By Naade Ali

Context

The chain reaction that got underway in the aftermath of Hamas October 7, 2023 attack on Isreal, continues to unfold at a tremendous speed. The fall of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime, a key ally in Iran’s axis of resistance against Israel, has triggered profound geopolitical changes in the Middle East, reshaping regional power dynamics. These shifts are not merely reactions to Assad’s fall but are also a reflection of broader ambitions and vulnerabilities of the regional and global powers. The Syrian Civil War’s devastating impact has left a fractured nation with competing factions vying for influence, complicating any resolution of the crisis.

The coalition of Turkey-backed Islamist and nationalist militant factions that toppled Assad has emerged as a pivotal force. Assad’s downfall represents a significant blow to Iran’s fragile axis of resistance, undermining its influence across the Levant. With Iran effectively expelled from Syria and Hezbollah’s reach significantly diminished in Lebanon, Israel has seized the opportunity to expand its strategic foothold.

Meanwhile, a transitional interim government led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Islamist group ideologically linked to Al-Qaeda, has assumed control in Syria. The country, however, remains in a state of chaos as multiple actors, including rebel factions, Turkey, and Israel, seek to consolidate their gains.

Although the civil war has officially ended, the shadow of potential conflict continues to loom over Syria. The involvement of external powers—ranging from Russia and China to the United States and Gulf States—adds another layer of complexity to Syria’s future. Each stakeholder has its own interests, and their competing agendas have made Syria a geopolitical chessboard. These developments underscore a pivotal moment for the Middle East, as the region grapples with shifting alliances and evolving power structures.

What to Expect from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham?

The newly formed interim government in Syria, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and composed of various rebel factions, faces the daunting task of navigating a fractured and war-torn nation. HTS has announced its intention to govern until March 1 next year, at which point new elections are expected to formalize its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, as Syria’s next president. Al-Sharaa has outlined a three-stage roadmap for the country’s transition to stability. The first stage involves legitimizing the interim government, followed by convening a national conference to address constitutional reforms and governance. The final stage aims to organize elections and restore full citizenship to displaced Syrians.

Despite these ambitious plans, the likelihood of elections occurring by March remains slim. HTS’s dominance suggests that it may continue to govern Syria for the foreseeable future. In an effort to gain legitimacy both domestically and internationally, HTS has launched a rebranding campaign to distance itself from its radical jihadist roots. This campaign emphasizes governance, state-building, and inclusivity.

Al-Sharaa and interim Prime Minister Mohammad Al-Bashir have outlined a five-point agenda focused on national unification, strengthening state institutions, rebuilding infrastructure, gaining international recognition, and fostering diplomatic ties with neighboring countries and the West.

One of the most significant challenges facing HTS is unifying Syria’s diverse political and ideological factions. The country’s political landscape includes Islamist and secular nationalist groups representing a broad spectrum of ethnic and religious communities. HTS, which historically drew support from radical Salafist elements, may encounter resistance from groups advocating for a secular democratic state. Its governance model in Idlib, where it established centralized control after defeating rival factions, raises concerns about its willingness to share power. Secular factions fear that HTS may impose an Islamist authoritarian regime, alienating Syria’s diverse population.

Some analysts caution that Syria risks becoming an Islamic Emirate akin to Afghanistan, with HTS governing in a manner reminiscent of the Taliban. Although HTS has demonstrated administrative competence in Idlib and appointed self-styled technocrats like Mohammad Al-Bashir, applying this model to Syria’s complex socio-political landscape will be far more challenging. Protests demanding secular governance have already erupted in Damascus, reflecting widespread skepticism about HTS’s intentions. Within HTS itself, hardliners may oppose Al-Sharaa’s attempts to adopt a more moderate stance, further complicating efforts to stabilize the nation.

