Analysis

Most analysts agree that there is convincing and compelling evidence of the emergence of such groups, which could be the unintended consequence of the pressure being exerted or part of a deliberate strategy adopted by the extremists. The failed bombing of the Times Square New York could also be the outcome of such rupture.
 

One of the premises of the new US strategy for Af-Pak region involves creating division amongst the Taliban ranks. Some strategists believe this is exactly what the intelligence agencies are doing by exploiting their differences and creating rifts between different factions of extremist groups, pitching one group against the other. The success of this strategy is yet to be seen. On a positive note, for the first time these tactics are part of a larger political strategy.

According to intelligence specialists, when you take out the central figures of a terrorist organization, chances of several splinter groups coming up increase. These groups could operate independently and have separate agendas. Part of the Al Qaeda operational strategy has always been the analogy of a snake with many heads and therefore cutting off one of the heads would not necessarily end the organization. This strategy now seems to be replicated by many contemporary extremist groups.

The Taliban has always operated as a loose alliance of several Jihadi groups. The first division among the Taliban came when the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) emerged and declared itself a separate organization from the Afghan Taliban. It operated along side the Haqqani group, Maulvi Nazeer Ahmed and Gul Bahadur groups besides others. Many of their recruits were criminals running away from the long arm of justice, sectarian groups targeting Shias and Barveli Muslims in Pakistan and brainwashed young men coming out of Madrassas. Overall, the terrorists were divided into three groups: ultra conservative Islamists, seeking the rule of Sharia where they operate; Islamists who think their first duty is to fight foreign occupation of Muslim territory; and global Jihadis, who dream of dominating the world with their own self defined brand of Islam. Some of these are extremists while all of them have some sort of ideological alignments with others.

The terrorist groups have proved to be very adaptable, as demonstrated by their tactics and strategies in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and increasingly in Yemen and the region of Greater Horn of Africa. They appear to be increasingly mimicking the operational model of small independent teams similar to the special operation forces, widely utilized by US and other NATO allies.It is apparent that dispersion of Taliban and other terrorists over a wide area and formation of independent groups would make the job of intelligence specialists much more difficult. Generally speaking, it is easier to locate larger groups, their structure, objectives, operational strategies and plans. Large groups are also easier to penetrate in order to ascertain a true picture of how they operate. But smaller terrorist groups are much more difficult to break into. By virtue of their small size, these groups can operate without detection over longer periods and plan devastating terrorist attacks. They may also slip away into cities, where they would be difficult to track. Furthermore, law enforcement agencies would be forced to commit considerable resources to track such groups. That would require more trained manpower, extra-specialized equipment and greater coordination between intelligence services. Consequently, more funds would have to be allocated for the task.

Additionally, while the drone attacks over the Pakistani tribal areas have claimed to be a success story, in the new scenario the role of this tactics will become even more complicated. Because such groups don’t comprise a large number of people, the terrorists may easily mingle with the local population. As such, it would pose new challenges for the security agencies to take them out without collateral damage. As pointed out before, the drone attacks are having the unintended consequence of spreading the terrorists from the peripheries to deeper into Pakistan.

The Pakistani security apparatus has learned first-hand the dangers of split groups. Many of the suicide attacks taking place in the country are being carried out by small independent groups, whose members once formed the Taliban but were forced to disperse in view of Pakistan military offensives in tribal areas. Most of these cells have no links with each other and seem to be compartmentalized, choose targets on their own, which may include military vehicles, mosques, military operational areas, five star hotels, etc. For Pakistani law enforcement agencies, tackling suicide bombings and raids on civilian and sensitive military installations across the country has been a complex task and will become even more so.

The extremists thus appear to be preparing for a long drawn out insurgency and these actions appear to be the first steps towards countering the US Surge including launching of the Operation Al-Faatha, that the Afghan Taliban has announced will be initiated on May 10, 2010.

PoliTact has also examined other implications of extremist strategies and tactics under a previously indentified pattern, Terrorism 2.0. The terrorists are gradually spreading their tentacles in Europe and Northern America by involving the Muslim community of these regions. Judging by the sentiments expressed in the official comments after the failed Time Square bombing, US risks overreacting and getting militarily drawn in another Muslim country. Not only will this widen the war theater but also accelerate anti-Americanism, and meanwhile considerably strain the American economic resources as well as those of the allies. One of the partners, Pakistan, is already slowly crumbling socially, ethnically and economically under the weight of this war.

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Context

The Pakistan Army’s Azm-e-Nau III exercises, being held near the Indian border in the Cholistan desert, are conspicuous by their scale, especially with regard to the number of troops involved and the firepower being used. It is the first time since 1989, which marked the beginning of a new era for the region following the departure of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, that exercises of such level and size are being held. Interestingly, the venue of the exercises is the same location where the late president of Pakistan and the army chief General Ziaul Haq witnessed the demonstration of M1 Abram tanks hours before he died in a mysterious air crash in August 1988.

The global balance of power is in transition and Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan are right at the epicenter of world attention. Iran, India and Pakistan have thus recently been conducting military exercises to demonstrate their readiness to known and potential adversaries.

Analysis

The Azme Nau exercises, under the Pakistan Army’s Southern Command and subsequently involving other commands also, have several dimensions, all of them significant in the present strategic scenario in the region.

The exercise signals to the Indians that there would be no element of strategic surprise for the application of the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD). The Indian doctrine envisions a limited conflict with Pakistan to achieve a set of defined objectives, while the Pakistani commanders consider CSD a major threat to strategic stability of the region considering both countries are nuclear powers. According to media reports, Pakistan has now developed two wings of forces to counter the Indian doctrine – one defensive, while the other would launch a counter offensive on the Indian territory following an attack from the west. Pakistani military strategists emphasize that in this era of advanced intelligence, the Indians do not have the luxury of the element of surprise and the battle indicators, especially mobilization, would be no secret. They say that Pakistani formations are positioned as such that they would require little time to counter the Indian offensive, which is apparently based on hit and mobilization concept – as opposed to mobilization and hit doctrine.

The exercises also seem to convey to the Indian military establishment that despite deployment of more than 100,000 troops on the country’s western borders to fight the Al Qaeda and the Taliban, the Pakistan Army retains the punch to take on the Indian military, if required. As it is, the Pakistan Army has assembled some 50,000 troops in the desert, which is a significant proportion of its total military strength on the Indian border. According to observers, the troops taking part in the exercise, which also involved live firing by Pakistan Air Force fighter jets, equaled the strength of three divisions of the army. While the Pakistan Army could always move additional troops from the western borders to the east in case of any contingency, that could put a dent in the ongoing war on terror, which the Army says it is successfully tackling.

The presence of foreign military attaches at the launching of the exercises puts in the picture another objective i.e. to demonstrate that the Pakistan Army is not cowed down in the face of the Indian Cold Start Doctrine. Additionally, the exercises show that while the Army battles al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the west, it is India that shapes the real threat perception of Pakistan.

Pakistani military believes the Indians may have misjudged the impact and effectiveness of the Cold Start Doctrine and that could have disastrous consequences for them. The Indian Cold Start Doctrine is based on certain assumptions, one of them being that reaction from Pakistan will not be equal in terms of mobilization of troops and firepower. That, however, may not be. And that is what makes the Cold Start Doctrine, in the era of unpredictable nuclear threshold, so dangerous.

