringement into the traditional American spheres of Influence, like Europe, has clearly been a cause of alarm. Moreover, Trump administration took certain actions that were seen as weakening the Western alliance – deemed essential to deal with emerging global rivals, to include Russia. Europe is critical to American power projection, and it was becoming progressively tied to Russia and China via trade. The present European energy dependence is a case point. Trumps admiration for Putin, and other authoritarian rulers, was seen as a vulnerability. Accompanied by his threats to NATO members to increase defense spending confused the Europeans on American reliability.

Under Biden, US is actively countering the expanding influence of China and Russia – and to reverse the Sino-Russian penetration in different regions. And one of the casualty of this reversal will be the phenomena known as globalization. Security concerns arising from aggressive Chinese posturing in the Indo-Pacific, events unfolding in Ukraine, and COVID-19 related supply chain disruptions have further weakened the case for globalization.

Additionally, these factors have helped eliminate American ambiguity on who is benefiting most from free trade presently. Going against laissez-faire principle is not an easy undertaking when the capitalist system is anchored around the very premise and has tremendously benefited the multinational corporations.

This context begs the question of what future security and trade system is the world shifting towards – and what phase of this transfer the present circumstances represent. It was WWI and II that moved the world to the nation-state system and the creation of United Nations. The answers are not readily available.

Analysis

New Cold War and Spheres of Influence

As these global rivalries escalate, they are being classified as related to the new Cold War. The previous one being between US dominated Western Sphere of Influence – with USSR mostly influencing Eastern Europe. China at that time was not as close of an ally of Russia as it is now.

The Sino-Soviet ties have had their ups and down historically. For example, during the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 Chinese Beiyang government had supported the Whites, like the West, and sent in forces to fight the Reds. Conversely, in 1923 Soviets provided support to groups opposing the Beiyang government. In 1949, with Soviet backed communists won the Chinese civil war leading to the creation of People’s Republic of China. Soviets and Chinese were even involved in a brief border conflict in 1969.

Irrespective, as the new Cold War gets underway, and no near-term Ukraine solution on the horizon, what will this emerging Cold War look like?

The first thing is obvious, the Spheres of Influence was the key character of the old Cold War – dividing the world into communist USSR and capitalist America. The Soviet system was associated with autocratic closed security states, with strict regulations controlling the lives of the citizens. On the contrary, the hallmark of Western democratic states was freedom of expression and trade that led to creativity, innovation, and greater economic prosperity. And these attributes ultimately became the reasons for the success of West against the closed Soviet system.

The new Cold War would likely create similar spheres of influence between US and China-Russia aligned states. While some would argue that this new Cold War is only between US and China. To understand these alignments – how the spheres of influence evolved after the Soviet Union collapsed need to be understood.

NATO’s Evolution

As Soviet Union dissolved during the period of 1988-1991, 15 Soviet republics opted for independence with the Baltic states leading. The former Eastern European states applied and became members of Western security alliance, NATO. A trajectory that has continued to this day – and one of the reasons for Ukraine conflict to erupt, which is also causing Finland and Sweden to move towards NATO.

Another element of this post-Soviet period was that Russia and China both adopted policies that has made Western system stronger, for example allowing foreign investments and free trade. But they did not embrace the democratic political system. So, while China and Russia benefited from free trade, their respective restricting political governance models remained in place. This has been a cause of continuous friction when it comes to for example, state controlling the currency values, protecting minorities and human rights etc.

Conclusion

Moving forward, the roles seem to be reversing. The US and West are shifting away from globalization and altering the supply chains that were created for maximum profitability. On the other hand, China is championing globalization. In May, Chinese Xi Jinping had urged the organization of emerging nations BRICS to, “reject Cold War mentality and bloc confrontation, and work together to build a global community of security for all”.

Two properties of the new supply chains are: they have to be from friendly nations and pose no economic and security implications for the dominant power of the alliance. In other words, the concept that evolved after WWII that economic interdependence can resolve security issues – is being put to rest.

While China has been attracting states through Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and associated large infrastructure projects, the US, EU, and Japan have begun to counter with their own infrastructure projects. At the recently held G7 conference in Germany, President Biden announced US will help finance $200 billion from public and private sectors to counter Chinese projects.