To address these challenges, Al-Sharaa has promised to shift away from a revolutionary mindset, emphasizing unity, stability, and institutional reform. He has pledged to disband rebel factions, integrate trained fighters into the Syrian army, and grant citizenship to foreign fighters willing to pledge loyalty to the new government. Internationally, HTS has sought to portray itself as pragmatic and inclusive, emphasizing human rights and good governance. However, reports of extrajudicial killings of former regime members by the HTS local commanders paint a different picture of the group. Notably, HTS has announced the establishment of tribunals to prosecute ex-officials of the Assad regime, despite initially granting them amnesty. This move has raised concerns about the group’s double standards and the potential for acts of vengeance will present a critical test for its leadership.

Another major challenge is economic reconstruction. Years of war have left Syria’s infrastructure in ruins, and millions of refugees are anticipated to return in search of better opportunities. To gain public trust, HTS would need to focus on rebuilding the economy and meeting the needs of Syrians. However, the current leadership of HTS is primarily focused on securing international support, including lifting sanctions and removing itself from terrorism designations. Al-Sharaa has assured the international community that Syria will not serve as a base for attacks against neighboring countries, to include Israel and Turkey. These assurances are part of HTS’s broader strategy to seek international recognition and restore trust.

Israel’s Strategic Response to Assad’s Fall

Israel has significantly benefited from Assad’s downfall, exploiting the power vacuum to further its strategic goals. Within just one week, Israel carried out over 350 airstrikes on Syrian military installations, neutralizing 80% of Assad’s critical military assets. Additionally, Israel has seized strategic positions in southern Syria, establishing a 400-square-kilometer demilitarized buffer zone that includes Mount Hermon—a vital vantage point for monitoring regional threats. These newly occupied positions provide Israel with a tactical advantage, enabling it to target Iran’s assets without the threat of Syrian anti-missile radar systems. By controlling key areas in Syria, Israel has bolstered its deterrence against Iran and other adversaries.

The fall of Assad and the subsequent weakening of Iran’s influence have allowed Israel to consolidate its position as a dominant regional player. Israeli leaders have framed Assad’s removal as a historic achievement, celebrating the collapse of an adversarial regime. Moving forward, Israel has extended a cautious diplomatic overture to the HTS-led government, signaling a willingness to explore avenues for peace and cooperation. However, any potential rapprochement with Israel will depend on HTS’s ability to demonstrate its commitment to Israeli-led security order in the region.

Turkey’s Expanding Role in Syria

Turkey has emerged as another significant player in the post-Assad era. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a long-time opponent of Assad, has used the opportunity to expand Turkey’s influence in Syria. By supporting opposition factions, Turkey aims to secure its southern border, exploit Syria’s resources, and establish the country as a client state. This strategic expansion aligns with Erdoğan’s broader ambition to position Turkey as a leading power in the Muslim world, challenging the traditional dominance of Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Turkey’s involvement in Syria also serves domestic political purposes, allowing Erdoğan to strengthen his nationalist base by portraying himself as a defender of Sunni Muslims. However, Turkey’s actions have not been without controversy. Its military interventions and support for Islamist factions have drawn criticism from both Russia and China. On the other hand, its opposition to US supported Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has put it at odds with the NATO alliance. Despite these challenges, Turkey’s influence in Syria continues to grow, making it a key stakeholder in the country’s future.

Iran and Hezbollah: Reeling from Setbacks

The fall of Assad’s regime has dealt a severe blow to Iran and its proxy, Hezbollah. For years, Syria served as a critical link in Iran’s axis of resistance, providing a conduit for arms shipments to Hezbollah in Lebanon. With Assad’s removal, Iran has lost a key ally, and its influence in the region has diminished significantly. Hezbollah, which has suffered heavy losses in the Syrian conflict, now faces an uncertain future. The group’s ability to project power in Lebanon and beyond has been severely weakened, raising questions about its long-term viability.

Iran, meanwhile, faces a critical situation. The loss of its strategic foothold in Syria has forced Tehran to reconsider its regional strategy. Some analysts speculate that Iran may pursue pragmatic diplomacy with the West to offset its losses, while others argue that it could escalate its nuclear program to establish deterrence against Israel. Regardless of the path Iran chooses its diminished role in Syria marks a turning point for the axis of resistance.

The Rise of Transnational Jihadist Movements

The victory of HTS in Syria has emboldened global jihadist movements, inspiring groups such as the Taliban and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Islamist groups from across the globe, like Afghan Taliban and various factions of Muslim Brotherhood, have sent congratulatory notes to HTS.

