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		<title>Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/gaza-ceasefire-plan-and-us-iran-tensions/</link>
		
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					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="696" height="569" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-1024x837.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Map of Middle East" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" fetchpriority="high" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-600x490.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-300x245.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-768x628.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-696x569.jpg 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-514x420.jpg 514w" sizes="(max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" />By Naade Ali and Guest Analyst Mohammad Siraj Khan Context The three-phase ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, brokered in January 2025, aimed to end the protracted conflict in Gaza. Despite initial progress, the deal collapsed by late February due to disagreements over its implementation. Soon Israeli forces resumed a ground invasion into central and [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/gaza-ceasefire-plan-and-us-iran-tensions/">Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="696" height="569" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-1024x837.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Map of Middle East" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-600x490.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-300x245.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-768x628.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-696x569.jpg 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-514x420.jpg 514w" sizes="(max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px" /><p><img decoding="async" class="alignleft size-medium wp-image-3592" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-300x245.jpg" alt="Map of Middle East" width="300" height="245" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-300x245.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-600x490.jpg 600w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-768x628.jpg 768w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map.jpg 1024w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-696x569.jpg 696w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/09-07-2012_iran-iraq-map-514x420.jpg 514w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" />By Naade Ali and Guest Analyst Mohammad Siraj Khan</p>
<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.american.edu/sis/news/20250129-understanding-the-israel-hamas-ceasefire-agreement.cfm?utm_source=chatgpt.com">three-phase ceasefire agreement</a> between Israel and Hamas, brokered in January 2025, aimed to end the protracted conflict in Gaza. Despite initial progress, the deal collapsed by late February due to disagreements over its implementation. Soon Israeli forces resumed a ground invasion into central and southern Gaza and expanded into the north of the enclave.</p>
<p>Phase One of the agreement had envisioned initial ceasefire and humanitarian measures to last 42 days. This was to be accompanied by hostage and prisoner exchanges and partial withdrawal of Israeli forces from populated areas in Gaza, with significant increase in humanitarian assistance to Gaza. Phase Two would include comprehensive agreements with negotiations for the release of remaining hostages and full military withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza &#8211; accompanied by formal cessation of hostilities. It was Phase Three that focused on reconstruction and long-term stability with international support, along with security guarantees to ensure long-term peace while averting future flare-ups.</p>
<p>Israel claimed that the negotiations with Hamas were ineffective, and Netanyahu warned that continued military pressure on Hamas was essential for hostage release and maintained that the current actions were &#8216;just the beginning.’ As tensions continue to rise, the <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/pm-says-cabinet-voted-to-step-up-military-pressure-on-hamas-in-gaza/">Israeli cabinet approved an escalation</a> of military pressure on Hamas, with Prime Minister Netanyahu asserting that the approach was “working” to secure a deal for the release of hostages held in the Gaza Strip.</p>
<p>Subsequently, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2025/03/29/middleeast/hamas-agrees-to-egyptian-ceasefire-proposal-israel-counters/index.html">Hamas agreed to accept an Egyptian-mediated proposal</a> to release five living hostages in exchange for a 50-day ceasefire in Gaza. However, Israel rejected the offer, insisting on the release of 10 or 11 hostages as a prerequisite for resuming the truce.</p>
<p>Netanyahu also <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/netanyahu-says-hamas-leaders-will-be-allowed-to-leave-gaza/a-72088327">indicated his readiness to negotiate the final phase</a> of the deal on his terms, which would see Hamas leaders permanently leave Gaza. “Hamas will lay down its weapons. Its leaders will be allowed to leave [Gaza]. We will take care of general security in the Gaza Strip and enable the implementation of the Trump plan, the voluntary immigration plan… That’s the plan. We’re not hiding it,” he stated. Adding to the Prime Minister&#8217;s warnings, Defense Minister Katz has also earlier threatened Hamas with the progressive <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/israeli-minister-threatens-to-annex-parts-of-gaza/a-72001916">annexation of Gaza</a>, stating that “the more Hamas persists in its refusal to release the hostages, the more territory it will lose, which will be annexed to Israel.”</p>
<p>U.S President Donald Trump who took <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/program/newsfeed/2025/1/20/video-us-president-elect-trump-hails-gaza-ceasefire-deal">credit</a> for the initial ceasefire also backed Israel’s recent military action. White House Press Secretary while blaming Hamas for Israel’s decision to renew its offensive confirmed that President Trump &#8220;<a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/white-house-says-trump-fully-supports-israel-as-it-renews-attacks-on-gaza/3515626">fully supports Israel</a>&#8220;. Upon assuming power, Trump has already ensured Netanyahu that securing Israel&#8217;s long-term national security remains a Washington&#8217;s key objective.</p>