The question then is how will the emerging respective spheres of influence be monitored and policed. The energy supply lines provide one example where sanctions are playing a critical role. In this, US using its influence in moving Europeans away from Russian energy dependence and building trade relations with China. Meanwhile, it is allowing India flexibility to acquire cheap energy from Russia, however, coercing weaker nations to stay away.

US is also resetting its ties with Saudi Arabia to use the enhance its energy leverage and to keep energy dependent states in-line. President Biden is scheduled to visit Saudi Arabia in July and ask for increase in oil production to compensate for Russian oil shortfall. He will also be attending the meeting of Gulf Cooperation Council. Meanwhile King Abdullah of Jordan has supported the idea of Middle East version of NATO. It’s not clear though what threat perception would the NATO of Middle East counter, Iran, Russia or China? Clearly, it cannot be Israel.

In other words, the balance of power tussles now involve use of economic influence to attract and discipline states. During the previous Cold War, USSR did not have the type of economic prowess that the US and West enjoyed, but in the emerging Cold War the case of China is different.

Thus, there will likely be a China-Russia dominated supply lines and economic zone and the US-Europe controlled one. Ultimately, China and Russia will likely use tactics similar to the West i.e., if the new Cold War persists and matures. The Domino Theory and the associated dynamics that were the underpinning of the old Cold War, will become relevant once more. This will fundamentally alter the way present global trade is conducted, and this will significantly impact the working of the UN Security Council.

The post Emerging Great-Power Rivalry; How Will The New Cold War Unfold As Ukraine Simmers? appeared first on Politact.

Context

Historical parallels are important in developing perspectives on present-day conundrums. They provide an illustration of where matters were and what were the important events and considerations at the time. Deciphering this helps to ascertain where matters stand and navigate the future.

The November article last year had examined the division of British subcontinent in 1947 and compared the US August 2021 withdrawal to that. Since then, two other significant events have unfolded on the global scene. The invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February and the removal of Imran Khan’s government in April through a no confidence motion. And the two events seem to be interlinked as well. Apparently, Imran Khan’s decision to visit Russia and meet Putin had angered Western powers including the US.

Analysis

Pre-Partition Dynamics

How does the arrival of new Cold War with Russia and removal of Imran’s government fit with the earlier balance of power tussles that led the British to leave the Sub-Continent – and the birth of India and Pakistan in 1947? Moreover, how does Imran’s stance differ from those adopted by previous leadership including Mohammad Ali Jinnah.

Clearly, both, Jinnah in the past, and Imran in the present, are dealing with a different set of circumstances. Jinnah was attempting to carve out a new nation and had to work with the colonial power. And the best chance for him to achieve success was by not being a revisionist. Moreover, he realized that the time of empires had passed, and the nation-state trend was the one he needed to conform to – not Pan-Islamism.

Another important consideration is an assessment of alternative political thoughts that existed at the time to deal with the challenges. Acuteness of obstacles, especially economic, often cause strong divergent views – where it is difficult to bring consensus.

For example, Jinnah’s attitude was in stark contrast to that of Mowlana Azad, Mowdudi, Mohammad Ali and Showkat Ali, Ghaffar Khan, and other Pan-Islamists of the time. He was against the ‘Khilafat Movement’ (which was formed against the breakup of the Ottoman Empire) and considered it a religious exaggeration; Gandhi, ironically, had supported this movement. Some Pan-Islamists later resisted the formation of Pakistan, as it would divide the Muslims of the subcontinent, and inadvertently became Gandhi’s staunch supporters.

The critical point in Jinnah’s position was his differentiation between the importance of local and regional interests vis-a-vis global ones. The local and regional interests translated into nationalistic interests, in the post-World War II nation-state environment. In Jinnah’s assessment, more importance was given to what was attainable; he complied with the nation-state trend in opposition to Pan-Islamism — the time for empires had passed. Not to forget, the transformation of Turkey to a State at the end of Ottoman Empire. And, it was not just Turkey. Virtually all the European empires had converted to nation-states toward the end of World War II.