This development marks a significant shift in the nature of jihadist organizations, with non-state actors evolving into state entities. HTS’s success in Syria—achieving what ISIS could not—raises concerns about the rise of transnational jihadist states. While HTS has promised governance and reform, its ability to deliver stability remains uncertain.

Conclusion

Syria stands at a crossroads. The fall of Russian supported Assad’s regime has created a vacuum in the Middle East and upset the tender balance of power, which was already in tatters with the weakening of Iranian backed Hezbollah and Hamas.
The nation is torn between the promise of renewal and the threat of further devastation. The actions of HTS and other key stakeholders will determine whether Syria can overcome its challenges or succumb to further conflict. For now, the future remains blurred, but one thing is clear: the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East will never be the same.

The post Assad’s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East appeared first on Politact.

Context

Syria has emerged as one of the most critical fault line for the global balance of power struggles. It is perhaps the only place in the world where both the global and regional powers have boots on the ground – such as US, Russia, and Turkey. US has about 900 soldiers based there, while Russian presence constitutes about 5,000 troops, and Turkey according to some estimates has more than 10,000 soldiers in northern Syria carrying out military operations.

Syria is also home to Iranian backed proxies which includes Shiite Hezbollah, and Sunni extremist groups such as ISIL and Al Qaeda. Moreover, there are other local non-state actors that are fighting against the Assad regime, such as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Free Syria Army (FSA), with western support and backing of Turkey and other Arab nations, such as UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. And then there is legacy business of Kurds, Syrian Kurds (YPG) operate from northern Syria against Turkey while also receiving US support for the fight against ISIL.

Arab Spring and Syria

The Arab Spring protests in Syria began in March 2011 as part of a series of pro-democracy demonstrations that swept across the Middle East. The protests initially called for increased civil liberties, greater freedom of speech, and the end of the Ba’ath Party’s rule. The Syrian government responded with a brutal crackdown on protesters, resulting in hundreds of deaths and thousands of arrests. As the protests continued, the government’s reaction grew increasingly violent, and the conflict escalated into a full-scale civil war and millions of refugees. Close to 3.5 million Syrian refugees migrated to Turkey while others went to different places in MENA region, Europe, and the US.

The threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) emerged in Syria around 2011. The group joined forces with other extremist groups in the region to fight against the Assad government – and quickly gained control over large swathes of territory in the country. ISIL was eventually defeated in Syria in March 2019.

The Assad regime in Syria was able to survive largely due to support from Russia, Iran, Hezbollah. They provided the Assad regime with military and financial support, enabling it to remain in power despite the civil war and international sanctions. Iran sent thousands of militiamen to fight alongside Syrian government forces in their fight against ISIL, SDF, and FSA that were operating to topple the Syrian government. Additionally, the Assad regime was able to rely on its strong security apparatus to repress domestic opposition and maintain control over the country. At the same time, while US, Turkey, and UAE were backing groups such as SDF and FSA to remove Assad, they were also fighting against ISIL.

As the extremist threat diminished, which was a common threat for state actors operating in Syria, the fissures became apparent along the respective geopolitical interests that are tied to the great power competition.

The Fight to Remove Assad’s Regime and Iran

Since the beginning of Arab Spring, one of the overarching aspirations has been to do deal with the wider Iranian behavior and influence in the Middle East, and constraining its nuclear and missile program. From the perspective of Israel and the US, any potential regime change in Syria would have undermined Iran and its control over Hezbollah – that extends its influence into Lebanon and Palestinian territories. Moreover, Iranian proxies also complicate the Middle East Peace Process between Israel and Palestine.

To counter this, Israel has simultaneously been working on what has come to be known as the Outside-In Approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and associated with it the ‘War between Wars’ strategy. The premise of the Outside-In approach has been to alter the regional dynamics to such an extent that it leads to diminished Arab support for the Palestinian cause – this would make the Palestinian more amenable to accept peace on Israeli terms. The approach also envisions undermining Iran’s nuclear and missile program while maintaining the threat of military action against Iran. This overtime led to the agreements which came to be known as Abraham Accords in 2020 and normalization of ties between UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco and Israel.

