In the COVID-19 geopolitical context, this zoom webinar, held on on July 28, explores the ramifications of the likely China, Iran economic and security pact for the Gulf region and its ties with Pakistan and India. Another important query examined is how will the pact correlate with the Saudi-Iran tensions and US-Saudi ties. Moreover, the panelists examined the impact of the deal for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

The panel included:
1. Khaled Almaeena – Former Editor-in-Chief of Arab News and Saudi Gazette.
2. Ambassador (R) Mustafa Kamal Kazi – Senior Vice Chairman and Senior Diplomat Emarituis, Karachi Council on Foreign Relations.
3. Dr. Claude Rakisits – Honorary Associate Professor, Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy, Australian National University.

This zoom webinar is part of a series PoliTact has organized to examine the economic and security interconnections between South Asia and the Middle East. In November 2018, PoliTact collaborated with the Middle East Institute to study this relation in detail (link: https://youtu.be/Wq7cWEsaqcs).

The post What Does The Potential China, Iran Economic and Security Deal Mean? appeared first on Politact.

Context

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the Coronavirus linked pandemic was first reported from the Wuhan city of China, around the end of December 2019. Now it has nearly engulfed the whole world. At the time this article is being written, CNN is reporting total global cases of around 823,479, with deaths standing at 40, 636. In the US, total cases stand at 177,308 and deaths at 3,538 and the numbers are expected to rise.

There is a tendency to view the disruption caused by COVID-19 from the perspective how life and things were. The focus here is to look at the impact of this pandemic on the trajectory of major trends we have been monitoring – particularly as they relate to the global political, economic, and security situation. And all three are interconnected.

If the economic prospects deteriorate, they are bound to influence the political and security state of affairs. And this is the reason why governments all over are under pressure to take action, provide financial stimulus packages and health facilities. This is in addition to the unprecedented steps, such as lockdowns, that state actors are being forced to consider – a damning step that literally translates into economic strangulation. Whether these steps would be enough is yet to be seen. Obviously, viruses do not discriminate between the rich and poor; nonetheless, the consequences for the developed and developing world are bound to be disproportionate.

Analysis

1. Political Systems and Governance

In our previous assessments, the weaknesses of the political systems and deteriorating governance have been pointed out. Equal opportunity for all does not exist – and inequality is at all time high. According to Oxfam International, “the world’s richest 1% have more than twice as much wealth as 6.9 billion people.” Moreover, every day 10,000 people die because of lack of access to affordable health care.

The democratic systems are seen as faltering first because the societies are extremely polarized – and developing consensus on critical issues has proven to be acutely difficult. The election results are failing to produce majority and thus the resulting governments are fragile and indecisive.

Additionally, the collusion between money and politics has gravely infected governance – as this means the interests of the powerful are represented at the cost of less affluent, leading to highly biased policies and corruption.

In the developing world the situation is further aggravated when the corrupt political leadership is often supported by the West, and is seen as not catering to the masses and the needs of the youth bulge while disproportionalely spending on defense budgets. This also results in anti-west sentiments and has created an environment that is ripe for revolt. Many of these reasons are also responsible for why religious extremism has spread.

Now, added to this is the shock created by the COVID-19 and the question of how that is likely to impact the already fragile governance and the election systems. The credibility of the governments will be further tested by how they handle the crisis and protect the citizens.

As they develop financial bailout programs, the governments will be divided between bailing out the corporations or the people. One can argue that businesses, and the people they employ, mean one and the same thing. If the corporations that suffer the economic consequence are not saved, how will these companies support their employees during the tough times?

But one can also argue that some of these corporations have been on a profit making roller coaster, and this is an opportune time for them to use the gains to back their employees – rather than using the taxpayer money to be rescued. The governments should instead focus on saving people on the lower stratum that are otherwise unlikely to get any help.

In the US, this argument has a special meaning with the elections approaching towards the end of the year. One of the positives President Trump had going for him has been the economy. However, the Wall Street has been jolted very seriously. According the jobless report that came out in March, 3.3 million people have applied for jobless claims, and the figure is reported to go as high as 47 million by summer.

This has the made his administrations nervous. If they mishandle the crisis and it prolongs, the chances of Trump getting reelected are going to diminish. On the other hand, if he effectively deals with the pandemic and is able to contain it in the short term, then the American economy could possibly be on track to recovery come election time.

However, if the pandemic spreads and the crisis deepens, then the societal fissures are likely to become more serious. As witnessed during the economic crisis of 2008, while the corporations were bailed out, the benefits did not trickle down, and the Middle Class significantly lost its economic prowess. This in turn will also erode the public confidence in the political system and reinforce the argument that the political system is tilted towards favoring the few – at the cost of the many.

2. Economic Consequence – Will the System Survive the Shock?

As alluded to earlier, the political, economic, and security health of a nation is intertwined. Financial stability is the backbone on which rests the political and security viability of the state. If the state is unable to provide for the economic wellbeing, and safeguard the citizens, then the social contract between a citizen and the state is threatened to the core.

In previous assessments, it was noted that often the choices made under the laissez faire approach have had an adverse impact on the political and economical governance models connected to the present nation-state structure, especially as it relates to the phenomenon known as Globalization. There has existed a growing alarm that the present models are unsuitable for the future needs, and thus the participants have already been nervous.

Just as the Coronavirus works across borders, so does the interests of the interconnected global markets. All of this raises the question of a value of an asset, who holds it, and who determines the value of that asset. This is amply at display in the current competition over the oil prices playing out between Saudi Arabia and Russia.

As a result of this dynamic, we saw nationalist and popular movements emerging, which often have backed protectionist and anti-immigration policies, and have supported ethnic nationalism. The election of Trump in the US, and Modi in India, are the noteworthy examples.

Now many fear, the policies being adopted to counter the Coronavirus, such as closing of borders, are similar to the ones favored by the ultra-nationalists, and will be used to reorient the otherwise global supply chains.

While the Coronavirus pandemic appears to be not man-made, there is an eerie near ten-years boom and bust cycle repeating itself. The Saving and Loan crisis of the 80s was described as the most significant bank collapse in the US since the Great Depression of 1929. This was followed by the Dotcom Bubble of 2001 and was mainly a result of speculative investing in the Internet related businesses. It was taking place at the same time as 9/11 terrorists attack unfolded in 2001. This was followed by the recession of 2008.

These cycles consistently and disproportionately destroy one set of businesses while benefiting the others. In classic business terms, the boom and bust cycle is explained as natural phases of market expansion and contraction, and as a characteristic of capitalistic system. However, in almost all of the bust scenarios, the taxpayer money was ultimately used to bail out the culprits whose rash activities crashed the markets in the first place.

For instance, in the 2008 recession, it was the behavior of the financial and banking institutions that caused the crisis – but then were deemed ‘too big to fail’ and subsequently bailed out at the taxpayers’ expense. It’s kind of a double whammy; first people loose their market investments – and then have to pay to save the bad players. Thus the question becomes, how many times can one repeat this disparaging cycle before eventually bankrupting the taxpayers and by extension, the state?

3. Security – From War on Terror to War Against Coronavirus

Strong economy is the lifeline on which depends both the political and security situation. Without sound fiscal health, neither good governance can be provided – nor security can be established. So while the global economic system was already under stress, Coronavirus has added to the global woes. If the highly indebted governments cannot generate taxes because the economy is in a shut down, how will the system continue to function? And this is why we are confronted with a scary situation of a system collapse, especially if the situation prevails for an extended time.

Short Term Scenario

If matters can be brought under control in two to three months, then the chances of normalcy returning are higher in the developed world than the developing. It is just because the financial systems of the developed world have a greater tolerance and buffer for shocks. However, system-level impacts will still linger for considerable time – and so will be the questions regarding hard choices that will have to be made.