India’s CSD is perhaps based on the lessons of the recent conflict in the region. These include the Kargil Conflict of 1999 and Drone Attacks conducted by US inside Pakistan’s tribal areas. In both cases Pakistan has demonstrated a tempered approach. During the Kargil Conflict, Pakistan was perceived widely as the aggressor and buckled under international pressure, as India was threatening to open a full scale war against Pakistan and the prospect of a nuclear showdown in the subcontinent appeared very real. Even past Indo-Pakistan conflicts have demonstrated that Pakistan cannot economically and geographically sustain a full scale war with India for long particularly without international support, and this resulted in the much criticized counter strategy of Strategic Depth adopted by Pakistan towards Afghanistan.

In the case of drone attacks, Pakistan has operated on a delicate PR management strategy. It has realized that the country lacked the (domestic and international) moral high ground needed to counter the drone tactics, which has proven to be very effective against asymmetric threats particularly emanating from non-state actors. Thus the drone tactic has had the effect of coercing Pakistan to cooperate with the US behind the scenes in acting against extremist threats originating from its territory, while saying very little publicly.

Other international players are liable to take their own message and lessons from these contemporary tactics and strategies. Since the Mumbai Incident in 2008, India has attempted to gain a similar moral imperative on the international perceptions theater. The CSD of India thus has to be evaluated keeping this context in mind. India believes it can achieves the same results as the US did, using these tactics. It is no wonder India is on a drone-buying binge lately!

On the contrary, the exercises have portrayed that Pakistan still maintains strategic equilibrium with India. More importantly, the exercises reiterated Pakistan’s stance that there will be no limited war with India, only total war. However, PoliTact believes that at the end of the day, it’s the actor which manages the dynamics of the war of perceptions, which will win the day.

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Context
In addition to the economic factor and and Indo-Pakistan relationship, described in the previous article, the role of NATO in changing Europe is also important to the new Afghan strategy; one has to fully understand the European geopolitical environment – more specifically, the balance of power on the continent – to understand how it will operate. To do so, one must take the following into account:

• The breakup of the Soviet Union, emergence of the newly independent states and resurgent Russia
• The unification of Germany
• The European Union and the evolution of NATO

Analysis

Russia’s Resurgence and NATO

The resurgence of Russia and the Georgian episode in 2008 proved that there was a limit to NATO’s expansion into Russia’s historic Near Abroad. Irked by Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia, Russia reacted by facilitating the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Although thus far about 60 nations have recognized Kosovo’s independence, about 100, including Russia and China, concerned over what they regard as an alarming precedent, have not. A decision regarding the legality of Kosovo’s independence is pending in the International Court of Justice in Hague. In addition, NATO continues to be at odds with Russia regarding the prospect of Ukraine and Georgia membership in NATO.

After backing away from its original plans for the Missile Defense System, in which the components were to be installed in the Czech Republic and Poland, the United States expects Russian cooperation regarding Afghanistan and Iran’s nuclear program. Russia, however, appears hesitant to commit itself, as it remains unsure about NATO’s intentions in Europe. It probably does, however, want to help NATO in Afghanistan, but not at the expense of expansion into its Near Abroad. Largely as a result, the first meeting of the NATO-Russia Council since the Georgia conflict has failed to produce any Russian commitment on offering militarily assistance to NATO in Afghanistan.

We at POLITACT believe that Russia is most likely to bypass NATO and develop its own relationship with President Karzai. For his part, faced with heavy criticism from NATO, President Karzai appears to welcome such a relationship with Russia.

The European Union and NATO

The positions of France and Germany during the Georgian conflict were markedly different from those of the United States and the UK, both of which wanted a more aggressive approach. The Germans and the French remain unwilling to take such a stand; after all, they both belong to the European Union and NATO. It is likely that the sentiment for strengthening the EU’s military capacity will regain momentum as NATO overreaches and questions regarding its role, in the face of emerging European realities, are heard again.

For example, a controversy has emerged as a result of France offering to sell arms including its state-of-the-art amphibious assault ship (Mistral) to the Russians, which NATO feels is contrary to its policy towards Russia. In addition to Georgia, the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are also worried about the Russians purchasing the ship, especially from their fellow NATO and EU member France.

The French have made the case that selling arms to Russia is essential for peace and stability in Europe. According to French Prime Minister Francois Fillon: “It would be impossible to call for continental stability in partnership with Russia if we refuse to sell armaments to Russia. A refusal would amount to contradicting our own discourse.” Thus it is likely that the competition between European Union and NATO will intensify in the future regarding the goals of both organizations not only in Europe but also in Afghanistan while increasing the importance of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS,) including Turkey. The criticality of CIS is tied to the European need for energy resources and also to serve as an alternative to Pakistan, for supplying and supporting coalition troops in Afghanistan.

Europeans and especially the Germans are heavily dependent on Russia for their energy supply. Thus there is a call for diversifying Europe’s energy sources, reducing its excessive dependence on Russia and allowing France and Germany to become more dependable NATO members. But for now, France and Germany are taking an independent position on Afghanistan, as they did during the Georgian conflict. These positions are more reflective of their traditional status in Europe than the post World War II set-up. When the Germans and the French take independent stands on various global conflicts, it undercuts the premise of Article 5 of the NATO alliance:
“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”

A United Germany

A senior German General had to resign in the aftermath of NATO’s recent airstrike in Kunduz, Afghanistan, which had resulted in the death of about 100 civilians. German public opinion is against continuing the course in Afghanistan. German reaction to the new US strategy in Afghanistan was best expressed by the nation’s senior official: “We’ve made it very clear that in our view the Obama speech alone does not provide a strategic basis, but that, together with the Afghans, we would like to hear and have binding agreements and what they are willing to contribute.”

As a unified and confident Germany emerges once again on the world scene, the United States and the UK want it to use its influence to help change Russia’s behavior and check its resurgence. For its part, however, Germany appears to be developing an economic and cordial relationship with Russia. Could this be the reason why a reluctant France returned to full NATO membership in April 2009?

In this environment, the newly independent states and Eastern European republics, disturbed by Russia’s reemergence, are turning to NATO to assuage their anxieties and are therefore likely to provide majority of the troops for surge in Afghanistan. German Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg was reported on December 20th to have stated that talks should be opened up with moderate elements within the Taliban, and that refusing all dialogue with the group is no longer a valid option.

The International Conference on Afghanistan organized by UK and to be held in London on January 28th, will probably reflect the true European position on the new US strategy. The conference is to be attended by 68 nations. Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, and the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, are both expected to attend.

So what’s at Stake?

Thus NATO’s credibility and future is clearly on the line in Afghanistan. The preservation of the alliance appears to be the most important factor for US to escalate the war. If NATO fails in Afghanistan, the security apparatus of Europe which has existed since World War II will also be threatened. As listed above, NATO is under strain not only in Afghanistan but also in Europe, and the reasons are connected.

Are the threats related to the extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan, coupled with Iran and North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, enough to keep the alliance together? Or, is it the European dynamics discussed above which will likely decide the future of NATO?

In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’ breakup, the emergence of the EU has complicated NATO’s role. Perhaps the best course for NATO is the one envisioned by Zbigniew Brzenski: adding NATO-SCO and NATO-CSTO Councils to the already existing NATO-Russia Council. For the time being, however, France and Germany don’t appear comfortable with this.

One can conclude that European rivalries will ultimately play a crucial role in the outcome of the Afghanistan conflict, which leads to the most important questions of all: can Afghanistan, the graveyard of empires, be saved and if so, at what cost?