Post-Independence Alignments

After gaining independence from Great Britain, Pakistan solidly remained in the Western block. The final battle of the previous Cold War was fought and won with Pakistan assistance in Afghanistan. It was, therefore, more than ironic that as the new Cold War got underway, and Russia invaded Ukraine in February, leader of Pakistan Imran Khan was seen standing next to Putin in Russia. And as Imran proclaimed his desire to establish and maintain independent foreign policy – his stances are perceived as Pan-Islamic and nationalist, with the undertones of revisionism.

When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the then ruler and chief martial law administrator, Gen Zia-ul-Haq, squarely sided with the US in organizing jihad against the godless Soviets. Subsequently, after 9/11 when US launched the War against Extremism, the then military ruler of Pakistan Gen Musharraf also decided to side with the US in carrying out the Campaign against Extremism. In both instances, the nation gained US economic and military support – despite the fact that both leaders had unceremoniously removed elected civilian governments, of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif respectively.

Irrespective, as the new Cold War gets underway Imran Khan appeared to be a misfit. To conform with the past trajectory would have meant for him to quickly fall in line – and avail the opportunity presented by the change in global political landscape for the betterment of the country – as had occurred during the Zia and Musharraf’s time. Alternatively, even if that was not possible, then Jinnah presents an ideal depiction of how to operate as a pragmatist with a weak hand. While Jinnah had to carve out an Muslim nation state, the present political, economic and security imperatives translate into no-less than existential threat.

Imran’s idealism is requiring him to alter the very conditions that are taking the nation to brink of extinction again and again – namely corruption and an opportunism. Whenever matters have taken a turn for the worse, the country has waited things out for the global context to change, and surely time never stays the same. This, by any definition, can hardly be called a policy or a strategy.

Societal Outlook

When we look at the past for examples, a question is also raised: did Jinnah align with the West because he believed the Allied powers were winning. Or – was it that he felt their values matched closely with his and what he was trying to achieve. After all, he spent a lot of time in Britain, like Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Imran Khan.

And this question remains relevant today. As Pakistan has remained an ally of the West and the US since Independence, naturally its people are also connected to the West when it comes to people-to-people contacts and commercial ties.

While the nation claim’s strategic friendship with China, the social contacts are no way near like what Pakistan has with the US. But which segment of the society are we talking about is also pertinent; the upper middle class, business elites, and top brass of the military have always been tied to the West, as can be said for many other nations.

More importantly, and otherwise less talked about, is how close are Pakistan’s value system to that of the West – at least in aspiring democratic form of government and sharing customized version of liberal world view. While its true that the West and the US have been losing their soft power – still Russia and China are no match when it comes to the cultural appeal.

When Imran Khan gives an example of what systems inspires him, other than ‘Riyasat-e-Medina’- he usually quotes the British system – not the Russian or Chinese. Although he has praised Chinese successes in poverty alleviation.

The fact of the matter is that Pakistan is politically, socially, and economically still connected to and dependent on the West and the US. However, this connection is deeper the higher one goes in the class system. This poses serious implications. Moreover, the disoriented youth have been galvanized and empowered by Imran’s narrative – which rhymes with their world view. Additionally, this world view inadvertently has been facilitated by the West: by supporting political leadership that falls short of its own standards and is seen as corrupt – and by not living up to the moral high ground in recent conflicts.

The non-revisionist class and leadership, in whose hands the British left the power, has lost credibility over time. Although that system is still attempting to maintain status quo – it would be increasingly difficult to do so.

The post New Cold War; Leadership Challenges For Middle Powers And Societal Imbalance appeared first on Politact.

Context

Why did Putin Invade Ukraine?

Many interpretations have come to the fore on why Putin invaded Ukraine on February 22. One of the recurring one is the ever-expanding NATO presence in Eastern Europe, which was now about to include Ukraine itself, right on the Russian border. Russia has often cited the unwritten understanding that came about at the time when Soviet Union was getting dissolved from 1989-1991 – suggesting NATO will not expand further. The cessation of Soviet Union eliminated the reason for NATO to expand in what Russia considers it to be its traditional sphere of influence, also known as its ‘Near Abroad’. US has denied that any such understanding existed.