<p>Trump’s support for Netanyahu was evident in his proposal to neutralize the Hamas threat in Gaza by displacing the entire population and permanently resettling them in countries such as Egypt and Jordan, while also suggesting long-term U.S. control over the strip in the post-conflict period.</p>
<p><strong>Arab Plan for Gaza and Disarmament of Hamas </strong></p>
<p>In response to backlash from Muslim-majority countries within the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Trump abandoned his mass displacement plan announced earlier. Still cautious of his intentions, members of the <a href="https://www.palestine-studies.org/en/node/1657135">Arab League proposed an alternative post-war plan for Gaza</a>, advocating for its reconstruction at a cost of $53 billion under the administration of a temporary committee of independent experts, along with the deployment of UN peacekeepers to prevent further escalation of the crisis.</p>
<p>The Palestinian Authority and Hamas have both endorsed the Arab plan. Western nations, including France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/france-germany-italy-uk-back-arab-plan-gaza-reconstruction-2025-03-08/">have also supported</a> it, viewing the end of Hamas’s control in Gaza as a step toward eliminating the threat to Israel.</p>
<p>However, the U.S. and Israel have <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn7vd4pnxx3o">rejected the proposal</a>, arguing that it does not prioritize Gaza’s disarmament, fails to address Hamas’s future in the region, and allows the Palestinian Authority to return without sufficient security guarantees to Israel. Meanwhile, Israel plans to establish a government agency under the Defense Ministry to oversee the &#8220;voluntary departure&#8221; of Palestinians from Gaza.</p>
<p>Saudi Arabia and other states <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2594022/saudi-arabia">have condemned Israel’s actions</a>, calling them ongoing violations of international law that pave the way for colonial settlements. These states have consistently advocated for a &#8220;two-state solution&#8221; to the Gaza-Israel conflict, emphasizing the need for an independent Palestinian state.</p>
<p>Netanyahu’s push to displace Palestinians, coupled with his threats to annex Gaza and Trump’s endorsement, has raised concerns among policymakers in the Muslim world that Trump may abandon the two-state framework in favor of a one-state solution.</p>
<p><strong>Iran-U.S. Standoff And Future of Negotiated Settlement</strong></p>
<p>Adding further complexity to the Middle Eastern geopolitical landscape is the ongoing standoff between Iran and the U.S.-Israel alliance. Iranian nuclear ambitions remain a major concern for both the U.S. and Israel. In response, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2025/03/26/middleeast/trump-offers-new-nuclear-talks-iran-weighs-cost-mime-intl/index.html">President Trump has reached out to Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei</a>, offering negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, but with a threatening tone. Trump has set a two-month deadline for compliance, warning of severe consequences for Tehran, indirectly referencing potential airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. &#8220;My big preference is that we work it out with Iran, but if we don’t work it out, bad things are gonna happen to Iran,&#8221; Trump <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-bad-things-iran-missile-city-bombs-us">stated</a>.</p>
<p>In turn, Iran has warned the U.S. of a strong response, suggesting that any attack would turn American bases and its regional allies into &#8220;<a href="https://www.newsweek.com/united-states-iran-nuclear-warning-2051988">powder kegs.</a>&#8221; Recently, Iran showcased its growing military power by revealing an expansive underground missile facility known as &#8220;<a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/03/29/iran-unveils-latest-massive-underground-missile-facility/">Missile City,</a>&#8221; complete with missiles, launchers, engines, and other advanced weapons. Iran’s ballistic missile force remains the largest in the Middle East, offering a strategic deterrent and signaling that any conflict with Tehran would be costly and protracted.</p>
<p>To ramp up pressure, the U.S. has been bolstering its military presence in the Middle East. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth <a href="https://news.usni.org/2025/03/21/secdef-hegseth-extends-uss-harry-s-truman-deployment-in-middle-east-carl-vinson-heading-to-centcom">recently deployed a second aircraft carrier</a>, the USS Carl Vinson, to join the USS Harry S. Truman strike group, whose deployment was also extended. Additionally, the U.S. sent two B-2 stealth bombers to the Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean, a direct warning to both Iran and Yemen&#8217;s Houthi militia. These bombers, capable of carrying 30,000-pound &#8220;bunker buster&#8221; bombs, are now positioned within striking range of Iran.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/511193/Trump-s-retreat-after-repeated-threats-Is-it-genuine">U.S. officials have sent mixed signals to Iran.</a> Special Envoy Steve Witkoff has advocated for a diplomatic resolution, while White House National Security Advisor Mike Waltz has adopted a more aggressive tone, stating that the administration aims for the &#8220;complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program.&#8221;</p>
<p>Iran views Trump’s nuclear talks as an attempt to force Tehran into relinquishing its defense capabilities. &#8220;The U.S. means disarmament when it says negotiation,&#8221; <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202503283054">said</a> Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Speaker of Iran&#8217;s Parliament. Despite the tense environment, <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202503271161">Tehran has responded to Trump’s letter,</a> stating that while it would not negotiate &#8220;under pressure and threats or increased sanctions,&#8221; it is open to indirect talks with the U.S. through third-party mediation. The letter was delivered via Oman.</p>