To be continued

Part III –Can Afghanistan be saved

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Any sober analysis of the military operations in Pakistan reveals that the menace of terrorism is spreading, with ever more dangerous consequences. Each operation is followed by a temporary respite followed by even more devastating terrorist attacks and increasing lawlessness. The writ of the state is gaining traction in the tribal areas but appears to be dissolving in urban centers, especially in Peshawar. Politicians are living in a bubble, increasingly unresponsive to public sentiment and thus are finding it more difficult to establish the national consensus required to govern effectively. Law enforcement authorities clearly lack the training and tools required to competently implement preventive measures.

As previously noted by PoliTact, in this situation extremists appear to be sophisticated and cutting-edge, while in reality they are merely exploiting the glaring vulnerabilities of Pakistan’s law enforcement agencies, both civilian and military. Meanwhile the government is losing the confidence of the public and its prestige internationally. The foot soldiers cannot be blamed for the shortcomings of the law enforcement agencies.

This analysis will focus on the implications of the attack on the Inter-Services Intelligence Office in Peshawar on November 13th. This followed an attack on Army General Headquarters on October 12th and one on the ISI Office in Lahore on May 27th. We also examine terrorist tactics and government security procedures in order to highlight apparent shortcomings. Lastly, we explore the future of terrorism in Pakistan vis-a-vis the situation in Afghanistan and the lessons of history.

Analysis

Extremist Tactics

Below are listed the different types of terrorist attacks, each adapted to its target:

Individual suicide attacks in which a person wearing a suicide belt blows himself up in a bazaar or in settings where support services for military and security personnel are present. Those utilizing Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED), the most lethal and destructive, and perhaps the hardest to pull off successfully. Cars and mid-size trucks have been used in most cases, but as demonstrated by the Marriott hotel bombing in Islamabad, big trucks have been used selectively. Ambushes in which a small team of assailants launch a surprise attack on a law enforcement or military facility in an attempt to kill its personnel and take hostages, thus prolonging the siege.

Extremist Targeting

The terrorists have attacked civilians, police and civil and military intelligence personnel; even players on the Sri Lankan Cricket team haven’t been spared. It must be noted, however, that responsibility for the attacks on civilians, such as the one which occurred in the Peshawar Meena Bazaar on October 28, (resulting in the deaths of more than 100 people and wounding many more), was not claimed by either the TTP or Al Qaeda. Instead, the extremists blamed American defense contractors operating in the country.

Oddly enough, political leaders are the only group that has been spared thus far. Possible explanations for this include:

The politicians receive better protection and are thus more difficult to attack;The terrorists believe that the politicians are proving so ineffective at governing that they are best left alone; that their ineptitude actually assists the extremists prevent the development of an effective counter-terrorism strategy;That politicians can be targeted later on when the escalation mounts;Leaving the politicians unharmed exacerbates tensions between the nation’s civilian and military;The terrorists are hoping that public discontent with the worsening situation will result in a violent revolution.

PoliTact’s analysis of September 29, 2009 identified some of the future potential targets. We also recommended closing of the Khyber Road to traffic, as it passes through areas housing sensitive government’s installations. If this measure were adopted, it would almost certainly eliminate the possibility of VBIED attacks, such as the ones launched against the ISI office and the Pearl Continental Hotel in Peshawar. Both facilities were located about a mile from each other on the Khyber Road in Peshawar.

Law Enforcement’s Weak Spots

It should also be pointed out that the extremists appear to have developed both a short and long- term strategy. Law enforcement agencies don’t seem to have anticipated the target surveying and selection activities of the extremists. One would hope that after each attack, the law enforcement agencies would tweak their countermeasures. Sadly, this doesn’t appear to be happening; it is the extremists who are more likely to adapt themselves to new contingencies.

For example, after careful scrutiny of the attack on the ISI Office in Peshawar and other similar ones, one feels compelled to ask the following questions:How did the truck used by the terrorists to attack the facility bypass numerous check posts located along each access point?The security measures in place at the facility appear to be more suited to countering an ambush than a VBIED-style attack. Why the oversight and what steps will be taken to deal with it?What does this dismal performance by security personnel tell us about the security of nuclear installations?

The following are possible answers:

The extremists had accomplices who helped the truck elude the check posts.The extremists know the area very well and arranged for the truck to move from a location situated between a given check post and the targeted facility, so that the truck never had to pass any check post.The fact that proper steps weren’t taken to protect the facility for VBIED attacks points to inadequate training and a failure to anticipate the worst-case scenario. A number of options suggest themselves. First, all traffic on Khyber Road should have been stopped and diverted. If this proved impossible due to public inconvenience, then the facility should have been moved to a more secure premise (inside a military base, for example), where its existence would not be common knowledge. If this was found to be untenable, blast-proof walls should have been constructed.

The extremists have shown themselves to be more astute than security personnel. The pattern underlying terrorist attacks point towards multiple groups with support within the country as well as outside it. The attacks on civilians and ethnic groups could have a different source than the ones on law enforcement and military facilities but they share the same motive; to destabilize Pakistan. Since the findings of government investigations of these attacks are never made public, it is hard to build a convincing case one way or the other.

Interpreting the Terrorist Message

By demonstrating their reach, the extremists send the message that the operations against them have failed to make a dent in their capabilities and that they can still freely attack the nation’s most secure facilities with impunity. This is worrisome to the Western powers, which are anxious about the safety of the country’s nuclear facilities. On its part, Pakistan is extremely sensitive about its nuclear status and thus these terrorist attacks play upon the government’s fears, as well as destabilizing the government itself. A nuclear power cannot afford the latter, which raises questions about terrorist motivation.

One explanation: by demonstrating their capabilities and reach, the extremists want to convince the country’s government and military to end support for the US-backed war in Afghanistan, in addition to military operations in the tribal areas of Pakistan. From the terrorist perspective, if the government fails to cease and desist, then it is not being true to Islam. Therefore, in the best interests of Islam, they feel justified in taking over the control of nukes.

The Future of Terrorism in Pakistan

In the absence of a political strategy accompanying the military one, Pakistan is fast sliding into the abyss. In the meantime, the United States is engaged in an extensive and realistic review of its strategy in Afghanistan; attempting to cope with a global recession, it will most likely leave more of the fighting to Pakistani and Afghan forces. According to some in Pakistan, the situation looks like a revival of the colonial model, where the native foot soldiers were led by British Army officers. When the British finally left, it wasn’t because they had won or that they had tamed the tribal areas, but simply because of the results of the two World Wars. The lessons of World War I and II educated the global powers to avoid direct confrontations, which could have disastrous consequences (for example, Mutually Assured Destruction, or MAD). Instead, “proxy powers” and “client states” emerged.

When government policies increasingly appear to be developed in response to foreign pressure and not to public opinion, it is the military where one usually detects the first signs of revolt. After all, this has been the case in other parts of the Islamic world, notably Egypt and Iraq. The Urabi Revolt of (1879-82) and the subsequent Free Officers Movement of 1952 in Egypt both provide historic antecedents and parallels to the current situation in Pakistan, as does The Iraqi Army Revolt of 1958. There is one significant difference, however: the above mentioned Arab revolts were mostly nationalistic in origin but today the reaction against pervasive corruption and perceived foreign meddling has both national and religious origins – a potentially explosive combination – one would think.

