Context

Since Nawaz Sharif came to power, he has consistently talked about improving ties with India and Pakistan’s other neighbors. However, the otherwise calm situation on the LoC is increasingly getting tense. The good intentions do not seem to be aligned with the ground reality.

Allegedly, Pakistani troops crossed the LoC and attacked Indian Chakanda Bagh check post in the Poonch sector on August 6 and as a result six Indian soldiers were reportedly killed. A similar incident had taken place in January, in which an Indian soldier was decapitated. Pakistan’s military promptly denied carrying out any such assaults. According to reports, in both instances the intruders were wearing Pakistan army’s uniform. The reaction from the Indian political and military leaders to the latest attack has evolved to become quite harsh, with casualties being reported daily on Pakistan’s side of LoC.

The similarities between the two cases have raised the possibility of jihadi elements being involved. Since the latest ambush, India has alleged that Pakistan’s Special Forces have carried out these attacks in conjunction with extremist elements, forming what it calls the Border Action Team (BAT).

On the other hand, Indian Consulate in Jalalabad also came under attack on August 3, which Indian authorities believe was instigated by Pakistan. The occurrence caused nine causalities, mostly ordinary civilians and security guards protecting the outpost. It is difficult to understand why Pakistan would want to harm relations with India at this juncture. The economic and security perils of the nation dictate otherwise. The question though remains: who was responsible?

Analysis

Jihadi Groups

It could be the militant jihadi groups, trying to circumvent the resumption of Pakistan-India talks, aimed at normalizing relations. The dialogue has remained limited since the 2008 Mumbai incident. Equally, it could be the hardliners and nationalist forces on the Indian or Pakistan sides that do not want increased trade between the two nations. It could also be a third hand that benefits from the extension of status quo and tensions in the region. It should be noted that continued wrangling between India and Pakistan benefits the global powers strategically.

Perceived from the Indian angle, a suspicion may linger about the possible connection between Chinese intrusions in the Ladakh region and the LoC attacks. Despite the jingoism and media euphoria displayed at the time of Chinese intrusions in the Ladakh region, India has resorted to diplomatic channels to calm things down. With Pakistan, India cannot afford to appear weak, as it did in the case of China. It should be added that in the aftermath of the Ladakh incidents there is increase traffic of senior US officials to India, including recently US VP Joe Biden. PM Manmohan Singh is also slated to meet President Obama on his upcoming trip to US in September.

Post US Withdrawal Afghanistan

Moreover, both Afghanistan and India share apprehension about how the state of affairs may evolve in the post US Afghan withdrawal regional scenario. India has calculated that if the jihadi network remains intact after the withdrawal, Kashmir may become active once more. On the other hand, Afghanistan fears that Afghan Taliban, with the help of Pakistan based comrades, may try to dominate once more. In essence, it may be a return to the pre 9/11 conditions, which did not bode well for both nations.

Through these border attacks, and strikes against Indian interests in Afghanistan, there may be an attempt to revert the American focus on these jihadi groups. With the US trying the speed up the Afghan reconciliation and withdrawal, India fears US has once more gone lenient on these extremist groups. India may also be looking closely at what is transpiring in Syria.

The Arab Factor in Indo-Pak Politics

The Arab Spring and the War on Terror has produced a new alignment of interests in the Middle East where former adversaries have now become undeclared allies.

The emerging configuration includes Gulf States, Israel, Turkey and the West, aligned on the one side. The other loose arrangement constitutes, China, Russia, Iran, and Syria. It is hard to miss the Shia-Sunni divide in the unfolding alignment of interests. The other undercurrent to keep in perspective is the state versus non-state actors. While the Sunni state actors are aligned with Israel and the West, the Sunni non-state actors are not. This divergence is likely to produce the most volatile turbulence in the region and beyond.

While US appears to be mostly backing Sunni states, Russia and China maintain ties on both sides of the isle. Pakistan shares this strategy with Russia and China, and does not unnecessarily want to make an enemy out of Iran. However, due to its strategic ties with Israel and the US, and fear of China, establishing this balance has become quite difficult for India.

As the relations tense up between Russia and the US on the one hand, and China and US, on the other, militant and religious proxies could once again become important. Some of this is already at display in Syria and to which Russia has repeatedly pointed out. Other than AQ, US is becoming more accommodating to nationalist and religious militant groups, as evident in the case of Afghan Taliban as well. If this outlook continues, it is highly threatening for not only the monarchs of the Gulf, but also for India and Afghanistan.