One the other hand, the main focus of the ‘War between Wars’ strategy is to prevent Iran from getting entrenched in Syria and thus threatened Israel directly via Lebanon. According to some estimates close to 2500 Iranian Revolutionary Guard members are operating in Syria.

Russian Role in Syria

The Russian support of Assad’s government and military intervention in 2015, directly undercuts the objective of regime change. Moreover, Israeli strikes against Iranian targets and Hezbollah in Syria risks hurting ties with Russia. Yet Israel has maintained close ties with Russia despite their differences over the Syrian conflict. Israel and Russia cooperate on a variety of matters, including security and trade. Additionally, the two countries have developed a mechanism to de-conflict their operations in Syria and ensure that their forces do not come into conflict with one another. Despite their differences, Israel and Russia have managed to maintain a good working relationship.

On the other hand, Russia has provided the Assad regime with military, financial, and political support, helping to keep it in power despite international sanctions and widespread opposition. Additionally, Russia has deployed thousands of troops and airpower to support the government in its fight against the FSA, SDF, and ISIL. To keep amicable ties with Turkey, Russia has generally maintained a neutral stance towards the Kurdish-led YPG in Syria.

In addition to air bases, Russia also maintains a naval base in Tartous. The larger Russian strategy is not only to protect the Assad regime but also maintain a foothold in the larger Middle East and North Africa. Russia is also military involved directly or through mercenaries in Libya and Sudan. But the conflict in Ukraine has had a significant impact on Russia’s military presence in Syria. Following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2014, the United States and its allies imposed economic sanctions on Russia hitting its economy. As a result, Russia has had to reduce its military presence in Syria and focus its resources on the conflict in Ukraine.

Turkey, YPG, PKK and Syria

Turkey is another stakeholder to the conflict in Syria, it has carried out military operations against the Kurdish-led YPG. Additionally, Turkey has sought to maintain a buffer zone along its border with Syria, which has been opposed by the YPG. Turkey’s actions against the YPG have caused tensions with the United States since it supports the group in its fight against ISIL – and YPG has collaboration with SDF and FSA to topple Assad’s regime. Being a NATO member, Turkey has also provided the SDF and FSA with arms, training, and financial support in their fight against the Assad regime.

On the other hand, both Russia and Iran have not directly engaged in the conflict between YPG and the Assad government and accused the group of cooperating with the United States and other foreign powers.

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Kurdish-led YPG in Syria have a close ideological and organizational relationship. The PKK has provided the YPG with military and financial support in its fight against ISIL, as well as political and diplomatic support in international forums. Additionally, many members of the PKK have joined the YPG in its fight against ISIL.

Like Turkey, US and EU consider PKK a terrorist organization. This approach which supports YPG in Syria but considers PKK a terrorist group, complicates US and European ties with Turkey and NATO – and raises Turkish concerns about the real intent behind supporting separatist YPG.

Saudi-Iran Detente

The question becomes how the situation of Syria will impact the Chinese facilitated Saudi-Iran truce reached in March. Or, in other words, what are the key terms of the détente reached by Saudi Arabia and Iran, that will facilitate establishing a regional balance of power and resolve proxy wars in places like Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, and Palestine. Moreover, what does it imply for the budding great power rivalry in South Asia.

One of the immediate benefits of the truce has been the ceasefire in Yemen, followed up by exchange of prisoners. The foreign minister of Syria has also visited Saudi Arabia, reciprocated by the Saudi Foreign Minister’s trip to Syria – raising hopes for potential reentry of Syria into the Arab League. Earlier in March, Assad had also visited UAE to rebuild ties that had been cut-off due to the support provided by Gulf States to anti-Assad Forces.

Iran’s nuclear program and the threat posed by its wider behavior in the region, represented the threat perception that had moved the Arab world closer to Israel – and by extension to the US. Additionally, the criticism of the Abraham Accord, reached in 2020, has been that it has not resulted in any quid-pro-quo when it comes to Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In fact, with the return of Netanyahu’s right-wing government and the aggressive actions it has taken, has reversed the gains made under the Abraham agreement. This has adversely impacted Israeli ties with the US.