Long Term Scenario

However, if the situation extends for a period longer than 3 months, a direr situation would be confronted. It would lead to stark choices regarding where the government spending would have to be cut – so that it can be beefed up for social programs. And the obvious area to be addressed would be the defense and security related funding. Moreover, it would lead to tensions between the state and the federal levels of government on budgeting issues. If political activities cannot be held, then even the elections would have to be postponed.

In the US, these fissures are already beginning to emerge, but the debate has not shifted towards defense spending. However, US was already in the process of withdrawing from Afghanistan, and drawing down its presence in Iraq. And it has also been pressuring the NATO members to increase their defense spending.

Ultimately the nations of the world would have to address a decisive question: how to confront the Coronavirus while the humans continue to exploit and fight each other. While this may require a more global collaboration, the trends are more in the opposite direction presently. The need of the day is to declare a moratorium on all human conflict – to deal with COVID-19.

The post The Post COVID-19 World – The Enemy Within And Without appeared first on Politact.

Context

“The history repeats itself, “first as tragedy, then as farce.”

These profound quotes, irrespective of the source, are often repeated – but then we see them unfolding right in front of our eyes.

PoliTact has been observing the connection of the affairs of the Middle East and South Asia, while contending that what transpires in the Middle East region will have a profound impact over South Asia, especially Pakistan and India. Moreover, we had pointed out last year that the Gulf region is slowly moving out of Pakistan’s sphere of influence and into that of India.

The present Kashmir crisis has exposed and highlighted this fissure more than ever, where other than Qatar, the other Gulf Nations have come out in favor of India. The rationale is that under the nation-state structure – the state has to protect its national interest, and economic interests trump religious inclinations. However, there is much more sinister global trend at play and that has to do with the rise of racism and right wing extremism. This is a boomerang impact of the War against Extremists, when thousands of uprooted Muslims headed to the economically struggling Europe to seek refuge – meanwhile escalating ethnic tensions and reinforcing the fears and the message of the right-wingers.

Analysis

Core versus Periphery Dynamics

There is obviously the internal dynamics of the Islamic World, what we term as the ‘Core versus Periphery’ dynamics, on who stands up and represents the held over Umma grievances from Palestine to Kashmir. As the Core regions represented by the Arab world abdicates the role, the Peripheral powers of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan have attempted to fill the vacuum.

These nations of South Asia and Central Asia, Middle East, and North Africa emerged from the ashes of WW I and II – when the tussles of the colonial powers had boiled over. However, even after attaining their nationhood, some of these states remained aligned with the West, as they switched from the British to the American sphere of influence.

However, after the cessation of the Cold War, and as the Global War on Terror (GWOT) evolved, the established and emerging power dynamics resurfaced will full swing. By the time, this campaign entered Syria and Libya, it transformed and has become a full fledge proxy war. Presently, it’s moving from the stage where the non-state actors were the primary targets – to becoming an inter-state conflict, which it had narrowly escaped up to now. Nonetheless, the war against terror and the tussles of the emerging and established powers are fully intertwined now.

While the low level conflict related to war against extremism played out, China has gradually made inroads into many of these former Western allies. Meanwhile, the US ties have deteriorated with peripheral powers of Pakistan and Turkey, which is also a NATO member. While an attempt was made during the Obama administration to ease tensions with Iran, the scraping up of the Iran nuclear deal, has rekindled the tensions. Meanwhile, the Syrian crisis has indicated that Russia never left the Middle East.

To counter these dynamics, US has developed strategic ties with India and the Gulf States. While Europe has served as the source of global power projection since the end of World Wars, India and the Gulf States are serving that purpose in these regions.

On the other hand, as the two-state solution is on a trajectory of slow death, the Gulf States have been aligning themselves with Israel and India, at the cost of both the Palestinian and Kashmiri Muslims. Instead, the rich Gulf States, with the exception of Qatar, have focused on fighting Iranian proxies in Yemen, and to counter the Iranian influence in places like Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. And in this they have convergence with Israel and the US.

On their side, both India and Israel have exploited the war against terror by linking the Palestinian and Kashmir cause with extremism. Irrespective, the Arab States will find it very difficult to manage the street as this transition unfolds, and even the peripheral powers will have a hard time sitting back – when India ruthlessly subjugates its Muslim citizens from Kashmir to Assam.

Post GWOT Era

With close to two decades of involvement in GWOT, in its new defense strategy, the US has finally shifted to focus on what it calls the strategic adversaries, such as China and Russia.

However, the post GWOT era is characterized by the weakness of Europe, growing ethnic nationalism, trade wars, and diminishing effectiveness of multilateral institutes such as UN, whose purpose was to prevent future wars and maintain peace.

Then there is the challenge of security versus economic dynamics. Meaning, should security affairs take precedence over economic matters, or vice versa. One thing is clear, that economies truly flourish in secure and peaceful environments. At the same time, when economy and fiscal conditions deteriorate, it gives rise to the blame game, xenophobia, ethnic nationalism, and civil strife. If religion is added as a variable to this dynamics, it results in a really combustible situation.

While the end of World Wars resulted in the cessation of empires and the emergence of nation-state structure, any future war of such magnitude is likely to spell the end of nation-state framework. And it’s not clear at this point what will replace the nation-state structure.

Conclusion

When it comes to India and Pakistan, the religious premise on which the division of India and Pakistan came about in 1947, appears to have been vindicated. But the history has not run in its course yet. While the politics, economics, and security of the region, and beyond, has evolved; people do try to settle scores when the timing is right, and in this sense history is always being rewritten.

India up to now represented the epitome of secularism and democracy, something it proudly shared with the West. A dramatic Indian turn to the right perhaps is matching the trend that is emerging in the West and the US as well. While this is by no means a done deal in the West, India seems to have chosen a direction that will be fought vehemently by the liberals there, as it is being in the West and Israel.

For right now, the vision of economic interdependence laid out in the post World War landscape, to prevent wars and prohibit ethnic nationalism from spreading its lethal tentacle in the future, is faltering right in front of us. The very powers that laid out the lofty aspirations are themselves turned inwards – from Brexit to America First. Once again, the world is entering a bleak phase where there is more reliance on military might and ethnic superiority to resolve issues – than negotiating and coexisting.

The post The Global Rise Of Far Right And Indian Annexation of Kashmir appeared first on Politact.

By Arif Ansar 

Context

The frame of reference used in an analysis tremendously influences the output, and in fact shapes it. Our vantage point is congruent with the theory that the events of Middle East are now superseding the political, security, and economic dynamics of South Asia, and are likely to become its major determinant. We are reaching a tipping point of this trajectory now. In other words, the opportunity to solve Afghanistan imbroglio and ease Pakistan-India tensions will now directly involve Iran and Saudi Arabia – and the dynamics of Middle East.

A different way to understand this predicament is to consider South Asia as another theater for the wider shift in the global balance of power that is not going in the favor of US – and drifting towards China and Russia, while the fate of Europe hangs in the balance. The European identity stands at the most crucial juncture of its history. Will it be able to carve out an independent posture and identity remains to be seen.

In previous articles we have explored how the US decision to move its embassy to Jerusalem was likely to impact the political and security situation of the Middle East. Now that this decision has been implemented, accompanied by the revoking of the Iran nuclear deal, we have entered a whole new era of international relations.

The American allies and adversaries alike are beginning to see the full manifestation of how the ‘America First’ doctrine looks like in reality. The foremost realization for American allies is that it’s not what America can do for them, but what these allies can deliver for the US to continue to receive the same level of economic and security assistance they had gotten used to.