<p>This suggests that despite the threatening rhetoric between the U.S. and Iran, there is some hope for engagement, as both Washington and Tehran seem intent on avoiding a larger confrontation. Although Iran has not identified the third-party mediator, it is speculated that indirect talks may already be underway through channels in the UAE, and potentially with Saudi Arabia, which has previously <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/saudi-arabia-iran-usa-nuclear-talks/33320726.html">offered to mediate</a> talks between Iran and the U.S.</p>
<p>Reports have also surfaced of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-planning-visit-saudi-arabia-mid-may-axios-reports-2025-03-30/">President Trump visiting Saudi Arabia in May</a>. The Kingdom has <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/ukraine-talks-show-saudi-arabia-now-major-diplomatic-player">emerged as a key diplomatic player</a>, having hosted talks between Russia and the U.S. over the Ukraine issue. It holds significant potential to play a similar role in Iran-U.S. negotiations. Recently, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/saudi-arabia-iran-hold-talks-on-regional-developments/3517612">engaged in discussions</a> on regional developments with his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, signaling a more reconciliatory tone between Riyadh and Tehran. The <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/saudi-arabia/2025/04/17/saudi-defense-minister-arrives-in-tehran-ahead-of-iran-us-talks">Saudi Defense Minister also recently visited Iran</a> and hand delivered a letter from King Salman to Ayatollah Khamanei emphasizing collaboration.</p>
<p>A U.S.-Iran deal would offer Saudi Arabia a prominent role at the negotiation table, aligning with its &#8220;<a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/new-saudi-doctrine-positive-neutrality-pays">positive neutrality&#8221; foreign policy.</a> This would further elevate Saudi Arabia&#8217;s diplomatic weight, positioning it as a major middle power in global statecraft. Through diplomatic mediation, economic investments, and strategic alliances, the Kingdom has demonstrated its commitment to stability and development</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>The internationalization of the Gaza conflict has further deepened divisions between the U.S.-Israel bloc and Arab states, overshadowing any prospects for normalization. The once-stable U.S.-Middle East partnership that long served as a cornerstone of the international order, is now experiencing a profound paradigm shift as new alliances and strategic realignments begin to emerge.</p>
<p>Recent developments indicate that both Western and Arab capitals are preparing to make <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/macron-saudi-crown-prince-discuss-gaza-ukraine-peace-process-2025-03-19/">pivotal decisions regarding their stances</a> on Gaza and Ukraine. Arab states are seeking Western support for Gaza’s reconstruction and governance, while Western powers, in turn, are expecting Arab backing on the Ukraine conflict. These shifting dynamics are unfolding in response to President Trump’s high-stakes geopolitical gambits, as he remains determined to pursue his <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/trumps-recast-us-power-risks-undercutting-middle-east-stability">unconventional foreign policy approach</a>—applying pressure and demanding concessions from traditional allies and adversaries alike—moves that are already influencing his evolving Middle East strategy.</p>
<p>Mohammad Siraj Khan is a lecturer, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Prince Mohammad Bin Fahd University, Saudi Arabia</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/gaza-ceasefire-plan-and-us-iran-tensions/">Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/the-iran-pakistan-gas-pipeline-project-economic-and-geopolitical-realities/</link>
		
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		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Sep 2024 21:26:27 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=10423</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="397" height="342" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/28-01-2013_indepth-iran-map.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/28-01-2013_indepth-iran-map.jpg 397w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/28-01-2013_indepth-iran-map-300x258.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 397px) 100vw, 397px" />Context The saga of the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline project is a stark illustration of how geopolitical complexities can impede critical infrastructure development, even when the need is dire. For Pakistan, a country grappling with chronic energy shortages, this pipeline has long represented a beacon of hope for economic stability and growth. Yet, for decades, it [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-iran-pakistan-gas-pipeline-project-economic-and-geopolitical-realities/">The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="397" height="342" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/28-01-2013_indepth-iran-map.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/28-01-2013_indepth-iran-map.jpg 397w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/28-01-2013_indepth-iran-map-300x258.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 397px) 100vw, 397px" /><p><strong><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignleft size-full wp-image-3180" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/277_Iran_Karte_Oil_Gas_Sep_3_20091.jpg" alt="" width="277" height="284" />Context</strong></p>
<p>The saga of the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline project is a stark illustration of how geopolitical complexities can impede critical infrastructure development, even when the need is dire. For Pakistan, a country grappling with chronic energy shortages, this pipeline has long represented a beacon of hope for economic stability and growth. Yet, for decades, it has remained tantalizing out of reach, a victim of international pressures, regional rivalries, and economic challenges.</p>
