Great Power Rivalry in the Middle East – What it means for South Asia?

Context

The New Cold War paradigm and great power rivalry framework is settling in and beginning to define international affairs. After Europe and Pacific, Middle East is emerging as another hotly contested theater between the global powers. While Ukraine has been consuming most of the media bandwidth, matters related to Iran’s nuclear program and Israeli-Palestinian conflict had taken more of a back seat. Nonetheless, after the War Against Terror, Ukraine has become the new pivot increasingly defining geopolitics, and meanwhile galvanizing NATO and EU.

President Biden’s visit to Israel and Palestinian territories in July, and then to Saudi Arabia, signaled that US aspires to reinvigorate its traditional ties with the Arab world – as it attempts to harness their support against Russia and China. And this was stated by none other than the President himself while speaking to the GCC during his visit to Saudi Arabia,

“We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia or Iran … We will seek to build on this moment with active, principled, American leadership.”

US withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, and from Afghanistan in 2021, gave the impression that America was no longer interested in the Middle East – a perception that was reinforced by mantras such as ‘Pivot to Asia’ used during the Obama administration (2009-2017). Moreover, Iran nuclear deal (also known as JCPOA) reached in July 2015 had greatly unnerved the Israelis and the Gulf States regarding the balance of power in the region and US intent.

After coming to power, one of the first nation visited by former president Trump in 2017 was Saudi Arabia. However, he withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018. During his tenure, US once again established cordial ties with Israel that have been damaged during the Obama presidency. One of the common themes that brought the Arabs and Israel closer has been the expanding influence of Iran in the region. Trump also applied maximum pressure on Iran. In a drone strike in January 2020, Iranian intelligence chief Qasem Soleimani was eliminated in Baghdad. On the other hand, Israel also kept the pressure on the country to stall its nuclear ambitions. The chief of Iran’s nuclear program, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, was assassinated in November 2020.

In parallel and on the diplomatic front, Trump administration worked towards improving ties between the Arabs and Israel, which culminated in Abraham Accords in August 2020. As a result, UAE, Bahrain, and subsequently Sudan and Morocco, also normalized ties with Israel. It was believed that Saudi Arabia will also soon follow, and according to some analysts, other key non-Arab nations, like Pakistan, are also being pressured towards this reorientation of the regional threat perception. The other key Muslim state, Turkey, already has normal ties with Israel.

Revitalized NATO

While Trump was exerting pressure on Iran, pulling out of the nuclear deal also alienated American European allies who had strived greatly to secure the deal. Moreover, not contributing enough towards NATO has also been a persistent source of tension between the US and its European allies. The Ukraine crisis has helped reverse this while attracting new aspirants, like Sweden and Finland, for NATO membership. Just before travelling to the Middle East, Biden was in Europe attending the NATO and G7 gatherings. One of the top-most agenda during the NATO meetings was to come up with a new concept that unites and define the NATO alliance for the future. NATO’s updated mission statement for the first time mentions Russia as the greatest threat and China-Russian alliance as a counter to its values.

While NATO looks to thwart Russia in Ukraine, Middle East represents the other flank. There is less consensus on how much time and resources it will take to achieve the goals in Ukraine and elsewhere. Disruption of supply chains and rising energy costs are some of the direct consequences of the conflict, including inflation, when nations were just beginning to come out of Covid-19 induced economic woes.

China- Russia and Middle East

China and Russia both have been extending their influence in the Middle East. The $400 billion China–Iran treaty signed in March 2021 must have been an ominous development from the perspective of the Gulf Arabs and the US. However, the talks have been proceeding for a while, as has been the ‘Outside-In Approach’ to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has become an active player in the Middle East with strategic ties with a number of regional players, to include Saudi Arabia. As its influence increases gradually, it could become an active interlocutor between Israel and the Palestinians, and other conflicts of the Middle East. However, it’s not clear if China desires to get involved in the security affairs of the region, like Russia has in Syria – as far as the Middle East is concerned. Soon after Biden’s visit to the Middle East, Putin and Erdogan visited Iran and discussed the evolving situation in Syria, and allowing shipment of Ukrainian grain through the Black Sea. According to media reports, Khamenei called for long-term cooperation between Russia and Iran and to guard against ‘Western deception’.

Chinese analysts present a case the nation wants to be more involved in providing economic support than engaging in the security affairs of the Middle East. Nonetheless, it has good political and military relations with both Iran and Israel. As part of BRI, China has been extending its trade relations with Israel and lately US has objected strongly to some of them citing security concerns – such as the Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) running a container terminal at the Port of Haifa – near an Israeli naval base that is frequently visited by the US Sixth Fleet. The Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had warned Israel in 2019 to reduce its economic and security ties with China or risk reduced security cooperation from US.

If the China-Israeli economic ties are allowed to strengthen uninhibited, overtime China will be able to build leverages that can potentially undercut US primacy in the affairs of the Middle East. The Israelis disagree on this, stating the nature of its ties with China and the US are of totally different nature.

Conclusion

Thus, Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia represents a push to counter China and Russia and meanwhile providing continuity to the policy undertaken by Trump, which resulted in Abraham Accords. At the same time, engaging and supporting the Palestinian authorities, and reiterating that two-state solution remains the best way forward to resolving the conflict.

The fresh engagement also envisions a new security architecture for the region that some have called the Arab NATO. During the G7 meeting held in the Bavarian Alps, the leaders also announced the $600 billion Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment program, seen as an alternative to Chinese BRI.