This has come as a surprise for nations that form the core of the transatlantic alliance like France, Germany and the UK. And the shock and awe extends to the American establishment itself, which now stands at a crossroad.

Analysis

America First and American Establishment

While the American establishment for the most part still operates from the globalist and liberal frame of reference, the Unilateralist premise the Trump Administration has adopted is the antithesis to that. This has already caused a number of inter-institutional frictions, and several of their leaders were removed unceremoniously. Many think this outlook can cause a full fledge trade war with China and the allies.

For example, the American foreign and security policies are still emphasizing building strong international alliances. Withdrawal from trade agreements such as Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Paris climate accord, and now the Iran nuclear deal, is undoing those alliances that US had built over decades with great effort. The re-imposition of trade sanctions on Iran has complicated economic affairs for many of its global allies. With the decision to move its embassy from Jerusalem, US has lost any semblance of neutrality in the Middle East Peace Process.

President Trump had also wanted cordial ties with Russia. However, this was not the assessment of the security institutions, which saw Putin increasingly meddling in the internal affairs of the US and acting against its global interests. Moreover, it has built strong strategic alliance with China and Iran. The investigation looking in to any direct collusion between Russia and Trump’s campaign team is still ongoing and looking ominous by the day.

Two critical dimensions are thus evolving simultaneously. The first one is will President Trump be able to align the establishment and bring consistency between his domestics and global outlook? Alternatively, increasing friction can further stimulate the impeachment process and attempts to revert to a more globalist approach. And even if this eventuality occurs, it’s not clear that if the world can be switched back easily?

Then there is the question of how will the increasingly insecure allies adapt to this flux in the US.

The first thing allies across the spectrum are going through is shock. How can this be happening? And now that ample time has passed to understand that their anxieties were not misplaced, serious thinking will be geared towards formulating a response.

European Allies

When it comes to the European allies, the first phase may be an introspection of how dependent they are on the US. Considering their present economic and security predicament, to what extent can they stand on their own on the world stage?

Once this period is over, it will likely move towards if you can’t beat them then join them mentality.

In parallel, an undercurrent will gain momentum emphasizing a respective Europe First or France First approach. The Nationalist forces have been resurgent across Europe too. This thinking will be accompanied by an evaluation of how Europe stands as individual nations, and collectively as EU, vis-à-vis those actors that US considers adversaries. Not to mention, the building resentment against the America First doctrine will help China and Russia to make inroads and begin to shake the trans-atlantic alliance. To some extent China has been well on its way to enhance its trade relations with Europe, while Russia exerts influence via the gas it supplies. China ranks as EU’s second biggest trading partner after the United States, while the EU is China’s biggest trading partner.

On the other hand, Trump administration would prefer the EU nations realize that they cannot face the global risks alone. Irrespective, in the absence of US support or withdrawal, the struggle would likely shift towards attempts to dominate Europe between France, Germany, UK, and Russia. After all these urges are what led to WWI and WWII – and US could not and will not allow an adversarial power to control Europe.

Equally, the European nations may start to chart an independent course overtime. How these nations deal with the Iranian sanctions will be a case in point. Threatened by American sanctions if their businesses continue with Iran, they might start developing an alternative financial system and in turn pose ominous risks for the US. Russia and China will be more than willing in this endeavor if matters deteriorate further. A major chunk of China’s oil imports come from Iran and trade between the two stands at 28 billion dollars.

Allies in the Middle East and South Asia

As previously discussed in this space, the forgoing of US neutrality in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and potentially in Kashmir in the future, will have grave consequences for the region. Some of them have already begun to manifest in the form of more aggressive Israeli behavior towards Syria, Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah. In this it has the tangent support of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. On the other hand, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan have come out strongly against the moving of the US embassy to Jerusalem. This has created an unprecedented fissure in the Islamic world.

Trump has pretty much applied the same formula on the Arab allies as it has now on the Europeans. Principally, if you need American security and economic assistance, then align your policies with that of the US. However, this cannot occur without significant short and long-term costs and consequences like the ones discussed above for Europe.

If the European nations, including Turkey and Pakistan, and other states of the region, start to ignore US sanctions, it could very well trigger the initiation of an alternative financial system spearheaded by Russia and China. The groundwork for such an alternative is already in the works under BRICS and the Chinese One Belt One Road (OBOR) plan.

In this new formulation, US-Indian strategic ties will be acutely tested. India is part of BRICS and the SCO, and also maintains close ties with both the US and Israel. Will India alienate its otherwise cordial economic relations with Iran? And if India does that, it will only move Iran closer to Pakistan, and possibly assist in Afghanistan as well.

The Chabahar port will be the other cost of the American sanctions that will test the Indian will. India has committed $500 million towards the construction of Chahbahar port. According to Indian Foreign Ministry, India-Iran trade for the fiscal year 2016-17 stood at $12.89bn. However, like on Jerusalem, a complete US turnaround on Kashmir could shift the tide in the US favor.

In the emerging formulation, Saudi Arabia and UAE will likely exert their influence to prevent Iran and Pakistan from moving closer, or for Pakistan to move ahead with the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline. These nations could possibly put their support for Kashmir on the table – as the cost for Pakistan to stay away from Iran. In the short-term, after the moving of US embassy to Jerusalem and withdrawal from Iran nuclear deal, the region and Pakistan should expect a more brazen Indian behavior.

The post American Renunciation Of Iran Nuclear Deal; Implications For Europe, South Asia appeared first on Politact.

Context

By Arif Ansar

PoliTact has previously noted that since 9/11 the threat perception of the Middle Eastern nations have transferred from being fixated on Israel to dealing with and countering violent extremism. A similar shift also occurred in South Asia, where the debate has continued if the threat Pakistan faces is primarily external or internal. More specifically, should Pakistan focus its defense and security strategies towards dealing with India, or fighting extremist groups that are specially targeting the country.

Despite years of effort, in the absence of political roadmap and deadlock on the diplomatic front, reaching a peaceful settlement to the perennial Arab-Israeli and Kashmir conflicts, appear remote. However, a new ‘Outside In’ approach is emerging in the Middle East that is equally applicable towards the Kashmir conflict and the Afghan political reconciliation. And it has to do with the change in the ecosystem in which these conflicts persist. Moreover, what appear to be the key challenges in the campaign against extremists, are also the key facilitators for the emerging approach.

At an event hosted by Atlantic Council on May 7 (video link), the author asked the former US special envoy for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the present executive vice president of Brookings Institution, Martin Indyk, about how the Iranian nuclear deal and the US-Gulf partnership can help or hinder the Middle East Peace Process. And now that a nuclear deal with Iran has been reached, this linkage is no longer just a hypothetical construct. His answer, and our research, points to the emerging approach.

Analysis

Understanding the Concept

Martine Indyk replied that the prospects of a solution emerging from an ‘Inside Out’ approach i.e., from with in Israel and Palestine, and independent of whatever else is going on in the Middle East, are not good. However, the potential for an ‘Outside In’ solution which has emerged because of the possible Iran nuclear deal and Israeli and Arab countries being on the same side, might emerge with positive response because of the new strategic alignment in the region.

Speaking at the Heritage Foundation, Israeli envoy to the US, Ron Dermer, recently commented along the same line:

“They used to believe the key to that [a rapprochement with the Arab word] was solving the Palestinian question, and there is no doubt that issue cannot be ignored,” Dermer said.

He continued: “But as the prime minister said a few months ago, I’m not so sure the reverse won’t be true, meaning that I don’t know if Israel and Palestinian peace will unlock wider rapprochement with the Arab world. It might be broader rapprochement with the Arab world will unlock Israeli-Palestinian peace. We should be focusing the next few years on how we can take advantage of this historic aligning of interests between Israel and our Arab neighbors.”