On the other hand, Western scholars have long maintained that Putin aspires to revive the union of former Soviet republics – and the invasion of Ukraine may be another step along that path. Previously, he occupied Georgian states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russo-Georgian War of 2008. Had it not been due to the intervention of France to negotiate the truce, and subsequent US financial support in which then Senator Joe Biden played a key role, Georgia may very well had lost its sovereignty. Many believe that what happened in 2008, and the lame Western response, emboldened Putin.

Then came Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. It occurred soon after President Victor Yanukovych fled to Russia and the new acting Ukrainian president pledged to move closer to Europe by signing the association agreement of European Union. At the time Putin claimed Russia wants to ensure proper conditions for the people of Crimea, 60 percent of which were of Russian ethnicity, to freely express their views.

Whatever the reason for the present offensive on Ukraine i.e., NATO’s expansion in Russian Near Abroad or Putin’s desire to revive the Soviet Union, the timing of his move is deliberate.

His decision to move into Ukraine is likely based on a sense of Western weakness. The manner in which US withdrew from Afghanistan, economic situation resulting from Corona pandemic, and the status of European cohesion, are all likely playing a part in his decision. Perhaps the most critical aspect of his calculation is the future of American domestic politics and the Trump phenomenon. US has accused Russia of meddling in American elections through social media and by launching cyber-attacks.

Why the West has to React?

From an American perspective, while there may have been reasons to not counter Russia aggressively previously, in the case of Ukraine that is not the case. Short of sending troops to Ukraine, all other options are being evaluated.

While Russia and China alone do not pose a serious threat to the US and the Western political system, put together they are formidable adversaries. Since 9/11 US has been engaged in one conflict after the other, and this has provided an opportunity for Russia and China to grow their military and economic wherewithal. US simply cannot allow them to build a stronger military alliance.

Moreover, US depends on Europe for its global power projection. A growing concern recently has been the dependability on NATO and other allies to counter threats emanating from global adversaries – such as China and Russia. European nations and other allies have increasingly been seen dealing with both – building trade and military relations with China and Russia at the expense of US. For example:

• Under US pressure, UK banned Huawei from developing the 5G networks in 2020 due to security concerns, resulting in strong criticism from Chinese officials. Huawei had been operation in UK for at least 20 years and was an integral part of its 4G network.
• In 2015, France backed away from selling two high tech Mistral warships to Russia, a deal worth $1.6 billion, reportedly due to Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. The deal was highly criticized by US since France is a NATO member and supplying of the ship would have augmented Russian military capabilities.
• Then there is the controversial Nord Stream 2 Gas Pipeline that goes from Russia to Germany. Merkel government averted sanctions and reached a deal with the Biden Administration in July last year. The agreement involved investing more than 200 million euros in energy security of Ukraine and sustainable energy across Europe. US-Germany ties were strained considerably when Trump administration decided to pull out 9,500 US troops based in Germany.
• NATO member, Turkey, bought S-400 missile defense system from Russia in 2017. This resulted in Countering American Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAASTA) kicking in, claiming the deal would threaten NATO alliance and F-35 fighter jets in Turkish fleet. Enacted in 2017, CAASTA urged American allies and partners to not engage in transactions with Russia, Iran, and North Korea or risk sanctions. This has also prevented Pakistan from moving forward with Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project.
• Another American ally, India, has also acquired the S-400 air defense system at the cost of $5 billion but so far US has not been highly critical.
• In December 2019, US gave a waiver to India to jointly develop the Chabahar Port with Iran, which is seen as a counter to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port – being erected with Chinese investment. While the US strategic partnership with India has been evolving, the nation has remained reluctant in talking stronger role against China. Not only that, India is also ironically a full member of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). And thus, serious questions continue to be raised about the efficacy of QUAD alliance in which India is a member as well.
• As part of BRI, China has been extending its trade relations with Israel and US objected strongly to some of them citing security concerns – such as the Chinese company Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) running a container terminal at the Port of Haifa. The terminal is located near an Israeli naval base that is frequently visited by the US Sixth Fleet.

China, Russia Alliance – Sanctions and Soft Power

Due to events related to the War against Extremism, American perception and Soft Power has suffered in different parts of the world, which has also been exploited by China and Russia. China has projected its Belt and Road initiative as a win-win as it takes on large infrastructure projects in many nations.

