Context

By Dr Peter Harris

U.S.-Saudi relations are under intense scrutiny. Officials in Riyadh chafe at U.S. reluctance to engineer the overthrow of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. More importantly, they fear that President Barack Obama’s diplomatic opening to Iran might prove to be a portent of normalized relations between Washington and Tehran. Meanwhile, U.S. lawmakers accuse the Saudis of manipulating oil production with the specific intent of bankrupting U.S. players in the energy industry – a hot button issue in this election year.

Furthermore, criticism continues to mount regarding the kingdom’s longstanding role in funding Islamist extremist groups and its current conduct of the war in Yemen. Could the U.S.-Saudi relationship actually expire? And if so, what would it take for the U.S. to abandon this important strategic partner?

Analysis

The Origins of Alliances

Broadly speaking, alliances in world politics exist according to one of two rationales: either there is a compelling geostrategic purpose for the partnership, or there are domestic reasons for closeness. The former category includes any number of opportunistic alliances past and present, including the Franco-Scottish “Auld Alliance” of the Middle Ages formed in opposition to England; the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, created to contain Russian expansionism in East Asia; and the U.S.-Soviet alliance during World War II. The latter are a rarer breed, depending much more on social and cultural affinity than hard-headed Realpolitik. Examples include Russia’s historic guardianship of Slavic and Orthodox states in Eastern Europe; the various alliances that work together to comprise the so-called Anglosphere; and, perhaps, the U.S. commitment to Israel.

Without question, the U.S.-Saudi relationship rests on geostrategic foundations rather than domestic ones. Indeed, it would be fanciful to suggest that the domestic population of either nation holds the other in particularly high regard. Many in the U.S. view Saudi Arabia as an intolerant and illiberal autocracy, a sponsor of extremism across the Islamic world, and an underhanded competitor in the energy industry. At the same time, although some members of the Saudi elite might display an outward admiration for Western materialism, the kingdom’s religious authorities and its general population do not hold the U.S. in high esteem.

Nevertheless, the geostrategic rationale for close relations between Washington and Riyadh is strong. Saudi cooperation is critical to maintaining stable energy prices, which, in turn, ensure the stability of the international economy. Geographically, the kingdom sits astride some of the world’s most important sea lanes and looms large over the other Gulf Arab states – themselves significant oil producers and strategic allies of the U.S. Culturally, Saudi Arabia carries special weight in the Islamic world as custodian of the holy sites at Mecca and Medina. These factors, coupled with the kingdom’s powerful military and deep coffers, indicate that Saudi help might well be critical when it comes to achieving future U.S. goals in the Middle East, such as peace between Israel and the Palestinians, or a resolution to the ongoing civil war in Syria.

Taking the Temperature of U.S.-Saudi Relations

The Realpolitik underpinnings of the U.S.-Saudi relationship validate a sense of nervousness about its future – that is, if the geostrategic rationales for closeness with Saudi Arabia were to evaporate, the alliance would indeed find itself adrift. Currently, the most worrisome scenario from a Saudi perspective is that rapprochement between the U.S. and Iran will undermine the basis of U.S. security relations with the Sunni states of the region. If Tehran can be tamed, what use will strategic planners in the Pentagon have for Riyadh or other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)? Of course, normalized relations between the U.S. and Iran are a long way off. But the successful implementation to date of the nuclear deal and the recent release of U.S. prisoners from Iran do seem to herald a significant – and perhaps long-lasting – diplomatic thaw.

There are longer-term risks inherent in the relationship as well. Whatever the future of U.S. relations with Iran, Washington’s much vaunted pivot to Asia threatens to downgrade the relative importance to the U.S. of the Persian Gulf and the greater Middle East. With officials in Washington striving to reduce the overall costs of foreign policy, any expanded presence in the Asia-Pacific region implies a curtailed military presence in the Gulf, especially if peace with Iran can reduce potential threats to U.S. interests in the region. (Iraq, of course, the U.S.’ other traditional adversary in the Gulf, is now a nominal U.S. ally). Meanwhile, Washington’s drive for “energy independence” from foreign producers is pointedly justified in public pronouncements by a desire to free the U.S. from having to pander to regimes such as Saudi Arabia’s.