Key Elements of ‘Outside In’ Method In South Asia

As the theater for the war against terror expands unabated, the environments in which extremism persists in South Asia, Middle East and North Africa are also evolving. There are two particular impediments that are forcing the state actors to change their past policies towards non-state actors. These challenges ironically are also serving as the key facilitators for the evolving ‘Outside In’ method.

Multilateral Approaches

Firstly, without adopting a multilateral approach, it is difficult for any individual state to deal with extremism comprehensively. For example, in the context of South Asia, pressure on extremist groups in Afghanistan had made them slip over to the Pakistan side of the border. Now that Pakistan has acted forcefully through its operation Zarb-e-Azb, the extremists have crossed over to Afghanistan.

This reality has forced both nations to cooperate; especially when along with Afghanistan, the economic and security situation of Pakistan has also dwindled overtime. And if the trend continues, it would become very difficult for Pakistan to maintain its posture against its regional rival India.

Islamic State, Al Qaeda and their Associates

The other aspect has to do with the introduction of a new player in the extremist ecosystem of the region that goes by the name Islamic State (also known as ISIS, ISIL and Deash). While mixed reviews have emerged regarding the IS penetration in South Asia, the group does appear to be adding the pressure on different factions of Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. IS is aligning itself with those factions of Taliban that are against any kind of reconciliation in Afghanistan and the ones that are acting against the state of Pakistan.

If this pattern holds, IS is likely to undercut and weaken Al Qaeda’s (AQ) connection with its associates in the region. The associates are known to include Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, sectarian outfits, including jihadist groups oriented towards Kashmir and India. Allegedly, some of these entities are also under the influence of Pakistan.

In essence, IS can disrupt the traditional hierarchies and influences under which the extremist ecosphere has operated in the region and steal their long held platforms.

Transplanting the Circumstances of Middle East on South Asia

This can lead to a lot of infighting in a fashion similar to what is unfolding in the Middle East where the Sunni IS and AQ and associates are fighting with each other, and at the same time targeting governments of the region. On the other hand, Sunni nationalist groups such as Kurds and Shia non-state actor, Hezbollah, are proving quite effective in countering IS and AQ. Many claim that without the support of Hezbollah, Assad’s regime in Syria would not have survived as long as it has.

Recent reports indicate that IS has now also threatened and challenged Hamas in Gaza. Under pressure from Egypt and US, Hamas has cracked down on the jihadist that oppose reconciliation with Fatah and Israel. “We will uproot the state of the Jews [Israel] and you [Hamas] and Fatah, and all of the secularists are nothing and you will be overrun by our creeping multitudes,” an IS member was quoted as claiming in a video release.

While Hamas itself is a jihadist group, its struggle against Israel has been under the umbrella of Palestinian nationalism, unlike IS and AQ that have global ambitions and do not affiliate with nationalist causes.

There is a real prospect for a similar dynamics playing out in the South Asia region as part of the ‘Outside In’ process. In such a scenario, AQ and IS, including their associates, are likely to target the state of Afghanistan and Pakistan while at the same time attacking at each other. Some of this is already in play. As this evolves, and as is occurring in the Middle East, IS will attempt to steal the platform of Afghan Taliban, including Kashmir oriented jihadist groups.

On the other hand, India oriented jihadist groups may come to the defense of Pakistan, in the same way Hezbollah is now focused on protecting the Syrian regime and distracted from its concentration on Israel. In this context, the concept of non-state actors that are under some sort of state influence, and those that do not listen to anyone, as has been previously discussed in this space, has taken on an added emphasis.

In this picture, Sunni nationalist Baloch insurgents, would target both the state and IS and AQ. Moreover, the Baloch insurgents are likely to gain western support, as have the Kurds, in their fight against the extremists. This situation can add pressure on Pakistan and Iran to not target Baloch fighters, as they will be viewed as partners in the fight against extremists. This is the same predicament Turkey has found itself in vis-à-vis the Kurds in the Middle East.

As the sectarian angel deteriorates, the groups that formerly formed the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan could also return to action.

All of this will, however, shift the orientation of Pakistan’s policies and will make it view India and Afghanistan as allies against non-state actors. This is similar to how the threat perception of Arab states have shifted away from Israel, while at the same time made them share Israel’s fear from Iran and the extremist groups.

Conclusion

As this scenario and ‘Outside In’ approach unfolds, and faced with a common threat, is likely to change how the obstacles in the way of settling the Kashmir issue and Afghan reconciliation are viewed. During the first phase of the process, confronted with existential threats, will obviously result in transformation of long-held positions and policies of the states in question. However, its unlikely this would suspend the dynamics that would have been unleashed.

At the end of World War II, the insurgencies and other religiously oriented militancies that opposed the colonial powers, and their allies, were absorbed by the new nation-state structure, while giving birth to the irredentist claims that presently pose a risk.

Now that the concept of nation state is threatened, and as the extremist phenomenon undergoes fission and fusion, the question is what kind of new order will be able to absorb and deflect their energies. While infighting amongst extremist groups weakens them in the short term, in the long run, one or the other group may start to domineer. As was the case in the past, how these religious and insurgent groups intermingle with regional and global powers, will provide clues towards understanding the future direction.

Note: The above analysis is based on a scenario that explores the possibilities based on the trajectory of present circumstances in the Middle East. PoliTact will continue to monitor the situation and adjust the scenarios according to the developing reality.

The post The Emerging ‘Outside In’ Approach To Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Afghan Reconciliation, And Kashmir Issue appeared first on Politact.

Context
A media discussion on VOA Urdu program ‘Round Table’ held on June 22, 2015. The program covered the US Department of State report on extremism for 2014 and comparing it with PoliTact’s forecast that lays out the top 10 characteristics of the war against terror.

The panel included:

– PoliTact’s Chief Analyst Arif Ansar
– Former Interior Secretary of Pakistan Tasneem Noorani
– Editor of London based Newspaper ‘Western Affairs’ Manzar Qureshi
– Journalist Aqil Yusufzai,
– Brigadier (R) Saad Nazir from the Institute of Policy Studies Pakistan

Analysis

The post 2014 US State Department Report On Extremism And Characteristics Of The Campaign Against Terror appeared first on Politact.

Context

By Arif Ansar

In earlier articles different facets and phases of the ‘war against terror’ since it got underway, have been discussed. The terminology has almost become defunct as the balance of power in Middle East stands at a tipping point. Why that has happened is instrumental towards understanding the present status of the campaign against extremists.

For all intents and purposes, the first phase can be classified as the time frame between 9/11 and the demise of Osama bin Laden. The period between Operation Geronimo to the ignition of Yemen conflict can be termed as the second phase. While Yemen has been in the limelight for a while as a strong seat for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the departure of US Special Forces in March this year represented a turning point. The eruption of Yemen conflict in its current form, and the growing Saudi and Gulf involvement there, marks the beginning of the third phase.

Each period of the campaign was accompanied by its own sets of assumptions and characteristics that have been previously discussed. They are being summarized to recollect and help us understand the Stage III. Obviously, each one these patterns pose unique implications.

Phase III of the campaign against terror may see more direct interstate conflict which risks involving one or the other global power. And this will fundamentally change the nature of the conflict that was initially deemed as the war against Islamic extremists.

Mitigating far-flung security threats is one thing, risks that can imperil influence in the home sphere and economic lifeline of an aspiring or an established global power, is a different matter altogether.

Analysis

Character I – The growth of Non-State Actors of different colors accompanied by Asymmetric Warfare, which the conventional militaries were not trained to engage in.

These include Sunni Islamic State (IS, ISIL, ISIS, Daesh) and AQ that apparently do not listen to anyone. Since 9/11 many affiliates of AQ have also sprung up in the extremism inflicted regions. Some are loosely attached while others are more directly linked with AQ. In some instances, these associates are also perceived to be under the influence of a state entity.