As the gap between a common citizen’s perception of reality and the elite increases, the chances of dangerous consequences escalate. The government is widely seen as corrupt and, in the public view, following foreign dictates and interests while compromising national interests. Additionally, the government and senior military officials seem to be working together with US under a tacit agreement, to conduct drone attacks on its own soil while launching military operations against its own people. Meanwhile, however, citizens are suffering under rising food prices and businesses are trying to deal with electricity shortages and price hikes resulting from IMF (International Monetary Fund) loan terms. Under these circumstances, the real question becomes, “How can a mutiny or a revolution in Pakistan be avoided?” The Western powers are bracing themselves for such an eventuality.

To prevent such a calamity, the government will have to prove to the public that it has the ability to discharge the minimal obligations of government: to safeguard human life and property. If the only security available is that provided by the extremists -that is, those occasions when they choose to initiate or conclude attacks – then why bother with a government? The need for credible leadership with the capacity to build a consensus on how to address critical issues has never been more pressing. Leadership means not only taking the initiative, but the ability to craft and then make a convincing case to the pubic on the suitable course for the future. In the interdependent world of the future the most daunting task is the ability to anticipate and cope with change as the status quo will not prevail. The institution most likely to initiate reform at this juncture, bringing a level of credibility to the system and help avoid extreme outcomes, is the Supreme Court of Pakistan and not the Parliament or the Executive.

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Any sober analysis of the military operations in Pakistan reveals that the menace of terrorism is spreading, with ever more dangerous consequences. Each operation is followed by a temporary respite followed by even more devastating terrorist attacks and increasing lawlessness. The writ of the state is gaining traction in the tribal areas but appears to be dissolving in urban centers, especially in Peshawar. Politicians are living in a bubble, increasingly unresponsive to public sentiment and thus are finding it more difficult to establish the national consensus required to govern effectively. Law enforcement authorities clearly lack the training and tools required to competently implement preventive measures.

As previously noted by PoliTact, in this situation extremists appear to be sophisticated and cutting-edge, while in reality they are merely exploiting the glaring vulnerabilities of Pakistan’s law enforcement agencies, both civilian and military. Meanwhile the government is losing the confidence of the public and its prestige internationally. The foot soldiers cannot be blamed for the shortcomings of the law enforcement agencies.

This analysis will focus on the implications of the attack on the Inter-Services Intelligence Office in Peshawar on November 13th. This followed an attack on Army General Headquarters on October 12th and one on the ISI Office in Lahore on May 27th. We also examine terrorist tactics and government security procedures in order to highlight apparent shortcomings. Lastly, we explore the future of terrorism in Pakistan vis-a-vis the situation in Afghanistan and the lessons of history.

Analysis

Extremist Tactics

Below are listed the different types of terrorist attacks, each adapted to its target:

•   Individual suicide attacks in which a person wearing a suicide belt blows himself up in a bazaar or in settings where support services for military and security personnel are present;
• Those utilizing Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED), the most lethal and destructive, and perhaps the hardest to pull off successfully. Cars and mid-size trucks have been used in most cases, but as demonstrated by the Marriott hotel bombing in Islamabad, big trucks have been used selectively;
• Ambushes in which a small team of assailants launch a surprise attack on a law enforcement or military facility in an attempt to kill its personnel and take hostages, thus prolonging the siege.

Extremist Targeting

The terrorists have attacked civilians, police and civil and military intelligence personnel; even players on the Sri Lankan Cricket team haven’t been spared. It must be noted, however, that responsibility for the attacks on civilians, such as the one which occurred in the Peshawar Meena Bazaar on October 28, (resulting in the deaths of more than 100 people and wounding many more), was not claimed by either the TTP or Al Qaeda. Instead, the extremists blamed American defense contractors operating in the country.

Oddly enough, political leaders are the only group that has been spared thus far. Possible explanations for this include:

• The politicians receive better protection and are thus more difficult to attack;
• The terrorists believe that the politicians are proving so ineffective at governing that they are best left alone; that their ineptitude actually assists the extremists prevent the development of an effective counter-terrorism strategy;
• That politicians can be targeted later on when the escalation mounts;
• Leaving the politicians unharmed exacerbates tensions between the nation’s civilian and military;
• The terrorists are hoping that public discontent with the worsening situation will result in a violent revolution.

PoliTact’s analysis of September 29, 2009 identified some of the future potential targets. We also recommended closing of the Khyber Road to traffic, as it passes through areas housing sensitive government’s installations. If this measure were adopted, it would almost certainly eliminate the possibility of VBIED attacks, such as the ones launched against the ISI office and the Pearl Continental Hotel in Peshawar. Both facilities were located about a mile from each other on the Khyber Road in Peshawar.

Law Enforcement’s Weak Spots

It should also be pointed out that the extremists appear to have developed both a short and long- term strategy. Law enforcement agencies don’t seem to have anticipated the target surveying and selection activities of the extremists. One would hope that after each attack, the law enforcement agencies would tweak their countermeasures. Sadly, this doesn’t appear to be happening; it is the extremists who are more likely to adapt themselves to new contingencies.

For example, after careful scrutiny of the attack on the ISI Office in Peshawar and other similar ones, one feels compelled to ask the following questions:

1. How did the truck used by the terrorists to attack the facility bypass numerous check posts located along each access point?
2. The security measures in place at the facility appear to be more suited to countering an ambush than a VBIED-style attack. Why the oversight and what steps will be taken to deal with it?
3. What does this dismal performance by security personnel tell us about the security of nuclear installations?

The following are possible answers:

1. The extremists had accomplices who helped the truck elude the check posts.
2. The extremists know the area very well and arranged for the truck to move from a location situated between a given check post and the targeted facility, so that the truck never had to pass any check post.
3. The fact that proper steps weren’t taken to protect the facility for VBIED attacks points to inadequate training and a failure to anticipate the worst-case scenario. A number of options suggest themselves. First, all traffic on Khyber Road should have been stopped and diverted. If this proved impossible due to public inconvenience, then the facility should have been moved to a more secure premise (inside a military base, for example), where its existence would not be common knowledge. If this was found to be untenable, blast-proof walls should have been constructed.
4. The extremists have shown themselves to be more astute than security personnel. The pattern underlying terrorist attacks point towards multiple groups with support within the country as well as outside it. The attacks on civilians and ethnic groups could have a different source than the ones on law enforcement and military facilities but they share the same motive; to destabilize Pakistan. Since the findings of government investigations of these attacks are never made public, it is hard to build a convincing case one way or the other.

Interpreting the Terrorist Message

By demonstrating their reach, the extremists send the message that the operations against them have failed to make a dent in their capabilities and that they can still freely attack the nation’s most secure facilities with impunity. This is worrisome to the Western powers, which are anxious about the safety of the country’s nuclear facilities. On its part, Pakistan is extremely sensitive about its nuclear status and thus these terrorist attacks play upon the government’s fears, as well as destabilizing the government itself. A nuclear power cannot afford the latter, which raises questions about terrorist motivation.

One explanation: by demonstrating their capabilities and reach, the extremists want to convince the country’s government and military to end support for the US-backed war in Afghanistan, in addition to military operations in the tribal areas of Pakistan. From the terrorist perspective, if the government fails to cease and desist, then it is not being true to Islam. Therefore, in the best interests of Islam, they feel justified in taking over the control of nukes.