Meanwhile, Washington’s drive for “energy independence” from foreign producers underscores its desire to free the U.S. from having to pander to regimes such as Saudi Arabia’s. Doyle McManus may have been correct when he recently wrote in the Los Angeles Times that the U.S.-Saudi relationship is “shakier than ever.” But it would still be wrong to underestimate the geopolitical rationale for cooperation. Indeed, it is difficult to envisage the sort of international developments that would be required to decisively weaken the U.S.-Saudi bond. The U.S. goal for the Persian Gulf in the twenty first century is a stable, peaceful, and predictable geopolitical environment, especially if Washington carries through with its rebalance toward the Asia Pacific region. America’s partnerships with Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab states are essentially irreplaceable bulwarks of regional order. The U.S. might try to bring Sunnis and Shi’ites together in the Middle East – unsuccessfully, with all probability – but it is unlikely to abandon Saudi Arabia and other GCC states altogether. The old policy of “dual containment” will have found its replacement in “dual engagement.”

If anything, the past five years have impressed upon U.S. officials the importance of stability in the Persian Gulf. The Arab Spring, initially welcomed as a possible harbinger of democratization across the Middle East and North Africa, severely damaged Washington’s interests in the region – fueling the activities of al-Qaeda, Daesh (“Islamic State”) and other terrorist groups; gifting openings to adversaries such as Russia and Iran in warzones like Syria and Yemen; and undermining the stability of longstanding U.S. allies. Given this unhappy recent history of regional upheaval, it is highly unlikely that the U.S. under Obama or his successor will do anything other than strive to maintain continuity and predictability in the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia – the oldest and most important U.S. partner in the region – can certainly be expected to play an important role in this equation.

The Reliability of Realpolitik

In the final analysis, the fundamental geostrategic impetuses for close U.S.-Saudi relations show no signs of dissipating. The Realpolitik logic that brought President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to Saudi Arabia in 1945 and led Jimmy Carter to promulgate the Carter Doctrine in 1980 remains as robust as ever. In the twenty-first century, the U.S. needs a strong, reliable, and friendly strategic partner in the Persian Gulf region. The continuation and, indeed, the deepening of U.S.-Saudi ties is likely. The bilateral partnership appears strong enough to weather manifold short-term problems, as John Kerry’s tête-à-tête with King Salman on January 24, 2016 perhaps attests.

Nonetheless, advocates of close U.S.-Saudi relations are correct that politicians in Washington could do more to strengthen ties between the two countries, especially at the domestic level, and that Gulf leaders ought to take measures that will ingratiate them to groups within the U.S. Although geopolitical imperatives are certain to align Washington and Riyadh for the foreseeable future, the alliance would be even stronger if domestic bonds were invigorated. At a time when internal politics are volatile in both nations, such bases of friendship become increasingly important. They do not exist at present, and it would behoove politicians in both countries to do more to foster them.

Dr Peter Harris is an assistant professor of Political Science at Colorado State University.

This article was originally published by an affiliate of PoliTact, Gulf State Analytics

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The process of transformation in the Middle East appears to be speeding up. If the western powers do reach an accord with Iran, it will come with tremendous risks and opportunities for both the region and the West. An agreement will represent a turning point in the West’s relations with the Islamic world, and perhaps in the long term, a move away from the Arab centric to Turkish and Iran oriented policies.

The traditional balance of power of the Middle East first got disturbed in Iraq. The environment of the Arab world has also been altering as a result of the war against extremists and Arab Spring; both have played havoc with the equilibrium of secular, conservative and religious forces of the region. How will the normalization of ties between Iran and the West impact these forces is a critical consideration. However, the first step is to understand what may have forced the West to engage with Iran.

Middle East Peace Process

The last attempt to push through a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict failed during the Clinton era. Subsequently, the death of Arafat, now thought to have been poisoned, was followed by a period of stalemate. During the Bush term, no serious effort was made to revive the Middle East peace process, and besides, US got busy with Al Qaeda after 9/11.