The unfolding situation of Syria, and the evolving American position, may push Gulf States and India closer, at the cost of Pakistan. This first became apparent in 2012 when Saudis handed one of the prime suspects of 2008 Mumbai attack, LeT affiliated Sayed Zabiuddin Ansari, to India.

So while Nawaz Sharif and Manmohan Singh wish for good ties, much inertia exists to such a prospect on both sides, and beyond. In Egypt, tables turned on the Islamists with the decisive role of its military. In the coming days and months, the ambiguity about the connection between the state and non-state actors, is likely to be tested in South Asia.

The post What’s Behind Pakistan-India Border Tensions? appeared first on Politact.

Context

President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang ironically ended up in India at about the same time. Karzai was there from May 20th to the 22nd, while the Chinese PM arrived on May 19th and left on the 22nd for Pakistan.

Majority of the media sources reported on them as separate visits and did not point to the significance of this coincidence. Nonetheless, what did this linkage mean for Pakistan?

The nations ties have improved with India, but not to the extent to make them oblivious to the occurrence. The visit of President Karzai was meant to solicit more defense equipment and training from India. The training of Afghan army by India has been a cause of grave concern and a red line for Pakistan. Moreover, Karzai’s trip has taken place in the aftermath of increased tensions on the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

On the other hand, the Chinese premier was visiting India after the recent confrontation between the two in the Ladakh region.

By visiting India first, and while Karzai was visiting, China is conveying to Pakistan, India and Afghanistan, it gives more importance to economic and trade relations as oppose to security concerns. While Pakistan considers China its close ‘all weather’ ally, China has been deepening its economic and trade ties with both India and Afghanistan.

The implied message will obviously have a positive influence on Pakistan’s ties with India and Afghanistan. However, the Chinese message is likely to be only valid as long as India does not play a countering role in the American pivot to the Pacific.

The post Chinese Message To Pakistan, India, And Afghanistan appeared first on Politact.

Context

During the last two weeks, Pakistan has taken two strategic decisions that will have far reaching implications. These choices also signify the direction it is posturing to move towards despite the risks. One of these decisions was to move ahead with the Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline project. The other being, handing over the Arabian Sea port of Gwadar to a Chinese government owned firm.

The US has consistently pressured and lobbied Pakistan to not proceed with the IP project, as the country would risk facing sanctions if it decides otherwise. On the other hand, the moving over of Gwadar port to the Chinese, raises the potential of it being used as a strategically located naval base, raising alarm for both India and US.

It’s too early to tell if these decisions will impact the Afghan reconciliation process, and Pakistan’s ties with the US and India. A recently leaked US Justice Department document indicates that it will continue the drone strikes in Pakistan and suggests that they may be occurring with nations acquiescence. The release of this information, plus the drone attacks, will further complicate the politics of Pakistan.

Reaching a decision and implementation of it are two different matters. While Pakistan has finally made some key decisions, how long it takes to implement them will involve many more maneuvers between the powers involved.

Nonetheless, Pakistan appears to be giving more weight to its immediate regional economic and political goals. At the same time, if more and more states appear unwilling to cooperate with US over sanctions on Iran, the country may be pushed to reconsider its policy.

The post IP Gas Pipeline, Gwadar Port, And Drones appeared first on Politact.

Context

Pakistan certainly seems to be passing through one of it toughest phases, with turmoil internally and in the neighborhood. Since the dismemberment of the country in 1971, the region has gone through four decades of continuous warfare. This has included the Iranian revolution of 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq War of the 80s, the Afghan civil war of the 90s, and the present phase that began since 9/11.

It appears more than a simple coincidence that two of Pakistan’s immediate neighbors to the west, Iran, and Afghanistan, were invaded at about the same time. In any event, in both conflicts religion got interjected. The repercussions of this are still playing out in the region and beyond. There was also a concern that after Afghanistan, Pakistan might become the next victim of the dreaded Domino Theory. Moreover, US also wanted to check the religious influence emanating from Iran to spread any further. That apprehension continues to bedevil the region.

Analysis

Soviet Invasion Of Afghanistan And Iranian Revolution

While a lot is heard about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, most accounts fail to mention the Iranian revolution started almost simultaneously. The Khomeini led rebellion effectively transformed the nature of the pro-American regime and this change impacted the politics of the Islamic world to this day. Only a year later, in 1980, Iran-Iraq war commenced and lasted until 1988, almost up to the time when Soviets started to withdraw from Afghanistan.