The Future of Terrorism in Pakistan

In the absence of a political strategy accompanying the military one, Pakistan is fast sliding into the abyss. In the meantime, the United States is engaged in an extensive and realistic review of its strategy in Afghanistan; attempting to cope with a global recession, it will most likely leave more of the fighting to Pakistani and Afghan forces. According to some in Pakistan, the situation looks like a revival of the colonial model, where the native foot soldiers were led by British Army officers. When the British finally left, it wasn’t because they had won or that they had tamed the tribal areas, but simply because of the results of the two World Wars. The lessons of World War I and II educated the global powers to avoid direct confrontations, which could have disastrous consequences (for example, Mutually Assured Destruction, or MAD). Instead, “proxy powers” and “client states” emerged.

When government policies increasingly appear to be developed in response to foreign pressure and not to public opinion, it is the military where one usually detects the first signs of revolt. After all, this has been the case in other parts of the Islamic world, notably Egypt and Iraq. The Urabi Revolt of (1879-82) and the subsequent Free Officers Movement of 1952 in Egypt both provide historic antecedents and parallels to the current situation in Pakistan, as does The Iraqi Army Revolt of 1958. There is one significant difference, however: the above mentioned Arab revolts were mostly nationalistic in origin but today the reaction against pervasive corruption and perceived foreign meddling has both national and religious origins – a potentially explosive combination – one would think.

As the gap between a common citizen’s perception of reality and the elite increases, the chances of dangerous consequences escalate. The government is widely seen as corrupt and, in the public view, following foreign dictates and interests while compromising national interests. Additionally, the government and senior military officials seem to be working together with US under a tacit agreement, to conduct drone attacks on its own soil while launching military operations against its own people. Meanwhile, however, citizens are suffering under rising food prices and businesses are trying to deal with electricity shortages and price hikes resulting from IMF (International Monetary Fund) loan terms. Under these circumstances, the real question becomes, “How can a mutiny or a revolution in Pakistan be avoided?” The Western powers are bracing themselves for such an eventuality.

To prevent such a calamity, the government will have to prove to the public that it has the ability to discharge the minimal obligations of government: to safeguard human life and property. If the only security available is that provided by the extremists -that is, those occasions when they choose to initiate or conclude attacks – then why bother with a government? The need for credible leadership with the capacity to build a consensus on how to address critical issues has never been more pressing. Leadership means not only taking the initiative, but the ability to craft and then make a convincing case to the pubic on the suitable course for the future. In the interdependent world of the future the most daunting task is the ability to anticipate and cope with change as the status quo will not prevail. The institution most likely to initiate reform at this juncture, bringing a level of credibility to the system and help avoid extreme outcomes, is the Supreme Court of Pakistan and not the Parliament or the Executive.

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Context

The process of reaching a decision regarding timing and the number of troops to be sent to Afghanistan unexpectedly metamorphosed into a comprehensive review of President Barack Obama’s foreign policy. In the course of making such a choice, one logically ends up also assessing what is in the national interest as a whole; how to align the country’s economic and military policies in such a way as to reach the desired objective. This in large part explains why deciding on a new Afghanistan strategy has become so lengthy, confused and cumbersome.

Analysis

A strategic review worth its salt can never ignore the evolving global enviornment – one must consider not only current, but potential allies and adversaries. The first step in such an evaluation is to identify the major emerging players – Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC).

The President, of course, needs the advice of his closest associates and cabinet members, but he also has to develop his own perspective regarding difficult policy matters. One must take into account multiple viewpoints in order to grasp the complex reality.

Media reports claim that the new US strategy towards Afghanistan will be announced after President Obama’s all-important trip to Asia in mid-November.Hillary Clinton was recently in Pakistan, where she worked tirelessly to change misconceptions regarding US intentions towards the region. Senator John Kerry as well as US senior military officials, have also made recent trips to Pakistan. The Prime Minister of India, Manamohan Sigh, will be conducting his state visit to the US at the end of this month.

Moreover, President Obama and Vice President Biden have both recently spoken with Russian leaders, giving them a first-hand opportunity to develop fresh perspectives regarding Russia and its intentions. The President has also had in-depth encounters with Israeli leaders.

Reappraisal of American policy also involves a critical question: what is at stake for America in Afghanistan? Answering this question satisfactorily involves evaluating US interests internationally, understanding how they are related and then prioritizing in terms of the prevailing global recession. Prioritizing involves considering the following:

• Whether it is more important to confront the nuclear threat posed by Iran and North Korea or to focus on stabilizing Afghanistan;
• Which is more pressing – preventing destabilization in Afghanistan or Pakistan;
• Whether or not countering Chinese and Russian ambitions is more important than fighting extremism;
• Whether environmental developments like global warming are more of a threat than international rivalries;
• Whether progress towards a two-state solution in the Middle East or stopping the spread of extremism is more critical;
• Whether the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq will be helpful or hurtful to US interests;
• How to keep NATO intact and effective in the future.

Then comes the task of identifying the real challenges in Afghanistan – obviously necessary if the situation is to be improved significantly:

• Is the coalition mustering a counter-insurgency or counter-terrorist campaign in the region? Each requires a different approach.
• If safe havens in the tribal areas of Pakistan are eliminated, will that change the situation in Afghanistan and if so, at what cost?
• Is the goal to eradicate Al Qaeda only or the Taliban and other Jihadist groups in the region as well?
• What can and cannot be achieved in the short and long-term by altering the regional balance of power?

The US entered Afghanistan after 911 in order to prevent the country from becoming a refuge for Al Qaeda and other extremist groups who had helped plan the attack on the WTC. Although there have been no fresh attacks on US soil since that time, the situation in Afghanistan has unquestionably deteriorated (consider the recent election and bombings in Kabul). The Al Qaeda militants are still at large and Afghanistan’s neighbor, Pakistan, has been weakened by the local Taliban. Then there is the matter of the Jihadist’s involvement in Kashmir, damaging to India.

It is clear that only Al Qaeda has the capability to deliver. The members of the Taliban are fighting for their local agendas or often simply for money. US is moving in the direction of negotiations with those militants with merely local grievances and the question becomes if US will do the talking with or without the help of allies like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. It is commonly assumed that these allies can still bring the parties (Afghan Taliban) to the table. This, of course, means recognizing the importance of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The Af-Pak policy unveiled soon after President Obama’s inauguration attempted a comprehensive approach to the region, but didn’t take into account the critical issue of Kashmir.

US prefers a bilateral track between Inadia and Pakistan to solve outstanding disputes. US policy appears to envision a global role for India to counter China, while a much constrained one for Pakistan. US in all likelihood would prefer changing the behavior of Pakistan, particularly in view of its economic woes, which are worsening while fighting against extremist. From early indications, this change in Pakistan’s India perception might be occurring slowly, but a lot also depends on China-US-Russia relations.

In finding a solution to Afghanistan, the US will have to address the tangled interests of local and regional players. Perhaps the best strategy is to deal with these interests separately and at the appropriate time, that is, to prioritize them. As a practical matter, of course, help from allies will not be forthcoming without considering their interests. One can attempt through diplomacy to convince other players to become allies, the alternative being coercion via economic pressure and force.

Not all potential friends and foes are readily identifiable, of course, and thus much will depend on the assumptions underlying future policy, which in turn depends on correctly gauging the intentions of other international actors and then deciding what can be achieved through persuasion and compromise. At the moment, for obvious reasons, it is best to attempt cooperation with both allies and potential adversaries, utilizing diplomatic and economic leverages as much as possible. But a genuine compromise cannot occur without consideration of the interests of allies. It is this which complicates the new US Afghanistan strategy and foreign policy in general.

