While the world attention is focused on Gaza and the seemingly slow undoing of Middle East, another crisis is looming on the horizon. This one has to do with Afghanistan. On his visit to Afghanistan in June, US Secretary of State John Kerry had helped reach an interim agreement, stipulating the recount of all votes, and temporarily raised hopes. Now he is back again to keep the momentum going. Just like in Iraq and Palestine, ‘unity government’ and ‘power sharing’ are also the buzzwords in Afghanistan. With so much polarization, such a set up provides the best hope.

Meanwhile, assessments continue if the Afghan army is ready for the difficult task at hand and the nerves are running high in the aftermath of the Iraq debacle. More and more the reviews are turning bleak. The death of Maj. General Harold Greene in a insider attack this week has once again raised questions about US Afghan strategy.

US policy circles continue to debate the strategic goals for the mission in Afghanistan and if that requires a quick draw down or preservation of what has been achieved so far. With the political and security transition at risk in Afghanistan, high-level diplomatic exchanges have also taken place between US and Pakistan. However, it was the appointment of the Chinese special envoy, Sun Yuxi, for Afghanistan, which was especially noteworthy. As China gets more interested in Afghanistan, it will be watching closely how the Pivot to Asia is evolving, and the Indian role in it.

Analysis

The Good and Bad Taliban

The diplomatic exchanges between Pakistan and US had a lot to do with the long awaited North Waziristan operation, and the accompanied policy change related to Good and Bad Taliban. On the US side, there remains a concern that Pakistan’s military operation has not targeted the Haqqani network, and for the most part its members may have escaped unharmed across the border.

From Pakistan’s side, there has been a strong negation of this viewpoint. The country maintains that it is now going after all brands of extremists. To amply convey its perspective, Pakistan sent its Special Assistant to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs, Tariq Fatemi, to Washington.

Without equal pressure from the Afghan side of the border, most extremists were likely to take refuge there, as has occurred in the past when Pakistan has conducted military operations. As they do, they become someone else’s headache, not Pakistan’s. This approach, however, does include the risk of continued cross border raids in to Pakistan from the Afghan side.

From what one can gather, Pakistan’s emerging strategy is premised on reestablishing its writ over FATA. Due to the unfolding situation of Afghanistan and Middle East, Pakistan finally seems to see the dangerous ramifications of the spreading influence of the non-state actors. If it is ready to revise the policy towards Good Taliban, is another mater.

The US Perspective

While Tariq Fatemi was in Washington, the retiring US Special Representative for Afghanistan Pakistan, James Dobbins was making rounds in the region and also met with senior military officials in Pakistan. He was probably gauging how much unity exists between Pakistan’s civilian and military officials on this significant policy change.

Judging from the joint statement that came out during the visit of John Kerry to India while attending the US-India strategic dialogue, Dobbins agenda with Pakistan may have also included a discussion on the nations posture towards Punjabi or India oriented jihadists (LeT).

China and India

As the Afghan situation becomes more uncertain, China and India are also worried; they both have security and economic interests at stake. While China appointed a special representative for the region, India has indicated it will buy arms from Russia to supply to Afghanistan. The country is also involved in training Afghan security forces, a concern for Pakistan. As a result of the crisis in Ukraine, it would be interesting to see how the Russian position evolves towards Afghanistan.

In a recent discussion on a blog linked to the Council on Foreign Relations, the Chinese involvement was portrayed in a positive light. However, it would be naïve to think that Chinese involvement in Afghanistan is singularly focused on extremism. How the Chinese move correlates with the ‘Pivot to Asia’ needs to be factored in as well. While the Pacific is the home sphere of influence, South and Central Asia represent the other flanks for China as it strives to secure its energy and trade routes.

If India were to become active in the pivot strategy, there is no doubt its security footprint in Afghanistan will not be taken lightly by China. In such a case, India will likely come under considerable pressure for acting as a strategic partner to the West, while at the same time remain a member of the BRICS.

The post Indian, Chinese Anxiety Grow Over Afghanistan appeared first on Politact.

All the pieces are slowly falling in place; Indian election is over and that of Afghanistan is also moving towards a closure. Whoever is the new Afghan president, the candidates have indicated they will sign the Bilateral Security Agreement with the US. And President Obama has also finally announced the level of American troops that will remain there from 2014 to 2016, contingent upon the signing of the security agreement. Gen Martin E. Dempsey also stated a few days earlier that Pakistan and Afghan counterparts were informed of the US decision and both were satisfied.