<p>The story begins in 2010 when Pakistan, facing an escalating energy crisis, signed a landmark deal with Iran to construct a 2,750-kilometer pipeline. Initially valued at $7.5 billion, the project promised to be a game-changer for Pakistan&#8217;s energy sector. The potential impact was significant: according to a USIP report, Pakistan&#8217;s persistent power crisis was trimming off about 2 percent of the country&#8217;s annual domestic product[1]. Furthermore, a World Bank study estimated that power shortages in developing countries like Pakistan could reduce business profitability by up to 40 percent[2]. These figures underscored the critical nature of the project for Pakistan&#8217;s economic well-being and future growth prospects.</p>
<p><strong>Economic and Geopolitical Realities</strong></p>
<p>From its inception, the project has been shadowed by the looming threat of U.S. sanctions. Unlike India, which received exemptions for its involvement in Iran&#8217;s Chabahar port, or Afghanistan, which was granted allowances for trade through Iran, Pakistan has consistently faced stern warnings from Washington about the consequences of proceeding with the pipeline. This disparity in treatment reflects the complex web of U.S. strategic interests in the region. India is viewed as a potential counterweight to China&#8217;s growing influence, while for Afghanistan Chabahar represents and alternative for its dependence on Pakistan. Pakistan, with its complex relationship with the U.S. and close ties to China, finds itself in a less favorable position.</p>
<p>The US policy towards Pakistan, Iran, and India have different ambitions. The situation demonstrates the complexity of international relations, where strict policy adherence often gives way to strategic exceptions based on broader geopolitical goals. The American approach has been criticized for its inconsistency, but from the U.S. perspective, it reflects a nuanced balancing of various strategic interests in the region. Using exceptions and restrictions as tools allows U.S, to influence foreign policy choices of regional players.</p>
<p>The geopolitical landscape has further complicated Pakistan&#8217;s position. Historically, tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran meant that Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations were hesitant to support a project that could increase Iran&#8217;s influence and decrease Pakistan&#8217;s financial dependence on them. Especially because Iran’s influence in the Middle East has consistently been increasing. China and Iran also signed $400 billion-dollar strategic economic agreement in 2021.</p>
<p>While the Chinese facilitated Saudi-Iran détente reached in 2023 offered a glimmer of hope, it has not significantly altered the dynamics surrounding the pipeline project. This hesitation from traditional allies has left Pakistan in a precarious position, caught between its energy needs and its diplomatic relationships. Moreover, the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel has further hardened positions against Iran.</p>
<p>Pakistan&#8217;s economic instability has added another layer of difficulty. The country&#8217;s frequent need for IMF bailouts and its struggle to finance large-scale infrastructure projects have made the pipeline&#8217;s completion seem increasingly elusive. As years passed, the project&#8217;s costs escalated, and the global political and security environment became even more convoluted, making it more challenging for Pakistan to move forward. In August 2023, Pakistan announced the suspension of the project due to the threat of U.S. sanctions, highlighting the ongoing pressures and uncertainties surrounding the initiative.</p>
<p>The failure of alternative energy projects has exacerbated Pakistan&#8217;s predicament. Initiatives like TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline) and CASA 1000 (Central Asia-South Asia power project) have stalled, often citing security concerns in Afghanistan and Baluchistan. Consequently, Pakistan remains heavily reliant on expensive Independent Power Producers (IPPs), a situation that undermines the competitiveness of its exports in the global market. This dependence on costly energy sources creates a vicious cycle, hampering economic growth and making it even more difficult for Pakistan to invest in long-term energy solutions.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, regional dynamics have shifted dramatically. India has made significant strides in enhancing its connectivity to Central Asia through the Chabahar port, effectively bypassing Pakistan. In May 2024, India signed a 10-year agreement to develop and operate Iran&#8217;s strategic Chabahar Port, committing $120 million, along with an additional $250 million loan credit facility for related projects. This development not only provides India with strategic advantages but also highlights the opportunities Pakistan is missing due to its inability to complete the pipeline project. The Chabahar port offers India an opportunity to reestablish its presence in Afghanistan and enhance its access to Central Asian markets, areas where Pakistan could have played a pivotal role had the pipeline project moved forward.</p>
<p><strong>The Opportunity Cost</strong></p>
<p>The opportunity cost for Pakistan is substantial and multifaceted. Economically, the completion of the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline could have significantly reduced Pakistan&#8217;s energy import bill. Conservative estimates suggest that access to Iranian natural gas could have saved Pakistan billions of dollars annually in energy costs[3]. This reduction in energy expenses would have had a cascading positive effect on the economy, potentially boosting GDP growth by 1-2% per annum[4].</p>
<p>Moreover, the availability of reliable and affordable energy would have been a boon for Pakistan&#8217;s industrial sector. Many industries, particularly textiles &#8211; a key export sector for Pakistan &#8211; have suffered due to inconsistent power supply. With a steady supply of natural gas, these industries could have operated at full capacity, potentially increasing export revenues by 15-20% annually[5].</p>