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Context

President Obama has defined his administration’s foreign policy as one of “engagement” with adversaries and “reengagement” with allies. This is, of course, in marked contrast to the more confrontational approach of his predecessor, which can best be summed up as “Either you are with us or against us.” With the new Democratic administration in place, the emphasis is on the use of economic aid and diplomacy. A new willingness on the part of the US to compromise can be seen in its dealings with Russia regarding the missile defense shield and with Israel regarding settlements. Yet it remains unclear how successful diplomatic overtures, by themselves, will be.

The U.S. is also testing its new modus operandi in Myanmar, in an attempt to counter China and perhaps strengthen India’s position in the Pacific realm and the South and Central Asian Region generally. This analysis explores regional geopolitics in terms of the growing Maoist threat in India, as well as regarding changes in the US-Japan relationship, which has been the mainstay of the balance of power in the Pacific Region since World War II.

Analysis

China benefited from the prevailing ill-will towards the US during the Bush Administration. While much of the world perceived the US as an aggressor, China in contrast was seen as peacefully pursuing its economic interests (in Africa and Latin America, for example), while avoiding military entanglements. As the US imposed sanctions and refrained from trade with countries with poor human rights records, China expanded its influence. Now the United States has come full circle and is attempting a reappraisal of its policies in the region and beyond.

So it should be no surprise that the US has decided to directly engage with Myanmar’s military junta and then gradually ease sanctions if the attempt at a rapprochement works. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s dissident leader, is also supportive of the new plan. The main thrust behind this US policy change can be understood as an attempt to undercut China’s influence in Myanmar and the region.

The US is rolling out its new policy towards Myanmar just as the Maoist insurgency in India is heating up and the country prepares for Operation Green Hunt. Reportedly, the Maoist insurgents have a presence in 20 Indian states. So far the insurgency has claimed the lives of an estimated 950 Indian security officers and India wonders if the Maoists are receiving support from others in the region.

It appears that regional and global tussles are escalating east of India, as they are in the west, and will directly impact Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. The Mayday Island, Gwadar and Hambantota sea ports are critical to the hedging strategy China has adopted to preserve an alternative route for access to sea and energy resources, in case the Malacca Strait is blockaded. And no geopolitical analysis of the Pacific realm is complete without attention to the role of Japan. The US-Japanese relationship is being reevaluated by the newly elected Japanese government, led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The DPJ appears poised to fulfill its campaign promises of adopting a more independent foreign policy. For the first time since World War II, Japan and Germany are attempting to redefine their international role and military posture, with profound impact on the regional and global political landscape. The purpose of President Obama’s visit to Japan this month is to settle thorny issues regarding the status of US forces and perhaps sooth Japanese concerns regarding US-China relationship.

It should also be noted that the Russia, China and India (RIC) meeting in Bangalore reportedly failed to develop a common agenda on Afghanistan. This means that US reliance on Pakistan will only increase, in an attempt to develop a solution for Afghanistan. Dealing with Pakistan inadvertently will involve China and this makes the Indians, Russians and the Japanese nervous regarding US intentions. Thus the visit to China by President Obama this month has taken on increased emphasis.

The US engagement in Myanmar can be seen as a challenge to China over Myanmar and Pakistan, perhaps to test its reaction. Additionally, it also counters the budding North Korean and Myanmar’s military ties. This is diplomacy at best, by pressuring China in its sphere of influence US hopes to make the country more amenable to US proposals, regarding Afghanistan in particular. The US also appeared to be testing Russia’s mettle when it announced its plan to install the components of its missile defense system in Russia’s sphere of influence, also known as its Near Abroad. The US ultimately backed down when it realized that Russia could injure US interests in other regions: the Middle East (Iran) Latin America (Venezuela and Cuba) and South and Central Asia (Afghanistan).

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Context

Introduction

Based on POLITACT’s Entropy Alerts, Vantage Point Analysis and Analysis of Perception and Perspective, following are a list of key themes which we consider vital to a meaningful geopolitical forecast for the South Asia region.

• The course of Pakistan’s current and future fight against extremists
• Pakistan domestic politics and NRO
• India’s Green Hunt Operation and the rise of Maoist in the region
• Changes in US Myanmar Policy
• Pakistan, Turkey and Iran Cooperation
• US-China Relations
• India-China Relations
• US Afghan Strategy
• NATO’s commitment to Afghanistan
• US-Iran Relations
• US-Russia Relations
• Saudi-Yemeni border situation
• Horn of Africa and Somalia situation
• Middle East Peace Process

Analysis

Unfortunately, while the South Waziristan Operation is in progress, the deadly terrorist attacks are continuing unabated across the urban centers of Pakistan. The government has claimed that it is encountering relatively low resistance from the militants. The latter have a strategy, however: to demonstrate their ability to inflict indiscriminate punishment on the country, which in the coming days might include Pakistan’s economic and financial hub, Karachi.

Well before the start of the South Waziristan operation, President Zardari made a public statement committing the nation to military action there-it wasn’t clear at the time, however, whether or not the Pakistani Army would undertake it. Similarly, in the aftermath of Hilary Clinton’s three-day public relations trip to Pakistan, he stated that action against extremists will not end with Waziristan.

Meanwhile, both conciliatory and confrontational statements have emanated from India regarding the Kashmir dispute and the role of Pakistan-based Jihadists in carrying out terrorist activities in India. The conciliatory statement came from the Prime Minister of India while the threatening one came from the Interior Minister. The Indian Prime Minister is scheduled to meet Mr. Obama in the White House on November 24, the first state visit of the new US administration. This visit will have a significant impact on the US Strategy for the region.

Kerry and Karzai
Kerry and Karzai

We believe the following regarding the future direction of counter-terrorist operations in Pakistan and other events in South Asia:

• The US pressure on Pakistan will increase to act against the Afghan Taliban as the price to be paid for a role in a US strategy which includes negotiating with the Taliban. US has conveyed ample messages that its dire position in Afghanistan does not bode well for Pakistan either. The upcoming summit meeting in Washington between President Obama and Prime Minster Manmohan Singh is a key part of the deliberation process regarding the future direction of the US strategy in the region and India’s role in it. The next frontier of Pakistan’s counter- terrorist operations might be Baluchistan, where the Afghan Taliban’s Quetta Shura Council is believed to be located.
• The distinction between Al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban and other Jihadists is minimal, so action against one group is ineffective; one must act against all. It appears that the only reason the Pakistani government is presently drawing distinctions between these groups is tactical, so as to go after them one at a time. Thus, it is clear that in principle Pakistan bought in to the belief that all of these groups must be liquidated if the problem of terrorism in the region is to be resolved. The recent sophisticated extremist attacks on the Army’s General Headquarters in Rawalpindi and the simultaneous ones in Lahore lends fresh support for this view. Based on the above, we at POLITACT have concluded that the next counter-terrorist operations will very well take place in Pakistan’s urban centers, including Karachi. Some analysts are calling it the “Civil War” scenario.
• It is not clear if President Zardari is making public commitment to military action in consultation with the military, or as a means to pressure them, thus protecting his good standing with the United States. The growing tensions in Parliament and in the ruling parties over the National Reconciliation Ordinance suggest that the second scenario is the correct one. This is exactly the intention of the Kerry-Lugar law (largely a response to Indian lobbying), designed to foster civilian government control of the military. The authors of the bill, however, did not take a critical factor into account: what happens if the head of the civilian government loses public and party support? In such a scenario the US would find itself the ally of unpopular leaders – obviously not a desirable position to be in.
• The conflicting statements from Indian leaders regarding Kashmir and Pakistani support for the Jihadists are also intended to buy time. In the past, President Zardari made a sensation when he called Kashmir-related Jihadists terrorists. India’s conciliatory gestures strengthen President Zardari’s hand against the military – if it is indeed standing in the way of an honorable peace between the two countries and a resolution of the Afghanistan situation. Moreover, India it is trying to exploit Pakistan’s economic weakness and dependence, including the water disputes, to get the country to change its ways – or so the Pakistanis think.
• India has other concerns, notably the Maoists in the Northeast, and is conducting Operation Green Hunt against them. The Maoists are known to have established a presence in 20 states and India has decided to confront this potentially lethal insurgency with 70,000 paramilitary troops. Thus, India benefits from delaying a resolution of the Kashmir situation, but on the other hand, failing to deal with the problem in a timely manner could lead to catastrophe if the country had to deal with two insurgencies at a time. India is curious to know if the insurgency in the Northeast is receiving support from other Maoists in the region. Meanwhile, the US has also altered its policy towards Myanmar and opted for more direct talks with the military junta there; it is also committed to countering China and strengthening India’s position in the Pacific realm and the South and Central Asian region generally.
• President Obama’s new approach to foreign policy can best be understood as one of “engagement” with adversaries and “reengagement” with allies. This is, of course, in marked contrast to the more confrontational credo of his predecessor: “Either you are with us or against us.” With the new Democratic administration in place, the emphasis is on the use of economic aid and diplomacy. A new willingness on the part of the US to compromise can be seen in its dealings with Russia regarding the missile defense shield and with Israel regarding settlements. Yet it remains unclear how successful diplomatic overtures, by themselves, will be. Thus, with respect to Afghanistan and Iran the US appears to playing a game of wait and see, trying to understand the unfolding reality before deciding on its direction. President Obama will also be making important visits this month to China, South Korea, Japan and Singapore which will further define US relations in the Pacific region.

As the geopolitical environment of the region remains in flux, buying time is beneficial for all involved, but only if it helps to reduce threats and not escalate them. If not handled well, today’s advantage can become tomorrow’s liability. Moreover, rash decisions can lead to costly mistakes, which can only benefit an adversary.

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Context

This article explores the implications of the recent (October 18, 2009) suicide attacks in the Sistan-Baluchistan province of Iran, which, the country alleges, were carried out by the Sunni Salafi Baluch jihadist group, the Jundallah; it is suspected that the groups leader, Malik Abdollah Regi, is hiding in Pakistan.

There were 42 casualties, including senior commanders of the Iran’s Elite Revolutionary Guard (IGRC). Iran subsequently accused the US, the UK and Pakistan of supporting Jundallah and generally of trying to destabilize the country. Pakistan has since replied that it has information regarding Regi’s location in Afghanistan, but that it cannot permit Iran to conduct operations on its side of the Iran-Pakistan border, as Iran has requested.

Other regional powers are engaged in finger-pointing:

• India maintains that Pakistan is attempting to undermine it by supporting the Kashmir-related Jihadis. It also blames the Pakistanis for complicity in the Mumbai incident, arguing that even if non-state actors were involved, Pakistan’s territory had been used.
• Afghanistan blames Pakistan for providing a safe haven for the Taliban. The country wants US forces to adopt a “boots on the ground” scenario,” that is, to cross the Durand Line in order to eliminate the safe havens and terrorists there.
• The Pakistan government officially blames India and Afghanistan for destabilizing the tribal areas and Baluchistan. Informally, Pakistan increasingly believes that the US and NATO, with their presence in Afghanistan, are also destabilizing the region.

So the question becomes: who is destabilizing who?

Analysis

As is so often the case, in order to make sense of what is going on at the regional level one has to look at current tussles between global players. The chief global rivals are the US, Russia and China. The global powers use the regional ones to further their interests, calling on them to choose sides. To exert pressure on the lesser powers, the international ones employ economic and military means, that is, soft and hard power. On the other hand, the regional powers might refuse to choose sides and attempt to use the global players to further their own goals.

In an effort to please Russia and obtain reciprocity on the issue of Iran, the US recently compromised regarding its defense missile shield plans. Russia’s initial reaction suggests that it is reluctant to meet America halfway, especially on the issue of a united front against Iran’s nuclear program. Russia recently stated that imposition of sanctions against Iran could backfire – definitely not the response the US was hoping for.

If we look at the regional situation from NATO’s perspective, China would be seen as the main adversary, with Russia occupying second place. While Russia has expressed resentment over NATO’s interference with its “Near Abroad,” China has not defined its sphere of influence in the South and Central Asian region, although its recent statements have shown escalating alarm regarding the growing American military presence in the region. Moreover, both the US and China appear to be upping the ante for influence in Pakistan.

In this context, China has the most to lose. A decision by the US to increase troop levels in Afghanistan by 40,000 is bound to have repercussions for China’s security calculus. It cannot sit idly by as one by one its regional allies falter. This might already be happening, as China appears to be adopting a more aggressive stance towards India and to be taking action matching Pakistan’s stand on the Kashmir dispute. Reportedly, Chinese incursions into India’s northern borders have doubled to 300 from 2007 to 2008. Furthermore, the Indian/ China rivalry over spheres of influence is heating up in the Indian Ocean region as well. The two powers, however, are united on issues relating to global warming, in opposition to the stance of developed countries.

By destabilizing Iran and Pakistan, China’s two allies and trade partners are themselves weakened in the region. This negatively impacts China and Russia loses its Iran leverage vis-a-vis the United States and NATO. Similarly, if Afghanistan remains in a chaotic state, Pakistan is menaced and the trouble must spill over into Iran sooner or later. Thus, if the other regional powers wane, India is bound to emerge in a stronger position with regards to China. Furthermore, the US and India’s improved strategic relationship is already a major concern for China and Pakistan.

Iran-Pakistani relations are better, mostly due to their cooperation on the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project. This in turn has led to a deteriorating relationship between Pakistan and the Saudis, who are entangled in Shiite-Sunni rivalries in the Islamic world. Thus, the Jundallah attacks can be seen as an attempt to drive a wedge between Iran and Pakistan and to isolate the latter. It also reinforces the perception that Pakistan is attempting to destabilize the regional countries. And, perceptions are very important in developing a perspective. The tribal areas (FATA) and Balochistan are increasingly out of Pakistan’s full control, and this creates an opportunity and possibility for non state and other adversarial actors, to use Pakistani territory for launching attacks on other countries. When Pakistan’s territory is used for attacking others, it creates mistrust regarding its role, as the country is often seen as unwilling to act against the perpetrators.

Of course, politics and extremism have never been separate entities, adding greatly to the complexity of the situation. The Jihadis were originally used by the US and Pakistan to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan and end the Cold War decisively. Learning from experience, Pakistan itself subsequently used the Jihadis as proxies in Kashmir and Afghanistan in order to create a sphere of influence. Then came 911 and everything changed; since then, Pakistan has been on the back foot and its sphere of influence has declined to the point that its own territory is now at risk in tribal areas and Balochistan.

From the US perspective, Pakistan must stop wavering between it and China and definitely ally itself with one or the other. It is this confusion over Pakistan’s intent which complicates relations with Iran and its other allies. These are some of the current interpretations of Pakistan’s behavior:

• Pakistan is working with extremists against India and NATO in Afghanistan;
• Pakistan-based extremists are involved in destabilizing China’s Uighur region;
• Pakistan is allied with the US, NATO and the UK against Iran;
• Pakistan has joined Saudi Arabia and Sunni extremists against Iran;
• Pakistan has teamed up with China against the US and India.