For example, in addition to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China and Iran have signed a $400 billion 25 year economic and security deal that would lead to enhanced military and trade relations. The agreement ensures Chinese investment in Iranian telecommunication, transportation, and military fields. The military cooperation includes exercises, intelligence sharing, and joint research and development of weapons. China will also procure its energy needs from Iran on discounted price for over next 25 years.

The questioned has remained how will China implement the deal while sanctions on Iran remain – which have also delayed the much-needed Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project (IPI). In addition to CAASTA, the new sanctions on Russia will further complicate the China-Russia strategic cooperation.

As negotiations continue on the revived Iran nuclear deal, China could emerge as the big beneficiary if the Iran nuclear deal is reached, which US had left in 2015 during the Trump administration. But then, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed that he has received ‘written guarantees’ from US that Ukraine sanctions will not restrict Russian participation in nuclear projects and trade under the revised nuclear agreement with Iran. It was only after this assurance that Russia dropped its last-minute objections to the deal.

Russian invasion of Ukraine has provided an opportunity to the US to recover the Soft Power reserves, reinvigorate the NATO alliance, and by using sanctions undercut the growing strategic China-Russia alliance.

Emerging Scenarios

As the Ukrainian situation evolves a couple of possibilities are emerging. One of them is for negotiations between Ukrainian and Russian officials to succeed, with Ukraine declaring neutrality and forgoing its aspirations to join NATO. Afterall there are several other nations that have been in the neutral status – just to avoid the type of situation Ukraine now finds itself in. These nations include Austria, Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, and Ireland.

The second scenario is more dreadful and involves Russia getting bog down in Ukraine. As NATO nations supply sophisticated weaponry to Ukraine – leading to increasing loses for Russia. In this scenario, as Russia faces the brunt of sanctions, it reaches out to its strategic partner China for economic and military assistance. According to media reports Russia may have already done this. Talking to a news conference on March 23, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg stated, “China has provided Russia with political support, including by spreading blatant lies and misinformation.” He added there is concern that this could shift to material support. Earlier, US officials threatened China that there will consequences for any Chinese military and economic support to Russia.

One of the benefits of Ukraine crisis for China has been the shift of US focus away from the Pacific. However, if Russian is weakened in the crisis, it represents a strategic loss for China in the long run. In the grand scheme of affairs, Russia could keep Europe busy, if the things take a turn for the worse in the Pacific. But then, why should China face sanctions for what Russia has done. After all, China believes in non-intervention and respect for state sovereignty.

The post NATO, Sino-Russian Strategic Alliance, And Future Of Ukraine appeared first on Politact.

Significance of Historical Parallels and the Future of Anglo-American World Order

Context

The historical parallels are important in developing perspectives on present-day conundrums. They provide an illustration of where matters were and how they were dealt with at the time. Not only that – they also provide historical continuity and help grasp the future course. Consider the following excerpt from Allam Iqbal’s Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam:

“The past, no doubt, abides and operates in the present; but this operation of the past in the present is not the whole of consciousness. The element of purpose discloses a kind of forward look in consciousness. Purposes not only color our present states of consciousness, but also reveal its future direction. In fact, they constitute the forward push of our life, and thus in a way anticipate and influence the states that are yet to be.

To be determined by an end is to be determined by what ought to be. Thus past and future both operate in the present state of consciousness, and the future is not wholly undetermined as Bergson’s analysis of our conscious experience shows. A state of attentive consciousness involves both memory and imagination as operating factors. On the analogy of our conscious experience, therefore, Reality is not a blind vital impulse wholly un-illuminated by idea. Its nature is through and through teleological.”

How far to go in the past, what were the significant events, and how to relate them to the present, carries immense significance. Deciphering all of this helps to ascertain where matters stand and navigate the future.

British Departure from Subcontinent and Beyond

In the context of geopolitics, the departure of British from Subcontinent and the creation of India and Pakistan was one such significant event in recent history. It was the period when balance of power had shifted decisively, and the British were retreating from colonies they could no longer hold.