However, it is also a fact that US interests in the Middle East have transformed in the aftermath of the campaign against extremism, and military withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan. It is no longer dependent on the energy resources of the region, as China is, but it is engaged head on in the great power rivalry with China and Russia. The Middle Powers are caught in the middle of these power tussles. According to the White House Coordinator for MENA, Brett McGurk, the main objectives of US in Syria are to reduce the violence, maintain a check on the activities of ISIL, help the Syrian humanitarian crisis, and back Israel.

The shift in UAE and Saudi position reflects a realization the Assad’s regime has survived the worse with Russian and Iranian support. The China, Iran Economic and Security Deal reached in 2020 demonstrated that China was also throwing its weight behind Iran, which has traditionally been also backed by Russia. PoliTact had pointed out at that time that the pact represented China’s pivot to the Middle East. With the China facilitating the Saudi-Iran truce, the balance of power appear to be shifting away from the US, which is increasingly been seen as an unreliable partner. Commenting on the deal, former Israeli prime minister commented that “This is a fatal blow to the effort to build a regional coalition against Iran.”

Will Israel counter or accept any potential guarantees from China that it can manage Iranian nuclear program and wider behavior in the region, remains to be seen. The new Chinese foreign minister Qin Gang recently stated that it is ready to mediate peace talks between Israel and Palestine.

Meanwhile, the Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had warned Israel in 2019 to reduce its economic and security ties with China or risk reduced security cooperation from US. During his visit to Saudi Arabia in 2022, President Biden had stated, “We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia or Iran … We will seek to build on this moment with active, principled, American leadership.”

Related:

• What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply? Aug 4, 2022
• Biden’s Middle East Policy, China-Iran Ties, and CPEC
  On July 28, 2020, PoliTact held a webinar to discuss the potential China-Iran economic deal and its impact on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

• PoliTact’s Chief Analyst Arif Ansar’s interview on the situation of Syria on Pakistan Television, March 2023

• The Emerging ‘Outside In’ Approach To Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Afghan Reconciliation, And Kashmir Issue. July 15, 2015

The post Saudi-Iran Détente, Syria, And Changing MENA appeared first on Politact.

Context
The Turkish President Abdullah Gul met President Obama on the sidelines of the Chicago Summit to discuss the supply of American drones. The US administration is trying to convince Congress to allow the sale of armed drones to Turkey. However, the move may be opposed due to tense relations between Turkey and Israel. Turkey wants armed drones to fight Kurdish rebels.

The issue has been complicated by a recent article in the Wall Street Journal revealing that an American drones provided the original intelligence to Turkey that subsequently led to the death of 34 Kurdish smugglers. These smugglers were mistaken for outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). This has led to an intense debate inside Turkey about the level of American involvement in Ankara’s fight against PKK.

Analysis

According to the WSJ article, “It was a U.S. Predator drone that spotted the men and pack animals, officials said, and American officers alerted Turkey.” The US had left Turkey to decide whether to attack. “The Turks made the call,” a senior U.S. defense official said. “It wasn’t an American decision.”

US drones have supported Turkish military efforts since 2007. This is when US established a Combined Intelligence Fusion Cell to jointly monitor live drone feeds. The cooperation was stepped up over the last year as US moved a squadron of Predators from a base in Iraq to Turkey’s Incirlik airbase.

The US-Turkish deal, if it goes through, could possibly be a model to resolve US-Pakistan tensions on the use of drones in FATA, Pakistan. Turkey, a NATO member, has told US that it can trust the country with armed drones. However, mistrust between US and Pakistan is on the increase.

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Iraqi Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr announced on Thursday that US presence, whether civilian or military, after the year-end would not be tolerated. In a recent interview, Sadr said that “We do not accept any kind of U.S. presence in Iraq, whether it is military or not.” He further states that any presence, even non military of the Americans would be viewed as an occupation. The cleric vowed that such presence would be resisted, whatever the cost.