On the other hand, there is the Shia Hezbollah acting as a proxy of Iran.
The third kind of non-state actors are nationalist in character such as the Kurds and Houthis, and moderate forces like Free Syrian Army (FSA) supported by the West, and others, against the extremists.

Character II – Future of extremism as represented by Fission and Fusion of Sunni extremists and the emergence of IS. The harmonization or divisions have resulted in new alignments amongst extremist posing ominous risks for the nation-states of the region and beyond. For examples the tussles between AQ and Associates against IS and Associates.

Character III – Societal transformation of extremist inflicted regions with increased polarization, growing religious conservatism, decreasing secular space and respect for minorities, with difficulty in achieving political consensus. The election results are narrow; power sharing formulas and unity governments are the outcome as witnessed in places like Iraq, Afghanistan and Tunisia.

In addition, this transformation has created a fear that religious parties may make it to the helm of power using the system, as occurred in Egypt. Preventing this is requiring constitutional amendments.

Character IV – The application of military force against extremists appears to have not worked and the political reconciliation is proving to be equally difficult; there are no clear winners or losers. The agenda of the extremists is often too harsh to reach any settlement. On the other hand, there is lack of ingenuity in crafting an alternative approach.

Character V – The tactics and strategies employed against extremists are mostly event/incident driven. Strategically, the emerging focus is on regional approaches and the onus is shifting towards western allies to take the lead in the fight against extremists and applying kinetic tactics. In many theaters of the war against terror, civil war like scenarios are now ripe, and Urban Warfare the likely outcome

Character VI – The weakening Nation-State structure is under dual economic and security pressures. The governments of the regions concerned are finding it harder and harder to govern as the multidimensional internal and external security risks intermingle and manifest. Internal divisions make it harder to deal with the external enemies, while those that pose external threats exploit internal risks. This dynamics produces a circular threat perception for the subject.

Character VII – Globalization and interconnectivity is being hindered by security apprehensions whether it be Trans Pacific Partnership, Kashgar-Gwadar Economic Corridor, Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project, or New Silk Road.

Economic aspirations now stand face to face with security concerns in many parts of the world, and the individual identity hangs in balance between the national, global, religious, tribal, and ethnic loyalties. The forces of religion and globalization are both acting against the nation-state structure and are often perceived as exploitive.

Character VIII – The cross-pollination of global power tussles, Arab Spring, and extremism has made the war against terror even more complex and motives confusing. This is amply visible in Syrian conflict. Moreover, weakening Europe and emerging BRICS have created a flux in the international systems, making the balancing act very stressful for international players.

Character IX – The future role of religion and the crisis of identity is brewing as nation states become weaker. Two key questions are emerging in this context:
one of them is equally applicable to the West and has to do with the settled debate of the separation of church and state. The other question is related to the extremist inflicted regions, in terms of who represents Islam.

Character X – The emergence of virtual soft weapons of mass destruction: Information and Cyber Warfare. The use of Social Media for radicalization, recruitment, and countering extremist messages and ideologies is an example. While the access to physical WMD’s is limited, these virtual soft weapons are freely available.

Arab and Western Perspectives

In essence, the campaign that was initially directed primarily against the perpetrators of 9/11 and their collaborators, have now spread to the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia. Afghanistan and Iraq, which were the focus of the Phase I and II, have remerged as a threat and have complicated western withdrawal strategies.

In Phase II, we saw other nations such as Syria, Libya and Yemen join the widening ring of instability. The beginning of Phase III is marked by gradual destabilization of the more secure states of the region, to include Egypt, Saudi Arabia and GCC, Jordan, Pakistan, and potentially India.

While the primary threat posed to these states initially came from the Sunni AQ and Associates, over time, the sectarian dimension and nationalist non-state actors (such as Kurds) have joined the fray. While the Western nations have remained supportive in the fight against Sunni extremists, when it comes to the sectarian angle and nationalist forces, their postures are more ambiguous. This has magnified the headaches for the respective states in question.

The present paranoia exhibited by Saudi Arabia and GCC nations is stemming from these contradictions. While the Sunni Arab nations have been fighting the war against Sunni non-state actors, the influence of Iran and Hezbollah has increased in places like Iraq and Syria. In contrast to opposing Hezbollah and Iran, the West entered in to negotiations with the country related to its nuclear program. According to the GCC nations, Iran’s behavior has been rewarded and this will embolden it. Imagine if Saudi Arabia was to do the same; back AQ and IS and then build a nuclear program, while at the same time threaten Israel and the West.

From the Western perspective, Sunni Arab nations have not led a spirited fight against Sunni extremists like Iran, Hezbollah, and Kurds have. Moreover, Western policy is premised first of all on preventing weapons of mass destruction falling in to the hands of extremists, or rogue and autocratic leaders that can threaten Israel or the West. Secondly, to prevent the extremists attacking Western targets again or becoming a proxy for an adversarial power in the future, along the lines of Afghan Jihad of the 80s.

As it stands now, Arab states are left with no leverage other than using the religious card. Even on the sensitive issue of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is Iran, Turkey, and to some extent Qatar, that took the lead. For its role, Qatar faced serious opposition with in the GCC.

In essence, the Iran deal, if finalized, contains its nuclear program, reduces the risk to Israel and the West, and thus strengthens it to become a strong ally in the fight against Sunni extremists. Additionally, it can help in pushing the Middle East Peace Process forward.

The Emerging Approach to the Middle East Peace

At an event hosted by Atlantic Council on May 7, the author asked the former US Special Envoy for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the present Executive Vice President of Brookings Institution, Martin Indyk, about how the Iranian nuclear deal and the US-Gulf partnership can help or hinder the Middle East Peace Process. Martine Indyk commented that the prospects of a solution emerging from an ‘inside out approach’ i.e., from with in Israel and Palestine, and independent of whatever else is going on in the Middle East, are not good. However, the potential for an ‘outside in’ solution which has emerged because of the possible Iran nuclear deal and Israeli and Arab countries being on the same side, might emerge with positive response because of the new strategic alignment in the region.

Speaking at the Heritage Foundation, Israeli envoy to the US, Ron Dermer, recently commented along the same line:

“They used to believe the key to that [a rapprochement with the Arab word] was solving the Palestinian question, and there is no doubt that issue cannot be ignored,” Dermer said.

He continued: “But as the prime minister said a few months ago, I’m not so sure the reverse won’t be true, meaning that I don’t know if Israel and Palestinian peace will unlock wider rapprochement with the Arab world. It might be broader rapprochement with the Arab world will unlock Israeli-Palestinian peace. We should be focusing the next few years on how we can take advantage of this historic aligning of interests between Israel and our Arab neighbors.”

(Note: It’s too early to tell if a similar ‘Outside In’ approach is applicable towards other festering hot spots, such as Afghanistan and Kashmir. However, despite differences, parallels do exist, and PoliTact will be researching this comparison further.)

The US Elections and Middle East

From the Arab and GCC perspective, the shift in the regional balance of power towards Iran is an additional danger to their security, perhaps even bigger than that posed by Sunni extremists. This view is shared by Israel and the Republican Party in the US, which is in control of both the House and the Senate. This is why the next US election is becoming so crucial. On it depends the direction of the Middle East; will the new American president share the threat perception of Israel and Arab allies, is in contention. In addition, the foreign policy hawks in the Republican Party also want US to once again take an aggressive role in the fight against extremists and against Russia and China.

Extremism and Global Players

US, Russia, and China, and other global powers, share the threat from Islamic extremists and have supported the fight against them in one form or the other. While US has been doing the heavy lifting, other powers have facilitated by building capacity of the allies; by giving training and providing military equipment. Moreover, they have also helped by allowing the use of their territories as part of the crucial supply lines for the campaign against extremists.