After being in the Subcontinent for about two hundred years, the last viceroy Lord Mountbatten was only given a year and half to complete his mission. He arrived in February 1947 and fulfilled his task in haste by August 1947. To draw the lines of divisions, Cyril Radcliffe was brought in, and was allotted just five weeks to figure out the complexities of such a momentous job.

However, the deliberation on the future of India had been continuing even before then, represented for example by the London based Round Table Conferences from 1930 to 1932 – and proved to be inconclusive. In any event, the baton after World War II was being handed over to the Americans – and soon transformed into a Cold War with the Soviets – giving rise to alliances such as Warsaw Pact, NATO, and affiliate alliances like SEATO and CENTO.

As the British withdrew from its colonies it must have thought deeply on securing its future interests as they related to other local and global players. Some of the strategic questions it would have had to grapple with is how to prevent the rise of revivalists in the Islamic world – against which the British, and other colonial powers, had fought hard in many theaters. Other consideration could have been, what kind of leadership to embed, land and sea accesses to secure, and resources to leave behind for their survival?

As victors of World War I, Britain had been ruling over more Muslims compared to any other European power, and in the Arab world under League of Nations Mandates. And, the holy places of Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem had also been gradually taken out of the hands of the Ottomans with British support. During this time, many new Arab nations came in to being, and the foundations of other states, like Israel, laid.

Pre-Independence Loyalties

Ironically, the World Wars had provided a perfect opportunity for the Hindus and Muslims to revolt against the British colonialists and side with axis powers – and take this route to gain independence. For the most part, the mainstream Hindu and Muslim leadership decided to remain loyal.

From what one can gather, Jinnah supported Great Britain in both World Wars, while the Muslims in India, Middle East, and Northern Africa were being subjugated. This should not be interpreted as a reflection of his belief in colonial causes and interests. Rather, these positions indicated the meaning of these wars for him and for the future of the people he represented. Jinnah positioned himself to gain some reciprocity and sympathy when the opportunity presented itself.

When the Round Table Conference on Palestine was called in 1939 and to which Aga Khan was invited, Jinnah was critical and lobbied many British parliamentarians indirectly. He demanded to be present as well to represent the Indian Muslims, after all, he argued, so many of them were serving in the royal army.

In the end, did Jinnah get what he expected when the partition of Subcontinent occurred, is up for debate. Many would argue that he received the short end of the stick on many calculations related to strategic accesses and resources – not to mention the unfinished business of Kashmir.

Jinnah’s attitude was in stark contrast to that of Mowlana Azad, Mowdudi, Mohammad Ali and Showkat Ali, Ghaffar Khan, and other Pan-Islamists of the time. He was against the ‘Khilafat Movement’ (which was formed against the breakup of the Ottoman Empire) and considered it a religious exaggeration; Gandhi, ironically, had supported this movement. Some Pan-Islamists later resisted the formation of Pakistan, as it would divide the Muslims of the subcontinent, and inadvertently became Gandhi’s staunch supporters.

The critical point in Jinnah’s position was his differentiation between the importance of local and regional interests vis-a-vis global ones. The local and regional interests translated into nationalistic interests as opposed to larger Pan-Islamic ones, in the post-World War II nation-state environment. In Jinnah’s assessment, more importance was given to what was attainable; he complied with the nation-state trend in opposition to Pan-Islamism — the time for empires had passed. Not to forget, the transformation of Turkey to a State at the end of Ottoman Empire. And, it was not just Turkey. Virtually all the European empires had converted to nation-states toward the end of World War II.

Post-Independence Geopolitics

As the empires and the colonies evaporated, the balance of power struggles were being taken on by the nation-states that were either aligned with the Soviet block or NATO affiliated alliances. However, two dramatic events in 1979 would have a profound impact on regional and global dynamics: the Iranian revolution of February 1979 and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.

The Afghan War in the 80s represented a pivotal moment in the Cold War. The Sunni Muslim revivalists now had the backing of US and moderate Muslims in the jihad against the Soviets. The subsequent collapse of Soviet Union meant that US had emerged as the sole superpower, and with the inadvertent side effect of empowered Muslim revivalists. The revivalists can be defined as of two types, ones that operate with in the system to reform through political means, and those that are working outside – against the whole system using violence (terrorists); those that belong to Al Qaeda and Associates and ISIS/ISIL/Daesh.