With their energy resources UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, have also come to play an increasingly critical role when it comes to the affairs South Asia, most recently exhibited in Afghanistan. Then there are the expanding Indian ties with the Gulf nations that have overshadowed the traditional Pakistan’s influence. And this change has undercut the financial support from the region Pakistan had relied upon in the past. PoliTact had covered this shift in a joint event with the Middle East Institute in November 2018.

The reoriented US engagement with the Arab world will also have a profound impact on the affairs of South Asia – and the present political and economic turbulence in Pakistan could be the direct result of this flux in Middle East – and surge of great power tussles there.

The post What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply? appeared first on Politact.

Context

Donald Trump’s decision to nominate the CEO of ExxonMobil, Rex Tillerson, for the position of Secretary of State will have surprised Australians probably as much as anyone else. Whether it is good news or bad news for the Land Down Under is too early to tell, mainly because no one knows Tillerson’s positions on some of the key global issues which he will need to address if — and that’s a big if — he gets Senate confirmation.

However, one thing is definitely sure. Donald Trump’s election win has seriously rattled the foreign affairs and defense community in Australia. It has not only come as a shock but it got political leaders, opinion-makers, and academics pondering as to what this means for Australia.

Unfortunately, because foreign affairs was not a critical issue often debated in the presidential campaign, Australians have very little to rely on to assess what a Trump presidency will mean for the country and ANZUS, the 65-year-old alliance with the United States. Nevertheless, most commentators agree that a Trump administration means that things will not remain the same. The question is how much change will there be.

Analysis

US-Australia Alliance

Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull was the second world leader whom President-elect Trump called. Reportedly, the conversation went well. Turnbull stressed the importance of global free trade and that Trump should rethink his position about rejecting the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Unfortunately, Trump’s position on this issue and other trade agreements was a core and consistent policy position during his campaign, and all the good will toward Australia is not about to change this. The good news is that it is unlikely that a Trump administration will want to renegotiate the 2005 U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, as it very much benefits the United States.

Another thing which is almost certain is that Trump will be seeking to have America’s allies around the world contribute more financially to their defense. He has repeated this on a number of occasions on the campaign trail, whether talking about NATO members, South Korea, or Japan. And while he has not specifically singled out Australia on this issue, there will nevertheless likely be a lot of pressure on the Australian government to pull more of its military weight in the region. This will be despite the fact that Australia has excellent bilateral military relations with the United States.

However, in spite of this intimate and long-standing bilateral relationship, the election of Donald Trump has led to a soul-searching debate in Australia about the U.S.-Australia alliance and what it means for the country, particularly on the left of politics. Needless to say, Trump’s unique character and the unusual, outlandish, often offensive, and bizarre things which he said during the presidential campaign have not helped matters. Accordingly, the election of Trump has been grist to the mill of the chattering class which has regularly questioned Australia’s close foreign policy alignment with Washington.

It did not take long following the election of Trump for liberals, progressives, and other fellow ideological travelers to publicly question the alliance and advocate a more independent foreign policy. Yesterday’s political luminaries from the left-leaning Labor Party, such as former Prime Minister Paul Keating and former foreign ministers Gareth Evans and Bob Carr, have been busy advocating that Australia take a more independent line. Keating even went as far as to suggest that Australia “cut the tag” with American foreign policy.

While stressing the importance of continued American engagement in the region, Senator Penny Wong, spokesperson on foreign affairs for the opposition Labor Party, has been echoing the same sentiments, recommending that Australia have an independent foreign policy within the framework of the alliance. This is effectively advocating an à la carte commitment to the alliance: pick the good bits, and reject the not so good ones. I seriously doubt that such an approach would be acceptable to a Trump administration.

The governing conservative parties (the Liberal and National parties), on the other hand, have a less alarmist view of what a Trump administration could mean for Australia and the region. Turnbull was quite positive in his assessment of the Trump victory, stating that “he is a businessman, a deal maker, and he will, I have no doubt, view the world in a very practical and pragmatic way.” The Australian ambassador to the U.S., Joe Hockey,stresses that the Trump people “love Australia.”

Commentators like to refer to an article by two of Trump’s senior advisers on foreign affairs, Alexander Gray and Peter Navarro, to reassure wavering Australians that under a Trump administration the United States “would remain committed in the long-term to its traditional role as guarantor of the liberal order in Asia” and to its “commitment to America’s Asian alliances.” However, despite a campaign promise to increase the U.S. Navy to 350 ships, there is absolutely no guarantee that a President Trump would necessarily hold his ground against an aggressive China. In an interview with the Washington Post in March 2016, Trump said that he didn’t think the United States would go to war over the South China Sea. After all, he has clearly shown his isolationist tendencies, starting with his “America First” campaign slogan.

The Pivot To Asia Policy, China, And Implications For Australia

It would be too easy, but wrong, to compare a talk-tough Trump with President Ronald Reagan, who also spoke about having America respected again by the world and who succeeded another risk-adverse Democratic president. Reagan also significantly built up the Navy and stood up to the Soviet Union. However, the fundamental difference between these two periods is that the USSR by Reagan’s time was in decline and within 10 years had ceased to exist. China, on the other hand, is on the rise, and unless there is a sudden collapse of the ruling Communist party (unlikely), it will become more difficult to militarily counter Chinese aggressive behavior. The question that then arises is whether Washington’s will to stand up to China is greater than Beijing’s drive to contest the maritime space in the South China Sea (SCS) and elsewhere. And this is where Australians get nervous.