A number of questions, however, have been raised; are the number of US and NATO troops to remain sufficient to secure the country in the next two years. Particularly, when Afghanistan has long maintained its security is linked to the cross border movement of Taliban from their refuge in FATA. On the other hand, Pakistan often says that stable Afghanistan is of utmost importance for the return of normalcy to their country.

In this context, the US gradual drawdown, the recent Pakistan military strikes in North Waziristan, the nations attempt to negotiate with TTP, and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit to India to participate in Modi’s inauguration, have all taken on added emphasis. Missing from this equation is the talk of Afghan reconciliation. These are obviously all interrelated events, and attempt to understand them independently will not be sufficient to grasp the overall situation.

Analysis

Status of Pakistan’s Talks with TTP

In this correlation, the first question that pops up is the status of Pakistan talks with TTP. Different interpretations have come to the fore in this regard. Have they completely failed and thus resulting in the military strikes? Or, is it related to the fight/talk strategy that appears to be a part of Pakistan’s national security strategy.

According to statements from the TTP side, the recent military strikes in North Waziristan indicate that the nation is moving towards a much-expected full-scale operation. On the other hand, Pakistan’s army has clarified the air strikes, and other actions recently conducted, are part of the retaliation to attacks carried out by the Taliban. Certainly ever since Gen Raheel Sharif assumed power, every TTP attack has been met with an immediate response. Meanwhile, western media sources are consistently pointing to the civil-military tensions on the talks with TTP, and that the military has all but decided to go ahead with a full scale offensive.

Another argument indicating that this may actually be the much-hyped operation has to do with the recent splintering of TTP. This has long been a goal of Pakistan’s strategy, including that of the US i.e., to weaken the connections between the various extremist groups constituting the AQ and associates. While some of these associates are involved in India and Middle East, others (ETIM) are linked to disturbances in Xingjian province of China. In May a series of violent events caused the death of about 79 people in this resource rich region that borders Central Asia.

Good, Bad, and Punjabi Taliban

An aspect connected to the stabilization of FATA has to do with the Afghan reconciliation and the classification Pakistan has used in applying kinetic force: the ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ Taliban. Recent events seem to suggest that Pakistan has now dropped this classification. If true, this represents a game changer. There is ground evidence to indicate that some of this is actually materializing, such as the comments made by the Hafiz Gul Bahadur after the May 20th airstrikes in North Waziristan. In the aftermath of this action, he was quoted by media as saying that his group was evaluating the peace treaty with the Pakistan government. Clearly implying his group had come under attack from the military.

According to media reports appearing on May 23rd that quoted unnamed security official, the target of the strikes on this date were the members of ETIM. The same report also states the air attack was in retaliation for the killing of security personnel and civilians across the country. On May 19th, A Chinese tourists was also abducted in DI Khan apparently by TTP linked extremists.

When it comes to Punjabi Taliban or India oriented jihadist, the ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ Taliban terminology does not apply, they have also facilitated and assisted the Afghan Taliban. The ties with India and the future behavior of Modi’s government will likely determine Pakistan’s strategy towards these groups. This is one of the key reasons India has been so involved in shaping the outcome of Afghanistan. The victory of Afghan Taliban there can translate in their reciprocity towards India oriented jihadists in the future, as events of the past suggest.

The Status of Afghan Reconciliation

A critical question related to the US/NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan has to do with the status of Afghan reconciliation. Will US withdraw irrespective of the political reconciliation between those fighting and the elected? The Afghan elections and the delay in signing the Bilateral Security Agreement have pushed back the political settlement even further.

Afghan Taliban has already reacted to the US status of forces announcement negatively. “Now that Obama has announced that he will keep around 10,000 troops until the end of 2016 and continue their occupation, Afghanistan Islamic Emirate condemns it and considers it a violation of sovereignty, religion and human rights,” a Taliban statement reported in the media said.

Coming back to Pakistan’s operation in North Waziristan

Pakistan’s operation there may not be the full-scale version with bells and whistles, as was witnessed in Swat in 2009. Obviously the terrain and dynamics of Waziristan is different. It could very well be the action-reaction format that we are presently seeing. Plus, the Taliban have already had enough notice to escape across the border. And in this regards, the future intent of Afghanistan and India towards Pakistan will become more critical. Meaning, will they assist in preventing this from happening, or will they provide refuge and then use them against Pakistan at a later time.