Based on its policies, the US appears to believe that if Pakistan decides on America as an ally, it must accept Indian dominance in the region, by virtue of which Kashmir would cease to be an issue. At the same time, in the aftermath of suspicions engendered by the provisions of the Kerry-Lugar bill and the news of strict terms accompanying forthcoming US military aid (reportedly the result of pressure from the Indian Lobby), esteem for the US in Pakistan has declined steeply.

On its part, Pakistan believes that in exchange for helping to tame the terrorist threat, it should receive assistance from the US in settling its issues with India. The US has, on the contrary, been working to strengthen its ties with India. Given all the circumstances – especially America’s bafflement as to what to do about the muddle in Afghanistan and the continued mystification regarding the intentions of the international players –  it is most likely that everyone will simply assume the worst, resulting in escalating rivalries.

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The post Possible Implications of the Jundallah Attack in Iran: The Escalation of Regional and Global Rivalries appeared first on Politact.

Context

This article explores the implications of the recent (October 18, 2009) suicide attacks in the Sistan-Baluchistan province of Iran, which, the country alleges, were carried out by the Sunni Salafi Baluch jihadist group, the Jundallah; it is suspected that the groups leader, Malik Abdollah Regi, is hiding in Pakistan.

There were 42 casualties, including senior commanders of the Iran’s Elite Revolutionary Guard (IGRC). Iran subsequently accused the US, the UK and Pakistan of supporting Jundallah and generally of trying to destabilize the country. Pakistan has since replied that it has information regarding Regi’s location in Afghanistan, but that it cannot permit Iran to conduct operations on its side of the Iran-Pakistan border, as Iran has requested.

Other regional powers are engaged in finger-pointing:

• India maintains that Pakistan is attempting to undermine it by supporting the Kashmir-related Jihadis. It also blames the Pakistanis for complicity in the Mumbai incident, arguing that even if non-state actors were involved, Pakistan’s territory had been used.
• Afghanistan blames Pakistan for providing a safe haven for the Taliban. The country wants US forces to adopt a “boots on the ground” scenario,” that is, to cross the Durand Line in order to eliminate the safe havens and terrorists there.
• The Pakistan government officially blames India and Afghanistan for destabilizing the tribal areas and Baluchistan. Informally, Pakistan increasingly believes that the US and NATO, with their presence in Afghanistan, are also destabilizing the region.

So the question becomes: who is destabilizing who?

Analysis

As is so often the case, in order to make sense of what is going on at the regional level one has to look at current tussles between global players. The chief global rivals are the US, Russia and China. The global powers use the regional ones to further their interests, calling on them to choose sides. To exert pressure on the lesser powers, the international ones employ economic and military means, that is, soft and hard power. On the other hand, the regional powers might refuse to choose sides and attempt to use the global players to further their own goals.

In an effort to please Russia and obtain reciprocity on the issue of Iran, the US recently compromised regarding its defense missile shield plans. Russia’s initial reaction suggests that it is reluctant to meet America halfway, especially on the issue of a united front against Iran’s nuclear program. Russia recently stated that imposition of sanctions against Iran could backfire – definitely not the response the US was hoping for.

If we look at the regional situation from NATO’s perspective, China would be seen as the main adversary, with Russia occupying second place. While Russia has expressed resentment over NATO’s interference with its “Near Abroad,” China has not defined its sphere of influence in the South and Central Asian region, although its recent statements have shown escalating alarm regarding the growing American military presence in the region. Moreover, both the US and China appear to be upping the ante for influence in Pakistan.

In this context, China has the most to lose. A decision by the US to increase troop levels in Afghanistan by 40,000 is bound to have repercussions for China’s security calculus. It cannot sit idly by as one by one its regional allies falter. This might already be happening, as China appears to be adopting a more aggressive stance towards India and to be taking action matching Pakistan’s stand on the Kashmir dispute. Reportedly, Chinese incursions into India’s northern borders have doubled to 300 from 2007 to 2008. Furthermore, the Indian/ China rivalry over spheres of influence is heating up in the Indian Ocean region as well. The two powers, however, are united on issues relating to global warming, in opposition to the stance of developed countries.

By destabilizing Iran and Pakistan, China’s two allies and trade partners are themselves weakened in the region. This negatively impacts China and Russia loses its Iran leverage vis-a-vis the United States and NATO. Similarly, if Afghanistan remains in a chaotic state, Pakistan is menaced and the trouble must spill over into Iran sooner or later. Thus, if the other regional powers wane, India is bound to emerge in a stronger position with regards to China. Furthermore, the US and India’s improved strategic relationship is already a major concern for China and Pakistan.

Iran-Pakistani relations are better, mostly due to their cooperation on the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project. This in turn has led to a deteriorating relationship between Pakistan and the Saudis, who are entangled in Shiite-Sunni rivalries in the Islamic world. Thus, the Jundallah attacks can be seen as an attempt to drive a wedge between Iran and Pakistan and to isolate the latter. It also reinforces the perception that Pakistan is attempting to destabilize the regional countries. And, perceptions are very important in developing a perspective. The tribal areas (FATA) and Balochistan are increasingly out of Pakistan’s full control, and this creates an opportunity and possibility for non state and other adversarial actors, to use Pakistani territory for launching attacks on other countries. When Pakistan’s territory is used for attacking others, it creates mistrust regarding its role, as the country is often seen as unwilling to act against the perpetrators.

Of course, politics and extremism have never been separate entities, adding greatly to the complexity of the situation. The Jihadis were originally used by the US and Pakistan to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan and end the Cold War decisively. Learning from experience, Pakistan itself subsequently used the Jihadis as proxies in Kashmir and Afghanistan in order to create a sphere of influence. Then came 911 and everything changed; since then, Pakistan has been on the back foot and its sphere of influence has declined to the point that its own territory is now at risk in tribal areas and Balochistan.

From the US perspective, Pakistan must stop wavering between it and China and definitely ally itself with one or the other. It is this confusion over Pakistan’s intent which complicates relations with Iran and its other allies. These are some of the current interpretations of Pakistan’s behavior:

• Pakistan is working with extremists against India and NATO in Afghanistan;
• Pakistan-based extremists are involved in destabilizing China’s Uighur region;
• Pakistan is allied with the US, NATO and the UK against Iran;
• Pakistan has joined Saudi Arabia and Sunni extremists against Iran;
• Pakistan has teamed up with China against the US and India.

Based on its policies, the US appears to believe that if Pakistan decides on America as an ally, it must accept Indian dominance in the region, by virtue of which Kashmir would cease to be an issue. At the same time, in the aftermath of suspicions engendered by the provisions of the Kerry-Lugar bill and the news of strict terms accompanying forthcoming US military aid (reportedly the result of pressure from the Indian Lobby), esteem for the US in Pakistan has declined steeply.

On its part, Pakistan believes that in exchange for helping to tame the terrorist threat, it should receive assistance from the US in settling its issues with India. The US has, on the contrary, been working to strengthen its ties with India. Given all the circumstances – especially America’s bafflement as to what to do about the muddle in Afghanistan and the continued mystification regarding the intentions of the international players –  it is most likely that everyone will simply assume the worst, resulting in escalating rivalries.

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