It will only be a matter of time before the Trump administration will request that Australia participate in joint Freedom of Navigation patrols in the SCS to challenge China’s 12 mile territorial waters claim around the controversial artificial islands it has created. Australia has been able to avoid participating in such patrols until now. But given Trump’s repeated statements about wanting to see U.S. allies pull their weight, Canberra will no longer be able to duck this one. It’s a decision policymakers would prefer not to have to make. It’s made that much more difficult because of the uncertainly as to how committed would Trump really be in staying in the region. But probably even more important in the decision-making equation is what impact would this have on Australia’s trade with China, which is the destination of 35 percent of Australia’s exports.

Notwithstanding the potential danger of retaliation by the Chinese against Australia’s exports, there is a strong argument to be made for Australia to participate in joint patrols with the United States. Not only would this confirm Canberra’s commitment to the alliance, it would also demonstrate that Australia firmly believes in the principles of freedom of navigation and the rule of law. Moreover, it would reassure the countries of the region that Australia actually stands by its principles and that it can be counted on for military support. Hopefully, this would reduce the risk of countries deciding to switch to China, as the Philippines effectively did recently.

While there is no question of abandoning — at least for the moment — the alliance with the United States and turning to China instead, this very public conversation questioning the value of the U.S. alliance would be very sweet music to the ears of the Communist leaders in Beijing. The more dissent they can cause in the Western camp the better it is for them, and all this without firing a single shot. The Chinese must think they are on a winning streak.

All in all, if to ensure Americans do not withdraw from the region means spending a bit more on defense, then this is a price Australians and other countries in the region should be ready to pay. The consequences of an American drawdown or the ripping up of the alliance, as some more extreme Australian voices advocate, would have far-reaching financial consequences for the Australian treasury. The Australian government would have to double its present commitment of 2 percent of GNP to defense spending to compensate for the loss of American military cover. This would mean other important socioeconomic programs would need to be significantly cut. And this may be a bridge too far, even for some of the more independently-inclined and China-friendly Australians.

This article originally appeared in The Diplomat.

The post The Impact Of Trump’s Victory On US-Australia Alliance, Pivot To Asia appeared first on Politact.

Context

by Dr Claude Rakisits

Following Senator Ted Cruz’s much expected defeat of Donald Trump in the 5 April Wisconsin primary, Trump’s goal of winning the majority of delegates by the time the Republican Party holds its convention in July has now become even more elusive. Although the odds of becoming his party’s presidential candidate are against him, it’s still possible that he could receive the nomination even if he doesn’t win in the first ballot. He is, after all, a great ‘deal-maker’ as he keeps reminding everyone.

Accordingly, it’s important to examine Donald Trump’s views of some of the critical international issues he would need to deal with were he to get to the Oval Office. And, quite frankly, based on the few statements on foreign affairs he’s made on the campaign trail, most of them incoherent and unfocused, there’s little to feel confident about. Quite the contrary; were Trump to implement some of his convoluted and confused ideas on foreign affairs, the world would undoubtedly be a more dangerous place.

Let’s look at some of the remarks he’s made on foreign policy, particularly on three issues that would have deep ramifications for the Asia Pacific region and Middle East.

Analysis

Dealing with China

In a wide-ranging interview with The Washington Post in March, Trump was asked what he thought about China’s aggressive behavior in the South China Sea and how he would deal with the situation. He argued that the best way to halt China’s militarization of the artificial islands would be to threaten its access to the US market. He repeated that threat in another long interview with The New York Times.

While China does hold some $4 trillion of US reserves, in the long-run China’s access to the US market is critical for its continued economic growth which is heavily dependent on being able to export its cheap products. But more importantly, continued economic growth is vital to the survival of the Chinese Communist Party. So if such a measure were implemented by a Trump administration, it’s unlikely that Beijing would simply roll over. Furthermore, the financial knock-on effects for the rest of the world of a trade showdown between its two largest economies would be enormous.

US Military Ties with South Korea and Japan

Staying in the Asia Pacific, Trump has repeatedly stated that he doesn’t believe the US gains anything by having bases in South Korea and Japan. Accordingly, he said that he would pull US forces from the two countries unless the host governments ‘substantially increased their contributions to the costs of housing and feeding those troops.

Scaling back the US military’s presence in such a manner would be welcomed heartily by Beijing, as those bases are the linchpin of American primacy in Northeast Asia. It would also ring alarm bells with America’s edgy regional allies and friends who are already worried about Washington’s commitment to the rebalance. It would force regional countries to increase their defense spending to compensate for the US withdrawal. But, more worrisome, it would most likely make regional allies less supportive of America’s approach to the region which would in make it easier for China to assert itself in the Asia Pacific.

However, much more alarming than the military vacuum which an American departure from Northeast Asia would create is Trumps statement that he would be open to allowing Japan and South Korea to build their own nuclear arsenals rather than depend on the American nuclear umbrella.

Such a dangerous policy position goes against the many international agreements and protocols designed to limit nuclear weapons proliferation. If such a position became official policy in a Trump administration, it isn’t possible to sufficiently stress how destabilizing it would be to have two additional nuclear-armed countries in an already highly toxic and dangerous environment as is Northeast Asia. Moreover, it would give the green light for other countries to develop their own nuclear weapons, essentially beginning an Asia Pacific arms race.