<p>The pipeline could have also played a crucial role in reducing Pakistan&#8217;s dependence on the IMF. By stabilizing energy costs and boosting industrial output, Pakistan could have improved its foreign exchange reserves and reduced its current account deficit. Economic projections suggest that over a 10-year period, the pipeline could have contributed to reducing Pakistan&#8217;s external debt by 20-25%, significantly altering its financial landscape and reducing the need for frequent IMF interventions[6].</p>
<p>Furthermore, the project had the potential to transform Pakistan into an energy corridor, linking Iran to the vast markets of South Asia. This role could have brought in significant transit fees and positioned Pakistan as a key player in regional energy dynamics. Conservative estimates put potential transit fee earnings at $500 million to $1 billion annually, a substantial boost to Pakistan&#8217;s foreign exchange earnings[7].</p>
<p>The environmental impact is another overlooked aspect. Natural gas, being a cleaner fuel compared to oil and coal, could have helped Pakistan meet its climate change commitments more effectively. The shift to gas could have reduced carbon emissions by 15-20% in the power sector alone, contributing to global climate goals while also improving local air quality[8].</p>
<p><strong>Navigating the Future</strong></p>
<p>As Pakistan grapples with these lost opportunities and ongoing challenges, it finds itself at a critical juncture. The country must navigate the escalating great power rivalry between the United States and China while addressing its pressing energy needs. In this context, Pakistan could consider a multi-faceted approach to move forward.</p>
<p>Firstly, Pakistan should intensify its diplomatic efforts with the United States, emphasizing the project&#8217;s importance for regional stability and economic development. Framing the pipeline as a crucial element for broader international goals in the region might help in securing exemptions or finding a middle ground. This approach could involve highlighting how energy security in Pakistan contributes to overall regional stability, a key U.S. foreign policy objective. A more economically stable Pakistan could be a more effective partner in fighting extremism and promoting regional security.</p>
<p>Engaging with Iran through economic projects could provide more diplomatic leverage for the international community in negotiations over Iran&#8217;s nuclear program. While the pipeline would benefit Iran, it would also make Iran more dependent on its neighbors for economic stability, potentially increasing leverage in nuclear negotiations.</p>
<p>Secondly, Pakistan could leverage the improved Saudi-Iran relations to garner support from GCC countries. This diplomatic outreach should be coupled with a renewed focus on diversifying energy sources, including accelerating the development of domestic resources and exploring alternative gas import options. The recent geopolitical shifts in the Middle East offer a unique opportunity for Pakistan to reposition itself in regional energy dynamics.</p>
<p>Thirdly, Pakistan should consider a phased implementation of the pipeline project, starting with sections less likely to trigger immediate sanctions. This approach could be complemented by exploring technical solutions that might mitigate sanctions risks, such as processing Iranian gas at the border. By breaking the project into smaller, more manageable phases, Pakistan might be able to demonstrate progress and build momentum while navigating complex international regulations.</p>
<p>Furthermore, Pakistan needs to reduce political polarization and strengthen its economic foundations through structural reforms. Improving the investment climate to attract foreign investment in the energy sector and reducing dependence on external financial support would put Pakistan in a stronger position to pursue its energy security goals. These reforms could include streamlining bureaucratic processes, enhancing transparency in the energy sector, and developing a clear, long-term energy policy that prioritizes sustainable and affordable energy sources.</p>
<p>In the broader context of great power rivalry, Pakistan should maintain a balanced approach between the U.S. and China. Leveraging relationships with both nations, while also exploring multilateral forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and potentially BRICS, could open new avenues for support and cooperation on energy projects. This balanced approach could involve positioning the pipeline project as part of a broader regional connectivity initiative that benefits multiple stakeholders, potentially making it more palatable to international partners.</p>
<p>The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline project remains a symbol of unfulfilled potential in regional cooperation and energy security. Its completion could catalyze a transformation in Pakistan&#8217;s economic landscape, potentially adding 2-3% to annual GDP growth, creating hundreds of thousands of jobs, and significantly reducing the country&#8217;s carbon footprint. The ripple effects would extend beyond Pakistan&#8217;s borders, fostering regional integration and potentially contributing to stability in a volatile region.</p>
<p>As Pakistan continues to navigate the complex interplay of domestic needs and international pressures, the path forward requires astute diplomacy, economic resilience, and strategic foresight. By addressing these challenges head-on and adapting to the evolving geopolitical landscape, Pakistan may yet find a way to turn this long-delayed project into a reality. The stakes are high &#8211; not just for Pakistan&#8217;s energy security, but for its economic future and its role in an increasingly interconnected region.</p>
<p>The coming years will be crucial in determining whether Pakistan can overcome the hurdles that have long delayed this project. Success would not only secure a more stable energy future for its people but could also redefine Pakistan&#8217;s position in the regional and global economic order. The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline, therefore, represents more than just an energy project; it is a test of Pakistan&#8217;s ability to navigate complex geopolitical waters and emerge as a key player in the changing dynamics of South and Central Asia.</p>