Sadr, who is the leader of Mehdi Army, dismissed concerns that the withdrawal of US troops would create a security vacuum in Iraq. He said the Iraqi government was capable of maintain peace in the country. 33000 US troops are expected to be pulled out of Iraq by Dec 31, 2011. However a US embassy in Baghdad, along with consular operations in Bara and Arbil are expected to be maintained in the country.

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Turkish troops on Wednesday pursued Kurdish rebels into Iraq. The operation came after rebels attacked military installations last night in Yuksekova. 24 Turkish soldiers were killed, and 18 injured in a clash between security forces and an estimated 15-20 militants. The clash took place in the Hakkari province near the Iraqi border. Ankara in retaliation launched a “hot pursuit” operation. Turkish planes bombed PKK bases and fighter jets and helicopter gunships crossed into Northern Iraq on Wednesday in pursuit of the rebels.

The attack on Tuesday was one of the deadliest attacks on security forces since 1993. President Abdullah Gul has promised to punish those behind the attacks. The US and NATO have also expressed sympathy and have issued statements of support for the Turkish government.

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The US and EU condemned the PKK attack on Turkey on Wednesday. The Western world expressed its sympathies for Turkey, and voiced anger at the PKK ambush which killed 24 Turkish soldiers. US president Barack Obama conveyed his country’s desire to continue to bring in stability in the region and offered support to Turkey against PKK. EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton in a statement said “the EU stands with Turkey in its resolve to fight against terrorism.”

The French spokesman also told reporters that France calls” on those elected representatives of the Turkish population of Kurdish origin to clearly distance themselves from the terrorist violence of the PKK.”

Turkey has started ground and air operations against the group across the border into Northern Iraq.

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Five policemen and three civilians were killed in the southeastern province of Bitlis in a terrorist attack carried out by the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) on Tuesday. The attack took place in the predominantly Kurdish district of Güroymak in Southeast Turkey. A two year old girl was among the killed. Two injured police officers are also said to be in critical condition.

The blast is believed to be the work of PKK under orders by Syrain Bahoz Erdal, a senior member of the group. It was conducted in retaliation to the destruction of a PKK camp in Kavakli by Turkish forces last week. The camp was an important base for the Kurdish Communities Unions (KCK), the network which controls PKK. Nearly 20 people have been killed by attacks carried out by the group in the last few months. The Turkish government has also stepped up its operations against the party.

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Germany’s sustainable development agency, GIZ, has denied reports which suggest it has been funding the banned Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK). Turkish Prime minister Tayyip Erdogan last week accused some foundations of funneling money to the PKK through loans to municipalities run by Turkey’s main opposition Republican Peoples Party (CHP) and the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP). Later reports suggested the head of state may have been referring to German funds coming into the country from German’s state-owned development bank Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) and GIZ.

GIZ released a statement on Wednesday which stated that all of its “projects are carried out jointly by Turkish ministries and state institutions and in agreement with the Turkish government upon applications by the state institution.”

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The Turkish Prime Minister on Sunday said that a joint military offensive would be launched with Iran against Kurdish rebels. Kurdish fighters based in northern Iraq are a common enemy for both Tehran and Ankara; Turkey is fighting against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) on its south east border while Iran is battling The Party of Free Life of Kurdistan or PEJAK from Qandil. The Kurdish areas of Iraq are one of the most prosperous of the country. However, they are a source of tension for both Iran and Turkey who fear support for Kurdish uprisings from across the border

It is not clear whether joint Turkish-Iranian action involves a major land offensive being launched against the Kurdish rebels.

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Three people were killed and 15 were injured in a bomb blast in the Turkish capital of Ankara. The explosion took place on Tuesday, when a parked vehicle with an LPG fuel tank blew up. The explosion caused other automobiles in the vicinity to also catch fire and explode. Nearby shops were damaged due to the blast as well.

The Turkish Interior Minister İdris Naim Şahin told journalists the cause of the explosion was still uncertain, but suggested it could be a possible terrorist attack. According to reports, the vehicle was newly purchased and its official notary transfer to its new owner was incomplete.

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