Dealing with the Middle East

Turning to the Middle East, Trump has also indicated that because the US is now less dependent on Middle Eastern oil than it was before, there’s less reason for US troops to remain there. As with a withdrawal from bases in Northeast Asia, a US military withdrawal from the Gulf the US 5th Fleet is based in Bahrain would be a strategic disaster. Another military vacuum would be created, making it more difficult for the US to protect its allies, including Israel, and its vital strategic interests in the region.

With the Americans gone, Iran would easily fill the vacuum and further expand its presence in the wider Middle East. Already Iran is playing a destabilizing role by supporting militarily the al-Assad regime in Syria, backing its ally Hezbollah in Lebanon, and having a major influence on the Iraqi government. With an American withdrawal, the Iranians now free of the sanctions shackles would feel emboldened to press their presence even more, making the Saudis and the other Gulf states very nervous indeed. And it would give the already restive Shiite population in the Gulf countries a boost in confidence in their opposition to the Sunni-dominated Gulf governments. That would mean bad news for the stability of the Middle East.

So in the unlikely event that Trump wins the Republican Party nomination and, even more improbably, goes on to win the general election in November, we could expect radical changes to the White House’s approach to some of the more pressing foreign affairs issues. For all intents and purposes, Trump wants to rip up the post-WWII international order but without suggesting an alternative to replace it.

In that regard, he’s effectively a crypto-anarchist disguised as an isolationist. Fortunately Congress would be there to block or dilute any ill-considered foreign affairs decisions by President Trump. However, that isn’t the way for a superpower to run an effective foreign policy. On the contrary, such a scenario would undoubtedly be exploited by China and Russia, which could only mean bad news for global stability.

A version of this article also appeared in the blog for Australian Strategic Policy Institute, The Strategist.

The post American Elections: Trump’s Dangerous Foreign Policy Outlook appeared first on Politact.

Context

By Kulsoom Belal

This article is part of PoliTact’s recently launched initiative to look at the events of the Pacific region from the vantage point of South Asia. In order to do this, one has to also study where South Asia belongs in the larger strategy of major international powers. Under this theme, various political, security and economic implications of the events of the wider region will be explored.

At one level, there is a need to understand how the recently announced China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) fits in the larger Chinese One Belt One Road (OBOR) vision. Since the announcement of OBOR strategy, a considerable number of countries, around 65, have signed up already.

At another level, there is the question of how OBOR and CPEC compare to the American New Silk Road architecture for South and Central Asia and the Indian ‘Act East’ and ‘Connect Central Asia’ policy. Then there is the US-India ‘Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean’ that is exploring the leverage offered by connecting the Indo-Pacific region with the Asia-Pacific, such as through the associated Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor (IPEC).

In this context, a number of questions are raised, are these different visions complementary or contradictory. Moreover, what would the US and Chinese strategic considerations mean for South Asia in good and bad case scenarios.

Equally important is the distinction between land and sea access. A Chinese White Paper released in May highlights its military strategy and has added emphasis on access and protection of sea routes. The paper states, “the traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned.” The document adds that China will develop “a modern maritime military force structure commensurate with its national security and development interests [and] safeguard its national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.”

Both US and China have publicly claimed these are complementary visions. For example, in South and Central Asia, US is promoting interoperability by helping to streamline customs, transit, and taxation policies of various states and this will certainly help the Chinese. However, US is faced with its own strategic imperatives as it implements the Pivot to Asia strategy. If it allows the present trajectory of China, it could reconfigure the balance of power in the region in a way that may not be favorable towards the US.

Then there is the question of how Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) are likely to play out in contrast to what BRICS is attempting to shape via institutions like Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). These are immensely intricate agreements, but are seen as giving advantage to one or the other player.

Moreover, in July India and Pakistan both have acquired full membership of the China and Russian dominated SCO, which has added another layer of complexity to the ongoing economic and security balancing act in the region.

In retrospect, the shape of present day trade and economic corridors were largely shaped by geographical proximity, historical linkages, and political realties. As a rising power with energy needs, China intends to realign them in its favor. And when one does that, it has the potential to unveil immense economic opportunities and security risks that previously did not exist.
In a series of articles we will discern, synthesize and interpret the above laid out dynamics. In part one, the attempt is to understand the OBOR vision and how CPEC fits in it.

ANALYSIS

China’s One Belt One Road Vision

When laying out the master plan for OBOR, China must be grappling with two strategic considerations. One, what would a potential future conflict with US, or more generally with the West, mean for its security and economic interests. Second, how it would secure the energy needs if the strategic sea pathways, through which much of its present day trade passes, were to become unstable. These worries are not unique to China alone, every major international actor is attempting to find their respective answers to these growing risks.
In view of these strategic considerations, China’s OBOR and its various tributaries, appear to provide alternative routes for the sustenance of its trade and the steady supply of energy needs to maintain its growth.

OBOR is a combination of two routes; the New Silk Road Economic Belt will run westward overland through Central Asia and onward to Europe. The second route, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR), will run south and westward through sea to Europe, with stops in South East Asia, South Asia and Africa.

Under the auspices of OBOR, at least six arteries are being developed, with CPEC being one of them:

1. The China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridor will be built with China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region as its starting point
2. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will be built to connect the ports of Pakistan’s Gwadar with Xinjiang’s Kashi
3. The northern China-Mongolia-Russia Land Corridor will connect Russia to China and starts from the Chinese province of Heilongjiang, and
4. The south running China-India-Bangladesh-Myanmar Corridor (BCIM), will be built with Kolkata as its starting point
5. The Indochina Peninsula Corridor
6. The New Eurasian Land Bridge, running from central China to Europe via Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus

OBOR will allow China to consolidate its access to Eurasia, Central Asia, South East and East Asia, including Africa. More significantly, it will help its penetration in to the maritime regions, especially the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Sea. These regions are estimated to include 4.4 billion people, constituting 63 percent of the world population, and US $2.1 trillion in gross production that makes up 29 % of the world GDP.