However, as the regional states become more entangled in this fight, and with their future at stake, the question for these global players is: what does the change in the regional equilibrium of power means for the global balance. Or in other words, what does the extending arc of instability in these regions implies for their security and economic interests.

In essence, three main considerations arise from this for the global players:

Firstly, if the states involved in the campaign against extremists, which may be allied with China and Russia, start faltering, what would that mean for their global positioning?

Secondly, how will these powers react to the activities of the competitor in their perceived home spheres of influence?

For example, Russia has cooperated with the West when it comes to Syrian chemical weapons and the Iran nuclear deal, as being part of P5+1, but it is playing a different role when it comes to the affairs of Ukraine. Similarly, China would evaluate its posture in South and Central Asia in comparison to what occurs as part of the ‘Pivot to Asia’ US policy.

Thirdly, what would be their contingency plans if the regions engulfed by extremism sink to full fledge chaos that may impact global energy and trade flows?

The Chinese and Russian energy deals may be the direct result of these assessments. On the other hand, US has also made big gains towards energy independence while Europe is still caught in the bind. Phase III of the campaign against terror may see more direct interstate conflict which risks involving one or the other global power. And this will fundamentally change what was initially deemed as the war against Islamic extremists.

While mitigating far-flung security threats is one thing, risks that can imperil influence in the home sphere and economic lifeline of an aspiring or an established global power, is a different matter all together.

The post The Future Of The War Against Extremists; The Arrival Of Stage III appeared first on Politact.

Context

The primary purpose of developing a forecast is to better plan. And at a more sophisticated level, to help shape a future that is conducive for ones interests. It’s an exercise to make a reasonable assessment of where matters might be heading. Smaller the variation between the trajectory of actual events, and the anticipated plan, greater the chances of success. Then there are risks, which if they were to come true, can seriously dent the expectations. Now a day, a term ‘black swan’ is more and more being used to conceptualize an unexpected and unprecedented event that can dramatically alter the present reality.

For instance, in the growing power tussles of the established and emerging powers, many nations are caught in a balancing act. While the present phase may be a transitory one, a single event could potentially end this stage and push different nations to chose between one or the other alignment. This is similar to how 9/11 dramatically altered international affairs. Anticipating what that incident could be, and how to pro-actively prevent such an eventuality, is critical.

While producing a forecast and a risk assessment, another important consideration to keep in perspective is the aspect of vantage point. Meaning, the future and the risks for one country are not the same as they may be for the other, just as is the case for individuals. Yes, there may be generalizations, but then there are always peculiarities as well. As a case in point, let’s take the example of campaign against extremism. The ramifications for the campaign that has been raging for about 13 years are different for the western nations than those regions that are inflicted by extremism.

Nonetheless, developing and understanding patterns and trends are an important ingredient and prerequisite for any forecast and plan.

Another essential distinction is the difference between local change brought upon by regional and global flux. Most often than not, global patterns are forcing a local response. Before formulating an appropriate tactical, strategic or policy level response, and for the sake of the success of the reply, it is vital to identify and understand the dynamics of global change first.

With this context, PoliTact has been working on identifying the most significant political, economic, and security patterns, from the vantage point of South Asia and Middle East. As oppose to listing them as the top ten risks or trends, as is fashionable these days, we have chosen a format that depicts how the political, economic, security and technology patterns are inter-linked. We have done so with an attempt to minimize rampant confusion and to enhance a conceptualization that helps to understand the confusion the world is presently experiencing.

The most important trend the nations of the region would have to grapple with is the changing nature of the world order.

Analysis
Nation-State Structure

While the world is organized politically in to an often arbitrary nation-state structure, there are a number of forces that are acting for and against this architecture. The campaign against terror with the associate phenomenon of non-state actors, climate change, disease, and technological advancements – particularly in the realm of communication technologies and social media, are all maneuvering against preserving the sanctity of the state, as we know it.

These man-made and other forces of nature are also hastening what has come to be known as the phenomenon of globalization, and making governance difficult. Equally, the communication revolution and social media has increased awareness and global consciousness for issues that transcend national borders and national identity. Then there are vested interests that have been over employed at the expense of the common people while putting the very social contract at jeopardy. The reaction can be seen in the form of movements such as the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street.

At another level, and more seriously, a crisis of identity is brewing. National identity is increasingly in friction with the economic necessities represented by the forces of globalization, which in turn are being challenged by the national security pressures of a state. Economic aspirations now stand face to face with security concerns in many parts of the world, and the individual identity hangs in balance between the national, global, religious, and ethnic loyalties. The forces of religion and globalization are both acting against the nation-state structure and are often perceived as exploitive. Recent events in India, Russia, and even Europe, suggests that the separation of religion/church and state may not be a done deal after all.

The European Union Model

The European Union was taken by many as the natural evolution of the nation-state structure, where states willing give up some of the sovereignty for the larger benefits derived from growing trade. However, the recent economic crises especially related to the banking and housing sectors, and tensions over Ukraine, are testing this model. The election results in Greece have once again revived thorny issues with in the EU.

This also remains a dilemma when it comes to Pakistan-India ties. The theory stipulates that increasing trade between nations leads to lessening of mistrust, while at the same time tying their fates to a shared future. This is not how the European Union appears to be evolving. The revisionist and nationalistic tendencies are reemerging.

In the long run, if economic circumstances worsen and security concerns rise, growing interconnectedness can create dependencies that could be extremely risky, as far as the sovereignty of a nation, are concerned. This is especially true if interconnectedness is exploited for political and security ends, as is when sanctions are imposed, witnessed recently in the case of Iran and Russia.

These concerns have posed a major roadblock in promoting trade between Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, as part of the New Silk Road vision.

TTP and TTIP

In additional to the European Union Model, the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Trans Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which the US is trying to finalize, will also provide important lessons.

The TPP will include 792 million people, makes up 40 percent of the world economy, and is perceived by China as a way to economically contain it. While the TTP excludes China, the nations regional approach to developing trade agreements, is seen as a way to keep US out from the region. At stake are the principles of bilateralism and regionalism versus multilateralism propagated by WTO.

Conclusion

The interplay of political, economic, security, and technology trends, and the forces of nature and globalization, are creating unique sets of pressures and vulnerabilities for the nation-state structure.

While the future model is still in evolution, the identity crisis that has ensued is creating multifaceted outcomes that need to be understood before policies and plans are put in place to address the challenges.

The larger trends are working across states and the response would also have to be coordinated and multilateral, which is difficult under the nation-state structure and the UN system (UN Security Council). Forming alliances is not easy in the absence of shared interests and values. What is occurring more and more is the configuration of coalitions around major crises and conflicts.

Then there is the issue of how the benefits and loses will be spread out in a globalized world, which depends on what one produces, and is also tied to how the value of those assets is determined. Consider the recent drop in oil prices, which has suddenly thrown the economies of Russia, Iran, and others, in to turmoil.

The global transition is by no means over, what’s critical is to spot what is emerging early and to be able to adapt quickly. The nation-state structure was suitable for an environment that is changing fast. The challenge now is to organize in a way that helps to deal with the future trends. And for this alliances and multilateralism are better suited than simple bilateralism. The complication being: aligning bilateral with multilateral approaches is a complicated task.

The post Organizing For The Future World; The Crisis Of Identity And Nation State appeared first on Politact.

Context

In its 2013 forecast, PoliTact had laid out a picture of the campaign against extremists that differed dramatically from the mainstream media. Many of these assessments were on the mark. As we approach the end of 2014 and enter the stage 2 of this campaign, these projections need to be revisited. As we conduct this exercise, the premises, tactics and strategies used to fight the war in the previous stage will also be reexamined, including their shortfalls and inadvertent consequences. It is this scrutiny that will point to what we can realistically be expected in the future, or stage 3.