Thus the most important component of what and how Pakistan moves forward is dependent on the Afghan political settlement. Until the TTP is pressured, Afghan Taliban are unlikely to sit down on the table. At the same time, TTP will not settle politically before the Afghan Taliban do. Nonetheless, the political and military pressure on TTP may either lead to more infighting between various groups, as being witnessed presently, or it may simply cause the group to disintegrate into more splinter factions. This outcome is not without its own inherent risks. TTP is more of a fighting machine and never had the political acumen to build consensus amongst it various factions.

It is quite possible that US and Pakistan have agreed on the broad contours of the Afghan settlement. By which Pakistan is free to decide on what format to employ to achieve the objectives in North Waziristan and FATA. The stoppage of drone attacks may also be part and parcel of this understanding.

The weakest link in this process may be the present political setup, which may have to deal with the political blowback. This is especially true if the above strategy leads to a serious backlash from the extremists, with further impact on the economic prospects of the country. As Pakistan drops the good and bad Taliban distinction, the reaction could also become more versatile. This may be in the form of Chinese interests increasingly being hit in Pakistan, as it targets ETIM.

On the other hand, American talks with Iran related to its nuclear program are also moving ahead. With Iran potentially on board in the future, stability in Afghanistan can be achieved. This only leaves Pakistan-India equation and the dynamics of US-China relations to worry about.

The post Making Sense; North Waziristan Operation, Talks With TTP, Afghan Reconciliation appeared first on Politact.

Context

The recent events of Ukraine and Crimea have not only raised alarm in Europe and North America, but have also increased worries in other regions on what the change implies for them. On the other hand, President Putin has thanked China and India for their understanding on the Ukraine crisis. Both China and India have refrained from criticizing Russia directly and have not backed moves to impose sanctions.

As US withdraws from Afghanistan, plus the shift in NATO’s attention towards Europe, has escalated concerns that US may start to cut aid to Pakistan. Then came the news last week that US has decided to shift $10 million from the $1.5 billion Kerry-Lugar-Berman annual fund meant for Pakistan, to support and expand Ukrainian, Balkan, Russian, and Tatar language services of Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and Voice of America. This development also raised questions regarding the state of US-Pakistan ties, which have gone through a rough patch and are only beginning to get steady.

The Director for Strategic Initiatives at PoliTact, Dr. Claude Rakisits commented on Geo News that this move will not have a significant impact on the ties. He added that the transfer of funds from one bucket to the other actually demonstrates that the relations between the two nations have been going quiet well, a point validated by Pakistan’s Ambassador to the US, Jalil Abbas Jilani. Furthermore, the US government has not given much credence to the allegations made in the new book by The New York Times correspondent Carlotta Gall that ISI knew about the presence of Osama Bin Laden in Abbotabad. After the US withdrawal from Afghanistan this year, the US reliance on Pakistan is only likely to increase.

Pak Ukraine Aid-03 April 2014 by GeoNews

Meanwhile, China seems to be speeding up its pivot to Europe by building business ties. President Xi Jinping completed his 11-day trip to Europe on April 1. “The relationship between China and the EU has become one of the most important financial relationships in the world,” Xi stated. During his trip of Europe, China sealed 50 deals with the total value of 18 billion Euros ($25 billion).

In addition to the flux in the Middle East, PoliTact is monitoring the evolving European situation closely and to decipher what it means for the South Asian dynamics.

The post What Does Ukraine Crisis Mean for South Asia, Pakistan? appeared first on Politact.

Context

The demands and expectations for a military operation in North Waziristan have arisen a number of times in the past. Each time they did not materialize. Despite international pressure, Pakistan claimed it would conduct action in this tribal agency based on its own strategic needs and not on pressures from outside. This time hopes are high once again. Some of the strategic considerations that may finally be pushing Pakistan towards a military operation are linked more to do the situation of Afghanistan.

Will US conduct a complete withdrawal and will it be accompanied by Afghan reconciliation, are likely a big consideration for Pakistan. Irrespective of this uncertainty, some sort of house cleaning is taking place, as represented by the elimination Asmatullah Shaheen Bhittani on February 24. By whom, and for what purpose, is less clear.

Two Scenarios for Afghanistan

In the aftermath of the Doha fiasco, at least publicly the reconciliation process in Afghanistan has stagnated. Moreover, the Bilateral Security Agreement between Afghanistan and the US has also been unable to clear the hurdles in its way. At this juncture, it appears unlikely that Karzai will sign the agreement, as President Obama warns of a complete US withdrawal. In view of the American strategic stakes in the region, zero option seems unlikely though. The head of US special operations command, Admiral Willian McRaven told the House Armed Services Committee on Feb 27th: “If we do go to zero, and there is no special operations component left in Afghanistan, it will certainly make it more difficult to be able to deal with the threat, …and the potential resurgence of al Qaeda in the area.”