China’s trade with the US and the Western Europe, its traditional markets, has seemed to stagnate. Considering this, OBOR will provide lucrative opportunities for China, expanding its trade with the littoral and inland states. According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, China’s bilateral trade with countries along the Silk Road aggregated to 26 percent of China’s total in the first quarter of 2015.

CPEC in Relation To China’s One Belt One Road

Thus, it is clear that while CPEC is just one of the tributaries of the Chinese OBOR vision, it is perhaps the most important one. Ideally, China would desire all of the corridors to operate as envisioned. However, the success of each strategic passage is dependent on mitigating several key security risks.

The Gwadar Port situated very close to the Strait of Hormuz, will allow China the shortest access to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. Moreover, it will provide an alternative route to the conflict prone and crowded Malacca Strait, sandwiched between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Obviously this carries economic and security implications.

Writing in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in June, PoliTact’s strategist Claude Rakisits pointed out:

“However, in geostrategic terms the success of CPEC would not be good news for the US: it would displace the US as Pakistan’s major external patron in favor of China. Most importantly, it would provide China with a firm and reliable long-term beachhead in the Indian Ocean close to the Persian Gulf, effectively making China a two-ocean power. This would be a red rag to India.”

Thus if tensions between India and China, and matters related to the South China Sea, were to escalate, the BCIM strategic corridor is likely to become nonfunctional. In this case, CPEC would take on an added emphasis.

Then there are concerns regarding the stability of Middle East. The Middle East reigns as China’s largest supply of oil and energy: sixty percent of China’s oil comes from the Middle East, of which eighty percent originate in the Persian Gulf. These supplies travel from the Strait of Hormuz to Strait of Malacca, curling through the Indian Ocean and reaching China while passing through South China Sea, East China Sea and the Yellow Sea.

However, if the situation of Middle East continues to deteriorate due to extremism and continuing worries regarding Iran’s nuclear program, it is possible that the Strait of Hormuz itself becomes quite insecure. It is perhaps this assessment that led to the Russia-China $400 billion 30-year gas deal in May.

Where Does CPEC Fit In Pakistan’s Calculus?

While there is the tangent of how CPEC corresponds to the overall Chinese OBOR vision, the other angle has to do with the strategic importance of the economic corridor for Pakistan. Equally critical is how the Arab world and Central Asia would balance the various forces at play.

In a letter released at the opening ceremony of China-Arab expo 2015 on September 10, 2010, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated, “China and the Arab States are good friends with mutual trust, as well as good partners in seeking common prosperity,” adding that the Arab States have been reacting actively to his Belt and Road Initiative.

On the other hand, the potential mainstreaming of Iran as a result of the nuclear deal has created a new variable. Iran’s initial backing of Pakistan and Chinese supported peace talks in Afghanistan must be of concern to India.
These aspects, along with those described above, will be explored further in the upcoming articles.

About the Author

Kulsoom Belal is a South Asia and Asia Pacific (SAAP) Fellow at PoliTact.
Her research focus includes the impact of cruise missiles on South Asian ‘strategic stability’ and ‘stability-instability paradox’; military doctrines in South Asia, and is currently monitoring Iran for a think tank based in Islamabad. Her M Phil dissertation concentrated on US-China-India strategic triangle in the Asia Pacific and its implications for Pakistan’s Nuclear Deterrence.

The post What Does The Chinese One Belt One Road, American Pacific Pivot Imply For South Asia? appeared first on Politact.

While the world attention is focused on Gaza and the seemingly slow undoing of Middle East, another crisis is looming on the horizon. This one has to do with Afghanistan. On his visit to Afghanistan in June, US Secretary of State John Kerry had helped reach an interim agreement, stipulating the recount of all votes, and temporarily raised hopes. Now he is back again to keep the momentum going. Just like in Iraq and Palestine, ‘unity government’ and ‘power sharing’ are also the buzzwords in Afghanistan. With so much polarization, such a set up provides the best hope.

Meanwhile, assessments continue if the Afghan army is ready for the difficult task at hand and the nerves are running high in the aftermath of the Iraq debacle. More and more the reviews are turning bleak. The death of Maj. General Harold Greene in a insider attack this week has once again raised questions about US Afghan strategy.

US policy circles continue to debate the strategic goals for the mission in Afghanistan and if that requires a quick draw down or preservation of what has been achieved so far. With the political and security transition at risk in Afghanistan, high-level diplomatic exchanges have also taken place between US and Pakistan. However, it was the appointment of the Chinese special envoy, Sun Yuxi, for Afghanistan, which was especially noteworthy. As China gets more interested in Afghanistan, it will be watching closely how the Pivot to Asia is evolving, and the Indian role in it.

Analysis

The Good and Bad Taliban

The diplomatic exchanges between Pakistan and US had a lot to do with the long awaited North Waziristan operation, and the accompanied policy change related to Good and Bad Taliban. On the US side, there remains a concern that Pakistan’s military operation has not targeted the Haqqani network, and for the most part its members may have escaped unharmed across the border.