During this phase, while Iran was moving out from the American influence, Pakistan was getting fully embedded into it. The nation helped facilitate the Jihad against the Soviets with the assistance of the Arabs and the US. The role of Pakistan in the Iran-Iraq war, however, was based more on maintaining a delicate balance.

Pakistan went out of its way in helping protect the Gulf States against the Iranian threat, and according to some estimates, Zia-ul-Haq placed close to 40,000 military personnel in Saudi Arabia for security and training purposes. This, however, did not occur at the cost of Iran. Reportedly, Pakistan also supplied weapons to Iran, and both neighbors supported the Afghan Jihad, albeit different factions.

Global Power Politics

The global powers were playing a similar game. For example, while Russians were intermittently supplying weapons to Iraq, the Iran-Contra affair proved that the US was also equipping the Iranians. Iraq had earlier broken relations with the US over the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, which were not restored until 1986. Nonetheless, shady dealing had continued between Saddam and the US.

What ended the Iran-Iraq war according to many analysts was increased the volatility of the sea-lanes, plus a fear that Iran was beginning to have an upper hand in the conflict. This would have had reverberations throughout the Middle East, including Afghanistan and Pakistan.

While Saddam’s decision to invade Iran in 1980 is believed to be a miscalculation, he also feared that a strong religious Iran would disturb the Shia-Sunni balance of Iraq. Saddam repeated his misjudgment when he invaded Kuwait in August 1990 but was met with a different response than his earlier mistake. Ever since Iraq has come under American-led intervention twice, and despite all past attempts to contain Iran, its sway has grown. In the end, it was the US that disturbed the ethnic balance of Iraq and Afghanistan. And, at the same time, the fear of Iran has helped in moving the Arabs even closer to US and Pakistan.

In this sense, there is continuity in the western policy of both propping Iran’s influence, and at the same time preventing it from becoming a dominant power in the Middle East. In Afghanistan, this has translated into checking any single player, whether Iran or Pakistan, to overshadow. And, lately, Indian influence has been introduced as a balancing factor.

What To Expect In Pakistan-Iran Ties

This historical context only raises the importance of Pakistan-Iran ties. While the US lost Iran in 1979, the importance of Pakistan has only increased. 1979 proved to be a crucial year as far as Pakistan’s relations with Iran are concerned. With the introduction of religion in both the Iranian revolution and Afghan jihad, secularism took a back seat. To this date, the two events have transformed and divided the politics of the region and also resulted in the birth of Al Qaeda.

Between the period of 1947 to 1971, Pakistan and Iran enjoyed very closely ties. In both 1965 and 1971 wars against India, Iran supported Pakistan diplomatically, militarily and financially. The country also offered military equipment, training, and intelligence to Pakistan in quashing the Baloch insurgency in mid-70s.

Now, almost a decade after 9/11, Pakistan-Iran ties stand at a crucial juncture, as do the US-Pakistan ties. President Obama’s reelection presents a hope that he may now take a different approach towards Iran. If an alternative route is indeed chosen, there is an opportunity for tremendous regional cooperation and economic boom, and the vision for the ‘New Silk Road’ can really blossom. There remain apprehensions that Russia and China may benefit more from this boom than the Europeans and the Americans.

However, if fear plays a major role, it would bring even more conflict and bust. The new sanctions connected to the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCPA) are expected to go into effect from July 2013. Under the provisions of this act, US would impose sanctions against any entity conducting energy, shipping and shipbuilding dealings, and port operations with Iran. Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project and the development of Chabahar port are most likely to be impacted by the new sanctions.

Such acts will impede regional cooperation and will hurt the economies of Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. Moreover, they will challenge President Obama’s claim made during his inaugural address that ‘ A decade of war is now ending,’ and that “We (Americans), the people, still believe that enduring security and lasting peace do not require perpetual war.”

As these choices loom on the horizon, Pakistan may end up invoking the paradigm it has consistently followed in its foreign policy; good ties with the US should not be at the cost of friendly neighbors and elements.

The post Outlook For Pakistan-Iran Ties appeared first on Politact.