After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, it took almost eleven years before the Violent Revivalist struck US on September 11, 2001, and the War Against Extremism got initiated. US launched an invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq in short order. Taliban were accused of providing refuge and support to Al Qaeda while Saddam Hussein was suspected of possessing nuclear weapons. He had previously fought eight-year war with Iran, temporarily taken over Kuwait, launched scud missiles at Israel, and chemically poisoned Iraqi Kurds.

While the previous wars were amongst empires or nation-states – the War against Extremism is being primarily fought against non-state actors. While it is not known as a World War, it spans many nations. Moreover, the Arab Spring revolts which got underway in 2010 have added to the complexity and many regimes fell under accusations of corruption and economic stagnation. Moreover, the removal of Muhammad Morsi in 2013, after being in office hardly a year, indicated that Islamists are still unacceptable at the helm. On the other hand, Syrian turmoil, the situation of Libya and Yemen has demonstrated that balance of power tussles are fully intertwined with the Campaign against Extremism.

After two decades in Afghanistan, US withdrew in August 2021. And this represents another pivotal moment in the ongoing saga. Are the implications of US withdrawal from Afghanistan parallel to that of Great Britain’s from Subcontinent in 1947? War against Extremism has had tremendous impact on the political, economic, and security dynamics of the nations where this battle is being waged – and on those that wage it. Especially now that a New Cold War between the Anglo-American world order and China heats up – and circumstances related to Covid-19 and climate change add to the economic woes.

The post The Division of British India In 1947 And War Against Extremism appeared first on Politact.

Context

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) held its head of state summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan on September 17. The conference took place in the backdrop of the collapse of Ashraf Ghani government in Afghanistan as Taliban took over. This was accompanied by the complete withdrawal of US and coalition troops – that has raised alarmed bells across the region and beyond.

The future of the US presence in the South and Central Asia, and increasingly Middle East region, have remained the focus of SCO. As early as June 2010, the then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev had commented that the future of Afghanistan was directly relational to security and stability in all SCO countries and most observer countries, and that the SCO must endeavor to increase cooperation and involvement in Afghanistan to try and ensure stability in a post-US scenario.

The withdrawal of US troops and NATO from Afghanistan represents a significant shift in the regional and global balance of power – and while Taliban are in the process of establishing their government – they have not formally been recognized by any other nation yet. This is reflective of the wait and see approach. As Taliban get established and their domestic and foreign policies become more apparent – that is likely when the recognition process and financial support starts.

As SCO matures, other questions regarding its vision and capabilities also come in to play. The Dushanbe Declaration stated, it aspires:

“a more representative, democratic, just and multi-polar world order based on universally recognized principles of international law, cultural and civilizational diversity, mutually beneficial and equal cooperation of states under the central coordinating role of the UN.”

While the US has insisted that it will continue ‘over the horizon’ operations in Afghanistan as needed – the withdrawal from Afghanistan represents an attempt towards obtaining strategic clarity – and re-prioritizing its national interests. While US has been striving to Pivot towards Asia for a while, other global distractions have come in the way, and continue to pull US towards the War and Terror related hot-spots.

As the War Against Extremism was being waged, American sway in the Islamic world has been considerably reduced, and other than the Gulf Arab nations, its ties with Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan remain tense. It is interesting to note that Pakistan and India are already full members of SCO. Interestingly, Iran attained full membership, while Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Egypt also achieved the observer status during the SCO 20^th anniversary convention.

Nonetheless, US and NATO withdrawal increases pressures on SCO, and the member states, to maintain stability in Afghanistan. If it not managed well, it could escalate the regional tussles.

NATO, QUAD, and AUKUS

While SCO contemplates with how it can safeguard its interest in other parts of the world where it carries significant stakes, like Afghanistan or the Pacific, a growing concern for the US is how much it can depend on NATO and other allies to counter threats emanating from global adversaries – such as China and Russia.