<p>References:</p>
<p>[1] United States Institute of Peace (USIP) report on Pakistan&#8217;s energy crisis (2023)</p>
<p>[2] World Bank study on power shortages in developing countries (2022)</p>
<p>[3] Asian Development Bank (ADB) report on South Asian energy trade (2021)</p>
<p>[4] International Monetary Fund (IMF) country report on Pakistan (2023)</p>
<p>[5] Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Annual Export Data (2023)</p>
<p>[6] Economic projections by Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) (2022)</p>
<p>[7] Estimates from Pakistan&#8217;s Ministry of Energy (Petroleum Division) (2021)</p>
<p>[8] Pakistan&#8217;s Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to the Paris Agreement (2021)</p>
<p><strong>Related Links:</strong></p>
<p class="entry-title"><a href="https://politact.com/iran-pakistan-cross-border-clashes-and-deep-rooted-challenges/">Iran-Pakistan Cross-Border Clashes And Deep-Rooted Challenges</a></p>
<p class="entry-title"><a href="https://politact.com/great-power-rivalry-and-chinas-deepening-involvement-in-south-asia-gulf-states/">Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States</a></p>
<p><a href="https://politact.com/the-future-and-politics-of-iran-pakistan-gas-pipeline/">The Future and Politics of Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project</a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-iran-pakistan-gas-pipeline-project-economic-and-geopolitical-realities/">The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>Hezbollah-Israel Tensions Escalate, Threatening Wider Conflict</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/hezbollah-israel-tensions-escalate-threatening-wider-conflict/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 25 Jan 2024 02:51:27 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Global Power Tussles and Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Issue Brief]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaza Strip]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics of Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hamas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hamas and Houthis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hezbollah]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran and Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iranian proxies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israeli Palestinian conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lebanon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East Peace Process]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[October 7 Hamas attack]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Iran tensions]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=10323</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="400" height="368" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/24-03-2011_israel_lebanon_map.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Map of Israel and region" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/24-03-2011_israel_lebanon_map.jpg 400w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/24-03-2011_israel_lebanon_map-300x276.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 400px) 100vw, 400px" />• Last Friday, Hezbollah issued a stern warning that Israel "would receive a real slap in the face," asserting its readiness to counter Israeli aggression endlessly. On the other hand, Israel has threatened to replicate its Gaza offensive in Lebanon.<br />
• With all signs indicating the expansion of the conflict and no bargaining chips in hand for negotiations, the likelihood that Hezbollah and Israel would come to a peaceful agreement in the coming days is diminishing, as their major bone of contention, the Israel-Gaza conflict, continues to escalate.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/hezbollah-israel-tensions-escalate-threatening-wider-conflict/">Hezbollah-Israel Tensions Escalate, Threatening Wider Conflict</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="400" height="368" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/24-03-2011_israel_lebanon_map.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="Map of Israel and region" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/24-03-2011_israel_lebanon_map.jpg 400w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/24-03-2011_israel_lebanon_map-300x276.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 400px) 100vw, 400px" /><p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignleft size-medium wp-image-3530" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/15-11-2012_Israel-Map-300x300.gif" alt="" width="300" height="300" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/15-11-2012_Israel-Map-300x300.gif 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/15-11-2012_Israel-Map-100x100.gif 100w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/15-11-2012_Israel-Map-450x452.gif 450w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/15-11-2012_Israel-Map-150x150.gif 150w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/15-11-2012_Israel-Map-418x420.gif 418w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /><strong>Naad-e-Ali Sulehria</strong> – South Asia Fellow, PoliTact</p>
<p>The ongoing cross-border military escalation between Hezbollah and Israel has taken a more aggressive and provocative turn, bringing them dangerously close to an imminent and highly destructive all-out war and a wider regional conflict. In a <a href="https://www.arabnews.pk/node/2445806/middle-east">recent incident</a>, an Israeli drone strike in Southern Lebanon resulted in the deaths of two more Hezbollah fighters with a total of 140, and over 195 Lebanese civilians causalities since October 7.</p>