Context

With the date of US withdrawal from Afghanistan approaching, the focus of Pakistan, as well as that of other stakeholders, has shifted towards envisioning the future beyond 2014. There is obviously an optimistic and a pessimistic picture. More than anything else, the major determinant of the direction of future events will be the ground reality and the public buy-in.

Analysis

The optimistic view envisions a trade and energy corridor that extends from Central Asia to South Asia. As energy shortages worsen in Pakistan, the nation is not only stagnating presently but the prospect for meeting future needs is not any brighter. According to a World Bank estimate, widespread load shedding and the economic impact of the energy crunch are estimated at upward of 2 percent of GDP. The State Bank of Pakistan claims that by year 2016, the country will face an acute gas shortfall of 3.021 bcfd (billion cubic feet per day).After years of delay, the country is working on a number of energy projects and approaches simultaneously, with special emphasis on regionalism. Nonetheless, political complications and instability have hindered exploiting of both the internal energy resources as well as the external ones.

The list includes the Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline project, the Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (TAPI) pipeline project, and Central Asia-South Asia (CASA) 1000. Surprisingly, regional rival India has offered to export liquefied gas to Pakistan. One of the recent successes came in the form of a World Bank approval for $1.1 billion worth of Agro projects.

As economic and trade ties between India and Pakistan warm up, India’s state-owned oil and gas company GAIL wants to provide Pakistan liquefied natural gas (LNG). This would be done through an extension of gas pipeline to Lahore. The company has plans of bringing gas to Gujrat, and then will transit this gas through the Dahej-Vijaipu-Dadri-Bawana-Nangal-Bhatinda pipeline to Indian Punjab, and onwards to Pakistan. As opposed to building an LNG terminal that takes longer time, supplying gas through extension of pipelines is being considered more feasible for this venture.

On the other hand, India is also exploring a Pakistani route for the transport of iron ore from Afghanistan. The project worth $11 billion and involves a consortium of 7 states and many private firms. The companies in the consortium include: state-run miner NMDC Ltd, steelmaker Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd (RINL), private sector steelmakers JSW Steel Ltd, JSW Ispat Steel Ltd, Jindal Steel & Power Ltd, and Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd.

Chairman of the Steel Authority of India, CS Verma said Hajigak mines and a 6 million-tons steel plant are being developed for this purpose. The Hajigak deposits contain about 1.8 billion tons of ore, with an exceptionally high iron concentration ranging from 61 percent to 64 percent.

The contract, to be signed in about two months, will be the biggest capital-intensive investment in Afghanistan, outweighing China’s $4.4 billion investment in Aynak Copper mine. Mining work is expected to begin in 2014 as the Afghan forces take over the security responsibility of the country. However, there are concerns whether Afghans will be able to provide the needed security.

As compared to using the longer Iranian route via Charbhar, Verma elaborated that India would prefer Pakistan for transporting the ore out and for building a slurry pipeline. While Pakistan recently approved the trade and transit treaty that allows Afghanistan to send goods to India, it has remained concerned about losing influence in Afghanistan as Indian economic clout increases there.

The above listed projects, including Pakistan-India trade cooperation, have tremendous economic potential for the region and Pakistan. For example, transportation, mining, construction, hospitality, agriculture and dairy sectors are all likely to substantially benefit. Additionally, the prices of basic consumer items, including medicines, are also expected to drop. However, in the absence of broad political consensus, the above vision is unlikely to be realized. In other words, a convincing public case has not been presented on what brought about a change in the long-standing government security concerns in Pakistan. In absence of this, the change in traditional policies might be perceived as a sign of weakness and present fuel to be used by hard line elements for further manipulation.

Driven by profit motives, the business community and traders have long been proponents of regional trade. However, since the start of the war on terror and due to poor governance, the liberal space has consistently shrunk while the nationalist and religious forces have constantly gained. None of the above approaches and projects will resolve the nation’s immediate energy and economic crisis. The success of these initiatives is dependent upon stable FATA, Balochistan, and Afghanistan, and that does not seem to be in sight. Moreover, achieving the above vision will require easing of international tensions over Iran’s nuclear program, which is also ultimately linked to the state of ties between Russia, China and US.

Managing change requires increased level of communication between people leading it and those impacted by it, so as to handle anxiety and misinformation. In case of Pakistan, we are seeing more interaction amongst those championing trade with India while the general public is in the dark. This usually means more of the potential benefits are likely to be exploited by the few, at the expense of the public. And, in this respect, it hardly represents a change.

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