From Pakistan’s side, there has been a strong negation of this viewpoint. The country maintains that it is now going after all brands of extremists. To amply convey its perspective, Pakistan sent its Special Assistant to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs, Tariq Fatemi, to Washington.

Without equal pressure from the Afghan side of the border, most extremists were likely to take refuge there, as has occurred in the past when Pakistan has conducted military operations. As they do, they become someone else’s headache, not Pakistan’s. This approach, however, does include the risk of continued cross border raids in to Pakistan from the Afghan side.

From what one can gather, Pakistan’s emerging strategy is premised on reestablishing its writ over FATA. Due to the unfolding situation of Afghanistan and Middle East, Pakistan finally seems to see the dangerous ramifications of the spreading influence of the non-state actors. If it is ready to revise the policy towards Good Taliban, is another mater.

The US Perspective

While Tariq Fatemi was in Washington, the retiring US Special Representative for Afghanistan Pakistan, James Dobbins was making rounds in the region and also met with senior military officials in Pakistan. He was probably gauging how much unity exists between Pakistan’s civilian and military officials on this significant policy change.

Judging from the joint statement that came out during the visit of John Kerry to India while attending the US-India strategic dialogue, Dobbins agenda with Pakistan may have also included a discussion on the nations posture towards Punjabi or India oriented jihadists (LeT).

China and India

As the Afghan situation becomes more uncertain, China and India are also worried; they both have security and economic interests at stake. While China appointed a special representative for the region, India has indicated it will buy arms from Russia to supply to Afghanistan. The country is also involved in training Afghan security forces, a concern for Pakistan. As a result of the crisis in Ukraine, it would be interesting to see how the Russian position evolves towards Afghanistan.

In a recent discussion on a blog linked to the Council on Foreign Relations, the Chinese involvement was portrayed in a positive light. However, it would be naïve to think that Chinese involvement in Afghanistan is singularly focused on extremism. How the Chinese move correlates with the ‘Pivot to Asia’ needs to be factored in as well. While the Pacific is the home sphere of influence, South and Central Asia represent the other flanks for China as it strives to secure its energy and trade routes.

If India were to become active in the pivot strategy, there is no doubt its security footprint in Afghanistan will not be taken lightly by China. In such a case, India will likely come under considerable pressure for acting as a strategic partner to the West, while at the same time remain a member of the BRICS.

The post Indian, Chinese Anxiety Grow Over Afghanistan appeared first on Politact.

Context
August – November 2015

As we approach the end of the year, the pace of unprecedented global change is in no way easing. While the Iran nuclear deal was a remarkable achievement, it was accompanied by two hypotheses: will the agreement bolster Iran to exert even more influence in the region, or would it have to adjust its behavior after being mainstreamed.

This debate has now been marred by the Russian actions in the Middle East. As compared to Iran, it is Russia that seems to have been more emboldened. While the West may have hoped to pull Iran in to its orbit with the signing of the deal, Russia seems to have preempted that prospect by forming its own alliance to tackle Daesh, and now the debate is more about Russian intentions.

As noted in the July newsletter, the present stage of the war against extremism has gotten immensely complicated; it has gotten intertwined with the tussles of regional and global balance of power. In Syria, the stated position of Russia is to fight Daesh, which is a goal it shares with NATO and the regional states. The question is why would it be willing to risk getting military involved in Syria if NATO led alliance was already working on that goal?

Alarmingly, NATO and Russia have been slowly moving towards a collision course in Syria. The Russians are increasing their support for pro-regime forces while US and Arab allies are doing the same for those opposing. The interjection of limited number of US Special Operations forces, albeit in advisory role, has further heightened the risks of confrontation.

Just as the events of Ukraine and Crimea reset the geopolitics of Europe, Russian military involvement has altered the dynamics of the Middle East and North Africa. However, the tragic terror attack in Paris on November 13 will increase pressure on Russia to change its focus away from sustaining the Assad government and focus on fighting Daesh. In this context, the agreement reached in Vienna over an 18-month transition plan for Syria is a positive development.

In order to make our strategic insights and queries more accessible, we have summarized them below. These were developed as a result of various analyses and media discussions described later in this forecast.

Analysis

Russia and China

• Why is Russia willing to risk getting military involved in Syria and Middle East if NATO led alliance was already working on the objective of fighting the extremist?

• The tragic terror attack in Paris on November 13 will increase pressure on Russia to change its focus away from sustaining the Assad government and focus on fighting Daesh.

• One theory for why Russia intervened in Ukraine is that NATO was impinging on its home sphere of influence, known as the Near Abroad. On the other hand, in addition to countering the extremists in Syria, the fall of government there would have represented a loss of a key ally and footprint in the Middle East.

Will the same logic also apply to China’s future behavior, as US enhances its political, economic, and security presence in the Pacific? Will this pressure China to flex some muscle, as much as it does not want to, just as Russia had to in Syria?

Afghanistan, Pakistan, India

• In the absence of progress in Afghan political solution, and the presence of threats directed against Pakistan from that direction, pressures are likely to mount on the nation to shift from the posture of Force Protection and towards Force Projection, one without the other makes no sense.

This increases the risk of Afghanistan becoming the Syria of South and Central Asia, especially if there is no progress towards reconciliation, India grows its security footprint in Afghanistan, and Deash continues to make in roads.

• To protect national interests and state sovereignty, international appetite for cross border interventions is growing, and in this, the utility of Good Non-State Actors is increasing – to challenge the likes of Daesh and Al Qaeda.