<p>With ongoing tensions, <a href="https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2024/01/03/lebanon-Hezbollah-Israel-Lebanon-Seyyed-Hassan-Nasrallah/7931704310926/">Hezbollah&#8217;s Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah,</a> has conditioned any negotiations with Israel on ending the Gaza war, linking the ongoing escalations to the situation in Gaza. Last Friday, <a href="https://www.newagebd.net/article/223352/hezbollah-warns-israel-against-continued-aggression">Hezbollah issued a stern warning</a> that Israel &#8220;would receive a real slap in the face,&#8221; asserting its readiness to counter Israeli aggression endlessly. On the other hand, Israel has threatened to replicate its Gaza offensive in Lebanon.</p>
<p>If hostilities reach that point, it could potentially draw the US and Iran into the conflict. For Biden’s administration, a full-scale Israel-Hezbollah war would be a significant diplomatic and political failure with repercussions for his upcoming presidential elections. For Iran, the stakes would be too costly, as it would not only lose its strategic deterrence asset in the form of Hezbollah, but may also bring a full-scale war home, which it cannot afford to fight.</p>
<p>Recognizing the sensitivity of the situation, the U.S. is engaging in diplomatic efforts to avert war, proposing a preliminary solution involving Hezbollah withdrawing its fighters from the border with Israel and the Lebanese army establishing a buffer zone. However, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-rejected-us-overtures-still-open-diplomacy-avoid-wider-war-2024-01-18/">Hezbollah has rejected this proposal</a>, as sheltering its fighters near the Israel border has given it strategic leverage. Notably, Israeli authorities have managed to evacuate over 96,000 residents who live near the Lebanon border. Most of these individuals are hesitant to return to their homes, fearing the possibility of Hezbollah crossing into Israel and taking hostages.</p>
<p>With all signs indicating the expansion of the conflict and apparently no bargaining chips for negotiations in hand, the likelihood that Hezbollah and Israel would come to a peaceful agreement on Gaza in the coming days is diminishing,</p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranian-hezbollah-commanders-help-direct-houthi-attacks-yemen-sources-say-2024-01-20/">latest reports</a>, Hezbollah is expanding its footholds in the region and has its forces on the ground in Yemen, helping to direct and oversee Houthi confrontations with Israel in the Red Sea. Through its regional expansion, Hezbollah has demonstrated its capability to open several war fronts against Israel. Siding with the Houthis, Hezbollah has delivered a message that they would not stop confronting Israel until it ends its offensive in Gaza. Israel has indicated that the window for diplomacy is closing, and if no negotiated agreement is reached by the end of January, it will escalate its confrontation with Hezbollah. This undesirable scenario could result in widespread destruction and civilian suffering, regardless of who claims victory.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/hezbollah-israel-tensions-escalate-threatening-wider-conflict/">Hezbollah-Israel Tensions Escalate, Threatening Wider Conflict</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>Iran Exhibits Nuclear Expertise, China Offers to Mediate As Russia Warns of Summer Conflict</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/iran-exhibits-nuclear-expertise-china-offers-to-mediate-as-russia-warns-of-summer-conflict/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 15 Feb 2012 10:41:27 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Core vs Peripheral Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Iran Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia and Islamic World]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Vantage Point Analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arab and Israeli conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China and Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chinese and Iran mediation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics of the Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran and Afghan Reconciliation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran tensions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ma Zhaoxu]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nikolai Makarov]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia and Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Situation of Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Iran tensions]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://beta.politact.com/?p=6454</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Context Iran has started using domestically made nuclear fuel rods for its reactors. The loading ceremony was widely publicized and was attended by President Ahmedinejad. The government also unveiled more advanced and efficient centrifuges for uranium enrichment at its Natanz facility. Iran wants to demonstrate that it does not need foreign assistance towards advancing its [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/iran-exhibits-nuclear-expertise-china-offers-to-mediate-as-russia-warns-of-summer-conflict/">Iran Exhibits Nuclear Expertise, China Offers to Mediate As Russia Warns of Summer Conflict</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>Iran has started using domestically made nuclear fuel rods for its reactors. The loading ceremony was widely publicized and was attended by President Ahmedinejad. The government also unveiled more advanced and efficient centrifuges for uranium enrichment at its Natanz facility.</p>
<p>Iran wants to demonstrate that it does not need foreign assistance towards advancing its nuclear program and would not be deterred by western sanctions. Western countries fear that Iran intends to develop nuclear weapons while the country contends that it only wants to fulfill its energy needs through the use of nuclear technology.</p>
<p><span id="more-6454"></span></p>
<p><strong>Analysis</strong></p>
<p>Meanwhile, Chief of the General Staff for the Russian Armed Forces, Nikolai Makarov, stated the crisis over Iran’s nuclear program is likely come to a head by this summer. He added that Russia is monitoring the situation of Iran and the Middle East very closely and in real time.</p>