Analysis

1. Eliminating the Leadership

After 9/11, one of the major emphases was to hunt down the head honchos and the perpetrators. The assumption was that if the leadership is eliminated, and those that replace them are also eradicated, the extremist outfits they represented would weaken overtime and disintegrate. The reality has played out differently. The elimination of Osama bin Laden may have weakened Al Qaeda (AQ) but the associates have emerged stronger and the extremist threat has spread to many new corners of the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region. This has created what is now identified as the phenomenon of AQ and Associates.

Moreover, seemingly AQ now also has a competitor in the form of Islamic State (also known IS, ISIS, and ISIL). With in these various extremist groups, there is a process of fusion and fission occurring simultaneously. The associates of AQ in the South and Central Asia, and Middle East, are having to decide their alignment with either AQ or the ISIS; obviously there can only be one Amir-ul-Mominin. In the case of Pakistan, the Taliban have splintered, some are beginning to align with IS and changing their long-standing affiliation with AQ.

One the one hand, this internal friction and power struggle is positive as this divides the enemy. On the other hand, this splintering has diversified the threat to the regimes in the region and to the West.

2. Nation-State Structure, Sovereignty, and Sectarianism

Another character that illustrated the previous phase and continues to presently, has to do with the constraints presented by the nation-state structure and state sovereignty. Associated with this is the persistent question of safe havens where extremists can regroup, cross-pollinate, and launch fresh attacks.

Since 9/11, the coalition forces have felt restrained by international borders while the extremists have conveniently crossed borders to other sanctuaries once they felt pressured in one location. This was the case in places like in Iraq, where extremists were traveling back and forth from Syria and other regional nations. The challenge has also remained highly prevalent on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

To counter this, American forces were authorized to take action wherever the extremist threat existed. This example was followed by Israel, and recently UAE and Egypt carried out air strikes against extremist groups in Libya.

At the same time, it was in Iraq where the sectarian dimension was added to the mix, and later resulted in the Sunni Awakening. Had it not been for the Iranian support, the NATO and US task would have been easier there. This is similar to what is taking place in Syria presently, where Assad would not have lasted against Sunni AQ, IS, and moderate opposition (Such as the Free Syrian Army) without the urban fighting skills of Shia Hezbollah and Russian support in the Security Council.

Thus overtime, the war against terror has inadvertently weakened the nation-state structure of the region. On the one hand, the states inflicted by terrorism are under extremist attacks, and at the same time struggling politically to maintain credibility on the street. The legitimacy of state was under scrutiny even before the war against terror started, as many have failed to govern and provide services to their burgeoning citizenry. This combustible mix was one of the causes that triggered the uprising now know as the Arab Spring.

As the priority of the West has remained on fighting the extremists, many autocrats of the region adopted the garb to persist and maintain the status quo. However, that strategy has proven to be short lived; ultimately, these governments would have to deal with both, increasing vocal citizens and the growing threat posed by the non-state actors operating across borders.

The stark irony is that it’s not in the control of any state to deal with extremism on it’s own. It’s a regional and global phenomenon, which requires dealing with the causes. Furthermore, the war against non-state actors has now gotten entangled with the global power tussles, apparent in Syria particularly. This leads to the question of if a political or military approach will be needed to win it. And what happens to extremists in stage 2 and 3, if the global power play between US, China, and Russia heats up further in different corners of the globe.

3. The Question of Ground Troops and Mission Creep

In the first stage, the US and NATO maintained their ground presence in Afghanistan and Iraq at a tremendous cost. The successes, however, were proven to be only temporary and easily reversible: the present situation of Iraq being the case in point. What occurred in Iraq has significantly raised the stake for the withdrawal from Afghanistan. This reality has now forced US to extend its mission in Afghanistan and the return of western advisors to Iraq and other places in the MENA region.

Over the years as the fiscal condition dwindled and the security situation worsened, NATO has been forced to develop new strategies to counter extremists. The new policy is focused on a smaller footprint and more use of rapid reaction Special Forces and Smart Technologies, such as drones, to achieve the objectives. For this purpose, NATO forces have been preparing for touch and go type operations and has established bases across the region. Additionally, the emphasis is on enhancing the capabilities of the allies, through providing military equipment and training, so they can lead the fight.

The dilemma is that many of these allies, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, have proven incapable of resisting the extremist onslaught on the ground, absent western advisors and air support. This has raised questions about the efficacy of training Iraqi and Afghan forces received in the past, and the utility of more training. Or, in other words, is it a question of capability or will.

Nonetheless, This has raised alarm for stage 2 of the campaign. Who will take on the burden of heavy fighting on the ground if the radicals are gaining and the allies are proving incapable? The American leadership is making it clear to its Arab partners that while they can assist; the main responsibility for countering the extremists rests on their shoulders.

In the resulting vacuum, the most successful fighters on the ground against IS/AQ are proving to be the Kurds and Hezbollah. Or, in other words it’s the non-state actors under state influence against those non-state actors that seemingly do not listen to anyone (IS/AQ and Affiliates). This is setting up a dangerous precedence and symbolizes the return of proxy wars.

While the initial goal of the war against extremism was to go after the perpetrators of 9/11, over time it has extended to dealing with rogue leaders and regimes that can potentially acquire weapons of mass destruction, are allies of Russia or China, have undemocratic set-ups, and carry hostile intent towards the West. The elimination of Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qaddafi, the present attempts of regime change in Syria, and P5+1 negotiations with Iran, are all linked to this risk.

While Russia and China share with US the apprehensions regarding the spread of non-state actors, they are also concerned about what it means for their influence and allies in the regions concerned.

4. The Ideology and Societal Transformation

One of the least explored and understood aspects of the campaign against terror is the grave societal transformation brought on by years of constant warfare and disruption. Thousands have died and millions have been uprooted. One of the obvious outcomes of this has been the gradual push towards religious conservatism, increasing militancy and lawlessness, diminishing economic prospects, and growing political and ethnic polarization of the nations inflicted by the scourge.

As alluded to previously, the blame does not just reside with the West, the local governments are equally liable for their disorientation and failure to understand the dynamics of the societal change underway. Recently held elections in Afghanistan, Tunisia, and Egypt etc. all have produced very close results and the demonstrated the need for political reconciliation. However, achieving political consensus in such a volatile and divisive environment is extremely challenging.

The evolution of politics in Egypt perhaps provides a perfect illustration of this phenomenon, where after the removal of Mubarak, Muslim Brotherhood was able to gain power through a close election. However, Mursi’s government was removed subsequently and now Sisi’s actions seem more an attempt to maintain a status quo. While many claim that it was the unwillingness of Mursi to share power that led to his demise, however, external threat posed by his regime to Israel and other Arab nations were also strongly at play against him.

Questions are now being raised if the Arab Awakening has hit a dead end. The terminology adopted by western think tanks is suggestive of how to answer this question. The Arab Spring inflicted nations, including Afghanistan and Iraq at some level, are now perceived as ‘countries in transition.’ This transition involves constitutional changes that would prevent religiously oriented political actors from gaining power, and with emphasis on promoting reconciliation among the other political stakeholders.

This approach is based on a fear that extremists may use the mainstream religious groups to arrive at the helm of power, especially when they do have a soft corner for them. In this transition, there is an attempt to have nationalist factions align with liberal thought, as oppose to the religious conservative elements. The political dynamics of Pakistan can also be understood in this context.