There was a growing realization in the West that a fresh approach was needed towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict if the two-state solution was to ever materialize. The new approach likely assessed the role played by the Arab autocrats during the previous peace efforts. And it must have quickly become clear that the monarchies were now more of a liability than an asset.

Due to challenges of credibility, they usually clung to the West and US for support. However, to remain relevant on the Arab street, they also had to take a strong position on the issue of Palestine. The arrival of the war on terror further complicated the dilemma of Arab authoritarian rulers. It increased their dependency on the West for survival while they compromised further on their traditional stances against Israel.

This was most evident when the Gaza Blockade started in 2007; Hosni Mubarak supported the Israeli moves while the Gulf States remained oblivious. The Arabs, especially the Gulf States, did not recognize at the time their inertness was causing Iran and Turkey to gain. The first visible sign of this shift came during the Mavi Marma incident in 2010. The Turks was seen as standing up to the Israeli injustices, while the Arab states came across as accomplices.

While the Arabs were mostly engaged in rhetoric, it was Iran doing the heavy lifting in Iraq, and for the Palestinian cause, using Hezbollah and even assisting Sunni Hamas in Gaza. The Arab States interpreted Turkish, Iranian, and Qatar’s support for Hamas in Gaza as attempts to sabotage the two-state solution.

Nonetheless, this dynamics further proved that in order to have a lasting solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran and Turkey were the key, and less so the Arab states. Ironically, as these developments were transpiring, the issue was identified less and less as a matter between the Arabs and Israelis and more and more as Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

How to Deal with Iran?

This led to the next question of how then to deal with Iran: through a military solution or a political one. As this argument was taking place, pretty much the same debate was occurring on how to tackle Taliban in the AfPak region. In 2009, President Obama presented a new strategy for Afghanistan. Engaging Iran politically was not only beneficial for the western policy in the Middle East but also for dealing with Afghanistan and Al Qaeda.

Throughout George W. Bush’s two terms, and especially after the invasion of Iraq, the debate on the best course for Iran came up for consideration on several occasions. Each time the route of negotiations was pushed back due to strong resistance from within the American system and from Israel. From the Israeli perspective, once Iran’s nuclear program matured enough to produce a nuclear weapon, it would be too late and therefore it persistently threatened a unilateral strike. On the other hand, every time a military option was explored its limitation also came to the fore, and even the American military advised against it due to the risk of a wider regional conflagration.

The Syrian Opportunity

Then another opportunity presented itself about three years ago with the arrival of Arab Spring in Syria, a strong ally of Iran. If Assad’s regime could be removed, and in addition to economic sanctions, Iran could be pressured to change course on its nuclear ambition. The Saudis and Qataris went full fledge in supporting the rebels in Syria.

This option ran into trouble when Russia, and China, resisted strongly against any Libya style military intervention. The West was not about to start a world war over Syria, and a political opportunity was presented when Assad offered to dismantle the chemical weapons. In addition, Iran’s new regime took a more moderate stance resulting in the restart of the negotiations on it nuclear programs.

The question now is if a nuclear deal with Iran is reached, how will the Arab world, particularly the Gulf States, respond to this sea change? Egypt and Saudi Arabia are already probing Russia, which seems willing to reciprocate. War on terror has caused tremendous damage to the repute of US and NATO in the Islamic world and China and Russia are well positioned to gain from this. On the other hand, Pakistan has been drifting ever closer to China. Even Turkey, a member of NATO, is flirting with the prospect of joining SCO.

Then there are ties between Islamic states themselves. With the easing of sanctions on Iran, the South and Central Asia can benefit tremendously economically. However, Pakistan ties with Gulf region are likely to be tested in case of normalization of Iran’s relations with the West. The gravest challenge, however, would be to prevent a confrontation between the resurgent Sunni extremist forces with Shia groups, which are likely to be energized by Iran’s emerging regional and global stature.