Moreover, despite the rhetoric regarding the issue, a complete US withdrawal is also not in the interest of Pakistan, as it does not want the past to repeat itself. Pakistan’s economy has benefited from the American and NATO presence in Afghanistan. However, these benefits were outweighed by the cost the economy had to pay because of the deteriorating law and order situation. And this does not factor in the long-term social and environmental price.

The nation has little stamina left to sustain another of waive of refugees heading its way if US withdraws prematurely, followed by a civil war. With Chinese and Indian investments tied up in Afghanistan that indirectly benefit Pakistan; the country can hardly afford to play a spoiler role.

Nonetheless, due to the uncertainty in Afghanistan, Pakistan has to prepare for two possible outcomes at this point. One of them being: US retains a limited military presence and continues the campaign against extremists while backing up the Afghan army and economy. The second outcome, US withdraws completely. If that happens, all foreign aid is also likely to wither away while raising the potential for the dismemberment of Afghan army. This poses a huge risk for Pakistan.

The Reconciliation Process

An associated consideration is, will the US withdrawal accompany Afghan reconciliation or will it happen irrespective of a political solution, and what does this mean for the array of extremists operating from FATA and beyond.

Hopes were raised recently when some elements of the Afghan Taliban attempted to initiate a dialogue with Karzai, in a fashion Pakistan did with the TTP a few weeks earlier. But those aspirations were short lived when one of the political figures involved in the talks, Mullah Abdul Raqeeb, was assassinated in Peshawar this month. Last November, just two months ago, Nasiruddin Haqqani was mysteriously eliminated and Hakimullah Meshsud was killed in a drone strike. Other pro-Taliban leaders have also been liquidated recently around Quetta. This week, a senior TTP leader Asmatullah Shaheen Bhittani met his fate in an ambush in Miramshah.

It’s clear some sort of house cleaning is underway, by whom and for what purpose, is less clear.

Following questions surround these killings. Are the pro-peace Taliban leaders being targeted, or the ones that are resistant to reconciliation? Perhaps it is those that are serving as glue between various factions and represent the greatest future risk. Nonetheless, US and Pakistan share the goal of separating reconcilable elements from those that would have to be dealt with otherwise. These eliminations and the silence around them is perhaps a representation of this common objective. This also suggests there is an attempt to prevent the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban from consolidating, whether US stays or leave.

Regrouping or strengthening of AQ linked extremists in the AfPak region presents a risk towards defeating them in the Middle East and North African front. This point must have come under discussion during the recent high-level meetings between Pakistani and Saudi officials. Moreover, if the détente between the West and Iran continues, it is perceivable that like Geneva II talks, the specter of Iranian inclusion in the Afghan solution may also be raised in the near future. This may be one more reason for Pakistan to use it cards while it can.

What Doe This Mean

As PoliTact has pointed out in the past, if Afghan reconciliation does take place, TTP, and the groups affiliated with it, have the most to loose. This increases the pressure on them to approach talks with Pakistan and define their raison d’être. At the same time, in the absence of any movement on the Afghan political solution, the talks between TTP and Pakistan government are unlikely to yield any result.

Sensing US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the country has little appetite left for TTP. Moreover, the pressure on TTP also pushes Afghan Taliban to reconcile. Thus the connection of TTP and Afghan Taliban is the most important link in understanding the emerging dynamics of the region and the approaching military operation in North Waziristan. The associated risk for Pakistan has to do with managing the Punjabi Taliban and how they’ll respond to action against TTP, and that element is tied with Pakistan’s ties with India.

Then there is the less talked about aspect: how to deal with those elements that do want to reconcile? How will they integrate in to the society is going to be a big challenge. The experiences from other parts of the world are not that promising. In this regard, it will be critical to examine the socio-economic context that led to the creation of Taliban in the first place. In the case of Columbia, research indicates FARC members ultimately gravitated towards areas ripe with criminal activity and the peripheries, where extractive industries were located. They leaned towards systematic intimidation of businesses. With Pakistan focusing heavily on building energy pipelines from Central Asia and Iran, this indeed would be a dangerous risk to look out for.

The post Why North Waziristan Operation May Finally Happen appeared first on Politact.