European nations have increasingly been seen dealing with both – building trade relations with China and Russia at the expense of US. Moreover, the European allies are increasingly acting as go-betweens – to mitigate ties with those nations with which US has less than amicable relations. For example:

• Under US pressure, UK banned Huawei from developing the 5G networks in 2020 due to security concerns, resulting in strong criticism from Chinese officials. Huawei had been operation in UK for at least 20 years and was an integral part of its 4G network.
• In 2015, France backed away from selling two high tech Mistral warships to Russia, a deal worth $1.6 billion, reportedly due to Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. The deal was highly criticized by US since France is a NATO member and supplying of the ship would have augmented Russian military capabilities.
• Then there is the controversial Nord Stream 2 Gas Pipeline that goes from Russia to Germany. Merkel government averted sanctions and reached a deal with the Biden Administration in July. The agreement involved investing more than 200 million euros in energy security in Ukraine and sustainable energy across Europe. US-Germany ties were strained considerably when Trump administration decided to pull out 9,500 US troops based in Germany.

“Should Russia attempt to use energy as a weapon or commit further aggressive acts against Ukraine, Germany will take action at the national level and press for effective measures at the European level, including sanctions to limit Russian export capabilities to Europe in the energy sector,” a senior State Department official told a CNBC reporter in July.

• Other NATO member, Turkey, bought S-400 missile defense system from Russia in 2017. This resulted in Countering American Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAASTA) kicking in, claiming the deal would threaten NATO alliance and F-35 fighter jets in Turkish fleet. Enacted in 2017, CAASTA urged American allies and partners to not engage in transactions with Russia, Iran, and North Korea or risk sanctions. This has also prevented Pakistan from moving forward with Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project.
• Another American ally, India, is also in the process of acquiring the S-400 air defense system at the cost of $5 billion. According to some reports, India will receive the system by the end of the year.
• In December 2019, US gave a waiver to India to jointly develop the Chabahar Port with Iran, which is seen as a counter to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port – being erected with Chinese investment. It can serve as an alternative supply route for Afghanistan and to help the country diversify its export opportunities. While the US strategic partnership with India has been evolving, it has remained reluctant in talking stronger role against China or getting engaged in the security realm in Afghanistan. Not only that, it is also ironically a full member of SCO. And thus, serious questions continue to be raised about the efficacy of QUAD alliance.

And this is where the trilateral alliance AUKUS, announced on September 15, comes into play. From the American perspective, one can observe what is the use of alliances or strategic partners that have significant divergent interests – as has been demonstrated from the behavior of European allies, that have to be cajoled to contribute more towards their defense spending – and cut down their dealings with adversarial powers. The quality of the alliance is more critical than the quantity of partners.

Managing the Rise of China

For US the question has remained how best to counter China which since its admission to the World Trade Organization in 2001, has gotten fully intertwined in global trade. The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement signed in February 2016, and dumped by Trump in 2017, represented the economic approach to deal with China. The recently formulated AUKUS pact between Australia, UK, and US is a security-oriented alliance.

The best approach would involve more economic dimension – according to Fareed Zakaria’s Washington Post column, titled: To contain China, joining the Pacific trade pact might be more effective than new submarines. But there is another dimension to this debate that was last heard prominently during the Obama administration – and has to do with coexistence. Speaking at the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) event in July, the White House coordinator for Asia Pacific, Kurt Campbell, admitted that coexistence is still possible but expect a period of uncertainty and raised tensions.

Speaking at the inception ceremony of ASPI in 2014, Henry Kissinger had stated while the Russian aggressiveness in Europe is clearly worrisome, it’s China that has the size and the economic wherewithal to challenge US. Moreover, this challenge does not appear to be a military one but perhaps more of an economic one. However, ever since, Chinese military capabilities are increasing by leaps and bounds.

Speaking at the same ASPI event in 2014, then Chinese Ambassador to the US, Cia Tiankai, had insisted they are not against the US presence in the Pacific; after all they have been there for a while. Furthermore, US businesses have large presence within China as well. What they (Chinese) are worried about is the US intent when it is building alliances in the region and conducting military exercises. When asked about what Kissinger’s advice would be for the Chinese and the US in the present circumstances (2014). He stated that he would tell China to not let the military issues overhang in their ties, while he will tell US not to get involved in military provocations, exercises in the region, or develop bases.

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