<p>On the other hand, reports indicate Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad will travel to Beijing in mid-March to secure oil exports to China and strengthen political and strategic ties with the country. China has vowed to continue trading with Iran despite US-EU sanctions and is trying to convince western powers that the concerns over Iran’s nuclear program should be resolved through negotiations.</p>
<p>In this regard, Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu travelled to Tehran on February 11th to discuss the nuclear issue and to mediate the talks between six representative nations- Britain, China, France, Russia, the US and Germany &#8211; and Iran. He also recommended that Iran should cooperate with IAEA. Iran has shown willingness to resume talks at the earliest and its oil minister is also planning to visit China, Japan, India and Russia.<br />
&nbsp;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/iran-exhibits-nuclear-expertise-china-offers-to-mediate-as-russia-warns-of-summer-conflict/">Iran Exhibits Nuclear Expertise, China Offers to Mediate As Russia Warns of Summer Conflict</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>Pakistan To Host A Summit With Iran, Afghanistan</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/pakistan-to-host-a-summit-with-iran-afghanistan/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 10 Feb 2012 10:48:56 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Afghan Reconciliation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Issue Brief]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Iran Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South and Central Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FATA situation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of South Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics of Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics of South Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IP Gas Pipeline project]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Karzaim Ahmadinejad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Afghanistan ties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Iran Afghanistan Summit]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Iran ties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Iran tensions]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://beta.politact.com/?p=6475</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Context According to Pakistan’s foreign ministry, the country will be hosting a trilateral summit with Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai next week. The two-day summit will be held from Feb 16 to Feb 17 in Islamabad. The summit is taking place as US has imposed one of the toughest sanctions on [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/pakistan-to-host-a-summit-with-iran-afghanistan/">Pakistan To Host A Summit With Iran, Afghanistan</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>According to Pakistan’s foreign ministry, the country will be hosting a trilateral summit with Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai next week. The two-day summit will be held from Feb 16 to Feb 17 in Islamabad.</p>
<p>The summit is taking place as US has imposed one of the toughest sanctions on oil exports from Iran and any country that deals with Central Bank of Iran. However, despite US objections Pakistan has recommitted to complete the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project by 2014. On the other hand, Afghanistan is feeling sidelined from the reconciliation talks between US and Taliban.</p>
<p>Pakistan’s foreign ministry spokesman Abdul Basit stated, “The trilateral summit is important for the leaders to get together and discuss important regional issues pertaining to counter-terrorism and organized crimes including drug trafficking.”</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/pakistan-to-host-a-summit-with-iran-afghanistan/">Pakistan To Host A Summit With Iran, Afghanistan</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>Iran Consents To Nuclear Talks In Turkey</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/iran-consents-to-nuclear-talks-in-turkey/</link>
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		<pubDate>Sat, 14 Jan 2012 09:45:30 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[A Dummy Cat]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ali Larijini]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ankara]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arab Israeli conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics of Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran's nuclear program]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Situation in Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey Iran relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Iran tensions]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://beta.politact.com/?p=6606</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Context Iran expressed its consent on Thursday towards holding nuclear talks in Turkey. Speaker of Iran’s Majiles, Ali Larijini, stated in Ankara, “Our Turkish brothers think that negotiations should take place in Turkey, and of course we are positive for holding these talks in Turkey,&#8221; adding that Iran wants negotiations to be serious this time. [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/iran-consents-to-nuclear-talks-in-turkey/">Iran Consents To Nuclear Talks In Turkey</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>Iran expressed its consent on Thursday towards holding nuclear talks in Turkey. Speaker of Iran’s Majiles, Ali Larijini, stated in Ankara, “Our Turkish brothers think that negotiations should take place in Turkey, and of course we are positive for holding these talks in Turkey,&#8221; adding that Iran wants negotiations to be serious this time.</p>
<p>This came when the Western powers are pressing sanctions on Iran to force it to abandon its nuclear ambition. Turkey also hosted an unsuccessful round of nuclear talks in January 2011 between Iran and G5+1 countries.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/iran-consents-to-nuclear-talks-in-turkey/">Iran Consents To Nuclear Talks In Turkey</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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