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Context

Nawaz Sharif’s team would have been relieved at the timely resolution of the fiscal impasse in US, allowing his visit to take place in somewhat normal circumstances. However, the message is clear; in the era of fiscal constraints, civilian aid and military assistance will get more limited in the future and will likely be connected to dealing with the extremists. Moreover, when it comes to trade, the protectionist sentiments are resurgent as Americans increasingly ponder over their government policies on outsourcing and trade dealings that benefit other nations more.

The priorities in Washington shift quickly based on the crises of the day. Consider this, just a month ago US was busy debating whether to strike Syria, and then matters shifted quickly to the government shut down and the debt ceiling. The emphasis is more on management than resolution. This is also the premise of the new book “No exit from Pakistan” from the leading Pakistani scholar at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Daniel S. Markey.

Nonetheless, what are the priority issues which the leaders of US and Pakistan are likely to raise when they meet? Many analysts have stated the ties are getting back to normal after a tumultuous year or so, but what is the new normal. Pakistan’s support for Afghan reconciliation process and stopping cross border terrorism, are likely to be on the top of US list. On the other hand, Pakistan will demand respect for its sovereignty and assistance in helping the economy and energy shortages. Meanwhile, the nation has already placed its strategic bets on China.

Analysis

Epicenter of Terror

Whether one likes it or not, unfortunately, Pakistan is labeled as the epicenter of terror. Several extremist groups took refuge in the country at one point or the other and wrecked havoc locally, in the region, and beyond. Pakistan adopted a selective approach towards Al Qaeda, Afghan Taliban, Pakistani Taliban, and Indian oriented militants. Due to this discrimination, the government’s sincerity and intention are often suspected, including by some of its own citizens. This is despite the fact that the nation suffered the most, in blood and treasure, in the conduct of this war. Thus talking with TTP, and the nations new counter terrorism strategy is of great interest, and Pakistan would have to carefully manage regional concerns and global perceptions.

For example, Indian apprehensions revolve around what extremists would do in the aftermath of NATO/US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Its position remains that if Pakistan deals with the extremist groups such as LeT and JuD, the problem of Kashmir will be resolved by itself. As it relates to Karzai government, in its security talks with the US, it is seeking assurance of protection against intervention from Pakistan. US has refused to offer such guarantees. Nonetheless, the fear of Afghan establishment persists. It continues to propagate why NATO/US forces want to retain the right to conduct operations in Afghanistan when the source of problem resides elsewhere, a reference to FATA and Pakistan.

US, for the most part, has remained sympathetic to Pakistan’s plight. After all, they jointly unleashed the genie during the soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Afterwards, Pakistan disseminated the lessons more widely. The country has actively cooperated with US in going after the extremists that have been threatening both countries. In the evolving phase of the war against terror, US would like to see Pakistan’s commitment to continue. It would also be interested in understanding its new counter-terrorism strategy, and how it addresses the concerns of Afghanistan and India. Both these countries are weary that in exchange for Pakistan’s help in Afghan reconciliation, US may go soft on it.

Covert and Overt Wars

On the other hand, in the post Mumbai incident environment, US-India cooperation on countering terrorism in the region really took off, and the Raymond Davis incident was perhaps the outcome of that. While Pakistan has assisted US in going after global extremists, that immunity does not automatically transfer towards seeking Afghan and Indian oriented extremists. The Salala tragedy and Raymond incident tested Pakistan’s red lines. India, meanwhile, has conducted joint exercises with many nations, including US Special Forces, envisioning counter-terror operations in the region.

This cat and mouse game is similar to the one Iran and US played over Iraq, and the wider region. The recent article by Dexter Filkins in The New Yorker Magazine, covering the role of the commander of Iranian Quds Force, Qassem Suleimani, indicates the breadth of exchanges between US and Iran. They never went directly at each other, but knew what the other was up to. This is the lesson of Cold War and almost an unwritten norm: great powers do not go head to head, and the use of proxies, whether via client-state or non-state actor, is considered fair play. The intent is always to keep things manageable.