PoliTact has pointed out the futility of this approach, especially as the societies become increasingly conservative. The mainstream religious parties present the best hope to prevent the slide towards the abyss. As oppose to viewing them with apprehension, they should be looked upon as an opportunity. Similarly, if the negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program were successful, it would suggest that if properly engaged, even theocracies can behave rationally.

Stage 1 of the campaign against extremism has shown the limitation of a purely military approach. To prevent the failure of the stage 2 that is presently unfolding, the emphasis would have to be on reconciliation with the reconcilable. This would involve setting up a political architecture that involves the moderate political conservatives at it center. They are the best suited, and the last hope, to counter the extremist ideologies and moderate the extremists, and to check the otherwise inevitable trajectory. Blocking these elements from political participation, like Egypt is attempting, will result in an even harsher backlash.

In future articles, we will continue to discuss the shifting assertions of the campaign against terror. What can be said at this juncture is that viewing this campaign separate from the global and regional tussles for balance of power would be pure naivety. Moreover, the regional governments that are leading the fight against extremists would have to be extremely careful to not do so at the cost of public sentiment and the provision of services to them.

The post Understanding The Stage 2 Of The Campaign Against Extremists appeared first on Politact.

Context

As the societies in the Islamic world undergo rapid transition, its institutions of governance are being pushed to adjust. Some of the major causes of this high flux are, for example, the campaign against extremists and the Arab Spring. These, obviously, have gotten intertwined with demographic patterns and the consequences of environmental change.

At the same time, it’s not appropriate to use the word ‘Islamic world’ as each Muslim state has its own system of governance and cultural peculiarities. For instance, monarchs mostly rule the Arab world. Pakistan has had both military and political leaders. Since the 1979 Iranian revolution, the country has evolved its own system. Some circumstances of Egypt look very similar to Pakistan, especially when it comes to the involvement of its military in politics and security policies of the country and the region. In addition to the internal dynamics of these nations, the interests and influences of global powers have also historically exerted tremendous sway on various institutions of governance.

Any given society is represented by different schools of thoughts, often taking the form of ideologies. These various expressions, often known as liberalism, socialism, nationalism, and conservatism, represent pathways through which individuals, ethnicities and nations, attempt to adapt and present their response to the constantly changing environment around them. However, the important thing to consider is what is perceived as causing change, because that has an influence on the type of response that is formulated.

In this context, PoliTact has noted in previous analyses that the prevailing ground situation in Pakistan has caused the political space for liberals to shrink considerably, as the nationalists and different brands of conservatives are gaining ground. It was also noted that this trend is not unique to Pakistan, and the same is occurring in Bangladesh and other part of the Middle East. This obviously has implications for the future politics of these nations and for the region they reside in.

Analysis

The Interplay of Nationalists with Socialist, Liberal, and Conservative Forces

Since the end of World War II, the liberals, socialists, nationalists, and conservatives in the Arab world have had their ups and downs. For the most part, their political maneuvering was the outcome of tensions between the socialist and capitalist models that were playing out globally. For example, it resulted in the creation of the Arab Socialist Baath Party in 1947, a coming together of nationalist and socialist forces against western imperialism that called for Arab unification. It later split in to Iraqi and Syrian factions. These same influences were also acting out in Egypt, causing Gamal Abdul Nasser to play a leading role in the formation of the Non-Aligned movement and nationalization of the Suez Canal Company.

Generally, the nationalists in the Arab world were more accepting of socialist influences. The conservatives, on the other hand, have had an uncomfortable political existence. They were looked upon with distrust, as waiting in hiding for their chance to revive the Khilafat. This in turn impacted the strategies of nationalists, who exploited the fear of global powers from the conservatives. This pattern continued in the post 9/11 environment. In case of Pakistan, since its creation, nationalists have remained closely linked with the liberal forces.1979 represents a watershed year; religion got introduced by the way of a revolution in Iran and jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Since the 80s, the nationalists have shifted towards the conservatives and 9/11 further escalated this societal drift. The new ground realities dictate that the nationalists in the Arab world, and Pakistan, that have previously swirled around socialist and liberal forces, now formulate their approach around conservative political agenda.

The Role of Army

The institution of the military has usually played a pivotal role in balancing these different influences, and continues to in places like Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan. The armed forces of these countries have stood as the bastion of secular influence. In Turkey, the army was the protector of the secularism adopted under Ataturk. In Egypt and Pakistan, it usually choreographs the liberal, socialist and conservative responses, preventing them from getting significantly out of line from what would be acceptable globally. However, as referenced above: due to the war on terror, corruption, lack of governance, the political landscape is changing considerably.

Then there is the ideology of Ikhwan-ul-Muslemeen that over the years has spread throughout the Islamic world, including Pakistan. Muslim Brotherhood (MB) influenced parties in Pakistan have been part of numerous political coalitions but have never formed a national government. Their agenda has been exploited more, and their leaders have allowed this to happen on more than one occasion, with a parallel loss of legitimacy.

However, in Egypt a different story has played out. After decades of struggle and years of persecution at the hands of the state, MB finally gained enough backing to form the government. Though just after a year in power, Mohamed Mursi’s government was overthrown by actions backed by the military. The scary thing is it’s not just Egypt but the whole region that is demonstrating the societal imbalance and inability to peacefully resolve the in equilibrium between the secular, nationalist, conservative, and religious influences.

In essence, the hard line taken by the Egyptian military is now pushing moderate Islamists to join hands with the extremists. If they do, the Egyptian military will be able to not only justify the extension of its harsh tactics but its role in governance. Nonetheless, this could potentially turn in to a bigger backlash against the military.

The evolution of civil-military relations in Turkey provides an interesting parallel. In Turkey, the civilian government has taken on the conservative and Islamic outlook as the military has retreated over the years and came to accept the supremacy of the political leadership, which it had to earn. Pakistan seems to be taking on a similar transformation, and this is now amply visible in the ongoing negotiations with the Taliban. The government is trying its best to avoid a military operation in North Waziristan and use moderate Islamists to bring in the extremist elements in to the mainstream. It’s the complete opposite of the approach the Egyptians have done.

Western Outlook

Keeping intact the moderate outlook of the Egyptian military is of utmost importance when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the expanding Syrian quagmire. Israel and US rely on Egyptian intelligence to manage the complex MB, Hamas, and Fatah dynamics. In the aftermath of military action in Egypt, Gaza based Salafi groups have reportedly declared jihad against the Egyptian military, which is increasingly facing attacks in Sinai Peninsula. This volatile situation could escalate leading to the closure of Suez Canal. Just like Egypt, moderate posture for Pakistan’s military is of critical significance, especially because of its nuclear arsenal. Moreover, as US withdraws from Afghanistan, it is essential that it keeps a check on the extremists forces that could threaten increasing western economic interests in India.

In essence, to tackle the extremists, emerging NATO strategies are depending on these militaries to prevent the balance shift from the moderate Islamists to the extremists, keep a check on non-state actors, and at the same time maintain its own moderate outlook. However, whether it’s the military or the civilian government of these Muslim nations, they have to incorporate the ground reality. If the military overreaches, like it has in Egypt, it could itself become the target. On the other hand, if the civilian government goes overboard in representing the conservative and Islamist influences, it could face a reaction from the West and its own military. Even in Turkey, a NATO member, the secular outlook is in retreat. It is this dynamics that will likely continue to complicate the civil-military relations.

Aggravating the situation further is the fragile economic situation of particularly Egypt and Pakistan. While in the past, the West could offer big financial and military incentives; it no longer is in a position to do so. The institution of military itself is under threat as it adjusts to the societal changes discussed above. Furthermore, the emergence of new global power centers, such as China and Russia, means that these militaries can no longer be relied upon to continue providing the liberal outlook the West has desired, and this presents unique challenges for the future.

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