• During the recent visit of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to the US, some reports on Pakistan’s nuclear program projected a perception that the concern has to do with the safety of its nuclear program, in fact it is the unease surrounding the increasing capability of Pakistan nuclear weapons program; the growing number of tactical weapons and ranges of its nuclear capable missiles. This attention may also be an effort to create a pressure point on Pakistan, especially in relation to Afghanistan.

United States and NATO

Since 911 the debate has continued about the US mission, right strategy, and how much resources would be needed to accomplish it. Then there are questions regarding the war authorization as the threat has morphed from Al Qaeda to Al Qaeda and Associates, and now to Daesh.

The regional allies, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq, are proving incapable to halt the extremist onslaught on their own; the downing of Russian plane over Sinai and the Paris attack will raise the voices for the return of ground troops, and complicate the foreign policy quandary as the American elections approach.

Change in the Middle East

• In the Islamic world, a unique dynamics is emerging. The core Islamic nations represented by the Sunni Arab world, are attempting to strengthen their alliance with the US and NATO. This is particularly true as Russia encroaches with the coalition of its own in the region, characterized by the Shia governments of Iran, Syria and Iraq.

On the other hand, Chinese and Russian influence is ressurging in the periphery, represented by the Islamic nations of South and Central Asia and the Pacific. Pakistan is furthering its strategic ties with China and Russia, while India is building on its alliance with the US. Meanwhile, the future of Afghanistan hangs in balance.

US Politics, Elections, Authorization for the War Against Daesh

As noted above, the Russian actions in Syria have raised questions regarding the US Middle East policy and strategy to counter Daesh. The US response is being closely watched by both allies and adversaries, especially China. Consequently, we are likely to see more assertive US activity in the Pacific region, to avoid the development of any incorrect impression. Meanwhile, the US Sunni Arab allies are not very happy about what they are seeing in Syria, and particularly in the aftermath of the Iran nuclear deal. The news about the Russian cooperation with the French in the aftermath of the Paris attack will further heighten concerns.

Then there are questions regarding the US strategy, war authorization, election cycles, and its fiscal health. In the aftermath of 9/11, US got militarily involved in Afghanistan and then Iraq. Since then the debate has continued about the mission, the right strategy, and how much resources would be needed to accomplish it. These discussions took place in the backdrop of major economic crisis that got underway around 2007. One of the main foreign policy goal of President Obama to bring the troops back home from Afghanistan and Iraq, has not only proved to be elusive, but lately has reversed altogether.

Dr Claude wrote two articles covering this dynamics in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute:

• The War Against ISIS That No One In US Wants To Hear About

• Russia, Syria and America’s feeble response

The regional allies, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq, are proving incapable to halt the extremist threat on their own; the downing of Russian plane over Sinai and the Paris attack will raise the voices for the return of ground troops and complicate the foreign policy quandary as the American elections approach. The expanding war theater, and the emergence of Daesh, has meant that US and NATO are being compelled to reinforce their military presence in the region. Meanwhile, as the situation in the Middle East worsens, the European refugee crisis is also getting dire, creating unique security and economic challenges.

PoliTact’s South Asia and Middle East Fellow, Abdullah Khurram, wrote a special report covering the dynamics of Western Balkans after a trip to the region in July. He interacted with a number of Balkan based centers of intellectual thinking especially in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia and Albania. These discussions helped develop five key areas that can help the Balkan nations deal with their domestic and international challenges. Here is the link:

• A 5-Point Agenda For The Western Balkans

Russia, China, and South Asia

The resurgence of Russia in global affairs is obvious, and perhaps desired by the West when it comes to countering extremism. This fact is not lost on South Asia where Pakistan is increasing its military cooperation with Russia, with great dismay of India. On the other hand, the Chinese participation in the Afghan peace process is maturing. The temporary fall of Kunduz to Taliban in September has raised the stakes for the Central Asian states, China, and Russia. Moreover, the Taliban attack on Badhaber camp, located near Peshawar, once again reminded Pakistan of the risks involved in the continuing Afghan instability.

The predicament for Pakistan is not much different than what the Saudi’s confront in neighboring Yemen, and that Turkey faces on its border with Syria. In the absence of progress in Afghan political solution, and the presence of threats directed against it from that direction, pressures are likely to mount on Pakistan to shift from the posture of Force Protection and towards Force Projection, one without the other makes no sense.

The challenge is that India is also looking at its defense posture towards Pakistan with a similar premise. This, after all, is the very principle under which the West has fought the war against terror. In our July newsletter, we had pointed out to the growing international appetite for cross border interventions to protect national interests and state sovereignty, and in this, the utility of Good Non-State Actors is growing.

Like Saudi Arabia and Turkey, Pakistan would continue to fight AQ and any Daesh elements, but would mount greater pressure on local extremists and insurgents that threaten its sovereignty, and are likely getting support from external actors.

One theory for why Russia intervened in Ukraine is that NATO was impinging on its home sphere of influence, called Near Abroad. On the other hand, in addition to countering the extremists in Syria, the fall of government there would have represented a loss of a key ally and footprint in the Middle East.

Will the same logic also apply to China’s future behavior as US enhances its political, economic, and security presence in the Pacific? Will this inadvertently pressure China to flex some muscle, as much as it does not want to, just as Russia had to in Syria? This makes the Pacific, including the Central Asia region, the next hot spots.