No wonder, from Pakistan’s side, respect for state sovereignty and the drone issue will be on the top of the agenda. This remains a thorny issue as US shifts to smart strategies and tactics in pursuit of extremists around the globe, especially where the state is weak or incapable of going after the extremists itself, as depicted by President Obama in his address to the 68th session of the UN General Assembly. The dilemma for Pakistan is that it cannot maintain it would neither go after certain brands of extremists nor will it allow anyone else. Especially, when certain extremists are blatantly killing its civilians and weakening the state, while other elements are targeting the neighbors. Such a course will continue to raise suspicions about the collusion of the state, concerns about the security of its nuclear arms, and strengthen voices claiming genocide.

Meanwhile, American relations with the Islamic world are entering tumultuous times. The thaw with Iran is progressing, however, after Egypt, Saudi Arabia became the latest victim of disillusionment. The country last week refused to accept the non-permanent membership of UN Security Council in protest against its dysfunction and double standards over Syria and Palestinian plight. However, the crux of the matter was the Russian stand on Syria, which caused others to back off. With this context, it is fair to say that Pakistan has already placed its strategic bets on China and cuddling with US will never be the same.

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US and Afghanistan have reached a strategic agreement that defines their relationship beyond 2014. President Karzai had demanded the transfer of prisons and the end of night time raids, and the agreement on these two contentious issues had earlier been reached. Now, the Afghan parliament and American security agencies will review the pact before it can be signed by the presidents of the respective countries, which is expected at the Chicago NATO Summit in May.

“The document finalized today provides a strong foundation for the security of Afghanistan, the region and the world, and is a document for the development of the region,” commented the Afghan national security adviser Rangin Dadfar Spanta.

According to reports, the pact does not specify the number of NATO troops or the funding levels that will be maintained beyond 2014. However, the deal signifies long-term US commitment to Afghanistan. It is also not clear how the deal will impact the stalled reconciliation process with the Taliban, who had earlier demanded removal of coalition forces from Afghanistan before proceeding further.

Meanwhile, Congressman Rohrabacher was refused entry into Afghanistan after he made controversial statements about the Karzai’s government.

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Context

Iran was the central theme of a meeting between US President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on March 5, 2012. The two leaders exchanged reassurances of support each for the other; however their biggest difference of opinion remains how to tackle Iran.

The Iranian issue remains a strong point of convergence as well as divergence for the Israel and the US. US President Barack Obama met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for an extended talk at the White House, but neither appeared to budge from their underlying positions: Obama that a sequential, ideally diplomatic solution is best. Netanyahu that Israel will strike, the only variable is at what time.

While the Israeli leader did not back down on his talk of a strike against Iran, he did say it was no longer a ‘matter of weeks’ that the event will take place. He curbed this, however, by also stating that it was also not ‘a matter of years.’ So no action in the immediate future, but there is the distinct possibility in a relatively short time.

Analysis

First Things First

For the US, dealing with Syria, specifically getting rid of Bashar al Assad is a premium objective before tackling Iran. Not only is the Syrian situation more pressing, but ridding Syria of al Assad is also removing a staunch ally of Iran. With no view of a stable government being formed in Syria quickly, a country in disarray will serve US interests in Iran, especially as a country in chaos is perhaps more palatable than the possibility of a new government with the same sentiments toward Iran and Israel as the al Assad government.

The US is also keen to wind things up in Afghanistan before turning fully to the Iranian problem, particularly if that will require use of military force. The US will want to prevent being military engaged in more than one area, and thus being overstretched as well as overtaxing the American population’s stomach for war. There would also have to be a clear and distinct approach to any action in Iran, as Pakistan has avowed to side with Iran in the event of an attack, and so the US would no doubt be denied the supply routes and presence it has enjoyed in Pakistan to support the Afghanistan war.

Furthermore, the US and the EU are putting a lot of effort into their sanctions regimes against Iran, so they will be calling for a stay of any military action to determine how effective these new sanctions can be in coercing Iran into cooperation on the nuclear issue. Already some positives have come out of it, with a positive response from Iran to the EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton letter of invitation back to negotiations.

Ashton wrote in her reply to Iranian chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili “Our overall goal remains a comprehensive negotiated, long-term solution which restores international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program, while respecting Iran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.” Iran has also allowed UN nuclear investigators into facilities where they were previously barred.

This movement on the diplomatic side of the Iranian problem would be cause for Obama to offer very stern suggestions of patience to Israel.

Israel Not Convinced

Israel, however, remains unconvinced of the sincerity of Iran on any of the diplomatic avenues or overtures. And they have support from many in the Republican Party in the US as well. They are more convinced of the negotiations and inspections as merely being a ploy to buy more time for Iran, than a true step toward conciliation or understanding.

The question is, how long is Israel prepared to wait. For its part, the US has staunchly vowed to support Israel, and to support Israel’s right to self defense. Prime Minister Netanyahu reiterated this at a speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC): “I think that above and beyond that there are two principles, longstanding principles of American policy that you [Obama] reiterated yesterday in your speech – that Israel must have the ability always to defend itself by itself against any threat; and that when it comes to Israel’s security, Israel has the right, the sovereign right to make its own decisions,” Netanyahu said.

He further added “That’s the very purpose of the Jewish state – to restore to the Jewish people control over our destiny. And that’s why my supreme responsibility as prime minister of Israel is to ensure that Israel remains the master of its fate.”

For Israel this realization remains tied to Iranian nuclear capacity. Because of the anti-Israel rhetoric of Iran, Israel views their achieving nuclear weapon technology and the destruction or attempted destruction of Israel as synonymous.

While the Washington talks may have cooled the threat of immediate military action on Iran, perhaps the most telling element of the meeting was the gift Netanyahu gave to President Obama: A copy of the “Megillah of Esther,” a scroll detailing the story of the Persian Jews who overcame a plot by the Persian Vizier Haman to destroy them. This story is read to celebrate the Jewish holiday Purim, but its theme, at such a time is all too pertinent. Israel means, like the Jews of ancient Persia to overcome the Persian plot against them.

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Pakistn’s President Asif Ali Zardari held a meeting with President Ahmedinejad who arrived in Islamabad on Feb 16 for a two-day trilateral summit. The two countries discussed ways towards augmenting political and economic cooperation and strengthen bilateral ties.

Meanwhile, President Asif Zardari has assured Iran that the country will not extend any support, including bases, to the US, if it decides to attack Iran.
“Pakistan and Iran need each other and no foreign pressure can hinder their ties,” Zardari said.

Referring to the IP project, he said Islamabad will not tolerate Washington’s stance and will not stand its dictation on whom it can and cannot trade with.
Iranian President said “They seek to create divisions and tensions among regional countries. They don’t want us to make progress.”

The multi-billion dollar Iranian gas pipeline project was also discussed with the delegates from both sides. Despite international sanctions against Iran, Pakistan has assured President Ahmedinejad of its commitment to the gas pipeline and electricity project. However, Pakistan has failed to provide any timetable for the completion of the projects. The two sides also discussed wide range of other issues including energy swap, barter trade agreements, removing tariff and non-tariff barriers and improved border coordination for facilitating businessmen from both countries.

Iran also wants to procure of 20,000 tones of wheat from Pakistan using currencies other than the dollar or gold for payments, as a way around the international sanctions. Iran is offering to increase bilateral trade to $10 billion from the present $1.5 billion.

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According to The Washington Post, CIA is expected to maintain a large covert presence in Iraq and Afghanistan even after the withdrawal of conventional US troops. The report adds that the intelligence organization has adopted three methods of traditional espionage in Iran: monitoring developments in the new government setup, suppressing al-Qaeda’s affiliates, and countering Iran’s influence.

On the other hand, the operational role in Afghanistan will be more aggressive and its paramilitary capabilities are considered important. The goal will be to keep the Taliban from consolidating and protecting the government in Kabul. Moreover, to maintain access to the Afghan airstrips used to launch drone strikes in Pakistan and to hunt down al-Qaeda remnants. Report indicates that CIA has financed and created the Afghan intelligence service and the organization maintains a number of bases along the border with Pakistan.

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