PoliTact’s Asia Pacific Initiative

This realization has led us to launch a special initiative, to assess what the economic and security events of the Pacific will imply for South Asia and Middle East. For example, the signing of the US backed Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement in October represented a significant milestone. However, little is understood about its impact on South Asia and Middle East.

As part of this initiative, we have produced following special reports:

• PoliTact’s director for strategic initiatives, Dr Claude Rakisits, wrote in the fall edition of World Affairs Journal: A Path to the Sea; China’s Pakistan Plan

• PoliTact’s South Asia and Asia Pacific Fellow, Kulsoom Belal, wrote a piece evaluating the Chinese and American vision for regional connectivity: What Does The Chinese One Belt One Road, American Pacific Pivot Imply For South Asia? A version of this report also appeared in Defense Journal, Pakistan.

• Dr Claude covered the September Xi-Obama Summit in an article published in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute: What to Make of Xi-Obama Washington Summit?

He noted: “So while there are areas where China and the US can work together, strategic competition between the two nations is real and is more than likely to become nasty down the road. The recent Xi–Obama summit has done nothing to dispel this perception.”

• Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat from our affiliate Gulf State Analytics covered China’s growing strategic partnership with UAE: The UAE, China Growing Strategic Partnership

“Throughout the 21st century, China’s ties with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have strengthened in various domains. China and the UAE’s growing relationship is a case in point. Since Beijing and Abu Dhabi established a diplomatic partnership in 1984, China and the UAE have become major economic partners and the bilateral relationship is well poised to flourish in the future.”

US Pakistan Relations, Afghanistan, India

The US Pakistan relations will evolve in the above laid out context. The direction of US-China ties, including the US-India security and economic cooperation, will be the important determinant of the shape of US-Pakistan ties. The Indian direct defense and security involvement in Afghanistan will likely aggravate the situation and add pressure on Pakistan to adopt an overt force projection posture, as described above. All of this increases the risk of Afghanistan becoming the Syria of South and Central Asia, especially if there is no progress towards a political solution and Deash continues to make in roads.

The Afghan situation is reaching a breaking point. Clearly, the talking and fighting cannot continue indefinitely. Since 9/11, the application of military force has been able to eliminate the AQ leadership, but has failed to weaken the Afghan Taliban. The presence of safe havens in Pakistan may have helped the sustainability of Afghan Taliban, however, no insurgency can survive without local resonance and support.

One of the foremost agenda item during the meeting of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and President Obama was the process of Afghan reconciliation and Pakistan’s role in the new alliance against Daesh, which the US is assembling. In addition, US once again raised the issue of targeting Haqqani Network and Lashkar-e-Tayiba. Pakistan, on the other hand, highlighted the Kashmir conflict and the security concerns arising from Indian military practicing its Cold Start doctrine, accompanied by threatening political messages.

A considerable amount of media hype focused on Pakistan’s nuclear program just before Nawaz Sharif’s visit, as it is now as General Raheel visits Washington. Some reports projected a perception that it has more to do with the safety of its nuclear program, in fact it is the unease surrounding the increasing capability of Pakistan nuclear weapons program; the growing number of tactical weapons and ranges of its nuclear capable missiles. This attention may also be an effort to create a pressure point on Pakistan, especially in relation to Afghanistan.

This was one of suggestion of the Atlantic Council report, released in October, to pressure Pakistan in de-operationalizing the Haqqani Network. The report was endorsed by a mix of senior serving and retired US officials and stated: “We further recommend the development of a multinational effort to engage Pakistan in support of this objective, backed by incentives, disincentives, and sharing of intelligence.”

These topics were debated in a number of media discussions covering the US visit of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif last month:

• Arif Ansar took part in a special VOA TV program on the visit of PM Nawaz Sharif to US. The guests included Defense Analyst Ikram Sehgal. Watch here.

• Arif Ansar shared his insights on a News ONE, VOA TV Special transmission on 22nd October 2015, as President Obama met PM Nawaz Sharif. Program was carried live from Washington DC and Karachi. (Part 1). Watch here.

• Rahman Bunairee of VOA Dewa interviewed Arif Ansar on Obama and Sharif meeting (In Pashto). Watch here.

The Changing Middle East

As different nations recalibrate their alignments vis-à-vis the emerging economic and security blocks of BRICS and SCO, the GCC Sunni nations have moved closer to the NATO and US, at least on Syria. In the Islamic world, a unique dynamics is emerging.

The core Islamic nations represented by the Sunni Arab world, are attempting to strengthen their alliance with the US and NATO. This is particularly true as Russia encroaches with the coalition of its own in the region, characterized by the Shia governments of Iran, Syria and Iraq.

On the other hand, Chinese and Russian influence is resurging in the peripheral Islamic nations of South and Central Asia and the Pacific. Pakistan is furthering its strategic ties to China and Russia, while India is building on its alliance with the US. Meanwhile, the future of Afghanistan hangs in balance.

These evolving postures are difficult to comprehend without a deep sense of history and how the matters have evolved in these regions during the last two centuries. These assessments, and their conclusions, are very much on the minds of different players as they decide on which nexus to tilt towards as the balance of power transitions.

The shape of the balance of power in the Middle East will create unique challenges for the peripheral nations, as it did, when Saudi Arabia sought Pakistan’s military assistance for its operation in Yemen, and to counter Iranian backed Houthis.

To prevent further deterioration of affairs along these lines would first require détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Secondly, it would necessitate that core and peripheral nations not get used against one another, in a manner that lead to the break up of the Ottoman Empire.

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